D. Other subordinate units affiliated with the Base 311
At least two other units are subordinate to Base 311, Unit 61070 and Unit 61198. Like
the others mentioned before (61716, 61023, 61985, 61275, 61590), these have a Military
Unit Cover Designator (MUCD – 部队代号) beginning with 61, in reference to their pre-
2015 reform affiliation to the PLA General Staff Department.114 The reform has not yet led
to a complete revision of the military designator system. As a result, it is unclear whether a
specific number was attributed to the PLASSF. The Huaxin Training Center, which is con-
nected to CEFC China Energy, is affiliated to Base 311 as well.
113. “两岸摄影家•两岸行风采录，看看有没有你” (“Photographs of the Two Shores. Recording Journeys
along the Strait, Observe If you are Present”), Meipian (30 Oct. 2016), https://www.meipian.cn/855299V.
114. Stokes and Hsiao identified six regiments subordinated to Base 311, the four other units were cited in previous
section, Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 29, and note 183 p. 68.
111
I
Units affiliated with the Base 311.
1. The Unit 61070: A center for network propaganda
Unit 61070 is located a few buildings down from Base 311, at 3 Meifeng Street.115 It has
been identified as a Center for Network Propaganda for Base 311 (311基地网络中心),
and its director was Zhu Leiming (朱磊明) in 2009.116 According to Stokes and Hsiao, in
addition to leveraging the Internet for propaganda, the unit may have launched cyber-op-
erations.117 The research of Professor Hu Huaping (胡华平), whois apparently affiliated
to this unit, supports this hypothesis. Born in 1967, he was the chief engineer (总工) of
Unit 61070 between 2007 and 2017. His articles described his expertise in information
network security, cryptography, and communication networks.118 Known for his participa-
tion in multiple national research projects, like the 863 Program, he won second prize at
the National Science and Technology Award from the State Council, and first prize at the
Military and Technology Progress Award.119
His publications available in open source showed that his research led to the develop-
ment of a full text retrieval system aimed at improving the detection of relevant content
115. “实验室揭牌成立” (“Inauguration of a Laboratory”), 福建省网络安全与密码技术重点实验室 (Fujian
Provincial Key Lab of Network Security and Cryptology), Http://archive.Md/Rsnfp.
116. “全省网络新闻宣传干部培训班在连城开班” (“The Propaganda Training on the Internet for Executives
in the Province was Launched in Liancheng”), Fjsen (5 Nov. 2009), http://Archive.Ph/S8Dms.
117. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 68, note 182.
118. For a reference to Hu Huaping as a Unit 61070 affiliate in 2007, see 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 胡光明 (Hu
Guangming), 董攀 (Dong Pan), and 陈新 (Chen Xin), “大规模移动自组网络安全技术综述” (“Survey Of Security
Technology For Large Scale Manet”), 计算机研究与发展 (Journal Of Computer Research And Development), 44:4 (2007),
Http://Archive.Ph/O4Hjy; In 2017, see: “学术报告” (“Presentation of Scientific Works”), 经管之家 (Jingguan Zhi
Jia) (11 Dec. 2017), http://Archive.Ph/Zv8Fz.
119. “国防科技大胡华平教授来我校进行学术交流” (“Professor Hu Huaping of the National University of
Defense Technoloy Visited our University during an Academic Exchange”), 兰州理工大学 (Lanzhou University of
Technology) (20 Nov. 2009), http://Archive.Ph/Kycvd.
112
in the era of Big Data;120 an algorithm capable of detecting a denial-of-service attack;121 an
intrusion detection system;122 a computer worm detection system;123 and a network security
alert system.124 He also produced a study on media access control (MAC) spoofing,125 and
another on mobile ad hoc networks.126 Furthermore, Hu Huaping’s interests exceeded the
technical aspects of informational warfare: in a 2009 conference at Lanzhou University of
Technology, he spoke about the psychological warfare waged on networks, specifically by
the US and by the Taiwanese Army.127
Unit 61070 seems to have a particularly close relationship with the National University
of Defense Technology (NUDT) in Changsha. Hu Huaping is a professor there and
co-wrote most of the papers written by his colleagues at the university. It is not a random
Chinese university: NUDT in Changsha is one of the PLA’s primary scientific research
institutes, and one the best funded, according to the China Defense Universities Tracker.
This tracker was developed by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) to trace the
links between universities and the Chinese industrial military complex (→ p. 296). The
University is classified “very high” risk because of its affiliation to the PLA.128 According to
the ASPI, the NUDT is directly subordinate to the CMC, it has been involved in espio-
nage activities and is connected to foreign universities and private companies in the defense
sector. Hu Huaping has also collaborated with colleagues at the Huazhong University
of Science and Technology,129 located in Wuhan province, another “very high” risk
university (according to the ASPI tracker), due to its ties to the Chinese industrial military
complex.130 Since 2012, the university has been supervised by the State Administration for
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND – 国家国防科技工业
局), which supports universities and supervises the defense industrial base.
120. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 周敬才 (Zhou Jingcai), and 岳虹 (Yue Hong), “基于Lucene 全文检索系统的设计
与实现” (“Design and Implementation of Lucene-based Full-Text Retrieval System”), 计算机工程与科学 (Computer
Engineering and Science), 37:2 (Feb. 2015), http://archive.ph/ndzvB.
121. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 张静 (Zhang Jing), 刘波 (Liu Bo), and 肖枫涛 (Xiao Fengtao), “基于ASPQ的LDoS
攻击检测方法” (“Detecting LDoS Attacks Based on ASPQ”), 通信学报 (Journal on Communications), 33:5 (May 2012),
http:// archive.ph/zSWRE.
122. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 蒋少华 (Jiang Shaohua), “IDS警报危急度的定义与建模” (“Modeling and
Definition of Alert Urgent Degree in IDS”), 计算机工程与应用 (Computer Engineering and Applications), 45:15 (2009),
http://archive. ph/yxdeK.
123. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 肖枫涛 (Xiao Fengtao), 刘波 (Liu Bo), and 陈新 (Chen Xin), “HPBR: 用于蠕虫检
测的主机报文行为评级模型” (“HPBR: Host Packet Behaviour Ranking Model Used in Worm Detection”), 通信
学报 (Journal on Communications), 29:10 (Oct. 2008), http://archive.ph/GCHjT.
124. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 何利民 (He Limin), 肖枫涛 (Xiao Fengtao), and 张怡 (Zhang Yi), “网络安全预警
模型的研究” (“Study of a Network Security Fore-Warning Model”), 计算机研究与发展 (Journal of Computer Research
and Development), 43 (Suppl.) (2006), http://archive.ph/pMtKj.
125. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 陈信男 (Chen Xinnan), and 岳虹 (Yue Hong), “基于MAC欺骗技术的嗅探器原型
设计与实现” (“Design and Implementation of the Sniffer Prototype Based on the MAC Spoofing”), 计算机工程与
科学 (Computer Engineering & Science), 32:12 (2010), http://archive.ph/7f7dQ.
126. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 胡光明 (Hu Guangming), 董攀 (Dong Pan), and 陈新 (Chen Xin), “大规模移动自
组网络安全技术综述” (“Survey of Security Technology for Large Scale MANET”).
127. “国防科技大胡华平教授来我校进行学术交流” (“Professor Hu Huaping of the National University of
Defense Technoloy Visited our University during an Academic Exchange”).
128. “National University of Defence Technology,” China Defence Universities Trackers, ASPI (25 Nov. 2019), https://
unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/national-university-of-defense-technology/.
129. 蒋少华 (Jiang Shaohua) and 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), “IDS警报危急度的定义与建模” (“Modeling and
Definition of Alert Urgent Degree in IDS”), 计算机工程与应用 (Computer Engineering and Applications), 45:15 (2009),
http://archive. ph/yxdeK.
130. “Huazhong University of Science and Technology,” China Defence Universities Tracker (18 Nov. 2019), https://
unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/huazhong-university-of-science-and-technology/.
113
Many of the research mentioned in these articles were financed by the national 863
Program,131 launched in March 1983. Its goal is to support and foster the development of
cutting-edge technologies in seven key sectors, including computer science. Hu Huaping’s
research was also funded by other bodies, notably key laboratories in network security and
cryptology in Fujian province,132 as well as the National Foundation for Natural Sciences.133
Hu’s papers helped identify the names, and sometimes profiles, of additional
Unit 61070 members. For example, Dong Hailiang (董海) and Liu Jianfeng (刘建锋),
both born in 1984, were confirmed as working on information security and cryptography.
Lead engineer (高级工程师) Yu Xinping (虞欣平), born in 1963, works on network insur-
ance (网络工程与保障). All three were affiliated to Unit 61070 in 2010.134 More recently,
four additional people were identified as members of Unit 61070: Zhou Jingcai (周敬才),
Yue Hong (岳虹), Zhang Zhi (张智), and Yang Ke (杨科).135 Zhou Jingcai, born in 1982,
and Yue Hong, born in 1980 are both from Hubei and work on network information secu-
rity.136 Yue Hong is a PhD, lead engineer, and member of the China Computer Federation (
中国计算机学会).137 Ai Ran (艾然), another member of Unit 61070, appears to be work-
ing on communication techniques and propaganda. For example, he has worked on topics
tied to the use of specific writing styles for external communication, using the overseas edi-
tion of People’s Daily as a case study,138 as well as on the effectiveness of narrative processes
in military affairs reporting. For the latter, he studied how the media covered the national
holiday military parade.139
131. Name of the program in Chinese: 国家高技术研究发展863计划. On the subject, see Emmanuel Puig, “Le
techno-nationalisme chinois: évaluation des grands programmes de développement scientifique et technologique en
chine” (“Chinese Techno-Nationalism: Evaluation of the large scientific and technologic development programs in
China”), AFRI, XIII (2012).
132. Name of the funding in Chinese: 网络安全与密码技术建省高校重点实验室开放课题基金资助项目.
Hu, Chen, Yue, “Design and Implementation”; Hu, Jiang, “Modeling and definition.”
133. Name of the foundation in Chinese: 国家自然科学基金委员会. Hu, Xiao, Liu, Chen, “HPBR: Host Packet
Behaviour”; Hu, Hu, Dong, and Chen, “Survey of Security.”
134. 董海量 (Dong Hailiang), 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 刘建锋 (Liu Jianfeng), and 虞欣平 (Yu Xinping), “基
于大规模网络信息发送的任务调度策略的研究” (“The Study of Strategy for Task Scheduling Based on Large-
Scale Message Group Sending”), 微电子学与计算机 (Microelectronics and Computer), 27:8 (Aug. 2010), http://archive.
ph/1c4dO.
135. Hu Huaping, Zhou Jingcai, and Yue Hong, “Design and implementation”; 岳虹 (Yue Hong), 张智 (Zhang
Zhi), and 杨科 (Yang Ke), “基于磷虾群免疫神经网络的微博僵尸粉检测” (“Detecting Microblogging Zombie
Fans Based on Krill Herd Immune Neural Network”), 计算机应用与软件 (Computer Applications and Software), 32:12
(Dec. 2015), http://bit.ly/2tZ47Wi.
136. In Chinese: 网络信息安全.
137. 岳虹 (Yue Hong), 王蕾 (Wang Lei), 邓宇 (Deng Yu), and 刘磊 (Liu Lei), “一种基于软硬件协同的程
序安全关键数据动态保护机制” (“A dynamic mechanism of critical data protection based on hardware-software
cooperation”), 计算机工程与科学 (Computer Engineering and Science), 38:2 (Feb. 2016), http://archive.ph/BeaTC.
138. 艾然 (Ai Ran), “对外传播评论写作风格初探——以《人民日报·海外版》“望海楼”栏目为例”
(“Preliminary Analysis of the Writing Style and Commentary on the Internal Communication: the Wanghailou Tribune
Example, Overseas Edition of the Quotidien du people”), 东南传播 (Southeast communication), 11 (2010), http://archive.
ph/L5cvw.
139. 艾然 (Ai Ran), “新闻故事化在军事报道中的运用” (“The use of Narrative Processes in Military Affairs
Reporting), 东南传播 (Southeast communication), 12 (2009), http://archive.ph/Ajcjx.
114
Biographical note for the authors of the article “Design and Implementation
of Lucene-based Full-Text Retrieval System” (2015). The authors are members of Unit 61070.140
Biographical note for Yue Hong, member of Unit 61070.141
Finally, it is notable that the address referenced for a number of these articles is
77 Meizhu Street (Base 311), and not 3 Meifeng Street (Unit 61070), which confirms
the link between Unit 61070 and Base 311.142 The research of Unit 61070 members,
briefly described in this section, align with the focus of Base 311. More specifically, they
address topics related to public opinion warfare, and to a lesser extent psychological
warfare.
2. Unit 61198
Unit 61198 is registered at the same address as Base 311, 77 Meizhu Street. It is
thought to be affiliated to the Unit 61716’s translation bureau.143 Similar to Unit 61070, a
number of articles written by individuals affiliated to Unit 61198 helped the authors iden-
140. This article is available here: http//archive.ph/ndzvB.
141. http://archive.ph/BeaTC.
142. Hu Huaping, Zhou Jingcai, Yue Hong, “Design and implementation”; Yue Hong, Wang Lei, Deng Yu, Liu
Lei, “A dynamic mechanism.”
