Third Part

ACTIONS

145

While not exhaustive, this part is the longest of the report. It shows the number and 

diversity of actions undertaken by the Party-State as a part of its influence operations 

abroad. They can be classified into two approaches: Beijing attempts to seduce and 

subjugate while, at the same time, infiltrate and coerce. These two categories are rel-

evant for analysis and to understand that Chinese influence operations stand on two legs. 

Yet, these two categories are often difficult to distinguish in practice; they are far from 

mutually exclusive. For example, language and culture are an integral part of the Party’s 

seduction efforts, but education in the Confucius Institutes, pressures exerted on the film 

industry and on museum are also methods of infiltration and coercion. As such, the dis-

tinction we made is debatable and could have been different. More important than the exact 

categorization of methods, as many overlap, is to acknowledge the extraordinary diversity 

of methods Beijing uses to seduce, subjugate, infiltrate, and coerce.

At first glance, these two approaches are complimentary. In practice, however, the sec-

ond has clearly become the dominant approach in recent years. This reality is reflected in 

the imbalance between the two chapters of this section, the latter being fifteen times lon-

ger than the former. This parallels the widespread and globally-shared representation that 

China is becoming increasingly aggressive. Beijing’s seduction efforts have not ceased, but 

the Party now uses coercion in a systematic and uninhibited manner. We will address this 

choice, which may prove counter-productive, in the conclusion (→ p. 638). 

147

Chapter 1

SEDUCE AND SUBJUGATE

The first type of political warfare strategy enacted by the CCP is to seduce for-

eign populations. Not unlike the United Front, which aims to eliminate Party enemies 

by rallying them to its cause, this strategy is built on a positive historical narrative on 

China, an ameliorative story-telling of its past and present successes. These narratives 

intend to spark sympathy, if not adhesion, to China and its political goals. In certain cases, 

they can lead to a complete subjugation (from the Latin jugare which means “attach”) of 

the targets of these operations of seduction. Fabrice de Pierrebourg and Michel Juneau-

Katsuya explained that “what Chinese strategists understood long ago is that influence is 

far more efficient than control. Ultimately, control is the end result of strategically 

deployed influence. Rather than launching a frontal attack to gain control over an oppo-

nent, it is better to be strategic and patient in order to gain influence over them. […] To do 

so, silver-tongued emissaries will initially dangle the benefits of a good relationship, notably 

lucrative economic markets and privileged partnerships.”1

The following section will demonstrate the Chinese seduction strategy through four 

easily identifiable narratives that highlight intrinsically Chinese qualities, values, or 

achievements. They are the “Chinese model,” tradition, benevolence, and power. 

These narratives can aim to build a positive image of China (positive strategies2) or to “rec-

tify” erroneous representations on China by debunking negative narratives like the Chinese 

threat theory. As demanded by Xi Jinping, it is primordial to “tell China’s story well and let 

China’s voice be heard.”3 Not all of these narratives are intended for the same audi-

ence, and specific channels target different groups. Some target entire populations and 

other specific groups within a population (the Chinese diaspora, the journalist or academic 

community, etc.). On rare occasions, these narratives may target one person (a politician, 

for instance), or a small number of people.

1. Fabrice de Pierrebourg and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Ces espions venus d’ailleurs. Enquête sur les activités d’espionnage au 

Canada, Montréal, Stanké, 2009, 149. All subsequent quotes from this book were translated from the French version, 

none withstanding the English version published by Harpercollins Canada in 2009.

2. James Pamment, Howard Nothhaft, Henrik Agardh-Twetman, and Alicia Fjällhed, “Countering Information 

Influence Activities: The State of the Art,” Lund University (Jul. 2018).

3. “Raconter correctement l’histoire chinoise et faire entendre la voix de la Chine” (“Telling the Chinese history and 

make China’s voice heard”), China.org (5 Dec. 2018), https://archive.vn/ykA7e.

148

I. The “Chinese model”

China’s seduction strategy relies on the model it implicitly offers to the world, an alter-

native to the liberal democracy. The attractiveness of this model rests primordially on 

a spectacular economic growth,4 an alleged political and administrative efficiency 

(a “Chinese way” of operating that is supposedly more efficient than the endless palavers 

of democracies – illustrated by the lightning fast, though controversial, construction of 

hospitals in China to deal with Covid-19 patients), and a political system based on mer-

itocracy and the wisdom of its leaders rather than on elections.5 

During a congressional hearing, in March 2020,6 Daniel Tobin noted that the CCP should 

not be considered a “reactive, defensive, and besieged” archaic organization that is on the 

defensive trying to hold together the relics of a communist heritage, and slowly dissipating 

after the fall of the Eastern bloc, as it develops a modern capitalist economy. In fact, the 

Party’s approach reveals revisionist ambitions. Beyond remaining in power, it seeks to 

reconfigure the international order to fit Chinese norms, values, and institutions. It 

is on the basis of this literature, as well as the memoirs of party leaders, that Rush Doshi 

shows that China is indeed endowed with global ambitions constituting a true grand strat-

egy.7 Jean-Pierre Cabestan notes that China has become the most important revisionist 

power in the world.8 This is significantly different from the Kremlin’s approach, explained 

Jean-Maurice Ripert, who served as ambassador of France in both countries. He noted that 

“China does not believe itself beholden to human rights standards, as defined by the UN’s 

1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It advocates for ‘Chinese values’ instead. 

Russia, on the other hand, pretends to uphold human rights.”9 “China wants to impose 

an alternative international order that can be defined as ‘multi-bilateralism.’ In a word, like 

a bicycle wheel, it presents the states act as spokes, leading toward a central point, China! 

Officially, China claims to defend multilateralism, but its actions are in direct contradiction 

to this claim. They push forth a system where countries define themselves in relation to 

China, where juxtaposing these relationships shapes a new international order, founded on 

Chinese values.”10 Beijing aspires to fashioning new international order, which it has 

the resources to do. Because Moscow is unable to fashion such a new order, it has 

opted for a “strategy of chaos.”11 We will address this comparison further in the conclu-

sion (→ p. 620). 

4. China experienced an average GDP growth of 9.8% per year for over 30 years. While not unique, this growth is 

comparable to that of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. From 1950 to 1980, South Korea experienced an annual GDP 

growth of 9.1%, Japan of 7.7%, and Taiwan (between 1960 and 1990) of 8.8%. China’s growth is only slightly better. 

Their average annual GDP growth in purchasing power parity is: 11.7% (China, 1978-2004) 11.1% (Japan, 1950-1980) 

11.1%, 9.5% (South Korea, 1953-1983) and 12.4% (Taiwan, 1960-1990). The Chinese growth is no exception: it is close 

to the overall regional growth.

5. See the response to Daniel Bell, a Canadian intellectual supportive of the Chinese meritocratic model: Paul Charon 

and Guillaume Dutournier, “Le confucianisme, un modèle politique? Une réponse à Daniel A. Bell,” (“Confucianism: 

A Political Model? A Response to Daniel A. Bell”), La Vie des idées (15 Jun. 2010).

6. Daniel Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions,” A 

‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission (13 Mar. 2020).

7. Doshi, The Long Game. 

8. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Demain la Chine: guerre ou paix (China Tomorrow: War or Peace), Paris, Gallimard, 2021.

9. Jean-Maurice Ripert, “Interview: Chine, Russie: rivales ou complices?” (“Interview: China, Russia: Rivals or 

accomplices?”), Open Diplomacy (30 Jul. 2020). 

10. Jean-Maurice Ripert, cited in Louis Hausalter, “Pour l’ancien ambassadeur de France à Pékin, ‘la Chine tente 

d’imposer un autre système international’” (“For the Former French Ambassador to Beijing: ‘China Tries to Impose 

Another International System’”), Marianne (25 May 2020).

11. Isabelle Mandraud and Julien Théron, Poutine, la stratégie du désordre (Paris: Taillandier, 2021).

149

Since Xi Jinping’s arrival to power, the promotion of this model has been incarnated in 

two main concepts: “the Chinese solution” (中国方案) and “the community of com-

mon destiny” (人类命运共同体). The former illustrates China’s opposition to Francis 

Fukuyama’s famous End of History thesis,12 which was refuted by Xi Jinping during the 

Party’s 95th anniversary in 2016: “history never ended.” The Communist Party is confident 

it can offer humanity an alternative and better social system – in other words, a substitute 

for liberal democratic institutions.13 This was the meaning of the statement made by He 

Yiting (何毅亭), vice president of the Central Party School, in May 2020: “Xi Jinping’s 

New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is the Marxism of the 21st century 

[...] China’s development transcends national geographical boundaries and acquires global 

historical significance, meaning that China is qualified to be the ideological and theoretical 

pinnacle guiding the innovative development of world Marxism.”14

Then, the “community of common destiny” is based on the idea of a global commu-

nity conscious of its shared destiny that needs to cooperate to face current challenges. The 

concept already had a place in the Party’s rhetoric before Xi Jinping. Hu Jintao referred to 

it in his speech at the 18th Party Congress, on November 8, 2012, when he said that it was 

necessary to make other countries aware that we are all part of the “community of com-

mon destiny.”15 Despite this mention, the concept was not central to Hu’s leadership. Hu 

focused more on the concept of a “harmonious society,” respecting the diversity of sys-

tems. Xi Jinping subsequently broke from Hu’s vision, using the concept of a “community 

of common destiny” to urge the adoption of the Chinese model. Besides, the idea of a 

community of common destiny has ties to the Confucian notion of Tianxia (天下- “all-un-

der-heaven”), recently re-popularized by Zhao Tingyang (赵汀阳); it has become a subject 

of intense debates within the Chinese academic community. For now, the Party has seldom 

used the term however.16

The concept of “community of common destiny” was added to the Party’s statutes in 

2017, and in the preamble of the PRC’s constitution in 2018.17 On multiple occasions, Xi 

Jinping introduced the subject abroad, such as during his African visit, at the Bo’ao Forum, 

and to ASEAN members in 2013, to the 2017 Davos Forum, and to the United Nations. In 

2015, the term “destiny” was replaced by “future” in the official English translation in order 

to reduce the expansionist character of the formula and thus avoid suspicion from for-

eign audiences.18 The established English formula thus became the “community of shared 

future for mankind,” but the Chinese expression remains unchanged. The rhetorical enter-

prise thus aims at distorting the liberal vocabulary in favor of the CCP’s vision, as Stella 

Chan points out: “the phrase incorporates traditional elements of Chinese foreign policy 

12. David Kelly, “The ‘China Solution: Beijing responds to Trump,” The Interpreter (17 Feb. 2017).

13. Xi Jinping, “中国共产党人和中国人民完全有信心为人类对更好社会制度的探索提供中国方案” 

(Speech at the 95th anniversary of the CCP, 1 Jul. 2016), https://archive.vn/W6E5l.

