F. The Covid-19 pandemic (2020)

This lost opportunity, for China, was quickly followed by a new opportunity for dis-

information: the Covid-19 pandemic. It was all the more important that, in Taiwan, 

information manipulation had focused on health issues more than on politics in 

recent years, as Audrey Tang explained: “most viral rumors are not political, they are 

289. “Taiwan Denies Donating NT$1 Billion in Support of Hong Kong Protest,” Focus Taiwan (20 Jun. 2019). 

290. http://archive.fo/cNjFm.

473

about food safety, they are about health […] That is dominant.”291 In other words, the 

Taiwanese society was particularly vulnerable to the Covid-19 “Infodemic.”

In late February and early March 2020, “Chinese users organized a coordi-

nated disinformation campaign to smear the Taiwanese government on Facebook, 

Twitter, and YouTube. Rumors spread included that the government was covering up 

domestic cases of the coronavirus, the DPP was profiting off of the disease, and bodies 

were being burned en masse or buried secretly in construction sites. Chinese Weibo users 

openly bragged about spreading these rumors on Facebook.”292 On Twitter, the hashtag 

#台湾肺炎 (Taiwan pneumonia) was used to make people believe that the virus was 

Taiwanese. Chinese media also defended the idea that Taiwanese authorities used the 

health crisis to pursue political independence (以疫谋独) but that this “shameful ploy” 

would end in bitter failure.293 The announcement of a Taiwan-United States partnership 

to combine their efforts in the fight the pandemic (台美防疫伙伴关系) and Taiwan’s 

subsequent donation of 10,000 masks a week to the United States triggered a surge of crit-

icisms from China. In an op-ed widely shared across Chinese networks, Xinhua described 

the decision as a political maneuver by Taiwan to get closer to the U.S. at the expense of 

its population’s well-being, an act depicted as treason. How could the DPP give so many 

masks to the United States when the Taiwanese population had trouble finding any? Xinhua 

condemned Taiwan’s policy of being “distrustful toward China but not the United States or 

Europe” (只防大陆，不防欧美). This policy, which they described as “hating China and 

flattering the United States,” was “even more harmful than the virus” (仇中媚美 比病毒

更毒) according to the media.294

This campaign also contained interesting cases of 

image and identity theft. On several occasions the 

accounts spreading these rumors portrayed themselves as 

established media: for example, @APChinese_ (an 

account since suspended by Twitter) used the logo of the 

Associated Press as a profile picture. In a tweet posted 

February 28 (see image), this account, which posed as a 

Chinese branch of the Associated Press, accused the gov-

ernment of hiding Covid-19 deaths and illustrated its 

point with a hijacked picture of corpses (captured in 2006 

and showing the victims of an Indonesian earthquake).

In the second half of March 2020, the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice 

organized a press conference to announce that 196 (72%) of the 271 cases of disinfor-

mation on the pandemic for which an investigation had been opened had originated 

in China: “Chinese users prepare messages aimed at the Taiwanese public, they 

co-ordinate the manner in which these messages are spread, then they use fake 

accounts to spread the messages on Taiwanese Facebook groups.”295

291. Quoted by Monaco, Smith, and Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints, 63.

292. Ibid.

293. “国台办：民进党当局趁火打劫，” 以疫谋独 “，注定遭到可耻失败” (“The Bureau of Consular 

Affairs: DPP Authorities Use the Pandemic to Advance Their Agenda of Political Independence, but this Shameful 

Ploy Will End in Humiliating Defeat”), Xinhua (14 Feb. 2020), http://archive.vn/l0Myn.

294. “仇中媚美 “比病毒更毒！——戳穿吴钊燮们的表演” (“‘Hating China and Charming the United States’ 

is Even More Toxic than the Virus! Let Us Expose Wu Zhaoxun’s Spectacle for What It really is”), Xinhua (19 Mar. 

2020), http://archive.vn/YsMap.

295. “70 Percent of Fake COVID-19 News from China: Investigation Bureau,” Focus Taiwan, CNA English News 

(8 Apr. 2020).

474

Among those cases were false testimonies which all followed a formulaic blueprint: 

“My father is a city councilor and another council member told him that Taiwan actually 

has more than 500 cases of Covid-19 and 200 related deaths” (elements of the formula 

like “my father” or “councilor” sometimes changed to give the impression of a variety of 

sources). One could also find doctored screenshots of Taiwanese TV channels and fake 

Taiwanese governmental press releases.296

One of the most persistent rumors in subsequent weeks was that of a (fake) racist 

Taiwanese campaign against the director general of the WHO. On April 8, Tedros 

Ghebreyeus, who is known to be close to the CCP (→ p. 213), declared during a press con-

ference that he was the target of a racist campaign on social media that had been going on 

for months and he accused Taiwan of being its instigator.297 President Tsai and the Taiwanese 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately denied having anything to do with the campaign. 

