2. Publishers
Chinese narratives, such as the representation of China as a benevolent power, are not
solely supported by think tanks and foundations but also by actors in the publishing indus-
try. In France, the La Route de la Soie publishing house is an interesting case of rela-
tively advanced cooperation with China.
a. The example of La Route de la Soie – Editions (The Silk Road Editions, France)
The publishing house La Route de la Soie was created in 2017 by Sonia Bressler,
a former journalist who holds a PhD in philosophy and has created a communication and
strategy consulting firm (Bressler Conseil956). She justified her decision to open a publishing
house by the partiality of the publishing sector in France, which presumably systemati-
cally rejects Chinese or Iranian manuscripts.957 She also expressed her admiration for “Xi
Jingping’s (sic) project One Belt One Road, that I find absolutely gigantic, and which is eco-
nomical, structured and, to my mind, represents an axis that should be developed to pacify
the world”958 – hence the name she gave to the company.
Sonia Bressler visited China for the first time in 2005, arriving in train from Moscow
and she ultimately visited the country six times between 2005 and 2019; it allowed her to
“see the progress made in the social development of China,” according to Xinhua, in one
of her many interviews with the Chinese press agency.959 Between March 2015, when she
said that Xi Jinping’s book The Governance of China “[marked] a milestone for the country
and the Communist Party of China (CPC),”960 and March 2021, she was quoted by Xinhua
in no less than 55 articles written in French and English,961 all introducing her as a “French
956. https://www.bresslerconseil.com/.
957. Zhu Shanshan, “Une maison d’édition unique pour comprendre la Route de la Soie,” Chine-info.com (29 Aug.
2017), https://www.soniabressler.com/app/download/11200738193/Une+maison+d%27e%CC%81dition+unique
+pour+comprendre+la+Route+de+la+Soie+-chine-info.pdf?t=1512027794.
958. Ibid.
959. “Sonia Bressler: pour mettre en accord ‘le rêve chinois’ avec ‘les rêves des autres peuples du monde’ (interview),”
(“Sonia Bressler: Aligning the ‘Chinese Dream’ with the ‘Dreams of the Other Peoples in the World’), Xinhua (19 Mar.
2019), https://archive.vn/oEnXh.
960. “French Writer Lauds Xi’s Book on Governance of China,” Xinhua (10 Mar. 2015), https://archive.vn/n9iBf.
961. Results compiled through Europresss on March 28, 2021.
332
Sinologue,” “French expert on China,” or “famous writer and French Sinologue.”962 In her
interviews, she adopts the Party’s talking points:
- On the overall role of China in the world: “China has a good system… China should
be proud of itself ”963; “[according] to me, China is opening the eyes of the world […] It is
a motor, a force that tends to link cultures and civilizations together according to a “win-
win” exchange;”964 “[the] Sino-French friendship is the key to the pacification of the world
and to the creation of a new system of thoughts and for the realization of humanity”;965
“the Chinese civilization is the oldest on the planet and, saying that, we should understand
that we have everything to learn from it”;966 “China does not look for hegemony, [it] has
decided to share and not to dominate”;967 “we ought to draw inspiration from what China
has implemented, for instance education designed for people in poverty, creative social wel-
fare mechanisms, local and national joint development plans, and so on”;968 and she said that
Xi Jinping’s opening speech at the 73rd World Health Assembly, in May 2020, confirmed
“that China is open to the world and the idea of a shared collective responsibility”;969
- On Tibet, which she visited three times between 2007 and 2016, and on which she
published four books:970 “[without] the help of the Chinese government, it would be very
difficult to preserve the Tibetan culture”;971 “[the] improving living conditions led to an
expansion of the life span, education put an end to illiteracy […] I discovered that 5G had
been set up in Lhasa. In France, we do not even have it yet”;972 “I was able to see the incred-
ible transformation of Lhasa, between traditions and absolute modernity”;973 and so on;
- And on Xinjiang, which she also visited several times and on which she wrote three
books974: “I saw people’s life [in Xinjiang] was getting better and better. I believe it will
962. “Il faut dissiper les fausses craintes afin d’assurer un avenir meilleur à l’ensemble de l’humanité (experts)”
(“False Fears Must be Dispelled to Ensure a Better Future to the Whole Humanity”), Xinhua (14 Feb. 2020), https://
archive.vn/q7nUs.
963. “La vie des habitants au Xinjiang s’améliore selon une femme écrivain française (interview)” (“The Life of
Xinjiang Inhabitants Improves According to a French Female Writer (Interview)”), Xinhua (3 Oct. 2015), https://
archive.vn/s0Hb1.
964. “La Chine est en train d’‘ouvrir les yeux du monde’ (interview)” (“China is Opening the Eyes of the World
(Interview)”), Xinhua (2 Nov. 2015).
965. Xu Yongchun and Tang Ji, “Des personnalités et des experts français font écho à la tribune du président
chinois sur les relations sino-françaises” (“French Personalities and Experts Echo the Tribune of the Chinese President
on Chinese-French Relations”), Xinhua (24 Mar. 2019), https://archive.vn/sXvNG.
966. “‘L’Asie est un élan vital,’ selon une sinologue française (interview)” (“‘Asia is a Vital Impulse,’ According to a
French Expert on China (interview)”), Xinhua (11 Apr. 2019), https://archive.vn/q89ny.
967. “Roundup: White Paper Gives Transparent, Comprehensive Picture of China’s National Defense in New Era:
Experts,” Xinhua (25 Jul. 2019), https://archive.vn/n9D86.
968. “Le succès de la Chine en matière de réduction de la pauvreté est une inspiration, selon des experts” (“China’s
Success in Reducing Poverty is an Inspiration, According to Experts”), Xinhua (26 Feb. 2021), https://archive.vn/JyNzu.
969. “Les propositions de Xi Jinping à l’Assemblée mondiale de la santé sont essentielles pour la lutte contre la
pandémie, selon des universitaires” (“Xi Jinping’s Proposals to the World Health Organizations are Essential to Fight
Against the Pandemic, According to Scholars”), Xinhua (19 May 2020), https://archive.vn/x7hUX.
970. Sonia Bressler, Voyage au cœur du Tibet (Journey to the Heart of Tibet) (Paris: Jacques Flament Editions, 2013);
A travers le Tibet (Through Tibet) (Paris: Jacques Flament Editions, 2014); A la découverte du Tibet (On Our Way to
Discover Tibet) (Paris: Editions Horizon Oriental, 2016); Découvrir le Tibet (Discovering Tibet) (Paris: Editions La
Route de la Soie, 2019).
971. “Interview: Chinese Gov’t Efforts to Promote Development and Preserve Culture in Tibet Significant: French
Author,” Xinhua (27 Mar. 2017).
