A. The international development of Chinese think-tanks
Beyond the relays the CCP is susceptible to find in foreign think tanks and foundations,
its strategy in the field of ideas consists in reinforcing the Chinese presence in inter-
national debates. To do so, and in accordance to Xi Jinping’s spoken exhortation to the
19th Congress to build “new think tanks with Chinese characteristics,” these institutions
have developed their activities abroad and branches in several target countries, notably in
Europe. They have organized “academic” events with foreign think tanks and universi-
ties, and tried to sign cooperation agreements. This strategy allows them to establish a
sense of respectability for Chinese think tanks, of which most are tied to the CCP,842 and
to spread official narratives.
For instance, on October 4 and 5, 2018, the Fudan Institute of Belt and Road
Global Governance (BRGG) participated in an event organized by the Confucius
Institute of the University of Edinburgh on “The Belt & Road Initiative: Challenges and
Opportunities.”843 On this occasion, the Shanghai-based think tank and the Future Institute
of Edinburgh signed a memorandum in order to foster their cooperation and research
on the silk roads. Yet, and even if the BRGG presents itself as a think tank tied to Fudan
University, a bundle of concordant traces reveal close links with the Party. Its objective
is not limited to spreading the Party’s narrative – or, to promote the Silk Roads, as it was
announced by its director at the launch in 2017844 – but its director Jiao Yang (焦扬) is also
the Party’s secretary at Fudan University, after several stints in the propaganda services of
the city of Shanghai.845 In addition, the China Daily affirmed, when the Fudan think tank
was created, that it was financially supported by the China Energy Fund Committee (CEFC
Energy).846 If the Hong Kong-based CEFC describes itself as a non-state think tank ded-
icated to the promotion of international dialogue, it is a branch of CEFC China Energy
Company Limited, which we mentioned before (→ p. 117). It was founded and headed by
842. David Bandurski, “China’s New Think Tanks in Europe,” Echowall (2 Mar. 2020).
843. “‘第二届” 一带一路’ 国际研讨会在爱丁堡大学举行” (“The Second International Symposium ‘One belt
one road’ Was Held at the University of Edenborough”), Hanban (17 Oct. 2018): https://archive.vn/FhKRC.
844. He Wei, “Fudan University Opens Belt & Road Research Institute,” China Daily ( 5 Nov. 2017).
845. See her biography here: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%84%A6%E6%89%AC/40755. Also see David
Bandurski, “China’s New Think Tanks in Europe.”
846. He Wei, “Fudan University Opens Belt & Road Research Institute.”
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Ye Jianming (叶简明) until he declared bankruptcy in March 2020.847 And his ties to the
PLA were known because he had been an assistant secretary of the CAIFC, a structure
linked to the PLA’s liaison department.848 In addition, Andrew Chubb highlighted the trou-
bling resemblance between the logos of the CAIFC and the CEFC.849
Chinese think tanks are multiplying cooperation agreements with foreign organizations to
facilitate the circulation of the Party’s narrative. Some go even further and set up branches
abroad, where the objective is to create tighter bonds with the actors of the target country’s
intellectual debates, and thus to be able to influence the content of these debates.
1. CGTN think tank
On December 4, 2019, during the third CGTN Global Media Summit dedicated to
“media and technologies,” Beijing announced the creation of a CGTN think tank. The
event was held in the presence of Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), deputy director of the propa-
ganda department.
The CGTN think tank is presented by its instigators as a media think tank – a new
generation of think tanks that can lean on the enormous information gathering capaci-
ties of media outlets like CGTN. The idea is to combine the capabilities of these two
types of structures: the impressive data gathering capacities of the media and the
analyzing skills of think tanks. The Chinese media that reported on the event have
explained that this endeavor was motivated by the difficulty to organize a rational debate
at the international level, along with the weakness of the Chinese voice in the concert of
nations. Beijing’s ambition is thus to create an exchange platform that leaves room for the
promotion of the opinions of Chinese intellectuals and experts, and to ultimately improve
the understanding of China in the world.850
According to Chinese media, the CGTN think tank has already signed about fifty partner-
ships with foreign think tanks, including the Schiller Institute (→ p. 326). Twenty-seven
institutions were present during the inaugural event on December 4. And several political
847. Ye Jianming was also the economic advisor of the Czech president, Miloš Zeman. He was arrested in March
2018 for corruption (→ p. 265).
848. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department. Political Warfare
with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 Institute (14 Oct. 2013).
849. Andrew Chubb, “Caixin’s Investigation of CEFC and Chairman Ye Jianming,” southseaconversations 讨论南海
(29 Mar. 2018).
850. Dr Summer, “CGTN Think Tank: A New Platform for International Dialogue to Promote a Better
Understanding of the World,” CGTN (5 Dec. 2019). https://archive.vn/k6FTL
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personalities gave their support to this initiative, including Ban Ki-Moon (former secretary
general of the United Nation), Romano Prodi (former president of the Italian Council of
Ministers and president of the European Commission), Esko Aho (former Finnish prime
minister), Jenny Shipley (former New-Zealander prime minister), Yves Leterme (former
Belgium prime minister) and Han Seung-soo (former South Korean prime minister).851
Since the launch, the CGTN think tank has not communicated much on its development,
partnerships, or even on its activities; it is then difficult to evaluate its precise place in the field,
and a fortiori, its impact on the international stage, which altogether seems relatively modest.
CGTN’s pseudopod introduced itself on the media’s website as a think tank like any
other, and, to add stock to this statement, it offered a video that explained “what a think
tank is.” However, far from showcasing or presenting Chinese think tanks, this video, pro-
duced by a Western communication firm, features Western think tanks. In this way, CGTN
tried to incorporate its think tank in the international think tank community by association,
to benefit from the legitimacy of others.
Overall, CGTN’s think tank seems to be yet another relay susceptible to spread China’s
voice or, in other words, to broadcast CCP narratives we previously identified. The adver-
tisement above of a debate organized on the efficiency of Traditional Chinese Medicine
(→ p. 152) to cure the Covid-19 is but one example. The Chinese think tank also took part
to the campaign that disseminated counter-narratives on the epidemic and highlighted the
efficiency of China’s crisis management. For instance, CGTN organized debates defending
that the virus might not have been from China (→ p. 589).
Strictly-speaking, CGTN’s think tank is thus a networking tool more than an idea-pro-
ducing institution.
2. Offensive on Central and Eastern Europe (The China-CEE Institute and the
SASS)
China specifically targets Central and Eastern European countries through the
16+1 cooperation format created in 2012,852 and renamed 17+1 with the addition of
Greece in 2019, then again 16+1 with the departure of Lithuania in May 2021. The format
is asymmetrical – not because China is alone in front of 17 other countries, but because it
weights far more than all of its interlocutors combined. Incidentally, it clearly falls within
851. “2019 CGTN Global Media Summit & VMF Opened in Beijing,” AP (10 Dec. 2019).
852. Bringing together China and 16 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro,
Albania and North Macedonia).
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a logic of “ the strong against the weak,” and the Party-State uses this channel to pro-
mote its vision and its initiatives, notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is also
meant to divide Europe since this format brings together European Union members and
countries with a pending (or no) membership (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro,
and Albania). Diplomatic sources have confirmed that Beijing uses this format to try to
play countries against the EU, amplifying existing fault lines, fueling resentment, such
as when it spreads the idea that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are “less well
treated” than Western European countries. In addition, the Party-State seems to be thinking
about expanding this group to other non-EU countries, to diminish the influence of mem-
ber states and give added influence to EU critics.
Be that as it may, this regional offensive is not simply economic: it also includes cul-
tural influence, as shown, among other things, by the increased number of Confucius
Institutes (37 in the 17 countries: 6 in Poland, 5 in Hungary, 4 in Romania, 3 in Greece
and Slovakia, 2 in Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Republic and 1 in Slovenia,
Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia)853; the multi-
plication of programs aimed at the youth (Bridge for the Future; China-CEE Young
Political Leaders Forum) and at the not-so-young (Political Parties Dialogue); the project
of a Fudan University campus in Budapest (see below), and the China-CEE (for Central
and Eastern Europe) Institute, founded in April 2017.
Source: https://china-cee.eu/2017/09/29/liu-qibao-unveils-china-cee-institute-in-hungary/.
