B. “Wolf-warrior” diplomacy or how to dignify trolling

“Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy” (战狼外交), a name referring to the Chinese blockbuster 

Wolf Warrior (2015, 2017 → p. 348), is the diplomatic version of the “fighting spirit” that 

Xi Jinping requires not only from the PLA but from all state and Party services, to defend 

China’s interests and image abroad. The expression was coined mainly to characterize the 

postures of the Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s office and of a dozen diplomats 

who, in 2020, responded particularly virulently to criticisms levelled against China during 

the Covid-19 pandemic (which focused in particular on the name and origin of the virus, 

Beijing’s responsibility in its circulation and on the management of the epidemic in China). 

Their aggressiveness was all the more striking because it broke with the discretion that had 

characterized Chinese diplomats before. 

The attacks carried out by these diplomats have taken relatively classic forms (official 

communiqués on embassy websites, official protests via diplomatic channels) but also new 

ones, such as social networks and an uninhibited recourse to abuse, admonition 

385. Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing Democracy.”

386. “Gai Lin,” School of international relations, http://archive.vn/TzH3O. “About Association,” EU-China Friendship 

Association, http://archive.vn/LepYg.

387. “旅欧华人华侨积极为全球 «战» 疫做贡献” (“The Chinese in Europe are actively contributing to the 

“war” against the pandemic”), Western Returned Scholars Association – Overseas educated Scholars Association of 

China, March 13, 2020, http://archive.vn/0nWSl

388. “欧洲东北同乡会暨商会向欧盟介绍中国抗疫经验” (“The European Association of Dongbei Chinese 

Brings the Chinese Experience of Fighting Against Epidemies to the EU”), 京报网 (Jingbaowang) (20 Mar. 2020), 

http://archive.vn/aYOf0.

389. Gai Lin, 我在欧洲议会 (Me at the European Parliament) (n.p., Éditions de l’université du Nord-Est, 2009). 

390. “首位中国籍欧盟公务员: 将真实西藏传达给欧洲议员” (“China’s Top EU official: Telling European 

Parliamentarians the Truth about Tibet”), China news (25 Jun. 2014), http://archive.vn/1gmCj. 

391. Gai Lin, “EU Must Prioritise China Summit,” European Voice, Politico (8 Oct. 2012). 

223

and even intimidation. For example, the Chinese consul general in Calcutta replied to a 

Twitter user that he would be “eradicated just like the virus,” or Zhao Lijian, spokesperson 

for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who posted a photo-montage showing an Australian 

soldier cutting the throat of an Afghan child (see image below), which provoked numerous 

indignant reactions around the world. This latest image, titled Peace Force (《和平之师》), 

is the work of the political artist Fu Yu (付昱), known as Wuheqilin (乌合麒麟), whom the 

Chinese media readily portrays as a “wolf warrior artist.”392

The violence of some comments has sometimes led platform moderators to take 

action. Twitter locked the official account of the Chinese embassy in the United States in 

January 2021 after a tweet describing Uyghur women as “baby-making machines.”

The problem with the term “wolf warrior,” which was picked up in 2020 by the media 

and many researchers, is that it helps make attractive a practice that should not be appealing. 

Elise Thomas recommended that “we should probably stop using terms like ‘wolf warrior,’ 

which makes everything sound cooler than it is, for what is essentially just diplomatic troll-

ing.”393

Her analysis is accurate in terms of the informational content, which can be observed on 

Twitter especially (from this perspective, the “wolf warrior” diplomacy is a “Twiplomacy” 

→ p. 229) – but also during press conferences (during one of them, in July 2020, Zhao 

Lijian attacked the German researcher Adrian Zenz (→ p. 53) with what amounted to a 

death threat: “what is unjust is doomed to destruction”).394 But the so-called “wolf-war-

rior” diplomacy is also present offline, in the physical world. In order to exert pres-

sure, silence critics, or impose positions favorable to the CCP, Chinese diplomats use many 

tools, of which this report provides examples: letters, phone calls, surveillance, intimi-

dation, and even physical attacks. Indeed, on October 8, 2020, on the sidelines of a 

Taiwanese National Day reception in Fiji, two Chinese diplomats assaulted a member of 

the Taiwanese Trade Office in Suva who had to be hospitalized as a result, prompting the 

392. Li Lei, “‘Wolf warrior artist’ strives to use new art to spread truth and inspire patriotism”, Global Times, 18 Jun. 

2020, https://archive.vn/WhBcy.

393. https://twitter.com/elisethoma5/status/1333702774454841346. 

394. “Chinese FM ‘Not Surprised’ If Rumormongers Will be Sued,” Global Times (9 Jul. 2020) (https://archive.vn/

qIWls).

224

Taiwanese Prime Minister to say that the “wolf warrior” diplomacy is really a diplo-

macy of “hooligans.”395

When the Chinese embassy puts pressure on Indian journalists

Source : https://twitter.

com/AdityaRajKaul/

status/1313814773830578176/photo/1.

On October 7, 2020, about 250 Indian journalists re-

ceived a letter from the Chinese embassy anticipating 

their potential coverage of the “so-called” Taiwanese na-

tional holiday that was to take place three days later 

(October 10). It reminded them that there was “only one 

China,” that Taiwan was “an inalienable part of China’s 

territory,” and that this statement was “the long-standing 

position of the Indian government.” The embassy there-

fore expected the media to respect this position, to “not 

violate the One-China principle,” and in particular not to 

refer to Taiwan as a “country,” “nation,” or as the 

“Republic of China;” but also not to refer to the leader 

of what is therefore only a “region” as a “president” 

(Tsai Ing-wen was not named in the letter). As usual, the 

letter ended with a thinly veiled threat: if these instruc-

tions were not followed, communication with the media 

would be broken off. As is often the case, this initiative 

by the embassy proved counterproductive, since one of 

the journalists to whom the letter was sent posted it on 

Twitter, where he was followed by more than 280,000 

persons, and where it was widely circulated, prompting 

numerous reactions, including from the Taiwanese 

Minister of Foreign Affairs.396 His Indian counterpart re-

sponded the next day, explaining that the “free media in 

India […] reports on issues that they see fit.”397

Similarly to journalists, politicians are also common targets, especially when they 

meet dissidents: in Germany, a meeting between Joshua Wong and Heiko Maas provoked a 

sharp response from the embassy.398 Members of parliaments are specifically targeted 

by “wolf-warrior” diplomats who do not refrain from calling them, or sending insistent 

and threatening letters, particularly when they plan to visit Taiwan, as happened in the 

Czech Republic (where the president of the parliament was targeted by a disinformation 

campaign → p. 267), or in France, as the following letter testifies. The Chinese ambassador 

Lu Shaye wrote to the senator Alain Richard, setting in motion a succession of events that 

led the ambassador to insult the researcher Antoine Bondaz and, in fine, pushed the minister 

of Europe and Foreign Affairs to summon the ambassador (→ p. 237). Only two days after 

the stern admonition from the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Lu Shaye 

reiterated with a second two-page letter to Alain Richard, dated March 25, this time clearly 

threatening retaliatory measures if the trip to the island, which he described as a “rupture”, 

395. Keoni Everington, “Taiwan Premier Condemns China’s ‘Wolf Warriors’ in Fiji for Being ‘Hooligans,’” Taiwan 

News (20 Oct. 2020). 

396. https://twitter.com/MOFA_Taiwan/status/1313838337875079169. 

397. Kallol Bhattacherjee, “Indian Media is Free, Says in MEA Response to Chinese Embassy’s Note to Press on 

Taiwan,” The Hindu (8 Oct. 2020). 

398. Interview conducted by one of our research assistants in Berlin (Mar. 2020). 

225

was maintained.399 Ignoring the warning he had just received, the Chinese ambassador seems 

to prefer provocation and escalation. The visit was not a novel idea however; Alain Richard 

already led delegations of senators to Taiwan in 2015 and 2018, such as his counterparts in 

the National Assembly did. And the five French parliamentary trips to Taiwan after 2015 

had not harmed relations between Paris and Beijing. The Chinese reaction to this proposed 

trip, which is no different from the previous ones, is thus symptomatic of the increasing 

aggressiveness of the Party-State, particularly on the Taiwan issue. 

Source:400 https://twitter.com/soubrou/status/1371850916320665601/. 

399. Régis Soubrouillard, “L’ambassadeur de Chine Lu Shaye récidive au Sénat” (“The Chinese Ambassador Lu 

Shaye On the Offensive Again in the Senate”), La Lettre A (13 Apr. 2021).

400. The letter was sent on February 18 by the ambassador Lu Shaye to the senator Alain Richard, chairman of the 

Senate Study Group on Taiwan, and disclosed by the website Lettre A on March 25 (https://bit.ly/2NRkD4z). 

226

In the United States, the Chinese Consulate in Chicago tried to pressure state con-

gressmen as well. On February 26, 2020, the office of Roger Roth, president of the 

Wisconsin Senate, received an email from a Wu Ting from the consulate asking him to 

introduce a resolution praising the Chinese management of the crisis. Attached to the 

email was a draft resolution, in which we could read that “China’s action has been critical 

to the global fight against the epidemic, and China has adopted unprecedented and rigor-

ous measures… [it has been] transparent and quick in sharing key information of the virus 

with the World Health Organization and the international community.” The attempt was 

counter-productive because, instead of the resolution proposed by China, Roger Roth 

introduced a resolution untitled “the Communist Party of China deliberately and intention-

ally misled the world on the Wuhan coronavirus.”401 

Along with journalists and MPs, researchers are also specifically targeted. The 

ASPI, one of the best think tanks in the world in its analysis of the Chinese influence, has 

published dozens of excellent reports on the matter, and has thus become a preferred tar-

get of Chinese diplomats that described the institution as “[US-funded] anti-China far-right 

scholars [that] fabricate[s] fake reports” (see the tweet from the Chinese embassy in the 

Netherlands below). The ASPI, more specifically Australian public funding of this institute 

presented by Beijing as “anti-China”, was listed among the 14 grievances that the Chinese 

embassy transmitted to the Australian press in November 2020.402 ASPI is not an isolated 

case. In Canada, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute was also targeted by the Chinese embassy 

after it supposedly criticized the CCP.403 In France, the example of Antoine Bondaz, 

described later in the report, illustrates the counter-productive character of these attacks 

(→ p. 237). 

401. Michael R. Pompeo (Secretary of State), and Roger Roth (Wisconsin State Senator), “State Legislatures and 

the China Challenge,” Speech at the Wisconsin State Capitol (Madison, Wisconsin, 23 Sept. 2020) (https://2017-2021.

state.gov/state-legislatures-and-the-china-challenge/index.html).

402. Jonathan Kearsley, Eryk Bagshaw and Anthony Galloway, “‘If You Make China the Enemy, China Will be the 

Enemy’: Beijing’s Fresh Threat to Australia,” The Sydney Morning Herald (18 Nov. 2020).

