Chapter 2
THE STATE
Within the state, two structures in particular are involved in influence operations: the
Ministry of State Security and the Taiwan Affairs Office.
I. The Ministry of State Security
In this assessment of the actors involved in Chinese operations, the Ministry of State
Security (MSS中华人民共和国国家安全部), the principal civil intelligence agency,
has two singularities: first, it is the most difficult institution to investigate with open source
methods. If our research into the Chinese-speaking Internet allowed us to collect numer-
ous details about the United Front, the Taiwan Affairs Office or even the PLA – all of them
leave documents online containing valuable information – the MSS appears to be much
more careful. Little information is thus openly available. Second, information manipulation
does not appear to figure among the MSS’s primary missions. To this day, no organization
dedicated to these questions (modeled on the KGB’s Service A) has been identified within
the Chinese agency.
The MSS was founded on July 1, 1983. It resulted from the fusion of the Central
Investigation Department (CID, 中共中央调查部) – an intelligence service created in
1955 and placed under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party – with
the first office of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS, 公安部) in charge of counter-es-
pionage (反间谍), generally called the Political Security Bureau (政治保卫局) –, probably
the second and third offices of the MPS, and finally several units of the United Front Work
Department (统战部) as well as the Commission for Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense (国防科工委). The deputy director of the MPS, Ling Yun (凌云)1
became the first Minister of State Security.
Several factors may have hung over the MSS’s creation and led to the decision to place
this new service under the supervision of the State Council instead of the Party’s Central
Committee. The creation of the MSS first made it possible to eliminate the CID, whose
head, Luo Qingchang (罗青长) was opposed to Deng’s rise to power – he had endorsed
Hua Guofeng (华国锋). Meanwhile, it was an opportunity to reduce the influence of the
2PLA, a branch of military intelligence, on the CID.2 Other reasons also deserve mention:
the MSS was tasked with developing operations under a non-diplomatic cover, an evolution
1. His real name is Wu Peilin (吴沛霖). After he joined the Yan’an base in 1939, Ling Yun entered the first
intelligence service of the CCP, which was euphemistically named the Central Department of Social Affairs (中央社
会 部), and run by Kang Sheng (康生).
2. 翁衍庆 (Weng Yanqing), 中共情報組織與間諜活動 (Intelligence Services and Espionage Activities of the Chinese
Communist Party), 新銳文創 (2018).
82
that the CID under Luo had refused, remaining faithful to the approach developed under
Mao.3 The transformation of China’s international and security environment at the end of
the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s could also explain the creation of the MSS.4
Officially placed under the supervision of the State Council, the work of the MSS is
nevertheless overseen by two important commissions: The Commission for Political-Legal
Affairs (政法委员会) – which supervises actors charged with implementing the law – and
the Central National Security Commission (中央国家安全委员会), created at the 3rd ple-
nary session of the 18th Party Congress in 2013 to strengthen the coherence of the CCP’s
security apparatus.
The MSS’s structure is only superficially known and numerous interrogations
remain as to the actual functions of its constituent offices. The MSS has 17 or 18 bureaus/
divisions to which must be added the affiliated bodies (see infographics). Furthermore, all
the bureaus/divisions have at their disposal front organizations to carry out operations
abroad. For example, the 4th Division uses the cover of the Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Macau Office of the Bureau of International Cooperation Chinese Academy of Sciences
(港澳台办公室----中国科学院国际合作局). As for the 14th Division, it could be able to
instrumentalize the CAS’s Institute of Sciences and Development (中国科学院科技战 略
咨询研究院). The National Society of Taiwan Studies (全国台湾研究会) is also, accord-
ing to certain sources,5 a body answerable to the MSS and used both to gather intelligence
and as a front organization. MSS agents can also take advantage of the covers offered by
different public agencies such as the Xinhua and China News Service press agencies and the
CITS travel agency (中国国际旅行社).6 The 17th Division supervises the activities of several
companies, including the Beijing Yanshan Hotel (北京 燕山大酒店), which serve as façades
during intelligence operations.
3. Ibid.
4. Peter Mattis and Matthew Brazil, Chinese Communist Espionage, An Intelligence Primer (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2019).
5. Russell Hsiao, “Changing of the Guard at the CASS-Institute of Taiwan Studies,” Global Taiwan Brief, 2:7 (15
Feb. 2017).
6. 翁衍庆 (Weng Yanqing), 中共情報組織與間諜活動 (Intelligence Services and Espionage Activities of the Chinese
Communist Party).
83
Charter of the alleged MSS organization
84
II. Taiwan Affairs Office
The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) is also involved in influence operations, although they
do not constitute the heart of its activities. As is often the case in the Chinese bureaucracy,
it is a dual body: at once the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (国务院台湾事务
办公室) and the Taiwan Work Office of the CPC Central Committee (中共中央台湾工作
办公室). The current director of this two-faced body is Liu Jieyi (刘结一), who used to be
a deputy director of the Central Committee’s Liaison Department. The current minister of
Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi (王毅), held the position between 2008 and 2013.
Created in 1988, the office implements the policy of the Party’s Central Committee
vis-à-vis Taiwan. This is largely formulated by the CCP Central Leading Small Group for
Taiwan Affairs (中央对台工作领导小组), now overseen by Xi Jinping with Wang Yang (汪
洋) as deputy. As a coordinating agency, the TAO guides and inspects all central and territorial
levels (autonomous regions, municipalities, and special administrative regions) organizations
of the Party-State in their management of Taiwan affairs (对台工作).7
The TAO serves as the permanent secretariat for a broad range of policies linked to
Taiwan. Cross-strait exchanges in all fields (culture, education, science, film, publishing, sports,
health…) are organized, managed, and coordinated by the Exchanges Office of the TAO.
The Economic Office coordinates economic questions, studies investment policies coming
from or dedicated to Taiwan, but also manages the different cross-strait flows – land-based,
maritime, and electronic. The Research Office follows and studies the evolution of the situa-
tion in Taiwan, the development of cross-strait relations, the policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and all
the other major subjects concerning the island. The Liaison Office is responsible for welcom-
ing important Taiwanese organizations and experts and operates as a liaison between all the
actors involved. The TAO also coordinates all legal issues concerning Taiwan, manages the
preparatory work for any negotiation or treaty signing with Taiwanese authorities and takes
general responsibility for the management of any major event involving Taiwan.8
More particularly, the TAO oversees propaganda bound to Taiwan. Its Information
Office plays an important role in this regard to the extent that it organizes the TAO’s press
conference, deals with Taiwanese journalists coming to China, manages cross-strait infor-
mation cooperation, and trains the different local departments and echelons on questions
related to Taiwan.9 The TAO also has a website used to circulate information addressed
to the “Taiwanese compatriots” (台湾同胞) who might wish to invest, start a business,
study, travel, or live in mainland China.10 The website finally relays news concerning the
PRC’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and the development of cross-strait relations.
The TAO oversees different media outlets – via the Jiuzhou Center for Cultural
Communication (九州文化传播中心)11 – such as the audiovisual company Jiuzhou (九
洲音像出版公 司), the Jiuzhou Publishing House (九州出版社有限公司), the Relations
7. “主要职责” (“Principal Missions”), 中共中央台湾工作办公室 (Taiwan Affairs Office) (9 Jan. 2011), http://
archive.vn/6pose.
8. “内设机构” (Internal structure), 中共中央台湾工作办公室 (Taiwan Affairs Office) (28 Jan. 2011), http://
archive.vn/USeQy.
9. Ibid.
10. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn.
11. “直属事业单位” (Sub-bodies), 中共中央台湾工作办公室 (Taiwan Affairs Office) (9 Jan. 2011), http://
archive.vn/iBW7B. “九州文化传播中心” (“Jiuzhou Center for Cultural Communication”), Taiwan Affairs Office (1
Sept. 2017), http://archive.vn/sAiaC.
85
Across Taiwan Straits newspaper (两岸关系), or the website www.taiwan.cn (中国台湾网)
which relays news on Taiwan – all of them vectors of propaganda diffusion for the Party.
Finally, we can also note that several organizations are affiliated with the TAO,12
including the Cross-Strait Relations Research Center (海峡两岸关系研究中心), the Cross-
Strait Exchange Centre (海峡两岸交流中心), the Cross-Strait Economic and Scientific
Cooperation Centre (海峡经济科技合作中心), and the National Training Centre for
Taiwan Executives (全国对台干部培训中心).
While it remains difficult to identify the exact involvement of the TAO in influence
operations in Taiwan, due to the lack of specific studies on this actor sometimes consid-
ered as of secondary importance, its role in this type of operation has been noticed by
Taiwanese actors.13
12. “直属事业单位” (“Sub-Bodies”), 中共中央台湾工作办公室 (Taiwan Affairs Office) (9 Jan. 2011), http://
archive.vn/iBW7B.
13. Interview conducted by the authors, Taipei (Jan. 2020).
87
Chapter 3
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not the country’s armed forces but the armed
wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As such, it participates in influence opera-
tions, a series of political maneuvers the CCP considers as part of its “political warfare” (政
治战). Political warfare is defined as the repertoire of maneuvers seeking to influence emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,
and individuals (→ p. 33).1 The PLA’s role in the CCP’s political warfare is based on the Gutian
Conference resolution of December 1929, also known as “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the
Party.” In it, Mao criticized the “purely military viewpoint” of Zhu De:
They think that the task of the Red Army like that of the White army, is merely to fight. They do not
understand that the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revo-
lution. Especially at present, the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting
to destroy the enemy’s military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda
among the masses, organizing the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political
power and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but
in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish
revolutionary political power.2
Hence, the PLA plays a key role in creating the CCP’s political power. It is within this
conceptual framework that influence operations (and information operations in particular),
must be understood. They are one of the PLA’s tools in asserting political power.