Two days later, in the midst of numerous messages of apology posted by Taiwanese users on 

social media, the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice declared that these accounts 

were in fact Chinese, and not Taiwanese. The investigators noted the existence of numerous 

identical messages to prove that this was a coordinated operation, as shown by the screenshots 

below. These messages frequently appeared on a false account modelled on that of Radio 

Free Asia in order to spread confusion.298 The ASPI showed that 60% of the 65 accounts 

diffusing these messages of apology in traditional Chinese had previously tweeted in 

simplified Chinese, which seemed to indicate that their owners were Chinese from 

the mainland hoping to pose as Taiwanese.299 The whole campaign was apparently a 

Chinese operation meant to weaken Taiwan’s position. This seemed to be confirmed 

by the rapidity with which officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed 

support for the director general of the WHO, and by the mobilization of the patriotic rap 

group CD REV which published a video clip about the scandal on April 14. The song entitled 

“Mr. Virus is warning us!” took up the idea of a racist Taiwanese campaign against the head 

of the WHO.300

296. Ibid.

297. William Feuer, “WHO Chief Addresses Death Threats, Racist Insults: ‘I do not give a Damn,’” CNBC (8 Apr. 

2020).

298. Hwang Chun-mei, “Taiwan Finds Fake Twitter Accounts Tweeting Apologies from ‘Taiwanese’ to WHO 

Chief,” Radio Free Asia (10 Apr. 2020). 

299. ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre, Covid-19 Disinformation and Social Media Manipulation Trends (8-15 Apr. 

2020), 3.

300. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2oCweEA4zfo.

475

Examples of identical messages (thus indicating a coordinated campaign). Translation: “I am Taiwanese 

and I am terribly ashamed of the Taiwanese who attacked Tedros in such a vicious way. 

On behalf of the Taiwanese people, I apologize to Tedros and ask him to forgive me.” 

The campaign had probabaly a twofold objective. A long-term objective first: 

Beijing could not prevent the re-election of Tsai but it could try to discredit her 

and the DPP while undermining the confidence of the population in its govern-

ment’s actions. And a short-term objective: to make people forget Taiwan’s excel-

lent handling of the pandemic, which could be interpreted by some observers as a 

demonstration of the virtues of the model of liberal democracy, especially in terms of 

the circulation of information. Indeed, Taiwan was seldom affected by the pandemic 

(there were very few cases, no necessary nation-wide lockdown and citizens kept living 

normal lives even in crowded entertainment venues) and, even worse for the CCP, in 

2020, Taiwan’s GDP growth (+2.98%) was greater than China’s (+2.3%) for the first 

time since 1991. Furthermore, Taiwan had never been more internationally visible and 

president Tsai’s popularity broke records – these factors merely exacerbated Beijing’s 

resentment.

The deteriorating health situation on the island in the spring of 2021 therefore pro-

vided the CCP with an opportunity. Numbers remained very low compared to other coun-

tries, but there was an epidemic outbreak in May 2021. This was accompanied by an 

“Infodemic” outbreak, a spike in informational attacks presumably created and/or 

amplified by mainland Chinese actors.301 

301. Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan unity flags as China steps up flood of disinformation,” Financial Times (30 Jun. 2021), 

6. See also: IORG, “Pandemic storm hit Taiwan, vaccines weaponized by CCP,” iorg.tw (10 Jun. 2021).

476

G. Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations, along with military affairs, are more often used in the psychologi-

cal warfare (see the case of military exercises → p. 478), but they can also be at the center 

of the dissemination of false information. Here are four examples. First, in 2018, as 

Taiwan had just lost its diplomatic ties with Burkina Faso, a user of the Taiwanese social 

media platform PTT spread the rumor that the Foreign Affairs Minister of Honduras was 

currently in Beijing negotiating the conditions for breaking its diplomatic relations with 

Taiwan in the next 48 hours and that Haiti would follow suit. This created a wave of panic 

in Taiwanese diplomatic circles until the Honduran minister denied the rumor.302 Beijing’s 

objective is to maintain a permanent insecurity and tension over Taiwan’s diplo-

matic relations by wooing away its few diplomatic allies one by one and by manip-

ulating information to heighten its anxieties.