Its mission is to provide support for the 17+1 system by forging links in the academia
and among think tanks in Hungary and in the rest of the CEE. The inaugural event was
853. Ivana Karaskova et al., Empty shell no more: China’s growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe: Handbook for
stakeholders, China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE) (Apr. 2020), 19.
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attended by Liu Qibao, director of the Propaganda Department, Wang Weiguang, president
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Huang Ping, the executive director
of the China-CEE Institute (see picture above).854
The China-CEE Institute is derived from the CASS. Huang Ping is, in fact, the direc-
tor of its European Studies Institute, under which authority the China-CEE Institute is.
If it proudly displays its independence with respect to European structures, this is due to
the refusal of the Institute of World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to
cooperate with the CASS, due to the future think tank’s then-blurry objectives and gover-
nance mechanisms.855
The China-CEE conducts two types of activities: organizing conferences and sympo-
siums, with Chinese researchers visiting Europe in particular, and the publication of notes,
reports and books. According to its 2019 annual report, it organized four international
summits, three workshops, and seven conferences, published 10 studies, 8 books and over
800 weekly notes covering the 17 Central and Eastern European countries that year.856
The think tank is, first and foremost, interested in the relations between China and
Central and Eastern European countries, which are systematically presented as
positive and mutually beneficial. In fact, an important part of its work focuses on ana-
lyzing these countries. The image of China in Central and Eastern Europe is among
the topics it closely monitors. A study and numerous books have been published on the
topic since 2017: some have dealt with the region in general, others with one country in
particular, or with the general image of China, while others have examined foreign rep-
resentations on specific topics.857 Unsurprisingly, the think tank played an important role
during the Covid-19 crisis, relaying the Party’s discourse and evaluating its adherence among
European public opinions.
Beyond the diffusion of the Party’s discourse, the China-CEE Institute seemingly plays
another, subtler, role in the CCP’s influence machinery. By gathering around the institute
and its projects an increasing number of local researchers working closely or indirectly on
China, and by forging ties with those countries’ authorities to be present in the heart of
their research systems, the Institute prevents the emergence – or the survival – of inde-
pendent research on China. In that regard, there is a growingly notable bias in the formu-
lation of questions in some PhD thesis on China. Its considerable financial resources allow
the Chinese think tank to dominate this fragile market. The issue however, does not solely
concerns Central and Eastern Europe as we saw previously (→ p. 286): the entire field, in
Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, needs to ensure the conditions for
independent research on China.
China-CEE is not the first Chinese think tank to be implanted in the West. In
2015, China created the Institute for China-American Studies (ICAS) in Washington.
Inaugurated with great fanfare in the presence of Henry Kissinger, and conceived to spread
China’s voice in Washington’s ecosystem, particularly on maritime issues, the ICAS remains
an insignificant actor whose work is unknown to most American leaders.858 Its presence
on social networks is negligible, it organized less than an event per month in 2019, and it
854. This position is now held by Chen Xin.
855. Antoaneta Roussi, “China Charts a Path into European Science,” Nature (8 May 2019).
856. China-CEE Institute, Annual Report 2019.
857. As an example, see: Chen Xin, ed., “How the CEE Citizens View China’s Development,” China – CEE
Institute (2017); Chen Xinx, ed., “How Slovakia Perceives the Belt and Road Initiative and China-CEEC Cooperation,”
China – CEE Institute (2019).
858. Isaac Stone Fish, “Beijing Establishes a D.C. Think Tank, and No One Notices,” Foreign Policy (7 Jul. 2016).
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publishes very little, despite a propitious period.859 The ICAS’s obvious failure contrasts
with the impact of the China-CEE Institute in Central and Eastern Europe, and
the difference is difficult to explain: lack of support from Chinese authorities? Short-term
ambitions limited to the arbitral court’s decision on the South China Sea in 2016? Lack of
skills and of understanding on the functioning of the U.S. think tank ecosystem? Whatever
the case may be, Europe shows that China now knows how to put in place its narra-
tive strategies through its think tanks. It seems that the implementation of the CASS’s
branch is not meant to be a unique case, and other first-rate think tanks will likely
develop branches abroad in the near future.
Hungary, Europe’s soft underbelly for Beijing
Hungary’s Prime minister since 2010, and champion of “illiberalism,” Viktor Orbán is known
for holding sympathetic positions in the EU toward the “great authoritarians” states, Russia
(he asked for the withdrawal of European sanctions), Turkey and China. Within a decade, he
turned Hungary into the “bridgehead of China in Europe.”860 The first European country to
sign a deal with Beijing as part of the Bridge and Roads Initiative (BRI), Hungary is the prime
destination for Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe. Several big Hungarian
companies, such as BorsodChem (the biggest national chemicals producer), were bought by
Chinese companies.861 Beijing initiated several major infrastructure works, including the high-
speed railway line between Budapest and Belgrade that, as part of the BRI, aims to shorten
the distance between the Greek port Piraeus, which was also ceded to a Chinese company,
and the center of Europe; and the construction of “the biggest, most modern rail terminal in
Europe,” close to the Ukrainian border, which will welcome all the trains coming from China,
and was branded the “Western gate” of ‘the new silk roads.’”
In Hungary, and contrary to more and more European countries, Huawei can deploy a 5G net-
work. Furthermore, during the Covid-19 epidemic, an “aerial bridge” on which the Hungarian
government heavily communicated, delivered more than 90 million masks and 40 million pro-
tection cloths from China; and, in late January 2021, Hungary became the first EU country
to approve a Chinese vaccine (Sinopharm). In September 2021, the Hungarian government
signed a letter of intent with Sinopharm to build an infrastructure for the local production
of the Chinese vaccine within ten months.862 It is also in Budapest that Fudan University will
build the first Chinese campus in Europe, on a gigantic 130-hectare plot – the government
announced it two years after banning the Central European University (CEU), which was
attacked for having been founded and financed by the U.S. billionaire of Hungarian descent
George Soros. He is considered by Orbán as an enemy of the state; And yet, the Court of
Justice of the EU considered this decision contrary to European law.863 The construction could
be contracted to the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), which has
been “suspected of corruption and espionage in many parts of the world in recent years”
(this is the company that bugged the African Union headquarters, for example → p. 130). It
apparently use mostly Chinese labor and materials, at a cost of €1.5 billion – more than the
country spent on its entire higher education system in 2019 – a budget “mainly financed by a
Chinese loan, which Hungary would pay for.”864 This Hungarian branch of Fudan University
should open in 2024 and quickly grow to accommodate 330 teachers, 150 administrative staff
and 5,000 students, including 500 PhD students, by 2028.865
859. See ICAS’s website: https://chinaus-icas.org/.
860. Jean-Baptiste Chastand, “La Hongrie, tête de pont de la Chine en Europe” (“Hungary, a Chinese Bridgehead
in Europe”), Le Monde (22 Jan. 2021).
861. “The economic Relations between China and Hungary Flourish,” French.China.org.cn (22 May 2019).
862. “Hungary signs letter of intent to produce Chinese Sinopharm shots,” Reuters, September 10, 2021.
863. Jean-Baptiste Chastand, “La justice européenne autorise l’’Université Soros’ à se réinstaller à Budapest”
(“European Courts Authorize ‘Soros’s University’ to Settle Again in Budapest”), Le Monde (6 Oct. 2020).
864. Panyi Szabolcs, “Huge Chinese Loan to Cover the Construction of Fudan University in Budapest,” Direkt 36
(6 Apr. 2021) (for the last two quotes).
865. Panyi Szabolcs, “To please China, Orbán’s government shifted plans to favor Fudan’s campus over Student
City,” Direkt 36 (14 May 2021).
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To complement the efforts of the China-CEE Institute, Beijing has more recently launched
a new initiative, this time aimed at Central Europe alone – easier to manage at a time when
its eastern segment, in particular the Baltic countries, have been questioning their relationship
with China. The 17+1 format has been weakened by Lithuania’s departure and calls for others
to follow suit (→ p. 644), and the states of the region are less and less naïve about Beijing’s
ambitions. Hence, Beijing has focused on the Visegrád Group (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia) by creating a Research Center for the Visegrád Group within the Shanghai
Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) in January 2021. Headed by Wang Jian (王健), who also
directs the SASS’s Institute of International Relations, the center was notably featured at the
second China-Central and Eastern European Countries Fair in June in Ningbo, Zhejiang.866 The
SASS is a powerful vehicle: founded in 1958, the oldest Chinese think tank in social sciences, it
is one of the best endowed and politically connected academic organizations in China. Some
of its departments also act as cover structures for MSS agents, as the US Department of Justice
detailed in the documents of a case of espionage: “since at least 2014, the FBI has assessed that
Chinese intelligence officers have used SASS affiliation as cover identities.”867
Inauguration of the Visegrád Research Centre at the SASS in January 2021 (source: Polish Presidency of the Visegrád Group,
https://www.gov.pl/web/V4presidency/official-opening-of-the-research-center-for-visegrad-group-v4-in-shanghai).
