6

China's Foreign Students in the United States

Conventional wisdom often cites the large inflows of Chinese graduate students into American hard science university programs and the potential use of those graduate students as conduits for economic and technology espionage. This chapter explores the origins and dynamics of the Chinese postgraduate diaspora in the United States, estimates the scale of the phenomenon, and assesses its potential counter-intelligence implications. 

The Chinese student diaspora in the United States

Origins

For well over a century, China has viewed sending students overseas as an indispensable element in its quest for national development and scientific and technological modernization. Reflecting the priority that was attached to these efforts by successive leaders from the Qing Dynasty to the Kuomintang, an estimated 30,000 Chinese students were sent to the United States between 1860 and 1950, while a far greater number studied in Japan.1 The students focused mainly on engineering and the sciences. Of those studying in the US from 1905 to 1953, for example, more than 40 percent studied engineering and the sciences.2

Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China continued to send large numbers of students abroad, though the countries to which they were dispatched changed in accordance with China’s ideology and Cold War foreign policy orientation. From 1949 to 1966, the Chinese Communist leadership sent 10,600 students to study abroad in more than two dozen countries. The majority of those students were sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where most majored in scientific and technical disciplines. About 70 percent of the Chinese who studied in the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957, for example, studied science and engineering.3

At the same time that Beijing was sending students abroad for advanced training, it was also beginning to reap the benefits of the study abroad policies implemented by earlier governments. In the 1950s, several Chinese scientists who had studied in the United States and England returned to

China to conduct research in nuclear physics and high-energy physics.

Many of these early returned students played key roles in China’s atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb development programs.4 Despite these important successes, however, the Mao-era study abroad program effectively collapsed in the 1960s as the Sino–Soviet split disrupted the educational exchange relationship between China and the Soviet Union and the Cultural

Revolution shattered the Chinese educational system.5

In all, from 1872 to 1978, China dispatched approximately 130,000 Chinese to study overseas.6 As China began reforming its economy and opening up to the outside world after 1978, this number – which was accumulated over a period of more than a century, from the final decades of the Qing Dynasty to the end of the era of Mao Zedong – would appear small indeed as the scale and scope of China’s study abroad program rapidly expanded.

Returned students in the post-Mao era

According to a Ministry of Education retrospective on China’s study abroad policies, related work in the reform and opening era began in 1978, when, after listening to a work report from Qinghua University, Deng Xiaoping said he favored increasing the number of students going abroad for further education.7 Deng described sending more Chinese to study abroad as one of the most important ways to promote China’s development and predicted that the effort would begin to bear fruit within as little as five years. “We should send tens of thousands of students abroad, not just a handful,” Deng said enthusiastically. “We should do everything possible to quicken the pace.” Deng’s comments set the tone for the Chinese government’s efforts to rapidly expand the number of Chinese students going abroad for graduate education in the West. Sending students to study in the most advanced countries – particularly the United States – was seen as an essential component of China’s plan to build a capable scientific and technological workforce. According to the Ministry of Education retrospective,

At the same time that Comrade Xiaoping repeatedly stressed the importance of opening to the outside world, he also emphasized that sending students abroad was a powerful means of implementing the opening policy . . . it was only by sending students to study abroad that China could truly study the advanced science and technology of foreign countries.8

With the exception of a brief period during the early 1990s, when the number of students receiving approval to go abroad was reduced in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown, Deng’s successors have continued along the same path, adopting policies aimed at “supporting study abroad”   and “encouraging students to return to China”   as part of their effort to increase the pool of highly trained personnel available for China’s ongoing economic development and modernization drive. As a result, “sending students to study abroad has become one of China’s main channels for cultivating skilled personnel.”9

Current statistics and trends

According to reports from the official Chinese media, more than 2.24 million Chinese have studied overseas for advanced degrees since the beginning of the economic reform and opening policies between 1978 and 2011, and 818,400, or more than one-third, have returned to China after completing their studies.10 Among those who had returned, more than half, or 429,300, had done so in just three years from 2009 to 2011.11 The China Statistical Yearbook, which is published by the State Statistics Bureau, provides annual data on the number of students going abroad and the number returning to China for most years since 1978.12 It confirms that both the number of students studying abroad and the number of returned students have increased markedly in recent years (see Table 6.1). In 2011, nearly 339,700 Chinese students went abroad, more than 10 times the number that left the country to study abroad in 2000 with more than half of them in the United States.

Destinations of overseas Chinese students

Chinese students have studied in more than 100 countries over the past 20 years. The most popular destination has been the United States, which has played a central role in China’s reform-era study abroad policies.19 China sent its first group of 50 students to the United States in late 1978, marking the resumption of US—China educational exchanges. As the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policies progressed, the US quickly emerged as the leading destination for Chinese study abroad students, hosting approximately half of all Chinese students going overseas by the mid-1980s.20 In the 1983 to 1984 academic year, for example, there were approximately 12,000 Chinese students and visiting scholars in the United States, representing about 2 percent of foreign students in the United States.21 The number of Chinese students in the US increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, and the Chinese quickly became the largest group of foreign students in the American higher educational system. After many years as the largest group of foreign students in the US, however, the Chinese student contingent fell to second place in 2001 to

2002, eclipsed by students from India. Experts blame the shift

 

on post-9/11 visa restrictions that made it easier for Chinese students to enroll in universities in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, though experts say the problem pre-dated the terrorist attacks.22 In 2004, the numbers of Chinese students enrolling in the United States actually declined 4.6 percent, primarily because of concerns about visas.23 Nonetheless, Chinese students in 2010 accounted for almost 22 percent of the total number of foreign students in the United States, with 158,000 Chinese students enrolled in US universities, a 23 percent increase over 2009 in total and a 43 percent increase at the undergraduate level.24 Within the United States, the State of California hosted the largest number of foreign students with 93,124, followed by New York with 74,934, and

Texas with 58.188.25

 

Academic level of Chinese students studying abroad

Since 1978, about 90 percent of the Chinese studying abroad have been graduate students. In more recent years, however, college-age students have reportedly become the fastest growing group of Chinese studying abroad. The Institute of International Education reported that the number of Chinese undergraduates enrolling in US universities increased 6 percent in 2006 and 20 percent in 2007.30 Following India, China sent the most undergraduate students to the United States in 2007, with 55 percent of universities reporting an increase in Chinese enrollments, more than any other country. By 2008, 60 percent of universities reported an increase in Chinese enrollment, while only 11 percent noted a decline.31 Undergraduate enrollment reached 26,275, though graduate student enrollment only rose 2 percent, to 57,451.32

One troubling trend among Chinese students is the increasing number of allegations of application fraud, including the use of agents to secure admission to US universities. A 2001 Chronicle of Higher Education article describes students buying essays, using stand-ins for exams, and obtaining improper access to standardized tests.33 By the late 2000s, the problems had reportedly gotten worse. Based on interviews with 250 high school applicants in China, one consultant working for US universities estimates that 90 percent of Chinese applicants submit false recommendations, 70 percent get other people to write their personal essays, 50 percent forge their high school transcripts, 30 percent lie on financial aid forms, and 10 percent list academic awards and other achievements they did not earn or receive.34

Despite these gains in undergraduate enrollment, the majority of Chinese study abroad students are still pursuing Master’s and Doctoral degrees. For example, according to the Institute of International Education in 2010, more than 64 percent of the Chinese students in the US were enrolled in graduate programs,35 yet this figure was down from 80 percent in 2002.36 In 2010, Chinese students were awarded 3,735 PhD degrees, the most of any single country of origin and almost twice as many as the next country of origin, India, with 2,140 PhDs.37 Yet the number of Chinese graduate students in the US has slowed down, while the rate of undergraduate enrollment has accelerated, primarily as a result of universities seeking additional foreign admissions dollars. As a result, it is possible that undergraduate enrollment could surpass graduate enrollment for the first time. In 2008 to 2009, there were 291,439 international undergraduate students, 296,574 graduate students, and 59,233 non-degree students.38

Fields of concentration of Chinese students studying abroad

The most popular fields of study for Chinese students going overseas have been engineering and the sciences. From 1978 to 1984, the vast majority of government-sponsored students in the US studied physical sciences (31%), life sciences (8%), engineering (23%), and mathematics (7%), and a smaller number studied computer science (4%).39 Relatively few Chinese students – whether government-sponsored or in the US with private support – were studying business, humanities, or social sciences.40

Chinese doctoral students in the US have continued to concentrate heavily on the sciences. In 1995, slightly more than half of all Chinese PhD students in the United States were studying natural sciences, according to the US Department of Education,41 and from 1988 to 1996, more than 16,500 out of the approximately 17,900 Chinese who received doctorates in the US were in scientific and technical disciplines.42 The fields of study with the largest numbers of Chinese doctoral recipients were engineering, physical sciences, biological sciences, and mathematics. Reflecting perhaps the maturation of the US–China trade relationship and the Chinese economy, the majority of Chinese students in the 2011 school year were enrolled in business management (28.7%) followed by engineering (19.6%) math/computer science (11.2%) and physical/life sciences (9.9%).43

Trends in sponsorship

Of the approximately 320,000 students China sent abroad between 1978 and 1998, more than 150,000 went abroad at their own expense, while roughly 90,000 relied on support from various work units and approximately 47,000 received scholarships from the government.44 The number of students paying their own expenses to study abroad was initially small, but increased dramatically beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s.45 Nearly half (47%) of Chinese undergraduates, and 29 percent of all foreign undergraduates, received some discounts on their tuition based on their academic record in 2009.46

Chinese student associations and the Beijing government

Most major universities in the United States have a Chinese student association, many of them a branch of the China Students and Scholars Association (CSSA),47 including top universities like MIT,48 Harvard,49 Stanford,50 Cornell,51 Duke,52 UCLA,53 and Penn.54 Nationwide, we can find 196 branches of CSSA, listed in Table 6.2.

 

 

 

 

 

These organizations serve primarily as a social outlet for Chinese students, organizing dances and sports activities, but they also provide orientation assistance for recent arrivals to the United States.

From a counter-intelligence perspective, the main concern about these student associations is the extent of their relationships with the Chinese government, either as a mechanism for monitoring the activities of Chinese students abroad, tasking students with particular actions, or facilitating access of Chinese government personnel to university resources. The official Chinese government liaison organization for these associations are the education sections of the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC,55 and consulates in New York,56 San Francisco,57 Los Angeles,58 Houston,59 and Chicago.60 The Chinese Embassy Education Section webpage succinctly describes the full range of their mission, including the need to “provide services and guidance for Chinese students and scholars in the USA.”61 The Houston consulate education section website even includes links to the China Students and Scholars Associations in the states that fall under its purview.

Concerns about potential Chinese government influence over these associations have been raised again in the past few years, as the groups appeared to be systematically mobilized to protest the disruptions of the Olympic torch in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the visit of the Dalai Lama to the White House in February 2010. After disruptions of the torch relay in London and Paris by Tibetan independence activists and Falungong adherents, large numbers of pro-China supporters turned out for the torch run through San Francisco, including contingents of local CSSA branches.

Prior to the Dalai Lama’s April 2008 visit to Seattle to receive an honorary degree from the University of Washington, the local chapter of the CSSA sent two letters to the university leadership protesting the visit, declaring:

As Chinese citizens, we want to reaffirm that Tibet was, is and will always be part of the People’s Republic of China. . . . We are against any kind of violence. We believe that every country in the world should show respect to the others’ own domestic issues. Therefore, we hope the University of Washington will make sure that Dalai Lama’s upcoming visit has no political agenda, and that his speech will be focused on non-political issues only.62

Similarly, the CSSA branch of the University of Northern Iowa issued the following statement prior to the Dalai Lama’s May 2010 visit:

[T]he recent overwhelming PR efforts on the Dalai Lama’s visit to UNI have reinforced the negative image of China in the minds of the American students, faculty, and staff as well as the local community. . . . If this is an educational event, the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) of UNI does not deem it appropriate for the University of Northern Iowa, as a state university, to endorse Dalai Lama’s political agenda on UNI’s official Web site or any public occasion during the event.63

When a film on Tibet was shown at Cornell University in April 2008, Chinese students allegedly made death threats on the school’s CSSA website against the organizers.64 More troubling, a Chinese student at Duke University was reportedly threatened on an email list run by the school’s CSSA branch for attending a pro-Tibet demonstration, publishing her contact information and the names and addresses of her family members in China for possible retaliation,65 though the association formally condemned the action in an open letter to the Duke University community.66 

After graduation, where do they go?

The early waves of Chinese graduate students decided overwhelmingly to stay in the United States after graduation. According to a National Science Foundation report, for example, between 1988 and 1996, more than 85 percent of the 16,550 Chinese students who received doctoral degrees in science and engineering in the US planned to remain in the US after graduation for employment or postdoctoral appointments.67 A survey by the Wall Street Journal in 2007 found that an astonishing 92 percent of Chinese doctoral candidates who received their degrees in 2002 were still in the United States,68 which was the same level as a 1995 Department of Education survey.69 For purposes of comparison, only 81 percent of Indian graduates and 55 percent of Canadian graduates stayed behind over the same period.70

More recent statistics reveal that Chinese graduate students are still staying in the United States in large numbers following graduation (see Table 6.3), though the numbers have declined almost 10 percent since 2006.