Second, in the course of the summer 2018 a rumor spread on social media, mostly on 

LINE, according to which Air Canada would no longer recognize Taiwanese passports 

after July 25 – the rumor picked up in intensity and forced the Minister of Foreign Affairs 

to publish a press release to deny it.303 It is true, however, that more and more airline com-

panies and airports are giving in to Beijing’s pressure to categorize Taiwanese booking as 

Chinese and Taiwanese cities as destinations inside China. Nevertheless, a Taiwanese pass-

port remains valid and gives visa-free access to far more countries (145) than a Chinese 

passport (75).304 In fact, Taiwan announced in early September 2020 the removal of the 

appelation “Republic of China” (the official name of Taiwan, which can lead to confusion) 

from its new passports, to avoid any ambiguity and to resist Chinese pressure. This conces-

sion should be put into perspective, as the Chinese wording (中華民國) remains present 

and the one in English appears inside the passports.

Third, the Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was forced to intervene to put an end 

to an insistent rumor spread by the Chinese website xilu.com that Taiwan was planning 

to lease the Taiping Island (Itu Aba) to the United States. This is the largest of the 

Spratly Islands, a disputed archipelago in the South China Sea.305 In the context of a Sino-

American “Cold War,” misinformation tied to the United States will certainly become 

more prevalent, to increase inter-strait tensions and ultimately provide a pretext for 

Beijing to intervene. 

Fourth, to kill two birds with one stone, turning the Taiwanese population against its 

own government and an allied state, Beijing also spreads fake news aimed not only at the 

United States but also at Japan. For example, in April 2021, a fake memo from the Office 

of the President stating that the Taiwanese government had agreed to receive contaminated 

(nuclear) water from Fukushima circulated on Facebook. The real origin of the memo was 

easy to discover as it contained simplified Chinese characters. The president’s spokesperson 

immediately denounced the maneuver, calling it “cognitive warfare” and President Tsai also 

published a denial on Facebok: 

302. Keoni Everington, “Honduras Denies Rumors of Talks with Beijing on Cutting Ties with Taiwan,” Taiwan 

News (28 May 2018).

303. J. Michael Cole, “Disinformation Targets Legitimacy of Taiwan’s Passport,” Taiwan Sentinel (1 Aug. 2018).

304. Henley & Partners Passport Index, Global ranking 2021, https://www.henleypassportindex.com/global-

ranking.

305. “Taiwan Rebuts China’s Claim that it will Lease Taiping Island to U.S.,” Taiwan News (29 Jun. 2018).

477

Source: https://www.facebook.com/tsaiingwen/photos/a.390960786064/10157418818956065/.

The ICAO’s Twitter account

Late January 2020 several Twitter users found that their accounts had been blocked by 

the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) after posting tweets on the agen-

cy’s policy toward Taiwan. 

The ICAO was then headed by Liu Fang, one of the Chinese nationals in charge of one of the 

15 UN specialized agencies (→ p. 206). Since her arrival at the head of this agency, the ICAO 

has stopped inviting Taiwan to participate in its tri-annual assembly.306 This exclusion has 

led to criticisms at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Several people expressed regrets 

on Twitter that Taiwan was not included in the exchanges with ICAO members, even 

though Taoyuan airport is a major hub for airport connections in the region, with more than 

72 million passengers transiting every year toward more than 150 cities across the world.307 

The polemic grew with the reactions of Jessica Drun, a non-resident member of Project 2049, 

who posted the following tweet on January 22: “Want to drive the point home that two orgs, 

@WHO & @icao, refuse to share knowledge w/ Taiwan authorities. This means civil aviation 

authorities for one of busiest regional airports do not receive up-to-date info on any potential 

ICAO-WHO efforts.”308 

A few days later, on January 25, she brought attention to the fact that she had been blocked 

by the ICAO’s Twitter account even though she was not calling for recognition of 

Taiwan as a member of the ICAO, but only for Taiwan’s inclusion in the talks.309 

Numerous other users – think-tank analysts, academics, journalists and other observers – also 

noticed that they had been blocked by the agency after criticizing Taiwan’s exclusion.310 

Beyond the symbolism of this gesture, the effect was that these users could no longer consult 

the publications of the agency’s account.

The ICAO went even further by blocking users who simply referred to the affair, such 

as Alex Dukalskis, associate professor at University College Dublin and China Fellow at the 

Wilson Center. Dukalskis revealed that, after writing to the ICAO, following its advice, he 

was asked to criticize himself to have a chance of having his Twitter account unblocked: “If 

you could therefore firstly reassure me that you recognize you were mistaken in your earlier 

questions and posts, and secondly confirm that you were not aware that your activities were 

augmenting risks to the safety and security of our staff, we’d be willing to reconsider re-es-

tablishing your ability to post your personal opinions on our account.”311

The ICAO’s immunity – originally conceived to protect international organizations from 

state interference – does not allow these decisions to be challenged in court. But this behavior 

306. J. Michael Cole, “ICAO Refuses to Invite Taiwan to Assembly,” The News Lens (23 Sept. 2016); “Ally Backs 

Taiwan’s ICAO participation,” Taipei Times (3 Oct. 2019).