972. “Le vrai Tibet aux yeux d’une philosophe française” (“The True Tibet in the Eyes of a French Philosopher”)
Xinhua (4 Apr. 2019), https://archive.vn/QDZZh.
973. “‘L’Asie est un élan vital.”
974. Sonia Bressler, La vie du Xinjiang (Life in Xinjiang) (Paris: Jacques Flament Editions, 2016); Xinjiang: les mille &
une merveilles de la Route de la soie (Xinjiang: the Thousand and One Wonders of the New Silk Road (Paris: Editions La
Route de la Soie, 2017); Les travailleurs du Xinjiang (The Xinjiang Workers) (Paris: Editions La Route de la Soie, 2018).
333
be more beautiful in the future”;975 “the Chinese government is making a huge effort to
preserve heritage, be it places of worship or old buildings”;976 “[the] commitment to gov-
ernment policies successfully created jobs and developed the region’s economy […] the
living conditions of the population have improved, along with the feeling of happiness.”977
This corpus is completed by her blog, on which she also systematically defends
Beijing’s positions and promotes Chinese achievements, from the “14th Chinese five-year
plan”978 to the Belt and Road Initiative (“which will simply “pacify the world” and invent “a
new system of values”),979 but also Hong Kong (“a symbol of the ending undivided Western
domination”)980 and Paris (while returning the favor to Xinhua: “[not] far from Matignon, at
85 Rue du Faubourg Saint-Honoré, you can find the Xinhua Gallery, a beautiful space where
you can discover exhibitions on China and its history all year long”).981 Besides, she insists
on the superiority of the Chinese model (“China represents the oldest civilization. It has
seen everything, experienced everything, and invented a thousand techniques (that we stole
afterward) … and today, we fail to draw lessons from China […] as usual, China listens, tries
to integrate [ideas] while Westerners try to impose their thinking and their rhythm. On the
one side China embraces, while the West orientates, closes, segments [on the other]”) before
inviting her readers to “leave modernity by re-formatting the Enlightenments.”982
Between 2013 and 2018, Sonia Bressler wrote for China-info.com,983 a website
which is the French-speaking version of Nouvelles d’Europe (欧洲时报), “the first Chinese-
language daily newspaper circulated in Europe,”984 created in 1983, with headquarters in
Ile-de-France, and owned by the Guang Hua Cultures and Media group. It describes
itself as “the European media leader of the Chinese community”985 as the group owns “five
large weeklies (published in France, in the United Kingdom, in Germany, Australia and
Italy), three news websites (Oushinet.com, Chine-info.com, Oushidai.com), a video pro-
gram, a travel agency, a cultural animation center and a publishing house.”986 Additionally,
it publishes the monthly magazine Le 9, subtitled Le monde chinois, to which Sonia Bressler
also contributed.987 The Guang Hua group organizes events such as the Salon de l’emploi fran-
co-chinois [the Franco-Chinese Job Fair] and the Salon d’échanges culturels et créatifs franco-chinois
[the Franco-Chinese Cultural and Creative Exchange Fair]; one of the latter’s edition was
975. “Life in Xinjiang is Getting Better and Better: French Writer,” China Daily (3 Oct. 2015).
976. “Interview: Reality in Xinjiang Different from Preconceptions, says French Writer,” Xinhua (25 Jun. 2020),
https://archive.vn/5usg9.
977. “Les experts applaudissent les efforts du gouvernement chinois pour promouvoir le développement
socioéconomique du Xinjiang” [Experts Applaud the Efforts of the Chinese Government to Promote Socioeconomic
Development in Xinjiang”], Xinhua, 30 septembre 2020 (https://archive.vn/mCfke).
978. Sonia Bressler, “Comprendre le 14ème plan quinquennal chinois” (“Understanding the 14th Chinese Five-Year
Plan”), Rebelle.blogspirit.com (12 Dec. 2020), https://archive.vn/comME.
979. Sonia Bressler, “La Route de la Soie réveille les craintes occidentales” (“The Silk Road Awakens Western
Fears”), Rebelle.blogspirit.com (31 Jan. 2017), https://archive.vn/qQ88J.
980. Sonia Bressler, “Hong Kong (toujours) sous un autre angle,” Rebelle.blogspirit.com, cited in Chine-info.com (29 May
2020), https://archive.vn/QXrTa.
981. Sonia Bressler, “L’éducation en Chine” (“Education in China”), Rebelle.blogspirit.com (2 Oct. 2020), https://
archive.vn/h8a7o.
982. Sonia Bressler, “Trump, la Chine et ses voisins” (“Trump, China, and its Neighbors”), Rebelle.blogspirit.com (23
May 2017), https://archive.vn/71HZ3.
983. https://www.soniabressler.com/articles/ (Archived: https://archive.vn/CVbjm).
984. “Les Amis de Nouvelles d’Europe,” Culture Oushi, https://archive.vn/GXu70.
985. “SKEMA, grand partenaire du Salon de l’emploi Franco-Chinois” (“SKEMA, Great Partner of the Franco-
Chinese Jobs Fair”), Skema Business School (21 Oct. 2020), https://archive.vn/RdIoI.
986. 2020 Franco-Chinese Jobs Fair, https://archive.vn/E3GI5.
987. With an article on Xinjiang: Sonia Bressler, “A la découverte de l’Ouest” (“Discovering the West”), Le 9, n°8
(Jul.-Aug. 2018), https://archive.vn/v0eai.
334
actually co-organized by the Chinese Cultural Center in Paris, which is subordinate to the
Embassy of China.988
The president of Guang Hua Media, editor-in-chief of the Nouvelles d’Europe and Le 9, is
Zhang Xiaobei (张晓贝),989 who also manages the Horizon Oriental publishing house990
that published one of Sonia Bressler’s books on Tibet (she also penned a chapter in a col-
lective book he edited on 50 years of friendship France – China).991 The Les Amis de Nouvelles
d’Europe [Friends of Nouvelles d’Europe] association, created in 1992, opened a cultural
center in Gentilly in 2013 as well, and it then congratulated itself on being “the first
Confucius Classroom opened in France, and recognized by the Hanban”992 (→ p. 299).
On March 1, 2015, Qiu Yuanping (裘援平), head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, a structure subordinate to the UFWD
(→ p. 66), visited the Nouvelles d’Europe Cultural Center and its Confucius Classroom, accompanied by Zhang Xiaobei,
president of Guang Hua Media and the newspaper Nouvelles d’Europe, Zhong Cheng, executive vice-president of the newspaper,
Chen Xiaoyan, its vice-president, and Liang Yang, its editor-in-chief.993
This was the context during which Sonia Bressler opened her publishing house, La
Route de la Soie, in 2017. Her own books, on Tibet and Xinjiang, give an apolitical,
uncluttered, almost unreal vision of it compared to the tragic situation in these regions.
