Chapter 4

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMPANIES AS 

DATA COLLECTION TOOLS 

Influence operations require massive amounts of data, on which they depend 

to know whom to influence, when, and how. Beijing uses “two combined approaches: 

‘bulk data collection’ and targeted data collection.”1 Bulk data collection refers to the use 

of numerous sensors to harvest large amounts of data, and Chinese services – due to their 

large workforce and advanced algorithms – are particularly well equipped to analyze it. 

Data collection is done through espionage and cyber-attacks (the 2018 data breach at 

the Australian National University and the 2019 cyberattack on the Australian parliament 

for instance, likely in order to build detailed profiles of individuals), but also by co-opt-

ing regimes, building infrastructures, developing new technologies. It heavily relies 

on public and private companies. According to Samantha Hoffman, “[to] get access to 

global data, the Party uses state-owned enterprises, Chinese and foreign technological firms, 

and others partners such as university researchers. The CCP [is] using capitalism as a vehicle 

to access data that can help it disrupts democratic processes and create a more favorable 

global environment for its power.”2 

The nature of the Chinese regime, a one-party state where the state is an institutional 

façade with no real power, forces all sizable companies to closely engage with the Party. 

These ties provide Party executives with access to companies – many they help fund through 

Chinese banks, which are primarily politically-minded. In fact, no important company in 

China can prosper without aligning itself with the Party. Since Xi Jinping came to 

power, this trend has only increased with the adoption of the Made in China 2025 pro-

gram, the Belt and Road Initiative, and AI development plans. The Party’s growing control 

over the strategy of high-tech companies has led Chinese firms in this sector to hire Party 

members, to expand the companies’ network, obtain political protection, and consequently 

become more competitive. 

In 2015 China elevated the military-civil fusion (军民融合) as a national strategy.3 In 

January 2017, the government established the Central Military-Civil Fusion Development 

Committee (中央军民融合发展委员会) and the publication of the Special Plan for 

Scientific & Technological Military-Civil Fusion (科技军民融合发展专项规划). The 

goal was to facilitate innovation in dual technologies in key sectors, such biology, 

the space industry, artificial intelligence, and information technologies.4 To do 

1. De Pierrebourg and Juneau-Katsuya, Ces espions venus d’ailleurs, 147.

2. Samantha Hoffman, in Rohan Thomson, “How China surveils the world,” MIT Technology Review (19 Aug. 2020). 

3. “习近平谈军民融合: 关乎国家安全和发展全局” (“Xi Jiping Discusses Civil-Military Fusions: Matters of 

National Security and Development”), Qiushi (16 Oct. 2018). The archived page is available here: https://archive.vn/

KHdPz.

4. Elsa B. Kania, “In Military-Civil Fusion, China is Learning Lessons from the United States and Starting to 

Innovate,” The Bridge (27 Aug. 2019), https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/27/in-military-civil-fusion-

china-is-learning-lessons-from-the-united-states-and-starting-to-innovate.

130

so, the government pushes private sector companies and research centers to collaborate 

with the public-sector defense industry. This program came from a desire to accelerate 

the PLA’s modernization and to convert civilian technological innovations into 

military gains.

These efforts were also part of a larger strategy aimed at strengthening the Party’s 

control over the private sector. In 2016, Xi Jinping argued for a modernization of the 

management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by integrating “CCP objectives in all 

aspects of corporate governance,” which led many SOEs to amend their internal struc-

ture to include a role for the Party in daily corporate matters.5 Then, in 2017, Article 

7 of the National Intelligence Act mandated all Chinese companies, public or 

private, as well as all citizens to “support, aid, and cooperate with national intel-

ligence efforts, in accordance with the law, and protect national secrets, related to 

intelligence activities, they are aware of.”6 The Canadian Security Intelligence Service 

(CSIS) explained that this law “applies to Chinese companies and individuals abroad 

[…] pointing to the judicial cooperation between the CCP and Chinese companies and 

citizens.”7 On September 15, 2020, this trend was reinforced when the CCP issued the 

“Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in 

the New Era,”8 which institutionalized the Party’s influence over Chinese com-

panies. For Scott Livingston, “the fact that China has released this opinion at a time of 

heightened US scrutiny over the government’s links to Huawei […] suggest that China 

feels confident enough in its system that it is now prepared to advance and defend it 

on the global stage.”9 In the end, the Party seems ready to openly assume these links 

and the lack of autonomy of the private sector with regard to the best interests of 

the Party.