307. J. Michael Cole, “ICAO Twittergate-Taiwan Scandal Highlights Deeper Problems at the UN: J. Michael Cole 

For Inside Policy,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute (6 Feb. 2020). 

308. Jessica Drun (22 Jan. 2020), https://twitter.com/jessicadrun/status/1220013584564002822?lang=en.

309. Jessica Drun (25 Jan. 2020), tweet, https://twitter.com/jessicadrun/status/1220984488303435777?lang=en.

310. Tom Grundy, “Wuhan Coronavirus: UN Aviation Body Blocks Users Who Raise Issue of Taiwan’s Inclusion 

on Twitter,” Hong Kong Free Press (28 Jan. 2020).

311. Alex Dukalskis, (20 Feb. 2020), https://twitter.com/AlexDukalskis/status/1230467827485806593.

478

contradicts the fundamental mission of these agencies, which are supposed to facilitate in-

formation sharing, and it brings into question the impartiality of ICAO authorities. In this in-

stance, the ICAO’s Twitter account was managed by a Chinese national named Guang 

Qining, who seemed to have suspended her LinkedIn profile as the affair was publicized.312 

Before being recruited by the ICAO, Guan worked for the Civil Aviation Administration of 

China, as did Secretary General Liu Fang, and for the Pan-Chinese Journalist Association 

which, as J. Michael Cole explained, is an organization that oversees, among other tasks, the 

broadcasting of Party propaganda on foreign media.313 Guang Qining was not, however, in 

charge of the agency’s PR but this modus operandi seemed to have been fully approved by 

the head of communication, Anthony Philbin, according to whom the ICAO is obliged to 

block people who intentionally and publicly damage the agency’s image, forcing the ICAO 

to protect the integrity of its broadcast information and the discussions arising from it.314 

The ICAO has in fact characterized Taiwan as a Chinese province.315 Besides, this 

agency also behaved similarly in March 2019 by blocking voices critical of its environmental 

policy.316 

IV. Armed Force

Beijing has always used military exercises – for the impact they have in their 

own right and for the ease with which they can be exaggerated in the media – as 

a means of psychological warfare against Taiwan – particularly (but not solely) 

during elections, as a way to influence, or at least to send a message to the win-

ners. For instance, between July 1995 and June 1996, with the presidential election sched-

uled for March 23, 1996, China organized no fewer than six military exercises aimed at 

the island, firing missiles into the sea a few dozen kilometers away from the Taiwanese 

coast. Not long before, in 1994, while a novel anticipating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan 

one year later became one of the island’s best-sellers,317 Beijing was conducting its biggest 

military exercises in years.

Military pressure has intensified since Tsai Ing-wen’s election in 2016, an admis-

sion that the Chinese soft power failed to win the hearts and minds of Taiwan’s 

population. The PLA regularly simulates an invasion of the island. For example, 

in August 2020, in response to what Beijing saw as an American provocation (the U.S. 

Secretary of Health and Human Services visited Taiwan), the PLA conducted amphibious 

landing exercises. The PLA actually has a full-scale replica of a part of downtown Taipei on 

the military base of Zhurihe, which includes the Taiwanese presidential palace and has been 

used to simulate assaults.318 Intrusions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone 

(ADIZ) have multiplied in recent years. And 2020 was saw a record 380 incursions by 

312. David Spencer, “Will ICAO Twitter block hasten Taiwan’s admittance to international bodies?” Taiwan News 

(1 Feb. 2020). 

313. Cole, “ICAO Twittergate-Taiwan Scandal.”

314. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “UN Aviation Agency Blocks Critics of Taiwan Policy on Twitter,” Axios (27 Jan. 

2020).

315. “Economic Impact Estimates Due to COVID-19 Travel Bans,” ICAO (13 Feb. 2020).

316. Megan Darby, “‘Fake News:’ UN Aviation Body Blocks Online Climate Critics,” Climate Home News (27 Mar. 

2019).

317. 鄭浪平 (Zheng Langpin), 閏八月震盪 (August fluctuations) (Taipei: Business Weekly Publisher, 1994).

318. Joseph Trevithick, “China’s Largest Base has Replicas of Taiwan’s Presidential Building, Eiffel Tower”, The 

War Zone, The Drive (27 May 2020).