Hence, she contributes to spreading positive narratives about China and to disseminat-
ing counter-narratives intended to deflect criticism about the Chinese regime’s repressive
nature. This commitment led her to publish, in December 2020, a book by Maxime Vivas
untitled Ouighours. Pour en finir avec les fake news (Uyghurs: To Put an End to Fake News). The
988. The Paris Creative Fair 2018, https://archive.vn/Ajl0H.
989. https://data.bnf.fr/16759679/xiao_bei_zhang/ (2014); https://archive.vn/0B02O (2019); http://entreprises.
lefigaro.fr/guang-hua-cultures-et-media-ghm-94/entreprise-330431081.
990. http://entreprises.lefigaro.fr/edition-horizon-oriental-94/entreprise-513982371.
991. Sonia Bressler, “La culture en avance sur la diplomatie,” in Zhang Xiaobei, ed., 50 ans d’amitiés, Chine-France
(China-France: A 50-Year Friendship) (Paris: Editions Horizon Oriental, Vitry-sur-Seine; Nouvelles d’Europe, 2014).
992. “Les Amis de Nouvelles d’Europe.”
993. “La visite du centre culturel de QIU Yuanping, directrice du Bureau des Chinois d’outre-mer” (“Visit of QIU
Yuanping, Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, to the the Cultural Center”), Les Amis de Nouvelles d’Europe
(5 Mar. 2015), https://archive.vn/zBbxs.
335
book intended to shed light on the situation in Xinjiang. Maxime Vivas stated bluntly that
“the fable of the Uyghur ‘genocide’” was fabricated by the CIA using “fake photos” and
“false testimonies.” According to him, the reality is quite different since the autonomous
province “is pulling itself out of its backwardness and poverty with the help of the whole
of China.”994
Contrary to the impression that the French-speaking public discovered the author with
this controversial book, Maxime Vivas is not an unknown actor of Chinese influence in
France. Born in 1942, this former postal worker and ergonomist is resolutely positioned
on the left of the French political spectrum: a former CGT trade unionist,995 still host for
a militant radio created by the CGT996; the former literary referent at ATTAC (an alterglo-
balization organization);997 he is a “long-time personal friend” of Jean-Luc Mélenchon,
leader of the political party La France Insoumise, whom he publicly supported in previous
elections and who prefaced two of his books.998 Vivas has been an administrator of the
website of “alternative news” Le Grand Soir,999 which “for many years has made itself
known with readily conspiratorial content, emanating either from its own editorial staff or
from notoriously conspiratorial friendly websites such as Réseau Voltaire, Mondialisation.
ca [→ p. 602] or ReOpen911.info.”1000 Vivas is also a regular contributor to the Russian
channel RT France, which invites him to speak on various topics, including Venezuela (as
he does not hide his sympathy for the Bolivarian revolution) and China.
994. Maxime Vivas, Ouighours. Pour en finir avec les fake news (Uyghurs. To put an end to fake news), Paris, La Route
de la soie, 2020, back cover.
995. The CGT (Confédération générale du Travail) is one of the oldest and largest trade unions in France.
996. “A sorting center occupied by postal workers: I was their CGT section secretary” (Maxime Vivas, “J’avais
un ami journaliste, clanique” (“I had a journalist friend, clannish”), Le Grand Soir (22 Nov. 2020), https://archive.
vn/e4OuE; Radio Mon Païs, created in 1980 in Toulouse by the CGT departmental union (https://www.schoop.fr/
ficheradio.php?id_radio=1240). His chronicles broadcast between 2002 and 2007 are gathered in his book Chroniques
littéraires et impertinentes sur Radio Mon païs (Literary and impertinent chronicles on Radio Mon Païs) (Angeville, Editions la
Brochure, 2008). His more recent interventions can be found on https://www.radiomonpais.fr/component/finder/
search.html?q=vivas&Itemid=106.
997. A press article presented him at the time as a “national cultural leader” of ATTAC (“Attac en douceur,” La
Nouvelle République du Centre-Ouest (Sept. 6, 2002), 10), but Vivas presents himself as “former literary referent” of
ATTAC on his Twitter profile.
998. Parti de Gauche en Haute-Garonne, “Maxime Vivas soutient Jean-Luc Mélenchon, le PG, et le Front de
Gauche”, https://archive.vn/5wB7G; “‘C’est la différence entre ce que j’ai vu au Xinjiang et ce que disent nos médias
qui m’a poussé à écrire’ – Entretien avec Maxime Vivas, auteur du livre ‘Ouïgour pour en finir avec les fake news’”,
Chine-info.com, 23 février 2021 (https://archive.vn/rxaEN).
999. https://www.legrandsoir.info/.
1000. https://www.conspiracywatch.info/le-grand-soir.
336
Maxime Vivas with the “red shirts” in a demonstration in Caracas, June 2, 2007 (image published by Jean-Luc Mélenchon on
his blog1001). Vivas is the author of a novel titled Rouges Les Collines de Caracas (Arcane, 2015) which he notably presented and
autographed at the stand of the Bolivarian Alliance at the “Fête de l’Huma” in September 2015.1002
Vivas has defended Beijing since the late 2000s by going after its adversaries: first, at
the end of 2007, in a book attacking RSF (La face cachée de Reporters sans frontières: de la CIA
aux faucons du Pentagone),1003 precisely when the NGO was campaigning to denounce human
rights violations in China ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.1004 When the media spoke
about it in 2008, the author was “on vacation in China.”1005
In 2010, he travelled to Tibet, in a trip admittedly “organized by the Chinese authorities. ‘We
could even say ‘supervised’”; he reported on it in an article untitled “Choses vues au Tibet,”1006
a daring reference to Victor Hugo. The following year, he published a book attacking the Dalai
Lama (Pas si zen: la face cachée du dalaï-lama),1007 which was abundantly relayed by Chinese media,
including some presenting Vivas as a “researcher on Tibet”.1008 Then, in 2015, in an interview
with Xinhua, he revealed that he had finished “a new book on China in which I examine the
issue of laicity in Tibet.” The book was untitled Tibet: Quelques vérités à ne pas dire aux libres censeurs,
aux nostalgiques de la théocratie safran et aux ennemis de la laïcité, and he hoped “first to publish it […] in
China. He wanted, as he explained, to show Chinese readers that they have friends in France.”1009
That said, the book was neither published, in France or in China.
Then, he turned to the Uyghur issue, by travelling to Xinjiang twice, in 2016 and
2018, during trips organized by the Chinese authorities. The second time, he was invited
by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (新疆生产建设兵团, also called
1001. “Systémique en diable,” blog de Jean-Luc Mélenchon (13 Aug. 2007), https://archive.vn/Hk2z3.