There is perhaps more public data available on the PLA than on any of the actors
mentioned so far. The research conducted for this report, as well as for previous studies,
show that it is possible to recover significant amounts of information from the Chinese-
speaking Internet.
I. The PLA prior to the reform
The former Liaison Department of the General Political Department (LD/GPD)
(总政治部联络部) was the primary organization in charge of political warfare within the
PLA. It was previously known as the Enemies’ Work Department (敌工部). According
to the regulations on the PLA’s political work, a liaison (联络工作) is more specifically
1. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare
with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 Institute (2013), 4.
2. Mao Tsé-toung, Écrits choisis en trois volumes (Selected Writings, in Three Volumes), I (Paris: François Maspero,
1969), 29-42. The text in Chinese: https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-192912.
htm. On the political context, see Alain Roux, Le Singe et le Tigre. Mao, un destin chinois (The Monkey and the Tiger: Mao, A
Chinese Destiny) (Paris: Larousse, 2009).
88
concerned with maintaining contacts with allied forces, disturbing enemy forces, carrying
out all Taiwan-related activities, studying foreign armed forces, enemy forces, assessing the
secessionist forces of ethnic minorities, but also with conducting psychological warfare.3
Other PLA actors who likely played a role in influence operations were the second
(2PLA) and third (3PLA) departments of the PLA’s former General Staff Department and
perhaps the fourth department (4PLA) as well. Amongst other things, these military intel-
ligence services were in charge of human (HUMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT),
for 2PLA, signals intelligence (SIGINT) for 3PLA, as well as electronic warfare (EW) and
electronic intelligence (ELINT).4
II. The PLA after the reform
The 2015 military reforms5 restructured the four general departments of the PLA,
including the General Political Department, into fifteen departments, all under the
direct authority of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Some of the missions
of the former GPD/LD were given to the Liaison Department of the new Political
Work Department (PWD/LD). The new Joint Staff Department of the Central Military
Commission was tasked with human intelligence. The role of the two aforementioned
institutions in influence operations is not studied in the report due to a lack of sources.
Furthermore, a new branch of the PLA was created following the reforms: The Strategic
Support Force (PLASSF) (解放军战略支援部队). This unit took over the cyber, elec-
tronic and spatial warfare domains, hence inheriting from 3PLA and 4PLA. The PLASSF
may also have acquired part of the former 2PLA’s technical competencies, though most
of the human intelligence missions were transferred to the Joint Staff Department of the
Central Military Commission (中央军委联合参谋部), and perhaps parts of the missions
of the former LD/GPD as well.
In addition to the four traditional administrative departments (General Staff, Equipment,
Political Work, and Logistics), the PLASSF has a Network Systems Department (网络系统
部) and a Space Systems Department (航天系统部). The Network Systems Department,
formerly supervised by Commander Ju Qiansheng (巨乾生)6 and Political Commissar Ding
Xingnong (丁兴农)7 (2019-2021) is said to have inherited certain missions and respon-
sibilities in the information domain, on top of the cyber and electromagnetic domains.8
3. Article 14§14 of the PLA Political Work Regulations (中国人民解放军政治工作条例), in the 2010 Revised
Edition. The text in Chinese is archived at the following address: http://archive.vn/zzrmu.
4. Peter Mattis, “China’s Military Intelligence System is Changing,” War on the Rocks (29 Dec. 2015).
5. For more information on the reforms of the PLA, see Juliette Genevaz, La réforme de l’Armée populaire de libération,
au coeur de la rénovation de l’État chinois (The Reform of the People’s Liberation Army, at the Heart of the Renovation of
the Chinese State), Research Paper 29, IRSEM (16 Aug. 2016).
6. Ju Qiansheng was appointed to head the PLASSF in 2021, and the name of his successor as head of the Network
Systems Department does not appear to have been revealed at this time. It is likely that Ding Xingnong has also been
replaced. Marcus Clay, “General Ju Qiansheng Takes Command of the PLA Strategic Support Force,” The Diplomat,
July 27, 2021.
7. “2019年晋升中将” (“List of Officers Promoted to Lieutenant-General Rank in 2019”), Sina (2 Dec. 2019),
http://archive.ph/d91VK. The Network Systems Department ranks one step below the theater command (副战区
职) and it shares its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) with Unit 32069. See the transcript of Zhou Zhongyi’s
speech (周仲义), “追思丁石孙先生,” (“In Memory of Mr. Ding Shisun”), Peking University School of Mathematical
Sciences (11 Nov. 2019), http://www.math.pku.edu.cn/docs/20191113155913480164.pdf.
8. On the PLASSF, see John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New
Era,” China Strategic Perspectives, 13 (2018); Mark Stokes and Rachaele Burton, “The People’s Liberation Army Strategic
Support Force: Leadership and Structure,” Project 2049 Institute (2018).
89
The PLASSF is a service (军种), along with the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the new
Rocket Forces. It benefits from a rank equivalent to a theater command (正战区级), which
is the highest rank beneath the Central Military Commission (CMC).9 Since 2021, the posi-
tion of SSF commander has been held by General Ju Qiansheng (巨乾生),10 the previous
commander of the Network Systems Department (2019-2021) who succeeded General Li
Fengbiao (李凤彪). The post of political commissar, meanwhile, has been held since 2020
by General Li Wei (李伟),11 a former political commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region,
succeeding Zheng Weiping (郑卫平).12
III. Base 311
PLA Unit 61716, also known as the
“Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological
Warfare and Legal Warfare Base” (舆论
战心理战法律战基地), or Base 311, was
created in 2005 in Fujian. The operational
starting date, unavailable in public records,
could be deduced from the date when the
first known commanders and political com-
missars of this base took office. Before the
2015 military reforms, the Base 311 was
part of the General Political Department
Liaison Department (GPD/LD) (→ p. 87).
After the reforms, Base 311 may have been integrated into the PLA’s Strategic Support
Force (PLASSF), based on the reassignment of some of its personnel.13 Its place within
the PLASSF internal structure remains unknown however. There are two plausible hypoth-
eses: Base 311 could be attached to the PLASSF’s Political Department or to the Network
Systems Department. Besides, the base is assumed to have a rank comparable to a deputy
corps command (副军职), meaning it is led by a major general or a senior colonel. According
9. On the rank system: Kenneth Allen, “China Announces Reform of Military Ranks,” Jamestown China Brief,
17:2 (30 Jan. 2017).
10. “4名 “60后 “将军晋升上将！现役最年轻上将是他” (“Four ‘post-60’ generals are promoted! Here is the
youngest general”), Sina (6 Jul. 2021), https://archive.ph/pJHJs. Marcus Clay, “General Ju Qiansheng Takes Command
of the PLA Strategic Support Force,” The Diplomat (27 Jul. 2021).
11. “2019年晋升中将” (List of Officers Promoted to Lieutenant General in 2019), Sina (2 Dec. 2019), http://
archive.ph/d91VK.
12. “5年晋升30名上将！中国最年轻 “60后 “上将纪录打破” (“In 5 years, 30 officers are promoted to general!
Record of ‘post-60’ generals in China”), 凤凰网(Ifeng) (19 Dec. 2020), https://archive.ph/tVLHt.
13. At least two people affiliated to the Base 311 (Unit 61716) were identified as working at the PLASSF concurrently:
Mou Shan (牟珊) and Wu Gang (吴刚). For a reference to Mou Shan as an affiliate member of the PLASSF in 2016,
see 牟珊 (Mou Shan), “北约战略传播策略探析” (“Analysis of NATO’s Communication Strategy”), 军事记者
(Junshi Jizhe), 6 (2016), http://archive.vn/wGjpf; For Mou Shan as an affiliate member of the Unit 61716, mentioned
the same year, see 牟珊 (Mou Shan) and 左伊 (Zuo Yi), “菲律宾军队民事与军事行动探析” (“An Analysis of the
Filipino Army’s Civil and Military Operations”), 军事政工理论研究 (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work), 17:1
(2016), http://archive.ph/6RQRv; On Wu Gang as an affiliate member of the PLASSF in 2016, see 吴刚 (Wu Gang),
“基于大数据的新闻传播探析” (“An Analysis of Communication Based on Big Data), Junshi Jizhe, 2 (2016), http://
archive.ph/bcjvp; On his alleged affiliation to the PLASSF in 2019, see 吴刚 (Wu Gang), “联合作战中党委领导的
时代创新” (“An Era of Innovation in Intra-army Operations Under the Direction of the Party Committee”), 政工
学刊 _(Zhenggong Xue Kan), 9 (2019), http://archive.ph/ceYv6; For a reference to Wu Gang as an affiliate member of
Unit 61716 in 2017, see 吴刚 (Wu Gang), “大数据在美军的运用探析” (“An Analysis of the Use of Big Data in the
American Army), 军事政工理论研究 (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work), 18:2 (2017), http:// archive.vn/F2u2o.
90
to Mark Stokes, it “carries the status of six conventional missile brigades” of the PLA’s
Base 52 of the Second Artillery.14
Irrespective of its specific position within the PLA, it is the only officially known
base dedicated to the implementation of the “Three Warfares” strategy. As such, it
is in charge of the operational side of political warfare. Starting in 2011, all psychological
warfare efforts against Taiwan have presumably been centralized in Base 311.15 And
Taiwan is the most targeted country in terms of information manipulation coming from
the PRC. In fact, Base 311 is suspected of having orchestrated the misinformation cam-
paign that targeted the 2018 Taiwanese elections.16 It also appeared that Base 311 conducts
research on the informational environment in the United States.17 Affiliated research-
ers have published reports on the US, notably on the potential effects of legislation passed
to fight propaganda, the role of social media in American political life, such as their impact
on the political polarization, and so on.
