A. Russian inspiration 

For attentive observers of influence operations, it is now evident that “China has been 

studying Russian activities for quite a number of years and learning from its experiences. 

They are getting better than the Russians in many ways.”14 The PLA, for instance, explicitly 

endorsed this “model”.15 

10. Lea Gabrielle (GEC coordinator), “Briefing with Special Envoy Lea Gabrielle, Global Engagement Center 

Update on PRC Efforts to Push Disinformation and Propaganda around COVID,” US Department of State (8 May 

2020). 

11. Jake Wallis et al., Retweeting through the great firewall: A persistent and undeterred threat actor, ASPI Policy Brief Report 

No. 33/2020, Jun. 2020, 5.

12. Gabrielle, “Briefing with Special Envoy.”

13. Camille François, “Moving Beyond Fears of the ‘Russian Playbook,’” Lawfare (15 Sept. 2020).

14. J. Michael Cole, “A Conversation about China’s Sharp Power and Taiwan,” Brookings Institution (11 Sept. 

2018), 3. 

15. The argument can be made that this amounts to a “return” to this model because the CCP had been influenced 

by the Soviet model: Elizabeth Chen, “China Learning From Russia’s ‘Emerging Great Power’ Global Media Tactics,” 

The Jamestown Foundation (12 Apr. 2021). 

622

For the PLA: Russia is a model to emulate

For its experience manipulating social networks, at least since the annexation of 

Crimea in 2014 (closely followed in China, by the PLA notably), Russia “provided China 

with a model to emulate.”16 In 2014, a member of the PLA General Staff Department 

wrote an article drawing three lessons from the “war on [the Russian] public opinion” 

in Ukraine:17 “take the offensive by pushing your narrative first, present legal argu-

ments, and back it up with hard power”18 Several similar articles were published after-

ward, which testified to a clear willingness, on the part of the Chinese military, to learn 

from the Russian precedent.19

In 2018, an article investigating RT’s coverage of the American bombings in Syria recom-

mended an “investigation of RT’s communication methods [:] without losing its ‘objectiv-

ity,’ we can silently influence the emotions and inclinations of the public and make it more 

dependent on information from our media outlets.”20 RT has regularly been quoted as a 

model to emulate in publications of the Chinese military, especially for its activities on 

social networks. Indeed, analysts from the PLA National Defense University compared the 

Russian channel to “a propaganda aircraft carrier,” stressing its performance on YouTube.21 

Another article published in 2018 insisted on “RT’s value for disinformation, reflecting a shift 

in the PLA’s discussion of offensive uses of social media.”22-23 Actually, it was the first “pos-

itive and detailed evaluation”24 of the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential 

campaign. The article highlighted how “Russia’s bots improved the effectiveness and lowered 

the costs of propaganda, and that RT spread disinformation on social media to confuse peo-

ple.”25 Several months later, another article showed admiration for the way RT exploited 

divisions within Western societies, suggesting China should do the same: “we can also 

make full use of the latent contradictions between different countries and the influence of op-

position factions within Western countries to prevent enemies from coming together to form 

an anti-China front, and to emphasize how its interminable conflicts and difficulty in reaching 

consensus contrast with our unity.”26

16. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of 

Social Media for Influence Operations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, 

Policy Papers (2019), 36. 

17. 朱宁宁 (Zhu Ningning), “乌 克兰政局动荡中俄对乌舆论战谋略运用探析” (“An Analysis of Russia’s 

Unfolding Media Warfare Tactics Amid the Turbulent Political Situation in Ukraine”), 军事记者 (Military Correspondent), 

5 (2014). 

18. Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea, 36. 

19. 李桥铭 (Li Qiaoming), “从俄罗斯两场战事看现代战争新发展” (“Analysis of Modern Warfare 

Development Based on Russia’s Two Conflicts”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily) (16 Aug. 2016); 邓秀梅 (Deng Xiumei), 

严振华 (Yan Zhenhua) and 张佳璐 (Zhang Jiayu), “乌克兰危机中的社交媒体战” (“The Social Media War in the 

Ukrainian Crisis”), 解放军报 (PLA Daily) (25 Sept. 2015). 