1002. Viva Venezuela, French chapter of the international campaign of solidarity with the Bolivarian revolution,
https://archive.vn/lJSpQ.
1003. Maxime Vivas, La face cachée de Reporters sans frontières: de la CIA aux faucons du Pentagone [The Hidden Face of
Reports Without Borders: from the CIA to the Pentagon Hawks] (Brussels: Editions Aden, 2007).
1004. “Un an avant les JO de Pékin 2008, Reporters sans frontières se mobilise à Paris, New York, Pékin et
Montréal” (“One Year Before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Reporters Without Borders are Mobilizing their Troops in
Paris, New York, Beijing, and Montreal”), RSF (7 Aug. 2007), https://archive.vn/5EBmi.
1005. Marie-Christine Tabet, “Révélations sur le financement de Reporters sans frontières” (“Revelations on the
Funding of Reporters without Borders”), Le Figaro (21 Apr. 2008), 2.
1006. Maxime Vivas, “Choses vues au Tibet (2)” (“Things I’ve Seen in Tibet (2)”), Le Grand Soir (2 Aug. 2010),
https://archive.vn/sIWjt.
1007. Maxime Vivas, Pas si zen: la face cachée du dalaï-lama (Not so zen: The Hidden Face of the Dalai Lama) (Paris:
Max Milo, 2011).
1008. “French Writer Presents Real Tibet in New Book,” Xinhua (12 Aug. 2011).
1009. “Maxime Vivas: un nouveau livre discutant de la laïcité au Tibet (interview)” (“Maxime Vivas: a New Book
Discussing Laicity in Tibet (Interview)”), Xinhua (30 Aug. 2015) (for the two quotes).
337
Bingtuan),1010 “a paramilitary organization subordinate to the CCP […] and directly involved
in the implementation of a complete program of surveillance, detention, and indoctrina-
tion in Xinjiang, which target the Uyghurs, and members of other ethnic minorities.” The
organization’s first secretary was sanctioned by U.S. authorities in July 2020 for his role in
“grave human rights violations.”1011 These supervised trips provided the content of the
book published by La Route de la Soie. From the perspective of Chinese authorities, and
of their trolls on social networks, they provided the author with his legitimacy – because he
went to see it “there for himself.”
Once his manuscript was completed, Vivas submitted it to nine “leftist” publishing
houses, to no avail. He then turned to Sonia Bressler, who “accepted it even before
reading it.”1012 By August 2020, and even though the book had yet to be published,
Maxime Vivas’ remarks on Uyghurs were already relayed by the Chinese embassy
in France, which later promoted the book upon its release, as did Chinese state media and
other Chinese diplomatic social media accounts (see images below). The Minister of Foreign
Affairs Wang Yi himself promoted the book during a press conference, noting that Vivas
“[based] on his two trips to the autonomous region, […] tells a real Xinjiang that enjoys
prosperity and stability.”1013 The Ministry’s spokesperson also “[gave] him a thumbs-up for
his courage to reveal the truth and hope[d] more people will cheer him on”1014. Despite this
Chinese media hype, four months after its release only a few hundred copies of the books
had been sold in France.1015 From Beijing’s point of view, this is not an underperformance
however, since it is propaganda for inernal use: in promoting Vivas’ book, the objective is
not to convince the French but to show, in China, that the Party-State has support abroad.
1010. Thaïs Chaigne, “Qui est Maxime Vivas, ce Français qui dénonce des ‘fake news’ sur les Ouïghours et fait le
bonheur de Pékin?” (“Who is Maxime Vivas, that Frenchman who Denounces “Fake News” on Uyghurs and makes
Beijing’s Day?”), Libération (30 Mar. 2021).
1011. US Department of State, “On Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers in Xinjiang, China” (31 Jul. 2020), https://
archive.vn/1VS02.
1012. Maxime Vivas, “‘C’est la différence entre ce que j’ai vu au Xinjiang et ce que disent nos médias qui m’a poussé
à écrire’”.
1013. “State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in
the United Republic of Tanzania (9 Mar. 2021).
1014. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on April 20, 2021,” ministère des
Affaires étrangères de la RPC, 20 avril 2021 (https://archive.vn/wH3g8).
1015. Julien Lecot, “Ouïghours: l’étrange comédie musicale de propagande chinoise,” Libération, 8 April 2021, p. 17.
338
Also for internal propaganda purposes, Vivas was honored on September 14, 2021 at
the Beijing International Book Fair with a “Special Book Award of China,” the highest
award for foreign authors, translators and publishers. His “great friend, the journalist Zheng
Ruolin”1016 (→ p. 628) represented him at a ceremony presented by Huang Kunming (黄
坤明), director of the Propaganda Department and member of the CCP Political Bureau
(→ p. 64).1017 These awards, created in 2005 by the General Administration of Press,
Publishing, Broadcasting, Film and Television (→ p. 193), recognize individuals “who have
made significant contributions to the promotion of Chinese culture abroad.”1018 The win-
ners receive 50,000 yuan (€6,700) each.1019
1016. Maxime Vivas, “Un prix littéraire chinois pour 15 auteurs étrangers, dont moi” (“A Chinese literary prize for
15 foreign authors, including me”), Le Grand Soir (Sept. 25, 2021), https://archive.vn/55pp9.
1017. “Senior Chinese official stresses making China better known globally,” People’s Daily Online (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://archive.vn/drzrc.
1018. Yang Yang, “Beijing International Book Fair to kick off on Tuesday,” China Daily (Sept. 9, 2021), https://
archive.vn/kBIIq.
1019. See the Baidu page for the prize: https://urlz.fr/gzWr, http://www.chinabookinternational.
org/2012/0905/33455.shtml.
339
Above, “Special Book Award of China” award ceremony on September 14, 2021.1020
Zheng Ruolin representing Maxime Vivas is on the far left.
Bottom left, the 15 winners;1021 right, the certificate published by Vivas on Twitter.1022
Maxime Vivas has since co-edited a collective book, La Chine sans œillères (China with-
out blinkers), published by a communist1023 (or “Marxist” according to the Chinese embassy)
publishing house that had been hosted by the Chinese ambassador to France. The latter
is also promoting it on social networks. Both Vivas and Beijing have a vested interest in
diversifying their vectors and therefore in working with other publishing houses. Finally,
Vivas is also promoting the Chinese vaccine on social networks (below).
1020. Source: https://twitter.com/EmbajadaEcuChi/status/1437712689409703943/photo/2.
1021. Source: https://www.facebook.com/beijingbookfair/photos/a.318670725176610/1481600432216961.
1022. Source: https://twitter.com/MaximeVivas/status/1445281486064824321/photo/1.
1023. “Above all, we are communist militants who refused the liquidation of our ideal”, explains Aymeric Monville
when asked where the Delga Editions he directs come from (“Aymeric Monville: ‘Il n’y a pas d’idées à droite, il n’y a
que la force des préjugés’,” Le Comptoir, 10 June 2015).