479

Chinese aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ.319 Beijing stepped up its activities immediately after 

President Tsai’s re-election, as if to send a signal. The first quarter of 2021 confirmed 

that the pressure is still mounting, with two large Chinese air sorties on March 26 and 

April 12, the latter involving 25 aircrafts simultaneously.320 These violations usually grow 

more intense during particular events over which Beijing wishes to exert its influence, such 

as the Taiwanese national holiday (October 10), diplomatic visits (as in September 2020, 

with the visit of the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the 

Environment), or during the inauguration of the new U.S. president. Between January 23 

and 25, for instance, a few days int Joe Biden’s presidency, Beijing tested the president’s 

resolve by sending 13 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ the first day, 15 on the second, and 15 

on the third, a record number since September 2020.321 On September 23, 2021, and while 

it expressed disapproval of Taiwan’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the 

Party-State sent 24 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. These massive sorties are becoming more 

and more frequent, and intimidating, with a clear acceleration since October 1, 2021 (the 

PRC’s National Day): 145 Chinese planes entered Taiwan’s ADIZ in 4 days (38 on 

October 1, which was already an absolute record, then 39 on the 2nd, 16 on the 3rd and 52 

on the 4th).322

As J. Michael Cole explained, this “latest militarization of Beijing’s posture comprises 

two main vectors – increased PLA activity and preparedness in the vicinity of Taiwan, com-

bined with a sustained campaign of psychological warfare against the Taiwanese govern-

ment and public.”323 Indeed, these exercises are generally accompanied by a bellicose 

rhetoric from Chinese media, which exaggerate their scale and significance. In April 

2018, relatively minor scheduled exercises were taking place off the coast of Quanzhou 

in the province of Fujian, but the Chinese press turned them into “live fire drills to check 

‘Taiwan Independence,’” as the Global Times headlined.324 J. Michael Cole also noted that 

these exercises “were ostensibly timed to coincide with a visit to Swaziland by President 

Tsai Ing-wen.”325 In August 2020, the Global Times described military exercises “not 

[as a] warning but [as a] rehearsal for [a] Taiwan takeover” by the PLA, which was 

deemed inevitable.326 Confirming the crushing superiority of the PLA and its capacity 

to attack the island from all sides, the unabashed objective of these exercises is to “deter 

Taiwan secessionists.”327 Hence, military exercises targeting Taiwan are increasingly 

frequent and the propaganda that accompanies them is growing more aggressive.

The purpose of these daily intrusions and this constant pressure is not only meant to 

create a permanent threat in the Taiwanese minds, or even a sense of inevitability for 

a Chinese invasion, but to create the conditions for an incident which would likely end 

badly. Pierre Haski explained that “[the] risk is not, at least not yet, a deliberate trigger of 

319. AFP, “Taiwan Says Chinese Jets Made Record 380 Incursions in 2020,” France 24 (5 Jan. 2021).

320. Greg Waldron, “Beijing Air Power Turns up the Heat on Taiwan,” Flight Global (16 Apr. 2021).

321. J. Michael Cole, “2021: The Year China and Taiwan clash?” The National Interest (25 Jan. 2021); Nathalie 

Guibert, “Taiwan: ‘Unprecedented Chinese Aerial Incursions,’” Le Monde (25 Jan. 2021).

322. According to the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense’s Twitter account, which provides daily numbers, 

models and routes of Chinese aircrafts entering the ADIZ.

323. J. Michael Cole, “Propaganda Drives ‘Massive’ PLA Exercises in the Taiwan Strait,” Global Taiwan Brief (26 

Aug. 2020).

324. Shan Jie, “Live-fire Drills to Check ‘Taiwan Independence,’” Global Times (13 Apr. 2018).

325. Cole, “Propaganda Drives ‘Massive’ PLA Exercises.”

326. “PLA Friday Drills Not Warning, but Rehearsal for Taiwan Takeover: Global Times Editorial,” Global Times 

(18 Sept. 2020).

327. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Holds Concentrated Military Drills to Deter Taiwan Secessionists, US,” Global Times (23 

Aug. 2020). 

480

war, but rather an incident that can trigger a series of events which would be difficult to 

stop.”328 The Taiwanese are aware of this and remain calm: they know they are targeted by 

operations of psychological warfare and that the mistake, the excuse Beijing is waiting 

for, would be to offer an overreaction paving the way for an escalation.329

One case is particularly instructive. On December 16, 2016, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)’s 

Weibo account published a picture of an airborne (nuclear-capable) H-6 bomber, reg-

istered under the number 20019 (which indicated it belonged to the 10th Bomber Division 

based in Anqing330). On the picture one could see two mountains in the distance peaking 

above a sea of clouds (Figure 1).331

Chinese Internet users quickly put forward a first hypothesis: the two peaks in the back-

ground could be part of the Jade Mountain, also called Yushan (玉山), which culminates at 

3,952 meters and is located on the island of Taiwan, in Nantou County. Hence, by analyzing 

the orientation of the two peaks, some Internet users believed that the bomber was coming 

from the north and heading south and that therefore the picture was taken by the PLAAF 

during a drill around Taiwan on November 25.332 Others suggested that it was more likely 

the long-distance surveillance exercise of December 10.333

Figure 2. Source : http://weibointl.api.

weibo.com/share/189226955.html?weibo_

id=4052894808581395.