403. “Chinese Embassy Spokesperson’s Remarks” (19 Apr. 2020), https://archive.vn/Lxtdz. It singled out an open 

letter signed by a hundred researchers and politicians and denouncing the cover-up by the Party-State at the beginning 

of the Covid-19 epidemic. The letter branded it as a “Chernobyl-like moment”: https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/

experts-say-chinese-government-covid-19-cover-chernobyl-moment/. 

227

These discursive strategies pertain to what Marc Angenot calls an agonic discourse – 

satire, pamphleteering or polemical speeches for instance – of the epidictic genre.404 The 

latter focuses on blaming or praising and can have a role in the social construction of a 

group. In its typical use, this argumentative strategy is meant to consolidate the unity 

of the group, of a nation, in the face of designated enemies. Through such a radical 

posture, the goal is to reinforce a divide: those who do not support China are enemies. This 

rhetoric highlights the narrative of the Party dedicated to the diasporas about the unfair 

treatment suffered by Chinese in the West. Furthermore, it uses modeling, axiological or 

deontic discursive markers (injunction, position of authority), and it is tied to eristic – the 

“argumentative warfare” which aims to exterminate the adversary and its arguments. To 

do this, it resorts to fallacies, to pathos in its vilest form, as well as to invective. The pro-

cesses are well known: unfounded accusations, argumentum ad baculum (an appeal to force), 

“pathos of indignation”, etc.405

The “wolf-warrior” diplomats abundantly use this repertoire of discursive strat-

egies as they condemn Western hegemon, colonialism, even racism; they brandish the 

humiliations suffered by the Chinese since the mid-19th century to justify this posture. They 

ultimately want the world to understand that the moment when China allowed this to 

happen is “over” – something explicitly written by the Chinese embassy in France and the 

spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see below). In a word, the world should 

get used to the Chinese power, hence its aggressive behavior (the second being pre-

sented as a manifestation of the first), and it should adapt itself accordingly. 

Based on this assumption, they disqualify everything that they see as a critic. They refuse 

to debate and strive to deprive the adversary of the very possibility to express an opinion, 

systematically countering narratives disagreeing with the official CCP line, blurring 

the line between what belongs to the CCP and to China as a culture or country. In 

this narrative system, the Party represents the whole China and is the depository of the 

Chinese culture. This is a renewed version of the rhetoric of the Three Representations (

三个代表) aopted by Jiang Zemin but created by Wang Huning (王沪宁). 

Hence, this aggressiveness of Chinese diplomats is at the very heart of the Chinese 

Machiavellian moment that seemingly characterizes the current influence policy 

of the CCP. The Party’s strategy is apparently based on the idea that seduction is not 

enough to reach its objectives. It is then necessary to constrain and intimidate those 

who “lower” or criticize China. 

404. Marc Angenot, La parole pamphlétaire (The Pamphleteer’s Word) (Paris: Payot, 1995). 

405. Ibid.

1. The origin

While this strategy became widely recognized during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, 

its beginnings could be observed long before, with some particularly aggressive ambas-

sadors already acting as forerunners, starting with Gui Congyou (桂从友) in Sweden 

(→ p. 523) and Lu Shaye (卢沙野) in Canada (→ p. 547), both explored in Part 4. Thus, 

the trend was not new and the pandemic only acted as a catalyst.

The origin of this aggressive diplomatic posture can be found in Xi Jinping’s decision 

to abandon Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character doctrine – often summarized in 4 characters (韬

光养晦), which literally means “hide one’s splendor and nurture darkness”406 but is often 

interpreted as to “hide one’s ability and wait for the right moment.”407-408 For Xiang Lanxin 

(相蓝欣), the evil came from even further back: the origin of this diplomatic hubris would 

be found in Martin Jacques’ 2009 book, When China Rules the World. Jacques was instru-

mental in popularizing the theory of a superior Chinese model. The great success of the 

British author is said to have intoxicated the Chinese leadership, which began to believe 

in this hypothesis, especially on the basis of China’s recent economic successes. However, 

according to Xiang Lanxin, Jacques’ erroneous interpretation was merely a modern version 

of Paul Kennedy’s thesis on “the rise and fall of great powers.”409 Indeed, Xiang believed 

that James was obsessed with a culturalist vision of China quite similar to the one that 

drove the Jesuits – except that they had a command of Chinese, which Jacques did not. The 

British author made China a model by denigrating the West (抑西扬中), leading to a dan-

gerous systemic opposition.410 This interpretation, however, has not convinced a majority 

of Chinese intellectuals. Chen Dingding, for example, who is much closer to the authori-

ties, believes that the “wolf warrior” diplomacy is not real, but a narrative produced by the 

United States, and particularly its hawks, in order to stigmatize and weaken China.411

Whatever the source from which diplomats drew their intellectual inspiration, it seems 

that the new diplomatic tone was initiated by the Chinese foreign minister himself. 

Indeed, several media outlets point out at Wang Yi’s response to a question by a Canadian 

journalist on June 1, 2016, about the disappearance of a bookseller in Hong Kong’s 

Causeway Bay – it presumably served as an inspiration for the diplomats412: “Have you 

ever been to China? Do you know that China has helped 600 million people lift themselves 

out of poverty? Do you know that China is the second largest economy with a per capita 

income of US$8,000? Do you know that China has included the protection of human 

rights in its Constitution?”413

406. This if a quote from the Book of Tang (舊唐書). 

407. Popularized as the official Chinese interpretation, according to the Pentagon and others, but contested by 

Chinese specialists. For our part, we decided to keep a more literal translation, faithful to the classical origin, that 

eventually leaves the interpretation to the reader.

408. The 24 characters are “冷静观察，稳住阵脚，沉着应付，韬光养晦，善于守拙，决不 当头。” 

Translation: “Observe Calmly, Secure Your Positions, Face Placidly, hide your Splendor and Nurture the Darkness, be 

Circumspect, and Above all, Do not Proclaim your Superiority. “

409. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Penguin Random House, 1988). 

410. 相蓝欣 (Xiang Lanxin), Interview with Ma Guochuan (马国川), “著名国际政治专家 相蓝欣教授:反思 战

狼文化，呼唤文明沟通” (“Professor Xiang Lanxin, a Renowned Expert on International Relations: Rethinking the 

Culture of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, Invoking Civilized Communication”), 苍山夜语 (30 Apr. 2020). 

411. Chen Dingding, Hu Junyang, “Is China Really Embracing ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomacy?” The Diplomat (9 Sept. 

2020). 

412. 安德烈 (An Delie), “中国外交部战狼式外交 反响不太好” (“Chinese Foreign Ministry’s wolf warrior 

diplomacy not well received”) RFI (19 Dec. 2019).

413. The citation in Chinese: “ 你去过中国吗? 知道中国从一穷二白，帮助六亿摆脱贫困吗?知道中国人均 

8000美元的第二大经济体吗? 知道中国把保护人权列入到宪法当中了吗?”

229

Presentation of the “passport” at the premiere of the film Wolf Warrior 2.414

The minister’s “boldness” was widely circulated on Chinese-language social networks; 

its popular success and the Party’s tacit approval could have inspired diplomats. When the 

“wolf warriors” spoke out during the Covid-19 crisis, Wang Yi was quick to support this 

posture: “We will strongly hit back against malicious slander and firmly defend national 

honor and dignity. We will lay out the truth to counter the gratuitous smears and firmly 

uphold justice and conscience.”415

Even if Wang Yi signaled that a new diplomatic posture was desirable – although 

one cannot exclude an intellectual reconstruction after the fact – the expression “wolf 

warriors” is not his: it was borrowed from a Chinese film franchise, Wolf Warrior, which 

features a Chinese special forces agent rescuing his fellow citizens. It is difficult today to 

trace the exact genealogy of the graft that led to describing diplomats as “wolf warriors”: 

we simply acknowledge it here and focus instead on the description of the posture in itself.

The parallel drawn between the film and Chinese diplomats is based on the message 

conveyed by the work of fiction, which these diplomats supposedly embody today. Indeed, 

Wolf Warrior’s motto is “[anyone] who harms China will die, no matter how far they 

are” (“犯我中华者虽远必诛”). The message was reinforced by the final scene of the 

movie, which revealed a Chinese passport with the following inscription superimposed on 

its back: ‘Citizens of the People’s Republic of China: when you are in danger abroad, do not 

give up. Do not forget that behind you is your powerful motherland” (see image above).416

2. The Twitterization of Chinese diplomacy

Unsurprisingly, this shift in the habitus of the diplomats has led to an increased 

presence on Western social networks, the very ones that cannot be used by Chinese 

citizens (especially Twitter). They were even encouraged to do so by Xi Jinping who, in a 

414. “Patriotism Helps Chinese Military Action Flick ‘Wolf Warrior 2’ Reach No.2 on List of Highest Single-Day 

Earnings for A Domestic Film,” Global Times (30 Jul. 2017).

415. Wendy Wu, “Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi Defends ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats for Standing Up to 

‘Smears,’” South China Morning Post (24 May 2020). 

416. Passport covers with this quote are sold in China.

230

2018 speech, urged them to “reach an international discursive power [and] optimize China’s 

international communication strategy and posture,” including “telling China’s story well and 

shaping a positive national image” and “actively using social media platforms abroad.”417 He 

has apparently been heard because, starting in 2019, official Chinese Twitter and Facebook 

accounts have multiplied.

Between March 2019 and March 2020, the number of Twitter accounts belonging 

to Chinese embassies, consulates, and ambassadors grew by 250%;418 75% of the 

162 Chinese government and diplomatic Twitter accounts that the Alliance for Securing 

Democracy (ASD) tracks on its Hamilton 2.0 tool were created in 2019 or 2020.419 There 

were apparently two turning points prompting the Chinese authorities to respond: first, 

the Hong Kong crisis in 2019, which coincided with the creation of a large number of 

accounts. Forty accounts were created between September and December 2019, about as 

many as Chinese diplomats with Twitter accounts prior to March 2019.420 By the end of 

December 2019, the BBC had counted 55 Twitter accounts of Chinese diplomats, embassies 

and consulates, the majority of which (32) had been created in 2019.421 Next, the Covid-19 

pandemic in 2020, which coincided with another peak in account creation-especially in the 

beginning (February-March), when China was implicated (4 in January 2020, 10 in February 

2020, 9 in March, 5 in April, 3 in May, and 1 in July),422 as well as with an increase in activ-

ity (while all the Chinese diplomatic accounts had accumulated a total of 5,000 tweets in 

January 2020, they had nearly 20,000 in April).423 This sudden inflation, which answered two 

successive crises, suggests that the Twitterization of the Chinese diplomacy could actually 

have been a policy, and a communication strategy more than a series of “decentralized 

personal initiatives,”424 even though this last possibility cannot be excluded either. 