340
When Maxime Vivas attacks the IRSEM
Reacting to an article in Le Monde announcing the imminent publication of this report and
mentioning him, Maxime Vivas published an article on his website Le Grand Soir entitled “An
IRSEM report, in the shadow of a senior US officer. Where it is proven that Le Monde draws
its articles on China from the NATO swamp.”1024 In this text, at the turn of which he called
Tristan Mendès France a “swine” (crevure), the argument against us is twofold: on the one hand,
one of the two authors of the report, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, is “a member of the
Academic Advisory Board of the NATO Defense College” (which is false, he used to be, but
not since 2019); on the other hand, an American officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jordan Becker, is
among the associated researchers of IRSEM. And Vivas focuses on him, adding that IRSEM
“communicates to Le Monde materials for anti-Chinese articles” (image below). He even makes
it the tagline of his Twitter post, summarizing the IRSEM report as the work of “a Yankee
lieutenant colonel.”
The procedure is crude and is a string of fallacies. First, an ad hominem argument, i.e. at-
tacking the person instead of the thing (ad rem) being discussed. Instead of answering on the
merits (what Le Monde or IRSEM have said), Vivas tries to find a link, whatever it may be, be-
tween the person and the United States and/or NATO – a link that would have, for him, an ex-
planatory value for the positions defended in the report. He had already done it with Antoine
Bondaz (“dubbed by the State Department” because he participated in an exchange program
a few years earlier1025); he did it again here. Furthermore, he uses a “bad company fallacy,”
or “dishonor by association,” because the link with the United States and/or NATO is – at
least in Vivas’ mind – discrediting. The detour via the NATO Defense College or an American
associate researcher is also a diversion since it has no bearing on the discussion (on Chinese
influence operations or on the role of Maxime Vivas in Chinese influence in France). Last but
not least, there is a causal fallacy since Vivas deduces from a simple correlation (the presence
of an American researcher in the team) a causal link (which supposedly explains that IRSEM
“communicates to Le Monde materials for anti-Chinese articles”), without any proof of course,
by the sole work of his imagination, in a construction that may seem conspiratorial.
To answer on the merits, Jordan Becker is not only an American soldier, he is first and fore-
most a researcher, holding a Ph.D. in political economy, regularly publishing in reputable
scientific journals and it is in this capacity that he is “associated” with IRSEM, without being
part of the resident team (associate researchers are not physically present at IRSEM, in this
case Jordan Becker lives and works in the United States). His expertise is in transatlantic se-
curity and defense economy, not in China or influence operations. He was obviously never
involved, in any way, in the preparation of this report. He was not even aware of it until
its publication. And the authors did not need Americans to find “materials” that the Party-
State itself, and its relays of influence throughout the world, leave lying around freely, as the
sources of this report show.
Finally, IRSEM has a team of about thirty resident and thirty associate researchers. Among
these sixty or so names, Vivas only named the sole American. But there is also on the team
(as resident, which should be worse) a researcher from the Singapore Ministry of Defense,
1024. https://archive.vn/sC5PD.
1025. Maxime Vivas, tweet published on July 11, 2021. The International Visitor Leadership Program, in 2019.
But Antoine Bondaz also did the Chinese equivalent in 2016, which neutralizes Vivas’ fallacious argument that should
logically infer that Bondaz is just as much “sold out to China” as the interested party points out to him (tweet from @
AntoineBondaz on July 11, 2021).
341
and, in the past four years, a German researcher from a think tank funded by the Federal
Chancellery. The fact that in this diversity the U.S. associate researcher is chosen and the rest
not even considered as potential explanatory factor is another fallacy of incomplete evi-
dence or “cherry-picking.” If one follows Vivas’ logic, there would actually be more reason
to believe that the report was influenced or fed by Singaporean or German authorities than by
U.S. authorities.
This fallacious reasoning would not deserve a detailed response if we had not anticipated that
this U.S./NATO card would be played extensively to try to discredit the authors and/
or the IRSEM, among other ad hominem attacks which the Party and its trolls have now cus-
tomarily used against those who dare criticize its practices.
Sonia Bressler’s cooperation with the CCP has also resulted in the birth of a French-
language journal, Dialogue Chine-France, published by the magazine La Chine au présent
(China Today). There are, in fact, two magazines with the same title, both meant to build “a
bridge between the Chinese and French populations.”1026 A digital journal was launched in
March 2020,1027 while a monthly printed journal has been published “in cooperation with
La Route de la Soie”1028 since its first issue in July 2020. We can find in these pages contri-
butions from several individuals mentioned above. This initiative, launched in the middle of
the Covid-19 pandemic, can be interpreted as tied to Beijing’s efforts to muscle its influence
in Europe precisely when its image was hit.
Joël Ruet, founding president of The Bridge Tank (→ p. 318) reacts to the release of the first issue of the digital journal China-
France Dialogue in March 2020. The dialogue he refers to, co-organized with the “Beijing Press,” is the “Sino-French Dialogue on
Civilizations” that The Bridge Tank had co-organized with the CIPG on October 21-22, 2019 in Paris (→ p. 321).
1026. http://www.dialoguechinefrance.com/qson/202008/t20200803_800216532.html.
1027. See for example issue #6 (the last of 2020, published on January 7, 2021): https://flbook.com.cn/c/
Nd1GsHpP7a#page/1 (https://archive.vn/l3Ift).
1028. Masthead, 2. Moreover, we note a change: up to and including issue 3 (September 2020), the masthead
indicated that the journal was “edited by China Today […] in cooperation with La Route de la Soie”, but from issue
4 (October 2020) onwards it was “edited by La Route de la Soie Publishing, in partnership with China Today.” This
inversion may have been motivated by a desire to put the French partner forward in order to be less susceptible to
criticism of the role of China Today, i.e., the Party.
342
The monthly magazine, printed at approximately 2,000 copies, is sold for 3 euros and
widely distributed free of charge to influencers, including think tanks and ministers’ offices,
which did not fail to attract attention.1029 The link with the CCP is obvious since Dialogue
Chine-France is published by La Chine au présent, which is none other than the
French version of the magazine China Today. The latter is published by the China
International Publishing Group (CIPG), an organization under the CCP’s Central
Propaganda Department (→ p. 288). The La Route de la Soie publishing house assumes
this link since it indicated on its website that it “co-produced” this magazine with “La Chine
au présent (part of China International Publishing Group).” Besides, Sonia Bressler is a
member of both their editorial board and committee of experts,1030 along with Wang Shuo,
deputy director of the European Department of the CICIR, the MSS think tank (→ p. 126),
Cui Hongjian, director of the Department of European Studies at the China Institute
of International Studies (CIIS), the think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
Christian Mestre, honorary dean of the Faculty of Law, Political Science and Management
at the University of Strasbourg (→ p. 409).