Why do they stay?

US government policies encouraging Chinese students in the US

Permissive US immigration policies are one reason for the popularity of the United States as a destination for Chinese students. Most Chinese students come to the United States on a non-immigrant visa, either a J-1 (cultural exchange) or an F-1 (foreign student). The J-1 visa was created in 1948 to promote educational and cultural exchange activities between the United States and other countries. It is designed for those engaged full-time in study at a college or university usually for some limited period of time with the support of either a US government agency or the student’s own government. Intended in large part to build bridges between the United States and the sending countries, J-1 visas restrict employment to that directly related to the student’s academic training and usually stipulate that the recipient return to his country of origin for two full years following the completion of his or her course of study.

 

J-1 visas are partly governed by international agreements with the dispatching country. Section 212e of the J-1 visa prohibits the holder from changing his or her status and remaining in the United States until he or she has returned to his or her country of origin and met the residency requirement. This requirement becomes applicable if either the student has received funding from his or her own government or he or she possesses certain skills that are included on his or her country’s exchange visitor skills list. J-1 visas were the most common visas issued to Chinese students in the 1970s and early 1980s. China includes most skills on its skills list and in the past was notorious for providing minimal amounts of funding, such as the bus fare to the airport, in order to force students to return.72

Waivers of the two-year return requirement are not readily granted, but there is anecdotal evidence that Chinese students frequently tried to have these restrictions waived.73 They are sometimes able to obtain waivers on the grounds that a US government agency is interested in having them remain. Chinese students most often received these waivers through their universities that can act as sponsors under this category of waiver if the research the student is involved in rises to the level of national interest.74

As China opened up more to the outside world and its economy began to grow, increasing numbers of Chinese students opted to travel to study in the United States without Chinese government funding. These students were able to obtain F-1 visas, commonly referred to as student visas. To qualify for an F-1 visa, however, applicants have to prove that they have sufficient funds available to cover their first year of study and that they have identified additional funds for each year of study thereafter.75 By the early 1980s, some Chinese students could rely on their families for tuition and living expenses. Others tapped into their networks of friends, relatives, and acquaintances who helped them identify and obtain scholarships from US universities.76 According to one source, by 1985 over half of Chinese students traveling to the United States had obtained assistance from US universities.77

While it is fairly difficult for Chinese students on J-1 visas to change their status while still in the United States, the same cannot be said of those on F-1 visas.78 According to both observers of and participants in the process, it is relatively easy to obtain a degree and get practical training while on a student visa, then to find a job and eventually qualify for permanent residence status or even citizenship. A significant proportion of those admitted on F-1 and other non-immigrant visas do just that.79 By the late 1980s, it had become clear that only a relatively small percentage of Chinese students were returning to the country after completing their degrees overseas, sparking concern among Chinese leaders that encouraging students to go abroad was resulting in a “brain drain.”

The Chinese government crackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 created an opportunity for the tens of thousands of Chinese students in the United States at the time. Within hours of the crackdown, President George Bush ordered the Attorney General to take action to allow students and other Chinese nationals who so desired to remain in the United States for up to one year even if their visa status expired. In addition, Chinese researchers who had grants or other support from the National Science Foundation (NSF) were invited to apply for supplemental funding to cover an extension of their stay as a result of this delay in departure.80

Shortly thereafter, citing concerns about reprisals against the prodemocracy movement in China, both the House and the Senate introduced bills designed to allow all mainland Chinese students residing in the country on June 5, 1989 to apply for a change of visa status. Under the bill, those who applied would be granted employment authorization. The Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 passed the Senate 97–0 in July 1989. A similar bill sponsored by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi of California passed the House of Representatives 403–0. Despite the unanimous show of support for this action in both Houses of Congress, in late November 1989 President Bush vetoed the bill, citing the potential damage it could do to exchange programs and diplomatic relations between the United States and China.81

In its stead, Bush expanded the measures he had initially taken so that they would provide the same level of protection for Chinese nationals in the United States as would have been accorded by the vetoed bill. His Executive Order included: (1) an irrevocable waiver of the two-year home country residence requirement until January 1, 1994; (2) assurance of continued lawful immigration status for those who were legally in the United States on June 5, 1989; (3) authorization for employment of Chinese nationals present in the United States on June 5, 1989; and (4) notice of expiration of non-immigrant status, rather than institution of deportation proceedings, for individuals eligible for deferral of enforced departure whose non-immigrant status had expired.82

Nonetheless, Chinese students through the newly formed Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS) continued to lobby Congress for a blanket amnesty bill. The Bush Administration’s delayed departure program was viewed as insufficient because it required Chinese students to go on record as saying they did not want to return to their homeland. After what has been described by some as a “sophisticated lobbying campaign” led by the IFCSS with assistance from a prominent Washington law firm, the Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA) passed Congress in 1992 and was signed into law by President Bush in October of that year.83 The CSPA authorized the Department of Justice to grant permanent residence status (PRS) to nationals of the People’s Republic of China who were in the United States after June 4, 1989 and before April 11, 1990.

Estimates of the numbers of students who benefited from the general amnesty vary from 40,000 to 80,000.84 Statistics collected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service show that the number of students adjusting their status from student to permanent resident increased by 55,000 between 1993 and 1994. This increase has been attributed largely to the Chinese Student Protection Act that came into effect in 1993.85

This one-time change in US immigration policy in the wake of the suppression of the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement in 1989, combined with a booming US high-tech economy, and an increase in Chinese students who held the more flexible F-1 visas, resulted in even fewer students considering returning to China.86

Since Tiananmen, the biggest institutional obstacles to Chinese students coming to the United States were the changes in the visa system following

9/11, which caused huge disruptions in educational applications. By the late 2000s, however, the 9/11 visa problems had largely gone away. Speaking in 2008, Peggy Blumenthal, the chief operating officer of the Institute for International Education, told the Associated Press:

The misperceptions have finally been laid to rest – that it’s impossible to get a visa, Students choosing schools are looking strictly at academic issues, because there’s no reason to believe they’ll have any more trouble getting to the States than getting to Australia.87

Chinese students who stay to work in US companies

Chinese students in the United States have overwhelmingly gravitated toward degrees in the hard sciences and engineering. In recent years this has meant semiconductors and information technologies including software design and development. It is perhaps unremarkable, therefore, to discover that given the opportunity to remain in the United States for employment after obtaining their degrees, Chinese students have been drawn to the same clusters of knowledge-based industries that have attracted their Americanborn colleagues. One geographic region has exerted a particular pull – the Silicon Valley of Northern California. The booming high-tech industry of the late 1980s and early 1990s attracted many of the Chinese students who benefited from the post-Tiananmen amnesty. According to estimates, the San Francisco Bay area in 2000 was home to approximately 20,700 professional workers in the high-technology sectors who were born in greater China (Mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan).88

Returned students: reversal of fortune?

Despite the historically low rate of return of Chinese students who have gone abroad for higher education, a steady increase in the number of students returning to China since the late 1990s has led some to proclaim that China’s “brain drain” is becoming a “brain gain.” Recent state-run media reports highlight the growing number of students returning to China in recent years,89 and official documents assert that the combination of an increasingly attractive economic environment, government incentives, and patriotism is motivating large numbers of students to return to China.90 Some official media articles are even proclaiming that the country is now enjoying the benefits of a “reverse brain drain”91; however, others highlight the continued exodus of China’s top university graduates, continuing to warn of the potential social and economic consequences of a prolonged “brain drain.”92

Factors motivating a decision to return to China

In a large-scale 2002 survey of Chinese and Indian immigrant engineers conducted by Anna Lee Saxenian, a professor of regional development at the University of California, Berkeley,93 respondents were asked to rank the importance of five factors that might influence their decisions to return to China: (1) professional opportunities in China; (2) culture and lifestyle in China; (3) favorable government treatment of returnees in China; (4) limits on professional advancement in the United States; and (5) desire to contribute to the economic development of China. Favorable government treatment of returnees was viewed as a significant factor. About 11 percent of the respondents ranked it as an extremely important consideration in their decision to return. But it ranked third in importance behind professional opportunity and culture and lifestyle. Professional opportunity was the factor cited most often as “extremely important” (29%), outranking the second most important factor, culture and lifestyle (17%), by a wide margin. The survey did not attempt to directly gauge patriotism as a motivating factor, but to some extent it is possible to see a desire to contribute to the economic development of China as a proxy for that. This factor ranked fourth in overall importance behind professional opportunity, culture and lifestyle, and government incentives.

According to an official PRC Ministry of Personnel document, economic development and scientific and technological progress in China present Chinese students who are studying overseas with an array of new opportunities to return to China to seek employment after completing their studies.94 Returned students are leaders in many scientific and technical fields in China and have won numerous awards for their research. Others have launched successful businesses in China. According to Chinese government statistics, as of April 2002, returned students had established about 4,000 enterprises in China. In addition, many hold important positions with universities, research institutes, and government departments at all levels in the Chinese political system. For example, at the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences, 80 percent of the faculty studied abroad, as did more than half of those at the Chinese Academy of Engineering.95

Rapid economic development in China is highlighted in official media reports as the primary factor that is drawing students back to China. In the words of a representative China Daily article, “China’s booming market is reversing the brain drain.”96 Major multinational corporations increasingly view China as one of the world’s most dynamic emerging markets. According to Chinese government statistics, in the first ten months of 2002, China attracted $46.4 billion in actual FDI and $76.5 billion in contracted FDI, increases of 20 percent and 35 percent over the same period the previous year. By late 2008, official Chinese media reported that 483 of the world’s top 500 firms had developed business in China, establishing 365 corporate headquarters in the country and managing more than 4,100 subsidiary companies.97

In addition to the increase in attractive economic opportunities available in cities like Shanghai and Beijing, another factor that makes returning to China an appealing option for many Chinese students is the ongoing recession in the United States. Some returned students have specifically cited the contrast between the global economic slowdown and the continued vibrancy of the Chinese economy as the reason for their decision to return to China to seek employment.

The relatively high social status accorded to returnees that derives from the various incentives the Chinese government has used to entice students to return also serves as a lure. Government connections continue to be perceived as essential to success in business in China and potential returnees recognize that their status opens doors for them that are unavailable to their counterparts in China. One Silicon Valley entrepreneur who frequently travels to China commented on the access that accrues to him because of his status as an overseas student: “It’s easier for me to meet with local mayors than it is for Chinese CEOs.”98

Chinese government policies encouraging students to return

Since the late 1990s, central government and local officials have promulgated a series of policy measures aimed at encouraging Chinese students overseas to return to China, either on a long-term or temporary basis. These policies reflect the Chinese government’s renewed emphasis on tapping the expanding pool of foreign-educated Chinese students and businessmen. At a late December 2001 meeting, for example, Vice-Premier Li Lanqing described overseas Chinese students as “a precious resource of the nation.” Li said that “the need for talent is urgent,” especially in the wake of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and urged officials to “work hard to create the conditions to attract these talented people to come back.” As part of this program, Chinese leaders have set ambitious goals. In November 2011, Ministry of Personnel officials said they intended to attract back to China 2,000 “talents” to work for the central government and 10,000 overseas Chinese students per year to work in provinces and large cities.99 The students would be encouraged to work in financial services – especially in banking, insurance, and securities – as well as for high-tech companies and large state-owned enterprises. The incentives designed to achieve these targets include providing funding to overseas Chinese students and scholars for advanced research as well as financial support for businesses established in China by returned Chinese students.

The first part of this subsection addresses central government policies that are aimed at increasing the number of overseas Chinese students and scholars returning to China. The second part provides an overview of preferential policies offered by several local governments. The final part of the subsection discusses government incentives that are designed to take advantage of the skills and expertise of members of the overseas Chinese community by encouraging them to return to China for short-term service 

 .

Central government policies

Central government incentive programs designed to attract overseas Chinese students, scholars, and entrepreneurs back to the mainland involve several organizations, including the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Public Security.100 Although the range of incentives offered is wide, they can be divided into three broad groups: (1) policies aimed at promoting the involvement of overseas students and scholars in science and education; (2) incentives designed to entice overseas students and entrepreneurs to establish companies in China; and (3) general preferential policies offered to all returned students and professionals.

Many of the central government’s preferential policies for returned students are aimed specifically at getting more of the students who have earned advanced degrees in the sciences and engineering at universities in the US and other Western countries to return to China. The Ministry of Personnel supervises many of the incentive programs, including several that provide financial assistance to students participating in major research projects.101 The level of funding allocated for these programs is impressive. The Ministry of Personnel has spent more than RMB200 million on programs designed to attract returned students to engage in scientific research over the past 15 years,102 and the government has reportedly dedicated RMB600 million for programs that are intended to recruit several hundred overseas Chinese scholars to return to the mainland.103 Among the programs sponsored and managed by the central government are the following:

  Ministry of Education "Yangtze Scholar Award Plan." Established in 1998 by the Ministry of Education and Hong Kong businessman Li Ka-hsing, the program will provide funding to create several hundred special positions for professors in important fields of study within three to five years. It also provides annual monetary rewards to several scholars for outstanding achievements.