The Base 311 is under the authority of the PLASSF, probably of the Political Work Department
or of the Network Systems Department.
This Base is an ideal case study to understand how the PLA conducts its influence oper-
ations, and more specifically information manipulation. While this unit keeps a low profile
and remains relatively opaque, it is possible to find information and data about it on the
Chinese Internet.18
Its headquarters are in Fuzhou, the capital city of Fujian, a province that faces Taiwan.
Several recent official websites indicated that its address is 77 Meizhu Street, in the city’s
14. Mark Stokes cited in J. Michael Cole, Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Illusion of peace? (London:
Routledge, 2016), 68.
15. This information was relayed on multiple Chinese platforms, but the initial source is thought to be a Japanese
media outlet. See “日媒称 “高新七号” 大幅提升解放军心理战能力” (Japanese media: The Y-8 GAoxin 7
Considerably Improves Psychological Warfare Activities), 参考消息 (Reference News) (17 Aug. 2013), http:// archive.
ph/43797. Extract: “2011年，该基地被指定为所有对台心理战工作的焦点” (“In 2011, [the Base 311] Was
Designated as the Focal Point for All Psychological Warfare Work Against Taiwan”).
16. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of
Social Media for Influence Operations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute,
Policy Papers (2019), 22.
17. Ibid., 97.
18. As demonstrated by Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department.”
91
Gulou District ((福州鼓楼区梅竹路77号) (Image 1).19 This address seems to match a
public pool (“the Dolphins’ Pool”) however, which was mentioned on a few Internet web-
sites as being at 77 Meizhu Street as well;20 it was seemingly confirmed by the presence of
“pool” sign at the site’s entrance (Image 2). Furthermore, a picture from inside the building
(Image 3) shows a roof that seems to correspond to the building on the satellite view of
the neighborhood (Image 4). If 77 Meizhu Street is the address of a pool, but also listed
as the address of Base 311, it could mean that this is nothing but a postal address and
that the base is actually elsewhere. And yet, a careful analysis of the satellite pictures of the
immediate environment of the pool shows a site several dozens of meters to the north that
resembles a military site (Image 5). Several details reinforce this hypothesis: the inexistence
of the Street View option on Baidu Maps for the entire perimeter (it stops at the supposed
entrance of the base, see Image 6); and the presence of several vehicles – apparently mil-
itary vehicles – in the courtyard of one of the buildings with, at its center, the shadow of
what could be a flag pole (Image 7). Last but not least, the site is just around the corner
from the Huaxin training center affiliated to Base 311 (→ p. 116) (Image 5).
1. 77 Meizhu Street (according to Baidu Maps), official address of Base 311 and of the Dolphins’ Pool.
2. Entrance of 77 Meizhu Street: on the pole on the left, we notice the “pool” sign.
19. All one needs to do is type “61716部队” on the Internet. This query on Google, in January 2021, brought
multiple pages of the Chinese government’s public market platform (中国政府采购网) confirming Unit 61716’s
address at 77, Meizhu Street, in Fuzhu. See a June 5, 2019 call for tender, for example: http://archive.fo/OSgWI; or
another released on June 11, 2019: http:// archive.fo/w81KV.
20. For instance: https://zi.media/@yidianzixun/post/8tNfCX.
92
3 and 4. The building’s roof (on the right) seems to correspond to that of the Dolphins’ Pool (on the left21).
5. Approximate site of Base 311, with the Huaxin Training Center nearby – screenshot from Google Earth.
6. Screenshot from the street view mode on Baidu Maps at the presumed entrance of Base 311. It is impossible to get closer.
21. Source: https://zi.media/@yidianzixun/post/8tNfCX.
93
7. Zoom on a part of the site – screenshot from Baidu Maps (Image 6).
A. An opaque structure
1. The commandment structure
POLITICAL
COMMISSAR
OF THE BASE 311
COMMANDER
OF THE BASE 311
PRESIDENT
OF CHBC
List of identified political commissars and commanders of the Base 311. Most of these individuals have cumulated the position
with that of president of CHBC, often under an alias. It is likely that the Base’s leadership has changed, but without an official
confirmation at this time.22
22. Photo of Song Haihang: http://archive.vn/JkrgZ. Deng Changyu (military officer): http://archive.vn/Nu5jL.
Deng Changyu (civilian): http://archive.ph/PjMkA. Yin Hongwen: http://archive.vn/yim1l. Wang Shu (military
officer): http:// archive.vn/nWXcS. Wang Shu (CHBC): http://archive.vn/RWGXN. Mei Huabo: http://archive.
vn/3pX5q. Yue Lei: http://archive.ph/sYfww. Qiu Yu: http://archive.ph/0Wrdf. Contrary to Wang Shu and Qiu
Yu’s photos, the photo of Deng Changyu as a civilian is not from a source referencing him as CHBC chairman: it is a
simple illustration. We could not confirm Deng Changyu as chairman of CHBC between 2005 and 2010, either under
his real name or with an alias. As such, we rely of the conclusions drawn by Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation
Army,” 68, note 184.
94
Despite a limited understanding of the Base’s internal structure, which remains extremely
opaque, it is possible to gather information on the individuals in leadership positions. No
official data is available, but the triangulation of information from various online sources
gives us a partial picture. Like in all PLA units, there is a dual management. At Base 311,
a commander and a political commissar (traditionally a major general or senior colo-
nel) form an executive duo, usually for a four- or five-year term. The first duo was made
of Commander Deng Changyu (邓长宇) and Political Commissar Song Haihang (宋海
航), and served from 2005 to 2010/2011. They were followed by Wang Shu (王树), alias
Wang Shu (汪澍) and the Political Commissar Yin Hongwen (尹洪文), who served until
2014/2015. Afterwards, Commander Yue Lei (岳雷), alias Qiu Yu (邱雨), and Political
Commissar Mei Huabo (梅华波) were appointed.23 A new duo should soon be appointed
to Base 311 – or may already have taken command without having been officially revealed.
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Internet provides little information on the background of
these officers, even though most high-ranking PLA officials have a Baidu page outlining their
professional trajectories. Except for Yue Lei, all of the aforementioned individuals have a
Baidu page that only provides meager biographical facts. For example, Major General Deng
Changyu, who was born in 1954 in Shandong, served as deputy political commissar in the
Lanzhou military region, then as the secretary of the political department of the Lanzhou
military region. He then commanded a unit attached to the General Political Department,
which likely corresponds to Base 311, and is since thought to have returned to Xinjiang.24
The most detailed Baidu page is that of Major General Song Haihang, born in 1955 in
Henan. It describes all of the positions he held between 1969 and 2015, including political
commissar for the Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare Base
of the PLA’s General Political Department (Base 311) between 2005 and 2011.25 Song was
also the president of the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC), a front organi-
zation for Base 311 (→ p. 103).26 Likewise, Major General Wang Shu’s Baidu page explains
that he was born in 1958 in Hebei and graduated from PLA Nanjing Political College (中
国人民解放军南京政治学院). Besides his position as commander at Base 311, he was
the political commissar for the PLA National Defense University and a PLA delegate at the
12th and 13th sessions of the National People’s Congress.27 On the contrary, Major General
Yin Hongwen’s Baidu page does not mention his affiliation to Base 311.28 Finally, the Baidu
page of Major General Mei Huabo, which mentions an affiliation to a certain unit of the
PLA’s PLASSF (to avoid mentioning Base 311), adds that he used to be the political com-
missar for Chinese Air Force Airborne Academy (中国人民解放军空军空降兵学院).29
A message that confirmed Mei Huabo’s position as political commissar of Base 311 was
posted on the Sina forum, but it has been erased since (see screenshot below).30 He is the
23. All of these names, with the exception of Yue Lei, have already been identified in previous investigations,
notably in Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” and Elsa B. Kania, “The Role of PLA Base 311 in
Political Warfare against Taiwan (Part 3),” Global Taiwan Brief, 2:7 (15 Feb. 2017).
24. Deng Changyu’s Baidu page: https://baike.baidu.com/item/邓长宇. See also Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s
Liberation Army,” 68, note 184, for reference to Deng Changyu as the first commander of Base 311 and chairman of
CHBC.
25. Song Haihang’s Baidu page: https://baike.baidu.com/item/宋海航.
26. “纪念红军长征胜利七十周年采访报道活动胜利结束” (“End of the 70th Anniversary Celebration of the
Red Army’s Long March”), Voice of the Strait (31 Aug. 2006), http://archive.ph/ZNbA1.
27. Wang Shu’s Baidu page: https://baike.baidu.com/item/王树/7254233.
28. Yin Hongwen’s Baidu page: https://bkso.baidu.com/item/尹洪文.
29. Mei Huabo’s Baidu page: https://baike.baidu.com/item/梅华波.
30. Webpage of the message (since deleted): http://blog.sina.com.cn/a/blog_8c0e29aa0102vqei.html.
95
last officially identified political commissar of the base, though he is now likely to have been
replaced.
Screenshot of the now-deleted message posted on Sina in July 2015, announcing the nomination
of Mei Huabo as political commissar of Base 311.31
Images highlighting the
link between the names
Yue Lei and Qui Yu.