B. The use of local relays
1. Think tanks
The CCP has built a vast network of relationships with think tanks and founda-
tions around the world. These structures cooperate with China to varying degrees and
for a variety of reasons. Some simply organize events with China on an ad hoc basis, while
others have developed relatively extensive collaborative programs that espouse the Chinese
reading of international relations. Some identify a community of interest or ideology with
Beijing, while others are only driven by greed. These partners compensate for the weak-
nesses of the Chinese presence in international debates.
A special effort has been dedicated to supporting the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), with dedicated platforms such as the Belt and Road Think Tank Cooperation
Alliance (一带一路智库合作联盟). The Alliance brings together some 50 Chinese
research institutions and its international branch (Belt and Road International Think Tank
866. “Le think-tank du renseignement chinois s’installe en Europe centrale” (“Chinese intelligence think-tank sets
up shop in Central Europe”), Intelligence Online (22 Jun. 2021).
867. US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, “Virginia Man Arrested and Charged With Espionage”
(22 Jun. 2017).
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Cooperation Alliance, 一带一路国际智库合作联盟) was launched in 2016. Other plat-
forms are the Silk Road Think Tank Network (SiLKS, 丝路国际智库网络) inaugurated at
the Silk Road Forum in Madrid in 2015; Research and Development International (RDI, 蓝
迪国际智库平台); and the Belt and Road Studies Network (BRSN, 一带一路国际智库
合作委员会). Nadège Rolland analyzed these alliances for Sinopsis.868
In the following pages, we distinguish three categories, or degrees, of Chinese influence
through local think tanks, according to criteria that will be detailed: occasional partners,
circumstantial allies, and accomplices. To avoid any misunderstanding, it is important to
add that here, as elsewhere in this report which focuses on how the Party-State designs and
implements its influence operations, these categories are to be understood from Beijing’s
point of view, and not from the point of view of local relays, who generally do not have the
impression of being partners, allies or, even less, accomplices. What we are saying is that this is
how Beijing sees and uses them, whether they are aware of it or not.
We will give examples that are illustrative: they allow us to understand what, in concrete
terms, these relations consist of. In no way do they constitute judgments on the quality of
the institutions and individuals cited, or even on their positions vis-à-vis China: it is not a
question of whether they are “pro-Beijing” – most are not -, only that the partner-
ships they establish, especially with the Chinese embassy, the events they organize
or in which they participate, the Party magazines in which they publish, or the sto-
ries they disseminate, de facto contribute to China’s influence. This is the case even
if they also know how to be critical of Beijing, because one does not cancel out the other.
This is not to say that these think tanks should not have relations with the Chinese
authorities. Dialogue is fundamental: it is important to continue to see and talk to each
other. Other institutions, including IRSEM, and the authors of this report, also receive
Chinese delegations in private, even from the PLA, and carry out missions in China.869 The
difference with the examples given in the following pages is that, in so doing, no resonance
or publicity is given to the Party’s propaganda – and, moreover, the Party-State can be more
freely contradicted, since there is no fear that it will end a partnership.
a. Occasional partners
This first category refers to think tanks, foundations and research centers which, far from
championing the Chinese model, serve as a sounding board on local markets of ideas.
Actors in this category may be directly solicited by Beijing, especially when it is ‘simply’ a
matter of co-organizing events designed by the Party. Other organizations may however
volunteer their services. These partnerships are beneficial to the Party because, with limited
efforts, they expand its contact area and acceptability on foreign land. When a reputable
think tank organizes an event with China, Beijing is looking for that organization’s ability
to get the Party’s message across. Rather than the scientific dimension of the interventions,
it is their compatibility with the Chinese discourse and their ability to be heard by a large
section of the population that appeals to China.
Think tanks in this category generally have a certain credibility on the national or even
international scene, and a pluralistic production. They do not work specifically on China and
they maintain relations with a large number of countries, including the United States and
868. Nadège Rolland, “Mapping the Footprint of Belt and Road Influence Operations,” Sinopsis (12 Aug. 2019).
869. See Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer’s Twitter feed of September 24, 2021: https://twitter.com/jeangene_
vilmer/status/1441308634072248323.
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possibly Taiwan. Besides, some may have had a critical discourse and publicly denounced
Chinese retaliatory measures (ad hominem attacks, lawsuits, sanctions) and censorship when
the Party tried to impose it on them. Thus, they cannot be considered “pro-Chinese,” and
this is precisely what increases their value from Beijing’s point of view.
The example of the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS)
The “Paris Forum on the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative”, co-organized since 2017 by
the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) and the Chinese
Embassy in France, belongs to this category. This event makes a laudatory presentation of
Chinese narratives on the New Silk Roads. Three sessions have so far been held: November 29,
2017, January 10, 2019 and December 19, 2019.870 The forums are systematically introduced
by the Chinese ambassador to France. And, according to an observer, “all criticism
has been carefully stifled,” and the events aim “above all to communicate in order to
appease fears about this enormous plan launched in 2013 by the Chinese president, Xi
Jinping.”871 Commentating on the first edition, the newspaper La Lettre A also believed that
“the conference gave the impression of a lobbying operation in favor of the Chinese project,”
with speakers who, in their large majority, “acted as fervent proponents of a French adhesion
to the Chinese project.”872 Several researchers “have underlined the apparent ‘docility’ of the
speakers at these conferences and questioned a possible influence from Beijing’ on the institute.
Pascal Boniface [IRIS’ director] firmly denied these accusations.”873
During the first forum in 2017, the Chinese embassy handled most of the interventions
on the Chinese side. The participating Chinese think tanks were structures of the state
apparatus. For example, the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS – 中国国际问
题研究所) is the official think tank of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR – 中国现代国际关系
研究院) is considered a branch of the Ministry of State Security.874 The composition of
870. The program is available here: https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Programme-Les-
nouvellesroutes-de-la-soie-29-nov-2017.pdf; https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Programme-
Les-nouvellesroutes-de-la-soie-10-janvier-2019.pdf; https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
Programme-Lesnouvelles-routes-de-la-soie-19-decembre-2019-1.pdf.
871. “La Chine fait la promotion de ses “Nouvelles Routes de la Soie” à Paris,” (“China Promotes the ‘New Silk
Roads’”), Novastan (11 Jan. 2019).
872. “Pékin intensifie son lobbying parisiens sur la route la soie” (“Beijing Intensified its Parisien Lobbying on the
New Silk Roads”), La Lettre A, 1800 (30 Nov. 2017).
873. Nicolas Quénel, “La propagande de Pékin à la conquête de la France” (“Beijing’s propaganda set to conquer
France”), Libération (3 Apr. 2021), 9
874. Although the Chinese regime never mentions this membership, clear links between the two structures can be
identified: a large part of the CICIR staff is trained, and even teaches, at the University of International Studies (国际
关系学院 – often called Guoguan University). However, in 1965, this university was placed under the responsibility of
the Central Investigation Department of the CCP (中共中央调查), which was integrated into the Ministry of State
Security when it was created in 1983 (→ p. 81). See also the Baidu pages (in Chinese) of the university and the DCI:
https://archive.vn/pos0t et https://archive.vn/pWocZ.
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the forum changed little in subsequent sessions, with most Chinese speakers coming from
Party-State structures and passing its narratives on.
It was also striking to note that specific warnings expressed by speakers about the Chinese
project, notably that it must respect a number of principles, were coined in the very terms
of the debate constructed by the Party. These speakers thus validated the ambitions of the
CCP through the vocabulary it had forged. This observation applied especially to politi-
cal actors, who are the Chinese authorities’ preferred targets as they are “easier”
to influence than researchers. For instance, at the second session on January 10, 2019,
Christian Cambon, senator of Val-de-Marne and chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defense and the Armed Forces, declared about the BRI: “[we] are starting to real-
ize that this is a much more important ambition [that we previously thought] that aims to
create a new world order based on the development of exchanges which presents many
advantages […] from this point of view, it seems to us that a certain number of specific
points must be respected, notably the win-win principle.”875 The adoption of this Chinese
expression placed the debate in some sort of tautology. China is invited to propose a “win-
win” project, which happens to be precisely the Chinese leitmotif. The senator borrowed
additional elements from the Chinese narrative: first, the inevitability of China’s rise to
power, which could only lead to the decision to work with it; second, the representation of
the Silk Roads as a factor of peace in the world. All this illustrates the prevalence of the
vocabulary conveyed by the Chinese Embassy in the French debate.
