4. Shaping China studies

Academic communities working on China are generally divided. To only con-

sider the German example, the community is mostly empathetic vis-à-vis Beijing, and the 

few dissident voices are more often than not on the sidelines of China studies depart-

ments. The micro-community of researchers working on and in Taiwan set itself apart 

from traditional German universities. In fact, a majority of researchers, shaped by inter-

personal relationships they have built with their Chinese academic partners for decades, 

are closer to the discourse of the business class: China is not a threat, and the point is 

to try and deconstruct the prejudices and the ignorance vis-à-vis this original political 

system. They hope to work on a rapprochement and dialogue (notably through academic 

699. Hamilton, “Chinese Communist Party Influence in Australian Universities.” 

285

exchange programs). The researchers considering China as a threat or those qualified as 

“China-Kritiker” are in the minority in Germany, and most do not have permanent posi-

tions in German universities. The open letter published by the spouse of the Canadian 

researcher Michael Kovrig, arrested and detained in China (→ p. 546), was signed by 

MERICS experts, journalists, think tankers critical of China at the Deutsche Gesellschaft 

für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), but not by the crushing majority of university professors 

in Germany (about forty scholars). It revealed the invisible fracture between the “China-

Versteher” and “China-Kritiker.”700 

Tensions inside the academic community and think tanks working on China are pres-

ent everywhere in the world and efficiently exploited by Beijing. Besides, to control the 

research published on China, and thus to model China studies, the Party-State 

uses the following tools: 

• Access to the field, using visas as leverage: they deny visas to researchers who are 

too critical, either on a case by case basis or, as it increasingly does, as part of offi-

cial sanctions, such as those enacted in March 2021. Indeed, they targeted the British 

researcher Joanne Smith Finley, Assistant Professor of China studies at the University of 

Newcastle; the Swedish Björn Jerdén, director of the Swedish National China Center at 

the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm: the German Adrian Zenz, 

Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation 

in the United States; and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), the larg-

est European research foundation on China, based in Berlin, and which hosts more 

than thirty experts. These individuals “and companies and institutions associated with 

them,” but also their families, are barred from visiting China, Hong Kong, and Macao, 

and they can no longer do business in China. Beijing accused them of circulating “lies” 

about China, on the fate of the Uyghurs but also, in the case of Jerdén, on the danger 

represented by the Confucius Institutes, or, in the case of MERICS experts, for “col-

luding with anti-China forces.” Targeting MERICS was surprising because it was far 

from the most radical research center on China; it usually followed a more moderate 

line. And yet, it was “the largest Chinese research center in entire Europe. Cutting off 

ties with China means its research channel will hardly be sustainable and its influence 

will be critically hit,” the Global Times noted. The goal was clearly to dry up the 

sources and the credibility of these individuals and institutions (first and fore-

most based on the researchers’ access to the field, in area studies), while intimidating 

the other researchers on China elsewhere in the world. Like this young sinologist 

who, under cover of anonymity precisely because he fears losing access to his research 

field, reports: “We all hear about a blacklist of researchers who would no longer be 

issued visas”. It does not matter whether this is true or not – it is even in Beijing’s 

interest to maintain a strategic ambiguity since, when in doubt, not knowing 

what their situation is and what the Chinese authorities’ tolerance threshold is, 

visa applicants will censor themselves with greater zeal. The anonymous young 

sinologist worries: “If tomorrow I can no longer go in the field, what legitimacy would 

I have as a researcher?” And, to show his credentials, he makes sure to include at least 

one official propaganda document in his bibliography – “a way to show the plurality 

700. Interview conducted by one of our research assistants in Berlin (Mar. 2020).

286

of entries and not to antagonize anyone,” he justifies.701 This is how self-censorship 

begins and how the CCP wins.

• Financial dependence (universities financially dependent on China are less suscepti-

ble to criticize it → p. 270);

• Elite capture (gifting luxurious trips and jobs – supplementary or full-time positions 

– in Chinese universities); 

• Pressure by Chinese students on campuses (shaping the topics studied and the list 

of guest lecturers);

• Pressure on publishers (to discourage them from publishing critical books such as 

Silent Invasion by Clive Hamilton, which was rejected by several publishers by fear of 

“retaliation from Beijing or from people in Australia acting in the name of the CCP”),702 

and on scientific journals (→ p. 287);

• Pressure on PhD advisors (a professor at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland 

received emails “from China” stating that one of her PhD students was posting “neo-

Nazi type content” on Twitter (in reality, his account created ten days earlier and fol-

lowed by less than ten people was only criticizing China’s handling of the Covid-19 

pandemic); fearing “that [she] would not be able to get a visa to China afterwards,” 

she sent her PhD student an email titled, “Urgent: Complaint from China about your 

Twitter” and terminated the academic relationship; the student has since dropped out of 

the PhD program)703; 

• Pressure on relatives in China for Chinese researchers of Chinese origin or with 

ties to China. For example, a professor of Chinese origin, naturalized French, working 

in a French university, posted this message on a social network in May 2021: “It is too 

dangerous for me to comment on the Xinjiang issue. Although I have always fought for 

academic freedom and freedom of expression, I must do my best to protect the safety 

of my family on the Chinese mainland”).704 For similar reasons, some professors, such 

as Vanessa Frangville (a professor of China studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles), 

have given up on taking Chinese doctoral students because “either they are there for 

other reasons than studying, or I am putting them in danger.”705

• Arrests and intimidations for those with access to their field in China. In 2017, 

Feng Chongyi, a permanent resident in Australia who holds a professorship at the 

University of Technology, Sydney, was completing a three-week research field trip to 

southern China, during which he had met with human rights defenders, among others, 

when he was detained by the authorities, questioned, and held for one week. Another 

example: a doctoral student from a Belgian university “was detained” during a trip in 

China “and interrogated for three days in a hotel room. The Chinese services had a huge 

file on him, including all his tweets since 2016 translated into Mandarin and a photo of 

a dinner at his [thesis director’s] home”.706

701. Laurence Defranoux and Marie Piquemal, “Dans les facs françaises, des travaux dirigés par Pékin” (“In French 

universities, work directed by Beijing”) Libération (27 Jul. 2021).

702. Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s influence in Australia (Richmond: Hardie Grant Books, 2018), x. 

703. Fanny Scuderi, “L’Université de Saint-Gall se méfie des critiques sur la Chine” (“University of St. Gallen wary 

of criticism of China”) Le Temps (4 Aug. 2021), 2.

704. Defranoux, “Les profs et étudiants chinois enrôlés.”

705. Ibid.

706. Ibid. 

287

• Kidnappings, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, forced televised “confessions” 

of activists, journalists, publishers, critics of Beijing;

• Lawsuits (or the threat of it) such as the ones that targeted the Canadian J. Michael 

Cole, the French Valérie Niquet, or the German Adrian Zenz; this is the lawfare strategy 

introduced in the first part of the report (→ p. 53). Beijing does not care about winning 

a trial, but aims to impose a cost on the target and to intimidate the others. 

• And finally, stemming from all of the above, self-censorship. 

Influencing publishers, printers and booksellers

In August 2017, the British publisher Cambridge University Press (CUP) blocked ac-

cess to over 300 online articles from China Quarterly to residents of Chinaat the request 

of the Chinese authorities because they covered topics considered sensitive by Beijing, 

including the cultural revolution, Tian’anmen, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.707 The General 

Administration of Press and Publications (→ p. 193) made the request, providing the list of all 

the articles to remove. CUP yielded to be able to continue publishing in China: “[we] do not, 

and will not, proactively censor our content and will only consider blocking individual items 

(when requested to do so) when the wider availability of content is at risk.”708 In other words, 

publishers yield to what they perceived as the lesser of two evils, because Beijing gave 

them the choice between removing the contentious articles or blocking their overall 

distribution. Following the scandal that this case brought about, (academics rallied against 

the decision), CUP went back on its decision, and a few days later, reestablished access to the 

articles in question. The Chinese authorities then asked CUP to block certain articles from the 

American Political Science Review which they did not do.709 

This example is not isolated. In November 2017, the German publisher Springer Nature 

blocked access from China to at least 1,000 articles, at the request of the Chinese govern-

ment.710 In September 2018, at Beijing’s request, the British publisher Taylor and Francis 

removed from its offer in China (its pack “arts, humanities and social sciences” sold to 

libraries) 83 journals with content deemed “inappropriate,” including the Asian Studies Review. 

More recently, in France, a Chinese university asked the portal Cairn, which distributes online 

journals, to withdraw the December 2020 issue of the journal Esprit, containing a dossier on 

China, which Cairn refused to do.711

Even children’s publishing is targeted. In March 2021, at the request of the Chinese con-

sulate in Hamburg, which threatened legal action, the German publisher Carlsen-Verlag with-

drew from sale an illustrated children’s book (Ein Corona-Regenbogen für Anna und Moritz) that 

had become the target of Chinese authorities and media (citing a request from the “Chinese 

community” in Germany712) because it described the coronavirus as “originating in China”. 

