IV. The Communist Youth League 

The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL – 中国共产主义青年团) was founded 

in 1920 (before the CCP), under the name Socialist Youth League (社会主义青年 团). 

Like the Communist Party, it was the product of three tendencies: it first emerged from the 

“Western iconoclasm”52 of the 1910s. One of the leading figures of this movement, Chen 

Duxiu (陈独秀), also a founder of the CCP, attributed the failure of the 1911 Revolution 

to the position of the preceding generation that imagined saving China by employing 

“Chinese knowledge for fundamental principles and Western knowledge for practical 

application” (中学为体,西学为用). For Chen and the intellectuals who founded this 

“movement for the new culture” (Hu Shi (胡适), Li Dazhao (李大钊) and Lu Xun (鲁

迅)), China could only be saved by the adoption of Western culture. They spread their 

ideas via the review Xin Qingnian (新青年) (New Youth) – whose sub-heading, La Jeunesse, 

was written in French – and they enjoyed a rapid success, especially among the youth. Then, 

the CYL emerged from the May Fourth Movement (in 1919), a vast protest movement 

resulting from the injustice felt by the Chinese youth faced with the Versailles Treaty’s deci-

sion to attribute the Shandong province (formerly under German domination) to Japan. 

This nationalist convulsion stimulated a germinating intellectual fervor and marked the 

birth of a form of activism among the educated youth. Finally, after 1920, the Kommintern 

(created the previous year) sent advisors to China to facilitate the creation of a Chinese 

section of the Communist International: first Grigori Voitinsky (born Zarkhin), the deputy 

director of the Far East Comintern Bureau, then Hendricus Sneevliet (alias Hans Maring) 

whose efforts led to the creation of the CCP and the CYL. The League adopted its current 

name in 1925.

Like the CCP, the CYL presents significant structural similarities with the Soviet 

system, in this case the Komsomol. The CYL is a so-called mass organization which serves 

as a relay for the Party toward a fraction of the Chinese population. Officially, its role is to 

assist the Party and it also serve as its reserve force (后备军). It is thus designed to serve 

as a go-between with the youth – the CYL ensures the dissemination of the Party’s key-

words and propaganda –, as an incubator for future Party executives (a quarter of CCP 

members comes from it53), and to be a mobilizable force if needed. An ideal arena to 

identify promising leaders, the CYL has long constituted a vehicle of social promotion for 

young people. It is nevertheless seen by some today as a decaying structure which no longer 

provides ambitious individuals with significant advantages.54

The CYL welcomes young individuals between 14 and 28 and it counts slightly more 

than 80 million members (compared to 90 million for the CCP). Around one young Chinese 

in five is a member. It thus represents a colossal force within this age group.

51. The event page is archived at: https://archive.vn/HhyXW.

52. Yves Chevrier, La Chine moderne (Modern China) (Paris: PUF, 1983).

53. Jérôme Doyon, Rejuvenating Communism, The Communist Youth League as a Political Promotion Channel in Post-Mao 

China, PhD Thesis, Sciences Po & Columbia University, 2016. 

54. Ibid. 

73

A. Operation and organization

The operation and organization of the CYL resemble the CCP’s. It is governed by a char-

ter drafted in 1957. A national congress is held every four years, following the CCP’s and 

whose themes it echoes. The congress traditionally opens with a speech by the Politburo 

member in charge of CYL relations,55 a symbolic way to remind the participants of the 

Party’s control and to convey its overall expectations regarding the mass organization. The 

Party also appoints the leaders of the CYL. The League is run by a first secretary, an execu-

tive secretary and five secretaries. It has only very limited autonomy in relation to the Party 

and no administrative power. It is not able to implement public policies. It is therefore 

above all an organ for mobilizing people and distributing propaganda. Like the Party, 

the CYL has local committees at each level of the Party-State apparatus, which are under 

the dual supervision of the higher-level CYL committee and of the same-level Party com-

mittee. 

The CYL supervises other Party-affiliated youth organizations: The All-China 

Youth Federation (中华全国青年联合会) – a structure of the United Youth Front – 

Young Pioneers of China (中国少年先锋队) – children from 6 to 14 – and the All-China 

Student Federation (中华全国学生联合会56). 