From Beijing’s point of view, this collaboration with a French publishing house is use-
ful not only because it brings local relays but also, and above all, to “‘blur the tracks’ as
to the real origin of this magazine financed by the Chinese Communist Party” as
Antoine Bondaz explained.1031 For the same reasons, this monthly magazine tries to inte-
grate French and international authors who are not necessarily stamped “friends of China.”
For instance, the 6th issue (December 2020) included an article by the mayor of Brest,
François Cuillandre, which he did not write: it “was directly commissioned by the munici-
pality of Qingdao,” Brest’s twin city.1032
Presentation of the magazine on the website of the publishing house La Route de la Soie
(as of September 10, 2021, https://archive.vn/9d8sh).
1029. Jenny Che, “Dialogue Chine-France, l’étrange revue d’influence chinoise” (“Dialogue France-China: the
Strange Review of Chinese Influence”), Intelligence Online, 210315 (15 Mar. 2021).
1030. See masthead on page 2 of the magazine.
1031. Nicolas Quénel, “La propagande de Pékin à la conquête de la France” (“Beijing’s Propagada Tries to Conquer
France”), Libération (3 Apr. 2021), 9.
1032. François Cuillandre, “Au bénéfice des peuples de Brest et de Qingdao” (“To the benefit of the Inhabitants
of Brest and Qingdao”), Dialogue Chine-France, 6 (Dec. 2020), 56-60; Quénel, “La propaganda de Pékin à la conquête
de la France,” 8.
343
Sonia Bressler has long strived to denounce forms of “China Bashing”: in 2016,
she criticized the fact that Beijing had become “an enemy of choice for French media.”1033
In 2019, she told Xinhua she planned to “write a book to analyze the narratives in French
media on China. I started this work for which I have set aside all the negative expressions
they constantly read.”1034 Covid-19 provided her with a perfect opportunity. On April 23,
2020, she published a note for IRIS (→ p. 316) titled Le Covid-19: du China bashing dans les
médias français à la guerre qui s’annonce… (Covid 19: From China Bashing in French Media to
the War Lurking Ahead…).1035
Sonia Bressler’s note on China Bashing, published by IRIS (left),
and recommended by the Chinese Embassy on Twitter (right).
Therein, she denounced the criticisms formulated against China in the context of the
epidemic, which she assimilated to a form of racism or, at the very least, to unfounded
stereotypes. She also referred to it as a form of cynicism which entailed accusing China to
divert the attention of public opinion. Her paper also tried to demonstrate that China had
managed the crisis well, which was one of the Party’s narratives – namely, that China showed
incredible generosity and, above all, that there was no evidence that the virus originated in
China – which was a subtle way of giving credence to the thesis of an American ori-
gins of the virus (→ p. 589).
1033. Sonia Bressler, “La Chine: un ennemi tout désigné par les médias français,” (“China: An Enemy Designated
by French Media”), Rebelle.blogspirit.com (27 Nov. 2016), https://archive.vn/p8YFu.
1034. “Sonia Bressler: pour mettre en accord ‘le rêve chinois.’”
1035. Sonia Bressler, Le Covid-19: du China Bashing dans les médias français à la guerre qui s’annonce… (Covid-19: From
China Bashing in French Media to the Coming War), IRIS, Programme Asie, Asia Focus #138 (Apr. 2020), https://www.
iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Asia-Focus-138.pdf.
344
On the left, in her review of the first session of the IRIS/Chinese Embassy forum on the Silk Roads, published on her blog and
reproduced on the website of La Route de la Soie, Sonia Bressler proposes a definition of the New Silk Roads.1036 On the right,
two and a half years later, the Chinese Embassy on Facebook recommends reading it.1037
The choice of IRIS to publish Sonia Bressler’s note is part of a relationship that seems
well-established by now. In 2017, Bressler had already published a laudatory review of the
1st session of the Silk Roads Forum co-organized by IRIS and the Chinese Embassy.1038
In 2020, IRIS published Bressler’s note in a series edited by Barthélémy Courmont, senior
research fellow at IRIS, and who was reciprocally published by Bressler at La Route de la
Soie Editions (a book on Cambodia in April-May 2020,1039 and then an article in Dialogue
Chine-France in October1040 – a journal to which another researcher and the director of IRIS
also contributed, as we already mentioned → p. 317). Since January 2021, Courmont has
also been the editor of a book series at La Route de la Soie.1041
Generally speaking, this French ecosystem is characterized by a regular, even cir-
cular, overlap of actors who gravitate around the Chinese embassy and who are gen-
erally the same ones participating in the same events. As seen in the previous pages, we
find Pascal Boniface (IRIS) at FPI events, and conversely Jean-Pierre Raffarin (FPI) at
IRIS events co-organized with the Chinese embassy and publicized by Joël Ruet (Bridge
Tank).1042 Raffarin participates in events co-organized by The Bridge Tank and the Chinese
Embassy; FPI is a partner to other events sponsored by The Bridge Tank; etc.
1036. Ibid.
1037. Source: https://www.facebook.com/AmbassadeChine/posts/213710613341491.
1038. Sonia Bressler, “Les nouvelles Routes de la Soie” (“The New Silk Roads”), Rebelle.blogspirit.com (29 Nov. 2017),
https://archive.vn/J092k.
1039. Barthélémy Courmont, Innocence (Paris: Editions La Route de la Soie, 2020).
1040. Barthélémy Courmont, “Une balance commerciale à rééquilibrer, des investissements à renforcer”
(“Rebalancing the Trade Deficit, Reinforcing Investments”), Dialogue Chine-France (4 Oct. 2020), 18-21.
1041. “Nouvelle collection dédiée à la géopolitique: Mondes actuels” (“A New Collection Dedicated to Geopolitics:
Mondes Actuels”) (Paris: Editions La Route de la Soie, 13 Jan. 2021), https://archive.vn/6DdJ8.
1042. For instance, telling Xinhua that the first edition of the Paris Silk Roads Forum “has well presented the
points that the French have not yet understood about ‘the Belt and Road,’ as well as those that interest them about this
initiative. This is good progress” (Joel Ruet, quoted in “Pourquoi ‘la Ceinture et la Route’ intéresse de plus en plus les
Français?” (“Why ‘the Belt and Road’ is increasingly interesting to the French”), Xinhua, December 21, 2017).