The publisher is preparing a new, corrected edition.713

Book publications are also concerned, which are often far less expensive in China (45% 

less expensive than in New Zealand for a book in color with illustrations on glassy paper for 

instance),714 which gives Beijing yet more leverage: some Chinese printers take it upon 

themselves to censor, sometimes reject, foreign books meant for foreign publics. For 

instance, one of them produced a list of keywords that publishers needed to avoid, while an 

707. Ian Johnson, “Sydney Professor Feng Chongyi Returns to Australia After Week-Long Detention in China,” 

ABC News (2 Apr. 2017).

708. John Ruwitch and Fanny Potkin, “UK publisher Pulls Scholarly Articles from China Website at Beijing’s 

Request,” Reuters (18 Aug. 2017). 

709. Benjamin Haas, “Cambridge University Press Headed for Showdown with China over Censorship,” The 

Guardian (9 Sep. 2017). 

710. Christopher Bodeen, “Springer Nature Blocks Access to Articles in China,” AP News (1 Nov. 2017). 

711. Pierre Buhler, hearing at the information mission “Extra-European State Influences” in the Senate, July 13, 

2021 (https://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20210712/miie.html). The issue in question of the journal 

Esprit is available at this address: https://www.cairn.info/revue-esprit-2020-12.htm. 

712. “Chinese Community Angered by German Book Claiming the Coronavirus Comes from China Demands 

Apology and Recall of the Book,” Global Times (8 Mar. 2021), https://archive.vn/vptjH.

713. Stefan Dege, “China gets German children’s book about COVID withdrawn,” DW (15 Mar. 2021). 

714. Thomas Coughlan, “NZ Publishers Feel Long Arm of Chinese Censorship,” Summer Newsroom (4 Mar. 2019).

288

Australian publisher eventually renounced having an atlas for children printed in China after 

the Chinese printer rejected one of its maps.715

Finally, what the above demonstration shows is that Beijing’s objective is to influence 

writings at every stage: not only their production (by trying to influence authors through 

incentives and pressures, pushing them to censor themselves for instance) but also their 

distribution, by trying to influence publishers and printers. It also includes the last stage 

which, for books, is their sales in bookstores. Here the story of the Thalia bookstore chain 

in Germany is telling. In September 2020, a customer posted photos on Facebook of the 

particularly large and propagandistic China section of a Thalia bookstore in Berlin, high-

lighting in particular the works of President Xi Jinping and significantly lacking in publica-

tions critical of the Party. It thus drew attention to a practice that was not new (a year ear-

lier, a Taiwanese from Berlin had also reported it on Facebook, but in Chinese, so without 

causing a German reaction in the media). This time, Thalia had to react and explain itself by 

acknowledging that it had rented some space in some of its stores to China Book Trading, 

a German subsidiary of the China International Publishing Group (CIPG), an organization 

dependent on the Party’s Propaganda Department.716 These rental contracts are neither il-

legal nor unusual, but in this case, the nature of the client introduced an important bias in 

the presentation of books from and about a country.717 The German press denounced such 

“propaganda” in the country’s bookstores. “Chinese propaganda is much more effective 

in Germany when it is distilled by people, media or even reputable companies like Thalia,” 

explains researcher Mareike Ohlberg.718

Source: https://www.facebook.com/moni.muka.

A survey carried out in 2018 among more than 500 experts on China showed that 

repression was a “rare but real phenomenon and collectively present a barrier to the con-

duct of research in China.”719 The identified restrictions belonged to three categories: 

restrictions on access to China (visa refusal or delay in deliverance: “the Chinese govern-

715. Ibid.

716. CIPG is a “body subordinate to the central authorities” (“中央所属事业单位”) and its activity is controlled 

by the Propaganda Department. See for example the Baidu page dedicated to CIPG: https://urlz.fr/gr8X.

717. See, for instance, Felix Stephan, “Bruch eines Tabus,” Süddeutsche Zeitung (20 Sep. 2020). 

718. Brause et al., “Chinas heimliche Propagandisten.“ 

719. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, “Repressive Experiences among China Scholars: New Evidence 

from Survey Data,” The China Quarterly (2019), 1.

289

ment does restrict visa access for work it considers potentially problematic,” in gradation: 

difficulties in obtaining a visa, denial of a visa, blacklisting)720; restrictions on access to 

material or research topics (deniedaccess to archives, deleted questions during interviews, 

cancelled interviews); surveillance and intimidation (questioning by the authorities, con-

fiscated equipment, including computers – these issues happen everywhere in China, but 

even more so when a researcher goes to sensitive regions such as Xinjian and Tibet).721 For 

70% of the respondents “self-censorship is a problem in the China study field.”722

Another article based on over a hundred interviews in American universities spoke of 

“an epidemic of self-censorship at U.S. universities on the subject of China.”723 

Considering the lack of resources in most universities, many students are tempted to reori-

ent their research in a direction that satisfies Beijing in order to have access to the field and 

receive funding. “It has gotten to the point where I do not engage with anything overly 

political relating to the Chinese state,” explained, for instance, a graduate student at a top 

American university.724 A common, and even encouraged, reaction: “I frequently hear grad-

uate students and younger scholars – people with academic jobs but pre-tenure – being 

advised not to explore sensitive subjects in their research, so they can preserve visa access,” 

an American historian on China testified.725 But this self-censorship has consequences: it 

“restricts the ability of U.S. policymakers, businesspeople, human rights advocates, and the 

general public to make smart decisions about how to interact with China.”726

Self-censorship is made stronger by blurry red lines: Beijing has not created a guide 

explaining what to say or what not to say, it is up to everyone’s best guess. This ambiguity is 

strategic: it prompts even more self-censorship to avoid the risk of crossing limits that are 

not clearly defined. 

That being said, the more China extends its influence over the world, the more it 

becomes possible to study China outside of China: researchers who no longer go to 

mainland China do a lot of field research in Honk Kong (less since 2019), in Taiwan, in 

Korea, Mongolia, etc. And the more Beijing becomes aggressive toward foreign research-

ers, increasing the risks for them to run into issues in China, if not being arrested, accused 

of espionage, etc., the more acceptable it becomes for scholars to do field research outside 

of China. Not only is it increasingly difficult to learn anything in China (due to self-cen-

sorship and wooden language), but it makes sense for personal security reasons. Moreover, 

with the conditions that Beijing requires to grant access to its territory, i.e. no criticism of 

the Party, it becomes more legitimate not to go there anymore, if only not to give up 

one’s ability to be critical, and in fine to ensure that the research is independent. Hence this 

“internationally renowned researcher” quoted by the newspaper Libération who “explains 

that she has renounced doing field research [in China], precisely to preserve this freedom 

of speech”727. This is obviously easier to do for researchers who are already well known, or 

in any case who are not in a precarious professional situation, than for young researchers 

who are more fragile and insecure.

720. Ibid., 6.

721. Ibid., 11.

722. Ibid., 18.

723. Isaac Stone Fish, “The Other Political Correctness: Why Are America’s Elite Universities Censoring Themselves 

on China?” The New Republic (4 Sept. 2018).

724. Ibid.

725. Ibid.

726. Ibid.

727. Defranoux and Piquemal, “Dans les facs françaises, des travaux dirigés par Pékin.” 

290

5. Acquiring knowledge and technologies 

Another major CCP interest for foreign universities comes from the acquisition 

of knowledge and technologies, through legal and unconcealed means: joint 

research programs (leading to joint publications, the number of which continues to 

grow, as shown by the British example with less than 100 articles co-published before 

1990, 750 in 2000, 3,324 in 2010 and 16,267 in 2019728) or illegal and concealed means 

such as theft and espionage by Chinese students or researchers integrated in foreign 

teams, or from a distance (cyberattacks). Joint research programs, and more generally 

research field trips in China are all the more tempting for researchers and visiting profes-

sors because Chinese universities – or at least some of them – have significant resources 

and state-of-the-art equipment that most home institutions do not have. This is true of 

France, where “the lack of recognition and means in the laboratories” was quickly 

identified by Beijing as an “Achilles heel”, i.e. an opportunity. The Party has had 

no trouble catching the attention and skills of French students and scientists for whom, 

as Antoine Bondaz explains, China is “a paradise: brand new labs, significant financial 

resources and a plethora of research support teams.”729 The attraction is less strong in the 

best-endowed French laboratories, which is why “Beijing seeks to establish itself in 

priority in medium-sized universities, far from the metropolises. This is where the 

lack of resources – and therefore the real or potential bitterness of teachers – is 

more acute. Poitiers, Angers, Arras, Pau. These are the same faculties where Confucius 

institutes are often found.” (→ p. 299)730

Concerning theft and espionage, universities are not the only targets. Companies 

in strategic sectors are also targeted, with the same tactics and more, including the 

seduction of executives by female agents, going as far as marriage. “Weddings are another 

one of the means used by Beijing to catch up on its technological gap in some sectors. In 

2009, the DGSE brought the proof that a young Chinese woman, in a relationship with 

one of the leaders of the EADS group with secret defense accreditation, was transmitting 

confidential documents to her country’s secret services.”731

a. Many recruiting programs 

In this context, China developed numerous talents recruitment programs which, for 

the CCP, is a “form of technology transfer.”732 Alex Joske, in his report Hunting the Phoenix 

(2020) – “phoenix”, because this practice is sometimes described in China as “building 

nests to attract phoenixes”733 – counted about 200 of them, according to a list published 

in 2018 by the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (which is now part of the 

Ministry of Science and Technology), while noting that the real number was “probably 

much greater.”734 This practice was developed during the 1980s, with a clear acceleration in 

the 2000s. Most of these programs are controlled by local governments, in the provinces, 

728. Jo Johnson et al., The China question: Managing risks and maximising benefits from partnership in higher education and 

research, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard Kennedy School and The Policy Institute 

at King’s College London, March 2021, 19.