Another feature of this debate was worth noting: the comparison between the United
States and China; the idea that, since we cooperate with the United States, there is no legiti-
mate reason to refuse to cooperate with China. According to this idea, France should adopt
a kind of “equidistant diplomacy,” as if the country was as far away from China as from
the US. This way of equalizing China and the United States is widespread in France,
without being really explained or justified.
Under these conditions, it is evident that, from the embassy’s point of view, an event
such as the “Paris Forum on the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative” serves first and foremost to
promote the Silk Roads in France, while leaving the French public with the impres-
sion that China is willing to discuss its foreign policy. In this way, such an action helps
reinforce the positive image of China.
These events are not the only ones in which IRIS interacts with the Chinese embassy. As
we will see (→ p. 344), IRIS Director Pascal Boniface and, to a lesser extent, IRIS senior
research fellow Barthélémy Courmont have also participated in events organized by or with
the Chinese Embassy or Party agencies.876 As we shall also see, IRIS maintains ties with the
publishing house La Route de la Soie, founded and directed by Sonia Bressler, which
notably published Maxime Vivas’s polemical book on Uyghurs (→ p. 335). Not only have
Pascal Boniface and IRIS researchers published articles in three of the first eight issues of
the journal Dialogue Chine-France, which La Route de la Soie co-publishes with an organiza-
tion dependent on the CCP’s Propaganda Department (→ p. 341), but Courmont (IRIS)
is also an author and series editor at La Route de la Soie, and IRIS has published a note
875. “La dimension géopolitique et de sécurité des nouvelles routes de la soie, entretien avec Christian Cambon”
(“The Geopolitical and Security Dimension of the New Silk Roads, Interview with Christian Cambon”), IRIS Account
on Vimeo (10 Jan. 2017), https://vimeo.com/3124853782.
876. The IRIS director notably participated in the International Forum on Global Governance and Shared
Future co-organized by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies (ACCWS) on August 26, 2021
(https://twitter.com/pascalboniface/status/1430804547602108418). The ACCWS belongs to the China International
Publishing Group (CIPG), a Party agency under the Propaganda Department (→ p. 321).
318
by Bressler on “China Bashing” (→ p. 343). IRIS has also published Pierre Picquart,877 a
researcher known for relaying Beijing’s positions. The author of several books, all of them
apologetic,878 Picquart frequently appears in Chinese media (but also in Russian media,
notably RT and Sputnik), to explain, for instance, that “the violence caused by demonstra-
tors in Hong Kong is disturbing and intolerable,” that “never in world history has a country
evolved so favorably than China has in 70 years,” or that “the CCP is leading the Chinese
to achieve remarkable accomplishments.”879 Systematically presented in these media as a
“doctor in geopolitics and human geography from the University Paris VIII” as if to better
make him play the role of a scientific guarantee, his positions are relayed by the Chinese
embassy (→ p. 234), and he has participated in events organized by it.880
Despite all this, it is important to note that IRIS also sometimes publishes less China-
friendly notes. The structure seems to maintain a relative pluralism, and both Boniface and
Courmont know how to be critical of Beijing as well. For example, Boniface publicly defended
Valérie Niquet when she announced that she was being sued for defamation by Huawei in
November 2019 (→ p. 53),881 and Antoine Bondaz when he was attacked by the Chinese
embassy in March 2021882 – which, according to Libération, may have led IRIS to reevaluate its
relationship with the embassy (→ p. 239). In other words, while their occasional relationship
with Chinese authorities, such as sometimes giving the floor to Party relays, or participating
in CCP-driven publications or events, de facto contributes to Chinese influence operations
in France – which justifies the presence of this example in this report – there is no indica-
tion that this is a conscious effort. Unlike other actors described in the following pages,
there is no defense of the Chinese model here. This is why, in the gradation of influence
through think tanks that we have established, this is only its first degree.
The example of The Bridge Tank (France)
The French think tank The Bridge Tank falls into the same category of occasional
partners. This association, created in 2013 by the economist Joël Ruet and, since then,
chaired by him, presents itself as “an innovative exchange tool, present in major global
forums, active with innovative companies, mobilized by decision-makers.”883 It also devotes
a significant part of its efforts to China: “China, in particular, is a country with which The
Bridge Tank has established working relationships at several levels,”884 explains Ruet, who
877. Regards sur la politique internationale de la Chine (Insights into China’s international policy), interview with Pierre
Picquart, conduted by Steve Dhahar, IRIS, Asia Focus #52, November 2017, https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/Asia-focus-52.pdf.
878. L’empire chinois: mieux comprendre le futur numéro 1 mondial, 2004 (The Chinese empire: better understanding the
future number 1 in the world); La forme olympique de la Chine (The Olympic shape of China), 2008; La Chine dans vingt ans
et le reste du monde: demain, tous chinois? (China in twenty years and the rest of the world: Tomorrow, all Chinese?), 2011;
La Chine: une menace militaire? (China: a military threat?), 2013; La renaissance de la route de la soie: l’incroyable défi chinois du
XXIe siècle (The revival of the Silk Road: the incredible Chinese challenge of the 21st century), 2018.
879. “Jamais dans l’histoire mondiale, un pays n’aura autant évolué aussi favorablement en 70 années que la Chine”
(“Never in the history of the world has a country evolved so favorably in 70 years as China”) Xinhua, (16 Oct.
2019); “le PCC conduit le peuple chinois à accomplir des réalisations remarquables” (“the CCP leads the Chinese
people to make remarkable achievements”), Radio Chine Internationale (6 Jul. 2021), http://french.cri.cn/interview/
list/714/20210706/685150.html (https://archive.vn/j1IJj).
880. webinar on May 6, 2020, which the embassy reports on its Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/
AmbassadeChine/posts/257061275673091).
881. https://twitter.com/pascalboniface/status/1198548335390535680.
882. https://twitter.com/pascalboniface/status/1372929048737947656.
883. https://thebridgetank.org/qui-sommes-nous/ (https://archive.vn/Bg4zJ).
884. Joël Ruet, Forum for the post-COVID-19 EU-China cooperation, co-organized by The Bridge Tank and
the Chinese Embassy in France (15 Oct. 2020), session report, introduction https://thebridgetank.org/wp-content/
319
was once a visiting researcher at the Center for China in the World Economy at Qinghua
University in Beijing.885
One of the Bridge Tank’s policy board members is Kang Rongping (康荣平), a
researcher at the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所研究员) and at the Center for
China and Globalization (whose president is a DTFU advisor → p. 40). And the Bridge
Tank’s China associate director is Zhao Wei (赵巍), an associate professor at ESSCA
School of Management in Angers as well as a member of the Institute for the Reform and
Development of the Pearl River Delta at Sun Yat-sen University (中山大学珠三角改革发
展研究院). The team has other China experts, including Wang Xieshu, a researcher special-
izing in financial issues, or Zhang Yang, who works on cooperation between China, Europe
and Africa in addition to her position as a partner in the consulting firm Cibola partners
(where Joël Ruet is a member of the advisory committee). It should be noted, however,
that the governance of the Bridge Tank’s actions with Chinese organizations is not only
the responsibility of its president and the Chinese members of its team, but also of other
French personalities and experts on its Board.886
The Bridge Tank partners with the Boao Forum, the “Chinese Davos,” which Joël
Ruet has attended every year since 2018, alongside Jean-Pierre Raffarin and many French
economic leaders. It should be noted that this forum, founded in 1998, chaired by former
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and with an international council that includes former
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and former US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,
is a rare place that still provides participants with some leeway with respect to Chinese
propaganda.887 Ruet also regularly intervenes in the French and Chinese press, for exam-
ple in Le Monde in 2018, to describe China as having a “Promethean capacity,” and to
highlight the “historical opportunity to capitalize on the existing Franco-Chinese industrial
relationship, and its extension” to create “one of the driving forces of the post-American
world”888; or in La Chine au présent in 2020, to suggest reading President Xi Jinping’s China’s
Governance.889 The Twitter account of the Chinese embassy has relayed his positions (image
below). He also attended (as well as representatives of several other French think tanks not
mentioned in this report) the launching ceremony of the English and French editions of
another book by Xi Jinping, The Belt and Road Initiative, in April 2019 in Beijing, during the
second Silk Roads Summit, during which The Bridge Tank supported greening this initia-
tive, which emits CO2.