Research conducted for this study revealed that Qiu Yu, president of
CHBC, is in fact the MG Yue Lei, the last identifiable commander at
Base 311. Base 311 operates through façade civilian companies,
notably the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC). All
commanders of Base 311 were also president of CHBC during their
tenure. Using an alias allowed these officers to have their face publicly
disclosed on websites that report on CHBC’s activities. For outsiders, it
is difficult to trace the actual person back to their alias, but not impossi-
ble given that aliases are always connected to their real name. For exam-
ple, the Major General Wang Shu (王树) chose the alias Wang Shu (汪
澍); the Chinese characters are read in the same manner, down to the
tone, and are written almost identically.32 Yet, and although the Pinyin spelling is the same,
the difference in Chinese characters is enough to complicate any online search.
Regarding Wang Shu’s successor, prior research33 was only able to determine that a Qiu
Yu (邱雨) became the president of CHBC in 201534 but it could not confirm the real name
of the Base 311 commander. We did manage to find his real identity, or at least to propose
a very likely hypothesis. The first clue came from a military forum.35 A forum user answered
31. Ibid.
32. For a reference to Wang Shu as commander of the Base 311, see for example his Baidu page: http:// archive.
fo/nWXcS; for a reference to him as CHBC chairman under his alias, see “台湾文化人在大陆” 报道活动圆满落幕
发行同名图书” (“End of the Press Conference for the Event ‘Taiwanese Culture in Mainland China’”), China Huayi
Broadcasting Corporation (2 Dec. 2013), http://archive.fo/0Ww8B.
33. Kania, “The Role of the PLA Base 311.”
34. For a reference to Qiu Yu as CHBC president, see “大陆成台湾学子求学就业 ‘新选项’” (“China is Becoming
the ‘New Option’ for Taiwanese Students in Terms of Academic and Professional Opportunities”), Taiwan Affairs Office
(16 May 2015), http://archive.md/qcUrH.
35. Messages exchanged on July 29-30, 2019 on the military forum Xilu (西陆), archived here: http://archive. fo/
g9NqL.
96
the question “who succeeded Wang Shu as Base 311 commander?” with the name of Major
General Yue Lei (岳雷), whose Chinese characters are subtly linked to those for Qiu Yu. In
each of these characters, a same “component” was retained. The “丘” is used to form the
“邱” character (Qiu), along with the “雨” which constitutes a separate word in itself. This
link was no longer a coincidence once the photographs were compared, evidencing that
the two names refer to the same individual (see image above).
Very little information on Yue Lei’s professional trajectory are available from public
sources. They only confirm that he became the political commissar for Unit 63650, a
nuclear testing base in Xinjiang, in August 2018.36 The last article we found that mentioned
Qui Yu as CHBC president was published early September 2018.37 If Yue Lei, alias Qui Yu,
effectively changed position in 2018, after only 3 years, then Base 311 has been given a new
commander.
Exchanges on a Xilu forum in July 2017:38
Jst119: “who succeeded Wang Shu at Base 311?” Hdcdh: “Yue Lei.”
Our hypothesis: Major General Yue Lei (left) is the same person as Qiu Yu, president of CHBC (right).39
36. “63650部队政委换将：岳雷接棒孔令才” (“63650 Unit Changed Political Commissars: Yue Lei Takes the
Mantle from Kong Lingcai”), JSTV (20 Aug. 2018), http://archive.fo/sYfww.
37. “第四届 ‘中华文化发展论坛’举行 _聚焦两岸青年传承中华文化 _” (“4e Edition of the Chinese Culture
Development Forum: Focus on the Heritage of Chinese Culture in Intra-Strait Youth”), 中国台湾网 (Taiwan.cn) (4
Sept. 2018), http://archive.fo/6CAvT.
38. http://archive.frg9Nql.
39. 2018 Photo of Yue Lei: http://archive.ph/sYfww. 2017 Photo of Qiu Yu: http://archive. ph/0Wrdf.
97
2. An outline of the internal structure
While the Chinese government does not provide any details on the internal structure of
PLA bases, it is possible to determine part of Base 311’s structure using open source
data. The majority of the following information was gathered from online articles written
by individuals affiliated with the units in question. Most of these articles were referenced
in the Chinese database CNKI (中国知网) and the content often available on the platform
iXueshu (爱学术). Accessing the articles often provides the name of the organization the
author was affiliated with. Sometimes an official position was specified, and on rare occa-
sions some biographical details as well – like the date of birth, province of origin, type of
diploma, and research interests. By perusing Unit 61716’s CNKI page, a number of mem-
bers attached to the unit were identified. Hence, we were able to piece together, albeit in an
incomplete manner, Base 311’s internal structure.
At the very least, Base 311 has the following bodies: A Political Department (政治
部), a translation and edition office (编译室), an Information Research Office (信息研究
室), an Equipment Department (装备保障),40 as well as an Outpatient Department (门
诊部). The political department supervises at least two bureaus (处), Secretary’s Cluster
Office (秘群处 or 秘书群联处) and Organizational Cadre Division (组干处 or 组织干部
处), which are typically found inside political departments.41 It can be assumed, insofar as
the majority of the PLA’s units have the same four departments, that Base 311 also contains
Staff and Logistics departments. Additionally, the remainder of Unit 61716 appears to be
divided into sub-units (分队). If we couldn’t determine their exact number and functions,
nine were identified: sub-units 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 61, 64, and 66.42 A number of them have
the same address as Base 311: 77 Meizhu Street.43 It is likely that others do as well. It is
difficult to conclusively ascertain the mission of each sub-unit, but a number of published
public tenders point at their subject areas, such as video surveillance and network security.
40. The source did not specify whether it is a department or entity of another rank. We supposed that it is a
department (部), given that there are typically four departments in each PLA unit: staff, political affairs, equipment, and
logistics. 张学明 (Zhang Xueming) and 张书启 (Zhang Shuqi), “解读美国空军新版小型无人机发展路线图” (“A
Study on the New SUAS Roadmap of USAF”), 国防科技 (National Science and Defense Technology), 37:4 (2016), http://
archive.ph/ZF1kE.
41. 纪兵 (Ji Bing) and 房新印 (Fang Xinyin), “新型军事人才培育的几个着力点 _” (“A Few Notes on the
Formation of New Military Talents”), 军队政工理论研究 (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work), 6 (2014), http://
archive.ph/iPwfs.
42. Sub-Unit 4: “61716部队4分队网络安全防护设备采购项目公开招标公告” (“Tender from Sub-Unit 4 of
Unit 61716 for the Acquisition of Protection Equipment for Network Security”), 中国政府采购网 (Website for Chinese
Public Markets) (27 Jan. 2019), http://archive.ph/pZpX0. Sub-Unit 5: 陈泽欣 (Chen Zexin), “区域文化和亚洲经济
发展相关性探析” (“Analysis of the Correlation Between Regional Culture and Economic Development in Asia”), 黑
河学刊 (Heihe Journal), 4 (2019), http://archive.ph/Yoyfb. Sub-Unit 6: “中国人民解放军61716部队6分队LED屏
幕采购项目询价公告 ” (“Request by Sub-Unit 6 of PLA Unit 61716 to Buy LED screens”), 国诚招标 _(Guocheng
Zhaobiao) (25 Apr. 2019), http://archive.ph/FCD2H. Sub-Unit 8: “作战研究资料室、图形视频工作站、技术士
官训练室家具及电子设备采购询价公告 ” (“Request for Sub-Unit 8 of Unit 61716 to Acquire a Research Room for
Combat, a Video Work Position, a Training Room for Technical Troops with the Necessary Accompanying Electronic
Equipment”), 中国政府采购网 (Website for Chinese Public Markets) (2 Apr. 2018), http://archive.ph/SbnTP. Sub-Unit
9: “福建灿鑫工程管理中国人民解放军61716部队九分队设备采购项目中标通知” (“Tender for Sub-Unit 9 of
Unit 61716, via the Fujian Canxin Gongcheng Guanli for the Purchase of Equipment”), 中国工程建设招标网 (Zhongguo
Gongcheng Jianshe Zhaobiao wang) (16 Apr. 2018), http://archive.ph/x9LG7. Sub-Unit 10: 张作农 _(Zhang Zuonong), “‘
军队律师条例’的立法构想 ” (“Legislative Conception for the ‘Regulations on Military Lawyers’”), 西安政治学院
学报 _(Journal of Xi’an Politics Institute), 22:1 (2009), http://archive.ph/66HrO. Sub-Unit 61: 胡建华 _(Hu Jianhua), 张
晓西 (Zhang Xiaoxi), “浅析对外汉语口语课教学存在的问题与对策 ” (“Analysis of Difficulties and Solutions in
Oral Chinese Language Education”), 河南教育 _(Henan Jiaoyu) (Dec. 2010), http://archive.ph/ypUtF. Sub-Unit 64:
“2015 年度’全国五四红旗团委(团支部)’名单 ” (“2015 List of ‘National League of the May 4th Red Flag Youth’”),
中国共产党新闻网 _(CPC News) (4 May 2016), http://archive.ph/n4Gnl. Sub-Unit 66: “王云会” (Wang Yunhui),
Baidu, http://archive.ph/Pjkdi.
43. For example, this is the case for Sub-Units 4, 6, and 8.
98
A member of sub-unit 10, Zhang Zuonong (张作农), published multiple articles on legal
topics, indicating that this sub-unit plays a role in the “legal warfare” component of the
“Three Warfares” for instance.
Individuals affiliated with Unit 61716 were typically presented as researchers
or engineers. Engineers located there have written about information security, commu-
nication networks, and other technical subjects. Researchers have written about public
opinion and psychological warfare, usually focusing on the US or Taiwan.44 Some
of the researchers were identified as military personnel like Colonel Zhang Xueming
and Lieutenant Colonel Zhang Shuqi (Equipment Department), as well as Senior
Colonel Zhang Zuonong (sub-unit 10).45 Not all Unit 61716 members are assumed to
be members of the military however. Engineers, like researchers, are hierarchically orga-
nized within the unit. At least three tiers were detected for researchers and engineers:
researcher, adjunct researcher, and research assistant, as well as senior engineer, engi-
neer, and assistant engineer.