143. Stokes and Hsiao hypothesis in “The People’s Liberation Army,” 68, note 183.
115
tify its members and research areas. Wang Wei (王维), born in 1970, was a lead engineer
for Unit 61198 from 2011 to 2017 at least. Like many others from Unit 61070, he worked
on network security. His papers, often co-written with NUDT researchers, explored com-
munication architecture,144 computer worm detection systems,145 a trust model to choose
a cloud computing service,146 or a research algorithm.147 His work was funded by the same
bodies that supported Unit 61070’s research: the national 863 Program, the National
Foundation for Natural Sciences, and laboratories on network security and cryptology in
Fujian province. Another member affiliated to Unit 61198 published a 2015 article on sat-
ellite positioning,148 and a 2016 article on the benefits of computerizing military financial
services.149
Moreover, some topics are less technical. A 2010 article, for instance, written by four
unit members, explored a trust mechanism that could foster trust and better military
relations between China and Taiwan.150 Other papers studied Japan’s method of “inte-
gration to the empire” during its occupation of Taiwan,151 and two others detailed the
American use of psychological warfare outside of armed conflicts.152 More recently,
in 2016, three unit members co-wrote an article that called for the development of a
strong army capable of winning wars.153 To conclude, Unit 61198’s research inter-
ests, like those of Unit 61070, include network communication, psychological
warfare, and Taiwan. The subjects are thus aligned with the interests of Base
311.
144. 陈新 (Chen Xin), 王维 (Wang Wei), 刘波 (Liu Bo), 肖枫涛 (Xiao Fengtao), and 黄遵国 (Huang Zunguo),
“一种 匿名等级按需可调的分层匿名通信架构” (“An Anonymity-Level Selectable Hierarchical Anonymous
Communication Framework”), 计算机工程与科学 (Computer engineering and science), 33:2 (2011), http://archive.vn/
mvL6G.
145. 肖枫涛 (Xiao Fengtao), 王维 (Wang Wei), 刘波 (Liu Bo), and 陈新 (Chen Xin), “一种基于进程流量行为的
蠕虫检测系统” (“A Worm Detection System Based on Process Traffic Behaviors”), 计算机工程与科学 (Computer
engineering and science), 33:4 (2011), http://archive.ph/Abimc.
146. 廖子渊 (Liao Ziyuan), 王维 (Wang Wei), 陈明志 (Chen Mingzhi), “一种用于云计算系统安全强度评估
的信任模型研究” (Research on Trust Model for Security Strength evaluation of Cloud Computing”), 信息网络安
全 (Netinfo security), 16:7 (2016), http://archive.ph/kG8dy. 王维 (Wang Wei), 肖传奇 (Xiao Chuanqi), 冯映燕 (Feng
Yingyan), and 陈明志 (Chen Mingzhi), “一种基于AIFS权重计算的信任模型的研究” (“Research on a Trust Model
Based on AIFS Weighting”), 信息网络安全 (Netinfo security), 16:12 (2016), http://archive.ph/rZLip.
147. 林要华 (Lin Yaohua) and 王维 (Wang Wei), “基于逐维策略的布谷鸟搜索增强算法” (“An Enhanced
Cuckoo Search Algorithm Based on Dimension by Dimension Strategy”), 计算机工程与科学 (Computer engineering
and science), 1 (2017), http://archive.ph/7Gsg3.
148. 钦垚磊 (Qin Yaolei), “基于统一参考卫星的多星座融合伪距差分定位方法” (“A Satellite Positioning
Method”), Industry A (工业A), 8 (2015), http://archive.ph/Y2q69.
149. Liao Ziyuan, Wang Wi, and Chen Mingzhi, “Research of Trust Model”, http://archive.ph/kG8dy.
150. 万苏杭 (Wan Suhang), “论建立两岸军事互信机制的问题” (“The construction of a Mutual Military Inter-
Strait Trust Mechanism”), 新一代 (New Generation), 420 (Aug. 2010), http://archive.ph/V9PCh.
151. 张力 (Zhang Li), “日据时期台湾 ‘皇民化运动’ 及其影响” (“The integration of Taiwan Into the Empire
Movement During the Japanese Occupation, and its Consequences”), 经营管理者 (Manager Journal), 23 (2010), http://
archive. ph/ZhOEm.
152. 夏蒙山 (Xia Mengshan) and 吴刚 (Wu Gang), “试析美军非战争军事行动中的心理战” (“An Analysis
of Psychological Warfare Used by the American Army During Military Operation Outside of Armed Conflict”), 南
京政治学院 学报 (Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics), 26 (2010), http://archive.ph/iFaZy. We found that Xia
Mengshan is the director of section 22 (22分队主任) and Wu Gang, assistant researcher for section 61 (61分队助理
研究员).
153. 夏蒙山 (Xia Mengshan), 李强 (Li Qiang), and 赵启庸 (Zhao Qiyong), “聚焦能打胜仗加强部队建设”
(“Focusing on the Capabilities to Win the War and Reinforcing the Construction of our Army”), 政工导刊 (Handbook
on Political Work), 2 (2016), http://archive.ph/djn8s.
116
3. The Huaxin Training Center
Stokes and Hsiao claimed that Base 311 is supported by the Huaxin Training Center
(华信培训中心)154 which is located at the same address as Unit 61070, 3 Meifeng Street (
梅峰路3号).155 Little is known about the training center, or about the type of support it
provides to Base 311. Research on the name returned a namesake hotel at the address
(see above), with 74 rooms over 13 floors. The Huaxin Training Center Hotel is said to
have opened in 2011.156 In conducting the research for this report, the authors found that
it was impossible to reserve a room at this hotel, regardless of the reservation website
used. There were no client reviews,157 nor is the hotel closed because of the Covid-19 (other
hotels in the neighborhood were partly open). Moreover, the hotel’s website was rather
unprofessional and its map located it in the wrong Fuzhou neighborhood. These facts sug-
gest that the Huaxin Training Center was not what it claimed to be, and that it was
most likely affiliated to a PLA unit, something we already know.
Entrance to the Huaxin Training Center. The main building can be seen in the background (from Baidu Maps).158
154. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 29. For a reference to the Huaxin Center’s affiliation to the
Unit 61716, see “企业简介” (“Company Presentation”), 福州市鼓楼区金海阁餐饮会所 (Jinhaige restaurant, Gulou
district, Fuzhou), http://archive.vn/q2TGJ.
155. “福州市鼓楼区金海阁餐饮会所” (“Jinhaige Restaurant, Gulou District, Fuzhou”), 福建新工商名录 – 名
录集 (New Directory of Companies in Fuzhou), http://archive.ph/5GIlj. Note: the numbers 3 and 302 Meifeng
Street seem apparently correspond to the same address.
156. Home page for the website 福州华信培训中心酒店 (Huaxin Training Center Hotel in Fuzhou), http://
archive.vn/qqApe.
157. “福州华信培训中心酒店” (“Huaxin Training Center Hotel in Fuzhou”), 价格线 (Jiagexian), http://archive.
vn/UAtj3.