890
uploads/2020/11/0-Introduction-Verbatim.pdf.
885. In 2010-2011, according to his resume: https://archive.vn/C0S9V.
886. A clarification provided by the Bridge Tank on October 3, 2021.
887. https://thebridgetank.org/2021/04/28/le-bridge-tank-au-forum-de-boao-dans-les-medias/ (https://archive.
vn/QBU7V).
888. Joël Ruet, “La Chine et la France ‘peuvent créer un des axes moteurs du monde post-américain’” (“China
and France ‘can create one of the driving forces of the post-American world”), Le Monde (7 Jan. 2018). The title of
this article, written during President Macron’s 2018 visit to China, refers to American Fareed Zakaria’s book, The Post-
American World (New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2008).
889. “Perhaps one way to see, in the current context, that the Chinese contribution to the governance of everyday
life can be found in reading, in particular, The Governance of China, with texts offering lengthy examples on the ‘well-
being of the people’” (Joël Ruet, “Nous sommes tous des Wuhanais” (“We are all Wuhanese”), La Chine au présent (5
Mar. 2020) (https://archive.vn/etay2).
890. Source: https://twitter.com/JoelRuet/status/1120964112069144577. The following year, in a webinar with
China International Publishing Group (CIPG) on the “Post-Covid” world, French speakers, including The Bridge
Tank, also spoke on “the recommended ‘green’ recovery to put the fight against global warming at the heart of global
governance” (clarification provided by The Bridge Tank in a September 24, 2021 correspondence with the authors).
320
On the left, Joël Ruet with Li Baodong (李保东), vice minister of foreign affairs of the PRC (in charge of international
organizations and conferences, international economic affairs and arms control) and secretary general of the Boao Forum, in May
2018.891 In the middle, Joël Ruet is a regular contributor to Chinese state media (here China Daily in April 2020892) but also Russian
media (RT France and Sputnik). On the right, the embassy publishes on Twitter a video of Joël Ruet produced by CGTN.
The Bridge Tank co-organizes events with the Chinese Embassy in France, such
as the “Forum for the Post-COVID-19 EU-China Cooperation” held on October 15, 2020
or the “Forum on China-EU Cooperation in the New Context” on January 21, 2021. The
later was attended by Jean-Pierre Raffarin while Ambassador Lu Shaye opened the proceed-
ings by thanking his “friends” “for [their] support for the Chinese Embassy in France
and [himself].”893 On October 11, 2019, at the opening of a “high-level seminar on China
and Sino-French relations,” also co-organized by The Bridge Tank, Ambassador Lu Shaye
already “ thank[ed] the Bridge Tank here for the high quality of its work.”894 In its deal-
ings with the embassy, The Bridge Tank mobilizes many French personalities, including
at least three former prime ministers, six former ministers, five former ambassadors and
about thirty experts, practitioners or general officers. Events are generally co-funded, which
explains why The Bridge Tank receives donations from the Chinese Embassy (€40,000
in 2019) and Chinese companies (€34,947.50 from the publishing company Bosheng
International in 2019).895 This transparency is acknowledged and appreciable: unlike other
think tanks mentioned in this report, The Bridge Tank publishes detailed financial state-
ments. Moreover, the association specifies that, in total, its financial commitments on China
“clearly exceed the subsidies received and are made up for by donations from [its] members
or European companies.896
891. Source: https://twitter.com/TheBridgeTank/status/1001164972439859200. Joël Ruet specified that he was
unaware of Li Baodong’s dual affiliation at the time, and that he only met him in his capacity at Bo’ao (correspondence
with the authors dated October 3, 2021).
892. Source: https://twitter.com/JoelRuet/status/1255602647152963591/photo/1.
893. “Allocution de l’Ambassadeur LU Shaye au Forum sur la coopération Chine-UE dans le nouveau contexte”
(“Speech by Ambassador LU Shaye at the Forum on China-EU Cooperation in the New Context”), Embassy of the
People’s Republic of China in the French Republic (22 Jan. 2021), https://archive.vn/QhqAt.
894. “Discours de S.E.M. l’Ambassadeur Lu Shaye au séminaire de haut niveau sur le 70e anniversaire de la
République populaire de Chine” (“Speech by H.E. Ambassador Lu Shaye at the High Level Seminar on the 70th
Anniversary of the People’s Republic of China”), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the French Republic
(11 Oct.2019), https://archive.vn/zeAoP. The full title of the conference was “China: what keys to the future? Seminar
on China and Sino-French Relations” as seen on screen in a CGTN video (14 Oct. 2019), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=AXmFMtoIWws (at 0:14). On its website, however, the Chinese Embassy chose to replace this title with
the context in which this seminar was taking place, reducing it to a “high-level seminar on the 70th anniversary of the
People’s Republic of China” (see next note) – even though it was also the “40 years of economic reforms” and the 55th
anniversary of Franco-Chinese diplomatic relations.
895. According to the 2019 financial report: https://www.journal-officiel.gouv.fr/document/
associations_a/814944260_31122019_RECTIF1. The Bosheng grant was largely provisioned for the publication of
proceedings from events held in 2020 on the dialogue of civilizations (information provided by The Bridge Tank in
correspondence with the authors on October 3, 2021).
896. Correspondence between The Bridge Tank and the authors (3 Oct. 2021).
321
Events co-organized by The Bridge Tank and the Chinese Embassy, October 15, 2020 (left897) and January 21, 2021 (right).898
The Bridge Tank also collaborates with the Academy of Contemporary China and
World Studies (ACCWS) of the China International Publishing Group (CIPG), a
Party agency supervised by the Propaganda Department.899 The ACCWS was founded
in 2004 as the Foreign Communication Research Center of the Foreign Language Bureau of
China. Its website details a team of about 100 permanent researchers working on issues of
communication, Chinese storytelling and world public opinion.900 It also deals with various
instruments of influence, such as the Global Young Leaders Dialogue,901 a program that
invites to China potential future leaders (Joël Ruet is a member of its international steering
committee902). On March 8, 2021, The Bridge Tank sponsored a “Think Tank & Media
Forum on Global Economic Development” with, among others, Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s FPI
and the CIPG of the Chinese Communist Party.903 On May 7, The Bridge Tank and the
ACCWS co-hosted a webinar on “Collaboration between France and China in the Post-
Covid Era,” again with Jean-Pierre Raffarin.904 On June 16, 2021, The Bridge Tank signed
a memorandum of understanding with the ACCWS, in the framework of a grouping of
think tank (named the “Contemporary China and World” Joint Research Centers905). The
vice-president of CIPG, Gao Anming, attended the ceremony.
The Bridge Tank works directly with the CIPG, whose delegation it hosted in Paris
in 2019.906 On October 21-22, 2019, the two organizations organized with the Information
Office of the State Council of China a “Sino-French Dialogue on Civilizations” in Paris,
with the participation of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, the President of the
French Constitutional Council and former Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, and former
897. Source: https://thebridgetank.org (https://archive.vn/nJxN6).
898. Source: https://archive.vn/WTi7k.
899. “The 70th Anniversary of CIPG,” Beijing Review (5 Sep.2019), https://archive.vn/qgNw0.
900. See the “关于我们” (About Us) page of the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies website.
http://www.accws.org.cn/gywm/201212/t20121226_45846.htm.
901. http://www.globalyoungleadersdialogue.com/cn/.
902. As the Global Young Leaders Dialogue website states: https://archive.vn/mC13b.
903. “Think Tank & Media Forum on Global Economic Development,” ACCWS (17 Mar. 2021), https://archive.
vn/oxnYj.
904. “Webinar eyes closer China-France collaboration in post-COVID-19 Era,” ACCWS (4 Sep. 2020), https://
archive.vn/xnpR2.