Figure 1. Source : http://weibointl.api.

weibo.com/share/187972608.html?weibo_

id=4053418358272402.

328. Pierre Haski, “Taiwan against China: The Risks of a Poorly Controlled Escalation,” France Inter (23 Sept. 2020).

329. J. Michael Cole, “China’s Live-Fire Drill in the Taiwan Strait: A Case Study in Psychological Warfare,” Taiwan 

Sentinel (18 Apr. 2018).

330. Kenneth W. Allen and Cristina L. Garafola, 70 Years of the PLA Force, China Aerospace Studies Institute, US 

Air University (2021), 139.

331. In Chinese, “周末，分享一幅很有意义的照片!”. “我空军绕台飞行，轰-6K与台湾玉山合影” (“Our 

Air Force Conducts a Flight Around Taiwan, the H-6K Bomber Poses with Taiwanese Mount Yushan”), 个人图书馆 

(360doc) (17 Dec. 2016), https://archive.vn/vuXbQ. 

332. “Our Air Force Conducts a Flight Around Taiwan,” 360doc.

333. “台媒: 轰6K绕台照” 造假 “在海峡西测” (“According to Taiwanese Media: the “Faked” Picture of the H-6K Circling 

Taiwan Was Actually Taken from the Eastern Side of the Strait”), 搜狐 (Sohu) (27 Dec. 2016), https://archive.vn/EHizL. 

481

When users linked this photo to others published by the same PLAAF Weibo account 

two days earlier, which showed the plane in the same position but from a different angle, 

it revealed not two but three peaks in the background (Figure 2). And a second hypothe-

sis was then laid out – about another Taiwanese mountain, Mount Beidawushan (北大武

山), which culminates at 3,902 meters, and is located on the southern tip of the island in 

Pintung County.334

On December 17, 2016, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense denied that the picture 

showed Mount Yushan.335 In fact, as Mount Yushan is 50 km away from the sea and around 

200 km inside the ADIZ, the proportions of the aircraft in relation to the mountain sug-

gested that if it were Mount Yushan, the picture had to have been taken from inside the 

Taiwanese ADIZ.336 One Internet user suggested that the picture was taken at a distance 

of 100-150 km from the Mount (Figure 3).337 But two complementary counter-arguments 

were advanced by Taiwan: if this was indeed the silhouette of Mount Yushan then the 

proportions in the picture had to have been doctored, or it could simply have been a dif-

ferent mountain, such as Beidawushan, which is closer to the sea.338 The reluctance of the 

Taiwanese authorities to recognize that the PLAAF’s picture was taken from the eastern 

coast of Taiwan was understandable since it reinforced the idea that the PLA was capable 

of attacking the island from all sides.339

Figure 3: A Chinese user estimated that the photo had to have been taken at a distance of 100 to 150 km from Mount Yushan. 

Source: https://archive.vn/vuXbQ.

334. “解放军空军发布疑似轰-6K与台湾中央山脉高峰合影” (“The APL Air Force Posts a Picture of What 

Seems to be an H-6K Next to the Highest Taiwanese Peak”), 观察 (Guancha) (17 Dec. 2016), https://archive. vn/Q4KUs.

335. Matthew Strong, “Military Denies Yushan in China Bomber Picture,” Taiwan News (17 Dec. 2016).

336. “According to Taiwanese media: the ‘faked’ photo”; 黄丽蓉 (Huang Lirong), “解放军轰6-K飞行背后山

影 可能是屏东大武山” (“The Mountain Behind the PLA’s H-6K is Probably Beidawushan”), China Times (17 Dec. 

2016), https://archive.vn/f793D.

337. “Our Air Force conducts a flight around Taiwan,” 360doc.

338. This is for example the argument put forward by the chief editor of a Taiwanese military magazine, Junshi 

lianxian (軍事連線). Lirong, “The Mountain behind the APL’s H-6K is Probably Beidawushan.”

339. “According to Taiwanese media: the ‘faked’ photo.”

482

In April 2018, the PLAAF’s Weibo account posted a 4-minute promotional video in 

which a scene had clearly been taken from the preceding photos (Figure 4). This was not an 

isolated case: the Chinese Air Force frequently posts photos and videos of its fighters 

around Taiwan, to keep the pressure up. This is a typical illustration of psychological 

warfare. Whether the picture had been taken from Mount Yushan or not, the harm was 

done as doubt was sowed in the Taiwanese public opinion. The goal was to under-

mine the Taiwanese people’s trust in their armed forces’ ability to track PLA move-

ments, to react quickly, defend the territorial sovereignty of the island and protect 

the people from a PRC attack. “The photos send a message […] to Taiwan’s citizens, 

to highlight the inability of their government to stop such flights. […]. When two H-6Ks 

entered Taiwan’s ADIZ during the July 20th flight, the Chinese pilots said they and the 

Taiwanese were the “same people,” an illustration of Chinese claims to Taiwan.”340

Figure 4: Video posted on April 19, 2018 on the Chinese Air Force’s Weibo account. 