In this process, several personalities stand out. Zhao Lijian (赵立坚) – the first to open 

an account in 2010 as “Mahomet Zhao Lijian” (“穆罕默德赵立坚”425) – was a counselor at 

the Chinese embassy in Pakistan at the time. Then several ambassadors created an account, 

starting with “small” postings (Wei Qiang (魏强), ambassador to Panama, in October 2017), 

later followed by larger ones (Sun Weidong (孙卫东), ambassador to India, in December 

2017). Then, in 2019, after China’s diplomatic presence on Twitter was deemed conclusive, 

the most important postings joined the social networks: Ambassador to the United States 

Cui Tiankai (崔天凯), in July 2019; Ambassador to the United Kingdom Liu Xiaoming (

刘晓明), in October 2019. But they do not all have individual accounts yet (in France, for 

example, @AmbassadeChine handles the communication on Twitter).

417. Speeches on Xi Jinping’s Media Thought (2018 Version) (习近平新闻思想讲义(2018年版)), (Beijing: 

People’s Press [人民出版社], 2018). 

418. Laura Rosenberger, “China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive,” Foreign Affairs (22 Apr. 2020). 

419. Raymond Serrato and Bret Schafer, Reply All: Inauthenticity and Coordinated Replying in pro-Chinese Communist Party 

Twitter Networks, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) (Jul. 2020), 3. 

420. Jessica Brandt and Bret Schafer, “Five Things to Know About Beijing’s Disinformation Approach,” Alliance 

for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund (30 Mar. 2020). 

421. Feng Zhaoyin, “China and Twitter: The Year China Got Louder on Social Media,” BBC (29 Dec. 2019). 

422. Alicia Fawcett, Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global 

Competition, DFRLab, Atlantic Council (2020), 8. 

423. Serrato and Schafer, Reply All, 3. 

424. Marc Julienne and Sophie Hanck, “Diplomatie chinoise: de l’’esprit combattant’ au ‘loup guerrier’” (“Chinese 

Diplomacy: From a “Combative Spirit’ to the ‘Wolf Warriors’”), Politique étrangère, 1 (2021), 108.

425. Lai Fu, “Growling back at the West,” China Media Project, August 8, 2021.

231

Not all online diplomats are “wolf warriors”: it depends on their personality but 

also on the context, i.e. the host country. For example, in Hungary, the Twitter and 

Facebook accounts of the Chinese embassy are less aggressive, because there is simply no 

need for it: the Hungarian government has been pro-Chinese since 2010 (→ p. 313). It was 

also pro-Chinese during the 2020 pandemic, emphatically thanking Beijing for its assis-

tance. “Given the cooperative approach of the Hungarian government to china in the last 

ten years, the Chinese government has no reason to directly influence or actively intervene 

in the domestic discourse to change public perceptions. It is the Hungarian government 

itself that promotes the success of Beijing in fighting the virus and emphasizes the impor-

tance of China.”426

426. DigiComNet, “The Chinese Covid-19 Information Campaign in Hungary: Keeping a Low Profile,” medium.

com (14 Jun. 2020). 

232

Zhao Lijian (@zlj517), leader of the “wolf-warrior” diplomats

Born in 1972, Zhao Lijian is China’s most active diplomat on Twitter (he is the author of more 

than 65,000 tweets published between May 2010 and May 2021), and he has been known for 

his undiplomatic style and aggressiveness, especially against the United States. He has become 

a “wolf warriors” icon, so much so that his image is most often used to represent the phe-

nomenon, as seen in the illustration below against the background of an image from the film 

Wolf Warrior.

An artist’s impression of Zhao Lijian as the hero of the action movie Wolf Warrior (by Tony Bell).

In July 2019, while stationed at the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, he reacted to international 

condemnations of the treatment of the Uyghurs by accusing Americans of being racist them-

selves. His tweet angered the American elite, including President Obama’s former National 

Security Advisor, Susan Rice, who thrust Zhao Lijian into the spotlight. His boldness paid off: 

called back to Beijing in the summer of 2019, he was promoted spokesman and deputy direc-

tor-general at the Foreign Ministry’s Information Department, where he has played a role in 

the “Twitterization” of Chinese ambassadors around the world. During the pandemic, he also 

spread conspiracy theories about the supposedly American origins of the virus (→ p. 596). He 

is considered one of the main figures, and perhaps the leader, of the “wolf-warrior” genera-

tion of diplomats.

233

3. The artificial amplification of diplomatic accounts

Another phenomenon which grew most prominently during the epidemic is the 

creation of a large number of anonymous accounts on social media that sup-

port the actions of the diplomats. By following 36 Twitter accounts belonging to 

Chinese diplomats or ambassadors, the Global Engagement Center (GEC) of the US 

Department of State detected a sudden increase in the number of followers after 

March 2020, which coincided with Beijing’s efforts to amplify its propaganda on 

Covid-19. The average number of daily new followers went from around thirty to over 

720, a 22-fold increase. Considering that “many of these new followers were newly cre-

ated accounts,”427 it apparently indicated the implementation of an artificial network 

designed to amplify the messages of Chinese diplomats, a tendency that “intensi-

fied from March to May.”428 The GEC coordinator gave as examples two accounts linked 

to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, @zlj517, and @spokespersonchn: 3,423 of 

their 10,000 latest followers were identical and “nearly 40 percent of the most recent 

followers were created in just a six-week period between the 1st of March and the 15th 

of April, 2020.”429 Another example: the Twitter account of the Chinese Ambassador in 

Hungary, created in October 2019, had 2,137 followers near the end of May 2020, 98% 

of them non-Hungarian with an unusually high representation of accounts from the 

Middle-East, South Asia, and Africa.430 

An analysis of the 828,646 followers of two CCP accounts showed that a large number 

of them appeared unauthentic and coordinated, were created in March 2020 and published 

on topics linked to four main themes: Covid-19 (conspiracy), Taiwan (indepen-

dence), Hong Kong (protests), and the United States (anti-racists protests).431 Their 

unauthenticity was indicated by: their name (many of them, with numbers, seemed to have 

been automatically generated), the time of their creation (in large chunks and at the same 

time), their profile picture (stolen elsewhere or unrelated to the account), their language (a 

same Twitter account tweeted in three to five languages), their behavior (mostly defensive, 

with a high reply rate – in some cases, 65% of tweets were replies – to criticisms of China 

usually, and to defend the country), etc. 

These followers, with accounts that seemed nothing but fake, are located everywhere 

around the world, but disproportionally in Pakistan. It is not surprising considering 

that the country served as a trial platform in the early days of the Twitterization of Chinese 

diplomacy when Zhao Lijian was posted there.432 The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad was 

also one of the first to create an account, which remains one of the most followed accounts 

among Chinese diplomatic representations, ahead of larger embassies. Finally, the General 

Consul in Karachi, Li Bijian (李碧建) (@libijian2), “has been the CCP’s most active diplo-

mat (by a significant margin) since joining Twitter in January 2020.”433 

427. Lea Gabrielle (GEC coordinator), “Briefing with Special Envoy Lea Gabrielle, Global Engagement Center 

Update on PRC Efforts to Push Disinformation and Propaganda around COVID,” U.S. Department of State (8 May 

2020).

428. Ibid.

429. Ibid.

430. Tamás Matura, “The Chinese Covid-19 Information Campaign in Hungary: Keeping a Low Profile,” 

DigiComNet (14 Jun. 2020). 

431. Serrato and Schafer, Reply All, 2.

432. Ibid.

433. Ibid., 6.

234

4. The French Case

France also witnessed a radical mutation of the embassy’s attitude since the appoint-

ment of Lu Shaye (卢沙野) as embassador in late July 2019. Earlier, the Chinese Embassy 

Twitter account had mostly been diffusing soothing information worthy of a tourism agency, 

praising the taste of Yangchun’s noodles, the finesse of plum flower paintings, or the dazzling 

colors of the Miao people’s New Year celebrations. Since then, and most specifically (but 

not solely) in the context of Covid-19, the embassy has been committed to defending the 

Chinese performances in a more aggressive manner, responding to criticisms and reports 

or research supposedly conveying an erroneous image of the situation in China: the treatment 

of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, religious freedom, or Hong Kong politics for instance. 

These narrative strategies are often imparted through intermediaries, as seen previously. 

On November 10, 2020, the embassy thus broadcast a video showcasing a French expert, 

Pierre Picquart, a regular on the Chinese (and Russian) media where he relays – and provide 

a foreign “scientific” veneer to – the CCP’s positions (→ p. 317). This time, his remarks were 

ostensibly read out on a teleprompter, which did not fail to provoke reactions.434 Along the 

same lines, it published, a month before, a video in which an unidentified Westerner explained 

in Chinese that, before visiting China, he held a negative view of the country, which was 

taught to him by Western media, but that he had realized how erroneous it was. Furthermore, 

a few days later, an interview of Dr. Robert Lawrence Khun, an American investor who 

deplored the inability of Western media to understand China, was also posted.

434. For example: Nicolas Hénin on Twitter: “Dear Chinese embassy, the next time you stamp an academic to get 

your message across, try to make him a little more comfortable. Right now, he really looks like he has a Kalashnikov 

pointed at his head…” (In French: “Dites, l’ambassade de Chine, la prochaine fois que vous tamponnez un universitaire 

pour faire passer vos messages, essayez de le mettre un peu à l’aise. Là, il donne vraiment l’impression d’avoir une 

kalachnikov pointée sur la tempe…,” https://twitter.com/N_Henin/status/1326124257127112706).

235

Lu Shaye, a not so diplomatic ambassador

The current Chinese ambassador in France, Lu Shaye, has been known as a “remarkably 

undiplomatic,” “combative,” and “vehement” diplomat, “slayer of the press,” even be-

fore his appointment in Paris.435 Born in 1964 in the Zhejiang province, Lu started his career at 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987,436 among the specialists of the French-speaking world. 

With an expertise on West Africa, he was posted to the Chinese Embassy in Guinea, then at the 

Department on African Affairs, a directory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988-2001). He 

was later posted to the Chinese Embassy in France (2001-2003), and again at the Department 

of African Affairs, as deputy director (2003-2005). He was appointed ambassador in Senegal 

(2005-2009) at age 41, making him one of the youngest Chinese ambassadors, before becom-

ing director general of Africa at the Ministry (2009-2014). He subsequently worked for a year 

as deputy mayor of Wuhan (2014-2015), and another year as director of the Bureau of Policy 

Research of the CCP’s Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs (2015-2016) – an 

important position that gave him access to central authorities. He late became ambassador to 

Canada (2016-2019) and to France (since July 2019), with the rank of vice-minister. 