Their articles allow researchers to better understand what are the topics of interest to
Base 311, and to have a better idea of its operating mode. For example, a 2019 article illus-
trated how Base 311 attempted to use the Internet as a tool for public opinion warfare. It
was based on the observation that traditional influence methods targeting public emotions
on the Internet (网络舆情引导) were inefficient. The authors advocated for the use of
44. The members of the consultation service write about medical topics, and as such are outside the scope of this
study.
45. Zhang, Zhang, “A Study on the New SUAS Roadmap of USAF”; Zuonong, “An Analysis of the Practices of
Military Justice Among the Taliban in Afghanistan.”
99
artificial intelligence to win the public opinion warfare on the Internet (网络舆论斗争),
sometimes also known as the “consensus war.” They considered that AI could lead to
a presumably intelligent way to move public opinion.46 This article was signed by Hu
Huaping, affiliated to Unit 61716 and previously a member of Unit 61070 (a subordinate
unit to Base 311), and by two members of Huaqiao University, which is under the direct
supervision of the United Front Work Department.47 Altogether, three key findings were
drawn from the articles published by Base 311 affiliates.
• Firstly, the articles pointed at Base 311’s interest in information and communication
technologies. Almost all the engineers identified as members of the base researched
network communication or communications security.
• Secondly, information and communication technologies must be wielded in service
of public opinion warfare. This war is waged on all platforms, notably on the Internet,
social media, and via the “new media.”
• Thirdly, the purpose of public opinion warfare is to persuade and rally the popula-
tion around Beijing’s narratives, especially in Taiwan.
To implement the “Three Warfares,” Base 311 uses three types of organizations:
front media companies, subordinate PLA units, and relaying platforms with which
the links are more distended and blurry. Together, they form a sprawling web, difficult to
untangle and analyze from the outside.
The front media companies are civilian organizations unofficially controlled by
Base 311. They allow the Base to operate publicly while remaining in the shadows. We
have already mentioned Voice of the Strait (VTS) and China Huayi Broadcasting
Corporation (CHBC). They were both former PLA radio stations, and are presently mul-
tichannel media targeting the Taiwanese population. Our research found a third front-com-
pany: The Haifeng Publishing House. All of these companies are potentially able to
influence populations through radio and television channels, the Internet, social
media, and books.
Multiple PLA units were discovered to be subordinates, or affiliates, of Base 311, such
as Units 61070 and 61198. Their official missions and activities are unknown, but it is pos-
sible to identify their members and sometimes access their published articles. We can then
piece together the units’ areas of focus.
A group of platforms, such as the China Association for International Friendly
Contact (CAIFC, 中国国际友好联络会) operate in the orbit of Base 311. These plat-
forms, many of which have former PLA members as executives, serve as relays for the Base
311’s operations. By examining these three types of organizations, we can outline the base’s
activities, interests, and priorities.
46. Two different terms are used here to refer to the concept of public opinion 舆情 and 舆论. We translated them
respectively as “public emotion” and “public opinion.” See the first section (→ p. 30).
47. 胡华平 (Hu Huaping), 李弼程 (Li Bicheng), and 熊尧 (Xiong Yao), “网络舆情引导智能代理模型” (“An
Intelligent Model to Guide Public Emotion on the Internet”), 国防科技 (National Defense Science and Technology), 3
(2019), http://archive.ph/DQ4Xw.
100
Google Earth satellite view of Fuzhou,48 focused on Gulou District, where Base 311,
its sub-units, and affiliates are located.
The first three images of building façade are from Baidu Maps’ street view
(screenshot from Feb. 2020), and the last image is from VTS’s Baidu page.
B. VTS and CHBC: Two PLA media outlets used to influence Taiwan
Voice of the Strait Broadcasting Station (VTS, 海峡之声广播电台) and China
Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC, 中国华艺广播公司) are actually cover
names for two PLA units. Evidence of this fact is easily traced online. The Fujian
frontline broadcasting station (中国人民解放军福建前线广播电台) was created in
1958 in Xiamen, by the Fujian province Party committee and the Fuzhou military
region. In 1984 its name was changed to Voice of the Strait.49 CHBC was originally
a subordinate station of the Fujian frontline broadcasting station.50 On November
1, 1991, it officially became China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation, creating another
public front organization for the PLA.
VTS and CHBC are both PLA units tasked with “communication toward Taiwan”
(对台广播), and whose ultimate goal is its reunification with mainland China. They
began as simple radio stations before evolving to more diverse methods of communica-
tion, seeking to reach the widest possible number of Taiwanese. After the creation of their
48. https://earth.google.com/web/@26.09195319,119.28017382,17.12812488a,18058.19351457d,35y,-0h,0t,0r.
49. See for example VTS’s presentation by Taiwan.cn (中国台湾网) in 2006: http://archive.vn/2kbP1; or VTS’s
Baidu page: http://archive.ph/THkSb.
50. The link between CHBC and VTS was confirmed by the minutes of a trial that involved both companies
in 2013. The document, “董卫强与中国华艺广播公司、海峡之声广播电台劳动争议 纠纷一审民事判决书””
(“First Instance Civil Judgment In Labor Disputes Between Dong Weiqiang, CHBC, and VTS”) is accessible on the
website: http://bit.ly/chbcvts2013 archived here: http://archive.is/R2Sks. Here is an extract: “证据A8. 《聘用合同
书》证明被告中国华艺广播公司是被告海峡之声广播电台的下属机构 (...) 被 告中国华艺广播公司的前身
是中国人民解放军海峡之声广播电台调频台” (“Prooof A8. The Work Contract Proves CHBC is Subordinate to
VTS […] CHBC Was Previously an FM Redio Station for the PLA’s Voice of the Strait”).
101
respective Internet websites, VTS and CHBC gained access to and employed a variety of
tools, such as text, audio, image, video, and social media, to achieve their goals. In an effort
to adapt to the local contexts, they have offered programs in local dialects, in addition to
Mandarin Chinese, Taiwan’s official language. More specifically, they have devised programs
in Minnan and Hakka Chinese, which are spoken in Fujian (by 20% of the population) and
Taiwan (by 70% of the population).
Two sides of the same coin, CHBC and VTS apparently share the same offices in
Fuzhou. They are located at 15 Yuandang Street, in a building nicknamed “the Building
of the Strait” (海峡大楼), likely in reference to its inhabitants. Also, the unit behind
VTS seems to have obtained a rank equivalent to that of a division (正师级).51 We
found in the report of a lawsuit against VTS and CHBC that CHBC is still administra-
tively subordinate to VTS. Yet, its exact rank is unknown. Consequently, it is plausible
that the PLA unit behind CHBC holds a rank equivalent to that of a deputy head of
division.
1. Voice of the Strait (VTS)
The Fujian frontline broadcasting station, known as Voice of Strait (VTS) since 1984,
was created during the Chinese attack on the Kinmen Islands. Initially under the authority
of the PLA’s former General Political Department, it sought to support the offensive.52
This 1958 military operation marked the beginning of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis,
a continuation of the Communist China’s attempt at retaking Taiwan from the nation-
51. This information is unconfirmed, but relayed by the Wikipedia page, https://archive.vn/b7Ak9, and by VTS’s
Baidu page.
52. “第四节 解放后军事机构和驻军” (“Chapter 4: Structure of Military Organizations and Post-Liberation
Garrisons”), 厦门市地方志 (Website for the Local History of Xiamen) (7 Oct. 2012), http://archive.ph/3ygjv.
102
alists. In August 1964, VTS officially received an official military designation.53 With the
2015 PLA reforms, and the dissolution of the former General Political Department, it is
difficult to ascertain who has authority over VTS at the moment. What is certain is that
Base 311 has been responsible for centralizing all psychological warfare activities against
Taiwan since 2011. It is also assumed that the base participates in the development of
VTS programs.54 Consequently, it is plausible that VTS now falls under the authority
of Base 311.
Since 2016, commander Ran Jiye (冉继业) and political commissar Wang Shuangyang
(王双阳) have led VTS. Wang Shuangyang has been affiliated to Unit 61716 (hence to
Base 311) since at least 2013.55 As for Ran Jiye, he worked as a political commissar
at VTS under the previous commander, Zhong Zhigang (钟志刚).56 Because Ran and
Zhong were announced as the new heads of Unit 61023 in 2016, it is possible that VTS
is Unit 61023.57 Unit 61023 is actually registered at the same address as VTS.58 Yet, 61985
is also tied to VTS. Its former general manager, Liu Linlan (柳林岚), was identified as
the commander of Unit 61985 in 2013.59 For that reason, Stokes and Hsiao defended
that VTS’s designation might be Unit 61985.60 According to them, Unit 61023 overseas
the editorial (编辑部) and technical (技术部) departments and it presumably maintains
an office in Beijing (北京記者站).61 As such, either both MUCDs are tied to VTS, or
a new designation was issued in recent years. Further research also suggested that VTS
has two local branches: Unit 61275 in Gutian and Unit 61839 in Xiamen.62
53. “1964年8月，解放军总部正式授予上述番号.” The Information is Available on VTS’s Baidu webpage and
was relayed by the CNR website, see: “海峡之声广播电台简介” (“Presentation of Voice of the Strait”), 央广网
(China National Radio), n.d., http://archive.ph/vv6LJ.