Source: https://archive.vn/df7MT.341

Another way for Beijing to exert military pressure on Taiwan is to spread false 

or biased news that would constitute a casus belli if they were proven accurate. For 

instance, a rumor suggested that American military planes were using Taiwanese bases: in 

August 2020 Internet users claimed that a U.S. Navy Lockheed EP-3 electronic warfare and 

reconnaissance aircraft had landed in Taiwan and taken off several times.342 The news was 

spread on social media, most notably by the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI).343 It 

was then taken up by the Global Times, which quoted the SCSPI and, as usual, issued threats 

as to the consequences for Taiwan if this was proven true: it would amount to “crossing a 

red line” and Beijing could “destroy the relevant airport on the island and the US military 

aircraft that land there – a war in the Taiwan Straits [would] thus begin.” The newspaper 

demanded to the Taiwanese and U.S. authorities to avoid “[playing] with fire,” and it went 

further, recommending that “Beijing officially declare the ‘airspace’ over the Taiwan Island 

340. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Derek Grossman, and Logan Ma, “Chinese Bomber Flights Around Taiwan: 

For What Purpose?” War on the Rocks (13 Sept. 2017).

341. http://weibointl.api.weibo.com/share/187972608.html?weibo_id=4053418358272402.

342. Keoni Everington, “Aircraft Spotters Allege US Spy Plane Landed in Taipei,” Taiwan News (19 Aug. 2020).

343. https://twitter.com/SCS_PI/status/1294091966305599493.

483

as a patrol area of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The PLA’s reconnaissance aircraft 

and fighter jets will perform missions over Taiwan Island [to] check whether there are US 

military planes landing at Taiwan’s airports or US warships docking at the island’s ports. If 

the island’s military dares to fire the first shot at the PLA’s aircraft, it will mean provocation 

of a war, and the PLA should immediately destroy Taiwan’s military forces and achieve 

reunification through military means.”344

The initial information on the presence of U.S. military planes on the island had no 

factual basis and it was denied by the Taiwanese authorities. As Cole noted, the SCSPI on 

which the Global Times based its threats is not a neutral actor, despite the fact that 

it presents itself as such: the group has ties to the University of Beijing. The direc-

tor of the SCSPI, Hu Bo (胡波), is also the director for the Center of Maritime Strategic 

Studies at the University of Beijing. One of the members of the SCSPI’s board of director 

is the president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS, 中国南海

研究院). The SCSPI and the NISCSS are regularly used as “platforms to support Beijing’s 

territorial claims.”345

What is certain is that the method is well established: false or biased information 

emerges on social media or on various forums, preferably with no visible link to the 

CCP and is taken up and amplified by Chinese media, generally the Global Times, 

which issues threats. This method may vary from full-fledged operations built from 

scratch, for example when Chinese intelligence plants the initial information, to 

sheer opportunism when the media identifies any piece of information that could be 

damaging to Taiwan, irrespective of its origin.

V. Conclusion

The Chinese political warfare against Taiwan has won a few tactical victories to 

the extent that it has contributed to polarizing the Taiwanese society and, thus, con-

vinced a section of the public opinion that “Taiwan’s real enemy was the opposite camp 

(the DPP) rather than the authoritarian regime across the Taiwan Strait.”346 Additionally, 

it “may have helped a few politicians to get elected.”347 Some seduction methods, 

notably through the business community, can work but others appear to be ineffective. 

This is notably the case in the Taiwanese academic world which is well educated about the 

Chinese threat and its methods: those who have been targeted by state-sponsored influence 

peddling (luxurious trips to continental China, indoctrination sessions supervised by CCP 

executives), returned without being converted by Chinese efforts and, if anything, rather 

sarcastic about them, according to Cole: “I’ve had several interviews with the Taiwanese 

academics who went on these trips to China, they come back and they tell me: ̀ we had great 

food, the hotel was nice […]. But did they succeed in brainwashing me or convincing me 

that I’m something that I’m not? Absolutely not’. And they normally laugh it off saying that 

the Chinese are spending a lot of money on these activities, and that the actual div-

idends are quite minimal.”348 The Chinese probably know that these measures are 

344. “Tsai Authorities Deserve a Stern Warning from Beijing: Global Times Editorial,” Global Times (31 Aug. 2020).