729. Ibid. 

730. Ibid. 

731. La Chine démasquée, 103.

732. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 4.

733. Ibid., 3.

734. Ibid., 29.

291

municipalities and counties735 – but they are coordinated by several central organizations, 

including, since 2003, the Central Coordination Group for Talent Work (中央人才工作

协调小组). According to official Chinese numbers, the sole programs run by the local 

governments enabled the recruitment of 53,900 foreign researchers between 2008 

and 2016, to which are added the national programs, including the Thousand Talents Plan 

(→ p. 292) and Hundred Talents Plan, which brought 7,000 researchers during the same 

period.736 

These programs cover all activities, from legal and unconcealed actions to ille-

gal and concealed ones, and the grey area in between. Concretely, they are based on 

“talent-recruitment stations” abroad, in the countries currently the most technologically 

advanced. The United States is the priority target, with 146 identified stations, then comes 

Germany (57), Australia (57), the United Kingdom (49), Canada (47), France (46), Australia 

(46), Singapore (21), New-Zealand (13), and Sweden (12).737 Overall, Alex Joske identified 

600 stations, and believed there were likely more than that. They have existed since 2006, 

and have increased exponentially after 2015.

Composed of a few individuals, these stations are more often than not inte-

grated in existing organizations linked to the UFWD (business offices for Chinese 

abroad, or other community, student, or professional organizations, companies in the 

education or technology sectors, or, in at least one case, to a Confucius Institute, etc.), 

which is paid extra for this activity: up to RMB150,000 (€18,700) per year for the 

running costs and up to RMB200,000 (€25,000) per recruited individual, according to 

Alex Joske.738 

John McCallum (→ p. 558), then Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 

takes part in the presentation, by the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs of Fujian Province, 

of a “Foreign Talent Recruitment Station” plaque to the Fujian Chamber of Commerce in Canada, in July 2016.739

735. Pär Nyrén, “China’s brain gain strategy. The role of local governments in the recruitment of ‘talents,’”

Swedish Center for China Studies (Feb. 2021).

736. Ibid., 17.

737. Ibid., 12.

738. Ibid., 15.

739. “福建省侨办首批四个海外招才引智点落地加拿大” (“The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the 

Fujian Province Approves, for the First Time, Four Foreign Talent Recruitment Websites in Canada”) 东南网 美国频

道 (USA FJSEN) (21 Jul. 2016), https://archive.fo/u8tkw#selection-373.0-376.0.

292

They are tasked, not only with recruiting and bringing potential candidates to 

China, but also with collecting data on the scientists and research programs in the 

countries in which they are based. For instance, the stations abroad affiliated with the 

city of Qingdao received the instruction to collect data on at least “fifty individuals per 

year, of a level at least equivalent to that of associate professor, researcher or company 

manager.” The objective was 100 individuals and “at least as many innovation projects” 

for those of the city of Tianjin. This data is then compiled and amounts to millions of 

profiles: in 2017, a Chinese think tank had established a base of 6.5 million scientific 

profiles in the world. The Thousand Talents think tank (千人智库), tied to the plan of 

the same name, “claims to hold data on 12 million overseas scientists, including 2.2 

million ethnic Chinese scientists and engineers.”740 These stations do not only relay infor-

mation, they may also “receive instructions to target individuals with access to specific 

technologies.”741

The most famous program is the Thousand Talents (千人计划), which “has poured 

billions of dollars into drawing in tens of thousands of foreign specialists to China and 

sends out thousands of Chinese scientists overseas to access the latest technology and 

knowhow.”742 Created in 2008, its implementation is supervised by the High-Level Working 

Group on Overseas Talent Recruitment (海外高层次人才引进工作小组) which depends 

on the Central Committee of the CCP. Initially conceived to attract Chinese talents living 

abroad, it was extended to foreign citizens in 2011. Beijing offers prestigious positions in 

Chinese universities and high salaries. An advertisement placed in the scientific journal 

Nature in January 2018 thus explained that “all successful applicants can expect a 1 million 

yuan [126 000 €] starting bonus, and the opportunity to apply for a research fund of 3–5 

million yuan [378 000 – 630 000 €]. Foreign scientists receive additional incentives, such as 

accommodation subsidies, meal allowances, relocation compensation, paid-for visits home 

and subsidized education costs. Employers are also obliged to find jobs for foreign spouses, 

or provide an equivalent local salary.”743

That being said, living in China is not necessary – on the contrary, it can be quite 

advantageous for both parties not to relocate and leave scientists in their home country. 

A short-term version of the Thousand Talents Plan exists, allowing the recipients to stay 

abroad and only spend two months in China each year, which “enables them to maintain 

multiple appointments at once, which may not be fully disclosed. This may mean that 

they’re effectively using time, resources and facilities paid for by their home institutions to 

benefit Chinese institutions.”744 

Alex Joske mentioned the case of Prof. Steven X. Ding (丁先春) from the University of 

Duisburg (Germany), who received an affiliation to Tianjin University (China). It showed 

the advantage for China to have him abroad: “I manage scientific research at the university, 

which has more than 100 projects supervised by me […]. I can serve as a bridge between 

China and Germany for technological exchange … and I can make greater contributions 

than if I returned to China on my own. Being in Germany I can introduce advanced tech-

740. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 15.

741. Ibid., 6.

742. Anne-Marie Brady, Holding a Pen in One Hand, Gripping a Gun in the Other: China’s Exploitation of Civilian Channels 

for Military Purposes in New Zealand, Kissinger Institute, Asia Program (Jul. 2020), 3.

743. Hepeng Jia, “China’s Plan to Recruit Talented Researchers,” Nature (17 Jan. 2018).

744. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 10.

293

nologies to China, assist communication, exchange and cooperation, and play a role as a 

window and a bridge [between China and Germany].”745 

Many targets are of Chinese origin (the Party can present these programs “as serving 

the country’s ethno-nationalist rejuvenation”).746 One of the most recent example is Gong 

Chen, born in China, naturalized American, and a mechanical engineering professor at the 

prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He was arrested in January 2021 

for failing to disclose “that he was acting as an overseas expert on science and technol-

ogy for the Chinese communist government after China’s consulate office in New York 

asked him to provide expertise and advice in exchange for financial compensation and 

awards.” He allegedly received $29 million in foreign funding, mainly from China, and at 

least $355,000 for his “services and expertise.”747

However, the targets are not always of Chinese descent, as attested by the case of 

Charles Lieber, chair of the Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology at Harvard 

University, who was arrested in 2020 because he hid the fact that he combined his position 

at Harvard with a job as a “Strategic Scientist” at the Wuhan University of Technology 

between 2012 and 2017, as part of the Thousand Talents, and that he received a monthly 

salary of $50,000 from China, with an additional grant reaching RMB1 million and a fund-

ing of RMB1.5 million (€190,000) to create a joint lab between Harvard and Wuhan.748 

Among the other programs, there is Project 111, which is meant to recruit 1,000 research-

ers from the 100 best universities in the world; the Peacock Program (孔雀计划) of 

the Shenzhen government “which seeks to attract global talent ranging from Nobel Prize 

winners and winners of other major academic prizes, senior executives of the world’s top 

500 companies or of international financial organizations, members of the International 

Standardization Organization (ISO) Standards Committee, university presidents, heads of 

academic associations such as the Royal Society, foreign experts who have won a Friendship 

Award, editors of leading scientific journals, actuaries, medical specialists, and Olympic 

coaches.”749 The PLA also used Horizon 2020, the 2014-2020 European program for 

research and development, in order to “gain access to international military technology.”750

On a different note, the “Gray Temples” program “aims to pamper very young retir-

ees or executives at the end of their careers to benefit from their knowledge. ‘This mainly 

concerns researchers or engineers,’ noted a French scholar. ‘The Chinese invite them to 

seminars, pay the plane fare and the hotel expenses, it’s nice. And, if it goes well, they can 

be offered funding for their research.’”751

b. Programs that raise a lot of issues 

These programs bring about many issues. First, the copyrights of all research produced, 

even those co-financed or financed by programs in other countries, have to be registered 

in China.752 Furthermore, these programs often serve as a cover and channel for eco-

nomic espionage, fraud, and theft pure and simple. In the annex of his report, Alex 

745. Ibid., 10.

746. Ibid., 11.

747. “MIT Professor Gang Chen Charged with Millions In Grant Fraud, Hiding China Ties,” CBS Boston (14 Jan. 