Ambassador Lu was noticed in Canada for, among other things, its virulent criticisms of 

Canadian media (→ p. 547). After the arrest of Huawei’s executive Meng Wanzhou by Canadian 

authorities, and that of two Canadian nationals in China, he personally signed an op-ed in The 

Hill Times that criticzed those who seemed to believe that “only Canadian citizens’ freedom 

shall be deemed valuable” and accused the country of an arrogant double standard which he 

explained to be due to “Western egotism and white supremacy.”437 During a seminar in Ottawa 

in May 2019, he defended Chinese supremacy (“a 5000 year old Eastern civilization, [with] a 

much longer history than all the exiting Western countries”, which “has realized its moderniza-

tion and become the second largest economy in the world in only a few decade, while it took 

its Western counterpart several hundred years to achieve the same,” etc.).438

In March 2020, the Twitter account of the Chinese Embassy in France “liked” a tweet 

asking the “fascist media” to stop “doing propaganda for white supremacy.”439 On April 

12, 2020, the embassy put on its website a statement untitled “Restoring Distorted Facts – 

Observations of a Chinese Diplomat in Office in Paris,” in French and in Chinese, in which 

this “diplomat,” who presumably was none other than the ambassador himself,440 violently 

attacked France and spread false information. He notably wrote that the “healthcare per-

sonnel at EHPADs [établissements d’hébergement pour personnes âgées dépendantes] (nursing homes), 

abandoned their duties overnight, collectively deserting and leaving residents to die of hunger 

and illness.”441 The statement was meant to show to the French – and to the Chinese – the 

superiority of the CCP’s authoritarian regime and to silence the “unfounded” criticisms com-

435. Keegan Elmer, “China’s ‘Outspoken’ Lu Shaye Leaves Canada to Become Ambassador to France,” South China 

Morning Post (10 Aug. 2019); Antoine Malo, “En France, un ambassadeur chinois peu diplomate” (“In France, A Seldom 

Diplomatic Chinese Diplomat”), Le Journal du Dimanche (2 Jun. 2020); “Le diplomate chinois Lu Shaye, pourfendeur 

de la presse canadienne, nommé ambassadeur en France” (“The Chinese Diplomat Lu Shaye, Slasher of the Canadian 

Press, Appointed Ambassador to France”), Reporters sans frontières (17 Jun. 2019).

436. “Curriculum Vitae de l’Ambassadeur” (“Curriculum Vitae of the Ambassador”), Ambassade de la République 

populaire de Chine en République française (31 Jul. 2019). 

437. Lu Shaye, “China’s Ambassador: Why the Double Standard on Justice for Canadians, Chinese?” The Hill Times 

(9 Jan. 2019). 

438. Embassy of China in Canada, “Remarks by Ambassador Lu Shaye at the Seminar on China-Canada Relations” 

(24 May 2019).

439. https://twitter.com/AntoineBondaz/status/1243140773215862784/photo/1.

440. La Chine démasquée, 12.

441. “‘Rétablir des faits distordus’ Observations d’un diplomate chinois en poste à Paris” (“‘Setting the Record 

Straight,’ Observations from a Chinese Diplomat Posted in Paris”), Ambassade de la République populaire de Chine 

en République française (12 Apr. 2020), https://web.archive.org/web/20200413103340/http://www.amb-chine.fr/

fra/zfzj/t1768712.htm.

236

ing from France. Besides, Lu Shaye had previously taken a stand to explain that Westerners, 

by their negligence and inability to handle a crisis, were, in some way, responsible for the pan-

demic. This article was strongly criticized, particularly by the researcher Antoine Bondaz who 

regularly denounces the lies spread by the embassy’s Twitter account. 

The ambassador was urgently summoned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves 

Le Drian on April 14, who expressed his disapprobation.442 The embassy subsequently 

removed the incriminated text from its website, but neither Lu Shaye nor the embassy apol-

ogized to the French people. 

Official declarations posted on the embassy’s website went back to a more conventional 

content, and the Twitter account back to highlighting elements of the Chinese “utopia” – 

the ambassador simply stressing the good relations between the French and Chinese pow-

ers, relying, when necessary, on consensual figures, such as General de Gaulle. And yet, the 

admonitions targeting opponents of the “Chinese Dream” who try to raise awareness to 

442. Frédéric Lemaître, “Coronavirus: la France convoque l’ambassadeur de Chine pour lui exprimer son 

mécontentement” (“France Simmons the Ambassador of China to Express Its Discontent”), Le Monde (15 Apr. 2020). 

Lu Shaye was summoned to the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs in February 2020, following the publication 

of a statement by the Chinese Embassy that accused the French authorities of discriminating against Huawei. 

237

the situation in Xinjiang among Europeans, have not disappeared. Raphaël Glucksmann, 

who leads a PR campaign on the situation in Xinjiang in the European Parliament, has 

become a target of the embassy’s account. 

The “Bondaz Effect,” or the demonstration of the perverse effect 

of the wolf-warrior diplomacy

Antoine Bondaz is a researcher at the French Fondation 

pour la recherche stratégique (Foundation for Strategic 

Research – FRS). He is used to denouncing, on Twitter 

and in the media, the disinformation and interferences 

coming from the PRC Embassy in Paris – which 

blocked him on social networks. On March 16, 2021, 

he reacted to the publication of a letter from the em-

bassy that exhorted French senators to abandon a 

planned trip to Taiwan (→ p. 225). In a tweet, Bondaz 

wrote that “this injunction is inadmissible. This is a 

characterized interference.”443 The following day, a 

spokesperson for the Ministry of Europe and Foreign 

Affairs addressed the issue during a press conference: 

“the French members of Parliament freely decide when 

they want to travel and the contacts they have.”444 

When, on March 19, Bondaz relayed this information 

on Twitter, the official account of the Chinese embassy 

insulted him, calling him a “lightweight.”445

This insult provoked an immediate condemnation from researchers, journalists, MPs, and po-

litical leaders – both in France and abroad. The embassy even managed a tour de force: 

as François Heisbourg noted, the intervention united the entire “community of French 

analysts and researchers,” even those who usually work with the embassy. 

To defend itself, the Chinese embassy released a communiqué on March 21, reiterating its mes-

sage and calling Bondaz “an ideological troll” and a “crazy hyena,”446 while the Global Times in-

ternationalized the scandal by publishing, the following day, two articles in English that defended 

443. https://twitter.com/AntoineBondaz/status/1371857850100817932.

444. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/chine/evenements/article/chine-q-r-extrait-du-point-de-

presse-17-03-21. 

445. https://twitter.com/AmbassadeChine/status/1372813385688027138.

446. https://archive.vn/N1X70.

238

the embassy and attacked Bondaz again447 – who then denounced a “well-ordered and coordinat-

ed attack that mobilized the resources of the [Chinese] state to try to discredit [him] and silence 

[him].”448 He subsequently received more visibility and even more messages of support. 

In only three days, the scandal led to numerous articles in newspapers and Bondaz won more 

than 3,000 additional followers on Twitter (not all of them benevolent however), after giving 

a number of interviews to newspapers, radio and TV programs. On March 22, the Minister 

of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, reacted: “[t]he public comments of the 

Embassy of China in France and the actions taken against European elected leaders, research-

ers, and diplomats are unacceptable”; for the second time in a year, he then summoned the 

Chinese ambassador to answer for this scandal, as well as for the Chinese sanctions adopted 

that very day against several European citizens, including the MEP Raphaël Glucksmann.449 

Even the former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, also president of FPI which, as we will 

see, usually relays Chinese positions (→ p. 313), distanced himself from the embassy. 

Summoned to the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs on March 23, the Chinese ambas-

sador was received by the Director for Asia who told him that “the methods of the embassy, 

and the tone of its public communication, are totally unacceptable and cross the line of what is 

commonly deemed acceptable for any diplomatic representation, wherever it may be.”450 The 

same day, the Global Times dedicated a third article to the scandal, noting that “[the] Chinese 

ambassador to France won widespread support from the Chinese public after he pushed back 

against radical words and deeds by some French politicians and pseudo-scholars over China’s 

447. Shan Renping, “The Chinese Embassy Calls Him ‘Little Rascal’, is that Wrong?” Global Times (22 Mar. 2021) 

(https://archive.vn/H3kWM); Chen Qingqing, “Chinese Ridicule French Scholar for Reigniting War of Words with 

Chinese Embassy for Attacking China in Pursuit of ‘Political Correctness,’” Global Times (22 Mar. 2021) (https://

archive.vn/2l5zx).

448. https://twitter.com/antoinebondaz/status/1373690137683591172.

449. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/chine/evenements/article/chine-22-03-21.

450. Christian Chesnot, “Qui est Lu Shaye, ambassadeur de Chine en France, ‘loup combattant’ de la diplomatie 

chinoise?” (“Who is Lu Shaye, Ambassador of China in France, and ‘Wolf Warrior’ of the Chinese Diplomacy?”) 

FranceInfo (23 Mar. 2021).

239

internal affairs in Xinjiang.”451 This argument reflects the largely shared interpretation that 

“wolf-warrior” diplomats are not looking to please local public opinions, which they 

actually alienate with indifference, but to please Beijing by highlighting their individual 

actions as good soldiers that do not allow China’s standing to be challenged abroad.

That said, this case exemplifies how counterproductive this has become, both because, as it 

hoped to discredit a researcher, the embassy drew more attention to his work – thou-

sands of people who did not know him discovered him and are now aware of the threat of 

Chinese influence and of the need to defend Taiwan, especially through parliamentary visits 

to the island – but also because, through its brutal and coarse attitude, the embassy lost, or 

weakened, some of its partners. These relays might find it more difficult to work with the 

embassy in the future. Hence, Pascal Boniface, director of IRIS (→ p. 316), seems to have 

admitted that “he could not go on with such a partnership [with the Embassy of China] after 

the attacks” against Bondaz.452

This is not exactly a case of the “Streisand Effect” since by attacking Bondaz the embassy did 

not seek to prevent the disclosure of information but, like the Streisand effect, it is a case of 

a perverse effect as the actions undertaken by the embassy backfired. In the context of 

the so-called “wolf-warrior” diplomacy, we can now call this the “Bondaz Effect.” 

5. Doubts about its efficiency 

This aggressive turn of the Chinese diplomacy was surprising because obviously 

counter-productive vis-à-vis the authorities and opinions of the host countries: when 

ambassadors, tasked with developing bilateral relations, constantly attack people on social 

media or in the press, relations tend to deteriorate, along with China’s image – which 

they were supposed to promote in the first place. The Swedish case is telling of this situa-

tion (→ p. 523). What shocks and raises questions is that Chinese diplomats do not seem to 

understand that this brutal and tactless attitude, which involves calling journalists to 

insult and threaten them for instance, does not work in liberal democracies; it even 

systematically backfires. More generally, this behavior accelerated a reckoning regarding 

the nature of the Chinese regime and the formation of a united front against China. 