14. He Yiting (何毅亭), “学习时报：习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想是21世纪马克思主义” (“Study 

Times: Xi Jinping’s Socialist Thought with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era is 21st Century Marxism”), 学习时

报 (Study Times), June 15, 2020. Quoted in Cabestan, Demain la Chine.

15. Hu Jintaro’s speech is available here (in English and Chinese): https://archive.vn/TT1ya.

16. Ji Zhe, “Tianxia, retour en force d’un concept oublié. Portrait des nouveaux penseurs confucianistes” (“Tianxia, 

the Strong Return of a Forgotten Concept. Portraits of New Confucian Thinkers”), La Vie des idées (3 Dec. 2008).

17. The entire text of 2017 edition of the CCP Statutes is available at: http://www.12371. cn/special/zggcdzc/

zggcdzcqw/#zonggang (in Chinese). The text of the PRC Constitution, with the 2018 revisions, can be found here (in 

Chinese): http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2018-03/22/content_5276318.htm.

18. Stella Chan, “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind 人类命运共同体,” China Media Project, August 

25, 2021.

150

that prioritize a state-centered approach to human rights, while subordinating individual 

rights to the basic question of national interest.”19

Unlike Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has a plan to implement his vision: The Belt and 

Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI consists in building platforms and infrastructures 

to help create this “community of common destiny.” The propaganda campaign on 

behalf of the “community of common destiny” is supported by a plethora of ameliorative 

slogans – “win-win” cooperation, “equality among states,” “pacific development,” “pros-

perity,” “mutual respect,” “friendship between peoples,” and others that foster adhesion to 

the concept. The lexical field used to promote the BRI is similar: vague, positive, but 

hollow. The BRI is often presented as an innocent and “inclusive” project, seeking “con-

nectivity,” or “cooperation.” The Chinese vision, as represented in the media, is associated 

to ideas like the “extended family” or a “global village,” working “hand in hand,” dialogue, 

justice, peace, human progress, a rejection of the Cold War mentality, a rejection of hege-

monic tendencies, the defense of “small” states, and other appealing ideas.

The first results of a 2020 Google search which included the words “Belt and Road” 

and a Chinese media reporting on international news, like the Global Times, China Daily, or 

CGTN, illustrates the domination of this positive rhetoric. The articles found are entitled: 

the BRI “…best hope for globalization’s rebound,” “…route of life and opportunity,” “…

beacon for gloomy global recovery”; it “…helps build lasting economic and trade rela-

tions,” “…boosts cultural exchanges, mutual understanding,” “…brings major benefits to 

four continents,” and asks “…Why is it important to Europe?” and “…Why is not the BRI 

a strategy of China?”20

This propaganda, diffusing the image of a beneficial-to-all, even altruistic, Chinese 

project, has proven fruitful for Beijing. Yet, the Chinese government does not hide its 

concrete intention: The Party-State wants to impose a new international order, with 

“Chinese characteristics,” that serves its interests. It does not just seek to replace the 

US as head of the current international system, but rather to become the leader of a new 

and different global order. Beijing is not satisfied with the current global order; it does 

not ensure the safety of its political regime nor does it recognize it as its “fair” value. The 

Party does not only seek a world order in which its political regime can survive, it seeks a 

world order in which its political regime is glorified.21 This is the ambition of the “Chinese 

dream” for the “great national renaissance.” Only the creation of the “community of com-

mon destiny” could bring this “great national renaissance.”

The “community of common destiny’s” propaganda campaign seeks to convince 

other states to adhere to the Chinese model, as an alternative to the Western lib-

eral model. It is presented as a superior, more efficient model that ensures economic 

development while preserving political stability. Based on China’s “five millennia of glo-

rious civilization,” nearly “one century of CCP rule,” and “forty years of miraculous 

development,” Xi Jinping asserts that China has the legitimacy and capacity to become 

19. Ibid. 

20. Alfred Romann, “Belt and Road Best Hope For Globalization’s Rebound,” China Daily (6 Jul. 2020); Wu Ken, 

“BRI: Route of Life and Opportunity,” Global Times (6 Jul. 2020); Huang Yongfu, “Belt and Road Initiative is a Beacon 

for Gloomy Global Recovery,” CGTN (14 May 2020); Liu Zhihua, “Belt and Road Helps Build Lasting Economic 

and Trade Relations,” China Daily (12 Dec. 2019); “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Boosts Cultural Exchanges, Mutual 

Understanding Among Participants: Chinese Scholar,” Global Times (27 Jun. 2019); You Yang and Li Shiyu, “70 Years 

of Diplomacy: BRI Brings Major Benefits to Four Continents,” CGTN (4 Oct. 2019); Nilay Syam, “China’s Belt and 

Road Initiative: Why is it Important to Europe?” CGTN (13 Nov. 2019); Ding Gang, “Why is not the BRI a Strategy 

of China?” Global Times (22 Jan. 2020).

21. Daniel Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s “New Era” Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions.” 

151

the leader of the new world order and to ensure international security.22 In his speech at 

the 19th Congress, Xi Jinping defended the argument that “Chinese socialism […] blaz[es] 

a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new 

option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while 

preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to 

solving the problems facing mankind.”23

The Chinese congratulate themselves that their concept of a “community of 

common destiny” was used verbatim in multiple UN resolutions. They see it as 

evidence that Chinese ideas are gaining ground in the international community, which 

recognizes China’s position as a responsible world power.24 The UN now considers the 

BRI as a project aligned with the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. And the 

UN secretary general personally promoted the BRI to other member states,25 incit-

ing them to participate. The UN presents the initiative like Chinese propaganda does: a 

global development project rather than a Chinese influence strategy looking to build an 

international order based on CCP ideals.26 François Godement acknowledged that “even 

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, whose mission and mandate is far from 

the BRI’s objectives, felt the need to sign a memorandum of action on the BRI with 

Beijing.”27

The participation of countries to the BRI and the adoption of the “Chinese solution” by 

others – whether or not they are blind to the revisionist Chinese ambitions, sincerely believe 

the altruistic propaganda narrative, or are simply not resisting the Chinese expansion – 

show the success of the Chinese propaganda campaign. However, during the drafting of 

the document celebrating the 75th anniversary of the United Nations in June 2020, the Five 

Eyes states and India refused the inclusion of the term “community of destiny” on the 

grounds that it would be an expression of CCP ideology.28

II. Tradition

Traditional Chinese culture, which is particularly well perceived in many countries 

(a wisdom that is more than a thousand years old, technical and scientific inventions and 

innovations, martial arts, graphic arts, ceramics, etc.), is now exploited by the Party. It has 

become a central component of the Chinese narrative used to create a positive image of 

the country, and of the political party leading it. The promotion of traditional Chinese 

medicine abroad, and within international bodies, is a good example of the Party’s narra-

tive strategy to expand its influence.

22. “习近平首提 ‘两个引导’ 有深意” (“The first mention of the “two guides” by Xi Jinping Has a Profound 

Meaning”), Sina (20 Feb. 2017), https://archive.vn/E3dIr.

23. Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Party Congress is available here (in French): https://archive.vn/QrvzM.

24. Charlotte Gao, “‘A Community of Shared Future:’ One Short Phrase for UN, One Big Victory for China?” The 

Diplomat (5 Nov. 2017).

25. “United Nations Poised to Support Alignment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Sustainable Development 

Goals, Secretary-General Says at Opening Ceremony,” Press release, SG/SM/19556, United Nations (26 Apr. 2019).

26. Antonio Guterres, “Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International 

Cooperation,” United Nations (26 Apr. 2019).

27. François Godement, “La Chine aux Nations unies – le cas de l’Organisation mondiale de la propriété 

intellectuelle,” (“China at the United Nations – the Case of the World Intellectual Property Organization”), Institut 

Montaigne (23 Mar. 2020).

28. Chan, “Community of Common Destiny.” 

152

A. The example of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM)

The Party initially focused on the recognition, by international organizations, of 

the intrinsic value of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM). This process occurred 

relatively quickly. In 2015, TCM was recognized in the medical world for the first time when 

Tu Youyou (屠呦呦) received the Nobel Prize in Medicine for her research on the role of 

the molecule Artemisinin, traditionally present in Chinese herbs, in the fight against malar-

ia.29 When Xi Jinping became president, he initiated two strategies to promote the use of 

TCM around the world: obtaining its recognition by the World Health Organization 

(WHO) and integrating it into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

1. TCM and the WHO

The Chinese Margaret Chan was director general of the WHO from 2006 to 2017. 