158. Photo: http://archive.vn/qqApe.
117
The Huaxing Training Center may belong to the former Fujian-based company Huaxin
Holdings Co. Ltd (福建华信控股有限公司),159 and it was perhaps funded by it. Huaxin
Holdings was founded in September 2005 – the same year as Base 311 – by CEFC
China Energy Co. Ltd (中国华信能源有限公司) and nicknamed Huaxin. In 2014 Lan
Huasheng (兰华升) took over the company, renaming it Fujian Dasheng Holdings Co. Ltd.
(福建大生控股有限公司).160 Yet, the company retains ties to CEFC China Energy; Lan
Huasheng used to collaborate with Ye Jianming (叶简明) the founder and chairman (独
立董事) of Huaxin and he has been an independent board member of the company since
2006.161 One of the most important private companies in China, Huaxing Holdings
was created by Ye Jianming when he was only 20 years old.162 Lan is also the executive
director of the China Academy of Culture (中国文化院).163 This organization, founded by
the China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC, 中国能源基金委员会) – the CEFC’s think
tank – is part of the “Huaxin nexus.”164
The CEFC think tank was identified as a platform for political warfare, affiliated
to the former General Political Department. Its links to the PLA and the Party have been
well documented.165 For instance, J. Michael Cole explained that the CEFC China Energy
think tank rented office space in Base 311’s offices.166 Ye Jianming, founder of Huaxin,
was also known for his membership to another organization linked to the former General
Political Department during the 2000s: the CAIFC.167 Besides, Huaxin’s think tank made
headlines on multiple occasions. In 2011, a former PLA officer who worked there gained
attention after he published a piece in the Global Times about the need for greater demon-
strations of force in the South China Sea.168 In 2017, its former director Patrick Ho (何志
159. For a reference to the Huaxin Training Center’s affiliation to CEFC China Energy, see the bi-monthly review
of the company, 华信新视野 (CEFC China New Vision), such as issue 4 (2011), p. 26, https://bit.ly/3cFhN9v. See also
Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 29; and Cole, Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The illusion
of peace, 68.
160. Between 2005 and 2014, the principal shareholder of Fujian Huaxin Holdings was the CEFC (Shanghai)
Group Co. Ltd. (上海石油集团有限公司 then上海华信国际有限公司), a subsidiary of CEFC China Energy
created in 2003. Since 2014, the principal shareholder of Fujian Huaxin Holdings, which became Fujian Dasheng
Holdings is 90% owned by Lan Huasheng. Its named cane be translated as Shanghai Zhongmao Chuangfu Equity
Investment Fund Co., Ltd. (上海中茂创富股权资基金有限公司); the Tianyancha profile of the company, last
updated April 7 2020: https://www.tianyancha.com/company/339639036. The current address of Fujian Dasheng
Holdings is 318 Wushangxi Street, Gulou district, Fuzhou (福建省福州市鼓楼区乌山西路318号洪山科技园创
业中心大厦第2层213). The Tianyancha profile of Fujian Dasheng Holdings from February 26 2020: https://www.
tianyancha.com/company/2344250825. The Tianyancha profile of CEFC (Shanghai) Group Co. Ltd – or CEFC
Shanghai International Group Limited – since April 7, 2020: https://www.tianyancha.com/ company/149845647.
Please also see “‘神秘富豪’兰华升旗下版图扩张遇阻” (“Obstacles on the Path of the Mysterious and Powerful Lan
Huasheng”), Xinhuanet (26 Jun. 2018), http://archive.vn/upJGY.
161. “‘神秘富豪’兰华升旗下版图扩张遇阻” (“Obstacles on the Path of the Mysterious and Powerful Lan
Huasheng”), http://archive.vn/upJGY.
162. In 2016, Ye Jianming ranked 2 in Fortune’s “40 under 40” – the 40 largest fortunes in the world owned by
people under 40. Scott Cendrowski, “The Unusual Journey of China’s Newest Oil Baron,” Fortune (28 Sept. 2016),
http://archive.vn/LSd8f.
163. Stokes and Hsiao prefer the translation “China Institute of Culture.” We use the Chinese translation in this
report.
164. “中国文化院” (“China Academy of Culture”), Baidu, http://archive.vn/4biGL.
165. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 26-29; Anne-Mary Brady, “Submission to the Inquiry
on Foreign Interference,” New Zealand Parliament, Select Committee on Justice (2019), 2, https://bit.ly/2ywdOgO;
Anne-Marie Brady, “On the Correct Use of Terms,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 19:9 (9 May 2019); J. Michael
Cole, “Unstoppable: China’s Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan,” National Interest (23 Mar. 2015).
166. J. Michael Cole, “A conversation about China’s sharp power and Taiwan,” Brookings Institute, (11 Sept. 2018),
15.
167. Stokes and Hsiao believed Ye Jianming was the deputy secretary general of the CAIFC or to CAIFC Shanghai
between 2003 and 2005 (“The People’s Liberation Army,” 26).
168. Andrew Chubb, “‘A Golden Opportunity to Use Force:’ Mysterious China Energy Fund Committee
Attackdog,” South Sea Conversations (29 Sept. 2011).
118
平) was arrested and found guilty of conspiracy, money laundering, and of violating the law
against corruption abroad.169 This businessman and former Secretary of Internal Affairs
in Hong Kong (2002-2007), was accused of bribing foreign officials, allegedly giving two
million dollars to the president of Chad in 2014, through the CEFC’s non-governmental
and non-profit branch, the China Energy Fund Committee, to facilitate the conglomer-
ate’s development abroad.170 The important number of scandals in Africa and Eastern
Europe – the Czech president Miloš Zeman named Ye Jianming as his “economic advisor”
in 2015171 (→ p. 265) – and at the UN172 finally convinced the NGO Committee to cancel
the CEFC think tank’s special consultative status at the ECOSOC173 it had received in 2011,
in 2019. Ye Jianming’s arrest, which closely followed Patrick Ho’s, sealed the fate of one
of China’s most powerful conglomerates,174 as the CEFC officially declared bankruptcy
in March 2020.175
Evidence of the connection between Base 311 and CEFC China Energy (Huaxin).
While Huaxin Holdings in Fujian was founded in 2005, the same year as Base 311, we
ignore when it was affiliated to Base 311. But Huaxin and the CHBC began collaborating
in 2014, when they co-organized the Chinese Culture Development Forum (→ p. 433).176
169. Mathieu Olivier, “Justice: le Hongkongais Patrick Ho déclaré coupable de corruption au Tchad et en Ouganda”
(“Justice: Hong Kong Patrick Ho Found Guilty of Corruption in Chad and Uganda”), Jeune Afrique (6 Dec. 2018).
170. Alvin Lum, “Patrick Ho US Bribery Case: CEFC China Energy Identified in Evidence Against Ex-Hong
Kong Minister,” South China Morning Post (29 Apr. 2018); Jenni Marsh, “How a Hong Kong millionaire’s bribery case
exposes China’s corruption problem in Africa,” CNN (10 Feb. 2018).