  Chinese Academy of Sciences "100 Person Plan." Initiated in 1994, the

CAS "100 Person Plan"   offers appointments to overseas Chinese aged 45 and younger who have received doctorates and have ah outstanding record of achievement in scientific research.

  Ministry of Education Returned Student Scientific Research Start-up Fund. This fund provides financial assistance to Chinese students who received doctorates or engaged in post-doctoral research overseas to return to China to work for educational institutions or scientific research organizations.

  Chinese Academy of Sciences Return to China Work Fund. This CAS program provides start-up research funds to Chinese students and visiting scholars younger than age 50 who have studied overseas.   Ministry of Personnel Financial Assistance Programs. These programs provide assistance to Chinese students returning to China to work in areas outside of the educational system.

  National Post-Doctoral Science Fund. This fund provides financial assistance to post-doctoral students who return to China.

  National Outstanding Youth Science Fund. This program encourages overseas scholars to return to work in China and to become leaders in their fields, and to conduct basic and applied research in the natural sciences in China.

Other central government programs focus on bringing overseas students back to the mainland to start new businesses, especially in the high-tech sector. One of the major parts of this effort has been the establishment of specially designated science and technology business parks for returned students. Officials have opened dozens of “pioneer parks” for returned students throughout the country.104 Many of the parks are established jointly by the Ministry of Personnel and local governments, and are administered by local officials. Specially designated returned students venture parks receive support from the Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Education. Other incentives for high-tech are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

In addition to policies that are tailored specifically to students with science backgrounds and business experience, the central government has crafted a variety of more general incentives that promise to ease the transition of a return to China:

  The government offers to help find employment for die family members of returned students.

  In 2000, the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular concerning preferential policies that are intended to simplify entry and exit procedures for returned students and make it easier for them to acquire residence permits. The preferential policies detailed in the MPS circular are aimed specifically at "high-tech talents and investors."105   Many returned students who hold foreign passports are also eligible for simplified entry and exit procedures under policies adopted by die

Ministry of Education and Ministry of Public Security.106

  The Ministry of Personnel has also established a service center for overseas Chinese students and scholars, along with some 20 consulting and service centers in cities throughout China.

  The government has also established the "China Talents" website (www.chinatalents.gov.cn), which provides information on many of these incentives and preferential policies, and is intended to serve as a convenient source of information for overseas Chinese students. The website features an online guide for students who are considering returning to China.107

  For returned students, after-tax income can be converted into foreign currency and remitted abroad.

The Chinese government is also trying to attract Chinese students studying overseas to return to work in Western provinces as part of its drive to increase the pace of economic development in the western regions. Targeted cities include Xi’an, Chengdu, and Chongqing, where the government has established numerous high-tech industrial parks and is offering a variety of financial incentives to entice overseas students to consider a journey to the west instead of working in the more economically developed and dynamic coastal provinces.108 To promote these efforts, the Ministry of Personnel has organized tours for overseas students considering establishing enterprises in the western provinces.

In addition to implementing the policies listed above, the central government has also assisted local governments in their efforts to encourage Chinese students residing abroad to return to China, especially to work in the high-tech sector and to invest in high-tech companies. According to an official document, the central government supports local governments and departments in their efforts “to create excellent work and living conditions” for returned students and encourages economic and high-tech development zones and returned students’ industrial parks to use preferential policies 

 , including land use and tax incentives, visa assistance,109 and reduced bureaucracy, to attract students to return from overseas.110 In addition, protecting the intellectual property rights of returned students is seen as another way to make returning to China a more attractive option, though China clearly still has a long way to go in this regard.

Local government incentives

While the central government is concerned primarily with increasing the overall number of returned students, and channeling some into lessdeveloped regions as part of its effort to develop the Western provinces, the interests of local governments are somewhat different in that they are competing with each other to attract the best overseas Chinese talent. Among the preferential policies established by provincial governments to attract returned students are tax reductions, and in some cases tax exemptions for firms founded by returned students, special funds set aside for returned students, and the establishment of special zones that offer investment incentives to returned students’ companies. Local governments throughout China have founded more than 40 high-tech parks that are intended to attract investments from Chinese students returning from overseas study.111 Among the municipalities and provinces that have established returned students’ business parks are Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Guangdong, Shandong, Henan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hunan, Guangxi, and Gansu. Free office space (usually for one year), seed funds, and low-interest loans are provided to returning students establishing businesses in the high-tech office parks.

Representatives from these high-tech parks, along with local officials, hold frequent recruiting events in the United States. The seminars they arrange in Silicon Valley have been drawing large crowds as a result of the US economic downturn. Among the cities offering the most comprehensive packages of incentives to attract returned students are Shanghai, Beijing, and Hangzhou.

While most local government incentive programs are aimed at enticing Chinese students to return for commercial opportunities, some provincial governments are attempting to recruit returned students to fill provincial and city government positions. For example, in Liaoning Province, officials from the provincial personnel bureau have reserved more than 50 government posts for Chinese returning from foreign study.112 Another city that has looked abroad to fill key government positions is Shenzhen, where city officials in late 2001 opened several posts at the deputy director level to overseas Chinese candidates.113

Short-term returnees and overseas Chinese helping from abroad

Many of the incentives and preferential policies discussed above are intended to attract overseas Chinese students to return to China on a longterm basis, but the Chinese government also offers incentives to students and scholars interested in returning to China only temporarily, and even to those who may be able to contribute their expertise while remaining abroad. These incentive programs reflect Beijing’s recognition that it is possible for overseas Chinese students, scholars, and entrepreneurs to “serve the motherland” in a variety of ways without returning permanently to China. As a Qinghua University administrator put it, “It doesn’t matter where they live. They are all Chinese and will be able to serve the country.”114 Indeed, according to an official document issued jointly by the Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology,

Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Finance, for example, Chinese students studying abroad do not need to return to China to serve the country:

Chinese students overseas have strong patriotic feelings   and a fervent desire to serve their country. Some have returned to China, where they have taken the lead in improving education and science and technology. At the same time, many students who remain overseas or work abroad after completing their studies can employ their advanced science and technology know-how and firm grasp of management techniques to serve China and contribute to its economic and social development. The ways in which they can do so include holding a concurrent post or part-time position in China; carrying out cooperative research projects with scientists or institutes in China; traveling to China to give lectures; participating in academic and technical exchanges; establishing companies in China; providing consulting services; acting as an intermediary; and engaging in other pursuits that contribute to the development of the Chinese economy and advancement of Chinese society.115

Some of the associated incentive programs are intended to attract overseas Chinese scholars and technicians to accept concurrent or part-time appointments and advisory or honorary positions with higher education institutions, scientific research institutes, national key laboratories 

 , technology research centers, and enterprises. Other incentives

are intended to encourage Chinese who have gone overseas for graduate study to engage in cooperative research with scholars and scientists at Chinese universities, research institutes, and enterprises. The overseas scholars can conduct the research in the countries in which they reside or by returning to work in China on a short-term basis. Chinese who have studied overseas are also encouraged to invest in Chinese companies or establish their own companies in China; to help Chinese enterprises train and educate their employees; to provide technology, consulting services, and financial support to promote the development of the Western provinces; to establish intermediary organizations   to bring foreign investment and technology to China; and to contact foreign experts to invite them to engage in academic exchanges in China and with Chinese academic and technical delegations traveling overseas.116

The following programs, all of which are advertised on the website of the

Chinese Consulate in San Francisco,117 are among those specifically intended to attract students and scholars to return to China for short-term service  :

  "Spring Sunshine" Plan  . Initiated by the Ministry of Education in 1997, the "Spring Sunshine" Plan provides financial assistance to overseas Chinese students to return to China on a short-term basis to participate in academic conferences; take part in scientific research and academic exchanges; help improve technology at large and mediumsized state-owned enterprises; and introduce technology into impoverished areas.118 Under the auspices of this program, more than 600 Chinese studying abroad have received funding to travel to China to attend academic conferences and participate in a host of cooperative research projects and joint educational endeavors.

  "Spring Sunshine" Plan Academic Vacations  . This plan provides funding for students studying or performing research abroad to return to China for three- to nine-month sabbatical leaves to teach in China (see www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/7527).

  National Outstanding Youth Science Fund Type B Financial

Assistance. Administered by the National Natural Sciences Fund Committee  , the program funds outstanding young scholars and recipients of doctoral degrees who are willing to return to China for two or more months per year for several years to work on research projects.

  Chinese Academy of Sciences High-level Visiting Scholar Plan. This program pays for housing and living expenses for overseas Chinese scholars with PhD degrees and five or more years' research experience to serve as visiting scholars at the Chinese Academy of Sciences for a period of six months to one year.

  National Natural Sciences Fund Committee Short-term Return Fund. This fund is used to provide financial assistance to overseas Chinese who hold doctoral degrees and who are willing to travel to China to attend conferences, give lectures, and conduct research in the natural sciences.

  Ministry of Personnel Short-term Return Financial Assistance Program. Administered by the Ministry of Personnel, this program gives funding to Chinese students studying abroad to travel to China to attend conferences, give lectures, engage in cooperative research, and participate in national, ministry/commission, province, or city-level scientific research projects. Among the program goals are facilitating technology transfer   and technological exchanges  .

  Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Academic Meetings Financial Aid Program. Managed by CAS, this program provides funding to encourage exchanges and contacts between young scholars in China and Chinese students studying abroad to conduct research at CAS or universities in China for at least two months of the year.

  Wang Kuancheng Scientific Research Prize. Established by CAS and the Hong Kong-based Wang Kuancheng Education Foundation, the prize funds international conference travel for Chinese students who have received doctorates abroad and return to China.

Continuing problems for returning scholars

Despite significant government resources and energy devoted to attracting returned scholars, there are still substantial complaints and obstacles. According to a survey of returnees conducted by the Central Organization Department in the first half of 2011, scholars complained that many domestic researchers still prefer to spend time on cultivating relationships with officials or appraisers rather than concentrating on research projects.119 They called for a system of fairly allocating government funds, replacing the current system that relies heavily on these cultivated connections.120 Other returnees complained about the failure on the part of hiring departments to deliver on schedule what they had promised and the cumbersome administrative red tape on the resident status for their family members who hold foreign passports.121 Other concerns include China’s notoriously terrible air and water quality, food safety, social security, health insurance coverage, and sky-high apartment prices in major cities.122 At the same time, some scholars have decried the rampant epidemic of academic plagiarism in China, which undermines public confidence in their credentials.123 Taken together, all these factors presented a demonstrable disincentive to leave Western lifestyles and academic standards to return to China. 

Implications

The final section of this chapter examines the technology transfer and counterintelligence implications of China’s study abroad and returned students policies. It is clear from open sources that the Chinese government regards some Chinese students and scientists traveling to or residing in the United States as potential facilitators of overt and covert transfer of technology and technological know-how.

Overt transfer of technology and technological know-how

The Chinese government views overseas Chinese scientists as a potential conduit for the transfer of foreign technology and technological expertise. This is reflected in several recent articles in Chinese science and technology journals, which have advocated expanding the role of Chinese scientists living overseas in conducting research on behalf of Chinese research institutes and facilitating technology transfer.124

Covert transfer of technology and technological know-how

Chinese scholars and scientists in the United States and other countries are also potential targets for China’s intelligence services, especially when they travel to China to attend conferences, according to a former FBI counterintelligence official.125 In some cases, the MSS has approached Chinese students preparing to study in the United States before their departure to establish a clandestine relationship.126 In addition, Chinese scientists and scholars who have studied in or visited the United States (and presumably other countries) are sometimes debriefed after returning to China, and the MSS recruits and co-opts some Chinese who are traveling overseas as part of educational exchange programs or as members of scientific delegations, tasking them with acquiring information or performing other operational activities.127

Notes

1 For an overview of US–China educational exchanges from the 1800s to the founding of thePRC, see D.M. Lampton, A Relationship Restored, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1986, pp. 16–20.

2 Ibid., pp. 182–183. As remains the case today, this distribution was a function of both Chinesegovernment priorities and the availability of foreign funding.

3 For a concise overview of Sino–Soviet educational exchanges, see ibid., pp. 20–23.

4 “Returned Students and HEP Research in China,” Institute of High Energy Physics, October10, 2002, www.ihep.ac.cn/english/r.s.&hep/index.htm. According to the Institute for High Energy Physics, “It can be said that the development of high energy physics in China is inseparable from the returned students.” For an in-depth look at another returned student, Qian Xuesen, who became a key figure in China’s missile development program, see Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm, New York: Basic Books, 1995.