During her term, she promoted TCM within the organization. In 2016, she gave a speech 

praising Chinese medical advances, and traditional medicine in particular: “by mobilizing 

doctors, barefoot doctors, traditional practitioners, sanitary inspectors, and medical per-

sonnel in factories, this country, despite its size, eradicated smallpox twenty years before 

the rest of the world. […] This feat gave China a reputation within the WHO: China can 

accomplish anything it sets out to do.”30

That same year, Xi Jinping forced local governments to praise and promote TCM 

within their health care systems.31 The following year, he visited the WHO for the first 

time, gifting the organization with a bronze statue representing acupunctural points,32 a 

symbol of the Party’s desire to have the traditional practice recognized.

The CCP also took advantage of the Covid-19 crisis to reinforce the legitimacy, 

recognition, and upholding the efficiency of TCM abroad. After developing an entire 

network of TCM-affiliated hospitals as early as January 2020, to help prevent Covid-19,33 

the CCP multiplied declarations on TCM’s efficiency in fighting the disease.34 On March 9, 

2020, Yu Yanhong (余艳红), deputy director of the National Administration of Traditional 

Chinese Medicine, declared in a press conference that the majority of the 50,000 cured 

Covid-19 patients had benefited from a mixture of TCM and Western medicine.35 For 

the Chinese administration, this was enough to prove the efficiency of Covid-19. Chinese 

teams of TCM experts were also deployed around the world to assist countries affected by 

Covid-19.36

29. David Cyranoski, “Why Chinese medicine is heading for Clinics around the world,” Nature (26 Sept. 2018); 

Ewen Callaway and David Cyranoski, “Anti-parasite drugs sweep Nobel prize in medicine 2015,” Nature (5 Oct. 2015).

30. Margaret Chan, “La contribution croissante de la Chine à la santé publique sur la scène nationale et international” 

(“The Growing Contribution of China to Public Health Nationally and Globally”), World Health Organization (18 

Nov. 2016); Nathan Vanderklippe, “Margaret Chan reshaped the WHO and brought it closer to China,” The Globe and 

Mail (12 Jun. 2020).

31. Viola Zhou, “Beijing city plans to punish people for ‘defaming’ traditional Chinese medicine,” South China 

Morning Post (4 Jun. 2020).

32. “Visit by the President of the People’s Republic of China to WHO,” WHO (25 Jan. 2017).

33. “China Tightens Preventive Measures to Curb Novel Coronavirus,” Xinhua (23 Jan. 2019).

34. The country has nearly 20,000 TCM clinics nowadays (compared to only handful three years ago). See “China 

Seeks to Increase Supply of Traditional Chinese Medicine Services,” Xinhua (26 Aug. 2020).

35. “Majority of Over 50,000 Recovered COVID-19 Patients in China Receive TCM treatment: Official,” Xinhua 

(9 Mar. 2020).

36. “Chinese Medical Experts Arrive in Kuwait to Help Fight COVID-19,” Xinhua (28 Apr. 2020).

153

The following month, the World Health Assembly (the decision-making body of 

the WHO) included TCM in chapter 26 of the organization’s 11th edition of the 

Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems – ICD, which could be applica-

ble to member countries by 2022.37 The ICD is the main document used by health actors 

because it allows them to compare the collection, analysis, and classification of data inter-

nationally. China’s influence campaign hence succeeded.

The inclusion of TCM in the ICD was controversial however; many health actors remain 

opposed to the decision. Much of the criticism stems from the inconclusive results of 

clinical trials, unable to determine the TCM’s efficiency. Some studies even suggested TCM 

could be dangerous.38 Many practitioners remain confused as to why the WHO shows 

leniency toward TCM (and China in general) (→ p. 213), given its goal of imposing stricter 

health regulations. China’s recognition campaign is likely driven by its ambition to place 

Chinese actors on a huge global market and use TCM as a vector for Chinese influ-

ence. In fact, the development of TCM propagates a noble, wise, and benevolent image 

of China.

In May 2020, the Healthy Sciences Authority of Singapore authorized the pharmaceuti-

cal laboratory Yiling Pharmaceutical (石家庄以岭药业股份有限公司) to sell its Lianhua 

Qingwen capsules as a treatment for Covid-19. Seven other countries have allowed this 

treatment on their territory: Canada, Brazil, Thailand, Romania, Indonesia, Ecuador, and 

Mozambique.39 These advances can be tied to the international recognition of Chinese uni-

versity medical diplomas in June 2020. The next step will be the recognition of academic 

specializations in the traditional medicine.40

While the promotion of traditional medicine abroad is primarily done through seduc-

tion, domestic promotion can be more menacing. In June, a new municipal regulation in 

Beijing, pressed by the Party, declared that any defamation of TCM could result in a 

lawsuit.41 

2. TCM and the BRI

In 2016, Xi Jinping announced a strategy for the development of TCM42 that would 

guarantee universal access by 2020, and a flourishing industry by 2030. In addition to the 

development of zones of medical tourism, China wants to build at least 30 TCM cen-

ters abroad. 17 have already been built in Hungary, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and the UAE.43 

China hopes to increase the use and adoption of TCM in health services around the world, 

37. “ICD-11,” World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/.

38. “The World Health Organization Gives the Nod to Traditional Chinese Medicine. Bad Idea,” Scientific American 

(1 Apr. 2019).

39. Mo Hong’e, “Giving World’s COVID-19 Fight the Invaluable Benefit of TCM,” China Daily (17 Jun. 2020).

40. Liao Shumin, “Chinese Medical Qualifications to Be Recognized Worldwide, Ministry Says,” Yicai (23 Jun. 

2020). 

41. Viola Zhou, “Beijing City Plans to Punish People for ‘Defaming’ Traditional Chinese Medicine,” South China 

Morning Post (4 Jun. 2020).

42. “Full text: Traditional Chinese Medicine in China,” The State Council the Republic of China (6 Dec. 2016), 

http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/12/06/content_281475509333700.htm.

43. “TCM further Incorporated into Medical Systems of B&R Countries,” The State Council the Republic of China 

(19 Dec. 2019), http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/201912/19/content_WS5dfab0a1c6d0 bcf8c4c1915d.

html.

154

vying for a share of an estimated 50-billion-dollar global market.44 In 2016, $3.42 bil-

lion’s worth of TCM products were exported in 183 countries.45

The vast majority of TCM practitioners are trained in China. There are only a handful 

of TCM programs in modern medicine universities and hospitals, including in Australia, 

Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. In France, only one academic institution (Sorbonne 

University, in partnership with the Pierre and Marie Curie Medical University) appears to 

offer a university diploma in mind-body practices associated with TCM (Diplôme universitaire 

des pratiques corps-esprit en médecine traditionnelle chinoise (DUPRAC).46 Other non-degree train-

ings do exist however. 

The campaign promoting TCM in Europe, especially to the European Commission, is 

coordinated by the European Traditional Chinese Medicine Association (ETCMA). This 

association brings together national actors from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 

Poland, Romania, Greece, Germany, Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, 

Portugal, France, Belgium, the UK, and Ireland.47

But the penetration of TCM is most potent in Africa.48 Numerous countries in 

Africa have TCM clinics by now. While many patients are Chinese expatriates, local popu-

lations are increasingly going to these clinics as well. African states are somewhat favorable 

to Chinese TCM investments, some having included TCM in their public health systems. 

And multiple TCM material producers are present on the continent.49 The extraordinary 

China-Africa Summit on solidarity against Covid-19, which took place online on June 

17, 2020, was likely an opportunity for Beijing to further promote tradition medicine in 

Africa.50

44. Zhuang Pinghui, “Traditional Chinese Medicine Closes on US$50 Billion Market with Long-Awaited Nod from 

WHO,” The Morning Post (29 Sept. 2018); David Cyranoski, “Why Chinese Medicine is Heading for Clinics Around the 

World,” Nature (26 Sept. 2018).

45. Zhang Dongmiao, “China Focus: Traditional Chinese Medicine Gaining Popularity Through Modern 

Approach,” Xinhua (1 Jul. 2017), https://archive.vn/CahR9.a.

46. “Diplôme universitaire des pratiques Corps-esprit en médecine traditionnelle chinoise” (“University Diploma 

on Mind-Spirit Practices in Traditional Chinese Medicine”), Sorbonne Université. http://www.fc.upmc.fr/plugins/

upmc-fc/fc/_content/program-diplome-universitaire-des-pratiques-corps-esprit-enmedecine-traditionnelle-chinoise-

duprac-2-2.pdf; “DUMETRAC,” Sorbonne Université. http://pitiesalpetriere.aphp.fr/ wp content/blogs.dir/134/

files/2014/06/D386.pdf.

47. “Full members of ETCMA,” ETCMA, https://www.etcma.org/find-a-member/.

48. Laurent Ribadeau Dumas, “La médecine traditionnelle chinoise connaît un grand succès en Afrique,” 

(“Traditional Chinese Medicine Receives a Wide Success in Africa”), Franceinfo (22 Nov. 2018); C. Kantai, “Why 

Traditional Chinese Medicine is China’s Fastest-Growing Export to Africa?” Pandaily (21 Apr. 2019).

49. “WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy: 2014-2023,” World Health Organization (9 July 2020), https://apps.who.

int/iris/handle/10665/95009.

50. See the archived statement here: http://archive.vn/IEjwB.

155

Although rarely mentioned, and relatively under the radar, TCM is a clear vector for 

Chinese influence in the world, supporting the CCP’s overall narrative strategy.