20. 刘力铭 (Liu Liming), “在突发军事行动中抢占舆 论主导权: 以CNN和RT对美国空袭叙利亚的报道为 

例” (“Seizing Control of Public Opinion Guidance in Sudden Military Operations: Taking CNN and RT’s Reporting 

on U.S. Airstrikes on Syria as an Example”), 军事记者 (Military Correspondent) (26 Sept. 2018). 

21. 马建光 (Ma Jianguang), 张秀波 (Zhang Xiubo) and 张乃千 (Zhang Naiqian), “俄罗斯布防网络媒 体新阵 

地” (“Russia’s New Front for Defending Internet Media”), 中国军 (China Military Online) (13 Apr. 2016). 

22. 马超 (Ma Chao) and 孙皓 (Sun Hao), “俄罗斯对外舆论传播的特点: 以’今日俄罗斯’电视 台为列” (“The 

Characteristics of Russian Public Opinion Propagation: Taking ‘Russia Today’ TV Station as an Example”), 军事记 

者 (Military Correspondent) (14 Jun. 2018). 

23. Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea, 38. 

24. Ibid., 94. 

25. Ibid., 95. 

26. 刘力铭 (Liu Liming), “在突发军事行动中抢占舆 论主导权: 以CNN和RT对美国空袭叙利亚的报道为 

例” (“Seizing Control of Public Opinion Guidance in Sudden Military Operations: Taking CNN and RT’s Reporting 

on U.S. Airstrikes on Syria as an Example”).

623

Before assessing to what extent Moscow might have inspired Beijing, we need to empha-

size that they have mutually inspired each other. On some elements, Moscow is actu-

ally taking cues from Beijing. This is the case, for instance, of the policies targeting the 

diaspora. “The second-biggest diaspora in the world, after the Chinese,”27 is the Russian, 

and they both adopted a similarly wide and homogenous conception of the diaspora. 

Indeed, the manner Beijing conceives “overseas Chinese,” both its nationals but also peo-

ple of Chinese descent whatever their citizenship may be (ethnic nationalism → p. 165), 

is similar to the way Russia perceives its “compatriots abroad”: not solely the Russians 

strictly speaking, but also Russian speakers that share a common history and culture. As 

Mikhail Suslov noted, “the Russian diaspora is not a diaspora in the strict sense, and nor is 

it ‘Russian.’ This ‘Russian’ diaspora is in fact a post-Soviet diaspora, its homeland no longer 

in existence.”28 In both cases, the extension of the “subjects” over which these states claim, 

if not sovereignty, at least some form of control, is very broad. They also tend to conceive 

these diasporas as a homogeneous bloc, which is obviously not the case, primarily because 

they include a significant proportion of dissidents. In any case, the regimes try to homog-

enize them, with varying degrees of effectiveness. In that case, Russia is actually doing 

less well than China. Indeed, “the Russian political elite has been aware of the potential 

of the ‘Russian compatriots,’ but at the same time its ways of relating to them are awkward 

and confusing.”29 Here, Russia is the one taking heeds from China, as the president of the 

French Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots admitted.30

Now, Beijing emulates the Russians in a number of ways:

• 1) In leading clandestine informational operations on Western social networks 

(Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube), using trolls, fake accounts, and bots. Freedom House 

noted that one of the main evolutions of the Chinese informational operations 

since 2017 has been the development of “Russian-style social media disinforma-

tion campaigns.”31 They seemingly debuted “as early as mid-2017” (the earliest such 

operation was presumably launched in April 2017)32 and grew more intense in 2019 when 

the Chinese government extended those methods to Western platforms: “[until] the 2019 

protests in Hong Kong, most evidence of Chinese computational propaganda occurred 

on domestic platforms such as Weibo, WeChat, and QQ. But China’s new-found interest 

in aggressively using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube should raise concerns for democ-

racies.”33 The 2019 campaign in Hong Kong was a test: “Beijing began experimenting 

27. Mikhail Suslov, “Russian World”: Russia’s Policy Toward its Diaspora, Russie. Nei.Visions 103, French Institute of 

International Relations (IFRI) (Jul. 2017), 5. 