I. Infrastructure 

A. Buildings (the example of Africa)

In January 2018, Le Monde revealed that the headquarters of the African Union (AU) 

had been bugged, which was confirmed by the Financial Times three days later.10 The build-

ing, constructed in Addis-Ababa in 2012 by the China State Construction Engineering 

Corporation (CSCEC), was filled with microphones. Backdoors were discovered in the IT 

system, which was installed at the time of the construction of the building, and Chinese 

intelligence was able to capture “all of the organization’s exchanges and internal produc-

5. Lin Yu-Hsin and Curtis Milhaupt, “Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity 

in Chinese Corporate Governance,” European Corporate Governance Institute – Law Working Paper 493 (2020), 

Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper 545, City University of Hong Kong Centre for Chinese and 

Comparative Law Research Paper Series Paper 2020/005, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3510342.

6. “任何组织和公民都应当依法支持、协助和配合国家情报工作，保守所知悉的国家情报工作秘密。” 

The text of the law is archived here: https://archive.vn/6zb0B.

7. CSIS, cited in the Canadian Parliament, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, 2019 

Annual Report (2020), §126, 68.

8. “中共中央办公厅印发《关于加强新时代民营经济统战工作的意见”, Document archived here: https:// 

archive.vn/6LN93.

9. Scott Livingston, “The Chinese Communist Party Targets the Private Sector,” CSIS (8 Oct. 2020).

10. John Aglionby, Emily Feng and Yuan Yang, “African Union Accuses China of Hacking Headquarters,” Financial 

Times (29 Jan. 2018).

131

tions.”11 The AU uncovered the hack in 2017 when it noticed high levels of traffic on its 

servers at night, when the offices were empty. Every night AU data was transferred to 

servers in Shanghai. This scandal made the headlines globally, highlighting the risks asso-

ciated with Chinese-built infrastructure, particularly (yet not only) in Africa, where they are 

particularly numerous.

A 2020 report pointed out that Chinese companies built or renovated at least 186 

government buildings in Africa since 1966, including “at least 24 presidential or prime 

minister residences or offices; at least 26 parliaments or parliamentary offices; at least 32 

military or police installations; and at least 19 ministries of foreign affairs buildings.”12 The 

Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have set up at least 14 sensitive government 

telecommunication networks, including systems used by police and armed forces. The 

Chinese government also provided office equipment, like computers, to at least 35 

African governments. The majority of these companies are SOEs, though even private 

sector companies are now beholden to the CCP collaboration law, specifically in terms of 

data collection. The information harvested through infrastructure and equipment 

can be used to recruit potential intelligence assets or compromise and coerce lead-

ers – including personal information on the habits and preferences of numerous political 

actors. They also “facilitate Beijing’s influence operations on the continent” as the data 

is used to tailor operations according to the targets.13 It is plausible that Beijing specifically 

sought to secure these construction projects, or even fund them entirely, in order to further 

its influence operations. At least 40 of the 54 African countries have infrastructure 

built by Chinese companies, including Namibia (25 governmental buildings), Angola 

(15), Equatorial Guinea (11), Ghana (11), Uganda (11), Sierra Leone (8), Mozambique (7) 

and Zambia (7).14

B. Submarine communications cables

Submarine communications cables are responsible for close to 95% of global com-

munications, being faster than satellite communications (40 milliseconds for fiber optic 

cables compared to 540 ms. for satellites).15 Along with data centers, these cables are the 

backbone of the Internet’s physical layer. As such, they are an important geopolitical 

asset.

The map of submarine communication cables reflects the historically advantaged posi-

tion of the United States and United Kingdom. These two countries remain the two pri-

mary communication nodes, despite recent network developments in other parts of the 

world. Indeed, the UK is connected to 49 of the existing 265 cables, and ensures nearly 

all of the exchanges between Europe and North America.16 And the US is a practically 

inescapable communication node, due not only to the density of American connections, 

11. Joan Tilouine and Ghalia Kadiri, “À Addis-Abeba, le siège de l’Union africaine espionné par Pékin” (“In 

Addiss-Abeba, the African Union Headquarters Spied on by Beijing”), Le Monde (26 Jan. 2018).

12. Joshua Meservey, Government Buildings in Africa Are a Likely Vector for Chinese Spying, The Heritage Foundation, 

Backgrounder, 3476 (20 May 2020), 6.

13. Ibid., 1.

14. Ibid., 2.

15. Camille Morel, “Protéger nos infrastructures vitales pour assurer notre résilience: les câbles sous-marins, entre 

invisibilité et vulnérabilité” (“Protect Vital Infrastructures to Ensure Resilience: Submarine Cables between Invisibility 

and Vulnerability”), Les Champs de Mars, 30 (2018), 419-426.