5 Educational exchanges between China and the Soviet Union were resumed at a more modestlevel only in the 1980s.

6 “New Policies to be Issued to Lure Overseas Students Home,” People’s Daily, July 29, 2000.

7 Wei Yu   (“20 Years of

Study Abroad Work: Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s Speech on the Expansion of Sending Personnel to Study Abroad”), China Education Daily, June 23, 1998, p. 3.

8 Wei Yu, “20 Years of Study Abroad Work.”

9 Wei Yu, “20 Years of Study Abroad Work.”

10 www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20111127000017&cid=1701.

11 “Fewer China Overseas Students Staying Abroad,” China Daily, 24 January 2013.

12 National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2002, Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2002, p. 675.

13 The data presented in the China Statistical Yearbook also suggest that the number of returned students frequently provided by official media sources may be too high. The most recent edition does not provide a total number of students studying abroad or returning to China since 1978, but based on the annual data it provides for the years 1978, 1980, and 1985 to 2001, it seems that the actual total number of returned students is perhaps closer to 90,000 to 100,000 than it is to the higher numbers frequently cited in official media reports. It should be noted that the definitions of the key terms are somewhat unclear: none of the sources we reviewed offers a full definition of the terms “returned students”   or “students studying abroad”   . This lack of a standardized definition suggests one possible explanation for the apparent discrepancies between various sources: official media reports may be using broader and thus more inclusive definitions of the key terms than does the China Statistical Yearbook. Some media reports, it seems, may be counting non-students, such as Chinese who have studied overseas as visiting scholars and returned to China, as “students studying abroad” and as “returned students.” It is also possible, of course, that some sources are deliberately exaggerating the number of Chinese students who have returned to China after completing their studies overseas.

14 www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=603811.

15 www.china.org.cn/china/news/2009-03/26/content_17502548.htm.

16 http://helinjiangliuxue.blog.sohu.com/146503590.html.

17 http://helinjiangliuxue.blog.sohu.com/146503590.html.

18 http://edu.sina.com.cn/a/2012-02-16/1633212392.shtml.

19 The US, moreover, has played a central role in China’s educational exchange policies since thelate Qing Dynasty period. In all, according to the Ministry of Personnel and Ministry of

Education, as of June 2002, some 460,000 Chinese had studied overseas, and by far the largest number – more than 150,000 of the total –have studied in the United States. See “Chinese Studying Abroad Top the World,” People’s Daily, June 18, 2002.

20 Lampton, A Relationship Restored, p. 2.

21 Ibid.

22 Beth McMurtrie, “No Welcome Mat for the Chinese? US Visas Seem Harder to Get,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 24, 1999.

23 Remarks of Donald M. Bishop, Minister-Counselor for Press and Cultural Affairs, AmericanEmbassy Beijing, speaking at the American Center for Educational Exchange on January 26, 2005. See www.iienetwork.org/?p=56814.

24 www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2011/2011-11-14Open-Doors-International-Students; and http://chronicle.com/article/InternationalEnrollments-at/129747/.

25 Tamar Lewin, “China Is Sending More Students to US,” New York Times, November 16, 2009.

26 www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2011/2011-11-14Open-Doors-Study-Abroad.

27 Mary Beth Marklein, “Chinese College Students Flocking to US Campuses,” USA Today, December 8, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-12-081Achinesestudents08_CV_N.htm.

28 www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/2011/156504.htm; www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184614.htm; and www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/100000_strong/index.htm.

29 See Institute for International Education, Open Doors 2012, accessed at www.iie.org/Researchand-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/US-Study-Abroad/Leading-Destinations/2009-11

30 “Chinese Students Pursuing US Education,” Associated Press, November 17, 2008.

31 Tamar Lewin, “China Is Sending More Students to US,” New York Times, November 16, 2009.

32 Marklein, “Chinese College Students Flocking to US Campuses.”

33 Daniel Walfish, “Chinese Applicants to US Universities Often Resort to Shortcuts or Dishonesty,” Chronicle of Higher Education, January 5, 2001.

34 Ian Wilhelm, “Falsified Applications Are Common Among Chinese Students Seeking to GoAbroad, Consultant Says,” Associated Press, June 14, 2010.

35 Beth McMurtie, “International Enrollments at US Colleges Grow but Still Rely on China,”

Chronicle of Higher Education, November 14, 2011, http://chronicle.com/article/International-Enrollments-at/129747/.

36 Institute for International Education, Open Doors 2002, Table 2, Foreign Students by Academic Level and Place of Origin 2001/2002.

37 www.nsf.gov/statistics/sed/pdf/tab25.pdf.

38 www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2011/2011-11-14Open-Doors-Study-Abroad.

39 Ibid.

40 Lampton, A Relationship Restored, pp. 2–3.

41 National Center for Education Statistics, US Department of Education, “Degrees Earned byForeign Graduate Students: Fields of Study and Plans After Graduation,” November 1997, p. 1.

42 National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resource Studies, Statistical Profiles ofForeign Doctoral Recipients in Science and Engineering: Plans to Stay in the United States, November 1998, NSF 99-304.

43 Institute of International Education (2012). “Fields of Study of Students from Selected Placesof Origin 2011/12.” Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange. Retrieved from www.iie.org/opendoors.

44 Wei Yu, “20 Years of Abroad Study Work.”

45 This trend may have worrisome implications for China as government-sponsored students arefar more likely to return to China.

46 Marklein, “Chinese College Students Flocking to US Campuses.”

47 After the Tiananmen Square turmoil in 1989, an “opposition” student organization, known asthe Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars, was established, with over 1,000 student representatives from 200 universities attending its first congress in August

1989. According to its bylaws, the mission of IFCSS is to (1) disseminate information and educate the public regarding the democratic movement in China, (2) represent the wishes of Chinese students and scholars in the United States and protect their interests; promote freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights in China as well as China’s scientific, cultural, and economic development, and (3) participate in and support activities to protect the interests of Chinese students and scholars in the United States, and promote China’s democratic movement. See http://research.nianet.org/~luo/IFCSS/Archives/Constitution/IFCSS_bylaws_94.PDF.

48 http://cssa.mit.edu/.

49 www.hcssa.org/.

50 http://acsss.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/entry/.

51 www.cornellcssa.com/.

52 http://dukechina.org/blog/.

53 http://sites.google.com/site/cssaucla2009/.

54 http://cssap.org/.

55 www.sino-education.org/english/index.htm.

56 www.nyconsulate.prchina.org/chn/jysw/.

57 www.chinaconsulatesf.org/chn/jy/default.htm.

58 http://losangeles.china-consulate.org/eng/hzjl/edu/.

59 http://houston.china-consulate.org/chn/jy/. The Houston education section covers Chinese student affairs in Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, and Puerto Rico.

60 www.chinaconsulatechicago.org/eng/ywzn/jy/.

61 www.sino-education.org/english/index.htm.

62 http://blog.seattlepi.com/schoolzone/archives/136186.asp.

63 http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/29b9f862-605d-11df-a484-001cc4c002e0.html.

64 Michael Stratford, “E-mails Target Professor For Showing Tibet Film,” Cornell Sun, April 16, 2008.

65 Paul Mooney, “Chinese Student at Duke U. Hit With Online Attacks for Alleged Sympathy forTibet,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 14, 2008.

66 http://dukechina.org/blog/archives/2812.

67 National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resource Studies, Statistical Profiles of

Foreign Doctoral Recipients in Science and Engineering: Plans to Stay in the United States, November 1998, NSF 99-304, pp. 4–5; see also Jean M. Johnson and Mark C. Regets, “International Mobility of Scientists and Engineers to the United States – Brain Drain or Brain Circulation?,” National Science Foundation Issue Brief, November 10, 1998 (revised).

68 www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20111127000017&cid=1701.

69 National Center for Education Statistics, US Department of Education, “Degrees Earned byForeign Graduate Students: Fields of Study and Plans after Graduation,” November 1997, p.

2.

70 www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20111127000017&cid=1701.

71 “Doctorate Recipients from US Universities: Summary Report 2007–08,” Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, NSF 10-309, December 2009.

72 Interview with Veronica Jeffers, immigration attorney, December 6, 2002. Chinese studentsmade use of the internet to share tips on successful strategies by setting up their own websites. Immigration attorneys also maintain websites which provide information on what is permissible under current law.

73 Ibid.

74 Work on the Human Genome Project or HIV-related research would fall into this category.

75 “Tips for US Visas: Foreign Students,” US Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.

This information is posted on the US State Department website at: http://travel.state.gov/visa/foreignstuden.html.

76 Interviews, December 2002, Silicon Valley.

77 This statistic is from a book by Qian Ning   on his impressions of life as a student in the United States entitled Studying in America  , excerpts of which are quoted in a February 1997 report from the US Embassy in Beijing, “Vice Premier Qian’s Son Writes Book on the Experiences of Chinese Students in the United States,” available at: www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/sandt/webqiann.htm.

78 Although student visas for Great Britain, Australia, and Canada are somewhat easier to obtain,it is reportedly more difficult to move from student to employee status in those countries than it is in the United States.

79 David S. North, “Some Thoughts on Nonimmigrant Student and Worker Programs” in Temporary Migrants in the United States, ed. B. Lindsay Lowell, US Commission on Immigration Reform, 1996, p. 67. Available at: www.utexas.edu.lib/uscir/respapers/tm-

96.pdf.

80 “Chinese Researchers in the US Who Receive Support from the NSF,” What’s News, June 30, 1989.

81 George Bush, “Memorandum of Disapproval for the Bill Providing Emergency Chinese

Immigration Relief,” November 30, 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89113002.html.

82 Ibid.

83 Norman Matloff, “A Fax On Both of Your Houses,” summer 1993. This article is available at:www.uwsa.com/issues/imigratn/imig001.html.

84 Accurate figures for the numbers of non-immigrant visa holders in the US at any one time aredifficult to obtain. Media reports quoted estimates of between 40,000 and 70,000 Chinese students in the country at the time. In his November 30, 1989 veto memo President Bush used the number 80,000 to refer to the cumulative number of Chinese students who had studied in the United States under student and scholar exchange programs up until 1989. This figure was subsequently picked up by the media and others to reflect the number of students who would benefit from the amnesty. This number is clearly erroneous.

85 North, “Some Thoughts on Nonimmigrant Student and Worker Programs,” p. 68.

86 For a survey of the views of Chinese students in the United States during this period of time,see David Zweig and Chen Changgui, China’s Brain Drain to the United States: Views of Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in the 1990s, University of California, Berkeley, 1995.

87 “Chinese Students Pursuing US Education,” Associated Press, November 17, 2008.

88 Cited in Anna Lee Saxenian, Local and Global Networks of Immigrant Professionals in Silicon Valley, Public Policy Institute of California, April 2002. Includes information on how these figures were estimated.

89 See, for example, “Shandong Province Welcomes Returned Students,” Xinhua, February 3, 2002.

90  

(Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Finance Notice Regarding “Several Suggestions Concerning Encouraging Personnel Studying Overseas to Serve the Country in a Variety of Ways”), May 14, 2001, Ministry of Personnel Document No. 49. Posted on the website of the Ministry of Education, www.moe.edu.cn/guoji/chuguo/cgzhengce/01.htm. See, for example, “Students Coming Home to Serve,” China Daily, December 9, 2002.

91 Among the many articles that report a “reverse brain drain” or “brain gain,” some of the mostilluminating put the issue in a comparative perspective, examining not only China, but also India and other countries. See, for example, Leslie Pappas, Monika Halan, and Daniel Heft, “Brain Gain,” The Industry Standard, August 7, 2000.

92 See, for example, Ray Cheung, “Talented Workers Stream Overseas,” South China Morning Post, July 29, 2002; and Ray Cheung, “Brain-Drain Fears Deepen as Graduates Join Foreign Exodus,” South China Morning Post, April 2, 2002. According to an official Xinhua news service report cited in the latter article, for example, about 30 percent of Beijing University’s 2001 graduating class left China to pursue graduate studies abroad.

93 Saxenian, Local and Global Networks of Immigrant Professionals in Silicon Valley.

94 “Several Suggestions Concerning Encouraging Personnel Studying Overseas to Serve the Country in a Variety of Ways.”

95 http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/24/business/fi-china24.

96 “Students Coming Home to Serve,” China Daily, December 9, 2002.

97 “82% of world’s top 500 in China found trade unions,” People’s Daily, October 13, 2008, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6514202.html.

98 Interview with Hong Chen, Silicon Valley, December 2002.

99 “China lures back overseas talent to help steer national development,” Want China Times,

November 27, 2011, www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx? id=20111127000017&cid=1701.

100 This makes for a rather crowded bureaucratic landscape and complicates analysis of the policies.

101 “New Policies to be Issued to Lure Overseas Students Home,” People’s Daily, July 29, 2000.

102 “China Allotted 200 Million Yuan for Students Returned from Overseas,” People’s Daily, January 22, 2002. The funds have been awarded to 4,000 students who returned to China permanently and 3,000 who came back on a short-term basis.