Now, this situation is paradoxical but not unexplainable. First, it should not be assumed 

that China’s behavior is always rational and calculated: it can sometimes result from 

an improvisation, and the expression of personalities not primarily swayed by particular 

policies. In this case, however, the “wolf-warrior” diplomacy seems to be a willing Chinese 

policy: its implementation is simply more or less skillful from one country to another. Then, 

diplomacy is not conducted by diplomats but by the Party: the diplomatic apparatus 

and personnel are subordinated to it, just like the rest of the state. In other words, the 

Party sees the diplomats as its spokespersons, which can generate discrepancies, if 

not tensions, among them. Finally, it is paramount to understand that pleasing foreign 

publics is less important than pleasing Beijing. It is, as Camille Brugier explains in an 

IRSEM note, an “external policy for internal use [whose] main purpose is to legiti-

mize the CCP in the eyes of its own citizens.”453 Moreover, Chinese diplomats do not 

hide it: “The standard for evaluating our work is not how foreigners see us but how people 

451. Chen Qingqing, “Netizens Hail Chinese Envoy’s France Pushback,” Global Times (23 Mar. 2021) (https://

archive.vn/BhKRO).

452. Nicolas Quénel, “La propagande de Pékin à la conquête de la France” (“Beijing’s Propaganda On Its Way to 

Conquer France”), Libération (3 Apr. 2021), 9. 

453. Camille Brugier, La diplomatie des “loups-guerriers” ou la nouvelle politique de légitimation du parti communiste chinois (The 

“Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy, or the New Policy of Legitimation of the Chinese Communist Party), Research Paper 115, 

IRSEM (12 Apr. 2021), 1.

240

in China see us”, explains Lu Shaye.454 The people and especially the Party: the diplomats 

are ambitious individuals who hope that their aggressiveness will be perceived in 

Beijing as a show of loyalty, hence helping to advance their careers. Many precedents 

seem to validate this idea, with the most famous case being that of Zhao Lijian, who was 

propelled deputy spokesperson from his position as counsellor at the embassy in Pakistan 

(→ p. 232).455 This rationale is not specific of diplomats and, in fact, also applies to zeal-

ous students on campuses, for instance; something that Clive Hamilton highlighted: “it is 

important to remember that Chinese nationalists who engage in patriotic attacks overseas 

are lauded in China and rewarded for their patriotism.”456 

That being said, Beijing sometimes acknowledges going too far and, in certain cases, 

even apologizes. When in February 2020, Dai Yuming, a chargé d’affaires at the Chinese 

Embassy in Israel, compared the Covid-19 pandemic to the Holocaust following the suspen-

sion of air connections between the two countries (“In the darkest days of the Jewish people, 

we did not close the door on them. I hope Israel will not close the door on the Chinese”), a 

comparison that stirred outrage in the country, the embassy eventually apologized.457

More generally, the important cost of these positions – the overall deterioration of 

China’s image across the world and the measures taken to counter its ambitions – generates 

an internal debate. The “wolf-warrior” diplomacy divides and creates unease among 

parts of the Chinese diplomatic elite. This is illustrated by the division between those, 

on the one hand, who claim this name – which originated in China and was not imposed 

from abroad – and those, on the other hand, who criticize it as if it were an insult. As such, 

an article from the People’s Daily, explained that, on December 5, 2020, at Renmin University, 

Le Yucheng (乐玉成), deputy minister of foreign affairs, “rejected the criticisms according 

to which, Chinese diplomats engaged in the ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy, affirming that the 

word was only another version of the ‘China threat theory’ and a rhetoric trap aimed at pre-

venting China from retaliating when its dignity and interests are affected […]. The ‘coercive 

diplomacy’ label cannot be pinned on China,” he repeated. “It is not China who coerces 

others, but some countries who accuse China of engaging in ‘coercive diplomacy.’”458 

A widely discussed article by Colonel Dai Xu (戴旭) noted that “wolf warrior” diplo-

mats have reinforced China’s isolation – and this, despite the fact that the Trump adminis-

tration sparks rejection– and he concluded that this strategy was mistaken.459 This assessment 

of China’s growing isolation risks solidifying even further with the Biden administration and 

its emphasis on reconstructing the global image of the United States and building a diplomatic 

front against Beijing. Hence, it is not surprising that this “wolf warrior” posture was stopped 

or, at least, put on hold to give time to reassess it. This new approach seemed confirmed, 

454. Lemaître and Guibert, “L’ambassadeur de Chine en France.” 

455. Other such examples include that of Lin Songitian, who was noticed when he was ambassador in South Africa, 

when he vigorously opposed a visit of the president of the exiled Tibetan government, and who, in May 2020 – perhaps 

as a reward for his attitude – was named president of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign 

Countries (CPAFFC); Lu Shaye as well (→ p. 235), the very vehement – particularly since the Huawei affair – former 

ambassador to Canada, who was named Ambassador to France with a protocole rank of deputy minister. Note that the 

actual weight of his behavior in Canada in the decision to appoint him in Paris is difficult to evaluate, and it may have been 

less important, in fact, than his previous functions within the Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs. 

456. Clive Hamilton, “Chinese Communist Party Influence in Australian Universities” (lecture at the University of 

Queensland, Brisbane, 28 Aug. 2019).

457. “China Apologizes After Envoy Says Israel’s Travel Ban Reminiscent of Holocaust,” The Times of Israel (2 Feb. 2020). 

458. “Selon un responsable chinois, l’étiquette de diplomatie du ‘guerrier-loup’ est infondée” (“According to a 

Chinese Politician, There is no Credit to the “Wolf-Warrior” Diplomacy”), Le Quotidien du peuple en ligne (7 Dec. 2020), 

https://archive.vn/8dSiq.

459. Richard McGregor, “Beijing Hard-Liners Kick Against Xi Jinping’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” Asia Nikkei 

(28 Jul. 2020). https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Beijing-hard-liners-kick-against-Xi-Jinping-s-wolf-warrior-diplomacy.

241

according to Bill Bishop, by the moderate Chinese reaction – particularly that of Wang Yi – to 

the closing of the Houston consulate, in July 2020,460 when many observers expected a vigor-

ous reaction from Chinese diplomats. It could also explain the more moderate discourse of 

the ambassador in France, Lu Shaye, between its convocation in April 2020 at the Ministry of 

Europe and Foreign Affairs and that of March 2021. 

Other Chinese voices have criticized this diplomatic hubris, including Yuan Nansheng (

袁南 生)461 who, taking heeds from a book by Jared Diamond, believed that the simulta-

neous confrontation with several countries can only lead to the failure of the diplo-

macy led by the Party, which might be overestimating its capacities. Yuan listed historical 

examples of a confrontation with several opponents that resulted in a general collapse: 

Napoleon, the Qing dynasty, and more notably a militarist Japan during the 1930s.462 Xiao 

Gongqin (萧功秦)463 took up this comparison with Japan, explaining that it was the exces-

sive southern expansion of the Japanese Empire that led to a war with the United States.464 

He also highlighted the limits of rationality in the succession of decisions that led to the 

confrontation.465 Yan Xuetong (阎学通)466 used another comparison: the Cold War. He 

presented it not as a “neither war, nor peace” period, but rather, as a specific form of 

conflictuality by proxy (代理人战争). Hence, he believed that if a new cold war were to 

emerge, it would hinder China’s policy of “national rejuvenation.”467 

The internal debate continues. On July 14, 2021, at a seminar organized by the Beijing-

based think tank Center for China and Globalization (CCG),468 Chu Yin (储殷) of the 

University of International Relations (国际关系学院), also took freely critized what he 

described as the trap (陷阱) of “external propaganda modeled on internal propa-

ganda” (宣内宣化). He noted that China needs to pay “special attention to the differ-

ences in environment, context, industry, and norms of communication, and pay attention 

to the difference between internal and external propaganda.”469 His approach is sim-

ilar to that developed by Zhang Jian (张建), a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes of 

International Studies (SIIS – 上海国际问题研究院), at a seminar organized by SIIS and 

ILD on Xi Jinping’s thinking on diplomacy and published in The Paper (澎湃新闻), a news-

paper controlled by the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee.470 Zhang thus argues that 

460. Edward Wong, Lara Jakes, and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Orders China to Close Houston Consulate, Citing 

Efforts to Steal Trade Secrets,” The New York Times (22 Jul. 2020).

461. A diplomat who used to be consul general in San Francisco. He is now Deputy-President of the China 

Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究所), the MFA’s think tank. 

462. “袁南生：与多国同时对抗：岂止是外交灾难” (“Yuan Nansheng: to Face Off Several States 

Simultaneously: More Than a Diplomatic Disaster”) 中美印象 (China-US Perception) (9 Sept. 2020).

463. Historian and member of the Neo-Authoritarian Current (新权威主义).

464. Katsuji Nakazawa, “Analysis: China’s Wolf Warrior Overreach Draws Comparison to Imperial Japan”, Nikkei 

Asia (17 Sept. 2020).

465. “萧功秦：太平洋战争是如何爆发的 ——从近代几次战争看人类决策理性的局限性限性” (“Xiao 

Gongqin: How the Pacific War Started – The Limitations of Rationality in the Human Decision-Making Seen Through 

Several Wars of Modern Era”), 中美印象 (China-US Perception) (26 Aug. 2020).

466. Berkeley graduate, and now dean of the Institute of International Relations at the University of Qinghua. 

467. 阎学通 (Yan Xuetong), “为何及如何防范中美意识形态之争加剧” (“Why and How to Prevent the 

Intensification of the Chinese-American Ideological Divergence”), 爱思想 (Aimer la pensée) (7 Oct. 2020).

468. This think tank is headed by Wang Huiyao (王辉耀) an economist who has just published a book entitled I’m 

Talking to the World about China (我向世界说中国) and is said to be close to the United Front. See on this topic: David 

Bandurski, “Seeking China’s New Narratives,” China Media Project (16 Jul. 2021).

469. “如何破解国际传播话语困境？知名专家学者如是” (“How to solve the problem of spreading [China’s] 

word internationally? What leading experts and researchers say”), CCG WeChat Account (14 Jul. 2021). https://

mp.weixin.qq.com/s/7Yflp6wj89vDTXE0ORvHQg.

470. David Bandurski, “Strategies for the China story,” China Media Project (9 Jul. 2021).

242

China should develop ad hoc narratives tailored to each of the audiences it addresses 

and embellish its narratives with concrete examples to make them more digestible. 

Left, Chu Yin at the GCC seminar on July 14, 2021471; right, Zhang Jian at a seminar in June 2021.472

All these voices warning the Party of an incoming danger essentially compare the CCP’s 

situation to the hamartia described by Aristotle in his Poetics – this mistake that constitutes 

the triggering act of the downfall of the tragic hero. But despite these warnings, there 

is no sign that this strategy may be abandoned. 

