GLOSSARY
A2/AD: Anti Access/Area Denial
ACFROC: All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (中华全国归国华侨联合会)
ACCWS: Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies
ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone
APT: Advanced persistent threat
ASIO: Australian Security Intelligence Organization
ASPI: Australian Strategic Policy Institute
BATX: Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi
BRI: Belt and Road Initiative
CAIFC: China Association for International Friendly Contact (中国国际友好联络会)
CAPCC: China Association for Promotion of Chinese culture (中华文化发展促进会)
CASS: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院)
CCP: Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党)
CCPPNR: China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (中国和平
统 一促进会)
CCTV: China Central Television (中国中央电视台)
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CEFC: China Energy Fund Committee (中国能源基金委员会)
CGTN: China Global Television Network (中国国际电视台)
CHBC: China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (中国华艺广播公司)
CI: Confucius Institutes (孔子学院)
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CICIR: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究
院)
CIIS: China Institute of International Studies (中国国际问题研究所)
CIS: Community of Independent States
CMC: Central Military Commission (中央军事委员会)
CMG: China Media Group (中央广播电视总台)
CNA: Central News Agency (中央通訊社) (Taiwan)
CNR: China National Radio (中央人民广播电台)
CPAFFC: Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (中国人民对
外友好协会)
CPPCC: Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中国人民政治协商会议)
CRG: Center for Research on Globalization (GlobalResearch)
CRI: China Radio International (中国国际广播电台)
CSIS: Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSSA: Chinese Students and Scholars Association (中国学生学者联合会)
CUSEF: China-United States Exchange Foundation (中美交流基金会)
648
CYL: Communist Youth League (中国共产主义青年团)
DGSE: General Directorate for External Security (France)
LD/GPD: Liaison Department of the General Political Department (总政治部联络部)
DPP: Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨)
ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council
EU: European Union
EWI: East West Institute
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
FPI: Fondation Prospective et Innovation (France)
FSB: Federal Security Bureau (Russie)
GAFA: Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon
GPD: General Political Department (总政治部)
GRU: Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
(Russia, foreign military intelligence agency)
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization
ILD: International Liaison Department (中央对外联络部)
IRA: Internet Research Agency (Russia)
IRIS: The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (France)
ISO: International Organization for Standardization
ITU: International Telecommunication Union
KGB: Committee for State Security (URSS)
KMT: Kuomintang (國民黨)
LD/PWD: Liaison Department of the Political Work Department of the CMC (中央军委
政治工作部联络局)
MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MG: Major-General (少将)
MPS: Ministry of Public Security (公安部)
MSS: Ministry of State Security (国家安全部)
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NPC: National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会)
NTDTV: New Tang Dynasty Television
OC: Overseas Chinese
OCSC: Overseas Chinese Service Center (华助中心)
OSINT: Open-Source Intelligence
PLA: People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军)
PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army Air Force (解放军空军)
PRC: People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国)
PWD: Political Work Department (中央军委政治工作部)
R&D: Research and Development
ROC: Republic of China (Taiwan)
RSF: Reporters without Borders
RT: Russia Today
SAR: Special Administrative Region
SARS: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SASS: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (上海社会科学院)
SDG: United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
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SSF or SSFPLA: Strategic Support Force of the People’s Liberation Army (解放军战略支
援部队)
SVR: Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)
TAO: Taiwan Affairs Office (中共中央台湾工作办公室 ou 国务院台湾事务办公室)
TCM: Traditional Chinese Medicine
UDN: United Daily News
UFWD: United Front Work Department (中央统一战线工作部)
UN: United Nations
UNAIDS: UN Program on HIV/AIDS
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNEP: United Nations Environnent Program
UNESCO: United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO: United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VPN: Virtual Private Network
VTS: Voice of the Strait (海峡之声广播电台)
WHO: World Health Organization
WRSA: Western Returned Scholars Association (欧美同学会)
WTO: World Trade Organization (欧美同学会)
OTHER IRSEM PUBLICATIONS ON INFLUENCE STRATEGIES
LE LION, L’OURS ET LES HYÈNES
ACTEURS, PRATIQUES ET RÉCITS
DE L’INFLUENCE INFORMATIONNELLE RUSSE
EN AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE FRANCOPHONE
ÉTU
D
E – n
o 83
Juillet 2021
Dr Maxime Audinet
Chercheur Stratégies d’influence et lutte informationnelle
à l’IRSEM
Maxime Audinet, Le Lion, l’Ours
et les Hyènes : Acteurs, pratiques et
récits de l’influence russe en Afrique
subsaharienne francophone, Étude de
l’IRSEM n° 83, July 2021 (93 p.)