54. See “日媒称 ‘高新七号’ 大幅提升解放军心理战能力” (“Japanese Media: The Y-8 Gaoxin 7 Considerably
Improves the PLA’s Psychological Warfare Capacities”), 参考消息网 (Reference News) (17 Aug. 2013), http:// archive.
ph/43797.
55. “廉政短信” (“Complet Text Message”), 新浪军事 (Sina Military) (17 Mar. 2013), http://archive.ph/XYw6G.
56. Hong Yanan (洪亚男), “‘闽台走亲乡镇行’ 大型图片展在泉州举办” (“Photography Exhibit ‘Fujian and
Taiwan Roams the Cities’ Took Place in Quanzhou”), 搜狐 (Sohu) (11 Jun. 2016), http://archive.ph/to9jk.
57. 丁蕾 (Ding Lei), “钟声副厅长走访慰问61023部队” (“Deputy Director Zhong Sheng Visits the 61023
Unit”), 中国海洋在线 (China Ocean News) (1 Feb. 2016), http://archive.md/JiGQL.
58. “中国人民解放军61023部队通用设备采购公开招标公告” (“Tender of 61023 Unit for the Purchase of
General Equipment”), 中国政府采购网 (Website for the Chines Public Markets) (27 Mar. 2018), https://archive.ph/
KS9E1. “第四节 _解放后军事机构和驻军” (“Chapter 4: Structure of Military Organizations and Post-Liberation
Garrisons”).
59. “五、拟表彰拥政爱民模范” (“5. Honor Model Citizens Who Support Government”), 搜狐 (Sohu) (5 Jul.
2013), http://archive.ph/Ndz6z.
60. Stokes and Hasio, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 68, note 185.
61. Ibid., 68, note 183.
62. For a reference to 61275 Unit as an antenna of VTS in Gutian, see “罗华中心小学 古二小入围2017年国家
国防教育特色学校” (“Central Luohua Primary School: The Second Primary School in Gutian was Pre-Selected from
a List of Special Education Schools for National Defense in 2017”), 古田新闻网 _ (Gutian xinwenwang) (31 Jul. 2017),
http://archive.ph/YcUBA. For additional evidence of a link between the 61275 Unit and the Base 311 see also “2016
年全县工作会议召开” (“District Work Conference in 2016”), Gutian xinwenwang (17 May 2017), http:// archive.fo/
T1hk4. For a reference of 61839 Unit as an antenna of VTS in Xiamen, see “林长泉等与中国人民解放军61839部
队物权保护纠纷上诉案” (“Lin Changquan and Others’ Appeal Record Against the PLA’s 61839 Unit Concerning
Property Rights Litigation”), 东方律师 (Shanghai Bar Association) (2011), http://archive. md/9bb2j. For ties between
61839 Unit and 61023 Unit, see: “61839部队营区机房改造工程项目施工招标招标公告” (“61839 Unit Tender for
The Renovation of IT Rooms”), 中国政府采购网 (Website for the Chines Public Markets) (19 Nov. 2018), http://archive.
ph/gnMg7.
103
VTS executives. From left to right: Zong Zhigang, Liu Linlan, Ran Jiye, and Wang Shuangyang.63
Furthermore, VTS is affiliated to CHBC. Liu Linlan, the former director of VTS,
served as the executive director of the CHBC Television Center (电视总经理) between
2010 and 2014.64 Ran Jiye, the current VTS director, is also an executive manager at CHBC.
He has been affiliated with CHBC since at least 2010, when he was director of the Network
Centers at CHBC.65 In 2012 he became one of its executive directors (总经理)66 and in
2013 he was already president of its executive committee (董事).67
2. China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC)
Like VTS, CHBC was initially a radio station, and it remains one. According to the
CHBC website, its radio programs are still accessible in Fuzhou (headquarter of Base 311),
and in a handful of other cities in Fujian province like Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou.
The programs are also available in the Taiwanese cities of Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Alishan.
Other cities where the station broadcasts include Beijing, Shanghai, and foreign cities such
as Bangkok and Toronto. CHBC’s geographical range shows that it targets Chinese citizens,
both in mainland China and abroad, as much as the Taiwanese population. CHBC radio
programs are even available online since the development of its website in 2009.68 Within
a few years, CHBC has become, like VTS, far more than a simple radio station. It
is now a multichannel company that produces podcasts and news reports, runs
forums and is available on social media platforms. One of its members wrote in 2009
that CHBC was a successful example of the integration of the “new media” as CHBC was
able to use them to increase the level of public interaction with its programs.69
63. Photos of Zhong Zhigang: http://archive.ph/F6mW8; Liu Linlan: http://archive.vn/W0lWN; Ran Jiye:
http://archive.ph/IC0pW; Wang Shuangyang: http://archive.ph/U7a5a.
64. For a reference to Liu as a member of the CHBC as early as 2010, see Liu Linlan, “‘钻石体系’与中国广播
竞争力” (“The ‘Diamond Mondel’ and the Competitiveness of the Radio Industry in China”), 声屏世界 (Voice and
Screen World), 10 (2010), http://archive.vn/NjFMc. For a reference to Liu as a member of the CHBC in 2014, see: Liu
Linlan, “中国电视娱乐节目季播制模式之分析” (“An analysis of the Diffusion Methods of Chinese Television
Entertainment Programs”), Voice and Screen World, 5 (2014), http://archive.vn/PoZNA.
65. “2010年两岸互联网发展论坛嘉宾” (“List of guests for the Intra-Strait Internet Development Forum in
2010”), 中国台湾网 (Taiwan.cn) (2 Sept.2010), http://archive.ph/nIRUM.
66. “中国华艺广播公司参访团拜会台湾中评” (“The China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation Visits the
Taiwanese Media CRNTT”), 中国评论通讯社 (China Review News Agency) (6 May 2012), http://archive.ph/2gbyc.
67. “我校台湾学生参加 ‘少年西北行 盛世中国梦’两岸大学生唐诗朗诵会” (“Our Taiwanese Students
Participated in the Tang Intra-Strait Poem Recital), 福建中医药大学 (Fujian University of Traditional Chinese Medicine) (3
Oct. 2013), http://archive.ph/KFp92.
68. “中国华艺广播公司网站改版 ‘华广网’正式开通” (“CHBC Website if Officially Online”), Voice of the Strait
(29 Apr. 2009), http://archive.vn/iFZNj.
69. 张扬 (Zhang Yang), “浅谈媒体融合变革下的广播节目互动——以中国华艺广播公司的娱乐节目
为例” (“On the Interaction of Radio Programs During the Media Fusion Period: The Case of the China Huayi
Broadcasting Corporation”), 东南传播 (Southeast Communication), 5 (2009), http://archive.vn/26pUe.
104
Information collected from articles by CHBC members showed that the organization
has, at the very least, a News Department (新闻部),70 an Art and Literature Department
(文艺部),71 a Networks Center (网络中心),72 a Television Center (电视中心)73 asso-
ciated with PLA Unit 61590,74 and a Research Center on Policies (政策研究中心).75
Among the individuals affiliated with CHBC, we found editors, television or radio jour-
nalists, researchers, and engineers.
On the left, the entrance to CHBC and VTS’s offices, on Yuandang Street.76 VTS’ logo and name (海峡之聲) are visible. On the
right, a Google Earth view of the building (Jan. 2021).77
CHBC claims that its mission is to develop and promote the Chinese culture, as well as
to reinforce the sentiment of belonging to the same homeland (弘扬中华文化, 凝聚同
胞情感).78 As such, culture is used as a vehicle for a rapprochement between the two
nations:79 this is a recurring theme in the articles of people affiliated to VTS.
a. Executives specialized in psychological warfare
As mentioned, the president of CHBC is in fact the commander of Base 311. The
Major General Yue Lei, who uses the alias Qiu Yu in public (for CHBC-related activities), is
the last confirmed president of CHBC (→ p. 95). He was far from being the only dual-hat-
ted military officer. Chen Guojun (陈国军), the executive director of CHBC, is also an
officer at Base 311. In 2015, he was confirmed to be the deputy chief of staff for Unit
70. 施会毅 (Shi Huiyi) and 韦冀宁 (Wei Jining), “微博在广播节目中的应用及其影响探析” (“An Analysis of
Weibo Use by Radio Programs”), 东南传播 (Southeast Communications), 2 (2012), http://archive.ph/zvnA1.
71. 张扬 (Zhang Yang), “浅谈媒体融合变革下的广播节目互动——以中国华艺广播公司的娱乐节目
为例” (“On the Interaction of Radio Programs During the Media Fusion Period: The Case of the China Huayi
Broadcasting Corporation”), http://archive.vn/26pUe.
72. 艾然 (Ai Ran), “台湾微博的发展特点及对两岸新闻交流的启示” (“The Development Characteristics of
Weibo in Taiwan and Their Significance for Intra-Strait Information Exchanges”), (Southeast Communications), 9 (2011),
http://archive.vn/TAUps.
73. 何志华 (He Zhihua), “从 ‘京杭运河·两岸行’拍摄看两岸电视媒体的合作” (“Intra-Strait TV Media
Cooperation Through the Production of the Film Canal Pékin-Hangzhou – Crossing the Strait”), 东南传播 (Southeast
Communications), 2 (2011), http://archive.ph/rkkMc.
74. Stokes and Hasio, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 68, note 183.
75. 黄晓伟 (Huang Xiaowei) and 牟珊 (Mou Shan), “台军招募文宣广告及其效果评析” (“Commentary on
Advertisements Used to Recruit in the Taiwanese Army and Their Efficacy”), 现代台湾研究 (Modern Taiwan Studies),
1 (2014), http://archive. vn/KSVw5.