28. Ibid., 10; see also: Andis Kudors, “‘Russian World’ – Russia’s Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy,” 

Russian Analytical Digest, 81 (2010), 2-4. 

29. Suslov, Russian World, 5. 

30. Quoted in Maxime Audinet, Une fabrique étatique du soft power: acteurs et pratiques de l’influence par la diplomatie publique 

en Russie post-soviétique (The State’s Construction of Soft Power: Actors and Influence Methods in the Public Diplomacy 

in Post-Soviet Russia), Ph.D. Thesis in Political Science, University Paris Nanterre (10 Sept. 2020), 235. 

31. Sarah Cook, Beijing’s Global Megaphone: The Expansion of Chinese Communist Party Media Influence Since 2017, Freedom 

House special report (Jan. 2020), 2. 

32. Tom Uren, Elise Thomas, and Jacob Wallis, Tweeting Through the Great Firewall: Preliminary Analysis of PRC-linked 

Information Operations Against the Hong Kong Protests, ASPI, Report No. 25 (2019), 29. 

33. Samantha Bradshaw and Philipp N. Howard, The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised 

Social Media Manipulation, Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University, 

https://bit.ly/3cDVvbe. 

624

with covert information operations on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, using false per-

sonas and pages that aimed to discredit the protesters by portraying them as violent.”34 

Since 2019 (Hong Kong), and especially 2020 (pandemic), a consensus has emerged 

to recognize that China is engaged in aggressive and clandestine “Russian-style” 

campaigns. Since 2020, many investigations have shown “that pro-Beijing actors are 

carrying out a whole range of covert activities in multiple countries and languages. The 

campaigns aim to spread proven falsehoods, sow societal discord and panic, manip-

ulate perceptions of public opinion, or undermine the democratic process.”35 As for 

now, these campaigns have mostly targeted China’s near abroad (Taiwan, Hong 

Kong), Australia and the United States. From this perspective, Europeans – who are 

battered by more visible Russian campaigns36 – may still be underestimating the threat 

of Chinese information manipulations. And yet, it is obvious that, without matching the 

intensity and sophistication of Russian efforts, China is bound to develop its operations 

targeting Europe or a European country in the informational domain.

• 2) In investing massively, openly, and aggressively in social networks, as illus-

trated by the “Twitterization” of diplomats participating in the “wolf warrior diplo-

macy” – something Russian authorities were already doing. 

• 3) In widening the reach of warfare beyond the sole diasporas. Traditionally – and 

this was a classical difference between the approach of Beijing and Moscow – the United 

Front concentrated its efforts on monitoring and surveilling overseas Chinese in Western 

countries, i.e. suppressing dissidents, constructing the narrative circulated in Chinese-

language media outlets, and mobilizing the largest possible number of individuals to act 

in conformity with the Party’s interests. However, during the last decade (2010-2020), the 

targets of the United Front have expanded to include, among others, the non-Chinese 

political, entrepreneurial, media and academic elites of targeted countries, as noted in 

the online version of the People’s Daily: the main targets have been “individuals who are 

representative due to their political influence, economic power, social position, 

and high academic status, as well leaders of communities.”37

The extension of the domain of struggle is particularly visible in the media landscape, 

where Beijing has evolved from a focus on international outlets in China and its imme-

diate environment (Hong Kong, Taiwan) ten years ago to an attempt at influencing 

and censoring media outlets everywhere in the world nowadays. It has used, espe-

cially after 2017, “tactics that were once used primarily to co-opt Chinese diaspora 

media and suppress critical coverage in overseas Chinese-language publications are 

now being applied – with some effect – to local mainstream media in various coun-

tries.”38

34. Laura Rosenberger, “China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive,” Foreign Affairs (22 Apr. 2020). 

35. Sarah Cook, “Welcome to the New Era of Chinese Disinformation,” China Media Bulletin (May 2020), 2. 

36. Martin Svárovský, Jakub Janda and Veronika Víchová, Handbook on Countering Russian and Chinese Interference in 

Europe, European Values et Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2019), 15. 