345
On the left, an event organized by the Chinese Embassy on June 11, 2020 with the participation of Ambassador Lu Shaye,
Barthélémy Courmont and Pascal Boniface (IRIS), as well as Joël Ruet (The Bridge Tank) and others, including Hubert
Védrine, former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lionel Vairon, a sinologist who, until his death in December 2020, was part
of the committee of experts of the journal Dialogue Chine-France, and Emmanuel Dupuy, president of the “Institute Prospective
and Security in Europe (IPSE),”1043 guest professor at Wanli University in Zhejiang1044 and expert at the Ningbo Maritime Silk
Road Institute in China1045. He is a regular contributor to the Chinese (and Russian) media1046 who had already participated in
the event co-organized by The Bridge Tank and the Chinese Embassy on October 11, 2019 and would also participate in the
October 15, 2020 Forum for EU-China cooperation co-organized by The Bridge Tank and the Chinese Embassy. Right, event on
“Post-COVID Ecology and Environment” organized by the Chinese Embassy on September 28, 2020 at the Château du Rivau,
featuring again Ambassador Lu Shaye and Pascal Boniface (IRIS) among others.1047
1043. An entity presented as a “think tank,” which has accounts on social networks, but whose website (institut-
ipse.eu) is inactive at the time of writing (12 September 2021). In the archived versions of the site, the “Our team” page
contains only one person, Emmanuel Dupuy, “president,” who is described as “having a number of people gathered
around him” (https://archive.vn/OCJiE).
1044. The university does not seem to indicate it on its website but this is how he presents himself in several
interviews and on social media (https://twitter.com/Emdupuy/status/1113724147866185728).
1045. https://archive.vn/haB41.
1046. See for instance “Pourquoi les médias français sont-ils hostiles à la Chine?” (Why are the French media
hostile to China?), CGTN, 6 May 2020 (https://archive.vn/DRYb7), shared by the Chinese Embassy on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/AmbassadeChine/status/1257958869038518272.
1047. Source: Facebook page of the Chinese Embassy in France (29 Sep. 2020), https://www.facebook.com/
page/100399834672570/search/?q=iris.
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VIII. Culture
Chinese influence on culture is twofold: influence on the production and export of cul-
tural products to seduce foreign publics; and influence exerted on foreign cultural produc-
tions to make them conform to the Party’s interests.
A. The production and export of cultural products
“Culture is a country and nation’s soul,” Xi Jinping said in his speech to the 19th CCP
National Congress: “Our country will thrive only if our culture thrives, and our nation will
be strong only if our culture is strong.” Therefore, he called for the “develop[ment of] a
socialist culture” to “add new luster to Chinese culture” and “to develop a great socialist
culture in China.”1048 Three five-year plans have successively delineated China’s strategy for
cultural development since 2006.1049 This strategy supports and promotes the production
and export of Chinese cultural products abroad.
Cultural products, such as movies and TV series, music, and books, are powerful
vectors of influence if they manage to penetrate foreign markets and adjust to consumers’
tastes who do not necessarily share the same cultural codes. Today, movies and TV series
are undoubtedly the most powerful and attractive among these vectors. In 2017,
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced $90 billion worth of exported cultural prod-
ucts that year, including more than $400 million for cinema and other television products,
based on data by the National Radio and Television Administration.1050 Chinese TV series
have always been particularly successful in Asia,1051 and in Southeast Asia mostly. However,
China wants to diversify and export its television products to other markets in Africa, the
Middle East, Europe, and in North America. In 2017, China Daily reported that China
had translated more than 1,600 films and television products into 36 foreign languages,
including English, French, Russian, and Arabic. These were being broadcast in about 100
countries.1052
Several organizations are key in selling cultural products abroad. For example,
China International Television Corporation (CITVC, 中国国际电视总公司) is a
subsidiary of China Media Group (CMG) founded in 1984 to promote Chinese televi-
sion products abroad. It has established partnerships with foreign channels to broadcast
Chinese programs, such as the “China Hour” broadcast on the Portuguese channel Porto
Canal since 2018, the first Chinese program on a Southern European channel.1053 The
China Radio, Film and Television Programs Exchanging Center (CHNPEC), one of the
main organizations marketing and promoting Chinese films and TV series worldwide, is
1048. “Texte intégral du rapport de Xi Jinping au 19e Congrès national du PCC” (“Full Report by Xi Jinping at the
19th CCP Congress”), Xinhuanet (3 Nov. 2017), http://archive.vn/QrvzM.
1049. The National Plan on Cultural Reform and Development published in 2006 is available on the government’s
website (in Chinese) and archived at http://archive.vn/q0bwo. An English translation is provided by Rogier Creemers
on his website, “Outline of the National ‘11th Five Year Plan’ Period Cultural Development Plan,” China Copyright
and Media (13 Sept. 2006). The 2012 and 2017 plans, also published on the government’s website, are archived here:
http://archive.vn/vVmPo and http://archive.vn/lt9oz.
1050. Sun Wenyu, “China’s Cultural Exports Hit $90 billion in 2017: Ministry of Commerce,” People’s Daily (9 Feb.
2018), http://archive.vn/dFH79; Xu Fan, “China’s Television Dramas are Spreading Their Wings Across Asia,” The
Nation Thailand (3 Jun. 2018).
1051. A relative success compared to the power of South Korean, Japanese, or even Taiwanese movies.
1052. Xu Fan, “Chinese TV Shows Win Foreign Fans,” Global Times (27 Nov. 2017), http://archive.vn/B3kxh.
1053. “‘China Hour’ Officially Kicks Off in Portugal,” CHNPEC (28 Nov. 2018), http://archive.vn/0jQWl.
347
supervised by CMG and CITVC.1054 In order to accelerate the distribution of Chinese TV
products abroad, CITVC and the CHNPEC have set up various other platforms:
• The China International Film and TV Programs Exhibition (CIFTPE, 中国国
际电视总公司联合展区): an annual exhibition showcasing China’s products for export
and its progress in international cooperation. The last, 16th editionwas held in September
2019. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in June 2019 between
CITVC and the American National Association of Television Program Executives
(NATPE) which included, among other things, the promotion of the CIFTPE.1055
• The Film and TV Import and Export Association (FTIEA, 影视文化进出口企
业协展区), created in 2017 with the support of the State Council Information Office
and the National Radio and Television Administration, has more than 50 members
now.1056 The FTIEA organizes and takes part in international forums and other events
to promote Chinese creations abroad.1057
• The Belt and Road Media Community (BRMC, 丝路电视国际合作共同体)
meets yearly since 2016, during an annual summit organized by CITVC and CHNPEC,
to promote cooperation in the media and cultural sectors and to develop the influence
of the “BRI community” internationally.1058
1. TV shows
Chinese TV shows can be broadly categorized into three genres, depending on the time
period of the plot: “costume” or “traditional” series (古装剧), whose story takes place
– more or less realistically – in ancient or imperial China; series that have the – often
hagiographic – history of the CCP as a backdrop; and “realistic” or “modern” series that
take place in the present-day China. Several “traditional” shows have been met with daz-
zling success abroad, such as Story of Yanxi Palace (延禧攻略), Empresses in the Palace (甄嬛
传), Nirvana in Fire (琅琊榜), and Princess Agents (楚乔传).1059 This type of series seduces
with elegant costumes and sets, and it feeds the image of a rich, refined and powerful past
Chinese civilization. This image reinforces the legitimacy of the Chinese narrative accord-
ing to which the emergence (or rather the re-emergence) of China is a natural fact, as the
country is just regaining the status of power it had enjoyed before Westerners inflicted “a
Century of Humiliation” on it (百年耻辱).