The CYL has its own propaganda tools, including the Chinese Youth Daily (中

国青年报57) – relatively liberal and distributed at almost 600,000 copies – and the Chinese 

Youth publishing house (中国青年出版社58). The latter has published over 700 mil-

lion copies of over 10,000 works since its creation in 1950.59 It also publishes a dozen 

magazines, including Chinese Youth (中国青年) and Youth File (青年文摘), both with over 

3 million copies distributed monthly. In 2007, the CYL publishing house set up shop in 

London. Its London branch (中国青年出版总社伦敦分社 – CYPI PRESS) was ordered 

to set up an international English-language publishing platform (in other languages 

as well) and an international marketing network. It is meant to “present a more genuine, 

modern, and beautiful China to the world.”60 The CYL also manages a central school in 

which its leaders are trained.

Over the past two decades, the CYL has been marked by the rapid development of its 

affiliated structures. It thereby acquired units capable of acting on its behalf and has thus 

been able to develop the scope of its missions. The CYL has furthermore strengthened 

its action regarding universities where it strives to better control students.61 Despite 

these developments the CYL remains a weakly-funded organization with a limited budget 

of RMB583 million in 2015 (€82.4 million at the time), far behind other mass organizations 

of the regime.

55. Ibid.

56. See the Federation’s webpage: https://qgxl.youth.cn/ and also the Baidu page: https://urlz.fr/dvlO. 

57. The website of the newspaper: http://www.cyol.net/.

58. Website: http://www.cyp.com.cn/.

59. “中国青年出版社” (“Chinese Youth Press”), Baidu: https://baike.baidu.com/item/中国青年出版社.

60. Ibid. “中国青年出版社伦敦分社将逐步构建一个国际化的出版平台和面向全球的营销网络, 努力把 

一个更加真实、现代、美好的中国呈现给世界, 同时也将面向国际出版市场采购图书或版权, 把英国、 欧

洲乃至世界文化介绍给中国读者。”.

61. Yan Xiaojun dates this regained influence to the 1990s, a consequence of the trauma of the Tian’anmen Square 

incidents. Yan Xiaojun, “Engineering Stability: Authoritarian Political Control over University Students in Post-Deng 

China,” The China Quarterly, 218 (Jun. 2014), 493-513. 

74

B. CYL influence operations

Most of CYL-led influence operations clearly take places on PRC territory. The 

mass organization participates first and foremost in the effort to legitimize the party in the 

eyes of the Chinese youth, which is why most of its resources are deployed in China. This 

mission obviously includes a defense against external aggressions. As such, it is useful to 

remember that between January 21 and 24, 2019, the CCP held a seminar at the Central 

Party School on risk and stability. In his opening speech on January 21, Xi Jinping underlined 

two essential objectives: the prevention of major risks and the protection of economic and 

social stability. The Party leader thereby urged managers to guard against eventual “black 

swans” and “gray rhinos” (警惕黑天鹅, 防范灰犀牛)62 to ensure the regime’s political 

safety.63 The seminar was likely motivated by unrests in Venezuela following the election 

in early January of Juan Guaidó as head of the National Assembly and his contestation of 

President Maduro’s power. These events thereby unearthed the CCP’s fears of a Chinese 

color revolution presumably encouraged by Washington. Although Xi Jinping had 

alluded to other types of black swans, linked to technology or finance for example, it is the 

risk of a color revolution that haunts the regime. The Party regularly accuses the United 

States of encouraging democratic revolutions worldwide and having such ambitions in 

China. The Party no doubt considered that the notion of a black swan offered an efficient 

means to remind Party leaders of the necessity to fight this insidious menace to ensure their 

monopoly on power.

Interestingly, the WeChat account named “Island of the Knights” (俠客島) run by China 

Daily and whose name refers to a swashbuckling novel, Ode to Gallantry (俠客行) by Jin 

Yong (金庸), echoed Xi’s 21 January speech, explaining that the ideological fight should be 

carried out online first and that the youth was its primary Internet audience.64 Activities 

targeting the youth are therefore a priority for the survival of the regime.