2021). 

748. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 38.

749. Brady, Holding a Pen in One Hand, 7.

750. Ibid., 7.

751. La Chine démasquée, 103.

752. Brady, Holding a Pen in One Hand, 6.

294

Joske enumerated a number of researchers that benefited from these programs and were 

arrested and convicted for one of these reasons.753 

Finally, among the Chinese universities involved, those linked to the defense and security 

sectors are over-represented: recruited researchers in fact develop Chinese military 

capabilities. The modernization of the PLA owes a lot to “an international technology 

transfer strategy, which includes academic exchanges, investment in foreign companies, 

espionage, and hacking.”754

For instance, one of the recruiting stations in Australia is located within the Northwestern 

Polytechnic University Alumni Association (西北工业大学, NPU), which has developed 

numerous links with Australian universities, and famously bragged about having presented 

no less than five professors from Melbourne at the NPU in less than a month. However, the 

NPU is one of the main universities in the defense sector in China, specialized in aviation, 

space, and naval technology; it is one of the China’s “Seven Sons of National Defense” 

(国防七子), which regroup the seven most important universities in the defense sector.755 

Over 41% of its graduates are employed in that sector.756 Another example: in 2014, the 

Chinese Academy of Engineering and Physics (中国工程物理研究院, CAEP), which is 

the main school for research on nuclear weapons, had already recruited no less than 57 

researchers through the Thousand Talents programs.757 The number of scientists from 

the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory that have been recruited by Chinese insti-

tutions is so important that “they’re reportedly known as the ‘Los Alamos Club.’”758

Some assume that tie, such as this “Australian participant in the Thousand Talents pro-

gram speaking of his duty to contribute to the development of China’s national defense,”759 

while others would rather ignore or hide it, which is, in and of itself, another problem. 

Often, recruited individuals fail to disclose it. An investigation at A&M University in 

Texas found more than 100 staff members “linked to China’s talent programs, but only five 

disclosed it despite employees being required to do so.”760 The Thousand Talents Plan how-

ever, allows its recipients to be considered as entrepreneurs with one or more companies in 

China that are supported by the Thousand Talents Plan Venture Capital Center (千人计划

创投中心). It is through such a ploy that a start-up born in an Australian university lab 

and financed by it provided the Chinese government with the surveillance technol-

ogy used against Uyghurs, unbeknownst to the university (see box). 

753. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 38-47.

754. Brady, Holding a Pen in One Hand, 2

755. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 18.

756. Ibid., 7.

757. Ibid., 25.

758. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, 25.

759. Ibid., 10.

760. Ibid., 8.

295

When Australia indirectly contributes to the repression of Uyghurs

Heng Tao Shen, a talented computer scientist appointed professor at the University of 

Queensland in 2011 at 34, was recruited three years later by a Chinese university (University 

of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC)) as part of the Thousand Talents 

program. He then founded a start-up in artificial intelligence, Koala AI, while maintaining 

his links to UQ, where he stayed as honorary professor. He used these links to poach sev-

eral Australians for Koala AI, including researchers at UNSW, UQ, and at the University of 

Melbourne. Koala AI expanded considerably and was worth more than a billion dollars in 

2020. Among its activities, the company provided the Chinese government with a surveillance 

system installed at the border with Kazakhstan, through which many Uyghurs fled the Chinese 

repression, to detect and categorize potentially suspect individuals and vehicles. Koala AI also 

managed a joint lab with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. This sparked a scandal in 

Australia because Heng Tao Shen benefited, when he was a researcher there, from public fund-

ing (AUS$2.6 million from the Australian Research Council), of which more than half (1.6 

million) was used after he founded Koala AI, to finance research on surveillance technology 

that are now used in Xinjiang.761

The civil-military fusion, i.e. the policy aiming to develop links between the civil-

ian and military sectors to help China’s economic and military growth, was devel-

oped by Hu Jintao in 2007 and Xi Jinping made it a national strategy; he personally heads 

the Central Committee for the Development of Military – Civil Fusion (中央军民融合

发展委员会).762 Concretely, it means that many Chinese civilian universities contribute to 

military research, if not to some activities: “[at] least 15 civilian universities have been 

implicated in cyberattacks, illegal exports or espionage.”763

The situation for the many foreign universities sharing sometimes tight links with Chinese 

institutions is problematic insofar as, through research projects or joint articles, exchanges 

between researchers, they may indirectly contribute to the development of the PLA 

and to the elaboration of surveillance, control, and oppression technologies used 

against the Chinese population. Several scandals have burst in recent years, such as 

when Australia was accused of indirectly contributing to repression of Uyghurs (see box). 

Furthermore, in February 2021, The Times revealed that close to 200 British researchers 

working in a dozen British universities were suspected to be involuntarily helping Beijing 

build weapons of mass destruction by transferring sensitive military technologies.764 

Considering the extent of collaborations with China, and the Chinese civil-military inter-

weaving, this type of scandals will presumably be on the rise in the next few years.

Alex Joske (ASPI) was key in drawing attention to this risk with his famous report Picking 

Flowers, Making Honey (2018),765 followed by The China Defense Universities Tracker (2019) 

and Hunting the Phoenix (2020).766 In January 2021, Joske also submitted a report on CCP 

761. Alex Joske, “The company with Aussie Roots That’s Helping Build China’s Surveillance State,” The Strategist, 

ASPI (26 Aug. 2019).

762. Alex Joske, The China Defence Universities Tracker: Exploring the military and security links of China’s universities, ASPI, 

International Cyber Policy Centre, Policy Brief, Report. 23 (Nov. 2019), 4.

763. Ibid., 3.

764. Matt Dathan and Billy Kenber, “Hundreds of UK academics investigated over weapons links to China,” The 

Times (8 Feb. 2021).

765. Alex Joske, Picking Flowers, Making Honey: The Chinese Military’s Collaboration with Foreign Universities, ASPI, Policy 

Brief, Report 10 (2018).

766. Joske, Hunting the Phoenix.

296

efforts in terms of talent recruitment in Australia to the Parliamentary Joint Committee 

on Intelligence and Security in which he explained that he had identified, in Australian 

research institutions, including some government bodies, no less than 325 participants in 

the Chinese talent recruitment programs.767 Similar research also looked at New Zealand,768 

the U.S.,769 and the Czech Republic.770

In 2019, Alex Joske created a database of Chinese research institutions, both mil-

itary and civilian, classified based on the risk they represent. This China Defence 

Universities Tracker (https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/) proves very useful for foreign univer-

sities and researchers, but also for public and private leaders, to evaluate the risk incurred 

– included the reputational risk – by an association with certain Chinese institutions. Using 

this database, Sinopsis and Czech Radio (Český rozhlas) noted that “14 out of 26 Czech pub-

lic universities have established collaboration with [Chinese] civilian universities the ASPI 

database assigns medium to very high risk.”771 

Likewise, a note of the Embassy of France in China, quoted by Le Point, noted that it was 

problematic that “French institutions signed agreements with more than a dozen Chinese 

universities tied to the military-industrial complex” while another note indicated than 

“twenty French academics had been recruited [by the Thousand Talents program] includ-

ing eight that “continue to hold a permanent position in their home institution in France 

at the same time.” The note continued by stressing that some “are susceptible to commu-

nicate particularly sensitive information.” Hence, France seems to be growing aware of the 

problem. The French MEP Nathalie Loiseau, who coordinates the Special Committee on 

Foreign Interference, defended that “we should start by imposing transparency. Omitting 

to declare [these positions] should be considered as an infraction.”772

These activities raised international concern, in particular from the American govern-

ment, Beijing has been concealing the Thousand Talents program as much as possi-

ble since September 2018. A directive signed on September 29, 2018 (see below) asked the 

recruiters to “stop using emails, and opt for the phone and fax instead, during the recruit-

ment process. Candidates have to be notified at the occasion of an invitation to attend a 

university conference or a forum in China. The written notifications cannot include the 

words ‘Thousand Talents Plan.’”773 The process thus increasingly resembles the practice of 

intelligence services.

767. Alex Joske, The Chinese Communist Party’s Talent Recruitment Efforts in Australia, Submission 48 to the Parliamentary 

Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Inquiry into National Security Risks Affecting the Australian Higher 

Education and Research Sector (Jan. 2021).