171. Martin Hála, “United Front Work by Other Means: China’s ‘Economic Diplomacy’ in Central and Eastern
Europe,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 19:9 (2019).
172. Jichang Lulu, “United Nations with Chinese Characteristics: Elite Capture and Discourse Management on a
global scale,” Sinopsis (25 Jun. 2018).
173. “Withdrawal of the consultative status of the non-government organization China Energy Fund Committee,”
UN Economic and Social Council (6 Jun. 2019), E/DEC/2019/217.
174. Eric Ng and Xie Yu, “China detains CEFC’s founder Ye Jianming, wiping out US$153 million in value off
stocks,” South China Morning Post (1 Mar. 2018); Don Weinland, “Chinese state brokerage takes over CEFC securities
arm,” Financial Times (15 Nov. 2019).
175. “Fallen Energy Conglomerate CEFC Declared Bankrupt – Caixin Global,” Caixin (25 Apr. 2020).
176. “第二届 ‘两岸四地文化沙龙’ 将于福州召开” (“The Second Edition of the Two Banks Cultural Fair
Inaugurated in Fuzhou”), Taihainet (13 Oct. 2014), http://archive.vn/cLMUt; “第二届 ‘两岸四地文化沙龙’ 在榕开
119
The China Academy of Culture, which emanated from the CEFC think tank, was originally
behind the forum.177 The relationship between Huaxin and CHBC likely began a few years
prior. In a 2012 speech, CHBC executive Ai Songru thanked Huaxin for its support during
an event the CHBC was invited to.178 Besides, the hotel named after the Huaxin Training
Center opened its doors in 2011, which could be identify the start of the collaboration
between Huaxin and CHBC.179 In addition, Zheng Yong (郑永), an executive at the
Dasheng group (大生) owned by Lan Huasheng, held a position at CHBC between 2012
and 2014.180
IV. A web of relaying platforms
A nexus of associations, non-profit NGOs, and other civilian facades – with blurry
links to the Chinese authorities – plays a role in the implementation of influence operations.
The organizations that make up this web of actors, irrespective of their proximity to the
central government, are all platforms conducing to PRC influence operations. They
serve the government to varying degrees, at times only facilitating its operations.
As such, they are referred to as “relaying platforms.” This report does not aim to create
an exhaustive list of these organizations, but rather to present the main organizations with
direct links to the PLA, the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC),
the China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (CAPCC), as well as the China
Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPNR), which has ties
to the Party, and the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF). The latter is an
example of an organization orbiting at a distance from the nexus, but that still deserves a
particular attention.
This nexus is sprawling. Many people accumulate or consecutively occupy key
positions in a number of these organizations. The former vice president of the National
People’s Congress (NPC), Xu Jialu (许嘉璐), is one of them. A respected intellectual
known for promoting Chinese values and culture around the world, Xu Jialu has served as
president of the CAPCC, honorary president of the CCPPNR, founder and president of
the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations’ organizing committee, principal advisor to the
CAIFC, president of the CEFC advisory committee, and president of the China Academy
of Culture.181
A number of officers from the former General Political Department’s Liaison Department
(GPD/LD) have held positions in these organizations. This is particularly the case of the
CAIFC, which was under the direct authority of the GPD/LD.182
幕” (“Inauguration of the Second Edition of the Two Banks Cultural Fair”), Voice of the Strait (26 Oct. 2014), http://
archive.vn/RWGXN.
177. “首届 ‘中华文化发展方略——两岸四地文化沙龙’ 形成共识” (“First Edition of the ‘Chinese Culture
Development Strategy – the Two Banks Cultural Fair’ Initiative, Which Resulted in a Consensus”), 网易 (Wang yi) (7
Nov. 2013), http://archive.vn/Pyg3X.
178. “中国华艺广播公司执行董事总经理艾松如的讲话” (“Speech by Ai Songru, Senior Director of the China
Huayi Broadcasting Company”), 五缘文化 (Sina Blog of Wuyuan Wenhua) (19 May 2012), http://archive.vn/mSf1O
179. Home page of the website “福州华信培训中心酒店” (“Fuzhou Huaxin Training Center Hotel”), http://
archive.vn/qqApe
180. “大生农业金融: 高管简介” (“Shanghai Dasheng: Executive Presentation”), 同花顺 (Tonghuashun), http://
archive.vn/o5cH2.
181. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 20-29.
182. Ibid.
120
• Jin Li (金黎) was director of the LD/GPD (1985-1990), deputy chief executive of
CAIFC, deputy secretary general of the China Japan Association for Friendly Contact (
中日友协), and a member of the Foreign Affairs Association (外交学会).183
• Ye Xuanning (叶选宁), alias Yue Feng (岳枫) was GPD/LD director following him
(1990-1998), deputy director of the CAIFC, and he supervised the newly-established
Carrie Enterprise Corporation (中国凯利实业有限公司). This company allows the
GPD to operate from Hong Kong and works as liaison conducting operations against
Taiwan.184 He is the son of Marshall Ye Jianying (叶剑英).
• Liang Hongchang (梁宏昌), alias Liang Shi (梁湜) became director of the GPD/
LD subsequently (1999-2007), and also executive director of the CAIFC, and the first
president of the CAPCC.185
• Xing Yunming (邢运明) was the director of the GPD/LD (2007-2015), deputy direc-
tor of the CAIFC, director of the CAPCC, vice president of the Nishan Forum’s organi-
zation committee in 2008, and executive director of the China Philanthropy Forum (中
国公益论坛) – the product of a collaboration between the GPD/LD and the magazine
Caijing.186
• Xin Qiu (辛旗) has been deputy director of the GPD/LD since at least 2011 and
deputy director of the CAPCC. He was affiliated to the China Painting Academy for
Friendly Contact (中国友联画院), the Tsinghua International Broadcasting Research
Center (清华大学国际传播研究中心), and the National Society of Taiwan Studies (全
国台湾研究会). This last organization gathers Chinese experts working on Taiwan, and
supports the TAO and UFWD.187 He is still vice president of the CAIFC.188
• Li Xiaohua (李晓华) served as deputy director of the GPD/LD, CAIFC, Chinese
Association for South Asian Studies (中国南亚学会), and of the White Jade Research
Association (中国白玉研究会).189
• Du Rubo (杜汝波) was the deputy director of the GPD/LD, honorary president
of the China Red Cultural Institute (中国红色文化研究会), a member of the United
Front Theory Research Association (中国统一战线理论研究会), and deputy secre-
tary general of the CAIFC. He also managed the activities of the Dongfang Yi Cultural
Expansion Association (东方毅拓展文化协会), which is considered a neo-Maoist,
anti-American platform that supported the former General Political Department in
developing the “Three Warfares.” Du Rubo’s writings in particular are said to have con-
tributed to the “Three Warfares” strategy, notably his 1990 book Introduction to psychological
warfare (心理战概论), co-written with Wen Jinquan (温金权) and Zhou Min (周敏).190
• Chen Zuming (陈祖明) served as the director of the GPD/LD, CAIFC general sec-
retary, executive director of the Nishan Forum, and deputy director for both the China
183. Ibid., 52, note 53.
184. Ibid., 11-12
185. Ibid., 14 and note 141, p. 63.
186. Ibid., 26
187. Ibid., 21, 34.
188. http:// www.caifc.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=25.
189. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 21.
190. Ibid., 29.
121
Association of Southeast Asian Studies (中国东南亚研究会) and the China Painting
Academy for Friendly Contact.191
• Zheng Jian (郑剑) was secretary general of the CAPCC and director of the China
Strategic Culture Promotion Association (中国战略文化促进会), a member of the
CAIFC board of directors, and a member of the Center for Peace and Development
(CPSD, 和平与发展研究中心), the National Society of Taiwan Studies, and the Cross-
Strait Relations Research Center (海峡两岸关系研究中心).192
A. CAIFC – China Association for International Friendly Contact (中
国国际友好联络会)
Modeled after the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
(CPAFFC, 中国人民对外友好协会),193 the CAIFC was created in 1984. According
to Stokes and Hsiao, it is one of the most important platforms relaying PLA and
CCP influence operations. It was a direct subordinate to the GPD/LD, probably its
Investigation and Research bureau.194 This is why multiple GPD/LD officers held positions
at the CAIFC. Today, the association is presumably under the authority of the new Liaison
Department in the Political Work Department (PWD/LD). Moreover, Chen Yuan (陈元)
is its current director. Xin Qi and Deng Rong (邓榕), the daughter of Deng Xiaoping, and
Yi Xian (乙先), who is also vice president of CAPCC, are the CAIFC’s vice presidents.
Finally, Liang Hongchang, is also still a member of the CAIFC board of directors, under
the alias Liang Shi.195
The CAIFC’s mode of operation consists in making contact and cultivating relation-
ships with foreign elites, in the defense sector especially, but also with lawmakers and
other influential actors in target countries. Its aim is to diffuse a positive image of China
through them.196 Henry Kissinger is an “old friend” of the CAIFC197 for instance. And
the US-China Sanya Initiative is an example of a CAIFC project that was created to foster
better relations with the US military elite (see section below).
At the provincial level, there are Associations for International Friendly Contact (AIFC)
as well. And the Liaison Department directors of the former military regions’ political
departments served as deputy directors of these AIFCs.198 It can be assumed that these
191. Ibid., 21.
192. Ibid., 61, note 131.
193. Ibid., 37. The website: https://www.cpaffc.org.cn/. Their “About” page is archived here: http://archive.vn/
J4hdc.
194. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 24.
195. CAIFC member pages can be found in the archives here: http://archive.ph/ftefX.
196. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 24.
197. “President Chen Yuan Meets with Former US Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger,” CAIFC (11 Nov. 2011),
http://archive.ph/cCymZ.
198. Stokes and Hsiao hypothesis, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 27.
122
overlaps were reproduced with the new command theaters of the post-2015 reform struc-
tures. For example, the Jiangsu Association for International Friendly Contact was tied to
the Nanjing military region.199
The CPDS, created in 1984, is also affiliated to the CAIFC.200 According to Stokes and
Hsiao, the CPDS functioned as the principle former GPD/LD think tank, and has likely
reprised its role with the current PWD/LD; it apparently supports the MSS as well.201
Finally, the CPDS publishes a bimonthly review about international relations, called Peace
and Development (和平与发展).
1. The US-China Sanya Initiative: how to influence US generals
Since 2008, the CAIFC has organized the US-China Sanya Initiative (中美高级退役将
领交流活动), officially named the “US-China High-Ranking Retired Generals Exchange
Initiative,” in partnerrship with the EastWest Institute (EWI). The EWI is an NGO that
promotes international dialogue and acts as a platform for informal diplomacy. The initia-
tive’s English name refers to the city of Sanya, in Hainan province in China, where the first
dialogue was held in 2008. The event is sponsored by the CUSEF (→ p. 125) and, in 2018,
the program celebrated its 10th anniversary.
According to the organizers and participants, the goals of the initiative are to improve
communication and mutual understanding, as well as to create a space for cooperation in
case of a crisis.202 These dialogues often take place in Beijing over the course of a day
or two of informal discussions. The Chinese and American delegations typically discuss
a variety of topics of interest, including Chinese-American military relations, conflicts in
the South and East China seas, the Korean peninsula, counter-terrorism, cyber security,
or Taiwan and its relationship with China. These exchanges always coincide with current
events, such as Xi Jinping’s visit to the US, the US elections, or the 2016 arbitration of the
South China Sea dispute by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.203
During the day, the participants meet with one or multiple important American or
Chinese figures. In fact, the delegations were invited to meet with GPD directors on
multiple occasions: General Zhang Yang (张阳) in 2013 and 2015 and General Miao
Hua (苗华) in 2017 and 2018. They met other important Chinese military figures like
General Xu Qiliang (许其亮), vice president of the CMC in 2015, and Lieutenant General
Li Zuocheng (李作成) in 2013, at the time commander of the Chengdu military region
but now a general and the Joint Chiefs of Staff director. In 2016, the 7th dialogue took
place in Washington, D.C. and New York. This allowed participants to meet high rank-
ing American officials like Senators John McCain and Tom Cotton, Representative Rick
Larsen, then-Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel,
and Maurice R. Greenberg, president of CV Starr & Co. Inc.
The US delegation was led by (retired) Admiral William A. Owens, a former vice chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Owens has publicly pushed for better US-China relations,
opposed the Taiwan Relations Act which he considered detrimental to the US, advocated for
199. Ibid., 30.
200. “和平与发展研究中心简介” (“Presentation of the Center for Peace and Development Studies”), 和平与发
展, 3 (1996), http://archive.ph/I7iZd.
201. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 27.
202. “A Briefing on the Sanya Initiative,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (6 Jun. 2008).
203. The minutes of the dialogue, with a list of participants and subjects discussed, are accessible on the EastWest
Institute website. For example, the minutes of the 2018 meeting can be found here: https://www.eastwest.ngo/ idea/
us-china-sanya-initiative-dialogue-report-10th-anniversary-meeting.
