D. The new corps of volunteers on Weibo
In mainland China, Weibo is the equivalent of Twitter, and its content is strictly regu-
lated (→ p. 199), as with all the Chinese platforms. However, Weibo plays an essential role
in the “fans’ economy.” Weibo is very lucrative for movie, reality TV, and music stars who
have mastered mobilizing their communities.35 The race for popularity on this network has
pushed many users to organize themselves in militant communities in order to support
their idols or pay “water armies” (水军)36 to artificially increase the popularity of a
star (or product) on the network. Weibo is thus a permanent battlefield between different
communities of users defending their favorite celebrities.37
1. Diba
A well-known example among Chinese users is the group “Li Yi Ba” (李毅吧), which
has morphed over time to become “Diba” (帝吧). “Liyiba” was originally a sub-section
of an online forum named “tieba,” a community of users known for mocking a football
player named Li Yi. It progressively became more organized and now regularly leads
“campaigns” (出征 – as in “military campaigns”) against targets “outside the Great
Chinese firewall” under the slogan “[when] Diba launches a military expedition not a blade
of grass is spared” (帝吧出征，寸草不生). For instance, Diba attacked the Facebook
page of the newly-elected head of the Taiwanese government Tsai Ing-Wen38 and
35. Fan Shuhong, “Idol Hands: How China’s Super Fan Groups Make and Break Stars Via the Multi-Million Dollar
‘Fan Economy,’” RADII (7 Jan. 2019).
36. Na, “Guns for Hire.”
37. Owen Churchill, “Hit Show Accused of Shirking Payment for Fake Reviews,” Sixth Tone (24 Feb. 2017).
38. “帝吧出征fb表情包大战升级 _千万大陆网友翻墙占领脸书” (“Diba Gears Up to Trigger the War of
Emojis. Ten Million Cyber-Citizens from the Mainland Seize Facebook by Crossing the Wall”), Sohu (20 Jan. 2019).
508
the international movement fighting for the rights of Uyghurs in early 2018. If Diba seems
essentially active in China’s peripheral environment (Taiwan and Hong Kong notably),
its campaigns can also strike more distant targets: they attacked the satirical Swedish
show Svenska Nyheter in September 2018 (→ p. 532) and the Danish daily newspaper
Jyllands-Posten in January 2020, after the publication of a caricature representing the flag
of the PRC with the characteristics of the coronavirus.39
The caricature of a Chinese flag in which the stars have been replaced by coronaviruses, published
by the Danish daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten on January 28, 2020, triggered a campaign
by pro-Chinese trolls which Diba partly led, against the paper and Denmark more generally.
On Twitter, the group Diba used the account @D8China. Thanks to Twint, we were
able to collect all the published tweets before the account was deleted in late October or early
November 2019. The first was posted in April 2019 and targeted activist groups defending
the rights of the Muslim Uyghur minority (and not Hong Kong demonstrators). The account
showed its successes through an article it shared.40 @D8China did not participate in targeted
campaigns but played the role of a propagandist, highlighting Diba’s successes and relaying
Beijing’s watchwords: territorial unity, the fight against “biased Western media,” etc.
On Facebook, Diba has several official groups (and pages). Foremost among these is
“Diba’s army group center” (帝吧中央集团军) created in 2015.41-42 In October 2019, it had
83,000 members including 3,000 new members that subscribed during the previous 30 days.
Diba also had several Facebook groups intended to organize its activities: “Diba’s campaign
to protect Hong Kong” (帝吧出征守护香港),43 created in July 2019 with 8,000 members
(October 2019), but also “Diba’s base of operations,” created in April 2016 and which had
22,000 members (October 2019).44 To join some of these groups, administrators impose rules
or submit users to questions which often consists in showing off one’s patriotism.
Diba was supposed to launch a campaign (出征) against Hong Kong protesters on
July 23, but it was brought forward to July 22 and the announcement was made on the
39. Diba’s implication was confirmed during our interviews in Denmark.
40. “中国网军出征 _维吾尔人权团体脸书遭洗版” (“The Army of Internet Users Goes After Uyghur
Facebook Groups”), DW (11 Apr. 2019), https://archive.vn/bxgdZ; see also Zhang Han, “Patriotic Posts Flood East
Turkestan Pages to Fight Untrue Reports on Xinjiang,” Global Times (10 Apr. 2019).
41. https://www.facebook.com/dibazhongyangjituanjunxiaozu/; see also https://www.facebook.com/pg/
Antiindependence/community/?ref=page_internal.
42. 帝吧中央集团军– https://www.facebook.com/groups/1101110389929793/?ref=group_header.
43. https://www.facebook.com/groups/1655995351222347/?ref=search.
44. https://www.facebook.com/groups/1721233154831031/?ref=pages_groups_card&source_
id=832140356914881.
509
group’s Weibo account.45-46 The pages of certain Hong Kong protesters’ support
groups were targeted in a well-defined modus operandi: the attackers copied and pasted
messages (often the same messages) one after another to saturate the spaces. However,
this time Diba was quickly detected and its main operators “doxxed”: their names,
addresses, telephone numbers and bank account details were made public and some of
these were used for enrolment applications in the PLA. The main operation was apparently
cancelled by the organizers for fear of reprisals.47
2. Fanquan
Another operation was apparently conducted between August 14 and 17, 2019 and this
time by a set of groups called “饭圈女孩” (fanquan nühai).48 Literally translated as
the “girls of the fan circle,” this was a group of young Internet users (most often high
school girls) deeply involved in the “pursuit of stars” (追星– zhuixing).49 There were in fact
different groups of fans of pop idols who “joined together” to help and support “阿中”
(a-zhong) or 阿中哥哥 (a-zhong gege) – or, in other words, China.50 These fans developed a
whole iconography based on “gifs” or memes (humoristic Internet images – biaoqing bao (表
情包 in Chinese)). And they responded to hashtags on Weibo such as “守护全世界最好的
阿中” (“Let us, in all corners of the world, protect the greatest China!”).51 A search with this
hashtag on Weibo returned a frenzy of activities over the slightest subject that involved China,
such as the NBA, Huawei, the military parade of October 1 and, of course, Hong Kong.
Furthermore, the “fan girls” also have a Twitter account, @520CHINA666,52 created
in June 2019 and suspended in late October. When we created our archive, around October
25, the account had published nearly 3,700 tweets (we were able to collect around 1,000).
In October, the fanquan boasted 5,000 subscribers and 55 subscriptions. In comparison to
Diba’s account, this one was more aggressive insofar as it actually answered (often with
insults) Internet users who favored democracy.53
3. Coordinated actions
The peak in activity of both Diba and Fanquan groups apparently occurred between August
14 and 20. Chinese websites spoke of the “814大团结” (“the Grand Unity of August 14”):
that day, different fan groups came together to lead a highly “disciplined” attack
against China’s enemies. Diba and Fanquan groups apparently led the charge. This attack
45. “[逃犯條例] 內地網軍「帝吧」提前「出征” (“[Rules on Fleeing Offenders] The Continental Cyber Army
‘Diba’ ‘attacks’ in advance”), KHO1.com (22 Jul. 2019), https://archive.vn/Yd3JY.
46. https://urlz.fr/ePsC.
47. “中國網軍揚言到香港FB 踩場 反被起底「所有」個人私隱” (“Chinese Cyber Citizens Threaten to
Trample Facebook in Hong-Kong but See Their “entire” Private Lives Exposed”), Unwire HK (Jul. 2019).
48. “中國網軍揚言到香港FB 踩場 反被起底「所有」個人私隱” (“Chinese Cyber Citizens Threaten to
Trample Facebook in Hong-Kong but See Their “Entire” Private Lives Exposed”); “饭圈女孩” (“The Girls of the
Fan Circle”), https://jikipedia.com/definition/679265533/.