To carry out this work, the CYL has significantly increased its presence on social 

networks, naturally favoring the outlets most popular among young people. A study con-

ducted by Ma Xiaoxuan and Anna Strelkova,65 shows the extent of this presence. It also 

shows the overrepresentation of Bilibili (哔哩哔哩),66 a video-sharing platform which 

allows for content diffusion along with comments embedded in the videos. The two authors 

explained that this platform’s audience is very young, and belongs to Generation Z. No 

wonder then that the CYL is devoting significant efforts on it.

The CYL uses Bilibili as its vector of choice for the dissemination of very diverse nar-

rative materials, but whose general aim remains the promotion of the Party, the home-

land, and criticisms of the United States. On the latter, the platform distinguished itself 

62. The term “Black Swan” refers to the idea of a low-probability, high-impact event or phenomenon; “Gray 

Rhinos” to a high-probability event unknown to decision-makers.

63. “习近平: 警惕 “黑天鹅” 防范 “灰犀牛” (“Xi Jinping: Beware of ‘Black Swans’ and Protect Against ‘Gray 

Rhinos’”), Renmin ribao (22 Jan. 2019), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2019-01/22/content_1905265.

htm. 

64. “習近平提七大風險 嚴防「灰犀牛」與「黑天鵝」” (“Xi Jinping Mentions Seven Major Risks to Prevent 

‘Gray Rhinos’ and ‘Black Swans’”), Radio Free Asia (23 Jan. 2019), https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/ news/risk-

01232019082604.html. 

65. Ma Xiaoxuan and Anna Strelkova, “Chinese Communist Youth League: Your Next Influencer,” Master of Media 

(24 Oct. 2019). 

66. Bilibili is the property of Shanghai Media Group (上海东方传媒集团), the second Chinese broadcasting 

company. The main shareholder of this publicly-owned company is the city of Shanghai. 

75

I

throughout June 2020 with videos using the death of George Floyd to “denounce” the 

racism of the American government (→ p. 387).

The narratives spread by the CYL on Bilibili, as on other social networks, use rhetorical 

tactics to gain the youth’s support, especially humor. The messages disseminated are thus 

often sarcastic (→ p. 395). 

To carry out its work, the CYL has also been equipped since 1993, through the newspa-

per of the communist youth, with a public polling center. Over the years, this center has 

carried out several studies on the attitudes of young Chinese toward the West. According 

to certain Chinese researchers,67 a study published by the center after the United States 

bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade showed the United States as the most-hated 

country among the Chinese youth; it may have influenced Clinton’s China policy. It is not 

possible to establish the robustness of the survey in question but the case illustrates well 

how the CYL tries to acquire tools to better understand and guide young people.

The CYL thus plays a key role in the CCP’s propaganda work and provides important 

support to the department of the same name. While the CYL’s actions aim first and fore-

most at winning over the Chinese youth, turning them into an unfailing Party ally, they also 

look to use young people to distribute narrative material produced by the Party to 

other segments of the society. 

CYL agents have thereby become true experts in the use of social networks, on the one 

hand, and in the use of subcultures likely to spread their message, such as rap, on the other. 

On August 4 2016, the Chengdu-based rap group CD Rev (天府事变) uploaded the 

song “Watch Out for Color Revolutions” (警惕颜色革命)68 which argued that the 

United States promotes democracy to better impose its power and control over the 

world. The song was in fact a propaganda operation led by the CYL. CD Rev regularly 

collaborates with the CYL whose slogans and narratives are repurposed in its songs.69 

They claim a lineage to American rapper Eminem and they have adopted the codes of 

Gangsta Rap but the content – acting as CCP apologists – brings them far from the spirit 

of the American rap movement. The imitation of American codes also contrasts with the 

sharp critique of Washington, incapable of finding favors with the rappers. “Watch Out for 

Color Revolutions” was met with real success and quickly established itself as one of the 

most effective instruments of the anti-American discourse in the Chinese youth. It 

also shows the Party’s capacity to turn American cultural codes against the United States 

themselves.

67. Feng Huiyun, ed., How China Sees the World: Insights from China’s International Relations Scholars (London: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2019). 

68. The video clip is available at: https://youtu.be/9NO9vXkCdLM. 

69. See “Red Power” (红色力量), for instance: https://archive.vn/MTirN.

76

Left, the singers of CD Rev70; Right, a screenshot of the song’s video. 