16. David Fayon, “Trafic au fond des océans,” Reliefs, 4 (2019).

132

but also the quality of the network. In fact, routers dictate the trajectory of the data based 

solely on speed; and given that American network infrastructures are the most proficient, 

an enormous amount of data is “diverted” through the US. This occurs even if a “geo-

graphically” shorter trajectory is available, for instance, in the case of data transferred from 

Europe to Asia.17

Controlling submarine communication cables is an enormous political and stra-

tegic asset. It allows those in control to capture information transferred by these cables, 

similarly to what the NSA (the “Upstream” program) and the GCHQ (the “Tempora” 

program) did, and to cut communications during times of political tensions or armed con-

flict. During World War I, telegraph cables were used in this manner. Initially developed 

as trading tool, telegraph cables were converted into a weapon immediately after the war 

began, as British authorities were able to interrupt and cut a significant share of German 

communications. At the time, London controlled over three fourths of all telegraph cables, 

holding a quasi-monopoly over the use, installment, and upkeep of the cables.18

Given the political stakes, China made submarine cables a priority for the digital Silk 

Road. Multiple companies, including Huawei Marine Networks, were encouraged to invest 

heavily in the sector. China’s progress in this endeavor has been extremely quick. 

Although China owns only 11.4% of existing submarine cables, it owns 24% of cables 

under construction. In Asia, 30% of installed cables, as well as more than 50% of cables in 

development, are controlled by China. Besides, Huawei “completed a cable stretching nearly 

4,000 miles from Brazil to Cameroon. The cable is partly owned by China Unicom.”19

The Chinese authorities want to improve their capacity to capture data transiting 

through submarine cables. This will allow them to exert greater pressure in case of 

a political or economic conflict, particularly in its neighboring countries. In fact, China’s 

investment in submarine cables has strengthened its operational ability to cut the cables 

it acquired and it could then turn it against Taiwan. Countries like Taiwan could easily 

have their international communication crippled due to Chinese cable domination.20 These 

developments are congruent with Beijing’s deployment of an underwater surveillance sys-

tem aimed at improving submarine detection, notably targeting American submarines in 

the South China Sea.21

China’s political expansion and cable capacity development faces serious obstacles. In 2013, 

the US government defeated a transatlantic cable project between New York and London in 

which Huawei was a stakeholder.22 More recently, Washington’s efforts to slow Huawei’s rise 

on 5G led Huawei to sell its shares of Huawei Marine Systems (which owns Huawei Marine 

Networks) to another Chinese company, Hengtong Optic-Electric.23 Huawei’s strategy was to 

avoid the deceleration of the Chinese penetration in this key market. 

17. Amaël Cattaruzza, Géopolitique des données numériques (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2019).

18. Jonathan E. Hillman’s intervention during the conference “China’s Digital Silk Road,” CSIS, (5 Feb. 2019).

19. James Stavridis, “China’s Next Naval Target is the Internet’s Underwater Cables,” Bloomberg Opinion (9 Apr. 

2019).

20. In accordance with the “Three Warfares” doctrine. See Eli Huang, “China’s cable strategy: exploring global 

undersea dominance,” The Strategist, ASPI (4 Dec. 2017); 吴杰明 (Wu Jieming) and 刘志富 (Liu Zhifu), 舆论战

心理战法律战概论 (Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare), National Defense 

University Press, 2014; Stefan Halper, ed., China: The Three Warfares, Report for Andy Marshall, Director, Office of Net 

Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (May 2013).

21. James Griffiths, “Beijing plans underwater observation system in South China Sea,” CNN (30 May 2017).

22. Félix Blanc, “Géopolitique des câbles: une vision sous-marine de l’Internet” (“Geopolitics of Cables: a 

Submarine Vision of the Internet”), Les carnets du CAPS (Jun. 2018).

23. Yang Yuan and Louise Lucas, “Huawei to offload undersea telecoms cable business,” Financial Times (3 Jun. 

2019).

133

II. New technologies

The use of the Chinese digital platforms WeChat, Weibo, and TikTok for data collec-

tion is discussed in other sections of the report (→ p. 196). The following section discusses 

Beidou, Huawei, and two database companies.

A. Beidou

The navigational system BDS (Beidou Navigation Satellite System), developed by Wuhan 

Optics Valley Beidou Holding Group, has been operational since 2012. The development 

of BDS added China to the very exclusive group of international powers with global 

navigation systems (Global Navigation Satellite Systems, GNSS) to which the US (GPS), 

the EU (GALILEO), and Russia (GLONASS) belong. By the end of 2020, the Chinese 

company had presumably close to fifty satellites, covering all New Silk Road countries. 

This system allows China to penetrate all of these markets.