103 Jasper Becker, “Research Revamp Aids IT Catch-Up,” South China Morning Post, January 11, 2002.

104 Han Rongliang, “China Opens a Wider Sphere for Returned Students from Overseas to MakeCareers,” People’s Daily, February 4, 2002.

105 “Returned Overseas Chinese, Relatives Encouraged to Develop High-Tech Industries,” Chinese Education and Research Network News, April 2001.

106 Liu Wanyong, “PRC Simplifies Procedures for Returned Students to Work in China,” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), March 1, 2002, in FBIS, March 1, 2002.

107   (Chinese Study Abroad Talent Information Network – Return to

China Guide), www.chinatalents.gov.cn/hgzn/index02.htm.

108 “Western China: Where Returned Students Become Successful Businessmen,” People’s Daily, July 5, 2001. According to this article, “Many students returning from overseas universities have become successful business people in western China and their high-tech businesses are prosperous.”

109 For example, Chinese personnel who need to enter China multiple times on a temporary basisare eligible to receive multiple-entry “F” visas that remain effective for up to five years, and those who will reside in China are eligible for foreign resident permits that remain valid for up to five years along with multiple-entry and exit “Z” visas.

110 “Several Suggestions Concerning Encouraging Personnel Studying Overseas.”

111 “China Acts to Attract Returned Students,” Xinhua, September 4, 2001.

112 “Liaoning Recruits Government Officials among Returned Students,” People’s Daily, July 8, 2001.

113 Clara Li, “Shenzhen Looks Abroad for Talent,” South China Morning Post, December 17, 2001. The article cites a Shenzhen Economic Daily report that officials were seeking overseas candidates for positions in the Shenzhen High-tech Industrial Zone Executive Office and the Shenzhen Information Technology Office.

114 Quoted in Cheung, “Brain-Drain Fears Deepen as Graduates Join Foreign Exodus.”115 “Several Suggestions Concerning Encouraging Personnel Studying Overseas.”

116 Ibid.

117 The information on these incentive programs is drawn from the website of the EducationDivision of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco (the information is only available in Chinese): http://sf.chinaconsulatesf.org/Education/0815/p8-ch-7.htm.

118 The program description notes that it is intended primarily for students who have received adoctorate and have an outstanding record of academic achievement in their fields.

119 “China lures back overseas talent to help steer national development,” Want China Times.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.122 Ibid.

123 Louisa Lim, “Plagiarism Plague Hinders China’s Scientific Ambition,” National Public Radio, August 3, 2011: www.npr.org/2011/08/03/138937778/plagiarism-plague-hinders-chinasscientific-ambition.

124 See “China: Journals Urge Use of Overseas Scientists for Technology Transfer,” FBIS Report,December 6, 2001, which cites articles from Keyan Guanli, a journal of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Keji Guanli Yanjiu, a science and technology policy journal published by the Guangdong provincial government.

125 The official is quoted in Vernon Loeb, “Espionage Stir Alienating Foreign Scientists in US,”Washington Post, November 25, 1999.

126 See Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994, pp. 61–65.

127 Ibid., esp. pp. 27–32. 

7

Bringing Technology "Back" to China

Sending students abroad provided no guarantee that China would benefit from their skills. As discussed in the previous chapter, most Chinese who studied abroad – the overseas Chinese scholars or OCS   – did not return. Those who did return faced sparse technical and financial resources, were cut off from their international peers, or had difficulty reintegrating into Chinese society. Promises made to returnees evaporated locally, where the foreign-educated experts ran into the age-old problems of bureaucracy, discrimination, lax standards, and a culture hostile to innovation.

By the same token, there is ample evidence that expectations were frustrated at both ends. Chinese scientists willing to return to these sub-par conditions were not always of the caliber sought by Beijing. Thus while PRC ministries and outreach organizations continued appealing to overseas scholars to return and “render service to the fatherland,” a counter-current of caveats, requirements, and calls for specific skill sets may also be seen in the policy declarations of these same organizations. Meanwhile, China promoted an alternative strategy of “serving in place” that allows Chinese scholars to stay abroad and transfer foreign technology remotely and continuously – a fee-for-service approach that reduces the exposure of both parties.

A final step to ensure foreign technology flows to China was the creation of more than 150 “OCS pioneering parks”  in the hearts of 54 “National New and High Technology Development Zones”  

. These ultra-modern facilities were designed for returning specialists to “incubate” (find commercial or military applications for) technologies acquired overseas and to support short-term visits by Chinese employed in high-tech sectors abroad, including labs funded with foreign tax money.

These returnee parks are home to some 8,000 companies founded entirely on technologies created abroad. 

Policy support for OCS recruitment

China has relied on overseas scholars to transfer foreign technology for over a century. While Japan and Russia at times were the preferred venues, the United States is first choice for Chinese students today. According to a study posted by the University of Southern California, 229,300 Chinese students went abroad in 2009 to 2010, 128,000 of whom came to the US. That number is growing, absolutely and relative to the number of foreign students in America.1 Although the ratio of students returning to China is rising, this is less of an issue to Chinese policy-makers than before, since the PRC is now able to exploit OCS who remain abroad, go back to China, or return “for short periods.”

Our task here is to show how China positioned itself to use OCS “talent” more fully to obtain and transfer foreign technology. In the previous chapter we listed factors responsible for the large number of Chinese students abroad, and gave specifics on the subjects studied, state incentives, motivation, career choices, and counter-intelligence implications for host countries. In this chapter we offer an insider’s view of the role that China’s diaspora scholars – PRC students abroad and co-opted participants born outside China – play in the transfer process, as seen through PRC ministry sources and Chinese academic studies.

A key document defining Beijing’s goals vis-à-vis overseas Chinese scholars is Ministry of Personnel (MOP) No. 75, “Plan for Working with Overseas Scholars in the Personnel System during the Ninth Five-Year

Plan”   , released in 1996. This document – the foundation for China’s current approach to OCS management – begins by acknowledging the mission’s importance:

Working with overseas Chinese scholars is an important component of China’s reform and development. Overseas scholars are a precious source of human talent. Completing this work with overseas scholars is an important task for our country’s total development and use of talent resources.

The document notes that from 1977 to 1995 China sent a quarter of a million students abroad, 170,000 of whom failed to return. Both groups – the returnees and those still overseas – are important resources, given their “grasp of the world’s advanced science and technology.” Accordingly, the document goes on, China enacted a series of regulations guiding efforts to attract OCS back to China, who made outstanding contributions on all “battlefronts.” Their numbers along with those still abroad “serving China by multiple means” keep increasing.

These successes aside, the “tasks ahead are still formidable.” China must “build a scientific system2 for working with overseas Chinese scholars consistent with our socialist market economy,” nurture a collection of overseas scholars of all types who understand the world’s advanced sciences and technologies, form a “cadre of people to work with them”   and encourage them to serve China by multiple means. In

particular, we must:

Perfect the system for working with overseas scholars and associated policies, laws, and regulations; train a cadre of cross-century overseas scholars; build an information market for their intellectual skills; support the creation and development of high-tech entrepreneurial parks for their use; support the creation and development of multi-channel, capital-intensive funding for their activities; and support and guide developmental activities of overseas scholar associations and academic organizations.

In plain terms, the PRC government is announcing its creation of a comprehensive technology transfer program based on overseas Chinese experts – those living abroad and those who return permanently or periodically – to include a dedicated corps of S&T transfer specialists distinct from the technical experts themselves, whose task is to identify overseas experts and find use for whatever information they have. The MOP plan goes on to outline specific tasks within these categories, highlights of which include:

  To create an operational system   for Scholars abroad to serve China by multiple means. Understand and get a grasp on the circumstances of top notch Chinese scholars abroad and adopt measures to encourage and draw them into serving China by returning for short periods to lecture, cooperate, and develop technological and intellectual exchanges.

  To create a system for exchanging at regular intervals information with China's embassies and consulates abroad on operations with OCS.   To release information at regular intervals on supply of and demand for overseas scholars' intellectual skills at home and abroad. This information needs to be systematized and online nationwide by 2000.

“Bases”   will be offered to returning Chinese scholars for R&D work, productization, and business investment. These entrepreneurial parks (described later in this chapter) will be used “to introduce knowledge they acquire abroad, the technologies they master, and their accumulated experience and research results.”

Beyond laying the groundwork for transferring overseas Chinese “talent” – and confirming what we noted earlier about the role played by Chinese diplomatic missions abroad in this process – the MOP document lays to rest any notion the outside world may have had about the independence of China’s overseas support groups, such as the foreign-based S&T advocacy groups discussed in Chapter 5, and Chinese student associations treated in Chapter 6. Specifically, the plan calls for:

  Creating multiple types of overseas scholar friendship associations and academic groups as a means of organizing their academic and technical exchange activities.

  Increasing contact with overseas scholar and student associations abroad and "endeavoring to broaden their channels of contact with the fatherland."

  Making these friendship associations into "a bridge and bond that links overseas scholars to the [PRC] government and all aspects of society." The document cautions that exploiting foreign-trained talent is a long-term strategic task. Ministry departments on all levels must fully understand the importance of this work, use the advantages their offices provide, and work systematically to make the project a success. Reiterating a point made earlier about the need for specialized handlers, the document calls for a cadre of “overseas study management personnel”   trained in S&T, law, computers, and foreign languages to interact with overseas scholars.

Five years after MOP 75’s release, a remarkably prescient article appeared in the July 2001 issue of a leading Chinese science policy journal summarizing efforts made by the MOP and other ministries to harness foreign technologies acquired by diaspora Chinese and proposing additional steps needed to take full advantage of ethnic scholars abroad.3 Entitled “Current Situation and Measures to Develop and Utilize Overseas Chinese Talent Resources,” authors Liu Yun and Shen Lin base their study on the following premise:

Although overseas Chinese scholars and ethnic Chinese specialists are living abroad, their hearts belong to their families and country. They are concerned constantly with the development of their ancestral country . . . and are willing to use what they learned in the service of China. . . . How to more effectively develop and utilize this precious intellectual resource and encourage them to contribute to China’s scientific development and economic construction by various means will affect whether China can play an active strategic role in the fierce international competition.4

Liu and Shen spend several pages describing work done by China’s ministries of Personnel, Education, Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Natural Science Foundation of China, and the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs in locating overseas Chinese talent and channeling it to China’s service. Notwithstanding these efforts, they argue, the following problems remain:

1. The increased mobility of overseas scholars has made it difficult for the PRC government to keep track and make use of them.

2. The various government departments are tripping over each other in their individual efforts to attract overseas scholars. There is insufficient coordination.

3. Financial inducements to return for long- and short-term work are inadequate. Some programs are limited to PRC citizens abroad and

“are not useful for attracting the larger range of foreign scholars of

Chinese ethnicity”  .

4. Not enough effort is being made to meet the individual needs of those recruited. More multifaceted   approaches are necessary.

5. Most attention is paid to ethnic Chinese overseas scholars in universities and research institutes with insufficient efforts directed at Chinese personnel in foreign companies.

6. Policy, organizational, and administrative mechanisms need improvement.5

Liu and Shen's proposed solutions to these problems were all, in one form or another, put into practice. Accordingly, we believe the article's purpose was to convey state decisions already taken and to build a consensus for their implementation, while avoiding embarrassment to the government over the aggressive nature of the proposals,6 Their recommendations merit a detailed accounting.

The article urges that an "OCS data center' be established to share overseas talent more fully and that "intermediate service and information networks" be strengthened. Databases supporting these networks will host information on overseas Chinese experts provided by the education and science offices of China's foreign embassies and consulates, NGOs abroad (presumably front organizations like CAIEP and COEA), and the "broad connections of overseas Chinese S&T organizations'' (the foreign S&T advocacy groups described in Chapter 5). Intermediary organizations "run by civilians with help from the government"    should be set up in areas of high-ethnic Chinese concentration overseas as a bridge for domestic recruitment.7

Using the martial metaphors characteristic of official prose, the article advocates building, an "overseas S&T corps"   that unites

expatriate Chinese scientists and engineers within a broad network. There are limits to what can be done with 140,000 OCS in the United States relying, solely on existing overseas organizations. We need "something on the order of a Chinese S&T development overseas advisory committee   established in the important advanced countries'' and provided with fixed support by the Chinese government. The advisory committee will control different "expert committees"   staffed by exemplary overseas scholars, whose responsibility will be to "contact and organize ethnic Chinese experts and scholars" and invite them to contribute to China's S&T enterprise by "enacting S&T plans, giving advice and evaluation, and at the same time promoting China's foreign S&T cooperation and exchange."8

Meanwhile, China should make full use of the overseas Chinese S&T organizations and set up multi-regional overseas expert advisory committees,. The overseas groups will support "discussion forums" in China for foreign experts to share information on the latest science and technology; deliver reports on "special topics" to relevant organizations in China; offer background information for talks between the Chinese government and foreign entities on S&T cooperation and exchange; conduct liaison between the PRC and foreign governments, universities, companies, and research institutes; "help China introduce technology"; give advice and counsel on important national S&T projects; evaluate Chinese state S&T projects; "arrange for direct exchanges between overseas experts and their counterpart units in China"; and "invite responsible persons from influential foreign science and technology Organizations back to China for exchange visits, lectures, consultations, and participation through suitable: means in S&T cooperation with their counterpart units."9

The article advocates nothing less than PRC state control and manipulation of foreign-based ethnic Chinese scientists; or to put a neutral spin on it, the merger of the PRC and diaspora Chinese S&T expert communities in support of China's development. Proposals made here expand the 1996 MOP plan, while plugging gaps that surfaced during its implementation. Other passages in the article are simply mind-boggling –or would be had they not played out in practice.