49. In the West, the importance of media consumerism and the fascination generated by pop-stars and other
idols is seldom understood. This economy is also a very proactive social movement (with extremely organized online
groups) that does not hesitate to use its striking force to support their artists or, like in this case, conduct campaigns
against their adversaries.
50. https://jikipedia.com/definition/224758815. The term “a-zhong/a-zhong gene” stems from the fascinations
for Koreen stars and “o-ba”(欧巴) culture in Korea. O-Ba is a word used by girls to talk about a boy.
51. To this end, see the results for the search on this hashtag on Twitter: https://bit.ly/3oxEpyl.
52. In the coded language of Chinese Internet users, “520” (wuerling) means “I love you” and “666” is a word play
meaning “cool.”
53. See our archive: https://archive.md/CNqwGa.
510
was in fact a meme war meant to control the comment section on the adversary’s posts,
to stop them from disseminating thir version of events and even to block their page.
On August 15, Guancha (→ p. 491) wrote an article about this symbolic victory.54
Another wave of coordinated attacks reportedly took place on August 17.55 More than an
“offensive campaign,” this “operation” aimed to stimulate patriotism and was supported by
the pro-Beijing Hong Kong representative Junius Ho.56 The day before, Diba’s official Weibo
account issued a mobilization order. This message, “虽千万人吾往矣” (“even in the face of
ten million, I shall advance”), was a quote from the Confucian theorist Mencius. It accompa-
nied instructions on how to “defend the right of the Hong Kong police to arrest protesters”
(坚决支持香港警察依法拘捕暴徒). According to Guancha, who used screenshots as evi-
dence, these groups were organized around QQ groups and into “regiments” (团). For
the occasion “reinforcement” groups from China (阿中后援团) were formed.
In terms of content the groups’ administrators provided the “ammunitions” (阿中
后援): images of violent protesters, phrases and messages previously prepared in Chinese
and English.
It is worth noting that the members of these groups took up the
codes of Hong Kong protesters only to turn them against them.
For instance, echoing the “five demands” of the protesters,57
they issued “five positive demands” (5大正能量诉求 – see pic-
ture on the left): an end to violence (止暴制乱), the restoration
of order (恢复秩序), severe punishments for the rioters (严惩
暴徒), attack on lawlessness (打击违法), fair coverage of the
news (公正报道).
In parallel to this type of targeted content, Diba’s Twitter group
asked its subscribers to spread messages of support on the Hong Police Facebook and
Twitter groups.58
Of course these actions encountered difficulties: Facebook and Twitter are banned in
China. Diba and Fanquan “soldiers” had to “cross the wall” (翻墙 – a word used to
mean “go around the great Chinese firewall”). Diba’s Facebook page seemed to give
instructions and technical advice on how to do it (see below).59 Included among the
ammunition, were “instruction manuals on how to use foreign social media and meth-
ods to avoid the blocking attempts (spam accounts) of foreign social platforms” (针对各
大海外社交平台制作了扫盲教程、防封号教程).60 On Twitter (see below) one account
advised “young patriots” (爱国青年) to use a VPN (theoretically banned by the Chinese
54. “守护全世界最好的阿中” 饭圈女孩出征”开撕” 香港示威者 (18 Aug. 2019), http://www.guancha.cn/
politics/2019_08_15_513689.shtml.
55. http://www.guancha.cn/politics/2019_08_18_514016.shtml. The Diba account message, suspended since,
was posted at this address: https://twitter.com/D8China/status/1162365049303756801.
56. Ibid.
57. The “five demands” of the Hong Kong protesters were the total withdrawal of the draft bill, the withdrawal
of the word “rioters” used to describe the protests, the liberation of arrested protesters, the establishment of an
independent commission to investigate the level of violence inflicted by police during the protest of 12th June, and
finally Carrie Lam’s resignation and the implementation of universal suffrage for legislative elections and for the
election of the head of the executive.
58. https://twitter.com/D8China/status/1162705584702885893 (account suspended, last used on 24 Oct. 2019).
This is the content of the tweet recovered from our archives: “现在转移新战场‼id：香港警察Hong Kong Police‼
香港警察的FB主页，大家进去所有帖子留言支持香港警察‼ 没有fb账号的留战ins‼ 点赞全部友军‼不要理
fq‼ 撑港警别骂人现在转移新战场‼千万别骂人这是我们的人！”
59. 热血！昨夜，帝吧出征 (“Warm blood! Yesterday Evening, Diba Launched a Campaign”) (18 Aug. 2019),
https://new.qq.com/omn/20190818/20190818A03Q7C00.html.
60. Ibid.
511
authorities) and an “accelerator” (加速器) called “Ant Accelerator” (蚂蚁加速器) to cross
the wall and thus contribute to China’s defense. On Weibo, another account explained that
the government “tacitly blessed” these illegal practices (see below).
The scale of the “attacks” on August 14-18 was such that the Weibo account of
the official TV network CCTC took up the information. Many articles, idols and popular
Chinese social media accounts endorsed the initiative, calling on their members to spread
images of support.61 This wave of patriotism also included Chinese students abroad.62 The
organizers and articles dealing with this campaign asserted, while backing their claims with
screenshots, that they were able “to take control” of the comment sections of several
Facebook and Instagram pages belonging to Hong Kong media outlets or protest-
ers.63
The Chinese also deployed their narratives through pornographic accounts on Twitter,
Facebook and YouTube. The porn audiences of these accounts were no doubt easier targets
for Beijing’s pre-fabricated narratives, but also to skirt around the growing vigilance of
traditional platforms in regard to Beijing’s activities.64 Rejected on certain platforms,
Chinese intermediaries disseminating the Chinese narrative decided to use PornHub. This
platform is not allowed in China, so Chinese agents acting from the mainland also had to
use VPNs to “cross the wall.” One such account took the name “CCYL_central,”65 which
seemed to be a reference to the Communist Youth League (→ p. 72), even if there was
probably no link between the operators and the CYL. As on the traditional platforms, pro-
testers were compared to hooligans, or cockroaches, and the idea of democracy itself was
discredited with references to its alleged deficiencies and malfunctions.
E. Conclusion
Analyzing China’s actions on its traditional media outlets and the content disseminated
on different social networks, mainly Twitter, Facebook and TikTok, between July and
October 2019, allowed us to identify several characteristics:
61. Ibid. – 《新闻联播》播发央视快评: 乱港暴力已入穷途末路 (“Xinwen Lianbo (CCTV) Broadcasts
a Commentary: The Violence in Hong Kong ‘Has Come to an End’”) (18 Aug. 2019), https://news.sina.com.en/
c/2019-08_18/docihytcern1749313.shtml excerpt from CCTV.
62. “留学生合唱团、帝吧网友、饭圈女孩……有的出手，有的出征” (“An Overseas Student Choir, Diba
Users, Girls from the Fan Circle… Some Have Come Out, Some Have Gone on The Offensive!”), Xinhuanet (20
Aug. 2019), http//:www.xinhuanet.com/gangao/2019-08/20/c_1124895556.htm. See also http://www.guancha.en/
politics/2019_08_18_514016.shtml, which contains numerous photos of operations on Facebook or Instagram.
63. See their campaigns on Twitter with the hashtag “14亿人撑香港” (“1.4 Billion People Support Hong Kong”),
https//bit.ly/36rBL6U.
64. Jane Li, “China’s Messaging Against the Hong Kong Protests Has Found a New Outlet: Pornhub,” Quartz (13
Nov. 2019).