905. Other international partners of the ACCWS are the Gino Germani Research Institute of the Faculty of
Social Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires and the Pakistan-China Institute. See “Joint research centers and
knowledge sharing initiative launched,” ACCWS (17 Jun. 2021), https://archive.vn/yWz90.
906. As indicated in the 2019 financial report since this hosting involved an expense of €2105 (https://www.
journal-officiel.gouv.fr/document/associations_a/814944260_31122019_RECTIF1).
322
French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin.907 It was an exercise in parallel diplomacy
(track 2), in this case cultural diplomacy, with the launch of a video on the Château de
Versailles.908 On March 8, 2021, the Bridge Tank and CIPG, this time with the FPI, orga-
nized a forum on global economic development.909
MoU signing ceremony between The Bridge Tank and ACCWS, June 16, 2021, and speech by Joel Ruet
(source: https://archive.vn/yWz90).
Finally, among the other Chinese actors with whom the Bridge Tank interacts, we should
mention:
- the Western Returned Scholars Association (WRSA), which is linked to the DTFU
(→ p. 40) and which Joël Ruet met in September 2018 in Xi’an on the sidelines of the
delegation to the 3rd Franco-Chinese Cultural Forum co-organized by WRSA and the
Fondation Prospective et Innovation (FPI → p. 323);910
- the CGTN Think Tank (→ p. 309), which a biography of Joël Ruet actually states
that he “co-launched.”911 Among other projects, the two organizations co-organized the
“Forum on the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals” on September 17-18, 2020912;
- the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the official think tank of the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with which the Bridge Tank co-organized an online
conference (“France-China Cooperation: Identifying Common Values and Visions for
Shared Action”) on August 29, 2021,913 with the participation of two former Chinese
and two former French ambassadors. Yu Jiang, the vice president of CIIS, also attended.
He is a French-speaking Chinese diplomat, French National School of Administration
(ENA) alumnus, former political counselor at the Chinese Embassy in France, and, since
2020, he has also been deputy secretary-general of the Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought
Research Center (习近平外交思想研究中心), set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and affiliated to the CIIS.914
While these interactions make The Bridge Tank an occasional partner of Chinese author-
ities, it is important to note that this think tank does not defend the Chinese model, nor
does it disseminate Party narratives. As its name indicates, it acts rather as a “bridge.” For
907. “Un consensus parvenu lors du ‘Dialogue sino-français sur les civilisations’” (“A consensus reached at the
‘Sino-French Dialogue on Civilizations”), Xinhua (24 Oct. 2019).
908. A clarification provided by the Bridge Tank on September 24, 2021.
909. “China’s ‘Double Assembly’: the Bridge Tank Co-Hosts the Think Tank and Media Forum on Global
Economic Development,” The Bridge Tank (8 Mar. 2021), https://archive.vn/16CaN.
910. Source: https://twitter.com/JoelRuet/status/1042787279528493056.
911. http://www.globalyoungleadersdialogue.com/archives/766.
912. “Forum on the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals,” The Bridge Tank (18 Sep. 2020), https://archive.vn/lB8vA.
913. Available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8RzwN-fd34k.
914. From his page on the CIIS website: https://archive.vn/3kCzq. The proliferation of research centers on Xi
Jinping’s thought in recent years is one of the symptoms of a strengthening of the personality cult in China.
323
example, it organized, during the summer of 2021, a meeting between the presidents of the
two liberal and socialist internationals with the objective of seeking coordination in the face
of the rise of illiberalism and other anti-democratic fronts.915 And a bridge can be used in
both directions: in this case, The Bridge Tank uses the multiple channels it maintains with
Chinese authorities to defend French positions, particularly in the fight against global
warming and for the preservation of biodiversity, a subject it has frequently addressed since
the COP21. During a January 21, 2021 seminar co-organized with the embassy, for instance,
several French speakers mentioned France’s strategic interests and pointed out certain short-
comings in the draft comprehensive agreement between the EU and China on investments.
b. Circumstantial allies
Actors in this category not only collaborate occasionally with the Chinese Embassy and/
or Party agencies but, without sharing the CCP’s ideology or even its strategic objectives, they
believe that it is in their interest – of whatever nature they may be – to spread the Party’s
narratives on a regular basis. Their motivations are diverse: for some, it may be anti-Amer-
icanism, which means opposing American power rather than adhering to Chinese values; for
others, it may be opportunism, as China can help struggling institutions increase their influ-
ence or help them reinvent themselves. In any case, these institutions often act as spokesper-
sons for China by providing an effective vehicle for Beijing’s discursive strategies. In doing so,
they too participate in building a positive image of China’s power.
The fact that these think tanks are pluralistic, sometimes formulating criticisms of the
Party-State, and working on other subjects, including the United States and Europe, does not
change anything, since they nonetheless reproduce Chinese narratives. From Beijing’s point
of view, this dissemination is even more efficient when it is diluted in a pluralistic
whole, since the transmitter will be less suspected of playing into China’s hands.
The example of the French Prospective and Innovation Foundation (FPI)
In France, the Fondation Prospective et Innovation (FPI) illustrates this second cat-
egory. Created in 1989 by François Dalle and René Monory, who was then a president
of the Vienne General Council, minister of the Economy and president of the Senate,
it initially ambitioned to create a discussion about “continuities inherited from the past”
and the “factors of the future.” It was symbolically established at Poitiers’ Futuroscope
(imagined by René Monory). Today, Jean-Pierre Raffarin (a former prime minister) leads
the foundation. Since 2006, however, it moved from its original objectives to focus on
three main areas916: understanding and appreciating rising new powers, such as China or
Africa; stimulating competitiveness by enlightening and supporting companies, especially
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and intermediate-sized enterprises (ISEs); and
participating in the design of a new global, national, and local governance.
Over the past decade, China has clearly become the preferred theme of the foundation.
At least half the publications and the majority of its activities have dealt with China,
with continued growth over the period that could indicate that the foundation prefers, when
it comes to China, organizing events rather than publishing documents – perhaps because it
915. A clarification provided by the Bridge Tank on September 24, 2021.
916. “La Fondation Prospective et Innovation: presentation,” Fondation prospective et innovation, http://www.
prospective-innovation.org/la-fondation-prospective-et-innovation/presentation/.
324
is a more appropriate vehicle to influence the political elite.917 The real number is probably
even higher because some publications and activities officially dedicated to current affairs
were in fact almost exclusively about China, and usually at its advantage. This was nota-
bly the case of the forum organized by the FPI at the Futuroscope on August 27, 2021.
Behind a neutral title (“Les vertiges du monde. Retrouver l’équilibre” [The Vertigo of the
World. Finding a Balance Again]), it was indeed devoted to the relations to Beijing.918 Among
the speakers, and in addition to Jean-Pierre Raffarin, were Pascal Boniface, director of
IRIS (→ p. 316);919 Kishore Mahbubani, one of the main pro-Chinese intellectuals on the
international scene and in the Singaporean debate (→ p. 515) – the interrogative title of his
latest book (Has China Won?) has interestingly been translated by an affirmation in French
(Le jour où la Chine va gagner [The Day China Wins]920) – or André Chieng, the vice-president
of the Comité France-Chine, a group of French companies with interests in China that Xi
Jinping personally thanked for having “played an active role in Franco-Chinese economic
exchanges. [The Committee] has contributed a lot to the economy of our two countries.”921
The figures are revealing, but the content of the publications and interventions of
FPI members is even clearer in setting the institution’s role in incorporating and propa-
gating many narratives constructed by the Party:
• On China as the savior of an international order sabotaged by the United States:
“At a time when the United States paralyzed the WTO by refusing to renew the members
of the Dispute Settlement Body, after it dealt a major blow to the Paris Climate agree-
ments, after it refused to redistribute voting rights at the IMF, after it killed the Iranian
nuclear agreement, it is essential to encourage China to participate actively in defining
and adapting the international order.”922
• On a “win-win” China as an opportunity for France: “China is adept of ‘win-win’
solutions. It is constantly striving to develop formulas where each of the stakeholders
can benefit from their engagement. For the French, who are used to a highly organized
market, being forced to adapt to a constantly changing market is a great opportunity.”923
• On the “community of common destiny” dear to Xi Jinping (which is nothing
more than a project of Sinicization of the international system): “In recent times we
have been able to measure the importance of China’s choices, notably through concrete
support for the euro, during our debt crisis, or on the occasion of the Paris Climate
agreements. We can also recall China’s positive attitudes toward international organiza-
917. In January 2021, the IPF website listed 26 publications (since October 2011) out of 52 on China, compared to only
10 on foresight and innovation, 7 on Africa and the Middle East, 5 on European democracy and multilateralism, 2 on the state
of the world, and 2 on culture and religion; as well as 98 events (since April 2008) out of 177 (https://archive.vn/OfAJv).