With Beidou, China has gotten independent from the US-owned GPS system.24 Prior to 

the development of Beidou, the US could cut China off from certain zones in case of a 

conflict. China in turn could exert the same pressure on any country using the Beidou 

system (instead of the GPS). Beidou provides then both autonomy and influence, 

a central element in the construction of the digital Silk Road.25 Besides, the Taiwanese 

minister of Science and Technology argued that the Beidou system creates a risk of espi-

onage. He explained that the Chinese government could use Beidou to track smartphone 

users through embedded malware or navigation signals.26 Currently, it does not appear that 

Beidou has the technological ability to do so however.27 Regardless, the “spatial information 

corridor,” defined by Beijing, should in fine accelerate the partition of the planet into two 

spheres of influence, American and Chinese.28

B. Huawei

Since the arrest of Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟, the chief financial officer of Huawei and 

daughter of CEO Ren Zhengfei 任正非), in Canada at the behest of the US government, 

and the retaliatory measures adopted by Beijing (including the arrest of two Canadian cit-

izens, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor → p. 546), the dispute between the US and 

China regarding Huawei has gone public. Beyond a play for power, this conflict has high-

lighted Beijing’s 5G ambitions, pushing its potential partners around the world to re-evalu-

ate the security risks attached to Huawei.

China made 5G a primary objective in the development of the digital Silk Road, heav-

ily investing in national telecommunication companies. They rapidly propelled China in this 

very competitive sector. Among all Chinese companies, Huawei has benefitted the most 

24. Pratik Jakhar, “How China’s GPS ‘rival’ Beidou is plotting to go global,” BBC (20 Sep. 2018).

25. Echo Huang, “China is building its new Silk Road in space, too,” Quartz (18 Jun. 2018). 

26. Lo Tien-pin and Jake Chung, “China Can Track Mobiles through Satellite System,” Taipei Times (5 May 2016). 

27. Jordan Wilson, China’s Alternative to GPS and its Implications for the United States, US-China Economic and Security 

Review Commission, Staff Research Report (5 Jan. 2017).

28. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “Vers une bipolarité fluide États-Unis/Chine?” (“Toward a USA-China Fluid 

Bipolarity”) Revue Défense Nationale, 781 (Jun. 2015), 58-63.

134

from China’s rapid ascension in the telecoms sector. It not only conquered the Chinese 

market, but successfully penetrated markets around the world.29 And unlike its main com-

petitors Nokia and Ericsson, who primarily make phones, Huawei is an integrated soci-

ety, present across the entire value chain. For example, Huawei is Deutsche Telekom, 

Vodafone, and Telefonica’s supplier in Europe.30

The Meng Wanzhou affair, and the US oppositional stance vis-à-vis Chinese companies 

operating in sensitive sectors, have led to a debate in the West about security risks associ-

ated to Huawei and 5G. But concerns about the proximity of Chinese companies with the 

CCP’s defense and intelligence apparatuses, and increasingly frequent cases of corporate 

espionage, had also paved the way for this debate.

Obviously, the US position does not only stem from a desire to protect its scientific and 

industrial property, but also from a desire to slow, or even halt, the rise of Chinese compa-

nies in strategic sectors. While this threat can be exaggerated at times, Huawei does raise 

security questions for countries that allow the company to build all, or part, of their 

5G infrastructure.31 

There are multiple security concerns. Is one of them. For example, when the Dutch 

telephone operator KPN installed Huawei technology in 2009, despite repeated warn-

ings from the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) about, it asked 

Capgemini to conduct a risk analysis. The report produced by the consulting firm found 

that Huawei had the ability to listen in on “KPN’s mobile numbers in an unlimited, 

uncontrolled and unauthorized manner,” including those of the Prime Minister 

and ministers, and had access to the database of all telephone numbers. The report 

concluded that “authorities and companies could withdraw their confidence in KPN if 

it became public that the Chinese government could tap KPN’s mobile numbers and 

paralyze the network.”32 This report remained secret until the Volkskrant newspaper, 

which had access to it, reported the findings in April 2021.33 Similarly, in Poland, a for-

mer Huawei official was arrested in January 2019: he is accused of being a “Chinese 

intelligence officer placed under a commercial cover at Huawei Polska” and to have “pro-

vided information to these services that could have been detrimental to the Republic of 

Poland.”34

Another concern is the nature of the company and its ties to the PLA’s intelligence 

services. Several articles have mentioned the collaboration between Huawei and the PLA, 

which dates back to the company’s inception. In fact, Ren Zhengfei presumably contrib-

uted to the construction of a network of communication infrastructure during the 1990s.35 

This initial contract may have created a privileged relationship between Huawei and the 

military. Moreover, the recent military-civil fusion effort has specifically targeted telecom-

munications. As such, it is highly likely that Huawei is involved in defense programs. In 

2013, the Indian Intelligence Bureau (domestic intelligence) affirmed that Huawei and ZTE 

29. “China’s Digital Silk road”, roundtable organized by the CSIS (5 Feb. 2019).