65. Ibid.
512
• The accounts were differentiated according to the effect sought: spam, dormant or
relay accounts with a complementary roles in disseminating anti-protester narratives.
• The approach focused on compiling very basic content but emphasizing their volume
to saturate the spaces of the target communities and play with their emotions.
• The modus operandi was relatively artisanal because they did not have the time to
mount a targeted operation and because events in Hong Kong accelerated, but this was
largely compensated by a multi-channel and pragmatic approach that used Twitter
and Facebook just as much as WeChat or TikTok.
• They showed a real ability to adapt themselves to Twitter’ repeated decisions to
delete waves of accounts, by adopting other approaches and other relays, notably via
communities that seemed apolitical at first sight, like the fans of celebrities. The cam-
paign led by Diba was the most sophisticated example of this in terms of its degree of
organization, its length, the aggressiveness of its members and its viral character.
• The Twittersphere and the “institutional relays” of official Chinese TV channels con-
verged, and even aligned themselves semantically. This is another indicator of a willing-
ness to coordinate informational operations.
513
Chapter 3
SINGAPORE
Singapore has an ambivalent relationship with China, which mixes proximity and dis-
trust, and several characteristics of the country make it both vulnerable and uniquely resil-
ient to Chinese influence.
I. Vulnerabilities
First, there are structural weaknesses such as its size. Singapore is a city-state that can
be toured in one day with a bicycle and this affects everything: “here everything is strategic:
there is no distinction between the tactical and the strategic.”66 This concentration, combined
with the country’s hyper-connectivity, means that online fake news can reach the entire
population within minutes. Besides, the widespread use of both English and Chinese
makes the Singaporean society easy to penetrate for foreign actors. Its dependence on imports
for all essential goods and its tense relationship with Malaysia (which is itself vulnerable
to radical Islam and more or less aligned with Beijing) are other exploitable weaknesses. In
fact, Beijing can use intermediaries based in Malaysia, for instance, to conduct disin-
formation operations against Singapore that would seem all the more credible as Singapore
and Malaysia have a tense relationship and because a number of informational operations
have already originated from Malaysia. Furthermore, there are precedents of known Chinese
groups paid to produce content in Malaysia, to target Taiwan especially (→ p. 367).
Yet, the main vulnerability lies in the very nature of Singapore’s multiethnic, cross-com-
munity society. These attributes are both a source of great richness and a lever easily acces-
sible to an ill-intentioned third-party actor. For now, cross-community tensions have been
avoided, but this harmony is never guaranteed and it requires proactive policies (such as the
constitutional revision that has allowed a Malay candidate to run for the presidency).67 A
terrorist attack could easily trigger such tensions. Indeed, among the improbable but high-im-
pact scenarios that must not be overlooked is the possibility of a terrorist attack targeting the
Chinese, which could subsequently serve as a pretext for Beijing to intervene.
Second, there are particular vulnerabilities in regard to China, primarily the pro-
portion of the population that is of Chinese descent: according to official statistics, 3.01 of
the 4.04 million inhabitants (74.5%) were Chinese in June 2020, 550,000 were Malays
66. From an interview with one of the authors, in Singapore (Nov. 2019).
67. The constitutional amendment allows a presidential election to be reserved for candidates from a particular
ethnic group if that group has not been represented in the presidency in the last five terms. This applies to all ethnic
groups: if there were a series of five non-”Chinese” presidents, the next election would be reserved for “Chinese”
candidates. See in particular Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s speech, “Race, multiracialism and Singapore’s place in
the world” (23 Sept. 2017).
514
(13.6%), 360,000, Indian (8.9%) and 130,000 classified as “others” (3.2%).68 This is why
Beijing’s main narrative describes Singapore as a “Chinese country” part of the
“Greater China” that owes its loyalty to China. For this precise reason, and to avoid being
assimilated into China’s orbit, Singapore has always been wary in its dealings with China.
For example, out of the five earliest ASEAN members, Singapore was the last to establish
diplomatic relations with China. However, the former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew (1959-
1990) contributed to the rapprochement by going to China frequently and by promoting, as
early as 1979, the use of simplified characters in Singapore to align it with mainland China.
The Chinese community is very organized, in clan associations for instance, a system
dating back to the early 19th century. More than 300 associations are officially registered in
Singapore. These serve as key institutions for “preserving a sense of Chinese identity and
kinship.”69 They organize cultural events, trips to China, etc. Older generations, who generally
have a stronger affinity with China, are more likely to be members of these associations.
Immigration from China keeps the proportion of the Chinese population in Singapore
at around 75%: their exact number is classified but there are an estimated 20,000 Chinese nat-
uralized in Singapore every year, and even more permanent residents. This flow contributes
to maintaining a Chinese majority because the community has the lowest birth rate there
(7.6 per 1000 in 2019, compared to 8.7 for Indians and 14 for Malaysians70). Chinese new-
comers, who retain their networks in mainland China, are an additional vector of influence.
For younger Singaporeans, who are less interested in clan associations, Chinese influence
is channeled mostly through its economic attractiveness. The youngest, born after the
Tian’anmen generation, have a tendency to see China solely as an opportunity and not as a
threat. The two economies are highly integrated: in the last two decades, Singapore has
increased its exports to China while reducing the ones to the United States, Europe and Japan.
Hence, the most powerful vector of Chinese influence is neither clan-based nor cultural,
but economic, with professional organizations, notably the Chinese Singapore Chamber of
Commerce and the Singapore Business Federation. “The PRC exerts leverage over Singapore
businessmen by making it harder for them to get contracts, licenses, permits, loans, etc – espe-
cially in the real estate sector, where Singaporeans hold significant investments in China.”71 Those
doing business in China are in fact questioned by Chinese intelligence services, which extract
negative information that could damage the Singaporean government. They also give business-
men key elements of speech that are printed on little cards and need to be disseminated by
them.72 The Chamber of Commerce and the Business Federation have also created the Chinese
Development Assistance Council, which offers scholarships to study in China, among other
actions. The Confucius Institute of the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), inaugu-
rated in 2005 – one of the first in the world (→ p. 300) – had only 200 students in 2006, but
7,000 in 2020.
Beijing can also count on media and individual relays. On the one hand, Xinhua has
a local office, China Daily has a supplement in the weekend edition of The Straits Times and
there are local Chinese-speaking media, such as Lianbe Zaobao, a daily newspaper created
in 1983 that has become the largest Chinese-speaking media in the city-state. On the other
hand, certain influential and notoriously pro-Chinese voices regularly intervene in the pub-
68. “Resident Population by Ethnic Group, Age Group and Sex Dashboard,” Department of Statistics, Singapore,
https://bit.ly/39G0CpP.
69. Russell Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Singapore,” China Brief, 19:13 (16 Jul. 2019).
70. “Number of Babies Born in Singapore Rises Slightly After 8-year Low,” Channel News Asia (28 Jul. 2020).
71. Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey.”
72. Description given by one of our contacts in Singapore who had seen these cards.
515
lic debate, including Kishore Mahbubani. In July 2017, as dean of the Lee Kuan Yew
School of Public Policy of the National University of Singapore, he published an op-ed in
The Straits Times calling for Singapore, “a small State” which he compares to Qatar, to be
more cautious in its relations with Beijing.73
Another, often under-estimated, vulnerability of Singapore is its approach to human
rights, since Beijing can prove a natural ally in the face of the hegemony of Western values
that are presented as universal (i.e. the debate on Asian Values).
In this context, Beijing’s objective “is to impose a Chinese identity on Singapore
so that it will align more closely with the PRC’s expanding interests.”74 In concrete terms
Beijing wants Singapore to stop training its armed forces in Taiwan (see the Terrex
Affair below), to stop speaking of the freedom of navigation, and to further develop
its trade with China. For example, Beijing wants a Chinese company to build the high-
speed Singapore-Kuala Lumpur railway. Singapore refused, asking the Chinese to respond
to the call for tenders like everyone else. Beijing responded by canceling a ministerial visit.