For example, on page 123 we learn that China must expand its financial subsidies   to OCS to “rapidly transfer overseas research work to China or bring back [sic] to China important technological inventions and patents already completed for commercialization.” By the same token:

When conditions permit, we can identify certain fields critical for China’s development and set up R&D facilities abroad to subsidize by means of planned projects the research of top overseas scholars and the reversion   of their research results to China.

Recognizing that it is not always advantageous or possible to persuade OCS to return to China, Liu and Shen argue the need to create more channels for ethnic Chinese experts abroad to “serve the fatherland.” Domestic PRC companies should be encouraged to establish R&D facilities and subsidiaries abroad to “induce overseas Chinese scholars and ethnic Chinese specialists to join the alliance”  . China must also “use the ‘two bases’ formula to promote an organic synthesis between the work of overseas scholars and R&D work done in China.”10 In lay terms, this means that “research” in China should be informed wholly or in part by parallel projects run in foreign laboratories, whose results are passed to China, costfree, by diaspora scholars working the foreign project.

This “two bases” approach to Chinese tech transfer is treated in detail later. Meanwhile, we conclude our presentation of the Liu and Shen piece, as do they, with an admonition that needs no interpretation on our part:

To protect the personal interests of overseas persons of talent, China should adopt a “do more, talk less”   or “do it but don’t talk about it”   policy on recruitment and foreign S&T cooperation, especially in sensitive fields, and avoid by all means propagandizing on a large scale in domestic and foreign newspaper reports successes in our cooperation and recruitment, to avoid making them vulnerable   and putting these overseas persons of talent in an embarrassing situation.11

Tweaking the OCS strategy

In February 2003, shortly after these proposals were aired, a report was issued by the PRC ministries of Personnel, Education, Science and Technology, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Public Security, Foreign Trade and Cooperation, the State Planning Commission, State Economic and Trade Commission, Bank of China, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs announcing the establishment under MOP auspices of a “Joint Working Committee for OCS to Return and

Serve the Country”   12 to “study and implement

the Party’s and State Council’s policies” on the utilization of OCS. The group was mandated to convene semi-annually to examine new circumstances and issues pertaining to OCS; discuss measures for linking up with them; report on their situation; and propose means to carry out relevant work. Addressing Liu and Shen’s second point (above), each member organization was required to work within its own area of responsibility.

Then, in 2006, on the tenth anniversary of its 1996 edict, the MOP issued a second major directive entitled “Notice on Printing and Promulgating the

Eleventh Five-Year Plan Regulations on Working for the Return of OCS” 

  that expanded the scope of the project

still further. The document began by pointing out that due to the pace of worldwide technology development, China’s efforts to utilize diaspora experts were still inadequate. Accordingly, the ministry promised:

We will unceasingly build new mechanisms for OCS to render service to China, encourage them and their groups to return and build bases from which to serve China, and support their linking up with special development projects needed in key domestic regions and industries.

The document called for the number of OCS parks at all levels throughout the country to reach 150 over the next five years (the goal was overachieved), 40 or 50 of which would be built by the MOP jointly with local governments, to host up to 10,000 returnees (they doubled their quota). At the same time, China would aim for 200,000 person-instances of OCS rendering service to China by a variety of appropriate means “without asking where they are, only that they be useful”  . OCS personnel and groups would be drawn from broader categories, wider regions, and higher levels to act as a bridge and conveyor belt   to foreign technology by means such as “dual appointments, cooperative research, returning to lecture, carrying out academic and technological exchanges, consultant activities and on-the-spot investigations, and intermediary services.” The document also stipulated a system of “fixed period exchanges” and stepping up “macro guidance” for short-term returnees.

The MOP vowed to make full use of OCS organizations and social bodies within China and abroad to positively affect these cooperative outcomes, share resources and cooperative services, expand OCS information networks and databases, “build an integrated nationwide talented overseas persons information system,” and continuously create service projects that match the needs and special characteristics of the OCS, mediated by consulting hotlines  , networking platforms, instruction manuals, and media dissemination.

Importantly, the document also called for attention to the quality of information and skills brought “back” by co-optees. New emphasis would be placed on attracting high-level OCS as the “cornerstone for building an innovative country” and to allow China to “leap over” stages other countries went through in their development. Dubbed the “Green Channel” 

 , the new policy called for “fewer but better” and for “flexible and diversified” means of inducing OCS support.

Ministry-level edicts from about 2005 on stressed this new goal of seeking top-level overseas scholars. Whereas the earlier mission had been merely to catch up with worldwide scientific developments, the newer strategy called for surpassing other countries in key S&T sectors by recruiting world-class talent. For example, a 2005 MOP policy notice promised preferential arrangements   to overseas scientists with “exceptional expertise in areas where China badly needs support.”13 The Ministry offered a schedule of salaries based on academic background and performance, with additional compensation for those with critical skills.

Another document issued by the MOP that same year raised the bar for OCS targeted via the Green Channel, seeking only:

  scientists known for contributions they have made as innovators in their fields;

  academics at famous universities who have attained the rank of associate professor or higher;

  high-level managers at Fortune 500 companies, famous MNCs, or financial institutes;   managers at mid- or top-level positions in foreign governments or famous NGOs;

  experts and academics who have made important contributions to their specialties or fields, published influential articles in famous journals or received awards of international scope, whose accomplishments are at the forefront of their fields;

  experts, scholars, and technical persons who have led large, international scale R&D or engineering projects and have rich experience in scientific research and engineering technology;   people who have important technological inventions and patents or specialized technology;

  talented persons who possess a particular specialized skill urgently needed by China.14

This same definition of “high-level OCS” appeared in a document issued subsequently by MOP and 15 other members of the Joint Working Committee on March 29, 2007, indicating its acceptance as state policy.15 The importance of top-level OCS in China’s scheme for development was captured in a scripted “question-and-answer” session appended to the joint announcement, which noted that an astonishing 81 percent of the Science Academy members had studied abroad, as had 21 of the 23 people awarded for their work on China’s “atomic bomb, ballistic missile and earth satellite”   projects. Almost the entire upper echelon of scientists responsible for China’s strategic weapons programs learned their skills abroad.

A final notice released by the PRC Ministry of Education also in 2007, titled “Opinions on Further Strengthening Our Work to Bring in Outstanding Overseas-educated Talent Abroad,” rounds out our understanding of the breadth of China’s effort to manipulate overseas scholars and the extent to which these efforts permeate (or spawn) diaspora scholarly organizations.16 According to the document, the MOE issues information on China’s needs for particular skills through “multiple formats and channels,” including “overseas embassies and consulates, the Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange,17 the China Scholarship Council,18 Chinese Scholars Abroad,19 and other organizations.” The ministry also sponsors “online exchanges” and “two-way interactive chat rooms” to promote ties between domestic employers and OCS.

In the 2007 document, the MOE promised to strengthen leadership over OCS organizations abroad, make full use of the “bridging effect” with these OCS bodies, and offer “information on demand” to PRC employers obtained from the overseas advocacy groups. The ministry would also “perfect the system for managing OCS information used by the education offices at Chinese embassies and consulates abroad,” build a database of skilled OCS assessed as candidates for support (what intelligence services would call “developmentals”), and make recommendations for recruiting leading OCS who work in areas of urgent demand (i.e., targeting leads). We are reminded in the document that China’s education attaches “vigorously provide information and other support to PRC employers with particular needs.”20

The ministry signaled its intent to move beyond reactive talent spotting and to try to forecast demand for OCS skills by canvassing the needs of “all categories of domestic work units.” It now advertises this information to the overseas talent pool through web-based portals and “trade talk working groups”   made up of HR personnel from PRC companies, who travel to countries where OCS are concentrated to negotiate their return. Like MOP and the Ministry of Science, MOE sponsors face-to-face technology exchanges, returnee subsidy programs, OCS innovation parks for diaspora experts who “have in hand contemporary S&T achievements,”21 and to that extent sheds much of the innocence one is predisposed to grant the coordinator of China’s academic programs. 

Contributing to China from "two bases"

Besides encouraging OCS to return, China also seeks diaspora Chinese willing to “serve in place,” i.e., service China’s technology needs while living abroad. Born of the fact that most Chinese who study abroad do not return, the rationale for pursuing this “two bases”   option has long since changed from making the most of a bad situation to a goal pursued cynically in its own right. Get past the metaphors and into specifics, and there is little to distinguish the policy from state-supported espionage.

“Two bases” simply means being abroad all or most of the time doing research at a host country facility and passing on the knowledge one obtains – in the form of know-how, data, or physical samples – to China, either gratis or in exchange for compensation. The Chinese literature dealing with this subject does not dwell on subtleties that host countries obsess over such as whether the technology is owned by the OCS researcher or is merely accessible.

Rather, the focus of the two bases documents we have examined is on transfer venues and their sustainability – how to get the information “back” to China and how to keep it coming back. While the formula has a benign aspect – students “gradually transfer the core of their overseas research work to China and ultimately effect a ‘soft landing’ to return and serve

China” – its usual expression, as Liu and Shen describe it,

means having one end abroad and the other end in China, providing a more stable “foothold” in China and foundation for cooperative research, so that the service rendered by overseas scholars to China can develop in a “deeply layered, sustainable, easily managed, and effective” direction.22

The origin of the two bases policy can be traced to China’s National Natural Science Foundation, which from August 1992 “had in effect specialized funding programs aimed at subsidizing the return of OCS to China for short periods of time to work and lecture.”23 These programs were seen as “enormously successful.” A decade later NNSF was still promoting the technique, resolving to “continuously improve and develop the two bases formula.” By raising subsidies and through “spirited organization and guidance” the foundation hoped more OCS would “tighten the connections between the work they do abroad and in China, and link up with important domestic research projects.”24

Two years after NNSF had codified the concept, China’s MOP in 1994 issued a document that expanded the idea beyond “two bases” and science to “returning for short periods” and to China’s development in general. Entitled “MOP Notice on ‘Implementing Temporary Measures for Subsidizing Overseas Chinese Scholars to Return to China for Short

Periods to Work in Areas Outside the Educational System’” 

 , the measure promised

subsidies to OCS volunteers who have:

  outstanding academic achievements, received an influential award in the natural or social sciences, or published a high-level academic paper in an influential journal;

important inventions or received a patent;

access to advanced technology urgently needed by China and who intend to return and carry out cooperative research or developmental exchanges.

Returning for short periods entails having a regular job at a second, overseas “base.” The MOP further defined eligibility as a willingness to:

  tackle key problems in scientific research at the state, committee, provincial, or municipal level; help work units in China solve critically important R&D issues; return for cooperative research, lecturing, training, project development, technology transfer, and technology exchange;

  participate in and give specialized reports at important international conferences held in China or important nationwide academic conferences;   engage in other academic and technological exchange activities recognized by the MOP.

Interested OCS were encouraged to apply to the MOP through a sponsoring organization in China, or work through the education office in a Chinese embassy or consulate abroad. Alternatively, a company in China with a technological problem could apply to the MOP, which “will work through the education office and other offices in Chinese embassies and consulates overseas to contact the needed personnel.” It is hard to find a clearer statement than this about the role of China’s overseas diplomatic corps in brokering informal tech transfers.

A closer look at how the system operates in practice is provided by Japanese researcher Endo Homare, who has had privileged access to the inner workings of China’s tech transfer organizations. Endo described a gathering in Xi’an of “short-term” OCS visitors, who were hosted by the municipal S&T committee. The session began with a speech by the organizer flattering the guests, who responded by describing in detail the technologies and patents they brought “back” and in what forms they could be made available. The committee then listed the city’s own needs, whereupon both sides delved more deeply into specifics. Endo noted that the technologies were medical and biological but he was reluctant to describe them, because “although not exactly secret” they were negotiated “deep inside China’s interior.”25

By the turn of the century “two bases” had broadened into “serve the country by multiple means”  . The new, extended formula was defined in a communiqué issued jointly by the ministries of Personnel, Education, Science and Technology, Public Security, and Finance in 2001 entitled “Circular on the Release of Opinions on Encouraging Overseas

Chinese Scholars to Serve the Country by Multiple Means” 

  as:

Chinese studying or working in foreign countries and their professional teams shall carry out various activities for the purpose of promoting the social and economic development of China through holding concurrent posts in China, conducting cooperative research at home or abroad as assigned by domestic entities, returning to lecture, carrying out academic and technology exchanges, founding businesses in China, doing consultancy work, on-site evaluations, and performing intermediary services [emphasis added].