123
the end of US weapon sales to Taiwan, and encouraged the development of US-Chinese
economic relations – positions that Beijing favors.204 Since his retirement, Admiral Owens
is believed to have defended Chinese interests through his appointment to various boards
of directors. With the help of Amerilink, a firm he created in 2009, he tried to help his first
client, Huawei, enter the American market, by winning a contract with the telecommunica-
tions company Sprint Nexel. Probably to quell concerns regarding Huawei’s connection to
Beijing, he enlisted the help of former congressman Richard Gephardt and former World
Bank president James Wolfensohn. While Alcatel and Samsung were eventually awarded
the contract, Owens’ efforts resulted in Huawei being one of the final six companies con-
sidered.205
Among the influential officers who participated in these dialogues were General Ronald
R. Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of Staff, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, former com-
mander of the Pacific Command (PACOM), General Charles H. Jacoby, former commander
of the Northern Command (NORCOM), General John Abizaid, former commander of
the Central Command (CENTCOM), and General Walter L. Sharp, former commander of
the US forces in Korea. On the Chinese side, the US-China Sanya Initiative is managed by
three people, Xin Qi and Yi Xian, both vice-presidents of the CAIFC, and Li Haoyu (李浩
宇), secretary general of the CAIFC. Stokes and Hsiao hypothesized that Haoyu was also
the former director of the GPD/LD investigation and research bureau.206
Official photograph from the 10th US-China Sanya Initiative dialogue (2018). From the left: Xin Qi (1st),
Li Andong (5th), Miao Hua (7th), Willian A. Owens (8th), Yi Xian (11th), Li Haoyu (14th).207
204. Bill Owens, “America must start treating China as a friend,” Financial Times (17 Nov. 2009), http:// archive.
ph/bKXl0. “Admiral Bill Owens: Leadership, ‘Togertheness’ and What is Required for China and the U.S. to Avoid
the Thucydides’ Trap,” China-US Focus, video published on January 9, 2020, https://www.chinausfocus.com/videos/
interview-with-admiral-bill-owens.
205. William Lowther, “Owens’ links to PRC firm ring alarm,” Taipei Times (9 Sept. 2010), http://archive.ph/
on53P; Spencer E. and Shayndi Raice, “Dignitaries Come on Board to Ease Huawei Into U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal
(21 Sept. 2010), http://archive.ph/Dqy5w; Winter Nie and William Dowell, In the Shadow of the Dragon: The Global
Expansion of Chinese Companies and How It Will Change Business Forever, AMACOM American Management Association
(2012).
206. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 24.
207. Jace White, US-China Sanya Initiative Dialogue: Report from the 10th Anniversary Meeting, EastWest Institute (17 Jan.
2019), https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/us-china-sanya-initiative-dialogue-report-10th-anniversary-meeting.
124
B. CAPCC – China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (中
华文化发展促进会)
According to Stokes and Hsiao, the Central Military Command (CMC) was the driving
force behind the creation of the CAPCC in 2001. The CAPCC was apparently founded to
become the principal PLA platform for political work dedicated to Taiwan, under the
authority of the former GDP/LD.208 It should not be confused with the Chinese Culture
Promotion Society (中华文化促进), which has an almost identical name in Chinese. In 2020,
for unknown reasons, the CAPCC’s website was no longer accessible even though it had still
been working in the summer 2019.209 The CAPCC is one of the organizers of the Chinese
Culture Development Forum (→ p. 433), alongside the CEFC China Energy’s China Culture
Academy, CHBC, the UFWD-affiliated All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, the
Want Daily and the China Review News.210 The CAPCC is apparently managing the commercial
company Huayi Audio Visual ((中国华艺音像实 业有限公司), the CEO of which, Bao
Lixian (鲍立衔), was deputy director of the CAPCC.211 The association also appears to have
a close working relationship with the China Review News and the PLA Academy of Military
Science.212 The last identified CAPCC president was Wang Zhengwei (王正伟) who had spent
the majority of his career in his native autonomous region of Ningxia before becoming vice
president of the CPPCC and deputy director of the UFWD.213
C. CCPPNR – China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National
Reunification (中国和平统一促进会)
Created in 1988, the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification
(CCPPNR) has a very close working relationship with political authorities. Members
of the CCPPNR bureau hold positions in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC), the standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC),
and the United Front Work Department (UFWD).
Each year during the NPC, the CPPCC gathers and consults with various political par-
ties, representatives of ethnic groups, and other organizations. Wang Yang (汪洋), the cur-
rent CPPCC president, is also the president of the CCPPNR. In fact, the presidents of
208. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 15.
209. The website’s address: http://www.chinaapc.org/. See also the Baidu page: http://archive.vn/8oY8D.
210. “中评现场：叶克冬谴责 ‘去中国化’ 行径” (“Ye Kedong Denounces Practices of ‘De-Sinicization’”),
China Review News Agency (18 Dec. 2016), http://archive.vn/FQKOp.
211. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 62, note 133.
212. Ibid., 26.
213. See Wang Zhengwei’s Baidu page: http://archive.vn/8U8R3.
125
the eight democratic parties that are allowed to exist alongside the CCP are vice
presidents of the CPPCC and of the CCPPNR. Some are members of the NPC’s
standing committee as well. The eight parties are:
• Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK, 中国国民党革命委
员会) – President: Wan Exiang (万鄂湘);
• China Democratic League (CDL, 中国民主同盟) – President: Ding Zhongli (丁仲礼);
• China National Democratic Construction Association (CDNCA, 中国民主建国会) –
President: Hao Mingjin (郝明金);
• China Association for Promoting Democracy (CAPD, 中国民主促进会) – President:
Cai Dafeng (蔡达峰);
• Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party (CPWDP, 中国农工民主党) –
President: Chen Zhu (陈竺);
• China Zhi Gong Party (CZGP, 中国致公党) – President: Wan Gang (万钢);
• Jiusan Society (JS, 九三学社) – President: Wu Weihua (武维华);
• Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (TDSGL, 台湾民主自治同盟) –
President: Su Hui (苏辉).
Among the other political personalities who jointly held vice presidential positions at
the CPPCC and the CCPPNR, we noted Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai (帕巴拉·格列朗杰),
president of the Autonomous Region of Tibet, Zheng Jianbang (郑建邦), RCCK member,
and Gao Yunlong (高云龙), CDNCA member.214
The National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会) is made up of some 3,000 representa-
tives, indirectly elected for five years, who meet once a year in session. Most seats are held by CCP
members, but there are also independent representatives and members of the eight authorized par-
ties. The NPC does not have any real legislative or executive power as it remains under the author-
ity of the CCP. Its role is largely symbolic. The NPC’s standing committee is composed of 175
people, including multiple CCPPNR vice-presidents: Wan Exiang (RCCK), Chen Zhu (CPWDP),
Ding Zhongli (CDL), Hao Mingjin (CDNCA), Cai Dafeng (CAPD), or Wu Weihua (JS).
Finally, You Quan (尤 权), the CCPPNR secretary general and second in command,
and Tan Tianxing (谭天星), are respectively the director and deputy director of the CCP’s
Central Committee UFWD. You Quan is also secretary of the CCP Secretariat.