If the Covid-19 epidemic revealed this posture to the world, the evolution of Chinese 

diplomacy stems from a slow transformation that has been propelled by the progressive 

reckoning, among Chinese leaders, of their newly-found power.473 In fact, it seems that 

no directive signaling a change in the diplomatic strategy has so far been penned. On the con-

trary, several organs and actors of the Party reasserted that this stance was not only legitimate 

but efficient. The Renmin Ribao thus published an article on August 10, 2020, that highlighted 

the altogether positive results from the campaign led by the diplomats during the first phase 

of the epidemic: “During the coronavirus epidemic, some countries ‘stigmatized’ China, and 

attempted to ignore their own responsibility – hence not doing enough to fight the epidemic 

– in order to make China a ‘scapegoat.’ [In response, we] launched a public opinion campaign 

with a very visible banner, we refuted them with reasoned arguments, we exposed their lies, 

and we let the world see their despicable actions and ugly faces.”474

An interview of Le Yucheng, published on the Guancha website on August 12, 2020, 

confirmed the sentiment evoked by the Renmin Ribao: the wolf-warrior diplomacy will 

not stop, and is here to stay.475 The statements of the minister carried more weight know-

ing that they were in line with what Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi said on August 6 and 7 respec-

tively. Le Yucheng’s central argument was that the guilty parties are in Washington, not in 

Beijing: “[the] series of measures recently taken by the United States against China aim to 

fuel an ideological confrontation, and rekindle the Cold War for the 21st century. We get the 

471. https://archive.vn/cPPIO.

472. https://archive.vn/8cdkX.

473. Kathrin Hille, “Wolf warrior’ Diplomats Reveal China’s Ambitions,” Financial Times (12 May 2020).

474. Quote in Chinese: “在新冠肺炎疫情期间，某些国家对中国” 污名化”，极力” 甩锅 »本国抗疫不力的

责任，拿中国当” 替罪羊”。我们旗帜鲜明地开展舆论斗争，有理有据地进行批驳，揭穿他们的谎言，让

世人看到其卑劣行径和丑恶嘴脸。” See “凝心聚神谱新篇（中国制度面对面⑧）——社会主义先进文 化

制度怎么守正创新？”, 人民日报 (10 Aug. 2020).

475. “复活冷战是时空错乱之举” (“Resurrect the Cold War is an Act Susceptible to Engender Chaos”), Interview 

of Le Yucheng (乐玉成), 观察者 (L’Observateur) (12 Aug. 2020). 

243

feeling that the ghost of McCarthyism is resurfacing in the United States. During the 1950s, 

when the United States fell for an anticommunist hysteria, tens of thousands of members 

of the Chinese community were suspected of being ‘spies.’ More than 20 million people 

had to go through ‘controls.’ Even three-year-old children had to sign a ‘loyalty oath.’ The 

expression, ‘find reds under the beds,’ was coined to describe this insane paranoia […].”476 

In a word, Beijing is aware of the ambivalent results of its “wolf-warrior” diplomacy, 

which is “both criticized and saluted in China.”477 This is contradictory since it is pre-

sented “both as the fruit of the imagination of the Western discourse on the Chinese threat 

but also as a response to this threat.”478 This inconsistency is well illustrated by a particularly 

confusing tweet from the Chinese embassy in Ireland, which on March 31, 2021, sought to use 

the fable “The Wolf and the Lamb” to justify the “wolf warrior” diplomacy (images below).

On the left, two tweets published on March 31, 2021 by the Chinese embassy in Ireland and that have since been deleted.479 They 

illustrated the confusion in Beijing toward the “wolf-warrior” concept – which was both revendicated and rejected here. The post 

from the embassy led to an immediate outpouring of mocking tweets such as those presented above (on the right), confirming 

the counterproductive nature of such actions.480

Now, there is no reason to believe that this posture could disappear. It will more 

probably last, alternating between varied degrees of aggressiveness. Beijing also 

appears to seek to diversify its repertoire of actions. Diplomats will continue fighting 

on social media to impose the Party’s narratives and admonish those identified as enemies, 

but will also likely try to build coalitions and lean on front organizations to create a buffer 

476. Quote in Chinese: “ 美国近期针对中国的一系列做法，是在挑动意识形态对抗，在21世纪复活 ” 冷 战”

，让人感到 “麦卡锡主义” 的幽灵又在美重现。上世纪50年代，美国国内掀起了疯狂的反共浪潮，成 千上

万的华裔被怀疑为” 间谍”，2000多万人接受了所谓” 清查”，甚至3岁的小孩也要签署 “忠诚宣誓书”。对于

这一荒唐行径，英语里都留下了一句话叫 “find reds under the beds,” 意思就是 “到床底下查找赤色分子”。”

477. Julienne and Hanck, “Diplomatie chinoise,” 115.

478. Brugier, La diplomatie des “loups guerriers“, 6.

479. It was taken from this address: https://twitter.com/ChinaEmbIreland/status/1377302554489544710. 

480. Helen Davidson, “Wait, Who is the Wolf Again? Chinese Embassy’s Aesop Fable Analogy Baffles Twitter,” 

The Guardian (1 Apr. 2021).

244

space; their mission will ultimately be to weaken the unity of targeted societies, particularly 

the United States. The risk for Beijing is twofold. On the one hand, it risks falling into 

a “rhetorical trap” that would cause it to lose control of the consequences of the actions 

of some of its diplomats. By not disavowing them, even when they go too far – because this 

would cause it to lose face and, above all, would give the impression that there are dissonant 

voices within a Party that would thus appear to be weakened – the Party-State could be 

caught up in a dangerous spiral. On the other hand, Beijing risks increasing the 

internal divisions between the moderates who, as we have seen, condemn the increasing 

aggressiveness of the diplomats and plead for more restraint, and the radicals, who are 

in overdrive and criticize the Party for not going far enough. This is the case with the most 

nationalistic fringe of the Chinese public opinion, which is already disappointed when the 

authorities do not react strongly enough to what they consider to be provocations. Thus, 

when in June 2021 Beijing reacted in a relatively restrained way to the visit of U.S. senators 

to Taiwan, some Internet users on Weibo criticized Chinese officials (“weak and incompe-

tent”), criticizing their lack of firmness (“Why didn’t we shoot them down? They violated 

our air space”).481 Caught between two fires of its own making – on the one hand, the 

international community and moderates who denounce the aggressiveness of the Chinese 

discourse and, on the other, the more nationalistic people who push for escalation and will 

not accept any retreat – the Party has condemned itself to being disappointing.

481. “Chine: les ‘loups’ pris au piège de la diplomatie combattante” (“China: the ‘wolves’ caught in the trap of 

combat diplomacy”)AFP (29 Jun. 2021).

245

IV. The Economy 

Economic pressure is undoubtedly one of the main levers of China’s coercive diplo-

macy; it is also, therefore, the most studied and best understood by observers of all stripes, 

whether they focus on the harmful effects of debt, commercial pressure exerted against 

states, companies or individuals to achieve political objectives, or on the “capture of eco-

nomic elites” by the Party-State. The preceeding overview of the literature has led us to a 

less in-depth treatment of this tool of influence in favor of others – information manipu-

lation, for example – which seem to us to be all the more dangerous because they are less 

adequately identified or studied. 

Economic leverage is notably important, primarily due to the size of the Chinese econ-

omy and the asymmetry of Beijing’s relations with most countries. Because it is the second 

global economy, with a GDP standing at $14 trillion, but also the first exporter and second 

importer of goods in the world, it is difficult to resist when China offers trade and invest-

ment deals to countries that need them or when it threatens to reduce trade exchanges, 

even among the richest countries. Beijing is the most important creditor among poor 

countries. Apparently free, Chinese aid is actually conditional on the non-recognition 

of Taiwan, in the first place, but also on the obligation to “use Chinese companies.”482 

Loans are also particularly opaque. A 2021 study of 100 contracts between state-owned 

Chinese entities and public borrowers in 24 developing countries from five continents 

found, among other things, that loan contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses 

and other measures that allow “the lenders to influence debtors’ domestic and for-

eign policies.”483 

In September 2021, an analysis of 13,427 Chinese development projects conducted by 

AidData, a research center of a U.S. university, concluded that, overall, China spends 

about $85 billion a year on international development, twice as much as the US, 

but that, since the launch of the BRI, this has been mostly in the form of loans (with a 

ratio of 31 loans to 1 aid grant), thus creating debt.484 “Between 2000 and 2018,” recalls 

researcher Thierry Vircoulon, “50 out of 54 African countries borrowed from China in 

various forms. In 2018, the PRC held nearly 21% of the continent’s outstanding external 

public debt.”485 AidData’s study concludes that 42 states already have a Chinese public 

debt that equals over 10% of their GDP. But it does not stop there: for a variety of rea-

sons, including the opacity of agreements with Beijing, the actual debt is not always clear in 

the public accounts of these states – in fact, according to the study’s authors, the “hidden 

debt” tied to the BRI would amount to $385 billion. These figures must be used with 

caution however, as they may be subject to conscious or unconscious manipulation – the 

researcher Thierry Pairault reminds us that the weight of Chinese debt varies from 13% to 

60% of the stock of long-term debt among sub-Saharan African countries, depending on 

482. Thierry Pairault, “L’Afrique et sa dette ‘chinoise’ au temps de la Covid-19” (“Africa and its ‘Chinese’ debt in 

times of Covid-19”), Revue de la régulation, 29 (2021).

483. Anna Gelpern, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Christoph Trebesch, How China Lends: A Rare 

Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments, AIDDATA / Kiel Institute for the World Economy / Center for 

Global Development / Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) (Mar. 2021), 2.

484. Ammar A. Malik et al., Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development 

projects, AidData, College of William & Mary (Sept. 2021).

485. Thierry Vircoulon, “Au bout de vingt ans, la ‘success story’ de la Chinafrique a des conséquences qui posent 

problème” (“After twenty years, the ‘success story’ of Chinafrique has consequences that pose a problem”), Le Monde 

(16 Mar. 2021).

246

the definition adopted, particularly if private debt is taken into account.486 Nevertheless, it 

is clear that loans are now one of China’s instruments of influence in Africa and “those 

who refuse to see the strategic dimension of Xi Jinping’s New Silk Roads are acting in bad 

faith,” as Jean-Pierre Cabestan explains, adding that, “by multiplying the links of eco-

nomic and financial dependence between an ever-increasing number of countries in the 

South, China has set up new asymmetrical and, so to speak, tributary relationships 

that represent a new form of hegemony.”487 Some do not hesitate to describe the effects 

of the BRI in South Asia as a form of “neo-colonialism,” evoking “the way in which 

the financing of infrastructure via loans outside the rules of the market allows Beijing to 

monopolize the economic assets of a state.”488

The economic dependence toward China is, more often than not, the first tool 

leveraged by Beijing. The latest Chinese five-year plan, approved in March 2021, adopts 

a strategy of “offensive decoupling” which consists in making itself less dependent 

from abroad while increasing the global dependence on China, which would mechan-

ically increase the economic leverage, and therefore the influence, of the Party.489 Beijing 

takes advantage of this strategy by emphasizing bilateral relations, especially in Europe, 

so as to impose itself more easily. 