768. Brady, Holding a Pen in One Hand.

769. Glenn Tiffert, ed., Global Engagement: Rethinking Risk in The Research Enterprise, Hoover Institution (30 Jul. 2020).

770. Filip Jirouš, “Nothing of Interest in a Small Country? Czech-Chinese Academic Exchange in the Age of 

Military-Civil Fusion,” Synopsis (22 Sept. 2020).

771. Ibid.

772. Jérémy André, “Comment Pékin profite de nos chercheurs” (“How Beijing Takes Advantage of our Scholars”), 

Le Point, 2535, (18 Mar. 2021), 48-51 (for the last four quotes).

773. “被美國盯上 傳中國引進人才不再提千人計畫” (“On the United-States Radar – China No Longer 

Mentions the Thousand Talents Plan to Recruit its Talents”), 中央通訊社 (CNA) (5 Oct. 2018), https://web.archive.

org/web/20191213131433/https:/www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/201810050158.aspx.

297

Source: https://twitter.com/Micheal47238455/status/1048797224669532160/photo/2.

Previously-public data was deleted: universities stopped mentioning the program on their 

websites; the list of recipients was deleted from the websites of the Chinese government, includ-

ing the program’s official website 1000plan.org774; and the website of the program itself, created 

in 2010, seems to no longer be functioning in its English version (since February 2020) and even 

in its Chinese version (since March 2020). Beijing is now laying low but, as explained by Anne-

Marie Brady, the “Thousand Talents continues, as do around 200 similar recruitment 

plans aimed at transmitting foreign research expertise to China.”775

c. Strategic infrastructures: the example of the China-Belgium Technology Center (CBTC)

CBTC is “the first Chinese hi-tech science park in Europe,”776 with construction 

beginning in 2017. Strategically located 30 minutes from Brussels, close to several uni-

versities, the center is built in the Louvain-la-Neuve science park, which is home to 

some 20 Chinese and European companies in the life sciences, information and high-tech 

industry sectors. The British pharmaceutical company GSK Vaccines is also located nearby.

The main shareholder and project leader is United Investment Europe (UI Europe), a 

Belgian subsidiary of the Chinese company United Investment Group from Hubei.777 

The project partners are the Catholic University of Leuven (UCLouvain), the Walloon 

Export and Foreign Investment Agency (AWEX) and the Intercommunale du Brabant 

Wallon (InBW). The total investment for this project would amount to 200 million euros.778

According to UCLouvain, the project has received political endorsements from both 

countries. It has been validated by the highest authorities of both states: President Xi 

Jinping and former Belgian Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo both attended the signing cere-

mony of the framework agreement at its launch in 2014. 

774. Smriti Mallapaty, “China Hides Identities of Top Scientific Recruits Amidst Growing US Scrutiny,” Nature (24 

Oct. 2018). 

775. Brady, Holding a Pen in One Hand, 6.

776. Presentation brochure: https://www.cbtc.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CBTC_Brochure_Corporate_

UK_Mail.pdf, 8. 

777. UCLouvain, “China-Belgium Technology Center (CBTC),” https://uclouvain.be/fr/decouvrir/china-

belgium-technology-center-cbtc.html.

778. Ibid. 

298

According to its website, the CBTC has three missions: “to build offices, laborato-

ries and infrastructure to host European and Chinese companies; to help them enter and 

expand in their respective markets by offering support services; and to invest in economic 

development and job creation.” The CBTC offers services to facilitate cooperation between 

European and Chinese high-tech companies and to facilitate their entry and development 

in their respective markets (company creation, market analysis, tax studies, recruitment, 

legal support, etc.). The three sectors on which the CBTC focuses are life sciences, infor-

mation and communication technologies, and smart manufacturing.779

The CBTC will also have a “privileged connection with the Leuven Innovation Network 

ecosystem,” a network composed of UCLouvain, the Leuven Technology Transfer Office 

(LTTO), the VIVES – Leuven Technology fund, the UCLouvain incubators, the Louvain-

la-Neuve Enterprise and Innovation Center and the Brussels Life Science Incubator, 

Mind&Market as well as the UCLouvain science parks.780

The CBTC construction project – which includes offices, coworking spaces, conference 

centers, hotel, parking and convenience stores – is divided into three phases, at the end of 

which the center is expected to be able to accommodate about 100 companies and 800 

jobs on 120,000 square meters.781 The first phase was launched in 2017 and completed 

in 2020. In September 2020 and with the help of real estate agencies Allten and Hendrix, 

the spaces began to be rented.782 Several Chinese companies – including the Traditional 

Chinese Medicine science and Technology Industrial park (Guangdong & Macau), China 

Medical City (Taizhou), Shanghai Zhangjiang Science Park, Hainan International Medical 

Pilot Zone, Nanjing Qixia Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone – have already signed 

agreements to set up operations there.783

Cover page of the CBTC presentation brochure on the cbtc.eu website.

For the Belgian internal security intelligence service, the Veiligheid van de Staat (VSSE), 

the CBTC project poses serious espionage risks to Belgian academic and techno-

logical research insofar as, even if the center were not a frontline organization of the 

779. Text of the presentation video: https://www.cbtc.eu/en/china-belgium-technology-center/.

780. UCLouvain, “China-Belgium Technology Center (CBTC),” https://uclouvain.be/fr/decouvrir/china-

belgium-technology-center-cbtc.html.

781. Ibid. 

782. Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, “China Belgium Technology Center: inauguration fin 2021” (“China Belgium 

Technology Center: inauguration in late 2021”) https://www.olln.be/fr/actualites/china-belgium-technology-center-

inauguration-fin-2021. 

783. Ibid. 

299

Chinese services, it could be used as an entry point by MSS agents for future espionage 

operations. There are precedents. According to confidential VSSE reports from 2010 to 

2016, revealed in part by EUobserver, Chinese intelligence services have a particu-

lar interest in biological warfare and vaccines.784 The VSSE suspects that China has 

targeted several Belgian experts as well as the British pharmaceutical company GSK. The 

Center of Applied Molecular Technology (CTMA), also located in the science park 

of Louvain-la-Neuve, would have been targeted. The Belgian authorities were concerned 

about the location of two Chinese structures in the same building as the CTMA, the Beijing 

ZGC Science Park and Shenzhen European Office. From now on, the China-Belgium 

Technology Center (CBTC) will also be located nearby.

B. Confucius Institutes

Chinese language is one of the main vectors of the CCP’s strategy 

of seduction. Not only does language gives an access to the Chinese 

culture and to Chinese people themselves, which constitutes a powerful 

motivation for the learners, but it is also used by the CCP to create a 

narrative, a mystification built around its age and its graphic peculiarities, 

where the act and art of writing are intertwined. This influence strategy 

was materialized by the opening of a constellation of Confucius 

Institutes since 2004, tasked with promoting the Chinese language and culture. 

1. Organization

There are two categories of Confucius Institutes: the institutes themselves, 

implanted in the universities, and the Confucius Classrooms, present mainly in institutions 

of primary and secondary education. These institutions can obtain the support, and coor-

dinate their actions with, the Chinese cultural centers at the embassies, but they are admin-

istrated by the Hanban (汉办), which stands for the Office of Chinese Language Council 

International (国家汉语国际推广领导小组办公室). The Hanban is not an agency per se, 

but an organization affiliated to the Ministry of Education. The Hanban permanent com-

mittee is however presided by Sun Chunlan (孙春兰), vice-prime minister, member of the 

CCP’s Political Bureau and former manager of the United Front Department. The direc-

tor of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (侨务办公室) is also in the committee; if the 

OCAO was formerly attached to the State Council, it was integrated into the United Front 

Department in 2018. Hence, there is no doubt about the Party’s control over the activities 

of Confucius Institutes. 

The implementation of Confucius Institutes (CI) abroad is based on a tripartite agree-

ment that includes the Hanban, the foreign university that hosts the institute in its 

facilities and a Chinese university that graciously provides the language teachers. The 

financial support offered by the Hanban through the ICs does not only include the learning 

material and teachers but, since 2009, it offers scholarships to allow foreigners to come 

to China to study Chinese and its culture. Between 2009 and 2020, about 50,000 students 

from 166 countries received such a scholarship.785 For example, in Kenya, it is estimated that 

784. Andrew Rettman, “China suspected of bioespionage in ‘heart of EU,’” EUObserver (6 May 2020).

785. https://www.afpbb.com/articles/-/3254376.

300

the CI in Nairobi alone awards at least 15 scholarships per year to African students to study in 

China for 6 months and up to 10 years – potentially to a doctorate level. It also offers specific 

language courses for Kenyan officials, including diplomats and customs officers.786

The institutes are managed by a tandem formed by a Chinese and a local co-director, 

while all the other employees seem to consistently be Chinese. When a university accepts to 

welcome a CI, it receives a financial assistance of a variable amount to launch its activi-

ties, an annual grant amounting to $100,000 or $150,000 on average, although it could reach 

several million dollars according to certain sources. The Hanban then recruits and trains 

the new teachers who are appointed to the institutes solely based on the Hanban’s decision. 