The CCPPNR has developed a network:of offices on all continents. According to a 2019
study by the Jamestown Foundation, it is present in 91 countries, including France, the
United Kingdom, the US, Canada, and Australia.215
D. CUSEF – China-United-States Exchange Foundation (中美交流基
金会)
The China-United-States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), which sponsors numerous
CAIFC events, like the US-China Sanya Initiative, has also funded a variety of dialogues,
programs, and exchanges between the US and China. Created in 2008 in Hong Kong,
214. To consult the list of CCPPNR members: http://archive.vnwmk12.
215. John Dotson, “The United Front Work Department Goes Global: The Worldwide Expansion of the Council
for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China,” Jamestown Foundation (9 May 2019).
126
the CUSEF describes itself as an “independent, non-profit, privately funded, and non-gov-
ernmental foundation… [that] builds platforms to encourage constructive dialogue and
diverse exchanges between the people of the US and China.” But it functions as a de facto
front organization for the PRC government216: it is one of the most active United
Front relays working in the US. Links between the CUSEF and UFWD are well-es-
tablished. The founder and president of the CUSEF, Tung Chee-Hwa (董建華), a former
executive chief of Hong Kong (1997-2005), was also the vice president of the CPPCC’s 21th
National Committee. Besides, the CUSEF board of directors includes known UFWD and
CCP members.217 Liu Changle, the CEO of Phoenix Media Investment (Holdings) Ltd. and
founder of Phoenix Television, is on the board of directors for instance. Phoenix Television
is a rare non-governmental stations authorized in China, pointing to Liu Changle’s close
relationship to the CCP.218 Finally, Henry Kissinger is CUSEF’s honorary advisor.219
Apart from the US-China Sanya Initiative, which it has sup-
ported since its inception, the CUSEF sponsors a number of
high-level dialogues. Similarly to the Sanya dialogue, but with
non-military participants, the US-China High-Level
Political Party Leaders Dialogue (中美政党对话) brings
together political leaders. Organized with the CCP’s
International Liaison Department (ILD) and the EastWest
Institute, this dialogue offers a delegation of American politicians (Democrats and
Republicans) the opportunity to meet with CCP members and discuss current events. The
10th dialogue, which took place in 2017 in Beijing, was led by Song Tao, the ILD minister,
Martin O’Malley, former Democratic governor of Maryland, and Alphonso Jackson, the
former Republican Housing and Urban Development Secretary.220
Additionally, alongside the EWI and the China Institute of International Studies, the
CUSEF organizes the US-China High-Level Security Dialogue, which allows schol-
ars, former and current government representatives, military officers, and Chinese and
American CEOs to exchange and produce recommendations for decisionmakers in both
countries, hence fostering mutual understanding.221 Among its other events, the CUSEF
sponsored the Conference on US-China Infrastructure Cooperation (中美基础设施建设
合作研讨会) in 2017 with the EWI and the China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR), a think tank believed to be an office of the MSS.222 It also supported
the Forum on China-US Relations, organized in Suzhou in 2016 with the Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), the Shanghai Institute for
International Studies, and the Carter Center (a US think tank). They have also sponsored
“China Forums” in elite US universities like New York University, the University of
Chicago, and Johns Hopkins. In 2019, the CUSEF and the China Center for International
216. John Dotson, “The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and United Front ‘Lobbying Laundering’ in American
Politics,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, 20:16 (16 Sept. 2020), 9.
217. Ibid., 4.
218. Complet list of CUEF directors on their website: http://archive.vn/LSxD9.
219. According to the CUSEF 2019 Annual Report.
220. Alex W. Schulman, (10th U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue,” EastWest Institute (12 Dec.
2017), http://archive.ph/uESaZ.
221. “9th U.S.-China High-Level Security Dialogue,” EastWest Institute (2015), https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/
default/files/ideas-files/HLSD9_FINAL.pdf.
222. “Profile of MSS-Affiliated PRC Foreign Policy Think Tank CICIR,” Open Source Center (25 Aug. 2011), https://
fas.org/irp/dni/osc/cicir.pdf.
127
Economic Exchanges jointly organized the “US-China Trade and Economic Exchanges:
What Now, What Next” (中美经贸关系现状与前景) in Hong Kong.223
Despite being registered as a “foreign agent” in the US, the CUSEF funds research
center and projects in American universities and think tanks, including at some
influential institutions in Washington. This funding became controversial when it was
revealed in 2017 that the CUSEF partially funded a new chair in China Studies at the pres-
tigious School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of John Hopkins University.224
The foundation’s academic projects are only “the tip of the iceberg” however. The CUSEF
is involved “in a much larger, multi-faceted effort to exert influence on US policy,”
notably as a sponsor of lobbying activities directed at Congress, as well as to local
and federal authorities.225
To do so, it uses intermediaries, including American PR firms (at least 7 since
2010).226 For instance, these firms manage a website funded by the CUSEF, chinausfocus.
com, created in 2011 (with a Chinese version in 2015), in addition to other publications.227
John Dotson explained that “this practice – of using a public relations firm to manage
synthetic think tank publication, which in turn published material that aligns with PRC
propaganda narratives – matches a pattern seen elsewhere in the world, as with the Sinoskop
website launched in the Czech Republic in 2019.”228 These activities “represent a sort of
‘lobbying laundering’ in which a nominally independent third-party organization
acts as a primary agent for funding and managing lobby efforts on behalf of the
PRC.”229
In 2015 and 2016, the CUSEF also brought delegations from the Center for American
Progress, a Washington-based think tank, to China. In 2016, the delegation met with “Zhang
Gaoli (张高丽), then-PRC Vice Premier and a member of the CCP Politburo Standing
Committee; Jin Liqun (金立群), president of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank;
and Admiral Sun Jianguo (孙建国), deputy chief of the PLA Joint Staff Department.”230
The CUSEF’s exchange programs target more than military and political leaders: many
are geared toward students. These programs offer students the opportunity to visit China
and they are usually organized in collaboration with the CPAFFC. Students from Columbia
University, the University of Chicago, Harvard (Kennedy School of Government), UC
Berkeley, Georgetown, and Johns Hopkins (SAIS) have already been invited to visit China
for instance. Other programs target American media representatives. Staff members from
The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Chicago Tribute, the National Public Radio, Vox, Bloomberg,
Reuters, and Forbes have participated in CUSEF programs.
223. See the full list on their website: https://www.cusef.org.hk/en/what-we-do/high-level-dialogues/us-china-
trade-economic-relations-what-now-what-next#article-header.
224. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “This Beijing-Linked Billionaire is Funding Policy Research at Washington’s Most
Influential Institutions,” Foreign Policy (28 Nov. 2017).
225. Dotson, “The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and United Front,” 3.
226. Ibid., 4.
227. The China-US Focus Digest review was created in 2014, and in 2017 the Chinese version was launched; the
weekly podcast “At Large,” hosted in English by the famous journalist and goodwill UN ambassador James Chau was
created in 2018; finally, the “storytelling dynamic” platform “China Current with James Chau” was launched in 2019.
228. Dotson, “The China-U.S. Exchange Foundation and United Front,” 5.
229. Ibid., 9.
230. Ibid., 7.
129
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