Since then, the site has been redesigned, with new headings and a different distribution, but you can see on the books page, for
example, that about half of them are about China (https://prospective-innovation.org/publications/livres/).
918. Richard Arzt, “La Chine face au monde: ce qu’en disent des specialistes français” (“China and the world: what
French experts say”), Slate (8 Sep. 2021).
919. The program is available online: https://prospective-innovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/FPI-
Programme-Futuroscope-actualise.pdf.
920. Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? The Chinese Challenge to American Primacy, New York, PublicAffairs, 2020;
Le Jour où la China va gagner. La fin de la suprématie américaine, Paris, Saint Simon, 2021. Note that the subtitle is also more
affirmative, since it moves from a “challenge” to American supremacy to its outright “end.”
921. A quote from the France-China Committee website: https://www.comitefrancechine.com/qui-sommes-nous/.
922. “Compte rendu de la conférence/Débat des 55 ans de relations diplomatiques Franco-Chinoises,” Fondation
Prospective et Innovation (25 Mar. 2019). https://archive.vn/FamHC.
923. Ibid.
325
tions such as the UN and UNESCO. “A Community of common destiny for mankind”
can bring people together.”924
• On the United States as a more significant threat than China: “one can well
imagine that once the compromise with China has been found and finalized, it will be
Europe’s turn. One can wonder what interest Europe can still find in being an ally of the
United States. There is talk of a Chinese threat, but it is a potential one: America’s threat
is present. Between the two, Europe must seek independence and balance.”925
• On Chinese companies as a counterbalance to U.S. companies: “Currently, the
GAFAs (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) dominate the world, and the only
ones that can balance them are the BATXs (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Xiaomi). The
GAFAs operate without counterweight on French territory: neither France nor Europe
has anything to oppose to them. The BATXs weight a lot on the Chinese market but not
on the international market: there is something to be negotiated there.”926
• On the BRI as the vector of a new era from which Europeans would be wrong
to remain on the sidelines: “[China’s] Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is charting a path
for this global synergy from which China intends to create a new global era in the future.
China is astonished and deplores that Europeans are so reluctant to commit themselves
to the BRI but it no longer waits for them. From now on, China is moving forward. We
are wrong to remain petrified in the face of the [the BRI]. For it is good news.”927
• On the diversity of political regimes, which are different but respectable: “Our sys-
tems are different and not meant to be similar”;928 “We need a delicate discourse to defend
our interests precisely, but without attacking others. We must acknowledge Xi Jinping’s
unambiguous statement: his country wants to be socialist with Chinese characteristics. We
need to respect his opinion while making clear that we do not share this approach.”929
• On Xi Jinping as a Gaullist figure whose vocation is to bring the country to the
place it deserves: “Often misinterpreted by Western media as a Stalin-like return to
personal power, he has in fact a Gaullist character: The proof of this is publicly given by
the formation of a very high-quality management team and the elevation of the status
of the new helmsman by one rank.”930
• On power put at the service of peace: “China is introducting itself as a peaceful
power, aspiring to more regulated and profitable exchanges based on mutual respect.”931
• On the fact that opposing China’s legitimate expansion would be both vain and
childish: “In the face of the rising tide, only kids can build sand dams. Faced with this
China, which, as we can see, has profoundly and impressively renewed itself, pretending
to stand in the way of its ambitions is illusory and counterproductive; they are, after all,
perfectly legitimate.”932
924. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, “Communiqué de presse de la conférence/ débat en l’honneur des 55 ans de relations
diplomatiques franco-chinoises,” Fondation Prospective et Innovation (19 Mar. 2019), http://www.prospective-
innovation.org/wp-content/uploads/CP-55ans.pdf.
925. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, “Compte rendu de la conférence/Débat des 55 ans de relations diplomatiques franco-chinoises.”
926. Ibid.
927. “XIXe Congrès: XXIe siècle,” Fondation Prospective et Innovation (5 Dec. 2017), https://archive.vn/eCod7.
928. Raffarin, “Compte rendu.”
929. “Compte rendu de la Conférence/Débat des 55 ans de relations diplomatiques Franco-Chinoises.”
930. “XIXe Congrès: XXIe siècle”.
931. Ibid.
932. “Compte rendu de la Conférence/Débat des 55 ans de relations diplomatiques franco-chinoises.”
326
These examples show how the FPI reproduces Chinese narratives. It reveals that it is in
the Party’s interest to carry out this type of narrative strategies relying on local relays capa-
ble of acting as sounding boards.
c. The accomplices
A third category involves think tanks and foundations that share a common vision
of the world with the CCP and whose interests are mainly convergent. That makes
them collaborate with the Chinese authorities and relay their stories but also defend China’s
image in all circumstances.
The example of the International Schiller Institute
The Schiller Institute illustrates this third category. It was founded in 1984 by Helga
Zepp-LaRouche,933 who wished to give substance to the ideas of Friedrich von Schiller, a
18th-century poet, playwright and art theorist. These ideas were delineated during the Third
International Conference that the Institute organized on November 24 and 25, 1984, in
Washington, and which led to the “Declaration of the Inalienable Rights of Man.” This
charter was meant to denounce the excesses of supranational financial institutions and the
“tyranny” that they inflict on less developed countries.934 The Schiller Institute wished to
bring about a new world in which “war, poverty and the wounds that affect us will appear as
the relics of an outdated world.”935 While promoting peace through economic development
and respect for the sovereignty of nations, the Schiller Institute has also been active in the
dialogue of cultures and insisted on a better understanding of the “advantage of others,” a
concept that Jacques Cheminade described as inspired by the Peace of Westphalia (1648).936
The Schiller Institute has developed its activities in many countries. Five seem to receive
special attention, with sister structures working under the umbrella of the International
Schiller Institute: Germany (Schiller-Institut, Vereinigung für Staatskunst e. V.), the United
States (Schiller Institute Inc.), France (Institut Schiller), Denmark (Schiller Instituttet) and
Sweden (Schiller Institutet → p. 536).937 The French website mentions a ‘presence’ in more
than 30 countries, although the exact nature of this presence is not specified.
One of the Institute’s main projects is based on the idea of a “Eurasian Landbridge”938
that would link the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean via three major communication
corridors: a northern route via the Trans-Siberian Railway, a central route through Ukraine,
Russia, Kazakhstan and China, and a southern route via Turkey, Iran and Central Asia to
China. These routes were imagined as a way to bring an end to age-old conflicts through
broadly beneficial Euro-Asian cooperation and economic development.939 Through this
project, LaRouche aspired to a fairer global economic order that would replace failing
933. She was Lyndon LaRouche’s wife.
934. “The Inalienable Rights of Man,” The International Schiller Institute. https://schillerinstitute.com/
inalienablerights-man/.
935. “L’Institut Schiller, ses idées, ses engagements” (6 Nov. 2011) (https://www.institutschiller.org/Institut-
Schiller-idees-engagements.html).
936. Jacques Cheminade, “L’identité de l’Europe: l’avantage d’autrui dans le nouveau paradigm,” speech at the 30
Anniversary of the Institut Schiller, Institut Schiller (4 Nov. 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJd7pMp6NiA.
937. “Stay in Touch with the Schiller Institute,” The International Schiller Institute, https://schillerinstitute.
nationbuilder.com/join (consulted on May 1, 2020).
938. https://archive.schillerinstitute.com/fid_97-01/fid_landbridge_map.html.
939. “About Us,” The International Schiller Institute, http://newparadigm.schillerinstitute.com/our-campaign/
aboutus/; Jonathan Tennenbaum, “Eurasian Alliance for Infrastructure: Key to World Peace,” Executive
Intelligence Review, 19:28 (Jul. 1992), 20-28, https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1992/eirv19n28-19920717/
eirv19n28-19920717.pdf.
327
financial systems. Since the project’s inception during the 1990s, and the appearance of the
Chinese project in 2013, the Eurasian Landbridge concept has expanded to include new
economic and maritime routes.
Since 2013, there has been a gradual convergence between LaRouche and the
Schiller Institute’s ideas on the one hand and the Chinese objectives on the other.