Despite some domestic successes, series and films on the Party’s history, which are always
challenging to evaluate since their broadcast is often imposed on TV channels, are difficult
to export. This category is best illustrated by Diplomatic Situation (外交风云),1060 a 48-epi-
1054. “GM Speech,” CHNPEC, http://archive.vn/hpSwk.
1055. “CITVC Signs Partnership Deal with NATPE,” NATPE, https://www.natpe.com/citvc-signs-partnership-
deal-with-natpe/.
1056. “Film and TV Import & Export Association: Telling Good Chinese Story,” CGTN (17 May 2018), http://
archive.vn/RSp99; TMTPOST, “Who Are the Buyers of Mainland Produced Drama Series Going Global?” Medium
(29 Oct. 2019).
1057. “People’s Daily: Chinese TV Series ‘Go Abroad Collectively,’” CHNPEC (25 Jun. 2018), http://archive.vn/
FRvkU.
1058. “2017 Belt and Road Media Community Summit Forum was Held in Beijing,” CHNPEC (22 Dec. 2017);
“2019 Belt and Road Media Community Summit Forum to Be Unveiled Soon,” Belt and Road Media Community (20
Jun. 2019), http://archive.vn/R2FqS.
1059. “People’s Daily: Chinese TV Series ‘Go Abroad Collectively’”; Xu Fan, “Chinese TV Shows Win Foreign
Fans.”
1060. This was one of the broadcasts made mandatory as the 10th anniversary of the regime approached.
348
sode series that painted an apologetic portrait of historical leaders of the Party (notably
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi) and recounted their diplomatic
successes at the Bandung or Geneva conferences. This category struggles to reach inter-
national audiences and contributes little to propagating a universally applicable Chinese
narrative.
“Modern” series, such as Ode to Joy (欢乐颂) or Stay with Me (放弃我, 抓紧我) – which
have been very successful abroad – convey another image that Chinese authorities are
just as eager to disseminate. Whatever the plot, these stories, which take today’s society
as their backdrop, show an economically developed, modernized and prosperous China
– an image that the Party welcomes because it sees itself as the architect of this modern
China. More importantly, these series are seen as a powerful vehicle to “more adequately
tell” China’s history and to “better understand” today’s China as the victim of many
prejudices.
2. Movies
Other cinematographic achivements defend the coun-
try more straightforwardly. Operation Red Sea (红 海
行动) and the Wolf Warrior series (战狼) are patri-
otic action films that have been very successful upon
their release, both at home and abroad. The first,
released for the 90th anniversary of the PLA’s creation,
and concurrently to the 19th CCP Congress, honored
the PLA naval forces who were tasked with evacuating
Chinese nationals stranded in the midst of the civil war
in Yemen. Wolf Warrior – the second opus was
China’s biggest box-office success (it brought $870
million) – follows the adventures of a former Special
Forces member who goes to Africa to protect his fel-
low countrymen in danger. Movies like these defend
the image of a responsible China, a “mother coun-
try” ready to make any sacrifice to protect its citi-
zens in danger, a message that undoubtedly primarily targets a domestic audience (to
strengthen its sense of national pride and confidence in the ruling authorities). These mov-
ies also show (off) the projection and combat capabilities of the PLA, the talents and
the sense of honor of the Chinese military. They convey an image that seeks to impress and
349
seduce foreign audiences in the same way that many Hollywood action films tend to rein-
force the attractiveness of U.S. armed forces.
The science fiction movie Wandering Earth (流浪地球) is another example: in a future
world where humanity is facing imminent extinction and in which not a single American
is represented, a group of Chinese dares to fight to the end and manages to revive hope,
unify the remaining people, and thus to save humanity. The message is forceful and cor-
responds to a PRC narrative: China cares about the well-being of others and, in this sense,
offers an alternative to the American way.
The dissemination of these cultural products abroad –
when they manage to make room for themselves and
take hold in the market – makes it possible to make
Chinese culture, history, language and civilization
known and loved and they serve as a powerful vehicle
to defend a specific image of China: powerful, rich,
developed, refined and caring.
3. Video games
China also exerts a cultural influence through video games, an industry where it is a
major player. In 2018, four of the top five global companies in the sector were Chinese,
with Tencent leading the way. The Chinese market is the world’s second-largest market
behind the United States and was estimated to be worth $92 million in 2020.1061 Video
games are one of the very first cultural goods exported by China and, therefore, a sig-
nificant vector of influence. They offer cultural worlds that are more easily adaptable
to the expectations of the global market than cinema and even more so than literature.
They allow China to export and make known typically Chinese characters or heroes
such as the monkey Sun Wukong from the Journey to the West. The Chinese market is
undergoing two important developments that could eventually facilitate the develop-
ment of national companies on the international market: the expansion of games on
cell phones and on the cloud. The first, known as mini-games, are mainly the work of
Tencent, which offers them on its social network WeChat and on QQ. Cloud games
offer streaming access without the need for downloads, and Tencent is also a leader in
this market.
In recent years, Chinese video game companies have embarked on a very aggressive
strategy of acquiring foreign companies. Tencent, for example, now owns the U.S.
company Riot Games (Legends of Runeterra), the Finnish company Supercell (Clash of Clans)
or the New Zealand company Grinding Gear Games (Path of Exile). The Chinese company
also owns 40% of the capital of Epic Games, the developer of Fortnite. In France, Tencent
holds a 5% stake in Ubisoft, the national leader in the sector. China’s penetration of this
market increases its influence and its ability to control anti-Chinese narratives or positions
contrary to its interests. However, video games are less readily associated with Chinese cul-
ture and are, therefore, only a secondary vector of seduction for Beijing. On the other hand,
it constitutes an excellent tool for disinformation.
1061. Wang Junwei, “China’s Gaming Industry Continues Explosive Growth,” China Daily (31 Jul. 2020).
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