RESEA
RC
H
PA
PER – N
o
. 114
April 12, 2021
DISCLAIMER: One of IRSEM’s missions is to contribute to public debate on issues relating to
defence and security. The views expressed in IRSEM’s publications are the authors’ alone
and are in no way representative of an official Ministry for Armed Forces stance.
“WOLF WARRIOR” DIPLOMACY: A NEW POLICY TO LEGITIMIZE
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Dr. Camille BRUGIER
China Research Fellow, IRSEM
ABSTRACT
For several years, and especially since the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis, some Chi-
nese diplomats, commonly called “wolf warriors” by Western media, have adopted
a warlike tone in the media and on social networks. While this new practice, heavily
criticized by Western and Asian public opinion, reinforces the perception of China
as a threat, this paper questions the motives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
in perpetuating such a policy. The paradox is that the real target of China’s foreign
policy are the Chinese themselves, at home or abroad. In line with previous Chinese
leaders, the main purpose of this domestically oriented foreign policy is to legitimize
the CCP in the eyes of its own citizens. Thus, “wolf warrior” diplomacy does not affect
the objectives of Chinese foreign policy. Three elements support this hypothesis: the
visibility of the “wolf warriors” in China, the subtle references to the “century of humili-
ation” and finally the instrumentalization of the cultural divide to alienate democratic
regimes.
CONTENT
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 2
“Wolf Warrior” diplomacy: a counter narrative to the China threat theory ......................... 3
A type of diplomacy for domestic use despite its dissemination on Western networks ...... 5
Reference to the Century of humiliation as a way to please Chinese nationalists ............. 6
The “insurmountable cultural incompatibility” aimed at deepening the divide between
the “us” and the “them”. ............................................................................................................ 8
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 11
Camille Brugier, “Wolf Warrior”
diplomacy: a new policy to legitimize
the Chinese Communist Party,
Research Paper No. 115, IRSEM,
12 April 2021 (14 p.).
RESEA
RC
H
PA
PER – N
o
. 99
May 25, 2020
DISCLAIMER: One of IRSEM’s missions is to contribute to public debate on issues relating to
defence and security. The views expressed in IRSEM’s publications are the authors’ alone
and are in no way representative of an official Ministry for Armed Forces stance.
RUSSIAN STRATEGIES OF INFLUENCE
IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS REGION
Régis GENTÉ
Journalist and former-Soviet Republics Expert
ABSTRACT
Russia uses a variety of methods to influence its former Soviet republics of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Since its conquest of the region in the 19th Century, Russia
considers Transcaucasia particularly important for its geopolitical standing. No longer
able to persuade or attract South Caucasus populations, Russia’s strategy of influ-
ence is largely based on military power (hard power). It struggles to develop its soft
power in this region, resorting finally to more coercive methods like exploiting: con-
flicts in the secessionist regions of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia;
Kremlin-affiliated oligarchs; and energy prices. This traps Russia in a vicious cycle: to
retain its influence in the South Caucasus, it becomes increasingly coercive and ag-
gressive, appearing malevolent to local populations. The Kremlin relies on well-known
and established strategies in the South Caucasus, making it an important case study
in the analysis of Russian foreign policy in general.
CONTENT
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Russia’s traditional strategies of influence ................................................................................................ 3
Armenia, once conquered but slipping away ......................................................................................... 5
Azerbaijan, a regime in search for protection ......................................................................................... 8
Georgia, hostile but seeking “normalization” .......................................................................................... 12
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 15
Régis Genté, Russian Strategies
of Influence in the South Caucasus
Region, Research Paper No. 99,
IRSEM, 25 May 2020 (17 p.).
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer,
The “Macron Leaks” Operation: A
Post-Mortem, IRSEM/Atlantic
Council, June 2019 (48 p.).
Céline Marangé et Maud
Quessard, Les Guerres de
l’information à l’ère numérique,
Presses universitaires de France
(avec le concours de l’IRSEM),
January 2021 (448 p.).
L’INFLUENCE SÉCURITAIRE CHINOISE
À SINGAPOUR
ÉTU
D
E – n
o 85
A
oût 2021
Dr Éric Frécon
Chercheur associé à l’IRASEC
Éric Frécon, L’influence sécuritaire
chinoise à Singapour, Étude de
l’IRSEM n° 85, August 2021
(60 p.)