III. Benevolence

Also falling under the category of “seduce and subjugate” are China’s efforts to build 

an image as a benevolent power. This new position first led to the reappropriation of 

Confucian concepts – after the CCP had scorned the figure of the sage for decades. The 

Party now draws its inspirations from the concepts of ren (仁) and shu (恕). Ren is the 

affection one feels for one’s fellow man, what Anne Cheng called “the human sense”;51 it is 

as much a spontaneous feeling as a moral value which must be cultivated by way of exam-

ple. Being a model of benevolence would therefore be at the heart of China’s “mission.” 

The concept of shu on the other hand refers to an idea of benevolence more “abstract” 

and “universal” than ren.52 While some have seen similarities with agape, divine love for 

Christians, shu is exempt of any divine dimension and is to be found in the reciprocity of 

human relations.53 

However, it is not always easy to distinguish in the Chinese strategy what is a sin-

cere belief – that China’s foreign policy is part of a more than millennia-old approach of 

benevolence and pacifism toward its neighbors as asserted by Li Anshan (李安山)54 – and 

what is a mere rhetoric of covert domination, authoritarian paternalism, and a feel-

ing of civilizational superiority.55 

51. Anne Cheng, Histoire de la pensée chinoise (History of Chinese Thought) (Paris: Seuil, 1997).

52. Nicolas Zufferey, La pensée des Chinois (The Chinese’s Thought) (Paris: Marabout, 2012).

53. Cheng, Histoire de la pensée chinoise. 

54. Li Anshan, “Cultural Heritage and China’s Africa Policy,” in Jing Men, Benjamin Barton, eds., China and the 

European Union in Africa: Partners of Competitors? (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 41-60. On this point, see also: 

Merriden Varrall, Chinese Diplomacy and the Social Imaginary of Chineseness, PhD Thesis, Free University Amsterdam, 2013.

55. The same idea of benevolence animates Chinese leaders and justifies, among certain Chinese and Western 

thinkers, a rejection of liberal democracy and a conservative framing of the masses. Charon and Dutournier, “Le 

confucianisme, un modèle politique? Une réponse à Daniel A. Bell.”

156

Beyond the positive image of Confucius and his morality, which the Party tries to 

embody, the construction of the image of a benevolent China also serves to discredit the 

theory of the “Chinese threat” which hinders the implementation of the Party’s for-

eign policy. To this end, the Party has promoted counter-narratives emphasizing China’s 

absolute pacifism and the harmless and beneficial nature of its growing international foot-

print: this is particularly the case with the theory of the peaceful rise56 “meant to reassure 

Beijing’s partners by encouraging “engagement” strategies.”57

This theory formally became a national strategy with the adoption of white papers 

in 200558 and in 2010.59 Proposed in 2003 by Zheng Bijan (郑必坚)60 – an intellectual figure 

of the Party that served in numerous structures including the Academy of Social Sciences, 

the Central Party School and the Department of Propaganda– this theory maintains that 

China is developing peacefully without threatening other powers, without looking for a 

territorial expansion, and all of this thanks to its labor and a peaceful international environ-

ment. This rhetoric has continued to be employed since Xi Jinping came to power,61 even 

though the use of force is now a possible option in the event of a threat against China’s 

interests.62 The central idea remains unchanged: to contradict all those who foresee an 

inevitable war between China and the United States (the famous “Thucydides trap”63) 

and those who see the international system as a zero-sum game – i.e. the rise of China 

leading to an inevitable decline of the United States. In its last Defense White Paper, which 

is more of a communication tool than a real doctrinal document, China presented itself as 

a leader in regional and global security. It also publicized its defense budget in it to prove its 

efforts in terms of transparency and explain that all its expenses are justified, which once 

again illustrated its desire to display itself as a benevolent and responsible country.64 

The Party accompanies this narrative with meaningful actions that aspire to give sub-

stance to benevolence. The Peace Ark, also know under the name of Daishan dao (岱山

岛), is one of the most visible symbols of Chinese benevolence manipulated by the 

Party. 

56. In Chinese, 和平崛起 means “peaceful rise” and 和平发展 “peaceful development.”

57. Valérie Niquet, “La Chine: une modernisation des pratiques de guerre de l’information” (in “China: The 

Modernization of Information War Practices”) Céline Marangé and Maud Quessard, eds., Les Guerres de l’information à 

l’ère numérique (Information Wars in the Digital Era) (Paris: PUF, 2021), 152. 

58. “中国的和平发展道路” (China’s Path to Peaceful Development), text (in Chinese) archived here: http://

archive.vn/8cQkP. 

59. “中国的和平发展” (China’s Peaceful Development), text (in Chinese) archived at http://archive.vn/upsDK. 

60. On the origin of the concept of “peaceful rise” see Robert L. Suettinger, “The Rise and Descent of “Peaceful 

Rise,” China Leadership Monitor, 12, Hoover Institution (30 Oct. 2004). For a compilation of Zheng Bijian’s speeches on 

the subject, translated into English, see China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian. 1997 – 2005, Brookings Institution 

Press (14 Oct. 2005). 

61. “Speech by President Xi Jinping at the United Nations Office at Geneva: Work Together to Build a Community 

of Shared Future for Mankind,” Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Iraq (23 Jan. 2017), http://archive.vn/vZ2QX. 

Original version of this speech archived at: http://archive.vn/HL22W. 

62. Jian Zhang, “China’s New Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping: Toward ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0?’” Global Change, Peace 

and Security, 27:1 (2015). 

63. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

Harcourt, 2017). 

64. Paul Charon and Carine Monteiro Da Silva, “Le Livre blanc sur la Défense chinois 2019: un effort de 

communication lacunaire” (The White Book on Chinese Defense 2019: A Deficient Communication Effort”), 

Research Note, 76, IRSEM (26 Jul. 2019).

157

 “Chinese Navy hospital ship Peace Ark (866) departs [U.S. base] Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam [in Hawaii] following the 

conclusion of the Rim of the Pacific 2016 military exercises” (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class 

Rebecca Wolfbrandt/RELEASED – public domain).

This hospital ship of the PLA South Sea Fleet naval forces has undertaken a dozen human-

itarian missions and cared for around 180,000 patients around the world since its commis-

sioning in 2008. These missions allow China to assume the best intentions and “conquer 

the hearts” of local populations who benefit from free health care. Chinese media regu-

larly report on the “achievements” of Peace Ark sailors, for example the Bangladeshi patient 

who gave birth to her baby on the ship and decided to name her daughter “Ciin” – “China” 

in Bengali – as a tribute to the team which had taken care of her; as for the newborn, she 

was quickly erected as “a symbol of the friendship between China and Bangladesh.”65 The 

Peace Ark also engages in cultural exchanges with local populations to reinforce the “con-

nections of friendship” between peoples and thus serve as an instrument of public diplo-

macy to create economic opportunities and enlarge the influence of the country.66 Several 

countries, like Fiji and Tonga have praised these missions.67 The Chinese navy’s hospital 

ship actually kills three birds with one stone: it not only improve the image of China 

(generous, humanitarian) but also discredit local governments (China is helping you 

because your government is incompetent) and scout to find out where they can go with 

large ships (to potentially military ends).

Finally, China has a development aid program to present itself to the world as a benev-

olent power. At the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Xi Jinping prom-

ised $60 billion in aid to African countries. The Chinese government reportedly funded 

more than three thousand projects between 2000 and 2014, worth more than $270 billion.68 

Even if the promises are not always followed by action, and a significant part of the “dona-

tions” are actually loans,69 this rhetoric presenting China at the bedside of the devel-

oping world allows the Party to portray itself as a benevolent country.

65. Ma Zhenhuan, “Peace Ark Carries Cargo of Goodwill,” China Daily (12 Dec. 2019), http://archive.vn/Nz8Te. 

66. Zeng Ziyi and Lan Haowei, “A look at China’s ‘Floating Hospital’ Peace Ark,” CGTN (19 Apr. 2019), http://

archive. vn/ObcbR. 

67. Jiang Shan and Shi Kuiji, “Fiji Prime Minister Highly Praises Hospital Ship Peace Ark’s Second Visit,” China 

military online (7 Aug. 2018), http://archive.vn/70hcp; Zhang Yongxing and Jiang Shan, “Chinese Hospital Ship Peace 

Ark Wins Praise from Tongans,” China Military Online (2 Aug. 2018), http://archive.vn/ImWM3. 

68. “AidData’s Geocoded Global Chinese Official Finance, Version 1.1.1,” AidData, https://www.aiddata.org/ 

data/geocoded-chinese-global-official-finance-dataset. 

69. On this subject see the enlightening work of Thierry Pairault: https://www.pairault.fr/sinaf/.

158

The flagship project contributing to this image is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 

whose discourses insists on the isotopies of “sympathy” and “altruism”: the Chinese cham-

pion a “win-win” cooperation and propose the idea of a “community of common destiny” 

working together for a better future, concepts that are supposed to construct a “Chinese 

vision” of international relations. 

Hence, the rhetoric of benevolence has been established, in recent years, as a structuring 

dimension of the discursive power of China on the international scene. 

IV. Power

Seduction cannot only rest on the Chinese “model,” tradition and benevolence. These 

qualities make it possible to appeal to a certain part of the international public but they are 

not enough to establish its ability to influence actors. This is why Beijing also relies on the 

image of power. For the last two decades, we can even say that it has been the main 

driving force behind Chinese seduction. In this respect, it is quite significant to note 

that the curve for the number of Chinese language learners is very strongly correlated with 

that of the development of this image of power: Chinese language learners admit to being 

mainly motivated by commercial prospects that they imagine to be monumental. 