37. Original text in Chinese: “海外统一战线工作对象是台湾同胞、港澳同胞、国外侨胞及一切热爱 中华

民族的人们。重点是政治上有影响、经济上有实力、社会上有声望，学术上有造诣的代表性人士 和社团

领袖,” in “海外统一战线工作” (“Work from Overseas United Front”), 人民网 (The People’s Daily Online), https://

archive.vn/xLRQI. Quoted in Clive Hamilton, “Chinese Communist Party Influence in Australian Universities,” 

lecture at the University of Queensland, Brisbane (28 Aug. 2019). 

38. Cook, Beijing’s Global Megaphone, 2. 

625

• 4) In switching from a positive narrative on itself to a negative narrative on the 

others. Beijing’s objective is no longer solely to promote a positive narrative and to pre-

vent the circulation of negative representations on China: in Italy and Serbia during the 

pandemic, for instance (→ p. 591), a critical (and, in that case, unwarranted) narrative on 

the EU was added. In fact, we observe more and more cases where Beijing is “seeking 

to manipulate conversations even on topics not directly related to China,”39 which 

is a recent development. The Party-State is acting gradually, blurring the line between 

its defensive and offensive objectives.40 It is not always easy to understand when the 

country is defending itself and when it is being offensive, contrary to the Kremlin, which 

endorses more openly the offensive character of its operations. In any case, Beijing is 

“seeing the need not just to defend its own system publicly but to unleash open criticism 

of ’western democracy’ through its officials and propaganda machinery rather than con-

fining this language to internal Party documents and speeches.”41

• 5) In trying to divide and sow discord in target countries, as illustrated by the several 

operations launched against the United States, including a campaign of text messages 

meant to create a panic in March 2020 (→ p. 392). On that matter, “American officials 

said China, borrowing from Russia’s strategies, has been trying to widen political divi-

sions in the United States.”42 The United States is no exception: other examples in this 

report highlighted how Beijing tried to divide Canada, Europe, South Korea or Japan. In 

trying to seduce discontent individuals, those who believe they have been left on the 

sidelines – such as Canadian First Nations (→ p. 583) or separatist movements, in Japan 

for instance (→ p. 401) –, Beijing has adopted a method commonly used by Moscow, 

which has not refrained from endorsing protesters in some countries (the Yellow Vests 

in France for instance).43

In a previous report, we noted that the divisions used by Moscow were not only inter-

nal to a country (to fracture its society) but also external, stirring up tensions between 

neighboring states and allies.44 Several examples in this report showed that Beijing has 

also tried to divide Europe, the transatlantic relation, and the U.S.-Canadian rela-

tionship, among others. 

• 6) In interfering with elections. As noted earlier (→ p. 268), China interfered in at 

least a dozen elections in Asia, Australasia, and in North America. In the United States, 

APT31, also known as Zirconium, a group of hackers backed by the Chinese state, tried 

to penetrate the emails of the Biden campaign in a manner (fishing) similar to 

the hack that allowed GRU officers to conduct the DNC Leaks operation against 

39. Sarah Cook, “Recent Wins and Defeats for Beijing’s Global Media Influence Campaign,” China Media Bulletin 

(Nov. 2020), p. 4. 

40. Michael J. Mazarr et al., Hostile Social Manipulation: Present Realities and Emerging Trends, RAND Corporation, 2019, 

p. 164-165. 