The CYL was also responsible for uploading, on August 1, 2016, a video that accused 

the United States of fomenting a color revolution in China, like those in Georgia, 

Ukraine, and the Arab spring.71 The video, uploaded to the Weibo website of the Supreme 

People’s Procuratorate, was viewed more than 10 million times in only 24 hours.72 Its 

publication date, August 1, was not a coincidence, as it was the anniversary of the PLA’s 

creation: as its author explained, the video was designed to support the army’s development 

and its deterrent role in the face of US actions.73 It was made by Lei Xiying (雷希颖), then 

a doctoral student at the Australian National University. A CYL member, and a particularly 

active member in Australia, he was described by the CCP as “an outstanding youth repre-

sentative of online ideological construction.”74 His thesis actually dealt with the representa-

tions of China in Australia’s media. According to his Baidu biography page,75 Lei was born 

in 1987 in Fujian province. Since 2014, he has distinguished himself in numerous “patri-

otic” activities aimed at uniting the Chinese people behind the Party’s objectives: in 2014, 

he created a commemorative map of the patriotic war against Japan (抗战爱国纪念地图); 

in 2015, he produced his first propaganda video entitled “The Engine of My Country and 

Myself ” (我和我的国家擎); finally, in July 2015, he participated in the 12th Plenary Session 

of the 26th All-China Youth Federation Congress, where he declared:

I am very excited about the idea of returning to China to participate in the Youth League Conference. 

I feel truly invested by a mission from the executive committee. I have studied and lived abroad for a 

long time, and I now better understand the Chinese dream. Last year, I launched the event “Share a 

Photo with the National Flag” which sparked the unexpected participation of hundreds of millions 

of Chinese and foreign citizens, and showed that the Chinese dream is the common dream of hun-

dreds of millions of people. As a foreign student, I am looking forward to learning and returning 

to China as soon as possible. Knowledge contributes to the development of our mother country.76

70. “Pump是谁 Lil Pump新歌辱华中国歌手回怼 美国说唱歌手Lil” (“Who is Pump? Lil Pump’s New Song 

Insults China, the Chinese Singer Responds to American Rapper Lil”), 好查网 (18 Dec. 2018), http:// www.haocaa.

com/2/32520.htm. 

71. The video is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9uBXypPR1yI&feature=youtu.be.

72. Philip Wen, “The Australian Connection Behind China’s Ultra-Nationalist Viral Video,” The Sydney Morning 

Herald (4 Aug. 2016). 

73. https://archive.vn/0N67I.

74. Tina Faulk, “China, Red in Tooth and Claw,” The Spectator Australia (5 Apr. 2018).

75. “雷希颖” (Lei Xiying), Baidu. The page is archived at: http://archive.vn/0N67I. 

76. Ibid. 

77

Left, Lei Xiying with Brian Schmidt, Vice-President of the Australian National University77; 

Right, a screenshot of Lei Xiying’s video.78

In the previously-mentioned video published by the account of the Supreme People’s 

Procuratorate, Lei Xiying suggested that unrests in the Middle East were the direct result 

of American interventions and the revolutions they fomented. China was presented as a 

stable and prosperous country under an American threat. The stars and stripes (see the 

screenshot above) was portrayed as lingering behind Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Kong and 

Taiwanese separatists, behind human rights activists, behind attacks against Chinese Blue 

Helmets, and behind the Japanese or Filipino actions in the South China Sea. According to 

this video, the U.S. aims to destroy Chinese harmony by all possible means. It presumably 

practices subversion and attempts to provoke existing tensions within the Chinese society. 

The video played on pathos, showing numerous images of children and adults, vic-

tims of the unrest supposedly created by U.S. interventions.79 It was about inflicting 

real “commotion”80 on the audience, hence designed to bend its will and gain support with-

out recourse to the rational logos.81 But this goal remains hidden behind a demonstration 

presented above all as “instructive” and well-argued. The persuasive process was further 

reinforced by an abundance of evidence (known in Latin rhetoric as copiosus) produced in a 

particularly embellished style.

The different actions carried out by Lei in the name of the CYL earned him, on May 

4 2017, the May Fourth Medal of Chinese Youth.82 Lei Xiying was also a contributor to 

the Internet website “April Internet”83 (四月网) whose original name was “Anti-CNN.” 