The Party wants to acquire all of the attributes of power to signify to the world that this 

is now China’s status. This strategy is carried out through a narrative, and even more so, 

through an image of this power that must, moreover, be variagated; because the Party admits 

no weakness, China must be the embodiment of power in all domains. Evidently, 

military power,70 which is expressed nowhere better than in the military parades – whose 

pageantry is just as good as that of the Soviet Union – an undeniable element but always 

liable to disrupt the message of peace and benevolence that the Party wishes to carry. This 

is why Beijing also relies on other images of power capable of fascinating without giving 

rise to a sentiment of fear. 

Left, truck-mounted version of the Dongfeng 41 nuclear missile during the October 1, 2019 parade for the 70-year anniversary of 

the communist regime (photo: Xinhua). Right, Beijing National Center for the Performing Arts (photo: Flickr user Hui Lan).

Visually, the image of power is foremostly reflected in architectural achieve-

ments. The promotion of the architectural heritage of China –the Great Wall and the 

Forbidden City are undoubtedly the best-known symbols in this case – reminds us that, 

historically, China has always been a refined and powerful country. And more modern 

buildings support the idea that China still is. Situated in the center of the historic capital, the 

70. This was a reason the nascent PRC, battered by decades of war, developed one of the most iconic symbols of 

power status – nuclear weapons – which, once developed in the 1960s, led to a wave of admiration in the Third World.

159

Beijing National Center for the Performing Arts, also called “Peking Opera” (国家大剧

院), is a symbol of the modernity of the Chinese power. Designed by the French architect 

Paul Andreu, the center is covered by an elliptically shaped titanium and glass dome, which 

appears to be delicately laid on water formed by the artificial lake that surrounds it. 

Many other architectural projects have been showcased for their beauty, their original-

ity or their technological feats, and they are used by the media as symbols of the Chinese 

power. These include the Beijing National Stadium (北京国家体育场) – nicknamed “the 

Bird’s Nest” (鸟巢) – built for the 2008 Olympic Games, the CCTV headquarters with 

its unusual shape, the Huoshenshan hospital in Wuhan built in ten days to cope with the 

Covid-19 pandemic,71 or even the many skyscrapers that have multiplied in the country; five 

of them are among the ten highest buildings in the world. 72 

China also promotes its scientific and technological achievements, some of which 

are visually striking and conducive to media coverage. This is the case for example of the 

spherical radio telescope with an opening of 500 meters that was built in a crevasse in Wuxi, 

in Jiangsui, which is the largest of its kind, the most sensitive in the world and whose aerial 

photos have quickly spread around the planet.73 The many transport infrastructures that 

have broken records are also easy to “publicize”: the bridge connecting Hong Kong, Macao 

and Zhuhai (Guangdong province), which is the longest maritime bridge in the world;74 the 

Beipanjiang Bridge in Guizhou province which crosses the highest precipice (565 meters);75 

the railway line that connects the Tibetan plateau to the rest of China, while breaking 

altitude records (4,500 meters);76 or the Fuxing bullet train77 and the magnetic levitation 

“Shanghai Transrapid” (Maglev), which are among the fastest trains in the world.

Achievements in the space sector are also widely publicized to 

reinforce the image of a technologically advanced China and to stir 

up feelings of national pride. To name a few recent examples, China 

was the first to put a quantum satellite, the Micius, into orbit in 

2016;78 the first to successfully land an exploration module, the 

Chang’e-4, on the far side of the moon in 2019;79 it finalized its 

global coverage satellite positioning system, BeiDou, a competitor to 

American GPS and Galileo in 2020 (→ p. 135);80 in July 2020 it sent 

its first probe to Mars, Tianwen-1, which, if successful, would be the first mission to achieve 

this feat.81 As the image of power is synonymous with cutting edge technologies, 

71. Zhang Ni and Chen Xi, “Wuhan’s Huoshenshan Hospital a Symbol of Chinese Spirit,” Global Times (26 Mar. 

2020), http///archive.vn/ThL3o.

72. The Shanghai Tower (632 m.), the Ping An Finance Center in Shenzhen (599 m.), the Guanghzhou CTF 

Finance Center (530 m.), the Tianjin CTF Finance Center (530 m.), and the China Zun in Beijing (528 m.).

73. “Le FAST, le plus grand radiotélescope du monde, entre officiellement en service” (“The FAST: the largest 

radio telescope in the world, officially comes into service”), China.org (12 Jan. 2020).

74. “World’s Longest Sea Bridge Outperforms,” Quotidien du people (24 Oct. 2019), http://archive.vnYc12v.

75. “The World’s Highest Bridge Locates in Southwest China,” CGTN (27 Jul. 2017).

76. New China TV, “Breathtaking Scenery: Aerial View of Qinghai-Tibet Railway in SW China,” YouTube (26 Oct. 

2017).

77. Huang Jinjing, “Fuxing High Speed Trains Restore Confidence in Chinese Tech at Home and Abroad,” Global 

Times (19 Jul. 2017), http///archive.vn/DB5pT.

78. Yang Sheng and Xing Xiaojing, “China Launches First Quantam Satellite,” Global Times (17 Aug. 2016), http://

archive.vn/ucIop.

79. “China’s Lunar Rover Travels 367 Meters on Moon’s Far Side,” Global Times (4 Feb. 2020), http://archive.

vn:oxQU6.

80. Deng Xiaoci, “China Completes BDS Navigation System, Reduces Reliance on GPS,” Global Times (23 Jun. 

2020).

81. Deng Xiaoci, “China’s Successful Launch of Mars Mission Heralds New Era of Deep-Space Probes Beyond 

the Moon,” Global Times (23 Jul. 2020), http://archive.vn/LSqD0. 

160

China wants to be the leader in this sector and is proud, among other things, of having 

developed the Taihu Light, the fastest super-calculator in the word when it was commis-

sioned in 2016, in Wuxi (Jiangsu). Still very well-ranked today, despite the lead taken by the 

Americans and the Japanese, China has the clear intention of reclaiming first place in this 

ranking.82 

Finally, China looks to host world-class events to showcase its power, such as the 

Olympic Gamesit organized in 2008, or the Winter Olympics that it will host in 2022, the 

World Exhibition held in Shanghai in 2010, and the G20 summit, which it held for the first 

time in 2016 in Hangzhou. 

Sometimes, the Party does not hesitate to take credit for innovations which were 

actually developed elsewhere. The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs launched a campaign in September 2020 to highlight China’s inventiveness. As part 

of the campaign, they presented four “new inventions”: self-service bicycles, high-speed 

trains, online shopping and mobile payment. However, as several accounts on Twitter have 

pointed out, all of these inventions were created outside of China: the self-service bicycle 

in the Netherlands in 1965, the high-speed train saw its beginnings in Germany before it 

boomed in Japan, online shopping is an American invention, while mobile payment origi-

nated in Kenya with its M-Pesa system. 

82. “China Races to Regain First Place in World of Supercomputers,” Global Times (1 Apr. 2019), http://archive.

vn/hpiF2. 

161

 

Chapter 2

INFILTRATE AND COERCE

The first category of operations focuses on discursive strategies that rely on the pro-

duction and dissemination of positive narratives about China, in order to shape foreign 

perceptions and eliminate potential threats to the Party. This first category is not mere 

propaganda, but is already part of the repertoire of active measures (→ p. 33). As we have 

seen, these speeches are not only disseminated by the Party’s own means, but also through 

local intermediaries who act as propaganda “whitewashers,” masking the true source of the 

narrative.1 What also characterizes the operations in the first category is that they call for 

voluntary local support, whose motivations are not always altruistic. 

The second category consists of “stronger” operations that do not try to seduce the 

adversary, but rather, to make it bend. Two types of tools must be distinguished in this 

category: infiltration and coercion. To infiltrate (from the Latin filtrum, “filter”) refers to 

the idea of “gradually penetrating” a society or a government to influence decision-making 

mechanisms. To coerce (from the Latin constringere which means “tighten with” or “tighten 

against”) is to impose something on someone against their will, through the use of threats, 

intimidation, blackmail, or other forms of pressure. 

In the first case, these are infiltration operations which aim to slowly penetrate adverse 

societies in order to hinder any possible action against the Party’s interest. These operations 

take extremely varied forms according to the nature of the “threat” and are deployed simul-

taneously in several sectors in order to circumscribe the targets: diasporas, media outlets, 

diplomacy, the economy, politics, education, think tanks, culture, and so on.

In the second case, we speak of “punitive”2 or “coercive”3 diplomacy. Originally, the 

CCP used it only to defend its fundamental interests (核心利益). Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), 

China’s foreign policy coordinator, recalled that, for the CCP this notion included “issues 

concerning Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.”4 On these subjects the Party does not 

tolerate any interference and will draw from the repertoire of coercive diplomatic actions 

to prevent a state from maintaining relations of any kind with Taiwan or to prohibit a head 

1. Some authors consider that the dissemination of misleading information falls within the scope of active 

measures, but we, for our part, consider that the element of concealment or, at the very least, of obfuscation on the 

part of the sponsor is an essential dimension that makes it possible to distinguish propaganda from active measures. 

2. Jamil Anderlini, “China is Escalating its Punishment Diplomacy,” Financial Times (22 Sept. 2020). 

3. On the concept of coercion (discussed in the field of international relations since Thomas Schelling, Arms and 

Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966)). See the synthesis: Charles-Philippe David and Olivier Schmitt, La 

guerre et la paix. Approches et enjeux de la sécurité et de la stratégie (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2020), 136-150. The concept 

of “coercive diplomacy” was theorized in: Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative 

to War (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1991). It was often applied to China, for example by: Fergus 

Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy, ASPI, Policy Brief, Report 36 

(2020). 