The use of economic pressures can also be explained by their greater acceptance on 

the international stage. Although it reveals a certain contempt for their trade partners and 

comes with “detrimental aspects” (due to the opacity of the deals, the resulting depen-

dence, and the corruption stemming from them),490 these methods remain less intrusive 

than other instruments of the repertoire of active measures, such as subversion and 

disinformation. Finally, and it is far from negligible, they are formidably efficient. 

The Chinese economic coercion takes vastly different forms491: denial of access to 

the Chinese market, embargos, trade sanctions, restrictions on investments, quotas on the 

number of Chinese tourists in regions dependent on them, popular boycotts – all actions 

that have targeted numerous countries in the last few years, particularly Japan, South Korean 

and now Australia. 

The Beijing-led trade war against Canberra is unprecedented, with sanctions target-

ing seven lines of goods (coal, beef, wood, wine, cotton, barley, and lobsters) and which 

could be extended to others later on (i.e. wool, sugar, or wheat). This, however, is only the 

tip of the iceberg and, against Australia, Beijing employs many tools from its reper-

toire of actions: trade sanctions; threats to lower the number of Chinese students and 

tourists; extremely violent attacks on social media (with the infamous photomontage posted 

by the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of an Australian soldier 

slitting the throat of a little girl → p. 223); legal proceedings to muzzle critical voices (law-

fare); blocking Australian ships in Chinese ports (“dozens of container ships were unable 

486. Pairault, “L’Afrique et sa dette ‘chinoise.’”

487. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, preface to Pierre-Antoine Donnet, Chine, le grand prédateur (China, the Great Predator) 

(Paris: éditions de l’Aube, 2021), 13.

488. Olivier Guillard, “Les ‘Nouvelles Routes de la Soie,’ la Chine et le néocolonialisme en Asie du Sud” (“The 

‘New Silk Roads’, China and neo-colonialism in South Asia”), Asialyst (22 Jan. 2021). Note, however, that the term is 

only found in the title and presentation of the article, not in its content.

489. Mat Pottinger, “Statement to the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” U.S. 

Congress (15 Apr. 2021). 

490. David Schullman, ed., Chinese Malign Influence and the Corrosion of Democracy: An Assessment of Chinese Interference 

in Thirteen Key Countries, International Republican Institute (IRI) (2019), 5.

491. Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures, Center for 

a New American Security (Jun. 2018). 

247

to unload coal imported from Australia [and] tons of grapes were stuck outside the port of 

Shenzhen”492) regular cyber attacks, military threats (the bellicose Global Times talks about 

sending “long-range missiles” to Australia493); even the abduction of Australian nationals 

as part of the “hostage diplomacy” (→ p. 411). By deliberately leaking, in November 2020, 

a one-page document that listed 14 recriminations presented as the origin of the bilateral 

tensions to Australian media, the Chinese embassy in Canberra implicitly admitted to 

be in a logic of retaliation, and made Australia an example for the region and for the 

world. The Australian case is a message to states and businesses around the world: “China 

has chosen Australia as a kind of scapegoat to show Westerners what it might cost them 

to criticize the Middle Kingdom too much,” analyses economist Philippe Chalmin.494 That 

said, it is not the first such case (when the South Korean government decided to deploy 

the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system on its soil in 2017, 

it was targeted by a wave of cyberattacks that did not spare the business sector495). And it 

won’t be the last. This trend should worry European countries as they could be tar-

geted by those same practices in the future496.

Economic sanctions are sometimes taken in isolation, but they are, more often than not, 

associated with diplomatic or political sanctions. France was targeted in 2008-2009, 

after Nicolas Sarkozy conditioned his participation in the opening ceremony of the Olympic 

Games on a renewed dialogue between Beijing and the Tibetans, and after announcing that 

he would meet with the Dalai Lama.497 In response, the CCP deployed political sanctions (it 

postponed the 11th annual EU–China Summit, which was supposed to be held in Paris, the 

Chinese minister of foreign affairs refused to receive the French ambassador, even though 

the Chinese ambassador in France continued to meet with Bernard Kouchner), and eco-

nomic ones (it cancelled an order of 150 Airbus airplanes, but also excluded France from 

any trade deal for many months). All of this aimed to make France give in. 

A. Economic pressures on foreign companies 

Chinese economic pressures do not solely target countries, but also companies and even 

individuals. Beijing increasingly requires censorship as a condition to access its mar-

ket. And many companies eventually crack under the pressure: Mercedes-Benz apol-

ogized for quoting the Dalai Lama,498 and Zara, Qantas, Marriott and Delta Airlines altered 

the way they named Taiwan when Beijing used “economic blackmail” against them.499 Coach, 

Givenchy, and Versace were also targeted by attacks on social networks because they pre-

sented Taiwan as a country on their clothes or in their advertisements; they all eventually cave 

492. Armelle Bohineust, “Embargos, surtaxes, intimidation, un an d’escalade entre la Chine et l’Australie” 

(“Embargos, surcharges, intimidation, a year of escalation between China and Australia”), Le Figaro (8 Jun. 2021), 21.

493. Hu Xijin, “China needs to make a plan to deter extreme forces of Australia,” Global Times (7 May 2021), 

https://archive.vn/LGKzF.

494. Bohineust, “Embargos, surtaxes, intimidation.”

495. Yeo Jun-suk, “Cyberattacks Against South Korea in Protest of THAAD: Former US Navy Commander,” 

TheKorea Herald (27 Apr. 2017).

496. Nicolas Regaud, “China’s policy of economic coercion against Australia: what can Europeans learn from it?”, 

Strategic Brief, 15, IRSEM, 20 Jan. 2021.

497. Which he did, on December 6, 2008. 

498. Sui-Lee Wee, “Mercedes-Benz Quotes the Dalai Lama. China Notices. Apology Follows,” The New York Times 

(6 Feb. 2018). 

499. Tara Francis Chan, “‘Economic Blackmail’: Zara, Qantas, Marriott and Delta Change Taiwan References After 

China Anger,” Business Insider Australia (18 Jan. 2018).

248

in, apologized, and recognized the “One China” policy.500 In April 2018, the Civil Aviation 

Administration of China (CAAC) sent a letter to 44 airplane companies, asking them to spec-

ify, in all public communications, that Taiwan was part of China, threatening them of retalia-

tory measures. A few weeks later, two dozen of them had already complied.501 Beijing tracks 

and condemns all mentions of Taiwan in the companies’ communication, which, in 

general, all end up submitting to the pressure, and present apologies that the Chinese 

media relish in relaying, such as the Global Times on February 13, 2021 with an apology by the 

Bayern Munich football club (see the screenshot below). 

Likewise, the Party used economic pressure in the Xinjiang cotton controversy. In 

March 2020, ASPI published a report revealing the extent of the forced labor system put 

in place by the Party against Uighurs locked up in camps.502 The Australian think tank iden-

tified 27 factories in Xinjiang and in 9 other provinces that used Uighur forced laborers. 

These factories were included in the production chain of 82 foreign companies, includ-

ing Volkswagen, Lacoste, Nokia and Alstom. Following the revelations, some companies, 

including Nike, Adidas, Uniqlo and H&M, stopped buying cotton from Xinjiang that was 

the product of forced labor and publicly stated their motivations.503 They then became the 

target of a smear campaign, led in particular by the Communist Youth League on Weibo 

(with the slogan “Xinjiang cotton doesn’t eat this!” – see below). Beijing took additional 

retaliatory measures, removing the products of the brands concerned from online plat-

500. Iain Robertson, Chinese Messaging Across the Strait: China-friendly Narratives and the 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election, 

DFRLab, Atlantic Council (Dec. 2020), 22.

501. Erika Kinetz, “Airlines Caving to China’s Demands Despite White House Protest,” USA Today Travel (22 May 

2018). 

502. Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, Uyghurs for sale. ‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang, ASPI (25 Mar. 

2020). 

503. See for instance, the reaction by H&M: https://hmgroup.com/sustainability/fair-and-equal/human-rights/h-

m-group-statement-on-due-diligence/.

249

forms, calling for a boycott of physical stores and blurring their logos on television. This 

campaign, which aimed to defend Chinese cotton and criticize those who “attacked China,” 

seemed to have been motivated less by the decision of these companies, which dated back 

several months, than by the need to respond to the growing criticism and sanctions taken 

by the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union.504

Economic sanctions targeting professional sports are a common CCP practice. 

In 2004, the NFL suffered its wrath for accepting the diffusion of a clip in homage to 

freedom that included a picture of the Tank Man near Tian’anmen Square in 1989. This 

“incident” led China to sanction the NFL by canceling all game broadcasts in China for 

a year.505 If basketball is by far the most important sports market, other big professional 

sports’ leagues bet on Chinese consumers and are, for that reason, particularly sensitive to 

economic sanctions. The baseball (MLB) and ice hockey (NHL) leagues have both signed 

game broadcasting contracts with Tencent for instance. 

504. Robin Brant, “Nike, H&M Face China Fury over Xinjiang Cotton ‘Concerns,’” BBC (25 Mar. 2021).

505. Andrew Beaton and Ben Cohen, “America Obsessed Over Janet Jackson. But the NFL Secretly Enraged 

China,” The Wall Street Journal (14 Oct. 2019).

250

The case of the NBA

On October 4, 2019, during the Hong Kong protests, Daryl Morey, the general manager of 

the Houston Rockets, a member of the American National Basketball Association (NBA), 

retweeted a picture that read: “Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong.” The Party’s sanc-

tion was immediate, and all the stronger due to the fact that Houston welcomed the star of 

Chinese basketball, Yao Ming, from 2002 to 201, and because it was the second most-liked 

team in China.506 As a retaliatory measure, the NBA’s Chinese partners suspended their 

ties with the American basketball league. Daryl Morey’s apologies were not enough to 

assuage Beijing’s anger and Chinese media outlets announced that no pre-season game would 

be broadcast on their channels. In the end, Tencent (the leader on that market) was allowed 

to broadcast a short summary of the games. This late loosening of the restrictions was most 

likely meant to avoid sanctioning the Chinese companies for whom the NBA represented an 

important source of income.507 

NBA games were eventually broadcast again on Chinese television on October 10, 2020, after 

a year of purgatory, but the reasons behind this return to grace are unknown. CCTV declared 

that the NBA had made a show of “continual goodwill” (持续表达的善意) and had ex-

pressed its support to China during the fight against the Covid-19 epidemic.508 We can assume 

that the dissatisfaction of the Chinese public may have influenced the decision as well, even 

if Sup China highlighted a notable discontent among the most nationalist fringe of the popu-

lation regarding the decision to resume broadcasting.509 Besides, on October 16, Daryl Morey 

announced his resignation from his position at the head of the Houston Rockets, presenting 

this decision as personal, although we can imagine that both the owner of the team and the 

NBA were in favor of this “solution.” On the Chinese side, even if CCTV remained polite (yet 

slightly ironic), the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), did note that many Chinese fans believed that 

Morey only got what he deserved.510 

B. The German Case

“What good would it do to interfere in Germany? Its leaders are fully won over, China 

is in conquered territory”: these words, from one of the officials we met in Berlin, ade-

quately illustrate the current mindset in Germany. Many of them, referring to “absolute 

naivety” or to a “cognitive bias” have confirmed this substantive tendency: the attitude of 

the German authorities and of the business sector have largely been directed by the weight 

of the Chinese economy in the German trade balance. In 2020, for the fifth year in a row, 

China was the main German trade partner (first importer and second export market for 

German goods511). This long-standing partnership (that debuted at the end of the 1980s) 

constitutes the original bias explaining the benevolent stance of economic and political 

leaders in Germany. Even if the economic partnership is increasingly perceived as asym-

metrical by German companies, it is maintained by the strong personal links established 

between the German employers and senior executives (the top 100 or 50 of the DAX 

506. Antony Tao, “Everyone is Jumping on Rockets GM Daryl Morey’s Hong Kong Tweet,” Sup China (7 Oct. 

2019).