345. J. Michael Cole, “Beijing’s Anti-Taiwan Propaganda Goes into Overdrive,” Global Taiwan Brief (23 Sept. 2020).

346. Cole, Democracy under Fire, 33.

347. Ibid., 32.

348. Cole, “A Conversation about China’s Sharp Power,” 4.

484

not efficient; their justification is found only in the mechanisms of the Party-State 

apparatus: certain operations are in fact the product of an administrative logic as 

civil servants hope to show their hierarchy that they are doing something. 

Strategically, this is a failure. In fact, the Chinese political warfare that targets 

Taiwan has been counterproductive: incentives and punitive measures under Xi Jinping 

have not produced the expected results; the majority of the Taiwanese population still 

approves of the president and the DPP and is even more distrustful of China than before. 

Beijing has even lost the KMT, which was once a useful CCP relay and is now distancing 

itself from China and vice versa (Beijing said it “will no longer rely on the KMT”).349 Besides, 

the 2020 presidential campaign confirmed the KMT’s loss of influence and the need for 

Beijing to rely on other channels, usually not political parties, to reach out to the population, 

and especially to the younger generations (China has lost its attractiveness among them 

because of the China-US trade war and of the Hong Kong crisis). Moreover, the nation-

alist sentiment is rising: the number of people identifying as “only Taiwanese” has never 

been higher (67%).350 The Hong Kong crisis has much to do with this since it played 

a role as a powerful turnoff. Taiwan’s government subsequently adopted a series of 

measures to combat interference – especially Chinese interference – which should make 

influence peddling more difficult in the future. This also reinforced the Taiwanese govern-

ment’s determination to reduce its dependence on China and to diversify its economy 

– in particular in the sectors used by Beijing (i.e. tourism) to exert pressure.

Overall, Beijing’s mounting aggressiveness in recent years, against Taiwan and 

globally, has considerably increased the island’s attractiveness. Without gaining any 

formal diplomatic allies, Taiwan has seen its relations with the US strengthened with 

the visit of the US Secretary of Health in August 2020 (the highest ranking US official to 

visit the island since 1979), of an Under Secretary of State in September, and with the cre-

ation of a U.S. F-16 maintenance center, the only one in East Asia. The visit of an impres-

sive Czech delegation in late August 2020 also brought international attention to the island 

while incurring Beijing’s wrath. In a word, Chinese efforts to weaken and isolate Taiwan 

have had the opposite effect of what they intended.

349. Yang Sheng, “Beijing Won’t Rely on KMT for Realizing Reunification with Taiwan Following ‘Mayor’ Recall 

Drama: Analysts,” Global Times (7 Jun. 2020).

350. Since the first poll in 1992: Huang Tzu-ti, “67% of People in Taiwan Self-Identity as Taiwanese,” Taiwan News 

(4 Jul. 2020).

485

From Taiwan to Hong Kong and Back

What has been the link between Taiwan and Hong Kong since the beginning of the 

Hong Kong crisis? Are the Chinese using the same methods and content in Taiwan as 

they have in Hong Kong, or vice-versa? Both probably. There seems to be an adaptive 

recycling of methods and content. On the one hand, the Hong Kong crisis contributed 

to shaping the narratives used against Taiwan, such as the rumor according to which “the 

Taiwanese government is interfering in the Hong-Kong crisis – by offering financial support” 

(a Facebook post asserted that President Tsai Ing-wen spent a billion Taiwanese dollars (€29.5 

million) to finance the protests in Hong Kong, all the while refusing to finance the fight against 

a dengue outbreak that afflicted the south of Taiwan), or tactical support (the pro-Beijing press 

in Hong Kong, picking up in Taiwan, claimed that Taiwanese agents were spotted advising the 

protesters on the best way to face off against the police).351 More generally the Hong Kong cri-

sis has not really had an impact on the frequency and the intensity of the informational attacks 

against Taiwan: Beijing has the resources to operate on both fronts. However, the crisis has 

had an impact on the narratives as they now focus less on unification (a delicate subject during 

the Hong Kong crisis) and more on Taiwan’s internal issues (social problems).

On the other hand, among the 13.8 million tweets identified by Twitter in August and September 

2019 as part of a pro-Beijing operation against Hong Kong, Taiwan was an issue. There were 

attempts to promote Taiwanese pro-unification leaders such as the journalist Joyce Huang (黃

智賢) or the politician Wang Ping-chung (王炳忠), both known to have worked with Chinese 

intelligence, something confirmed by several criminal investigations.352 Also, China seeming-

ly used its Taiwanese allies to intervene in Hong Kong, because they could use traditional 

Chinese characters. They were less susceptible to make mistakes than Chinese individuals from 

the PRC, thus making them harder to detect.

351. K. G. Chan, “Taiwan Hits Back at Claim It’s Funding HK Rallies,” Asia Times (29 Jul. 2019).

352. Monaco, Smith, and Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints, 32.