But, once there, they can receive instructions from the embassy or the consulate. The 

linguistic resources (books, audio or video media) are also elaborated by the Hanban. 

CIs have grown rapidly: the first opened in Seoul in November 2004, the first in Africa at 

the University of Nairobi in 2005, and the first Confucius Classroom in 2006 in a Bangkok 

high school. South Korea and Thailand remain the Asian countries with the largest numbers 

of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. At the end of 2009, there were 282 Institutes, and 

272 Classrooms in 88 countries,787 and the objective was to reach a thousand by 2020.788 Their 

number has stagnated globally since 2018 however (the official Hanban website mentions 

541 but this number has not changed in years even though some CIs have closed while others 

have been created –the Hanban is likely intentionally ambiguous about the real number of 

CIs).789 If we go by the facts mentioned on the official website, there would be 135 CIs in Asia 

(25%), 61 in Africa (11%) 138 in the Americas (25%), 187 in Europe (35%) and 20 in Oceania 

(4%). The three countries with the most Confucius Institutes are the United States (75 insti-

tutes, including 65 on university campuses, and approximatively 500 Classrooms in August 

2020),790 the United Kingdom and Australia (14 Institutes and 67 Classrooms in Australia 

in July 2019).791 This massive expansion allowed the Party to multiply the number of 

Chinese learners and to extend its influence everywhere in the world. 

In France, CIs allow Beijing to strengthen its influence in medium-sized cities, 

where they are mainly located. There are 18 of them in the country, where they “lead a 

seemingly quiet life” as Nathalie Guibert explains, having travelled around France to study 

these “ever so discreet Chinese relays.”792 These institutes appeal not only to univer-

sities but also to local political actors who, fully aware of the links between CIs 

and the Party, hope to be able to use them as communication channels to develop 

business relations, as a deputy mayor of Angers acknowledges: “The CIs are considered 

by Chinese actors to have the seal of the Party, with validated executives, which allows us 

to get things across better. We want a return other than cultural, the Institute must also 

promote business.”793 Their establishment is encouraged by the widely shared feeling 

of an inevitable Chinese domination. It is the discourse according to which “China is 

moving fast, it is overtaking us in terms of technology. It is going to become a superpower, 

the question is how to work better with it,” as expressed in particular by the French co-di-

786. From a diplomatic source. 

787. http://english.hanban.org/article/2010-07/02/content_153910.htm.

788. De Pierrebourg and Juneau-Katsuya, Ces espions venus d’ailleurs, 155.

789. english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm.

790. https://www.state.gov/confucius-institute-u-s-center-designation-as-a-foreign-mission/.

791. James King and Echo Hui, “Confucius Institute Chinese Language and Culture Teachers Must ‘Love the 

Motherland’ To apply,” ABC Australia (16 Jul. 2019).

792. Nathalie Guibert, “Confucius en France: de si discrets relais chinois” (“Confucius in France: such discreet 

Chinese relays”) Le Monde (9 Jul. 2021), 4.

793. Ibid. 

301

rector of the Confucius Business at the Ecole supérieure de commerce de Paris.794 This 

approach, both fatalistic and opportunistic, is certainly debatable – primarily because it 

seems to ignore the risks of such cooperation – but the fact is that it is widespread. The 

academic Gilles Guiheux, former co-director of Paris’s CI, concludes that “the problem 

with Confucius Institutes is that they spread a false image of China. But we are 

partly responsible for this. The actors of the French network adhere to the idea of an 

unstoppable Chinese power.”795

The Confucius Institute project in Greenland

CIs allow China to increase its penetration in certain regions where it has little presence at 

the moment but identifies important current or future interests, such as in Greenland. China 

manifested a renewed interest for Greenland after the adoption of a self-governing act in 2008 

which gave the territory more autonomy from the Danish government, and notably, the possi-

bility to conclude deals with other countries. The Chinese presence in Greenland is first moti-

vated by the abundance of natural resources (illustrated by investment in the mining sector for 

instance), the infrastructure market (ports, airports, hydraulic etc.),796 and scientific research: 

Beijing wishes to establish research stations dedicated, for instance, to climate change.797 That 

being said, the CCP envisions its penetration in Greenland within the scope of its Arctic strat-

egy which, since the arrival to power of Xi Jinping and the rise of tensions with the United 

States, has explicitly become geopolitical and not merely economic. 

The continuing Chinese presence in Greenland necessarily goes through a more in-depth penetra-

tion of the indigenous society, and particularly its elite. Since 2016, it has led to a cooperation agree-

ment between the cities of Shanghai and Kujalleq (at the southern end of the territory) in order to 

open a CI in 2018 on the Qaoqortoq campus. A well-conducted targeting of the local elite, which is 

quantitatively unimportant, could allow to a rapid increase in the influence of Beijing.798 However, 

for unknown reasons, the project of a CI in Greenland seems to have aborted.

2. The true nature of Confucius Institutes

CI defenders generally present them as harmless language schools, similar to the Alliances 

françaises, the British Councils and the Goethe Institutes. However, and even if it were the 

case, we must remember with the Tibet specialist Françoise Robin that “even with lan-

guage courses, one can convey political ideas, such as showing maps of China that include 

Taiwan.”799 Additionaly, and most importantly, CIs are in fact fundamentally different, start-

ing with their politicization: contrary to the aforementioned cultural diplomacy institutions, 

which are particularly careful not to have any link to a political party, CIs are inherently 

linked to the CCP. 

Another difference: their implementation in universities and other foreign edu-

cational institutions “gives them leverage over the host institutions.”800 There was 

794. Ibid. 

795. Ibid. 

796. Ties Dams, Louise van Schaik, and Adája Stoetman, “Presence Before Power. China’s Arctic Strategy in 

Iceland and Greenland,” Cligendael Report (Jun. 2020).

797. Ibid.

798. André Gattolin and Damien Degeorges, “China in Greenland: A Call for Deeper EU Political Engagement,” 

Euractiv (28 Mar. 2018). See the document (in Danish) put together by the city of Kujalleq here: http://cak.gl/wp-

content/uploads/2016/11/PM_Kina-i-Kujalleq_271016_dk.pdf.

799. Jérémy André, “Comment la Chine pousse ses pions à l’université” (“How China is pushing its way into the 

university”), Le Point, 2532 (25 Feb. 2021).

800. Hamilton, “Chinese Communist Party Influence in Australian Universities.”

302

even a case of an implantation at the heart of the education policy of a target country: 

the Ministry of Education of New-South Wales hosted a CI – a case presented as unique 

in the world.801 In other words, Beijing had appointed employees (potentially agents) 

inside an Australian ministry. This institute operated a Confucius Classroom program 

which state schools paid at least $10,000 annually (plus material resources such as books, 

which were graciously offered) to propose Chinese language and culture classes. Some 

schools subsequently made them mandatory. This decision shocked many parents, some 

describing this program “as the infiltration of the Chinese Communist Party into the NSW 

public school system.”802 Following this polemic, the state decided to stop the program in 

December 2019. 

Over the past couple of years, China’s efforts have faced an increasing opposition 

that has put a stop, or at least slowed, the implementation of new institutions. Several uni-

versities have also decided to shut down the Confucius Institutes they hosted, invoking, in 

particular, an infringement of academic freedom. In July 2020, at least 50 universities in 

9 countries stopped the activities of CIs implanted on their campuses – for instance, the 

University of Chicago and Penn State in the United States, McMaster in Canada or Lyon in 

France (→ p. 305). In the United States, at least 15 of them closed in 2018-2019.803 In 

Australia, the state of New South Wales announced, in August 2019, the closure of the 13 

Cis in its public schools.804 In Germany, the universities of Düsseldorf and Hamburg have 

terminated CIs they hosted, and in several cities, including Ingolstadt and Göttingen, citi-

zens’ collectives have been formed to end public subsidies or cooperation with local CIs.805 

In response to Chinese sanctions against researchers and a German think tank (MERICS) 

in March 2021, the University of Trier announced the suspension of all activities of its CI, 

a decision which the Minister of Research welcomed a few months later by stating: “I do 

not want the Chinese government to influence our universities and our society. Germany 

must admit self-critically: in some places in the past, we have given too much space to 

the Confucius Institutes, and have done too little ourselves to build up independent 

China expertise in Germany.”806 Everywhere in the world, the problems have multi-

plied and CIs are shut down. 

The problems stemming from CIs have been summarized by a very thorough study of 

the National Association of Scholars (NAS) in 2017.807 The most frequent criticisms leveled 

against them referred to the pressure exerted on teachers to avoid subjects deemed sensitive 

in class (Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, Human Rights, etc.), the restrictions on the teachers’ free-

dom of expression and of religion (prohibition of Falun Gong for instance808) and a lack, 

or very little, of transparence on the nature of the relations between the institutes and the 

Hanban or other Chinese administrations. 