76. VTS’s Baidu page: https://archive.vn/Kbhpw.
77. https://earth.google.com/web/@26.08266593,119.28521175,10.91894476a,307.41277471d,35y,0h,0t,0r.
78. “华广概况” (“Presentation of CHBC”), China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation, http://archive.vn/Nhezm.
79. 艾松如 (Ai Songru), “两岸心灵契合要靠文化引领” (“Intra-strait Spiritual Harmony Must be Based on Culture”),
台声 (Taisheng) (2015), http://archive.vn/R1zhK. Accessible on Huaxia (华夏经纬网): http://archive. vn/3NztJ.
105
61716.80 His promotion in 2018 from deputy chief executive (副总经理)81 to chief exec-
utive (执行董事)82 at CHBC likely reflects a promotion inside Base 311 as well. An article
he wrote in 2015, which is freely accessible online, examined the US psychological warfare.
It was commissioned by the Liaison Department of the General Political Department and
published in the PLA’s Review of Theoretical Study of Political Work.83 In it, Chen Guojun ana-
lyzed the evolution of the US doctrine, showing how psychological warfare had become
a crucial component of its information warfare. In fact, these psychological operations
were referred to as “support to military intelligence” for a few years. According to Chen,
information should then be exploited as a weapon. He also pointed at the pre-eminent role
of the Air Force in this type of warfare, focusing first on the dissuasive effects of military
demonstrations, and then on the possibility of using aircrafts as means of communica-
tion (which has been illustrated by the numerous intrusions in Taiwan’s air defense identi-
fication zone). Chen’s interest in the US, along with others, highlights the PLA’s perception
of the US as the primary practitioner of psychological warfare, as well as its desire to avoid
falling behind.
On the left, Chen Guojun;84 on the right, Ai Songru, alias Ai Ke.85
Ai Songru (艾松如), also known as Ai Ke (艾克), is another officer who served at
CHBC for almost a decade and took a particular interest in psychological warfare. He
has been the legal representative of the CHBC’s Television Center since 2010, and he has
concurrently served as CHBC managing director and chief executive (执行董事兼总经
理) since 2012.86 According to Stokes and Hsiao, Ai Songru previously served in the Unit
6530’s Political Department, also known as the Ground Force’s 16th Battalion.87 He pre-
sumably left CHBC, after nearly eight years serving there as the last trace of his name, in
association with CHBC, was in 2017.
His publications indicate he is a specialist in psychological warfare. He co-wrote a book
about the use of psychological warfare during the Iraq War, in which he laid out the strat-
egies on the Americans and Iraqis, as well as the role of communication technologies. The
book also analyzed the other two elements of the “Three warfares”: legal warfare and
80. 陈国军 (Chen Guojun), “美空军军事信息支援行动力量体系建设” (“The Construction of the U.S. Air
Force Military Information Support Operations (MISO)”), 军队政工理论研究 (Theoretical Studies on PLA Political
Work), 16:4, (Aug. 2015), http://archive.vn/m7KqA.
81. “第五届中华文化发展论坛圆满落幕” (“5th Chinese Culture Development Forum Ends in Success”) (30
Dec. 2017), http://archive.fo/pItRi.
82. “中国华艺广播公司执行董事陈国军致辞” (“Speech by CHBC CEO Chen Guojun”), China Huayi
Broadcasting Corporation (7 Jun. 2018), https://bit.ly/2OXveLD.
83. Chen Guojun, “The Construction of the U.S. Air Force Military Information Support Operations (MISO).”
84. Photo from 2018, Chen Guojun appears as a CHBC executive: https://bit.ly/2Q1V9SB.
85. Photo from 2016, Ai Songru appears as the CHBC chairman: https://bit.ly/38EkLM0.
86. “重要地点” (“Important Locations”), China Daily (26 Nov. 2010), http://archive.fo/TfRZQ.
87. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 69, note 187.
106
public opinion warfare.88 In it, the United States is painted as a key player in psycho-
logical warfare. Ai Songru’s publications showed that the Chinese are studying and
learning everything they can from the latest wars in which the US was involved.89
In an article about the War in Kosovo, Ai Songru concluded that “in future conflicts, the
enemy will use all possible methods, including propaganda and starting rumors to initiate
psychological warfare.” Consequently “we must be prepared to enact counter-propaganda
and more importantly to strengthen our internal communication system during times of
war to keep the initiative.90”
Ai Songru stated in another article that the soldiers of the Taiwanese Army were pro-
foundly unsettled when Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) took power in 2000.91 He was the first
president from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and his pres-
idency ended decades of Kuomintang (KMT) governments. According to Ai Songru,
Taiwanese soldiers, the majority of whom were against Taiwan’s independence, no longer
knew “who or what they [were] fighting for” after the DPP took power (不知为谁而战,
为何而战), an idea espoused by others, including Zhong Zhigang (→ p. 430). Ai Songru
painted a picture of confused and fearful Taiwanese soldiers. Their confusion sup-
posedly stemmed from the removal of the “anti-independence education” in the army and
from the split between those who supported reunification and those against it, which then
divided, even paralyzed the army, according to the author. They remained fearful of a real
confrontation with the PLA, which they saw as a superior force. They ultimately doubted
the abilities of the Taiwanese Army against mainland China and did not want to be the
“first sacrificed.” Songru believed that the DPP’s political tenure had altered the Army’s
“political mentality” (政治心态), as it had become more confused, more complicated, and
as a result, more difficult to control.
C. Haifeng, the Base 311’s publishing house
Base 311 has its own publishing house: Haifeng (海风出版社), also known as
Haifeng Publishing House; it is located at 187 Gudong Street (鼓东路187号), near Gulou
District in Fuzhou (where the base is) (→ p. 100).92 Haifeng is a common name and could
88. 艾松如 (Ai Songru), 胡凤伟 (Hu Fengwei), and 杨军强 (Yang Junqiang), 伊拉克战争心理战 (Psychological
Warfare During the Iraq War), 白山出版社 (Baishan Publishing, 2004), http://archive.vn/ULJGV.
89. Other articles by Ai Songru, signed with Yang Junqiang (杨军强): “心理战: 美军又有新动作” (“Psychological
Warfare: Novelty Within the US Army”), 环球军事 (Global Military) (2004), http://archive.vn/ SqV89; “美国’倒萨’心
病多” (“The US Operation to Depose Saddam Hussein Created Anxiety”), 环球军事 (Global Military) (2003), http://
archive.vn/P07Aj; “大战在即,美军没有好心情” (“Faced with Imminent War, the US Army is Depressed”), 世界军
事 (World Military Affairs) (2003), http://archive.vn/nu0g2.
90. 艾松如 (Ai Songru), “从科索沃危机看现代战争心理战的运用” (“An Analysis of Psychological Warfare
Since the Kosovo War”), (知远战略与防务研究所) Knowfare Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies (22 Apr. 2005),
http://archive.fo/snRPY.
91. “台军乱了精气神” (“The Taiwanese Army is Disarray”), 环球军事 (Global Military) (2002), http://archive.
vn/mF7tg.
92. Haifeng profile, updated on 20 Dec. 2019: https://www.tianyancha.com/company/270887829. See also “
海风出版社企业信用报告-天眼查” (“Tianycha Report on Haifeng Publishing House”), 度文库 _(Baidu Wenku)
(27 Nov. 2018), https://archive.vn/0mbcP. Tianyancha (天眼查) is a free Chinese platform that aggregates open
source information on Chinese companies, such as the name of the legal representatives, coordinates, names of the
shareholders, or the description of their activities. This is meant to improve transparency for the investors. Tianyancha
is blocked outside of China, but its content is sometimes archived on other websites like Baidu Wenku, as is the case
here.
107
easily be confused with namesake companies.93 While the connection between the PLA,
VTS and CHBC was uncovered years ago, to our knowledge, the link between this
publishing house and Base 311 is delineated here for the first time. And yet, the PLA’s
“Three Warfares” base – or Unit 61716 – was the company’s only shareholder until 2019
and it is believed to have invested RMB480 million (€61 million) in the publishing house.94
Haifeng’s former editor in chief, Jio Honghui (焦红辉), was identified as the head of a PLA
propaganda publishing center (解放军某部宣传品编辑中心主任) in 2016.95 It likely cor-
responds to the publishing center for PLA propaganda support aimed at Taiwan, located at
the same address as the Haifeng publishing house in Fuzhou (福州73720部队中国人民
解放军对台湾宣传品编辑部).96 This center is the former PLA Unit 73720, but currently
of unknown military designation.97 73 referenced all units attached to the former military
region of Nanjing, which was redrawn by the 2015 reforms. Like VTS and CHBC, which
are fronts for PLA units, Haifeng is almost certainly a cover for a unit affiliated to
Base 311. Although established in 1993, the publishing house did not immediately become
a front for Base 311. Its affiliation began either in 2005, when the base was created, or in
the early 2010s, when the base became the central organ for psychological warfare against
Taiwan.
Excerpt from Haifeng’s Qichacha profile (accessed 25 Jan. 2021).
93. Not to be confused with Haifeng Publishing House – Hong Kong “海風出版社 – 香港” (“the Haifeng
Publishing House – Hong Kong”), HKTDC, http://archive.vn/WflIN; Haifeng Publishing House – Taïwan “马 建 著
作 出 版 年 表” (“Ma Jian Publications”), 独立中文笔会 (Independent Chinese Pen Center), http://archive.vn/wAyip; or
Haifeng Publishing House – Korea “中国五位诗人诗集在韩国出版” (“An Anthology of Poems from Five Chinese
Authors Published in Korea”), 中文书刊网 (Zhongwen shukan wang) (12 Sept. 2019), http://archive.vn/4AFya.