30. Laurens Cerulus and Lauren Bishop, “Europe’s 5G Stumbles,” Politico (18 Jul. 2019). 

31. Mathieu Duchâtel and Francois Godement, “l’Europe et la 5G: le cas Huawei. Partie 2” (“Europe and 5G: The 

Case of Huawei. Part 2”), Institut Montaigne (May 2019).

32. “Pays-Bas: Huawei a pu écouter les conversations des clients de l’opérateur KPN” (“Netherlands: Huawei may 

have Listened to the Conversation of clients of the KPN Provider”), RTBF (17 Apr. 2021). 

33. “Huawei kon alle gesprekken van mobiele KPN-klanten afluisteren, inclusief die van de premier” (“Huawei was 

able to Eavesdrop on all Calls from KPN Mobile Customers, including those of the Prime Minister”), De Volkskrant 

(17 Apr. 2021). 

34. “Pologne: procès d’un ex-responsable de Huawei accusé d’espionnage” (“Poland: Trial of a Former Huawei 

Manager Accused of Espionage”), Le Figaro (1 Jun. 2021). 

35. Keith Johnson and Elias Groll, “The Improbable Rise of Huawei,” Foreign Policy (3 Apr. 2019). 

135

were part of the PLA’s 863 Program, which apparently involved Ren Zhengfei in the devel-

opment of routers and switches. Indian intelligence services were notably concerned about 

the possibility of embedded malware China could then exploit during future conflicts.36 

Forbes claimed that Huawei worked with Bo Yu Guangzhou Information Technology Co, 

considered to be one of the groups of hackers working for the Chinese government.37 The 

company was listed in an indictment for attacks on US firms by the US Justice Department. 

Huawei never denied its links to Boyusec, but claimed that they simply conducted an eval-

uation of Huawei systems. 

Evidence has already shown that the company, which provides “surveillance systems 

for entire cities,” “has knotted a partnership with the police,” in Xinjiang for instance. 

Because Huawei signed “a strategic cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Public 

Security of Xinjiang,”38 the German researcher Adrian Zenz described “this region [as] 

a laboratory for the Police State of the 21st century, to which Huawei closely collabo-

rates.” He thought it probable that “Huawei’s technology had already been used to identify 

Uyghur people and to contribute to their internment.” He then concluded that “Huawei 

is a strategic tool used by the Chinese state to repress the Uyghurs, and probably a 

major Trojan Horse threatening the security of telecommunications elsewhere in 

the world.”39 

In a July 2019 article, Christopher Balding discussed the intimate ties between Huawei 

and the Chinese state security services, seemingly confirming the fears expressed by the 

US government and its allies.40 Balding’s research was based on the analysis of the CVs 

of Huawei employees, which revealed prior professional affiliation to Chinese intelligence. 

While this method is innovative and interesting, 3 CVs are not enough to support Balding’s 

conclusion. Even the case of Li Jingguo, who supposedly worked as a representative for the 

Ministry of State Security (MSS), cannot confirm extensive ties between the institutions, 

nor the instrumentalization of Huawei by the MSS.

In fact, intelligence services have little to gain from establishing a direct control over 

Huawei and installing covert agents. The 2017 intelligence law already provided a legal 

framework for the government to coerce Chinese companies into collaborating with 

its intelligence services. On that note, Huawei hired the law firm Zhong Lun to defend 

the company, stating that Beijing can only ask for their assistance in specific and clear 

cases of counterespionage.41 Furthermore, they defended that no existing law mandates 

Huawei to implant backdoors in IT system, because Chinese law protects the interests 

of companies. Finally, they argued that Huawei branches and subsidiaries abroad are not 

subjugated to Chinese law. The nature of the Chinese regime severely undercuts 

Huawei’s defense: it actually offers no real protection to citizens or companies 

against the regime. Rule of law does not exist in China. The system can more accu-

rately be described as what the German doctrine refers to as a police state. Consequently, 

it is difficult to imagine Huawei executives refusing a request from the intelligence ser-

36. Joji Thomas Philip, “NSC points to Huawei, ZTE’s links with Chinese military,” The Economic Times, (15 May 

2013).

37. Thomas Brewster, “Chinese Trio Linked to Dangerous APT3 Hackers Charged with Stealing 407 GB of Data 

from Siemens,” Forbes (27 Nov. 2017).