801. Mission, Lowy (Aug. 2019).

802. Kelsey Munro, “Behind Confucius Classrooms: the Chinese Government Agency Teaching NSW School 

Students,” Sydney Morning Herald (29 May 2016). 

803. “The New Red Scare on American Campuses,” The Economist (4 Jan. 2020).

804. “New South Wales to End Chinese-funded Confucius Institute Education Program,” The Japan Times (23 Aug. 

2019).

805. Thomas Wieder, “Berlin regrette d’avoir ‘laissé trop d’espace’ au réseau Confucius” (“Berlin regrets having 

‘left too much space’ for the Confucius network”) Le Monde (9 Jul. 2021), 5.

806. “Germany too dependent on Confucius Institutes, minister warns,” The Times Higher Education Supplement, 2486 

(8 Jul. 2021). 

807. Rachelle Peterson, “Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education,” 

National Association of Scholars (Apr. 2017).

808. See the documentary In the name of Confucius (2018), https://inthenameofconfuciusmovie.com/fr/.

303

• 1) Teachers. At the end of 2016, the CI headquarters in Beijing designed new recruit-

ment criteria for teachers, first implemented in early 2017. They required “good 

political and professional qualities” (“具备良好的政治和业务素质”) and a “love 

for the homeland” (“爱祖国”) for instance.809 The word sushi (素质), often translated 

by “quality” encompasses the behavior, ethic, and education of the individual. It is a 

marker of belonging to the civilized world. To lack of suzhi is to not be “civilized”; the 

word is thus often used to endorse a paternalistic politics or the refusal to hold elections 

to choose the country’s leaders, under the pretext that rural people are not of “good 

enough quality.”810 According to the former Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin, who had 

defected to Australia in 2005, to have a “good political quality” means in this context to 

“always be faithful to the CCP and nothing else.”811

The required candidate profile: “good political and professional qualities, loves the homeland, works voluntarily for the 

internationalization of the Chinese language, has a dedicated spirit, a strong sense of organizational discipline and team spirit, 

with good character and no criminal record.”812

• 2) The learning material. The learning material is prepared by the Hanban and 

compliant with a Chinese vision of the world. It is actually a preferred resource to 

convey the Party’s narrative abroad. The work is, in this case, eased by the young age 

of this “literature’s” public, the children and teenagers, not yet able to confront the 

propaganda that, despite lacking in subtlety sometimes, can be effective due to the rep-

etition of the same message. The ability of some students to defend themselves against 

such assaults can also be questioned. Here, the Chinese strategy can be illustrated by 

an animated documentary on the Korean War (1950-53), the War to Resist US 

Aggression and Aid Korea,813 proposed by the Hanban to young learners. The 

video explained that the United States manipulated the United Nations Security Council 

and that the Chinese army only went to war in response to the American bombings of 

Chinese villages and in order to protect the homeland (see screenshots below). The 

Hanban removed the video once its content was exposed.814

809. James King and Echo Hui, “Confucius Institute Chinese Language and Culture Teachers Must ‘Love the 

Motherland’ to Apply,” ABC Australia (16 Jul. 2019).

810. See: Paul Charon, Le vote contre la démocratie. Rationalisation de l’État et processus de politisation dans la Chine rurale 

post-maoïste (Vote Against Democracy: The Rationalization of the State and the Politization of Post-Mao Rural China), PhD Thesis, 

EHESS (2012).

811. King and Hui, “Confucius Institute Chinese Language and Culture Teachers Must ‘Love the Motherland’ to 

Apply.”

812. Ibid.

813. Official name of the Korean War in China. 

814. It is nonetheless available here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=13k3AEjHNR0.

304

Source: Screenshots from the animated documentary The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.

• 3) Financial leverage on universities. The problem with CIs is not so much the 

propaganda they spread but the influence they exert on university administrators, 

Salvatore Babone explained.815 Beijing delivers the institutes with the funding, teachers 

and their remuneration, the learning material, and sometimes even with the dedicated 

buildings. For universities – particularly those with tight budgets – being offered a rev-

enue-generating language center free of charge is hard to refuse. This can create 

a dependence, if not a full subjection, that allows Beijing to have an influence on 

certain choices of the university, sometimes on the content of some research programs 

(to limit the research on Tibet, Taiwan, or China’s influence strategy for instance), on the 

choice of guest speakers, and ultimately, on the way the university speaks of China and 

of Chinese interests. In all cases, it creates a form of self-censorship. 

• 4) Self-Censorship. Experience has shown that the presence of CIs on a campus “com-

promised their institution’s commitment to academic freedom.”816 There are numerous 

documented cases of self-censorship. In 2008, Tel Aviv University decided to close 

an exhibition dedicated to the Falun Gong movement at the request of the Chinese 

Embassy.817 In 2009, at North Carolina State University, the Chinese director of the CI 

warned the university management that the Dalai Lama’s conference scheduled on the 

campus could “damage” the relationship of the university with the Hanban, thus forc-

ing the former to cancel the event.818 In 2013, the prestigious University of Sydney also 

“cancelled the visit [of the Dalai Lama] to avoid damaging its ties with China, including 

funding for its cultural Confucius Institute.”819 In 2014, Xu Lin (许琳), director of the 

Hanban, then invited to the annual conference of the European Association of China 

studies at the University of Minho in Portugal, demanded that the conference programs 

be rid of several pages mentioning Taiwanese institutions, including the Chiang Ching-

Kuo Foundation.820 In December 2018, at Victoria University in Melbourne, the screen-

ing of a documentary critical of CIs was cancelled at the last minute under pressure 

from the Chinese consulate, and the university lied to the movie promoter, saying there 

was no available room. Clive Hamilton highlighted the irony of this situation: “a doc-

umentary arguing that the presence of Confucius Institutes gives them politi-

cal leverage over their hosts was banned because of the political leverage of a 

815. Salbatore Babones, “It’s Time for Western Universities to Cut Their Ties to China,” Foreign Policy (19 Aug. 2020).

816. “China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad,” Human Rights Watch (21 Mar. 2019).

817. Ofra Edelman, “Court: TAU Bowed to Chinese Pressure Over Falun Exhibition,” Haaretz (1 Oct. 2009).

818. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “How China Managed to Play Censor at a Conference on U.S. Soil,” Foreign Policy 

(9 May 2018).

819. “Sydney University criticized for blocking Dalai Lama visit,” The Guardian (18 Apr. 2013).

820. Elizabeth Redden, “Censorship at China Studies Meeting,” Inside Higher Ed (6 Aug. 2014).

305

Confucius Institute over its host.”821 The integration of these constraints by Beijing’s 

partners is a phenomenon observed in other fields such as cinema (→ p. 348) or profes-

sional sport (→ p. 249).

A closed Confucius Institute in Lyon

In France, where there are 18 Confucius Institutes left,822 the fate of Lyon’s Confucius Institute 

(CIL) is interesting. Created in 2009 following a proposition of Sun Yat-sen University 

(Guangzhou ) to the University Lyon 3, the relationship between the two parties started to 

deteriorate in 2012 after the appointment of a new Chinese director: “He questioned our 

learning material and insisted that the CIL be more integrated in the university in order to be 

included in the core courses. We considered this interference from a structure emanating 

from China inappropriate because it was susceptible to compromise our academic 

freedom but also the spirit and rules of higher education in the French Republic,” 

explained Gregory Lee, professor at the University Lyon 3. He paid the price: “the Hanban di-

rector demanded his head and announced the interruption of the annual contribution without 

notice. […] Without an agreement, Lee closed the CIL in September 2013.”823

• 5) Effects on the teaching staff. Considering what was previously described, the 

implementation of a CI in a university often brings about controversies, and is suscepti-

ble to divide the teaching staff, if not marginalize some of the best specialists on China 

because they are critical of CIs and, as such, of their colleagues cooperating with the 

institute, or receiving its funding. In this situation, Christopher Hughes explains that 

“even the most well-established experts in Chinese studies can find themselves 

isolated and at odds with their colleagues when they raise concerns. The worst-

case scenario is when academics no longer feel able to work in a university that does not 

respect their professional standards, suffering from ostracization, exclusion from the 

university and denial of promotion [for instance].”824

• 6) Effects on other researchers. Pressure from a CI affects not only immediate col-

leagues at the university, but it can also extend to the regional or national research and 

think tank landscape. For example, in April 2021, the Slovak director of Bratislava’s 

CI, Ľuboslav Štora, attempted to intimidate Matej Šimalčík, the director of the Central 

European Institute of Asia Studies (CEIAS) and one of the leading China experts in 

Central Europe. He sent him a letter attacking him over the publication of a report on 

Chinese influence in Slovak universities,825 with explicit threats: “Are you sleeping well? 