Consequently, the main narratives conveyed in Chinese operations targeting
Singapore are the following: “Singapore is a country of Chinese culture if not altogether a
Chinese country”; “it is a small country that can’t afford to be arrogant or make an enemy out
of the Chinese juggernaut”; “It is a country that has not had a strong leadership since Lee
Kuan Yew (unlike his father, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong underestimates the importance
of the relationship with Beijing)”; “the country is too close to a declining United States, while
China represents the future (it would be in Singapore’s interest to align itself with Beijing)”;
and “Singapore shouldn’t meddle in the debate on the South China Sea.”
II. The Terrex Affair: taking pledges
Since 1975, and for lack of space at home, Singapore has trained its land army
in southern Taiwan. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1990,
Singapore has had a tacit agreement with Beijing which, while asking Singapore to use
Hainan instead of Taiwan, never turned the issue into a problem because Singapore kept
a low profile (notably by making their military wear Taiwanese uniforms when they are
there75) and respected the One-China policy.76 However, on November 23, 2016, Hong
Kong customs seized nine military Terrex armored vehicles belonging to Singapore
that were transiting in a commercial carrier to Singapore from Taiwan, where they had
taken part in military exercises. The transit was routine: Singapore has been transiting its
military vehicles, on the way back from exercises in Taiwan, through Hong Kong since the
1990s and it had never been a problem. Furthermore, this military equipment benefits from
an immunity and cannot legally be confiscated or withheld by the authorities of another
state.77 This did not prevent Beijing, via Hong Kong, from doing so.
The spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reminded Singapore that
states which have diplomatic relations with China must abstain from “[having] any form of
73. Kishore Mahbubani, “Qatar: Big Lessons from a Small Country,” The Straits Times (1 Jul. 2017).
74. Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey.”
75. Eric Frécon, L’Influence sécuritaire chinoise à Singapour (The Chinese Security Influence in Singapore), IRSEM
Report #85, August 2021, p. 48, n. 12.
76. Angela Poh and Chang Jun Yan, “The Terrex Fallacies,” The Straits Times (6 Dec. 2016).
77. Sébastien Roblin, “Singapore’s YouTubers Took on China Over Seized Armored Vehicles,” medium.com (26 Jan. 2017).
516
official exchanges with Taiwan, including military exchanges and cooperation.”78 Chinese
media, particularly the Global Times, took over after the ministry. They exhorted Singapore
to abandon its military training in Taiwan – unless it wanted to see its relationship with
China deteriorate. The affair generated tensions between China and Singapore until the
eventual restitution of the vehicles on January 30, 2017. In this interval, a disinformation
campaign hit Singapore using dormant accounts (inactive for a long time before they
were suddenly awakened), according to a Singaporean social media analyst.79
Truly, this was not an isolated case or a random occurrence: Hong Kong customs
officers seized the containers carrying the Terrex vehicles at a moment when Beijing was
ostensibly looking for a way to heighten the pressure on Singapore. The relationship
had been deteriorating for almost a year.80 In December 2015, a strengthened cooperation
defense agreement between the U.S. and Singapore, which notably involved the deploy-
ment of US Navy P-8A Poseidon military airplanes in Singapore, was not well-received by
Beijing. In June 2016, the absence of the Singaporean Minister of Foreign Affairs Vivian
Balakrishnan at a joint ASEAN-China press conference in Kunming was also noted. In
September, the Global Times accused Singapore of having tried to raise the issue of freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea and The Hague’s verdict on the matter at a summit of
the Non-Aligned Movement in Venezuela. The attempt, according to the Party’s newspa-
per, was immediately blocked by many countries.81 The Singaporean ambassador to China,
Stanley Loh, protested against this “fabricated” information. Responding to the ambassa-
dor, Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of the Global Times, attacked Singapore for siding with
the Philippines and Vietnam on the conflictyal South China Sea, and accused the country
of hosting U.S. warplanes “aimed at China.”82 On October 1, General Jin Yinan (金一南)
of the PLA National Defense University went further, declaring on Chinese national radio
(CNR) that Singapore had been meddling for years in affairs which are none of its concerns
(the South China Sea) and advising Washington on the subject. He believed that “[it was]
inevitable for China to strike back at Singapore, and not just on the public opinion
front… Since Singapore has gone thus far, we have got to do something, be it retaliation
or sanction.”83
The Terrex affair thus crowned a series of incidents in a tense bilateral relation.
This sequence itself was not coincidental: its climax, the Terrex affair, came exactly one
year before Singapore’s chairmanship of the ASEAN (November 2017), and coincided
with Singapore’s coordination of the ASEAN-China Dialogue (2015-2018). From
Beijing’s point of view it was necessary to remind the city-state about “who was in charge,”
particularly on the topic of freedom of navigation, and especially after Singapore had called
for the implementation of The Hague’s decision rendered in July 2016. During this period
Singaporeans were bombarded with YouTube videos in Mandarin and clan associ-
ations subjected to particularly intense pressure, always with the same narrative:
Singapore “must stay in its place” as a “Chinese country” which must not rely on
the United States; besides, the ASEAN was presented as worthless without China.84
78. Han Fook Kwang, “What’s Behind Singapore’s Latest Run-Ins with Beijing,” The Straits Times (14 Dec. 2016).
79. From an interview conducted by one of the authors in Singapore (Aug. 2019).
80. William Choong, “Shining the Spotlight on Starlight,” The Straits Times (30 Nov. 2016).
81. Leng Shumei, “FM Calls on Singapore to Respect China’s Sea Stance,” Global Times (28 Sept. 2016).
82. “Singapore Accuses Chinese Paper of Fabricating South China Sea Story,” Reuters (27 Sept. 2016).
83. Minnie Chan, “Chinese Defense Adviser Turns Up Heat on Singapore Over South China Sea Row,” South China
Morning Post (1 Oct. 2016). This article has been archived and is behind a pay-wall.
84. From an interview conducted in Singapore by one of the authors (Aug. 2019). The same information had
evidently been conveyed to RAND researchers in an on-site interview a few months earlier: Scott W. Harold, Nathan
517
Singapore has since scaled down its Taiwanese training exercises from 15,000 to 6,000
men (which is also explained by a downsized military service) and is planning to move them
to Australia, where training facilities should be available in 2022. The episode contributed
to the authorities’ and the public’s growing awareness of the city-state’s vulnera-
bility to Chinese influence, or even interference. Since then, this question has been
discussed with growing frequency in public.
The nine Terrex vehicles seized in Hong Kong.85
III. The cases of Huang Jing and Jun Wei “Dickson” Yeo
In the past few years, two cases of Chinese espionage in Singaporean academic circles
have received media attention. The first concerns Huang Jing (黄靖). Born in China in 1956,
educated in both China (masters at Fudan University) and the United States (PhD at Harvard),
he is an American citizen who lived and worked for twenty years in the United States, occupying
different positions in universities and research centers, including Stanford and the Brookings
Institution, before joining the prestigious Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National
University of Singapore, serving as director for the Center on Asia and Globalization as well as
the Lee Foundation Professor on US-China Relations. In parallel, Huang was an analyst for the
Chinese press agency Xinhua. In August 2017, he was accused by the Singaporean Ministry of
the Interior of being “an agent of influence for a foreign state” that was not identified; he and
his wife were expelled from the country (with their residency permits revoked). They went to
China where, since 2019, Huang Jing has been the dean of the Institute for International and
Regional Studies at the Beijing Language and Culture University.