507. In 2018, more than 500 million Chinese watched at least one NBA game. 

508. “央视谈复播NBA: 对方持续表达善意支持中国抗疫” (“CCTV on the NBA Comeback: The Other 

Involved Expressed its Goodwill to Support China against the Pandemic”), 环球网 (Huangqiu shibao) (9 Oct. 2020).

509. Feng Jiayun, “Chinese State Television Lifts Yearlong Ban on NBA Games, but Nationalists Want it to stay,” 

Sup China (9 Oct. 2020).

510. Wang Qi and Deng Xiaoci, “Chinese NBA Fans ‘Wish Morey well’ After Resigning,” Global Times (16 Oct. 

2020).

511. According to number compiled by Destatis: https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economy/Foreign-

Trade/_node.html. 

251

companies’ executives) on one side, and Chinese actors, who manage to bring a majority of 

German entrepreneurs to interiorize the CCP’s narratives, on the other.512 

The dominant idea, at least until the KUKA case,513 is the win-win deals stuck between 

the two economies, dominated by very positive representations of China among the com-

panies and the representatives of different professional associations. The alarm bells that 

rose from other countries like Australia regarding the risks of dependency toward 

China and the latter’s subsequent infringements of the sovereignty of these states 

have been largely ignored. 

Several events nonetheless affected the pro-Chinese stance of the economic and polit-

ical actors in Germany514: KUKA’s purchase by Chinese investors in 2016, which opened 

up the debate on the role reversal between Chinese and German economic actors, the 

latter becoming the targets of China’s predation; the publication of the program Made in 

China 2025, which revealed the true strategy of the regime in many key technologies; the 

gradual realization of the actual role of the CCP’s correspondents in Chinese companies, 

which is becoming more tangible for expatriate German managers through their increasing 

involvement in the strategy and in the internal life of the company; the action of Chinese 

representatives in standardization committees; or, the evolution of the internal balance of 

power inside the CCP. 

Regarding the latter, several German experts believe that the concentration of power in 

China tends, in fact, to numb its system. According to them, the regime needs to propose a 

new political offer to its population, or at least a symbolic alternative: the representation of 

a superior Chinese system. It is the temptation of “Cosmological Communism” exposed by 

Didi Kirsten Tatlow.515 The exposure (if not overexposure) of the German economy 

to the Chinese market is the first variable of Berlin’s policy vis-à-vis Beijing, and it 

explains the moderate stance of the German chancellor, who is the main spokesperson of 

her business community. 

The business community in Germany has undergone a significant change: it is 

now divided between long-homogenous actors seeing China as an exceptional market, 

without any alternative, and companies that chose to remain careful and vigilant. The BDI 

report published in the fall of 2019 was the translation of that mood change among a num-

ber of German managers. With the publication of the Made in China 2025 strategy, they 

became aware that China hopes to eliminate German industries from key sectors, 

rather than pursuing the cooperation. Sensing the tide turning, Beijing is redoubling 

its efforts to influence not only business leaders and politicians but also public opinion, 

by recruiting communication agencies and local lobbyists.516 But its attempts are not 

always skillful, and at the same time there is a growing awareness in Germany (as in France 

→ p. 640) of the extent of Chinese influence operations, thanks in particular to some 

in-depth investigations in the press, including a particularly detailed article published in Die 

Welt in June 2021.517

512. A good example of this narrative is the argument that the regime was able to remove 600 million Chinese 

from poverty in record time. Another such discourse highlights the “efficiency of the CCP in the coronavirus epidemic 

management.” 

513. The German and European industrial robotic leader was bought by the Chinese group MIDEA for 4.5 billion 

of euros in June 2016. 

514. The topic chosen on Anne Will’s talk show (one of the most popular on ARD) in October 2019 was a good 

indication of this trend: “Kann Man China Noch Vertrauen?” (“Can We Still Trust China?”).

515. https://www.merics.org/en/china-monitor/cosmological-communism.

516. Brause et al., “Chinas heimliche Propagandisten.” 

517. Ibid.

252

According to a 2019 study, Germany was host to 190 Chinese groups with direct links to 

the UFWD, about 80 CSSAs in the universities, more than 20 Confucius institutes and class-

rooms, a dozen Chinese-speaking medias “aligned with the United Front” and an unknown 

number of “Chinese help centers” (华助中心). In total, Didi Kirsten Tatlow estimated 

that “there are hundreds of groups working in Germany to maintain the CCP’s ideology, 

values, language and goals to varying degrees among a relatively small Chinese diaspora, 

and, importantly, more broadly in the society from the grassroots to the elite.”518 Germany 

is also a European base: for instance, the Federation of Chinese Professional Associations 

in Europe (FCPAE, 全欧华人专业协会联合会), a United Front organization, is based in 

Frankfort and operates everywhere in Europe. 

The China Brücke

The China-Brücke (“bridge” in German) was created by Hans-Peter Friedrich, a former min-

ister for agriculture (CSU), who was removed from the Merkel government in 2014 over his 

involvement in information leaks on an ongoing criminal investigation regarding an SPD MP 

suspected of pedophilia. Friedrich may be considered as very close to the business sector. The 

China-Brücke is a forum for dialogue between the (mainly) Chinese and German economic 

elites, tasked with improving the knowledge of China among German decision-makers. It is 

set on promoting “exchanges between actors from the political, economic, scientific, civil so-

ciety and cultural sectors regardless of ongoing political events.”

The composition of its executive board is telling. It includes the former SPD MP Johannes 

Pflug, now China-Beaufragter (in charge of the relations with China) for the city of Duisburg 

(often seen as the front door of Chinese influence in Germany, and a hub of the Chinese 

presence in the Ruhr); Carsten Senz, the head of corporate communications at Huawei 

Deutschland; along with SAP and Alibaba managers.519 

Created in early 2020 on the model of the Atlantic-Bürcke, which was very active in German-

American lobbying, the China-Bürcke strives to leverage influence in the business sector. Most 

of its manifestations (conferences, meetings behind closed doors) remain out of sight, al-

though it should be said that the health situation put a stop to the network practices, in Berlin 

as elsewhere. 

C. CCP agents lobbying from within Western companies 

In December 2020, a document presented as a leak from the CCP, and containing a reg-

ister of two million Party members, was made public by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance 

on China (IPAC), which gathers about 150 MPs from a variety of countries who hope to 

change the relationship between democratic countries and the PRC. The document had 

supposedly been passed on to the IPAC that September by a Chinese “dissident” whose 

identity is not known. The IPAC then transmitted the register to four media outlets after 

prookchecking it. The register apparently dated from 2016 and seemed to comprise mem-

bers of the Party’s Shanghai committee mostly, mentioning their positions within the Party, 

their birthdates and their ethnicities; it was divided into 79,000 branches, of which many 

were affiliated with private companies.520

518. Tatlow, “Mapping China in Germany,” 2.

519. Claudia von Salzen, “Was es mit dem neuen Netzwerk auf sich hat – und warum die Mitglieder geheim 

bleiben,” Der Tagesspiegel (6 Jun. 2020). 

520. Sharri Markson, “Names, positions of Chinese Community Party operatives revealed in major security leak,” 

The Weekend Australian (19 Dec. 2020).

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The list of Party members contained the name of individuals working for prom-

inent companies such as Volkswagen, HSBC, ANZ or Boeing. The latter counted, at 

the time the list was compiled, 287 employees who were CCP members in its 21 branches 

in China; Qualcomm, an American company making processors (among other things) 

had 229 Party members in its ranks; Hewlett-Packard employed 390 CCP members in 14 

branches in China; Volkswagen, on its part, listed over 5,700 employees as members of the 

CCP in 131 sites. Other sensitive sectors appeared on this list, such as pharmaceutical 

companies: Pfizer’s branch in China, Pfizer Investment Co, counted 69 members, while 

AstraZeneca employed 54. The register also included scholars, particularly in Australia 

and the United Kingdom, and an executive at the British Consulate in Shanghai.521

Belonging to the CCP does not mean that these individuals were Chinese spies ipso facto, 

or that they even collaborated with the Party. Many employees of big companies conduct 

political activities, alongside their careers. It is not necessarily incompatible. In China, as we 

mentioned with the LJC (→ p. 72), adhering to the CCP can constitute a career accelerator, 

and is often the main motivation of the inductees. The issue – and in that, the Chinese case 

differs from that of democracies – is that the affiliation of these individuals constitutes 

a leverage that the Party can use to demand information on their employers. Some 

could even be tempted to volunteer information to the CCP to get favors, increase their 

influence in the Party, or even accelerate their careers (and so on). 

The Global Times quickly countered the media’s revelations. The Chinese daily used a 

classical discursive method and spoke about the “alleged list of CCP’s members.” “Alleged” 

in this case, is meant to discredit the other’s argument, or the proof put forward to cast 

doubt on its veracity. This method often hides a cruel lack of solid arguments. The official 

media added that this announcement was part of a witch hunt targeting China. It affirmed, 

finally, that this type of statements stemmed from a lack of knowledge on China, a recur-

rent argument of the CCP.522 

521. Jake Ryan, Jonathan Bucks, and Holly Bancroft, “Leaked files Expose Mass Infiltration of UK Firms by 

Chinese Communist Party Including AstraZeneca, Rolls Royce, HSBC and Jaguar Land Rover,” The Mail on Sunday (12 

Dec. 2020).

522. “West Hypes ‘Leaked’ List of CPC Members to Sow Discord in Foreign Institutions,” Global Times (14 Dec. 

2020).

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