You should be very stressed when you walk down the street….”826

821. Hamilton, “Chinese Communist Party Influence in Australian Universities.”

822. Officially 17 according to the French website of the Confucius Institute (https://archive. vn/8GHMR: CI of 

the University of Poitiers, CI of the University of Paris 7 Diderot, CI of Brittany in Brest, CI of La Rochelle, CI of 

Alsace in Strasbourg, CI of Clermont-Ferrand Auvergne, CI of the University of Artois, CI of Pays de la Loire, CI of 

the University of Lorraine, CI of the University of French Polynesia, CI of the Neoma Business School in Reims and 

Paris, CI of Montpellier, CI of the University of La Réunion, CI of Pau-Pyrénées, CI of the University of Orléans, 

CI of the ESCP Business School in Paris, IC Côte d’Azur in Nice) but in reality 18 if we also count the one of the 

Chinese cultural center in Paris.

823. La Chine démasquée, 112.

824. Christopher Hughes, “Confucius Institutes and the University: Distinguishing the Political Mission from the 

Cultural,” Issues and Studies, 50:4 (2014), 66.

825. Matej Šimalčík and Adam Kalivoda, China’s inroads into Slovak universities: Protecting academic freedoms from 

authoritarian malign interference, CEIAS and Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (Dec. 2020). 

826. “Le directeur de l’Institut Confucius à Bratislava menace un expert slovaque” (“Director of the Confucius 

Institute in Bratislava threatens Slovak expert”) Euractiv (27 Apr. 2021).

306

• 7) Espionage. Jonathan Manthorpe believes that the Confucius program is noth-

ing more than “a major CCP international propaganda and espionage operation 

masquerading as a cultural exchange program.”827 It is not only, as Li Changchun, a 

member of the Permanent Committee of the Political Bureau, publicly acknowledged, 

“an important part of China’s overseas propaganda set-up;”828 in most cases “they are 

espionage outstations for Chinese embassies and consulates through which they 

control Chinese students, gather information on perceived enemies, and intim-

idate dissidents.”829 However, documented cases of espionage are rare, and Western 

counter-espionage services do not always have an interest in making them public. Among 

the most well-known examples is the case of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) CI 

director, Song Xinning, who, in 2019, was expulsed and banned from the Schengen area 

for eight years after the Belgian services accused him of espionage – and more specif-

ically, of being a recruiter for Chinese intelligence.830 Following that event, the VUB 

decided to close its CI. 

The wave of Confucius Institute closures gained momentum in the last few 

years and should further spread as a result of the awareness of Chinese influence 

strategies, and of the growing tensions between Beijing and Washington. To try to 

counter this tendency, the CCP decided to rename the Hanban as the Center for Language 

Education and Cooperation in June 2020.831 The announcement by the press agency Xinhua 

did not specify that it was an actual change of name, nor did it explain the reasons behind 

this change, giving stock to the belief that it might have been a new institution.832 Xu Lin, 

likely judged unfit to accompany this change in the image of the institutes, was replaced by 

Ma Jianfei, her deputy. The Party also created a non-governmental foundation promoting 

teaching Chinese abroad to oversee the institutes. This structure is thus supposed to act as 

a buffer between the institutes and the Party. 

3. Hanyuqiao: the Chinese Bridge Program

Hanyuqiao (汉语桥), literally “bridge to Chinese” (also translated as “gateway to 

Chinese”), and which has been known in English as the Chinese Bridge Program, started 

as a linguistic and cultural competition organized by the Hanban with help from the 

network of Confucius Institutes. CIs organize the pre-selections in the various countries 

where they are implanted and send the best candidates from each country to participate in 

the semifinals, followed by the finals, in China. The selected candidates only have to pay for 

their roundtrip plane fare while Beijing takes care of the rest – housing and food.833 The 

competition is broadcast on the Hunan Television (湖南卫视) channel and is available on 

streaming platforms such as Mango TV (芒果TV).834 

827. J. Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda: Beijing’s Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada (Toronto: Cormorant 

Books, 2019), 192.

828. “A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power,” The Economist (22 Oct. 2009).

829. Manthorpe, Claws of the Panda, 192.

830. Kinling Lo et al., “Chinese Professor Accused of Spying by Belgium, Barred from Entering Schengen Area,” 

South China Morning Post (30 Oct. 2019). 

831. Zhuang Pinghui, “China’s Confucius Institutes Rebrand after Overseas Propaganda Rows,” South China 

Morning Post (4 Jul. 2020).

832. “China Sets Up Language Cooperation Center,” Xinhua (5 Jul. 2020).

833. “About ‘Chinese Bridge,’” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), http://english.hanban.org/node_8080.htm.

834. “汉语桥” (“Hanyuqiao”), Baidu, https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%B1%89%E8%AF%AD%E6%A1%A5.

307

It targets an audience of non-Chinese young individuals born outside of China 

and for whom Chinese is not the mother tongue. Their oral and written comprehension 

is assessed with their Chinese speaking abilities and artistic qualities. The winners eventu-

ally earn scholarships to study in the PRC. 

This competition has two formats: the first, the Chinese Proficiency Competition for 

Foreign College Students has been held since 2002 and is open to university students; the 

second is the Chinese Proficiency for Foreign Secondary Students, launched in 2008 

for high-schoolers. According to numbers provided by the Hanban, around 800,000 uni-

versity students and 300,000 high-schoolers participated in the preselection stage and 3,000 

university students from over 110 countries, along with 2,700 high-schoolers from over 100 

countries, were selected to take part to the semifinals and finals in China.835

The objective of these competitions is to spark interest in the Chinese language and 

culture among a young foreign public, and to stimulate international exchanges. As attested 

by the way the Handan reported on these events, these competitions are an occasion to 

“build a ‘circle of friends’ worldwide thanks to Chinese,” but also to “show [one’s] talents 

to follow [one’s] Chinese dream” to “tell together ‘[about one’s] affection for China.’”836

The Hanban’s Hanyuqiao has in fact expanded to formats beyond the competitions: the 

Chinese Bridge Summer Camp invites foreign high school students for a summer 

camp in China during which they can attend language classes but also classes on tradi-

tional cultural practices (calligraphy, martial arts, traditional dances, tea ceremonies etc.), 

and meet with other youth with an interest in China from all over the world.837 This pro-

gram also aims to stimulate a passion for learning Chinese and Chinese culture in general, 

along with imbuing these teenagers with official Chinese narratives. 

Schools and teachers are other targets of the Hanyuqiao. The Chinese Bridge for 

Foreign Schools invites the teaching staff who have already established a Chinese pro-

gram at their schools, or who has the intention of doing so, to spend a week in China, not 

only to promote cooperation between the schools, but also to improve their knowledge of 

the Chinese education system and promote the learning of Chinese abroad.838 European, 

British and American schools are primarily targeted. According to the Hanban’s web-

site, it apparently invites, each year, the teaching staff of 100 primary and secondary schools 

from the European Union,839 100 British schools, and, since 2007, it has invited some 450 

British delegates in China,840 along with 3,000 American delegates since 2006.841

835. “关于 ‘汉语桥’” (“About ‘Hanyuqiao’”), 孔子学院总部(国家汉办) (Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban)), 

http://www.hanban.org/chinesebridge/node_7489.htm.

836. “Competition ‘Gateway to Chinese’: the Candidates of 122 Countries Show Their Abilities In Chinese and Make 

Friends in Changsha,” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), http://french.hanban.org/article/2019-08/07/

content_781953.htm; “Competition “Bridge to Chinese,’” Confucius Institute Clermont-Ferrand – Auvergne, https://

archive.vn/49wdC.

837. “‘Chinese Bridge’ Summer Camp,” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), http://english.hanban.org/

node_8073.htm

838. “About ‘Chinese Bridge,’” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban).

839. “‘Chinese Bridge’ For EU Schools,” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), http://english.hanban.org/

node_10084.htm.

840. “‘Chinese Bridge” For UK Schools,” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), http://english.hanban.org/

node_8072.htm.

841. “Oversea Principals’ Tour to China,” Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban), http://english.hanban.org/

node_8074.htm.

308

VII. Think tanks

We have previously shown how the Party attempts to build the image of a powerful 

China, with a power that rests, among other things, on the development of the country’s 

scientific and technological capacities (→ p. 159). The promotion of that narrative is paired 

with important efforts to impose itself in the field of ideas. It is about seducing with 

China’s capacity to produce concepts and to raise its voice in international intel-

lectual debates. To do so, the CCP’s strategy is twofold: on the one hand, setting up 

branches of Chinese think tanks abroad, whose mission is to showcase the Chinese 

intellectual power by inserting themselves in the local intellectual and political debates; on 

the other hand, similarly to the United Front’s strategy consisting in using one’s friends 

against one’s enemies, the Party-State also tries to get closer to the existing structures 

susceptible to assimilate and share Chinese narratives.