4. The citation in Chinese: “台湾、涉港、涉藏、涉疆问题涉及中国主权和领土完整，事关中方核心利 

益” See: “杨洁篪署名文章: 尊重历史 面向未来 坚定不移维护和稳定中美关系, 新华网,” (7 Aug. 2020).

162

of state from receiving the Dalai Lama. But, gradually, the CCP has broadened the 

scope of coercive diplomacy beyond its core interests, to include claims in the South 

China Sea or the attainment of market economy status for instance. In recent years, coer-

cive diplomacy has been directed at an increasing number and variety of issues, so much 

so that a simple speech that could be interpreted as the beginning of a criticism and as a 

public questioning of China’s behavior, or as even the recognition of the talent of an artist 

not endorsed by the Party, could lead to a surge of coercive measures in order to bring the 

offender back in line with the CCP’s interests. 

The Party’s use of these coercive means seems to be largely accepted by Chinese experts 

in international relations. For instance, Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey, and Tracy Beattie 

mentionned Jian Jisong (简基松), a specialist in international law at Zhongnan University 

(中 南大学)5 who supports China’s unilateral sanctions, or the CICIR, a think tank of the 

MSS – because they all defend the implementation of Chinese economic sanctions against 

anyone who threatens its interests.6 State media accept and help diffuse this policy of sys-

tematic sanctions; hoping to establish a form of deterrence, as illustrated by the reaction of 

the Global Times’ editor-in-chief to a call of some British MPs to boycott the 2022 Winter 

Olympics in Beijing (see screenshot below).7

The day after Joe Biden’s inauguration, on January 21, 2021, the spokesperson of the 

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced sanctions against 28 people, including 

many Trump administration officials (Michael R. Pompeo, Peter K. Navarro, Robert C. 

5. See his page on the university’s website: https://www.hanspub.org/journal/DetailedInforOfEditorialBoard/

aspx?personID=20715. 

6. Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy. 

7. https://twitter.com/HuXijin_GT/status/1358387752459411458. 

163

O’Brien, David R. Stilwell, Matthew Pottinger, Alex M. Azar II, Keith J. Krach, Kelly D. K. 

Craft John R. Bolton and Stephen K. Bannon). These “anti-Chinese American politicians” 

were accused of having “seriously violated the country’s sovereignty” and were deemed 

“responsible for a series of foolish American actions on issues related to China.”8 They 

and their immediate family members are now prohibited from entering Chinese territories 

and doing business with China. The announcement of these sanctions in the midst of 

Washington’s political transition is a way for Beijing to kill two birds with one stone: pun-

ish the Trump administration and warn the Biden administration. It sent a message 

to the new U.S. president’s entourage that those who pursue anti-CCP policies will have a 

hard time being recruited by U.S. businesses when they leave the administration (as most 

of them have interests in China). Here, Beijing skillfully exploited the vulnerabilities of the 

U.S. revolving doors system. 

If the scope has worryingly widened, as a number of states have recently realized, Evan 

Feigenbaum noted nevertheless that the CCP has not yet established a hierarchy in its 

response that would specify the actions likely to be taken, from the most limited to the most 

coercive.9 The type of response that Beijing will use remains thus relatively uncertain, even 

if experience seems to show an increasingly multifaceted use of coercion. The Party 

adapts its response to the local reality by identifying the weaknesses of target countries. The 

vagueness maintained by Beijing could stem from a hesitation over the approach or from 

the desire to dissuade its opponents from any action, as the nature of the Chinese reaction 

remains unknown to them. The idea being that more is often achieved when the thresh-

old of intolerance is not clearly defined.

One of the most evident manifestations of coercion is retaliation, which Beijing prac-

tices extensively as we will see in this chapter and in the case studies. States, companies, 

and individuals who criticize or oppose the CCP are targeted by all kinds of diplomatic 

or trade sanctions (such as those currently imposed on Australia): expulsions from the 

Chinese market, including some targeting artists (Beijing canceled contracts with South 

Korean actors and singers as a retaliation against the THAAD) and cultural products (radio 

stations in Beijing have been ordered to stop broadcasting Swedish music). Imposing a 

financial cost can also be accomplished by reducing the number of Chinese tourists and 

students on which some countries depend (→ p. 405 and 271), or by refraining from broad-

casting NBA games to punish one of its leaders for his critical comments (→ p. 250), for 

example. It can also mean legal actions (lawfare → p. 53); refusing visas (some Swedes 

who were refused Chinese visas were told that it was because of Stockholm’s attitude, for 

which China demanded a change); the disclosure of personal data to assist in the online 

harassment of certain people (notably pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong → p. 397); 

cyber-attacks, intimidation, even physical attacks and kidnappings (Beijing, like some pariah 

states, practices a “hostage diplomacy” → p. 411), etc. 

The CCP uses an incredibly wide range of retaliatory measures, in all domains 

and against all actors. An ASPI report studying 152 cases that affected 27 countries as 

well as the EU between 2010 and 2020, noted “a sharp escalation in these tactics since 

2018.”10 

8. “La Chine annonce des sanctions contre 28 Américains dont Mike Pompeo” (“China Announces Sanctions 

Against 28 Americans, including Mike Pompeo”), Xinhuanet (21 Jan. 2021). 

9. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?” Macro Polo, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace (25 Jul. 2017). 

10. Hanson, Currey, and Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s coercive diplomacy, 3. 

164

In any case, whether to infiltrate or coerce, we will see in the following pages that the 

Party-State usually goes through a nexus of intermediaries – individuals, associations, com-

panies, institutions, and various organizations. These connections are generally based on 

“secrecy, compartmentalization, and deniability,” an approach that has several advan-

tages as Matt Schrader reminded us: not only are the intermediaries force multipliers but the 

fact that the relationship with the Party-State is not often assumed – that they may “plau-

sibly deny” it – contributes to “obscure[ing] the Party’s objectives” to “generat[ing] 

uncertainty about the extent of party influence,” making it difficult or impossible to 

“establish proof required for enforcement of actions” against such practices, and 

this ambiguity also contributes to “erod[ing] social trust in target societies.” 11

11. Matt Schrader, Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries, 

Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund (22 Apr. 2020), 13. 

165

I. The Diasporas 

According to the official Chinese media, there are between 40 and more than 60 million 

“overseas Chinese” (海外华人, OCs).12-13 The estimate contrasts with that of the U.S. 

Census Bureau (nearly 10 million).14 In fact, it all depends on the reach given to the term, 

whether it refers to citizenship or, as Beijing does, descent. In any case, according to a U.N. 

estimate, the number presumably doubled between 1990 and 2017.15 They have settled in 

around 180 countries, and more than 80% of these “Chinese” have taken the citizenship 

of their host country.16

Overseas Chinese, the overwhelming majority of whom live in countries freer than 

China, have the particularity of having access to many uncensored sources of informa-

tion. They are thus constantly exposed to criticism of the CCP, and even to the outright 

hostility of certain communities, including the famous “five poisons” and certain foreign 

governments. From Beijing’s point of view, this population is a danger because, on 

the one hand, it is harder to reach and more exposed to negative influence and, on 

the other, it is likely to return to China or simply communicate with (and thus influ-

ence) relatives who remain in China. It is therefore logically one of its priority targets in 

its influence efforts. The objective of the Party is twofold: to control these diasporas 

so that they do not represent a threat to the ruling power, but also to mobilize them 

to serve its interests. 

A. Ethnic Nationalism 

In its broadest definition, the Chinese diasporas – the plural is justified given their het-

erogeneity – are composed of the Huaqiao (华侨) i.e. Chinese nationals (Hong Kong, 

Macanese and Taiwanese nationals are included from Beijing’s point of view) who live or 

stay abroad; the Huaren (华人), who have abandoned their Chinese passport and obtained 

the nationality of their country of residence; and the Huayi (华裔), the descendants of 

Chinese born abroad.17 From Beijing’s point of view, all are “Chinese” “sons and daughters 

of the motherland,” regardless of their citizenship status.18 Originally, Beijing drew a rela-

tively clear distinction between them, particularly the Huaqiao and the Huaren, but – “espe-

cially under Xi Jinping’s vision of the “one big China Family” and his project of a great 

rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” – the line of demarcation has tended to become more 

blurry.19 

12. “Premier Calls on Overseas Chinese to Contribute to Economy,” Xinhua (6 Jul. 2015). 

13. Since China does not have overseas territories, it is preferable to speak of overseas Chinese (OCs) to refer to 

Chinese residing abroad or of Chinese descent. One could speak of “foreign Chinese” but this would not be a literal 

translation of the Chinese term. On this point, see the work of Pierre Trolliet in particular. 

14. Daniel Goodkind, “The Chinese Diaspora: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Trends,” United States 

Census Bureau (Aug. 2019), 4. 

15. Ibid.

16. James Kynge, Lucy Hornby and Jamil Anderlini, “Inside China’s Secret ‘Magic Weapon’ for Worldwide 

Influence,” Financial Times (26 Oct. 2017). 

17. James Jiann Hua To, Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 108. 

18. John Garnaut, “How China Interferes in Australia And How Democracies Can Push Back,” Foreign Affairs (9 

Mar. 2018). 

19. Laura Grunberg, “Business Moguls and Chinese (Soft) Power: The ‘Huaren’ of Southeast Asia, The Diplomat 

(4 May 2021). 