The second case is less ambiguous: it was tried in U.S. courts.86 It involved Jun Wei
“Dickson” Yeo (杨俊伟), born in Singapore in 1981. He may also have been linked to the
previous case as he was one of Huang’s PhD students at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy. This link led Bilahari Kausikan, an ex-diplomat and a major figure in the Singaporean
foreign policy debate, to declare that it was Huang Jing who had Yeo recruited by Chinese
intelligence services, something Huang denied.87 Yeo was recruited by Chinese intelli-
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Chinese Disinformation Efforts on Social Media, RAND Corporation, 2021, p.
82. For the authors, the fact that these videos were published exclusively in Chinese (simplified and traditional) suggests
that they were specifically targeted at Singaporean clan associations.
85. https://www/straitstimes.com/sites/default/articles/2016/11/29/40657903_-_24_11_2016_-_jcarmoured25.jpg.
86. United States of America vs June Wei Yeo, also known as Dickson Yeo, defendant. Us District Court for the
District of Columbia (https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1297451/download).
87. Rei Kurochi, “Ex-diplomat Bilahari Kausikan Rebuts Huang Jing’s Denial that he Recruited Singaporean
Dickson Yeo as Spy,” The Straits Times (29 Jul. 2020).
518
gence in 2015 through Chinese think tanks which invited and paid Yeo to write reports.
He quickly came to understand that these “scholars” were in fact intelligence officers. He
was debriefed during frequent trips to China and online via WeChat. Initially used to transmit
information about South-East Asia, he was reoriented toward the United States, where he had
previously studied, he subsequently lived in DC for several months in 2019. His mission was
to collect information and to recruit U.S. sources, which he did through LinkedIn and by
creating a fake consultancy agency that put out job offers in order to collect CVs.
In this way he came into contact with U.S. military member and officials with access to
confidential information. He would ask them to write reports in exchange for money.88 A
U.S. Army officer working at the Pentagon was hence hired to write a report, allegedly for
private Asian clients, on the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences for
China. This work was paid $2,000, which was wired to the officer’s wife’s account to avoid
raising suspicion. An agent from the State Department also became entrapped by writing a
report about a member of the U.S. Cabinet. Yeo’s Chinese handlers asked him to go further
by trying to recruit the U.S. officer so that he could transmit different, more confidential,
information this time. But Yeo was arrested when he landed in the U.S. in November 2019,
precisely to do that. He pleaded guilty of espionage during his trial and was sentenced to 14
months in jail. After serving his sentence, he went back to Singapore, where he was arrested
by the Internal Security Department on the day of his arrival (December 30, 2020).89
IV. Resilience
Chinese influence is not a new problem for Singapore, which had defended itself from
it during the 1950s and 1960s “when People’s Republic of China (PRC) leaders sought to
export communist revolution to Southeast Asia.”90 Singapore has always been able to offer a
nimble resistance. Its defense rests on the development of a counter-narrative where a
unique national identity, one that is multicultural and multi-racial, “is closely managed
as an existential issue by Singapore’s ruling elites.”91 It defends the singular identity of Chinese
Singaporeans compared to other Chinese identities in the world and, of course, to the way
Beijing views this identity. For instance, to counter – or at least to compensate for – the cre-
ation in 2012 of the Chinese Cultural Center, the Singaporean government created its own
“Singapore” Chinese cultural center in 2017. It promotes the idea of “a vibrant Singapore
Chinese culture, rooted in a cohesive, multi-racial society,” and during his speech at the cen-
ter’s inauguration Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long emphasized that “Chinese in Singapore are
very different from the Chinese in China, in terms of both history and identity.”92
If three quarters of the population are theoretically “Chinese,” the vast majority
of them feel Singaporean, speak English (many only speak very imperfect Mandarin),
have a largely Western, Asian and non-Chinese culture (Taiwanese and Korean singers are
far more popular in Singapore than Chinese singers). In spite of Beijing’s efforts there
is very little cultural penetration. Chinese influence on Chinese-speaking media is rela-
88. Michael Yong, “How a Singaporean Man Went from NUS PhD Student to Working for Chinese Intelligence in
the US,” Channel News Asia (25 Jul. 2020).
89. Cara Wong, “Singaporean Dickson Yeo, Who Spied for China in the US, Arrested by ISD Upon His Return,”
The Straits Time (31 Dec. 2020).
90. Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey.”
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
519
tively limited because of the already tight control Singapore exerts on all outlets. Ultimately
money and business ties remain the main vulnerabilities.
Moreover, in recent years, people have grown cognizant to the risks posed by
Chinese influence in Singapore, in the course of several episodes: the Terrex Affair in
2016, the Huang Jing Affair in 2017, the departure the same year of Mahbubani, whose
op-ed on the “small state” generated controversy, and also the hack on the Ministry of
Health (between June 27 and July 4, 2018). 1.5 million patients’ medical files were stolen,
among which were that of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong who was “specifically and
repeatedly targeted.”93 The attack was never attributed but, according to some sources, the
incident may have been a response to the Huang espionage affair to find compromising
information on the Prime Minister and blackmail him, or simply to undermine him. The
attackers found nothing however.
Meanwhile, Bilahari Kausikan, a former ambassador and permanent secretary of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published several articles in The Straits Times in June and July
2018. In these, he called on Singaporeans to “be aware” when Beijing is trying to manipulate
them and not to “trust oversimplified narratives.”94 He wrote that “China uses a range
of tactics – from legitimate diplomacy to more covert and often illegal deployment
of agents of influence and operations – to sway decision makers or public opinion
leaders.”95 He believes that these operations against Singapore were intended “not
just to direct behavior, but to condition behavior. China does not just want you to
comply with its wishes, it wants you to… do what it wants without being told.”96
He also noted that “[o]ur identity, based in the idea of multiculturalism and meritocracy,
is under pressure. There are centrifugal forces trying to pull us apart”, and went on to cite
China’s attempts to “assert the Chinese identity on multiracial Singapore.”97 These interven-
tions inspired others afterward.98
A year later Russell Hsiao published an often-mentioned report on Chinese influ-
ence operations in Singapore.99 China reacted through its embassy, dismissing the claims
as “absurd.” But the report was benefitial as it liberated the discussion on the subject in
Singapore: the topic remains touchy but it is well-documented and, with the accumulation
of scandals since 2016, which are frequently analyzed in more and more details, the subject
has become unavoidable and easier to talk about.
Finally, the Singaporean government is acutely aware of its vulnerabilities, partic-
ularly in regard to national unity, and regularly takes measures against what a 2013 report
called “corrosive speech.”100 Unlike hate speech, it targets certain communities, and can
easily be instrumentalized, possibly by a third state, to create inter-community tensions.
For example, the Internet website TheRealSingapore.com was shut down in May 2015 by
the Media Regulation Authority (MDA) because some articles threatened public order and
93. Kevin Kwang, “Singapore Health System Hit by Most ‘Serious Breach of Personal Data’ in Cyberattack; PM
Lee’s Data Targeted,” Channel News Asia (20 Jul. 2018).
94. Charissa Yong, “S’poreans Should be Aware of China’s Influence Ops: Bilahari,” The Straits Times (28 Jun. 2018).
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Yasmine Yahya, “Staying Aware of Foreign Influence Best Form of Defense for Singapore: Bilahari,” The Straits
Times (20 Jul. 2018).
98. Including Simon Tay, “Inoculating Singapore Against Foreign Influences,” The Straits Times (26 Jul. 2018).
99. Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey.”
100. Carol Soon at Tan Tarn How, Corrosive Speech: What Can Be Done, a Report from the Institute of Policy Studies,
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (2013).