41. Andrew Small and Dhruva Jaishankar, “‘For Our Enemies, We Have Shotguns’: Explaining China’s New 

Assertiveness,” War on the Rocks (20 Jul. 2020). 

42. Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg, and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages that 

Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say,” The New York Times (22 Apr. 2020). 

43. Colin Gérard, Guilhem Marotte and Loqman Salamatian, “RT, Sputnik et le mouvement des Gilets jaunes: 

cartographie des communautés politiques sur Twitter” (“RT, Sputnik, and the Yellow Vests Movement: Mapping 

Political Communities on Twitter”), L’Espace politique, 40, 1 (2020). 

44. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Alexandre Escorcia, Marine Guillaume, and Janaina Herrera, Information 

Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, Report from the Centre for Analysis, Planning and Strategy at the French 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CAPS) and the Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School (IRSEM) of the 

Ministry of the Armed Forces, Paris (Aug. 2018), 70. 

626

Hillary Clinton four years earlier.45 Here, China follows Russia’s lead, seemingly posi-

tioning itself as a copycat – even though it would not go as far because, as usual, it hacks 

but does not leak. A report of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) stated that, con-

trary to Russia, Beijing did not try to interfere or to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential 

election for different reasons, including the fact that opposition to Beijing is bipartisan 

in Washington – there was no pro-China option in the electoral field. That said, in the 

same report, the officer dealing with cyber questions added a “minority opinion” accord-

ing to which Beijing still tried to harm the Trump candidacy through actions on social 

networks and in the media, but “calibrated its influence efforts to avoid blowback” in a 

manner that still qualified as “electoral influence.”46

• 7) In circulating conspiracy theories, via official (diplomatic) channels for instance, 

as was saw during the Covid-19 pandemic. An article published in a PLA magazine in 

2018 suggested that conspiracy theories should be spread out in Western media outlets 

if China were to be losing the battle for public opinions. According to its author, a stu-

dent from the department of public opinion warfare at the National Defense University, 

Beijing “should cultivate a group of media outlets and think tanks having a 

small ‘grey’ audience to spread lies and create a database of negative topics and 

conspiracy theories.”47 Doing so, it should focus more particularly on “targeting the 

younger Western audiences’ distrust of mainstream media, politicians, and even val-

ues.”48 Likewise, it could use “official channels to amplify conspiracy theories and to 

sow doubt about established facts in the context of major political events […], a tactic 

often used by Moscow.”49 “China’s recent promotion of known conspiracy websites is 

another move taken from the Russian playbook.”50

• 8) In using its near abroad as a testing ground before launching operations world-

wide: Moscow tested its methods during the color revolutions of the mid-2000s, in Georgia 

(2008), and Ukraine (2014), before it turned them against Western democracies. Similarly, 

Beijing started its operations in Taiwan and Hong Kong before widening their reach glob-

ally, including in (but not limited to) Australia, Canada, the United States and Europe. 

From Argentina to Denmark, everyone can see a globalization of Chinese operations. 

• 9) In subcontracting portions of its informational operations to intermediaries. 

The frequent use, on the Chinese side, of content farms (→ p. 367) that are outsourced 

in Malaysia or elsewhere echoes the Russian troll farms, some of which are based abroad 

(such as the troll farm uncovered by Graphika in the suburbs of Accra, in Ghana).51

• 10) In moving closer to political radicals. The ties between the Chinese embassy 

in Sweden, the nationalist far-right party Alternativ för Sverige and the Schiller Institute 

45. David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “Chinese Hackers Target Email Accounts of Biden Campaign Staff, 

Google Says,” The New York Times (4 Jun. 2020); Tom Burt, “New Cyberattacks Targeting U.S. Elections,” Microsoft.

com (10 Sept. 2020). 

46. NIC, Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections (10 Mar. 2021), declassified version published on March 15, 

2021, p. 8, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf. 