38. The author refers to the provincial branch of the MPS. 

39. Adrian Zenz, “Huawei est une arme stratégique de l’Etat chinois pour réprimer les Ouïgours” (“Huawei is a 

Strategic Weapon of the Chinese State to Repress the Uyghurs”), Le Monde (4 Mar. 2021) (for the last six quotes).

40. Christopher Balding, “Huawei Technologies’ Links to Chinese State Security Services,” SSRN (5 Jul. 2019).

41. Declaration of Jihong Chen and Jianwei Fang Before the Federal Communications Commission (27 May 2018), 

https://thechinacollection.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Huawei-Declaration.pdf.

136

vices. Notable in Huawei’s defense is their law firm’s link to the CCP. Zhang Xuebing, the 

managing partner of Zhang Lun law firm, is also the secretary of the Beijing Lawyers’ 

Association. The law firm made waves after Xi Jinping’s election as it participated in sub-

duing civil liberties defense lawyers. 

Furthermore, Christopher Balding and Donald Clarke have questioned Huawei’s 

financial structure, highlighting that it was impossible to determine its real owner. Ren 

Zhengfei, the official owner, only possesses a fraction of the company. Huawei, whose full 

name is Huawei Technologies Inc., is entirely owned by Huawei Investment & Holding, 

a much smaller company of about one hundred employees. This holding is co-owned by 

the founder Ren Zhengfei (“about 1.01%”) and a CCP-aligned union, called the Huawei 

Investment & Holding Company Trade Union Committee (HHTUC), which owns the 

remaining 98.99%. According to the two authors, the opaque nature of the system deflects 

any attempt to understand the articulation of the respective responsibilities of the different 

structures.

Finally, two former managers of Huawei’s Czech branch anonymously reported, to 

a local radio, that they were required to enter the information of private client into the 

company database, such as number of children, their preferences, and financial situa-

tion. The database was managed by the headquarters, and they did not know who could 

access it. The collected data was routinely discussed with Chinese embassy officials. Data 

regarding top Czech officials was also collected, with some of them subsequently invited 

to China.42

C. Databases

Chinese authorities understood long ago that in order to “guide” or “channel” a peo-

ple– with a quasi-hydrological approach to public opinion,43 it first needed to know 

it. Surveillance, through a massive data collection and analysis of habits and indi-

vidual preferences, is essential in that endeavor. And automated tools are needed, which 

leads to a tight link between the control of public opinion and big data technologies in 

China, as well as between the Party-State and private companies.44 Initially (and mostly) 

a technique to control domestic public opinion, the Chinese authorities are increasingly 

using this tactic to shape public opinions abroad. According to Jessica Blake and Mareike 

Ohlberg, “the emergence of the public opinion service sector offers a glimpse of what 

[Chinese] techno-authoritarianism might actually look like […]: The Party-state’s 

use of, and reliance on, private technology companies to manage the volatile interaction 

between ideas, speech, and society.”45 An increasing number of studies have focused 

on China’s “digital authoritarianism.”46 In this context, Beijing’s use of databases to 

feed into and prepare influence operations abroad can be illustrated by the following two 

examples.

42. “Huawei’s Czech Employees Share Sensitive Information with Chinese Embassy,” Kafkadesk (23 Jul. 2019).

43. David Bandurski, “How China’s Government Controls the News: A Primer,” Foreign Policy (21 Jul. 2015).

44. Rogier Creemers, “Cyber China: Upgrading propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social Management for the 

Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Contemporary China, 26:103 (2017), 85-100.

45. Jessica Blake and Mareike Ohlberg, “Message Control,” ChinaFile (Dec. 2020).

46. Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese Models,” 

Policy Brief, Brookings Institute (Aug. 2019). This article compares the Chinese and Russian models. 

137

1. GTCOM

Global Tone Communications Technology Co. Ltd (GTCOM) is a big data and artifi-

cial intelligence company affiliated to the Propaganda Department. One of its prod-

ucts “claims to collect 10 terabytes of data per day, or two to three petabytes per year, from 

Web pages, forums, Twitter, Facebook, WeChat, and other sources. In terms of size, it is 

the equivalent of 20 billion Facebook photos. The company describes its work as directly 

contributing to China’s national security, including military intelligence and propaganda,47” 

explained Samantha Hoffman, author of an ASPI report on the company.48 GTCOM has 

an agreement with Alibaba Cloud, for instance, which uses its translation services and 

authorizes GTCOM to collect any data its services generate.