The website, launched in April 2008 and inaccessible since the end of 2020, was meant to 

counter the “arrogant” discourse “full of prejudice” coming from the American – and by 

extension Western – media.84 It was the treatment by Western media of “incidents” in Tibet 

that seemingly motivated the creation of the website which offered articles that “demol-

77. Source: Baidu, reproduced in Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia (Richmond: Hardie 

Grant Books, 2018), 8 of the central booklet. 

78. The video is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9uBXypPR1yI&feature=youtu.be. 

79. The Greek verb patheîn means “suffer.”

80. Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani, “Portraits de l’orateur” (“Portrait of the Orator”), in Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani (ed.), 

La rhétorique des passions (The Rhetoric of Passions) (Paris: PUF, 2000).

81. “Nothing in fact is more important for the orator, Catulus, than to gain the favor of the listener, especially to 

arouse in him such emotions that instead of following judgment and reason, he yields to the drive of passion and the 

turmoil of his soul.” (Cicero, De Oratore).

82. Medal awarded to those having distinguished themselves for having made an “exceptional contribution” to the 

Party’s benefit.

83. The website is accessible here: http://www.m4.cn/; See also the Weibo age of the website which appears to still 

be active: https://www.weibo.com/acm4?is_all=1. 

84. “四月网” (“April Internet”), Baidu, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%9B%9B%E6%9C%88%E7% 

BD%91. 

78

ished” Western “centrism” (中心主义) and “Hegemony” (霸权). The website was created 

by Rao Jin (饶谨), who was also the producer of the hip hop group CD Rev – proof of 

a certain level of coordination between the different information operations car-

ried out by the CYL. The target public, even more than Chinese living in China, was the 

Chinese living abroad (especially students) as well as people of Chinese ancestry (huaqiao). 

Rao Jin called on Internet users to denounce cases of biased treatment of informa-

tion tied to China in Western media. The website also published articles echoing official 

propaganda narratives, for example about the coronavirus,85 and reproduced all or part of 

the remarks of important foreign figures that could contribute to building a positive image 

of China, as was the case for example of an interview with the British Sinologist Martin 

Jacques who showed support for the measures taken by China in the fight against the coro-

navirus epidemic.86

The website “April Internet,” inaccessible since the end of 2020 (Screenshot taken on November 30, 2020).87

In terms of influence operations, the CYL can therefore play two key roles: first, in 

manipulating the Chinese population to shield them from actions carried out overseas 

that could destabilize the Party; next, in mobilizing the Chinese youth, especially those 

living abroad, to contribute to coordinated actions. This report will show examples of this 

type of operations undertaken by the CYL (→ p. 365). 

V. The 610 Office

The 610 Office (610 办公室) is a particularly secret structure in charge of the fight 

against the Falun Gong movement (法轮功) and by extension against all “religious 

sects.” Little corroborated information is available on its precise objectives, its chain of 

command and organization, on its number of employees, or even on its modus operandi. 

The office’s origin is traced back to 1999, when, on June 7, Jiang Zemin convened a special 

85. 储贺军 (Chu Hejun), “中国是人类文明的吹哨人” (“China is the Whistleblower of Human Civilization”), 

四月网 (April Internet) (29 Apr. 2020), http://www.m4.cn/opinion/2020-04/1365314.shtml. 

86. http://news.m4.cn/2020-05/1365445.shtml.

87. https://web.archive.org/web/20201130103833/http://m4.cn/. 

79

meeting of the Party’s Politburo to take measures against the dramatic rise in power of the 

Falun Gong movement within the Chinese society.88 Their activities of spiritual gymnastics 

were bringing together tens of thousands of practitioners, including at the highest levels 

of the CCP. Jiang Zemin saw a threat to the survival of the Party, unable to tolerate the 

existence of a social structure outside of its control.89 Following the meeting, a directive 

established a small leading group directly connected to the Central Committee of the Party 

and under the leadership of Li Lanqing (李岚清), a Politburo member in charge of solving 

the Falun Gong “problem.” On June 10, the 610 Office (whose name reflects its date of 

creation) was created to implement the directives formulated by the central leading group. 

No text appears to have been promulgated on the 610 Office and it literally remains an 

extra-legal structure.