Examples given of venues were “holding concurrent and honorary posts, or working as consultants in PRC universities, research institutes, state key laboratories and engineering centers, companies and non-industrial organizations.” More to the point:

Overseas Chinese scholars are encouraged to cooperate in research with domestic universities, colleges, scientific research institutes, and industrial enterprises by taking advantage of advanced technologies, facilities and financial support in the countries where they are located. . . . Research may be done in foreign countries and then shifted back home for a short or long term. OCS are encouraged to establish R&D bases at home and abroad through cooperation with domestic organizations.

Compensation for services to the fatherland was also addressed: “The government offers financial support to OCS for introducing world class and internationally competitive cooperative R&D projects.” In addition, “OCS engaged in national priority research projects or returning home for short periods to render service will have their expenses paid by the national or local government and employing unit.” The document also encourages them “to transfer the results of their scientific research” at Pioneering Parks for Overseas Chinese Scholars   , which we discuss below.

A MOP spokesperson provided more specific points at the scripted “public” session that typically follows these ministry announcements:

“Joint positions” include higher education, R&D labs, state key labs, engineering technology research centers as well as various kinds of jointly held company and business, advisory, and honorary posts. “Cooperative research” can be done in schools, research labs or companies or involve setting up cooperative R&D bases in China or abroad. “Commissioned research” involves China commissioning OCS to do R&D abroad.

OCS can convert intellectual property or scientific research results into products or businesses in China, or use the technical skills and information [obtained while abroad] to set up specialized consultancy companies. They can also help train PRC specialists; perform intermediary services that bring capital, technology and projects to China; and build relationships between Chinese and foreign academic and technical organizations.

They can do all this without leaving their host country or by traveling to China for short periods only. The spokesperson continued, “Of course, rendering service to China is not limited to the above-mentioned methods. We encourage OCS in practice to create other appropriate methods to better serve China.” The session ended with a reminder that China’s policy is to “borrow knowledge”   and “borrow brains”  , so please oblige us. 

Science towns and OCS parks

In 1994, the same year in which MOP adopted the “two bases” formula, China established its first dedicated returnee park – the Jinling Overseas Chinese Scholar S&T Park   – in Nanjing, a joint venture of the city’s office of personnel and the “Nanjing New and High Technology Industry Development Zone.” The Jinling OCS Park, the method by which it was established, and its location at the center of one of China’s designated zones for “indigenous” high-tech development became a model repeated more than 150 times as China created a national S&T infrastructure based largely on information provided by overseas returnees. We know of no other country with a structure that is remotely similar.

In this section we discuss the legislative basis for these returnee centers and in the subsequent section provide examples of their organization, layout, and functioning. Our first task, however, is to make sense of the confusing layers of administration that link OCS parks with the facilities hosting them. The largest of these superordinate organizations in which the OCS parks are embedded are the “National New and High Technology Development Zones”  , which are distributed among all the

major Chinese cities (some cities have two or more such science towns, 

 . There are also at least 130 national-level “Innovation Service Centers for New and High Technology”  , to productize technology brought “back” by returnees or acquired by other means (see box below).

As the importance of returnees in China’s development scheme grew, the taxonomy distinguishing these units began to break down. “Pioneering Parks for Overseas Chinese Scholars”   were originally created within innovation service centers, or within the New and High-tech Development Zones directly (which hosted the service centers), but in time they became coterminous with either or both superordinate bodies. For example, the website for the Guangzhou Innovation Service Center sports a second masthead today for the OCS Park   – the two are one

organization.26 In Wuxi one nameplate carries both the Innovation Service Center’s and OCS Park’s logos,27 and so on through most of the 150 or so cases we studied. Examples with three logos are not uncommon.

The following is typical: Jiading National OCS Pioneering Park  also called Shanghai Jiading OCS Pioneering Park 

, was set up in 1996 within the Shanghai Jiading High-tech Park District .28 The latter began life in 1994 as one of six sectors in the Shanghai Zhangjiang Hi-tech Park Zone  . That, in turn, is one of China’s science towns, established in July 1992 in the central area of Shanghai’s Pudong District.

According to a description on the OCS Park Alliance website, Jiading was one of the first national OCS parks ordained by MOST, MOP, and MOE, and “uses the two labels–one set of teams formula   for managing the commercialization of enterprises,” i.e., the OCS Park and Jiading Hi-tech Park operations are integrated, and may even be the same thing.29 This is the norm for returnee parks today and speaks volumes about their importance in China’s S&T development. The association of the OCS Park with the science town itself is also acknowledged on the Jiading website: “Thanks to the cumulative effect of the national science town’s and OCS park’s two trademarks, the park area has become an important vehicle for guiding companies’ autonomous innovation and bringing the incubator function into play.”30 In other words, returnees support the science town’s “innovation.”

 

In 2001 about 10 percent of the OCS parks were co-designated “incubators” and that percentage rose over the years. The relevant point, however, is not what a unit nominally does (their goals and starting points are shared in any case) but whether one or more ministries subsidize a facility by accrediting it, for example, as a “national-level OCS park.” Bearing in mind their overlapping functions and the impossibility of distinguishing these organizations in any practical sense, let us look at the documents that supported the creation of China’s science towns and the OCS parks within them.

On March 6, 1991 China’s State Council issued a “Circular on the Approval of National Development Zones for New and High Technology

Industries and the Relevant Policies and Provisions” 

 , which along with a co-

published Annex recognized 26 development zones that had been operating locally since 1988. Thus were born China’s “science towns.” The zones were to be managed jointly by the city or province where they were located and by the Science Ministry, which defined their physical boundaries. In

1992, 25 zones were added, the total eventually stabilizing at 54.37

The Circular also defined some 11 technical disciplines, corresponding to areas targeted for development in the Five-year Plan, as within the zones’ purview. The science towns, from their outset, were not built to create new technologies but “to accelerate the commercialization and industrialization of achievements in high technology” – an entirely different mission that depends on access to outside “talent” and the ideas of others. While administration of the zones was to be a government function, the Circular was clear about who ran them, namely:

The persons in charge of the enterprises shall be the scientists who are familiar with the research, development, production and sale of the products in their enterprises, and shall be the full time personnel of the enterprises.38

Documents issued jointly by the Central Committee and State Council in 1999,39 and by MOST in 199940 and in 2002,41 continued to push the basic theme of using the science towns to “transform high and new technology achievements,” as opposed to accomplishing the achievement. “Innovation” was consistently understood in the narrower sense of adapting breakthroughs done elsewhere to products that directly supported China’s industrialization and international competitiveness. Experimenting “for its own sake” was discouraged in favor of a “practical and realistic” approach that adapted ideas brought in from abroad.42

The adapting could be done in China’s science towns, or it could be done through Chinese proxies overseas. According to a third MOST document on high-tech zones issued in 2002,

The role of China’s science and technology institutions in foreign countries shall be brought into full play to help the enterprises in the National New and High-tech Zones introduce the advanced technologies from abroad, which shall be assimilated and innovated.43

Indicative of the Science Ministry’s thinking is a cogently argued study entitled “Leading Innovation and Imitative Innovation” that appeared in a PRC S&T policy journal in 2001.44 The article bears citing because it describes so well the direction Chinese science followed as recently as a decade ago and even today. According to its authors, there are two types of innovation: “leading innovation”   and “imitative innovation” 

 . People ignore the latter, when in fact it is a key element in expanding the economy. Whereas leading innovation, where fruitful, may improve a company’s finances, its effect on the country as a whole, they argue, is “infinitesimally small”  .45

The authors give compelling reasons for China to concentrate its resources on imitative innovation – the argument itself being an adaptation of the “early adopter” theory that posits success not to the innovator but to the first user. Risk is minimized. It is easier to make practical products. Return on investment is faster. It is more suitable to later developing countries (such as China), which typically are weaker in human capital, have an inadequate technology base, and “lack an ability to create things themselves”  . Since no one copies a bad innovation, the technical level of society as a whole is raised.46

Although imitation risks IPR violations, the article claims that this is not a necessary outcome with a proper legal framework and correct assessment of the trade-offs inherent in buying and licensing. One obvious problem with imitation as a strategy, the authors note, is that the owners of new technology may not want it “diffused”  . But that problem can be overcome by focusing not on the “monopoly protection characteristics” of technology but on its open and transferable aspects along with opportunities for “forced transfer”  .47 Taking this into account, the emphasis on creativity is misplaced. China “should not blindly pursue leading innovation.” Doing so is a waste of resources and opportunities.48

The Science Ministry, meanwhile, has continued to emphasize right up until the present the need to “internationalize” technology innovation. Here are some planks from MOST’s 2006 to 2010 plan for development of the high-tech zones:

  China must "expand international cooperation and exchange" and "seize opportunities to transfer international industries and R&D."

  Gathering information on international technology and transferring that technology is part of our task to create high-tech industries during the eleventh Five-year Plan.

  "Make full use of the S&T resources of multinational corporations in China and encourage their technological cooperation with domestic firms through multiple means."

  We must Concentrate on international "S&T information work" as the basis for developing China's high-tech industry and "help domestic companies utilize by multiple means foreign innovation resources."49

MOST’s plan also calls for setting up a “Chinese innovation network”    that links up China’s high-tech zones, technology incubators, technology transfer organizations, and “international innovation relay centers”   worldwide to promote tech transfer. The network will further blur the already fuzzy distinctions between these units, although the centrality of overseas Chinese scholars to the operation – those who return to China and those who transit back and forth – is evident in official statistics.

According to MOST, some 22,000 OCS were attracted to the New and High Technology Development Zones as of 2006.50 This number is up from 9,700 occupants claimed by the ministry for 2000,51 and close enough to the 20,000 figure given by the OCS Park Alliance in 200952 for the occupancy of OCS facilities inside the zones to conclude that most returnees to science towns end up in OCS parks, that OCS parks for all intents have merged with them, or that the parks themselves are defined by concentrations of returnees.

These “OCS Pioneering Parks” first appeared in 1994 under municipal or provincial sponsorship and were referenced in the MOP’s 1996 “Plan for Working with Overseas Scholars in the Personnel System during the Ninth Five-Year Plan.”53 They achieved national status in 2000 in a tri-ministry document entitled “Notice on Trial Work to Organize and Develop the Model Construction of National OCS Pioneering Parks,” which stated:

Some 300,000 Chinese have studied abroad since the country was opened up and more than 100,000 have returned, constituting an important resource for China’s development of new and high technology enterprises. To implement General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s instruction at the 15th Party Congress to “encourage overseas Chinese scholars to return to China to work or serve their ancestral country through various means” the Ministries of Science, Personnel and Education adopted various practices over the years to bring them home to found businesses and serve China. Meanwhile, local organizations made use of National New and High Technology Development Zones and Innovation Service Centers for New and High Technology to establish more than 30 OCS pioneering parks, creating an excellent environment and conditions for them to return and found businesses.

Under these new conditions, to accelerate the building of OCS pioneering parks, MOST, MOP and MOE have joined to ratify the creation of the first batch of national base model Overseas Chinese Scholar Pioneering Parks on the foundation of existing parks and to guide their development nationally, to build more favorable conditions for OCS to return and found businesses.

1. Ten or so of the better OCS parks will be chosen for the first batch of trials and as experience accumulates, they will serve as models for developing OCS entrepreneurial parks throughout the entire country.

2. Existing parks will apply for model status and be selected by the three ministries with recommendations from provincial or local government authorities.54

The document served notice that the PRC national government, through the three ministries charged with managing OCS “talent,” was putting its weight and money behind the returnee park project. Locally built OCS parks that showed promise were selected in batches for state funding and promotion. MOST had more to say about OCS parks the following year in a July 2001 paper on technology “incubators.”