520
national harmony. The MDA accused the website of “inciting hostile sentiment toward
foreigners in Singapore.”
In combating information manipulation, Singapore is one of the most advanced
and well-informed states in the world. Its officials travel a lot, and are willing to learn
from the experience of their foreign counterparts, in Europe, North America and Australia
in particular. The Center of Excellence for National Security (CENS) of the RSIS also
organizes an annual international symposium on these questions which has become one
of the largest meeting of that kind globally, particularly because it brings together experts
from different geographical areas (Euro-Atlantic and Asian regions). For all these reasons,
Singapore, along with Sweden, can be considered among the best prepared states
in the fight against information manipulation, and even against hybrid threats in general.
521
Chapter 4
SWEDEN
Why is China interested in Sweden? Generally, China takes an interest in all Nordic
countries, that is to say Denmark (with the Faeroe Islands and Greenland), Finland,
Norway, Iceland and Sweden, to which China has been proposing for several years, in
vain for now, to meet in a “5+1” format modeled on the “17+1” group with states from
Central and Eastern Europe (→ p. 310). China considers these countries to be a double
entryway, toward the Arctic first (Sweden has hosted a Chinese satellite station in its far
northern reaches since 2006 – this is China’s first fully-owned station1), and then toward
the EU, because it has a longstanding relationship with these countries (Sweden, Denmark
and Finland, in that order, were among the first Western countries to establish diplomatic
relations with the PRC in 1950) and because they “are politically stable, pro-free trade and,
importantly, described as less suspicious toward China than many other ‘Western’ coun-
tries.’”2
Inauguration of the Chinese satellite station in Kiruna on December 15, 2016.3
They have the advantage of offering both a regulatory environment that is not
very restrictive, even permissive, for foreign investment, and leading technology
sectors, with some of the world’s most innovative companies. And this combination is
valuable. As Heather Conley and James Lewis showed, “China remains dependent on
the West for advanced technology, and it uses four techniques to acquire it: (1)
forced technology transfers as a prerequisite to conducting business in China; (2)
placement of students and workers in universities and companies in the West; (3)
1. The “China Remote Sensing Satellite North Polar Ground Station” is located in Kiruna. All the other Chinese
satellite stations in the world, notably in Africa and North America, are joint-ventures: Stephen Chen, “China Launches
its First Fully Owned Overseas Satellite Ground Station Near North Pole,” South China Morning Post (16 Dec. 2016).
2. Jerker Hallström, China’s Political Priorities in the Nordic Countries: from Technology to Core Interests, Policy brief, 12
(2016), Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (2016), 2.
3. Keegan Elmer, “Swedish Defense Agency Warns Satellite Station Could be Serving Chinese Military,” South
China Morning Post (14 Jan. 2019).
522
cyber espionage; and (4) the acquisition of foreign firms.”4 In Nordic countries
China mostly uses economic espionage, as it does elsewhere – except in local universities
(China lacks the critical number of Chinese students it has in Australia or Canada for
example), but also the acquisition of local businesses, as a privileged way of accessing
technologies.
If “the primary motive for Chinese investment in the Nordics is commercial,”
strategic interests are never far behind: it can be illustrated by investments in “semi-
conductors and munitions-related technology as well as emerging technology such
as FinTech, GreenTech, BioTech and MaritimeTech.”5 The acquisitions of Awilco in
Norway (2008), which produces drilling equipment among other things, of Volvo Cars
in Sweden (2010) and of Elkem, dealing with the production of silicon, silicone and
carbon materials, in Norway (2011). They still rank among China’s most important
purchases in Europe.
In this region, Sweden has generated the greatest Chinese interest because it is par-
ticularly innovative and has a strong start-up culture. “Sweden is China’s Nordic Hub6”
and it attracted the highest levels of Chinese investment in Europe ($3.6 billion) in 2018,
far ahead of other countries ($1.6 billion in the United Kingdom, 1.5 in Germany and 1.4
in France).7 When the Chinese Geely purchased Volvo Cars in 2010 – one of the most
important Chinese acquisitions in Europe and North America – and invested in Volvo AB
(which makes trucks and buses) in 2018, it made an impression in Sweden and internation-
ally. A peak in acquisitions was reached in 2017 (with 13 majority acquisitions, out of
51 in total from 2002 to 2019)8. By 2019, there had been a total of 65 (51 majority and 14
minority) Chinese acquisitions of Swedish companies. And, in November 2019, more than
1,000 companies declared that they were, in effect, owned by a Chinese or Hong Kong
citizen9.
Beijing has taken a notable interest in firms that develop dual-use technologies,
i.e. for both civilian and military uses. For instance, Chinese companies have purchased
three Swedish semiconductor businesses, including Silex Microsystems (by a company with
ties to the Chinese defense sector), and Chematur, a spin-off of the ammunition manu-
facturer Nobel which stands at “the center of Sweden’s defense industrial base”10 (by the
Wanhua group). The government’s China strategy, presented in September 2019, confirms
that CCP intelligence activities in Sweden are not only significant but also focused
on acquiring military technologies, in addition to intelligence on Swedish military capa-
bilities. It also mentioned that the Chinese satellite station in northern Sweden could also
be used for military intelligence.11
4. Heather A. Conley and James A. Lewis, Chinese Technology Acquisitions in the Nordic Region, Center for Strategic &
International Studies (CSIS), 20.
5. Ibid., 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 3.
8. Oscar Almén, Johan Englund, and Jerker Hellström, Survey of Chinese Corporate Acquisitions in Sweden, Swedish
Defense Research Agency (FOI), November 2019, (in Swedish: https://www.foi.se/en/foi/reports/reportsummary.
html?reportNO=FOI+Memo+6903).
9. Ibid. A large number of these 1,000 companies were Chinese restaurants owned by Chinese citizens who lives
in Sweden. Only a small minority of them were actually Chinese companies based in China and Hong Kong acquiring
Swedish companies.
10. Conley and Lewis, Chinese Technology Acquisitions, 7-8
11. Elmer, “Swedish Defense Agency Warns.”
523
I. A typical case of a “Machiavellian moment”
For a long time, China invested a good deal in its relationship with Sweden and the
Swedish public opinion was rather favorable, since China meant new jobs. But then the
Party entered in a “Machiavellian moment” with the appointment of a new ambas-
sador in August 2017: Gui Congyou (桂从友), apparently tasked with dominating the
public debate. He quickly showed himself to be aggressive (some observors acknowledged
a turning point in early 2018), attacking the media, journalists, the government, political
parties, scholars, and denying visas with the aim of enticing fear and self-censorship.
The ambassador’s profile is revealing: Gui Gonyou admitted that he did not know any-
thing about Sweden when he was appointed, that he had never visited the country, and that
he had never had a Swedish friend.12 He even declared in February 2020 that “he did not
know why he had been sent to Sweden.”13 However, he speaks very good Russian and he
is an expert on Russia: the earlier part of his career alternated between Moscow, where he
was posted twice and he remained for about 10 years, and Beijing, where he kept a close eye
on Russian affairs for the ministry, often accompanying Xi Jinping during his diplomatic
visits to countries in the former USSR. He was one of the main instigators of the Xi-Putin
summits and he attended at all high-level meetings between Chinese and Russian leaders.