166

The goal is to blur the line between Chinese nationals and overseas Chinese and 

to create and maintain a sense of belonging to the same nation by homogenizing 

very heterogeneous communities, including in their relation with China, since a large 

part of these “Chinese” claimed by Beijing are dissidents who fled the regime, particularly 

after Tian’anmen, who come from elsewhere (Hong Kong or Taiwan), or who are the 

descendants of immigrants. Sometimes they no longer have any ties to the country, the lan-

guage, or the culture of their ancestors. But it is by mixing as much as possible these diverse 

trajectories that Beijing tries to establish – or even artificially manufactures – a “Chinese 

community” in a given country to generate a sense of pro-Chinese identity. Most of the 

time, this creates a significant gap in perception between the way Beijing sees “the” Chinese 

community in Thailand, for example, or in Canada, and the Chinese Thai and Chinese 

Canadians who do not feel that they belong to a defined Chinese community. This can lead 

to odd situations, such as that anecdote reported by a Chinese-American member of the 

U.S. Air Force. During a banquet with a Chinese delegation, he was toasted by the head of 

the delegation, a senior general in the PLA air force, who invited him to “remember that 

blood is thicker than water. Chinese blood runs through you. You understand us, and know 

that no matter what flag you wear on your shoulders, you are Chinese first and foremost.”20 

This episode is a reminder that the most likely targets of Chinese influence operations, 

whether based on seduction or coercion, are first and foremost those who are consid-

ered by Beijing to be ethnically Chinese. The experts at the RAND Corporation, in 

a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, are therefore right to believe that “one of 

China’s first targets of disinformation on social media will be ethnic Chinese U.S. military 

officers and service members” – not only on social networks but also in the physical world, 

through various means.21 

This vision based on “blood” is symptomatic of the fact that the Chinese foreign policy, 

especially its actions against those considered as “overseas Chinese”, is first and foremost an 

identity policy, and an ethnic nationalism which is also reflected in the integration of the 

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) into the United Front Work Department in 2018 

(→ p. 168), and in initiatives such as the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations in 

Beijing in May 2019.22 

B. The largest campaign of transnational repression in the world 

The first priority for the Party-State is to ensure that these diasporas – which by defi-

nition include many dissidents and opponents who have fled China, or simply people 

who grew up in a liberal environment critical of the Chinese communist regime – do not 

pose a threat. Its main targets in this regard are ethnic and religious minorities, particularly 

Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols (from the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region) and Falun 

Gong followers, but also Taiwanese independence fighters, political opponents, and pro-de-

mocracy activists, including Hong Kong nationals (who, since 2019, have been the focus of 

particular attention), human rights defenders, journalists, and former officials wanted for 

20. Eric Chan, “Fifth Column Fears: the Chinese Influence Campaign in the United States,” The Diplomat (24 Sept. 

2019).

21. Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Jeffrey W. Hornung, Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social 

Media, RAND Corporation (2021), 5

22. Russell Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore,” China Brief, 19:13 (16 July 

2019). 

167

 “corruption.” Against these categories of “overseas Chinese,” Beijing is deploying a cam-

paign of transnational repression which, according to the NGO Freedom House, 

is “the most sophisticated, global and comprehensive campaign of transnational 

repression in the world.”23 Concretely, it includes monitoring these communities and 

individuals, regardless of their citizenship (since the Party-State has an ethnic approach), 

to identify and infiltrate them, maintain constant pressure on them, intimidate, 

threaten, harass, and coerce them, one way or another, or even to physically assault 

them (no less than 214 cases recorded by Freedom House between 2014 and 2020). It also 

involves putting pressure on the states where they reside to have them arrested and pos-

sibly extradited (which happened in India, Thailand, Serbia, Malaysia, Egypt, Kazakhstan, 

UAE, Turkey and Nepal at least).24

The case studies in Part 4, particularly Sweden (→ p. 521) and Canada (→ p. 539) pro-

vide specific examples of the tactics employed, which range from death threats, or rape, 

to physical assault, and include cyber-attacks, pressures on family or relatives still in China, 

travel restrictions (confiscated passports, revoked visas), surveillance, searches, harassment 

campaigns on social networks, and so on. 

Women victims of particularly virulent hate campaigns

A somewhat visible voice that is critical of the Party is systematically targeted by a more-or-less 

organized campaign of hatred. Those “ethnically” Chinese, whatever their citizenship, suffer 

from attacks all the more violent as they are perceived as “traitors.” Among them, women are 

subjected to particularly violent insults. 

Vicky Xu, an Australian journalist of Chinese origin, has been the subject of an online ha-

rassment campaign since she published an ASPI report on the repression of the Uyghurs in 

March 2020.25 Insulted daily on social networks, she has been called “a race traitor,” “a fe-

male Han traitor,” “a female demon,” and “a slut”26 “bewitched by the anti-China forces in 

the West,” according to the Global Times, which quoted one of her alleged former classmates 

at the University of Melbourne (describing her as “a person who pursues personal interests by 

selling out her own country”).27 A video uploaded on YouTube – but deleted since – speculat-

ed on her obviously-unrestrained sexual life28 (that she presumably “has sex simultaneously 

with 15 men and doesn’t pay”29). She received death threats (an Internet user insisted on the 

need to “kill a traitor”30), while some of her colleagues received rape threats and others were 

detained and interrogated in China.31

Tzu-I Chuang, the Taiwanese wife of an American diplomat (a consul general at Chengdu) 

was also targeted by a campaign of online hatred in July 2020. For instance, one social network 

user mentioned her 7- and 9-year-old sons: “I hope your two little dogs get bitten to 

death and knocked down by a car.” Trolls have released pictures of her home in Maryland 

(where the family was repatriated due to the Covid-19 crisis), of her family and herself to 

ridicule them. Several pro-Beijing Taiwanese and Hong Kong newspapers published articles 

hypothesizing that she was a prostitute paid by the Taiwanese government to harvest 

23. Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational 

Repression, Freedom House (Feb. 2021), 15. 

24. Ibid., 17. 

25. Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Uyghurs for sale, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre, Policy Brief, Report No. 26/2020 

(Mar. 2021).

26. Zeyi Yang, “The anatomy of a Chinese online hate campaign,” Protocol (9 Apr. 2021).

27. “‘Bewitched’ Vicky Xu who Fabricates Xinjiang Story Stokes anti-China Sentiment in Australia: Observer,” 

Global Times (11 Apr. 2021), https://archive.vn/tca4F. 

28. https://twitter.com/xu_xiuzhong/status/1379206536287772676. 

29. https://twitter.com/xu_xiuzhong/status/1376500795785445381. 

30. Lily Kuo and Gerry Smith, “China Researchers Face Abuse, Sanctions as Beijing Looks to Silence Critics,” The 

Washington Post (7 Apr. 2021). 

31. Paul Johnson, “Q+A panelist Vicky Xu Says Chinese Government Agents have Detained her friends over her 

Reporting on Uyghurs and Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,” ABC News (15 Apr. 2021). 

168

intelligence on American diplomats. Furthermore, Chinese media, such as the Global Times and 

the Hubei Daily – but also the CYL – were involved and amplified the campaign as it lasted for 

months. She eventually stopped leaving her house and thought about committing suicide.32

The reader can find additional examples in this report, such as the case of Sheng Xue, a 

Canadian activist targeted by a similar campaign which delved into speculations on her sexual 

life and led to the publication of doctored images of her on Twitter (→ p. 551). These 

sexist and mysoginistic attacks against foreign personalities echo the way feminist activists are 

treated in China.33 This structural problem is well-summed up by the journalist Shen Lu in the 

following tweet: 

C. The mobilization of the diasporas to serve the Party’s interests 

Diasporas are not only a potential threat to the Party-State: they are also an opportu-

nity, a powerful relay to defend its interests around the world. As such, various actors are 

in charge of “diasporic affairs” (华侨事务 工作), including the former Overseas Chinese 

Affairs Office (OCAO), which now reports to the UFWD, but also the ministries of Foreign 

Affairs, Education, and State Security.

Chinese diasporas can bring many benefits to the Party. Located abroad, OCs can serve 

as promoters of Chinese soft power: they are in the best position to disseminate the 

Chinese culture to the communities whose codes they have adopted. They can play 

the role of a “vanguard” or at least a “bridge” between China and their countries of resi-

dence to improve mutual understanding and even promote the PRC’s diplomatic and eco-

nomic objectives.34 The PRC can also benefit from their knowledge of their countries 

of residence to better understand the local political systems and decipher current events.35 

This is all the more feasible as OCs are increasingly able to secure a high social status in 

their respective countries in various fields such as trade, scientific research, and politics.

However, more than mere facilitators of exchanges between China and other countries, 

OCs can be instrumentalized by the PRC for political purposes to influence their 

32. Liza Lin, “A U.S. Diplomat’s Wife Was a Social Media Star – Until Chinese Trolls, Aided by State Media, Came 

After Her,” The Wall Street Journal (29 Mar. 2021).

33. Sui-Lee Wee, “Women Are Battling China’s Angry Trolls. The Trolls Are Winning,” The New York Times (24 

Apr. 2021).