In an interview for Xinhua, Helga Zepp-LaRouche’s husband, Lyndon LaRouche, stated
that China was a key nation in the advent of a new world economic order.940 Not long
afterwards, Helga Zepp-LaRouche published a paper called “New Economic Order Begins
with New Silk Road.” Therein she invited the UN to cooperate and stressed the role that
Xi Jinping’s New Silk Road project could play in the organization of a new world order
capable of taking into account ‘non-aligned’ countries.
As a result of the LaRouches’ positions, the head of the Schiller Institute became a
favorite with Chinese media. For instance, she was invited to Yan Rui’s famous TV how
“Dialogue” on China’s national CCTV channel, which introduced her the “New Silk Road
Lady” and a founder of the “Eurasian Landbridge” project.941 Mrs. Zepp-LaRouche was
also interviewed on China Radio International’s “People in the Know” program. During
the interview, she asserted that the New Silk Road could pave the way for a new credit sys-
tem between sovereign nations to replace our “unjust financial system.”942
Source: https://schillerinstitute.com/our-campaign/about-us.
In September 2014, Helga Zepp-LaRouche participated in several conferences on the
Silk Roads in China. At an event organized by China Investment Magazine (中国投资),943
Helga Zepp-LaRouche was introduced by Colonel Bao Shixiu (鲍世修), a former profes-
sor at the PLA Academy of Military Science (中国军事科学院), translator of Russian and
specialist in military theory.944 In fact, Bao Shixiu had previously participated in a conference
for the 30th anniversary of the Schiller Institute in June 2014, during which he delivered a
speech describing Obama’s “pivot” policy as an atttempted hegemonic strategy in Asia. He
940. “An agreement Among Leading Nations Can Change the direction of History,” Executive Intelligence Review
(Aug. 2013), 23-26, https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2013/eirv40n31-20130809/23-26_4031-lar.pdf.
941. “A Silk Road for the 21st Century – CCTV Interview with Helga Zepp-LaRouche”, Schiller Institute (23 Apr.
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRz40SGhmaw.
942. “Helga Zepp-LaRouche Interview with China Radio International ‘People in the Know,’” Archive Schiller
Institute (Sept. 2014), https://archive.vn/OrEWY; “Zepp-Larouche sur China Radio International: Concentrons nous
sur les objectifs communs de l’Humanité” (“Zepp-Larouche on China Radio International: Let Us Focus on our
Common Objectives for Humanity”), Schiller Institute (18 Apr. 2014), https://archive.vn/TmeV5.
943. Party journal dedicated to business and investment. In May 2016, the journal launched an African edition
with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the International Department of the Central Committee.
944. See its Baidu page archived here: https://archive.vn/BjWRU.
328
therefore advocated for an American withdrawal from Asia by adopting Xi Jinping’s leit-
motif, detailed at the founding of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Measures in Asia (CICA): “security problems in Asia should be solved by Asians them-
selves. Outsiders should consciously exit the game.”945
Gradually, the common positions turned into a
common strategy. Both Mrs. Zepp-LaRouche’s state-
ments in Chinese media and the participation of Chinese
intellectuals in events organized by the Schiller Institute
have gradually built a positive image of China. They
have given way to an increased coordination between
the two actors and an unremitting support of the
Schiller Institute to China’s influence operations.
This coordination crystallized on December 4, 2019
when CGTN announced the creation of CGTN Think
Tank, a network of foreign think tanks and institutions
the Schiller Institute immediately joined (→ p. 309).946
According to Zheng Bijian (郑必坚),947 president of
the China Institute for Innovation and Development
Strategy (中国科学院国家创新与发展战略研究会), CGTN Think Tank could “play an
outstanding role in the process of deepening and expanding the ‘understanding of China and
the world.’”948 At this event, Helga Zepp-LaRouche addressed the first panel of experts as a
founding member of the project. She stressed the need to extend the Eurasian Landbridge
concept worldwide (World Landbridge), which would make it possible to replace outdated
institutions such as NATO.949
The day after the summit, Zepp-LaRouche was invited on China Radio International’s
“World Today” program. She asserted that the model of Chinese development for eradi-
cating poverty created a new paradigm that contrasted with the Western neo-liberal model,
which was doomed to fail.950
The positions adopted by the Schiller Institute and its president, on social networks and
in their publications, illustrate the converging strategies and the unfailing support given by
the think tank to the dissemination of the Party’s narratives. All the Institute’s publications
have unfailingly praised the projects included in the Silk Roads. To this end, the Institute
does not hesitate to appropriate the Party’s narratives. The Schiller Institute’s publication
The New Silk Road becomes the World Landbridge: A Shared future for humanity illustrates this by
taking up the slogan of the community of common destiny.951
945. “Bao Shixiu: A New Silk Road and a New Security Architecture for Asia,” Archive Schiller Institute (15 Jun.
2014), https://archive.vn/hlsb2.
946. “CGTN Think Tank Launches in Beijing,” CGTN (4 Dec. 2019). https://archive.vn/Yu5m5.
947. Nicknamed the Chinese Henry Kissinger, he promotes the theory of China’s peaceful emergence.
948. Wu Guoxiu, “CGTN Summit Overview,” CGTN, (4 Dec. 2019), https://archive.vn/8xF0n.
949. “Schiller Institute Becomes Founding Member of CGTN Think Tank,” Schiller Institute, https://archive.vn/
fo7W4.
950. “World Today,” China Radio International (5 Dec. 2019); “Zepp-Larouche Interview on china-US Relationship,”
Executive Intelligence Review (20 Dec. 2019), 49, https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2019/eirv46n50-20191220/47-
49_4650-hzl.pdf.
951. “The New Silk Road Becomes the World landbridge, Vol. II,” The Schiller Institute, https://archive.vn/IyP9P.
329
Each national branch of the Schiller Institute targets local officials to convince
them to join the Chinese project. Thus, following Rome’s decision to join the Silk Roads
project, the Schiller Institute urged France to do the same.
Mrs. Zepp-LaRouche is also committed to defending China against its Western
critics. This posture was evident during the Covid-19 crisis, which led Zepp-LaRouche
to cross swords with China’s critics.952 Her criticisms were notably aimed at the United
Kingdom, presented as the cornerstone of the opposition to China. Zepp-LaRouche
described London as resisting dialogue with China and set a somewhat fallacious historical
continuity between the Opium Wars and Covid-19.
952. Helga Zepp-Larouche, “China Deserves Praise and Cooperation in the Fights against the Coronavirus,”
Schiller Institute, https://archive.vn/ZUppP.
330
The messages also concern the perceived disinformation presumably suffered by China,
Xinjiang or the debt diplomacy that Beijing is accused of implementing via the Silk Roads.953
Think tanks such as the Schiller Institute are therefore essential nodes in the export
and dissemination of Chinese narratives, which aim above all to build a positive image
of China. Additionally, as per the examples above, they can also act as intermediaries exert-
ing a certain pressure on Beijing’s critics. In this case, with the Schiller Institute, Beijing
can count on the entire LaRouche movement, which has many branches around the
world. In Australia, for example, the Australian Citizens Party, a political party affiliated with
the LaRouche movement, regularly attacks CCP critics – to the delight of Chinese authori-
ties and media.954 Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian praised those “very well-written
articles,” a comment echoed by the Chinese embassy in Australia.955
These relays can also provide a “scientific” legitimacy (even though their work is pre-
cisely not scientific). For example, when a large number of researchers around the world
953. Christine Bierre, “Schiller Institute in China – Xinjiang province: China Rejects All Accusations,” Schiller
Institute, https://archive.vn/6oLIF.
954. See, for instance, the following compilation: https://citizensparty.org.au/sites/default/files/2020-10/china-
narrative.pdf.
955. “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks,” Embassy of the PRC in Australia (15 Apr. 2021),
https://archive.vn/Eqra3; see also: “Commentaire: D’où vient le courage des conspirateurs occidentaux de jouer la
carte du Xinjiang?” (“Commentary: Where are the Western Conspiracy Theorists Playing the Xinjiang Card From?”),
RCI (15 Apr. 2021), https://archive.vn/vMp09.
331
denounced the oppression of Uyghurs in March 2021, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ spokesperson invoked a list of “real researchers” defending China concocted by
the Schiller Institute (image below).
https://twitter.com/SpokespersonCHN/status/1376163186290749441 (28 mars 2021).
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