In Stockholm, the ambassador multiplied attacks and threatening statements,
especially against the media. He even talked of “the tyranny of the media.”14 On tele-
vision he likened Swedish media criticizing China to a “48-kilogram lightweight boxer who
starts a fight with an 86-kilogram heavyweight boxer, who out of kindness and good-
will urges the (smaller) boxer to take care of himself.” This provoked a reaction from
the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who interpreted the ambassador’s words as an
“unacceptable threat” and an attempt to intimidate, and incidentally to muzzle, the press.15
The embassy also publishes a lot on its own site: during 2019, it published at least 74 neg-
ative comments on Swedish media, most of them in reaction to publications perceived to
express criticism of China.16 Gui Congyou maintains constant pressure on the media,
inviting some journalists to lunch to comment on how they cover China, sending protest
emails himself when he doesn’t like an article.
These practices were documented and analyzed by journalist Patrik Oksanen, head
of the Center for Influence and Disinformation Analysis at the think tank Frivärld, in a
September 2020 study titled China’s attacks to silence critics.17 When conducted a follow-up
analysis a year later, he found that the embassy’s tactics had changed. In an August 2021
report entitled The Dragon’s Changing Tactics, he noted that the frequency of public statements
on the embassy’s website appeared to have decreased, with the emphasis shifting to direct,
intimidating and even threatening letters to journalists, experts and MPs.18 Already,
in a survey made public in January 2020, at least four of Sweden’s largest media groups
(Svenska Dagbladet, Expressen, Sveriges Radio and Sveriges Television) said they had been
12. “今日头条：桂从友大使接受瑞典三家华文媒体集体采访” (“Today’s Headline: Ambassador Gui
Congyou Gives a Group Interview to Three Chinese Media Outlets in Sweden”), Chineseonline.se, (12 Oct. 2017).
13. Birgitta Forsberg, “Ambassadören: ‘Sverige inte viktigt nog att hota,’” Svenska Dagbladet (30 Jan. 2020).
14. Statement from the Embassy of China in Sweden (22 Jun. 2018).
15. Jari Tanner, “Sweden Summons Chinese Envoy Over ‘Lightweight Boxer’ Remark,” Associated Press (18 Jan.
2020).
16. “China’s large-scale media push: Attempts to influence Swedish media,” SVT Nyheter (19 Jan. 2020).
17. Patrik Oksanen, Kinas Attacker För Att Tysta Kritiker, Frivärld (Sept. 2020).
18. Patrik Oksanen and Jesper Lehto, Draken Som Bytte Taktik, Frivärld (Aug. 2021).
524
contacted and criticized repeatedly by the Chinese embassy – some of the language used,
in letters and emails, was threatening.19 And, in April 2021, Jojje Olsson, a Swedish jour-
nalist based in Taiwan who has long been a target of the Chinese authorities, received yet
another email from the Chinese embassy, clearly threatening him: “we ask you to stop your
wrongful actions immediately, otherwise you will end up facing the consequences of your
actions.”20 In order to denounce and counter this practice, the think tank Frivärld launched
a campaign on social networks, calling on the recipients of these messages to testify using
the hashtag #Kinabrev.
This behavior is not exclusive to the embassy: Swedish journalists we met said that
they were victims of intimidation tactics from Chinese diplomats but also from various
Chinese associations, including student associations, which demanded that the journalists
stop writing about specific topics. Some journalists were even followed by car to their
homes.21
This pressure goes far beyond the media: for instance, the embassy convinced the
Sheraton Stockholm hotel to cancel the celebration of the Taiwanese national holiday in
October 2019, even though it had hosted the event for more than a decade. The celebration
was finally hosted by the Swedish History Museum, which resisted the embassy’s pressure.22
China’s aggressive turn in Sweden has been consequential since 2018: the Sino-
Swedish relationship has considerably deteriorated. The Chinese ambassador has been
summoned by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs nearly forty times since he was
appointed. In late 2019, several MPs demanded his expulsion. Then again in 2021 after
the journalist Jojje Olsson was threatened by the Chinese embassy: several Swedish pol-
iticians then again called for the expulsion of the ambassador.23 Sweden was also the
first European country to close all its Confucius Institutes (the last in December 2019
and the last Classroom in April 2020).24 Sweden eventually rewrote its “China strategy,”
which was presented to the national parliament in September 2019, and it created a cen-
ter for China Studies (along with another privately-funded institution) to better anticipate
challenges posed by China’s growing influence. Even the city of Gothenburg, the second
largest in the country, home to Volvo, and where China is omnipresent (to the extent that
restaurant and service personnel are trained to speak Chinese), has cancelled its twin
city program with Shanghai in April 2020 – a 34-year-old partnership. In October 2020,
the Swedish Post and Telecommunications Authority (PTS) banned equipment from
Chinese companies (Huawei, ZTE) in its ongoing call for tenders on the 5G infrastruc-
ture (a decision confirmed in January 2021 by the Administrative Court in Stockholm,
which rejected Huawei’s appeal). The government is increasingly distrustful of China, once
seen only as an economic boon, but now perceived as a national security threat. China’s
public approval plummeted with 49% of unfavorable opinion in 2017, 52% in 2018, 70%
in 2019, 85% in 2020, and 80% in 2021. Nowadays, out of the 34 countries surveyed, only
the Japanese hold more negative opinions on China than the Swedes (→ p. 191).25 From
a regional perspective, far from being tempted by the Chinese proposition of a “5+1” for-
19. “China’s large-scale media push.”
20. Journalistförbundet, “Vi fördömer Kina-angrepp mot Jojje Olsso” (13 Apr. 2021).
21. From an interview in Stockholm conducted by one of the authors (Feb. 2020).
22. Birgitta Forsberg, “Kina Pressade Sheraton att nobba Taiwaneser,” Svenska Dagbladet (3 Oct. 2019).
23. Hannah Somerville, “China’s Embassy in Sweden under Fire over ‘Threats’ to Journalists,” Euronews (12 Apr. 2021).
24. Oliver Moody, “Swedes Axe China-backed Confucius School Scheme as Relations Sour,” The Times (21 Apr. 2020).
25. Pew Research Center, Global Indicators Database, Opinion of China (2019). Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine
Huang, “Large Majorities Say China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms of Its People,” Pew Research Center
(30 Jun. 2021).
525
mat, the Nordics are considering organizing themselves against Chinese influence in a “5
against 1” format.
In September 2021, the Chinese embassy in Stockholm finally announced the departure
of Ambassador Gui Congyou, who was recalled to Beijing. This announcement was wel-
comed in Sweden with a certain relief (expressed on social networks by journalists, research-
ers and political leaders26), but without naivety as to his successor who could follow in his
footsteps if Beijing wishes. His record is objectively disastrous. Since the end of 2017, he
has unpicked the relationship his predecessors had built. “By launching a combative campaign
ill-adapted to local conditions, China appears to have shot itself in the foot.”27 How can it
be explained? First, as Jerdén and Bohman showed, his priority was not to seduce the
Swedes but the CCP: “[his] actions may [have been] motivated by a desire to impress supe-
riors in Beijing. By vocally propagating China’s narrative abroad, he [put] his embassy in the
spotlight and positioned it as a front runner in Xi Jinping’s mission to increase China’s global
influence over media and ‘tell China’s story well.’”28 This is an overall feature of the phenom-
enon of “wolf warrior” diplomats – which we presented in the third part (→ p. 222). Gui
Gonyou was one of its precursors. Then, the ambassador’s lack of understanding of lib-
eral democracies – his experience abroad being exclusively Russian – very likely contributed
to his haphazardeous crisis management and in underestimating the negative consequences
of an overly aggressive behavior in Sweden for China. The embassy should have foreseen that
Sweden, being one of the most hostile countries toward the CCP and toward authoritarianism
in general, was also likely to resist this pressure.
Beyond the personality of the ambassador, Sweden is debating whether the country
was chosen as a testing ground for a more aggressive strategy that China could ulti-
mately generalize globally. Why Sweden? There are several reasons:
• Sweden is the right size: small enough not to be a threat, with no diaspora-related
issues (there were only 31,700 people of Chinese origin in Sweden in 2017, 10,000 more
than in 2009, and 2,671 students),29 but large enough to be significant, in any case for
Europe.