34. Hua To, Qiaowu, 40.

35. Ibid., 41.

169

local political life. This is thus a form of interference. In a book based on his PhD thesis 

on extraterritorial policies toward OCs, James Jiann Hua To cited, for example, the case of 

the unofficial protection of the PLA granted by Beijing to members of the Chinese dias-

pora in the United States for their commercial interests, in exchange for channeling funds 

for Democratic Party election campaigns during the Clinton era.36 The investigation into 

illegal and improper activities in connection with the 1996 federal election by the Senate 

Committee on Governmental Affairs identified at least six individuals involved in these 

donations who allegedly had some direct connection with the PRC, including John Huang, 

Maria Hsia and Yah Lin “Charlie” Trie.37 The PRC can also organize, notably through 

United Front organizations, the mobilizations of OCs in support of China’s interests, such 

as what the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China (CPPRC, 

中国和平统一促进会) does on behalf of the reunification with Taiwan (→ p. 124), or 

to protest against topics that anger Beijing, such as the Dalai Lama’s visits abroad, for 

which the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs, 中国学生学者联合会) 

have repeatedly mobilized Chinese students (→ p. 280).38 To hinder a rally in support of 

Hong Kong, on August 23, 2019, the Chinese Embassy in Lithuania, in coordination with 

the Chinese intelligence services, organized a counter-demonstration in Vilnius; a majority 

of the participants were members of the Association of Chinese Expatriates in Lithuania.39

Chinese embassy involved in counter-protests in Lithuania

On August 23, 2019, as hundreds of Lithuanians formed a human chain in solidarity with the 

Hong Kong protesters (several tens of thousands of people were doing the same thing at the 

same time in Hong Kong), pro-Beijing activists burst in and disrupted the chain by shouting 

“Hong Kong is part of China.” The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry established that “the staff 

of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China were involved in organizing the un-

lawful actions undertaken by the Chinese citizens during this incident.” The ambassador 

himself, Shen Zhifei (申知非), was seen at the protest, where he was observing and “direct-

ing” the counter-protesters. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also said to be relying informa-

tion from the Department of State Security regarding “the role the PRC Embassy performed 

in the organization, or coordination of the counterprotest.”40 It would be a first example of 

Chinese interference in a demonstration in Lithuania.

In countries where OCs also represent a significant portion of the electorate, managing 

to influence them to vote for candidates who are favored by the Party is another form 

of interference.41 A study of OC participation in U.S. elections produced by the OCAO 

36. Ibid., 41-2.

37. “The China Connection: Summary of the Committee’s Findings Relating to Efforts of the People’s Republic of 

China to Influence U.S. Policies and Elections,” Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with 1996 

Federal Election Campaigns, Final report of the Committee on Governmental Affairs Senate Rept. 105-167 – 105th 

Congress 2d Session (10 March 1998), available on the website of the Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/

irp/ congress/1998_rpt/sgo-sir/2-18.htm. 

38. John Doston, “The United Front Work Department in Action Abroad: A Profile of The Council for the 

Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 18:2 (13 Feb. 2018); Josh 

Horwitz, “A Visit by the Dalai Lama is Dividing a US Campus Where 14% of Students are from China,” Quartz (15 

Jun. 2017). 

39. “National Threat Assessment 2020,” Second Investigation Department Under the Ministry of National 

Defence and State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius (2020), 67. 

40. Alvin Lum, “Chinese Ambassador Summoned in Lithuania over ‘Deplorable Behaviour’ by Officials During 

Vilnius’ Show of Support for Hong Kong Protesters,” South China Morning Post (3 Sept. 2019). 

41. Hua To, Qiaowu, 42-3.

170

in 2004 called for the development of a Chinese voting bloc and support for Chinese can-

didates running for office.42 In 2015 the Globe and Mail reported that, since 2010, Canadian 

intelligence services have been concerned about the Chinese government’s influence on 

Michael Chan, Ontario’s Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, who immigrated to 

Canada at age 18, and who had presented himself as wanting to serve as a “bridge” between 

the two countries, having not forgotten his origins (→ p. 557).43 In 2017, the election of 

two Italian deputies of Chinese origins, but perfectly integrated into the local political cul-

ture, was celebrated by the Chinese media as a “victory for China’s participation in Italian 

political life.”44

In order to persuade the diaspora and push it into action, the Party uses more or less 

“soft”45 methods of cooptation. Sometimes it is enough to appeal to the sense of 

national or ethnic pride, of love for the motherland to seduce some of them, includ-

ing those who have abandoned their Chinese passport and those who never had it. The 

“diplomacy of assistance” consists in assisting the Huaren and Huayi as much as the 

Huaqiao. The PRC has adopted this approach particularly since the 1998 riots in Indonesia 

that claimed the lives of over a thousand ethnically Chinese people.46 This diplomacy aims 

to maintain a sense of belonging to the same nation across all members of the diaspora. 

Scholarships to come and study in China, exchange programs with high schools 

and universities abroad, but also all “back to your roots” summer camps (寻根之

旅), open to all Huayi, show that the PRC is ready to invest in the long term to build this 

sense of belonging into the future generations.47

Religion is another powerful vector of influence on the diaspora, many members of 

which have converted to Christianity.48 The PRC seeks to infiltrate these religious groups to 

influence and mobilize OCs who are more likely to be receptive in these circles of sociabil-

ity.49 Financial incentive-such as the promise of a job or a house-is obviously another 

lever used to persuade, as are intimidations and even threats.50 For example, MSS agents 

have reportedly forced OCs to cooperate by threatening not to grant or renew visas, to 

attack their relatives residing in China, or to consider them subjects of Chinese law even if 

they hold a passport of another nationality.51 

Beijing also knows how to use traditional media to reach Chinese diasporas. In France, 

the embassy uses the Mandarin TV channel, which is a real source of transmission for the 

Party’s official discourse toward the Chinese diaspora in France. On March 14, 2020, for 

example, the Chinese ambassador in Paris, Lu Shaye (→ p. 235) spoke on the channel and 

accused the French media of malice and of using “propaganda” methods to inflict “real 

brainwashing” on public opinion. The ambassador criticized the biased treatment by the 

French media of the coronavirus crisis in China.52

42. Ibid., 42.

43. Craig Offman, “CSIS Warned this Cabinet Minister Could be a Threat. Ontario Disagreed,” The Globe and Mail 

(16 June 2015); Gerry Groot, 175.

44. Interview with an Italian researcher (Mar. 2020).

45. Hua To, Qiaowu, 200-2.

46. Ibid., 232-4.

47. Ibid., 136-40, 172-3.

48. Ibid., 149.

49. Ibid., 150.

50. Ibid., 45. 

51. Ibid.

52. The transcript of the interview was published on the website of the embassy on March 15. “Entretien de 

l’Ambassadeur Lu Shaye sur l’émission “Parole d’Ambassadeur” de Mandarin TV” (“Interview of Ambassador Lu 

Shaye during the “Parole d’Ambassadeur” TV show on Mandarin TV”) https://archive.vn/D5pYP. 

171

In France, the Association pour la paix et la réunification de la Chine (Association 

for the Promotion of China’s Peaceful Reunification (法国中国和平统 一促进会)) plays 

a leading role. It was established on July 5, 2000 by the Association of Chinese Residents 

in France.53 It is now headed by Wang Jiaqing (王加清), its executive director, and by Yang 

Ming (杨明), its president. As the organizer of the promotional association, Yang Ming 

lent his business premises for the inaugural festivities: 78 associations were invited.54 The 

purpose of the Association is to unite all Chinese throughout the world who support the 

reunification of China and oppose the independence of Taiwan.55 To this end, it organizes 

seminars and visits that showcase the Chinese culture.56 It also maintains important links 

with other Franco-Chinese associations. Ultimately, it is supervised by the Chinese Embassy 

in France, the consular department, and by the Chinese Council for the Promotion of 

Peaceful Reunification (中国和平统一促进会), which is its parent association.57 

The mobilization of the Chinese diaspora in France was completed by the creation, on 

July 14, 2020, of the Association of Chinese Writers in France (AECF), whose stated goal 

is to “coordinate activities between members and associated institutions and to promote 

the development of literary activities; to develop exchanges between Chinese and French 

literary circles.”58 The association, based in L’Haÿ-les-Roses, is chaired by Liang Yuanfa (梁

源法), also known as François Leung (pictured below).59 Liang is the former editor-in-chief 

of the daily News of Europe (欧洲时报), which belongs to the Guang Hua Media Group 

based in nearby Gentilly (→ p. 171). The association’s board presumably also include Wu 

Qin, general manager of Hipotel, a group of 17 hotels in Paris, and president of the France-

China Shenzhen Association, as well as Huang Guanjie and Tang Tiehua, respectively jour-

nalist for News of Europe and cameraman for Phoenix TV.60

Liang Yuanfa. Source: 今日中欧.

53. https://archive.vn/y3OUZ.

54. https://archive.vn/LECHh.

55. https://archive.vn/ckB7k.

56. https://archive.vn/C0Bxn.

57. https://archive.vn/ckB7k. The association’s website in Beijing can be reached here: https://archive.vn/KJHjF.

58. See the announcement in the Journal Officiel: https://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/associations/detail-annonce/

associations_b/20200030/1593. It uses the name of another association created in 1991 in Aulnay-sous-Bois. 

59. “梁源法先生《岁月的记忆》新书发布会在巴黎举行” (“Book Launch for “Memory of the Ages” by Mr. 

Liang Yuanfa in Paris”), 今日中欧 (Europe-Chine Today) (11 May 2019), https://archive.vn/H4ett. 

60. “Le service spécial chargé des campagnes d’influence de Pékin à l’étranger est derrière la nouvelle Association 

des écrivains chinois de France, présidée par le journaliste François Leung” (“The special department in charge of 

Beijing’s influence campaigns abroad is behind the new Association of Chinese Writers in France, chaired by journalist 

François Leung”), Intelligence Online, 862 (28 Sep. 2020); Marie Nicot, “Wu Qin, l’hôtelier aux quatre bras” (“Wu Qin, 

the Four-Armed Hotelier”), Le Journal du Dimanche (21 Jun. 2017). 

172