2. OKIDB

A report published in September 2020 provided for the first time “direct evidence of 

data collected by China on its monitoring and data collection on foreign individ-

uals and institutions for purposes of intelligence and influence operations.”49 The 

authors were able to access the Overseas Key Information Database (OKIDB), a database 

created by the company Shenzhen Zhenhua Data Information Technology Co. It con-

tained information on “2.4 million individuals, 650 thousand organizations, 2.3 billion news 

articles, and 2.1 billion social media posts.”50 The data was siphoned from a variety of other 

databases, including Factiva, as well as social networks, like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, 

and others. China Revival appeared to be using these websites to build personal profiles 

that included family relationships and work histories. Additionally, the database con-

tained photographs of the individuals in question. The study estimated that the majority of 

the information compiled came from open sources, but around 10% to 20% did not. The 

authors believed that “some of the data comes from unauthorized data access such as 

hacking.”51 Among the individuals found in the database, many were public sector employ-

ees: “everyone from known politicians to political aides to low level military personnel.”52 

The database also contained information about the business world, academic and scientific 

communities, think tanks, and even organized crime. The common element among them 

was that “all are individuals and institutions Chinese security, intelligence, and influ-

ence operations are known to be interested in targeting.”53

The database was used for analysis: “designed to assist the Chinese government, security, 

and intelligence services, OKIDB adds in multi-layered functionality to help target and link 

individuals. Though not extensive, we found analyst notes about certain targets. Certain 

indexes had classifiers for individuals or institutions such as importance.”54 It also enabled 

the mapping of personal and professional relationships.

47. Samantha Hoffman, in Rohan Thomson, “How China surveils the world,” MIT Technology Review (19 Aug. 2020).

48. Samantha Hoffman, Engineering Global Consent: The Chinese Communist Party’s Data-Driven Power Expansion, ASPI’s 

International Cyber Policy Centre, Policy Brief, Report 21 (2019). 

49. Christopher Balding, “Chinese Open Source Data Collection, Big Data, And Private Enterprise Work For State 

Intelligence and Security: The Case of Shenzhen Zhenhua,” SSRN (13 Sept. 2020).

50. Ibid., 2.

51. Ibid., 3.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 4.

54. Ibid., 3.

138

OKIDB does not appear to be the only database of this kind. In fact, the authors found 

“links in the database [linking] to other databases” and that institutions and individuals 

seemed to be classified in separate bases. They affirmed that “the Chinese state is using 

OKIDB data,” a fact Shenzhen Zhenhua did not deny. The company admitted having 

close ties to the PLA and MSS. It is likely that OKIDB helped these structures plan 

their intelligence and influence operations by collecting information on possible 

targets. The authors concluded that “the unique blend of civil-military fusion pushed by 

China that works with private firms to engage in state policy activities such as intelligence 

gathering should be concerning. Foreign individuals and institutions working in sensitive 

or influential sectors need to be aware of how China is targeting them for influence oper-

ations. China is using a variety of firms and channels to gather data to inform its influence 

and intelligence operations.”55

55. Ibid., 5.

139

SUMMARY OF THE SECOND PART

Contrary to the prevalent assumption generally made about authoritarian regimes, “China” 

is not a unitary actor. In fact, the relative fragmentation of the regime can impact the 

nature of its influence operations. These operations are implemented by four major institu-

tional actors: The Party, the state, the army, and the companies.

• Within the Party, there are five main bodies implementing influence operations:

- The Propaganda Department, in charge of ideology, controls all media and the cultural 

production in the country. It is a powerful machine that aims to shape the dominant discourse, 

control mass media, restrict freedom of speech and critical thought, guide and manipulate 

public opinion, defend its interests, justify its actions, and present the state positively. The 

Propaganda Department also controls a vast network operating within China and abroad. It 

commands a variety of vectors of information and is increasingly aggressive in its data col-

lection efforts.

- The United Front Work Department (UFWD), has twelve offices which reflect its principal 

targets: political parties; ethnic minorities; Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; the private sector econ-

omy; non-CCP intellectuals; new social classes; Tibet; Xinjiang; overseas Chinese (two offices); and 

religious affairs (two offices as well).

- The International Liaison Department (ILD) engages with foreign political parties, 

through “party diplomacy,” with dual objectives. It aims to build a global consensus that 

favors Beijing (supporting China’s “friends,” reinforcing its soft power and its discursive 

power) and it serves as an analysis and observation platform (and possibly also intelligence 

gathering).

- The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) is simultaneously a breeding ground 

for future Party members, directly funneling the youth into the CCP system and ideology, and 

a disposable reserve of manpower (over 80 million members aged 14 to 28). The CYL has its 

own propaganda methods, in Chinese and English. It is increasingly present on social media, 

where it promotes the Party, glorifies the state, and criticizes the US through humor and sar-

casm. The rap group CD Rev is an example of a CYL agent: it is one of the most effective 

anti-American discourse tools targeting the Chinese youth around the world. Several examples 

of CYL actions demonstrate its ability to manipulate the Chinese population and mobilize the 

Chinese youth, particularly those living abroad, with the purpose of contributing to coordi-

nated operations.