• Sweden is a world champion of democratic and liberal values, one of the leaders
in terms of “soft power diplomacy.”30 The country always tops rankings (thus the cul-
tural shock experienced by the Chinese ambassador when he arrived in a country sys-
tematically in the top five of RSF’s Freedom of the Press rankings, whereas China is in
the bottom five or three out of 180 countries). Sweden is then a symbol, a model to
be broken (with the idea that if China achieves this, the foundations of all democracies
can be shaken at their core).
• Linked to this, this is also a state that is among the most vehement critics of human
rights violations in China. From this point of view, going after Sweden was an opportu-
nity to demonstrate that criticizing China comes at a cost. This is a message for the
world and especially for Europeans.
26. Anne-Françoise Hivert, “En Suède, l’ambassadeur chinois s’en va dans un climat de tensions” (“In Sweden, the
Chinese ambassador leaves in a climate of tension”), Le Monde (27 Sept. 2021), 6.
27. Björn Jerdén and Viking Bohman, China’s Propaganda Campaign in Sweden, 2018-2019, Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, 4 (2019), 11.
28. Ibid, 8.
29. Interview of one of the authors with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), in Stockholm (Feb. 2020).
30. Elise Carlson-Rainer, “Sweden is a World Leader in Peace, Security, and Human Rights,” World Affairs, 180:4
(2017), 79-85.
526
• Sweden is one of China’s main rivals in certain key industrial sectors, including
5G infrastructures, batteries and trucks.
• There were already several irritating issues in their bilateral relations: the most
infamous being the Gui Minhai (桂敏海) affair, involving a Swedish citizen detained in
China since 2015 (see box below). But also Peter Dhalin, a Swedish human rights activ-
ist, who was kidnapped and incarcerated for 23 days in China in 2016, and was forced
to confess on television.31 The “hostage diplomacy” practiced by China has left traces
in Sweden. There was also the Qiao Jianjun (乔建军) affair, which involved a former
civil servant who became one of China’s most wanted fugitives, allegedly for corruption
(he was accused of misappropriating millions of dollars). He was arrested in Sweden at
Beijing’s request in August 2018, but Stockholm refused to extradite him (the Swedish
Supreme Court held that this would be a violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights, since he would risk death, torture and/or other inhuman or degrading
treatment). He was freed in June 2019 and re-arrested five days later at the request of the
United States, which was also looking for Qiao. He was extradited to the United States
in late May 2020.
• Finally, Sweden – which hosted the Dalai Lama in September 2018 – has granted asy-
lum to Uyghur, Tibetan and Falun Gong refugees, i.e. Beijing’s main targets. This
was confirmed by a series of spying cases in these communities: in 2010, a Uyghur
refugee was condemned to 16 months in prison on charges of spying for China (he had
infiltrated the Uyghur World Congress and provided information to a Chinese intelli-
gence officer posing as a diplomat)32; in 2018 a Tibetan refugee was also condemned to
22 months in jail on charges of espionage in the service of China (he had infiltrated the
Swedish Tibetan community and was transmitting information to a Chinese intelligence
officer in Poland).33
For Beijing the objective is to make Sweden submit by limiting its freedom of expres-
sion, notably on the “five poisons” while sending a warning shot at other countries,
especially in Europe. But this has completely failed: instead of giving in, Sweden has
resisted and the consequence has simply been the deterioration of bilateral relations and of
China’s image in Sweden.
In any case, the Swedish case is both an opportunistic test and a symptom of a
worldwide evolution in the behavior of China: the same happened in Canada (→ p. 537),
Australia, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Among them, there are differences of inten-
sity but not of nature. The Swedish case is particularly spectacular because of preexisting
tensions in the bilateral relations, but this announces a larger turning point and was inter-
preted as such, even in 2018.34 We call this turning point the Chinese “Machiavellian
moment” (→ p. 619).
31. Tom Phillips, “A Human Rights Activist, a Secret Prison and a Tale from Xi Jinping’s New China,” The Guardian
(3 Jan. 2017).
32. “‘Uyghur Spy’ for China Jailed in Sweden,” BBC (8 Mar. 2010).
33. “Swedish Court Convicts Man of Spying on Tibetans for China,” Reuters (15 Jun. 2018).
34. Jojje Olsson, “Chinese Embassies are Becoming Increasingly Assertive: The Case of Sweden,” Taiwan Sentinel
(7 Sept. 2018).
527
The Gui Minhai Affair
Gui Minhai is a writer, editor and librarian who, born in China, arrived in Sweden in 1988 to
begin a Ph.D and who stayed there, acquiring the Swedish citizenship while renouncing his
Chinese citizenship. He then settled in Hong Kong, creating several publishing houses from
2006 on. Under a pseudonym (Ah Hai), he published a number of works on China’s political
life that were banned in mainland China. Knowing himself to be watched and under threat, he
avoided going back to China, missing his father’s last days of life and funeral as a result.
In October 2015, he was abducted by Chinese intelligence officers during his hol-
iday in Thailand and disappeared. Four of his colleagues also subsequently disappeared.
Confirmation of his incarceration came in January 2016 in a quintessential Soviet-style
televised confession – a practice that has made a comeback in China in recent years35
(in July 2020, Britain’s Ofcom estimated that CGTN had violated the broadcasting rules of the
United Kingdom by showing the forced confession of a British citizen).36 In a CCTV broad-
cast, Gui, in tears, “confessed” to having killed a young woman in a car accident in 2003 and
explained that, full of remorse, he had surrendered to the Chinese authorities. He added: “I do
not want any individual or organization, including Sweden, to involve themselves in, or inter-
fere with, my return to China. Although I have Swedish citizenship, I truly feel that I am still
Chinese – my roots are in China. So I hope Sweden can respect my personal choice, respect
my rights and the privacy of my personal choice.”37
In October 2017, Chinese authorities informed Sweden of Gui Minhai’s release. He, however,
had not provided any news, which left the exact situation unclear. What we do know is that
in January 2018, while in the company of two Swedish diplomats on a train headed for
Beijing for medical examinations, Gui was once again abducted by ten men dressed as
civilians. He reappeared in another televised confession, in which he admitted to having been
pressured by the Swedish authorities into trying to leave China, using a medical appointment
at the Swedish embassy as a pretext.
In November 2019, he received the Tucholsky Prize for Freedom of Expression from the
Swedish section of PEN, which angered the Chinese embassy. In February 2020 he was finally
sentenced to ten years in prison on charges of espionage – a new accusation that came
as a surprise as it had never been raised before. On this occasion, it was revealed that in 2018
Gui Minhai had “demanded” to recover his Chinese citizenship (which was largely seen as a
maneuver to deprive him of his consular visitation rights). However, Sweden still considers
Gui as one of its citizens since, as far as Sweden is concerned, there has been no proper and
formal renunciation of Swedish citizenship.
Gui Minhai’s televised confession on CCTC in January 2016.
35. Tania Branigan, “Televised Confessions on State-Run TV Consolidate China’s Social Control,” The Guardian
(11 August 2014); Magnus Fiskesjö, “The Return of the Show Trial: China’s Televised ‘Confessions,’” The Asia-Pacific
Journal, 15:13:1 (1 Jul. 2017).
36. “Chinese TV Channel Breached Rules With ‘Forced Confession,’” BBC News (6 Jul. 2020).
37. Michael Forsythe, “Missing Man Back in China, Confessing to Fatal Crime,” The New York Times (17 Jan. 2016).
528
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