94. According to the last version of the Haifengs Tianyancha profile, the 7th Office of the Fujian provincial
government has been the sole shareholder of the company since 2019 (福建省政府第七办公室). Rather than a
move away from Base 311, this change, which attaches Haifeng to an office that oversees Unit 61716, suggests that
the transformation was only a façade. For a reference to the ties between Haifeng and the 7th office before 2019, see:
“2015国内出版社信息 _附2008年ISBN出版社代码” (“Information on Chinese Publishing Houses from 2015 with
the ISBN codes from 2008”), Douban (18 Nov. 2015), http://archive.ph/ccKhD. Table extract: “ISBN出版社代码:
978-7-80597; 出版机构名称: 海风出版社; 地区: 总政; 主管单位: 福建省政府第七办公室” (“ISBN code: 978-
7-80597; Publishing House: Haifeng; Territory: General Political Department of the PLA; Parent Organization: 7th
Office of the Fujian provincial government”).
95. “姓焦的军事将领有哪些 焦姓军事将领大全” (“Who are the Generals with Family Name Jiao?”), Wenxuehui
(11 Oct. 2016), http://archive.md/ZMXUK.
96. Message posted on March 15, 2010 on the forum Tiexue: http://archive.md/ ETYdM#selection-1313.0-1317.19.
For the address, see “73720部队中国人民解放军对台湾宣传品编辑部183号邮政信箱” (“Mail Box n° 183 for
73720 Unit PLA Propaganda Destined to Taiwan Support Center”), Youbian, http://archive.ph/eTTJp.
97. Ibid.
108
1. The directors of Haifeng
The former director, Jiao Honghui appeared to be a photographer.98 His work as a pho-
tographer was easily traced, notably in a twenty-minute YouTube video posted by China
Southeast TV in November 2018, in which he showcased his work on the preservation
of the traditional Hakka culture.99 A number of articles on his work for the Haifeng pub-
lishing house could also be found. It includes the “Cross-Strait Photographers – Cross-
Strait Tour” (两岸摄影家·两岸行) project, which has brought together photographers
from Taiwan and China since 2002 in joint trips to capture and showcase the richness
of the Chinese culture.100 Further inquiries showed that someone named Jiao Honghui
– presumably the same person – is a military officer and member of the CCP, who
graduated in economics and management from the Central Party School of the
CCP and was a PLA delegate for the 11th session of the Nation People’s Congress.101
He was director of Haifeng since at least 2010,102 but likely worked there since the early
2000s. But Jiao is thought to have left his posting around 2014, when Fu Guoqiang (傅
国强) was first identified as the new director. Since then, Jiao Honghui has been deputy
president of the Photographers’ Association of Fujian (福建省摄影家协会)103 and has
repeatedly participated in the publishing house’s projects.104 In fact, the latest version of
Haifeng’s Tianyancha profile, in December 2019, listed him as the legal representative of
the publishing house.
Little information is available on his successor, Fu Guoqiang. Born in 1964, Fu studied
communication and specialized in “radio” (无线电共专业) before studying literature,
and becoming the director of Haifeng around 2014.105 Someone named Fu Guoqiang
was however affiliated with the Assembly and Inspection Office (装检所) of the PLA
ballistic force, located in Baoji, in Shaanxi – but namesakes are common in Chinese, and
for lack of sufficient evidence, we cannot say for certain that this is the same person.106
98. “焦红辉 讲师” (“Jiao Honghui, Conference Participant”), 海峡摄影艺术培训学校 (Straits Photographic Arts
Training School) (5 Mar. 2013), http://archive.ph/8Jjan.
99. “海峡艺术名家 焦红辉 用镜头守护传统文化” (“The Famous Artist Jiao Honghui Uses his Camera Lens to
Preserve Tradition Culture”), 中国东南卫视官方频道 (China Southeast TV Official Chanel) (11 Nov. 2018), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9Q8Jx8CRpA&t=274s.
100. “两岸光影 星辉相映” (“Shadows and Light on Two Banks”), 凤凰网 (Ifeng) (21 Mar. 2013), http://archive.
ph/Fq3NY and “重走茶马古道，探寻人类千年文明的记忆 6月，海风与您相约台湾” (“Borrow the Ancient
Tea and Horses Route – in June, Haifeng Will Meet you in Taiwan”), 搜狐 (Sohu) (19 Jun. 2017), http:// archive.ph/
esljz.
101. “姓焦的军事将领有哪些 焦姓军事将领大全” (“Who are the Generals with Family Name Jiao?”).
102. “两岸摄影家聚焦世博：将盛会之美展示给更多民众” (“Photographers of the Two Shores”), Taiwan.cn (7
May 2010), http://archive.vn/RugOU. Jiao Honghui has likely been the editor-in-chief of Haifeng since 2007, see “请问
福建省有哪些出版社” (“What are the Publishing Houses in Fujian?”), 百度知道 (Baidu Zhidao), (25 Jul. 2007), http://
archive.vn/WHzSn.
103. Jiao was identified as holding this position as early as 2007: “副主席 焦红辉” (“Deputy Director Jiao
Honghui”), 福建省摄影家协会 (Fujian Photographers Association), http://archive.vn/ASAps. He was still in this position
in 2019: “省摄协副主席焦红辉到光泽县指导摄影工作” (“The Deputy Director of the Provincial Photography
Association Jiao Honshu Visited Guangxian to Oversee Photographical Works”), 南平文艺网 (Nanping Wenyi wang
(16 Dec. 2019), http://archive.vn/IBNIl. See also “焦红辉 讲师” (“Jiao Honghui, Conference Participant”), 海峡摄
影艺术培训学校 (Straits Photographic Arts Training School) (25 Mar. 2013), http://archive.ph/8Jjan.
104. “传播文化 增进情谊” (“Diffusing Culture and Promoting Friendship: End of the Journey to Hakka
Territory, Photographs of Two Banks”), China News (30 Jul. 2019), http://archive.vn/SE7ba.
105. “海風出版社社長傅國強：推動兩岸交流更深入” (“Editor in Chief of the Haifeng Publishing House,
Fu Guoqiang: it is Important to Expand the Promotion of Inter-Strait Exchanges”), China Review News Agency (24 Apr.
2014), http:// archive.vn/WmknI.
106. Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute (2010), 9.
109
This unit had the pre-reform designation 96411.107 Elsewhere, a Fu Guoqiang was iden-
tified as a PLA delegate at the 13th National People’s Congress.108 Setting aside the two
aforementioned references, it is very likely that the former director of Haifeng was the
same Fu Guoqiang who held a position within Unit 61839 because Unit 61839 is a VTS
affiliate in Xiamen.109 Nevertheless, his tenure as director must have been short as all
references to Fu Guoqiang in this position date from 2014. And Lü Fengtang became
editor-in-chief in 2015.
Few biographical facts could be found on Lü Fengtang (吕凤堂), and there has been
no online mention of him in this position since 2018.110 Thus, he may no longer be
holding this position at Haifeng. The only reference to Lü Fengtang, cited on multiple
Chinese websites, mentioned a namesake PLA officer, affiliated to the former General
Political Department.111 If this reference were to be about the same Lü Fengtang, it could
strengthen our hypothesis that the director of the Haifeng publishing house is a
PLA officer.
Identified Haifeng directors.112
107. 吴凡 (Wu Fan), 王国庆 (Wang Guoqing), and 傅国强 (Fu Guoqiang), “基于人工智能的机电设备智能保
障系统研究” (“Research on Intelligent Guarantee System of Mechanical Electronic Equipment Based on Artificial
Intelligence”), 计算机测量与控制 (Computer Measurement and Control), 14:8 (2006), http://archive.vn/5mBya
108. “市领导参加解放军代表团和思明区代表团分组审议” (“The Municipal Authorities Participated in The
PLA delegation and Siming District Exam”), 厦门人民政府 (Municipal Government Of Xiamen) (21 Jan. 2010), http://
archive.vn/G6Qg3.
109. “福建省厦门市中级人民法院民事判决书” (“Civil Judgment by the Intermediate People’s Court in
Xiamen, Fujian”), 汇法网 (Huifa Wang) (2011), http://archive.vn/cahgf.
110. “两岸摄影家作品联展亮相台北” (“Inauguration of The Exhibit: Photographs of The Two Rivers”)
Huanqui (20 Jun. 2015), http://archive.vn/rnmum. “两岸大学生共话丝路征文大赛评审结束” (“End of the
Writing Contest on the Silk Road for Students of the Two Rivers”), Sohu (24 Nov. 2016), http://archive.vn/
fzbfb. “‘两岸交流30周年影像记忆’ 交流创作活动在湄洲岛启动” (“Project Launch ‘Portrait of 30 Years of
Inter-Strait Exchanges’ on Meizhou Island”), 华夏经纬网 (Huaxia Jingwei Wang) (30 Oct. 2017), http://archive.vn/
hcg0C.
111. “解放军四总部表彰全军优秀指挥军官和参谋人才” (“Exceptional PLA Officers”), 华夏经纬 (Huaxia
Jingwei) (15 Feb. 2011), http://archive.vn/Ro7Xs.
112. Photo of Jiao Honghui: https://www.sohu.com/A/219482503_178999. Photo Of Fu Guoqiang: Http://
Archive.Vn/Wmkni. Photo of Lü Fengtang: https://www.meipian.cn/855299V.
110
Haifeng members who participated in the 2016 trip “Photographs of the Two Shores.”113
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