RESEA
RC
H
PA
PER – N
o
. 66
13 November 2018
DISCLAIMER: One of IRSEM’s missions is to contribute to public debate on issues relating to defence and
security. The views expressed in IRSEM’s publications are the authors’ alone and are in no way representative of
an official Ministry for Armed Forces stance.
THE DISSEMINATION OF RUSSIAN-SOURCED NEWS IN AFRICA
A preliminary general map
ABSTRACT
Although the Russian media apparatus is subject to considerable scrutiny in the West, it is much less so in
other regions of the world, in particular in Africa. Consequently, at a time when Russia appears to be attemp-
ting to regain footing on the continent, it seemed necessary to undertake a preliminary exploration of the
role that this country can play in the African information space, with particular focus on the French-speaking
countries of Africa. This paper presents the results of a quantitative study of the distribution and propagation
of information content produced by the Russian news agencies RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik News. On the
basis of the data collected, it has been possible to establish an initial general map of the circulation paths of
this content, its relays and the discursive strategies used by the various players involved. In addition to its
empirical value as an aid to understanding the real state of Russian implantation in the information space of
the French-speaking African world, this paper also aims to highlight the methodological possibilities available,
by explaining the methods used here, at the intersection of geopolitics and big data.
CONTENT
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 2
Chosen methodologies ..................................................................................................................................... 4
General Presentation of the database – general results .................................................................................... 5
Analysis of the theoretical visibility of russian content per country in french-speaking africa .......................... 11
Attempted typology by relationship graph and hyperlink communities ............................................................ 14
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 19
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................................... 20
Kevin LIMONIER
Lecturer at the French Geopolitics Institute (Paris 8 University)
Kevin Limonier, The Dissemination
of Russian-sourced News in Africa,
Research Paper No. 66, IRSEM,
13 November 2018 (21 p.).
Maud Quessard, La diplomatie
publique américaine et la
désinformation russe : un retour des
guerres de l’information ?, Note
de recherche n° 54, IRSEM,
30 April 2018 (13 p.).
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer,
Alexandre Escorcia, Marine
Guillaume, Janaina Herrera,
Information Manipulation: A
Challenge for our Democracies, CAPS/
IRSEM, August 2018 (210 p.); La
Documentation française, 2019.
Céline Marangé, Les Stratégies et
les pratiques d’influence de la Russie,
Étude de l’IRSEM n° 49, March
2017 (55 p.).
www.irsem.fr
ISBN : 978-2-11-155519-8
Printed in France
For a long time, it could be said that China, unlike Russia, sought to be loved
rather than feared; that it wanted to seduce and project a positive image of
itself in the world, or to inspire admiration. Today, Beijing has not renounced
to seduce, nor its overall attractiveness and its ambition to shape international
standards, and it is essential for the Chinese Communist Party not to lose face.
And yet, Beijing is also increasingly comfortable with infiltration and coercion: its
influence operations have become considerably tougher in recent years and its
methods are resembling more closely the ones employed by Moscow. This is a
“Machiavellian turn” inasmuch as the Party-State now seems to believe that “it
is much safer to be feared than to be loved,” in the words of Machiavelli in The
Prince. This is a clear Russification of Chinese influence operations.
This report delves into this evolution, with the ambition to cover the whole specter
of influence, from the most benign (public diplomacy) to the most malign methods,
that is, interference (clandestine activities). To do that, the report is divided into four
parts: successively laying out the main concepts; the actors implementing these
operations, including the Base 311 of the People’s Liberation Army; the actions
conducted by Beijing toward the diasporas, the media, diplomacy, economy,
politics, education, think tanks, and in terms of information manipulations –
some levers among others; then, several cases are studied (Taiwan, Singapore,
Sweden, Canada, the operations that targeted Hong Kong protestors in 2019,
and the one that branded the Covid-19 as an American fabrication in 2020). The
conclusion returns to this “Russification”, which has three components: Beijing
is inspired by Moscow in several ways, there are obviously differences between
the two, and there is also a certain degree of cooperation. Finally, the report
assesses the effectiveness of this new Chinese posture, which can boast some
tactical successes, but constitutes a strategic failure.
Authors: Paul Charon (director for “Intelligence, Strategic Foresight, and Hybrid
Threats” at IRSEM) and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (director of the IRSEM).
The IRSEM is the Institute for Strategic Research of the French Ministry for the
Armed Forces.
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