In the months following the Party’s decision, the 610 Office opened branches at all 

levels of the Party-State to structure a tight network throughout the territory. At each 

level, the local 610 Office director also occupies the role of secretary or deputy secretary 

of the Political-Legal Affairs Committee (政法委) of the same level.90 The Party also cre-

ated Maintaining Stability Offices (维稳办公室), especially in major coastal cities, which 

appear to work in close collaboration with local sections of the 610 Office and often share 

the same physical premises.91 According to the Epoch Times – whose reporting should be 

approached with the utmost caution – in March 2010, the government of the Pingyang 

District, in Zhejiang Province, apparently announced the nomination of only one manager 

at the head of the local offices of the two administrations, thus proving their integration 

and common objectives. The 610 Office employs around 15,000 individuals across all 

Chinese and overseas territories. The agents of this “administration” act without any 

legal basis to eradicate the Falun Gong movement.

We know more about this office, especially about its overseas activities, since the 

defection of Chen Yonglin in 2005, who was then a consul in Sydney and in charge of 

Falun Gong. In July 2005, he described in detail Beijing’s practices for detecting, surveil-

ling, and persecuting Falun Gong followers worldwide before a House sub-committee in 

Washington.92 He explained that following the creation of the 610 Office, the Chinese 

Minister of Foreign Affairs put in place an office on the Falun Gong question connected 

to the national measures taken to fight the “cult.” In 2004, this service took the name of 

the Department of External Security Affairs. In February 2001, the Chinese consulate in 

Sydney created a special group in charge of the fight against Falun Gong. The group was 

run by the Consul General himself and convened twice a month.

According to the diplomat, similar groups were created in the United States and countries 

where the cult was active.93 “The war against the Falun Gong was extended abroad in 2000. 

In each Chinese diplomatic mission, there had to be at least one official responsible 

for the Falun Gong issue,” explained Chen Yonglin, who occupied this precise position 

in Sydney, and whose mission was to “monitor and persecute” Falun Gong members in 

88. Sarah Cook and Leeshai Lemish, “The 610 Office: Policing the Chinese Spirit,” China Brief, 11:17 (16 Sept. 

2011). 

89. On the Falun Gong and its repression after 1999, see Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New 

Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 

90. 章洪 (Zhang Hong), “中共政法委黑幕: “610” 秘密机构内幕” (“The Intrigues of the CCP’s Political-Legal 

Affairs Committee: Behind the Scenes of the Secret ‘610 Office’”), 大纪元 (The Epoch Times) (10 Jun. 2016). 

91. Ibid. 

92. “Falun Gong and China’s Continuing War on Human Rights” (21 Jul. 2005). The report is archived here: 

https://archive.vn/EzvOZ. 

93. Ibid. 

80

Australia.94 Chen furthermore confirmed that the system of intelligence gathering on Falun 

Gong in Australia relied on some “1000 agents and informers” at the time. Their number 

was apparently at least equivalent in the United States; the two countries are specifically 

targeted by the Party due to the strong presence of Falun Gong members. Surveillance 

and repression against the followers are accompanied by significant propaganda aimed 

at foreign governments, elected officials, media, universities, etc. to convince them of 

the legitimacy of Chinese actions and of the harmfulness of the Falun Gong. Diplomats 

are also tasked with detecting and keeping a record on its members, adding them to a 

blacklist that prevents them from returning to China. The Chinese authorities also try to 

reduce the broadcasting and circulation of media outlets created by the Falun Gong such 

as New Tang Dynasty Television – today called NTD – and they finance the broadcast of 

anti-Falun Gong radio and television shows. Finally, local relays of the 610 Office, as with 

other Party-State actors, rely on the Chinese diasporas in the West to muffle Falun Gong 

activities. Universities likely to support CCP actions are encouraged to take a public posi-

tion against the cult.

Even if the 610 Office is not a leading actor in Chinese influence operations, its activities 

in countries with numerous Falun Gong followers constitutes a real interference. 

94. Fabrice de Pierrebourg and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Ces espions venus d’ailleurs. Enquête sur les activités d’espionnage au 

Canada, (Nests of Spies: The Startling Truth About Foreign Agents at Work Within Canada’s Borders) (Montréal: Stanké, 2009), 

220. 

81