Under the new plan priority will be given to promoting the construction of Pioneering Parks for Overseas Chinese Scholars in cooperation with MOP, MOE and SAFEA to attract even more OCS back to China. We will also move ahead with pioneering parks for dual military–civilian technology conversion.55

The July paper recognized the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs’ role in the program. It also included a rare reference to the use of returnees for military projects. Direct involvement by China’s Education Ministry, for its part, was signaled in a document released by MOE a few years later, which stated:

The MOE is building OCS innovation parks and perfecting their incubator function to attract groups of OCS who have in hand contemporary S&T achievements and their own IPR and modern management skills to facilitate their cooperation with domestic employers and promote effective integration of advanced foreign technology with domestic resources.56

As part of its consolidation effort and as an indication of the program’s maturity, MOST, MOE, and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (successor to MOP) in 2008 formed a “Returned Scholars Venture

Park Alliance of the China Association of Technology Entrepreneurs”   from 44 of the returnee parks.57 Its purpose

was:

To support the development of returnee enterprises; accelerate the conversion of their S&T achievements; promote interaction with the government, commercial, academic and research sectors; improve their ability to provide internationalized services; and attract high-level skilled persons to China.58

Organizationally, the Alliance acts as a platform to connect member parks with government offices at the national and local levels. It also aims at “strengthening cooperation between returnees and domestic events” such as the Guangzhou Convention of Overseas Scholars in S&T and the Overseas Chinese Scholars Business Founding Week (see Chapter 5), i.e., to encourage returnees who already made the transition to pitch those still sitting on the edge.59

Some insight into the Alliance’s day-to-day operations may be gleaned from its emphasis on databases. These include a “database of S&T accomplishments”   a database for difficult   technological problems, and a “com-mon service platform for transferring S&T accomplishments.” Another database holds information on returnees with businesses in China in order to “integrate the enterprises and personnel resources of member units with society.” As of 2010, the Alliance was fielding a system to “disseminate information about the needs and availability of technologies” to member park stakeholders.60

A small but critical change in the Alliance’s structure came from a 2010 decision to allow “organizations for returned scholars” to become members of the park alliance, eliminating the need for a physical presence on site. OCS associations and NGOs brokering returnee skills – including support from diaspora Chinese back for short periods – now have a role in park policy decisions.61 Headed by the secretary of MOST’s Torch Program Incubator Management Office   , the Alliance will ensure that the parks develop in ways that are supportive of national S&T planning.62

Central role of OCS parks

Returnee parks are not isolated islands within China’s science towns but are embedded within their organizational hierarchies, integrated with surrounding components, and are the towns’ most prominent and persistent components. An example is Zhongguancun  , a science town with seven subdivisions in the northwestern part of Beijing and host to 16 OCS

parks, some of which are administered as “companies.”

The Beijing ZGC International Incubator Co., Ltd.  

  is recognized by MOST as a National Innovation Service Center for New and High Technology , a New and High-tech Commercial Incubation Base , and a sponsor of Beijing

OCS Pioneering Park . The firm was established in

December 2000 from several pre-existing organizations, including three government bodies, four state-owned companies, and the original Beijing OCS Park, which was the basis for the new organization. It is focused entirely on returnees.63

Similarly, The ZGC Software Park Incubation Service Center Co., Ltd. 

  was founded in November 2001 from the

preexisting ZGC Software Park OCS Pioneering Park   and ZGC Software Park Incubator . It was recognized by the Beijing Municipal S&T Committee in 2002 as a New and High-tech Commercial Incubation Base; in January 2004 the ZGC Science Town formally named it an OCS Pioneering Park; and in December 2006 MOST recognized it as a National Innovation Service Center for New and High Technology. Each of these five names appears on the website’s masthead today.64 In 2007 the Beijing Personnel Office and the city’s S&T Committee also recognized it as a Beijing OCS Pioneering Park, one of 27 (!) returnee parks in the capitol area alone.65

Another OCS park in the ZGC complex is CUTM Returned Student Pioneer Park  , established in 2007 jointly by ZGC

Science Town and the Chinese University of Mining and Technology. Its website also sports two logos, including one for the Zhongguancun Energy

and Safety Science Park  .66

One more example in Zhongguancun is CASIA Incubator Park, run by the Chinese Academy of Sciences.67 The park began in April 2004 as the

CAS Automation S&T Commercial Incubator Co., Ltd.   established by CAS and the same Beijing ZGC International Incubator Co. identified with Beijing OCS Pioneering Park

(above). It acquired its present name and status as an OCS park in 2005.68

The park teams up with the Beijing National Technology Transfer Center 

  to “offer specialized services to returning OCS, such as

conversion of R&D results, integration of S&T resources, international S&T exchanges, and linkups with large-scale company projects.”69 If the park does any “pioneering” at all, it is not apparent in its description.

Besides the Jiading National OCS Pioneering Park described above,

Shanghai has at least six more OCS parks. An example is Caohejing OCS

Park   established in 1996 by Shanghai’s Caohejing New Technology Open Economic Zone and the Shanghai Office of Personnel. It is “three units in one”   an OCS Pioneering Park,

National Innovation Service Center for New and High Technology, and an International Company Incubator set up to support PRC firms

“commercializing S&T achievements.” The park had 95 OCS businesses “under incubation” in 2011. Half originated in the US.70

No better illustration of the importance of returnee parks in China’s scheme for high-tech development can be found than Guangzhou’s

Entrepark , “Guangzhou OCS Pioneering Park”).

Established in August 1999 by the ministries of Science, Education, and the “Guangzhou Development District” (the science town), Entrepark is allied with 30 local universities and research facilities to support commercialization of returnees’ technical skills. Many of these labs and colleges have centers at the park to facilitate interaction. The park also brokers “multifaceted alliances” between OCS and PRC companies.71

English names for the six joined “parks” that make up the main complex are: Science Town Consolidated R&D Incubation Zone, Guangzhou International Incubator for Technological Enterprises, Science Town Information Building, Guangzhou Development District Western Zone, Guangzhou Software Science Park, and Guangzhou Technology Innovation Base. These six parks are not simply affiliated with the OCS park; they were “established”   by it for the benefit of returnees, who to date have incubated some 455 high-tech companies.

Nearby Shenzhen, with its own science town (Shenzhen Hi-tech

Industrial Park), is host to the co-located Shenzhen Overseas Chinese High-

Tech Venture Park  . The facility started out in 2001 as

Longgang OCS Park, was certified in its present incarnation by MOP in 2004, and was named an Innovation Service Center for New and High Technology by MOST in 2008, growing in the process from 25,000 square feet to 720,000 square feet.

A useful exercise for readers with more specialized interests might be to plot the intersection (geophysical, organizational, personnel) of OCS parks with large centers of defense research at, for example, Mianyang, Xi’an and Hefei. For us, our goal is simply to show the centrality of OCS parks and of returnees in general to China’s S&T development.

This concludes our survey of PRC policy support and domestic infrastructure for converting technology that Chinese scholars acquire abroad into weapons and competitive products. The Chapter complements material presented in the preceding chapter on PRC students abroad, and closes the loop on the question of what Beijing actually does with its foreign-trained talent. In the next chapter we examine the role that traditional espionage plays in China’s technology transfer process.

Notes

1 Vivian Lin, "Chinese Students Pour into the United States," US-China Today, November 18, 2010, www.uschina.usc.edu/w_usct/showarticle.aspx?articleID=16091.

2 Note the nuance: not a system to do science, but a "scientific system" to make use of overseasscientists.

3 Liu Yun   and Shen Lin   ("The Current

Situation and Countermoves on Development and Utilization of Overseas Chinese Experts Intellectual Resources") in   (Science Research Management), vol. 22.4 (July 2001), pp. 115-125.

4 Ibid., p. 115.

5 Ibid., p. 121.

6 The likelihood of this being a quasi-official communiqué is strengthened by the appearance afew months later in a second major Chinese language S&T policy journal, Keji Guanli yanjiu

 , of a similar proposal to step up exploitation of OCS. The article recommended

subsidizing the "recruitment and utilization of overseas S&T personnel" and sponsoring activities with overseas Chinese S&T associations. Mirroring Liu and Shen's proposal, it also endorsed building an "international S&T personal information database, an overseas Chinese experts database, and supporting systems for information networks and decisions." Zeng Lu 

  ("Opportunity and Challenge: International

S&T Cooperation Environment and Measures for Guangdong Province"), in Keji Guanli yanjiu  , 2001.5, October 2001.

7 Ibid., p. 122.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 123.

11 Ibid., pp. 124-125.

12 By 2006 its membership had increased to 16 with the addition of the State Council's Overseas

Chinese Affairs Office, the General Administration of Customs, the State Administration of Taxation, and the National Development and Reform Commission. By 2011 the roster of participants stood at 22.

13   (Policies Relating to Experts Returning (or Coming) to China to Reside Permanently and Work), MOP, 2005.

14   (Guiding Opinions for Defining Highlevel Talent in Our Work to Bring in Overseas-educated Talent), MOP, 2005.

15   (Opinions on Building a Green Channel for the

Return to China of High-level Overseas-educated Talent Abroad), MOP, 2007.

16   (Opinions on Further Strengthening Our Work to

Bring in Outstanding Overseas-educated Talent Abroad), MOE, 2007.

17   www.cscse.edu.cn.

18   www.csc.edu.cn.

19   www.chisa.edu.cn.

20   (Opinions on Further Strengthening Our Work to

Bring in Outstanding Overseas-educated Talent Abroad), MOE, 2007.

21 Ibid.

22 Fiu Yun and Shen Fin, "The Current Situation and Countermoves on Development and Utilization of Overseas Chinese Experts Intellectual Resources," p 123.

23   (Subsidizing OCS to Return for Short Periods to Work and

Fecture). CAS, Institute of Mechanics, undated article posted to www.imech.ac.cn, viewed March 2010. The programs were the "Special Fund to Subsidize OCS to Return to China for

Short Periods to Work and Fecture"  , and the "Overseas Scholars Cooperative Research Fund"  .

24 Ibid.

25 Endo Homare,   (When China Links Up with Silicon Valley).

Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2001, pp. 266-270.

26 www.entrepark.com/WEB/gzstip/index.htm.

27 www.wxsp.gov.cn.

28 Also known as the Shanghai Zhangjiang New and High-tech Industrial Development Zone -

JiadingPark   or simply  .

29 www.rcsp.com.cn. Item number 28, viewed October 25, 2010.

30 www.jdhitech.com.

31 Also called "Incubators for Technological Enterprises"  .

32   (Introduction to Innovation Service Centers for New and High Technology). Yuan Huan  , Huang Cuiqin  , Zhang Lili  , and Zhang Li  

, October 1995.

33   (Opinions on Construction of Incubators for

Technological Enterprises Durine the Tenth Five Year Plan), MOST, July 9, 2001.

34   (Means for Accrediting and Managing

S&T Commercial Incubators (Innovation Service Centers for New and High Technology)), MOST, December 7, 2006.

35 Ibid.

36 www.kscyy.com.cn.

37 By early 2013, the number Of designated "science towns" in China had surpassed 80.

38   (Conditions and Measures for the Designation of High and New Technology Enterprises in National High Technology and New Technology Industry Development Zones), Section 3, March 6, 1991.

39 (Decision of the Chinese

Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council on Strengthening Technical Innovation, Developing High Technology and Realizing Industrialization), August 22, 1999.

40   (Various Opinions on Speeding up the

Development of National New and High Technology Development Zones), MOST, August 11, 1999.

41   (Report on the Status of Ten Years of

Development of National New and High Technology Development Zones), MOST, March 15, 2002.

42   (Various Opinions on the Reform and

Innovation of the Administration System of the National New and High Technology

Development Zones), MOST, March 8, 2002,

43   (Decision on Further Supporting the National

New and High Technology Development Zones), MOST, January 31, 2002.

44   (Wu Qiong),   (Lang Xijun),   ("Leading

Innovation and Imitative Innovation"), In   ("Scientec, Talent, Market"), April 2001.

45 Ibid., p. 8.

46 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

47 Ibid., p. 11.

48 Ibid., p. 9.

49  

  (Notice on Promulgating the Eleventh Five-year Development Program for National New and High Technology Commercialization and Its Infrastructure (Torch) and the Eleventh Five-year Developmental Planning Program for National New and High Technology Development Zones), MOST, April 4, 2007.

50 2006  , (Developmental Status of National New and High-tech Zones for

2006), MOST, June 28, 2007.

51   (National New and High Technology

Development Zones Tenth Five-year and 2010 Developmental Planning Program), MOST, September 12, 2001.

52 bbs.533.com/viewthread.php?tid=109549.

53   (Plan for Working with Overseas Scholars in the Personnel

System during the Ninth Five-year Plan), MOP, 1996.

54   (Notice on Trial Work to Organize and

Develop the Model Construction of National OGS Pioneering Parks), MOST, MOP, MOE, June 21, 2000.

55   (Opinions on Construction of Incubators for

Technological Enterprises During the "Tenth Five-year Plan"), MOST, July 9, 2001.

56   (Opinions on Further Strengthening Our Work to

Bring in Talented OCS), MOE, February 2, 2007.

57 By the end of 2009, 61 of 149 OCS parks had joined the alliance, constituting 76 percent of thenational-level returnee parks.

58 "Introduction" from the Alliance website, www.rcsp.com.cn, dated October 25, 2010.

59 Ibid.60 Ibid.

61 Alliance website <www.rcsp.com.cn>. Information dated October 8, 2010.

62 Ibid.

63 www.incubase.net.

64 www.zgcspi.com.

65   (Beijing's OCS Pioneering Parks Reach 27 Units), December 18,

2008, www.chinaqw.com/lxs/cytd/200812/18/142735.shtml.

66 www.zgces.com.

67 The English name does not capture the term "OCS Pioneering Park" present in its actual

Chinese name  .

68 www.rcsp.com.cn.

69 Ibid.

70 www.cscse.edu.cn/publish/portal0/tab888/info5888.htm and www.chinatalents.gov.cn/lxcyyq/shanghai.htm.

71 www.entrepark.com.