- The 610 Office, an entity with presumably around 15,000 members in China and abroad, 

operates outside of any legal framework to eradicate the Falun Gong movement. There are 610 

Office members in every Chinese diplomatic mission, in charge of detecting, reporting, and per-

secuting followers of the movement. They are also involved in propaganda activities aimed at dis-

suading foreign governments of engaging with the followers.

140

• Within the state, two main structures are involved in influence operations:

- The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the main civilian intelligence agency. Composed of 

17 or 18 divisions, some of them use covers to conduct operations abroad (for instance, the 4th Di-

vision uses the Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau Office of the Bureau of International Cooperation 

Chinese Academy of Sciences as a cover). 

- The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) is in charge of propaganda targeting Taiwan. It supervises 

multiple media as part of this effort.

• Within the Popular Liberation Army (PLA), which is the military branch of the Party rath-

er than a national army, the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), and 

especially the Network Systems Department, has probably inherited the capacities and missions in 

the information, cyber, and electromagnetic domains since the 2015 reforms.

PLA Unit 61716 is a key actor also known as the “public opinion warfare, psychological 

warfare, and legal warfare unit,” or Base 311. Dedicated to the implementation of the “Three 

Warfares” strategy, it centralizes all psychological warfare efforts against Taiwan. Other activities 

of the base include research on the US informational environment. The base’s headquarters are 

in the city of Fuzhou. It is headed by a duo, a commander and a political commissar. And most 

of its members are researchers and engineers specialized in information and communication 

technologies, that can be used for public opinion warfare, notably artificial intelligence.

Base 311 also manages front companies like Voice of the Strait (VTS), the China Huayi 

Broadcasting Corporation (whose chairman has always been the Base 311 commander), and the 

Haifeng publishing house (we believe the director is also a PLA officer) – all branded as civilian 

organizations. These companies have the potential to influence people through radio, television, 

the Internet, social media, and books. The base supervises other PLA units as well, notably Unit 

61070 and Unit 61198 which focus on network communications, psychological warfare and 

Taiwan. Finally, the base maintains a close relationship with a nexus of platforms like the China 

Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), whose mission is to foster relationships 

with foreign elites. Within the base, a training center uses a fake hotel as a cover.

• Private and public companies play a central role in the data collection essential to influence 

operations, as it is necessary to know whom to influence, when, and how. There are multiple mech-

anisms involved in data collection, including espionage, hacking, co-opting regimes, constructing 

infrastructures, and setting up new technologies. The Party uses firms for these activities. The 

Party-State has implemented different strategies to expand its control over the private sector. The 

first is the military-civil fusion aimed at converting innovative technologies into military gains. The 

second is Article 7 of the National Intelligence Law, which forces all Chinese companies, private 

and public, as well as citizens, to “support, help, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.” 

The following tools are specifically used for data collection:

- Infrastructures, including buildings, were discovered to be data collection tools following 

the scandal over the African Union headquarter. Built by a Chinese company, it was filled with 

microphones, and its IT system riddled with backdoors, allowing Chinese intelligence services to 

absorb all exchanges between staff members. Chinese companies have built or renovated at least 

186 government buildings in Africa and created at least 14 sensitive government telecommuni-

cation networks, all of which are at risk of similar security breaches. The siphoned information 

can be used to recruit potential intelligence assets, coerce leaders, and facilitate Beijing’s influence 

operations. Another tool used for Beijing’s influence operations are the submarine communi-

cations cables. A priority of the CCP’s digital Silk Road, these cables allow China to increase its 

data capturing capacity, expanding its ability to exert pressure over other actors during political or 

economic conflicts.

141

- New technologies, including the platforms WeChat, Weibo, and TikTok (discussed in an-

other portion of this report); Beidou, which not only allows China to exert pressure on states who 

adopted the navigational system, but also poses espionage risks; and Huawei, an integrated com-

pany with a presence across the value chain, which raises concerns because of the nature of the 

company and the relationships it may have with the security services and the PLA. Finally, databas-

es offer a glimpse of what researchers refer to as Chinese “techno-authoritarianism” or “digital au-

thoritarianism.” These databases feed and prepare influence operations abroad, as exemplified by 

GTCOM (a big data and artificial intelligence company affiliated to the Propaganda Department) 

and OKIDB. The latter is a database company that acknowledges its ties to the PLA and MSS. It 

created millions of personal profiles detailing the family networks and work histories of individuals 

“Chinese” security, intelligence, and influence operations are known to be interested in targeting.”