47. 刘力铭 (Liu Liming), “叙利亚内战中美俄的舆论博弈 与启示” (“Insights and the Public Opinion Game 

Between the U.S. and Russia in Syria’s Civil War”), 军事记者 (Military Correspondent) (Dec. 2018). 

48. Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea, 95. 

49. Jessica Brandt and Bret Schafer, “Five Things to Know About Beijing’s Disinformation Approach,” Alliance 

for Securing Democracy, GMF (30 Mar. 2020); see also: Ilya Yablokov, “Social networks of Death: Conspiracy Panics 

and Professional Journalistic Ethics in the Post-Soviet Russia,” Quaderni, 94/3 (2017), 53-62. 

50. Rosenberger, “China’s Coronavirus Information Offensive.” 

51. Ben Nimmo et al., IRA in Ghana: Double Deceit, Graphika (Mar. 2020). 

627

 (with its sulfurous reputation) startled observers. The same occurred in France when the 

CCP-affiliated People Daily used Damien Viguier to discredit the coverage of China by Le 

Monde. Viguier, who had been condemned for his denial of crimes against humanity,52 

is the lawyer of the far-right ideologist Alain Soral.53 Likewise, Egalité et réconciliation, the 

association founded by Alain Soral, relayed the Chinese conspiracy theory according to 

which the coronavirus would have its origin in the American laboratory of Fort Detrick 

(→ p. 589).54 Last but not least, the Chinese embassy in Paris promoted a book on Uyghurs 

written by the far-left administrator of a website that has “repeatedly relayed conspiracy 

theories” (→ p. 335).55 Examples elsewhere are legions, such as in Italy where Beijing has 

grown closer to the far-right.56 According to an April 2021 report from the Soufan Center, 

as of March 2020 China was the state actor “most involved in amplifying QAnon 

narratives on Facebook,” ahead of Russia. Between January 1 and February 28, 2021, 

for example, 58% of QAnon posts on Facebook would have originated in China, while 

less than half would have originated in Russia. The report concludes that “China’s goal, 

most likely, is to sow further discord and division among the American population.”57 If 

the precise data is to be taken cautiously, as the methodology of the report has been ques-

tioned (the exact origin of the operators of the Facebook accounts involved are unver-

ifiable except by Facebook itself58) the very involvement of Chinese state actors in the 

amplification of QAnon stories remains plausible. Facebook, like Twitter and Google, has 

reported manipulations of Chinese origin on several occasions and, as we have seen, some 

of these manipulations were indeed aimed at increasing divisions within the U.S. society. 

This relatively new tendency is another symptom of the Russification of Chinese attitudes 

(and diplomatic practice) as the country no longer refrains from displaying itself with local 

extremes, something Russia has done for a long time. 

Yet, the motivations are different: in general, people aligning themselves with China 

are motivated by financial gains, more than by a convergence of views or inter-

ests; while Russia benefits from a genuine ideological proximity with those groups 

(pro-traditions, pro-sovereignty, anti-European feelings, etc.). That said, China’s conduct 

in the Xinjiang – putting a million Muslims in concentration camps as part of an ethnic 

cleansing or even genocide – may seduce some far-right fringes. 

Some anti-Semitic signals in the Chinese discourse must probably be interpreted in 

the context of this rapprochement with the political extremes. Not only some of the 

relays of this discourse have been notoriously conspiratorial and anti-Semitic websites, 

such as the one Larry Romanoff had as early as 2010 (→ p. 608); but some Chinese 

diplomats, journalists and influencers have recently made some disturbing references. 

On May 24, 2020, the Embassy of China in France published on its Twitter account a 

52. Olivia Dufour, “Non, l’immunité de l’avocat n’est pas totale” (“No, a Lawyer’s Immunity is Not Without 

Limits”), Gazette du Palais, 16 (23 Apr. 2019), 5. 

53. “French Lawyer Condemns Le Monde’s Stigmatization of China,” People’s Daily Online (3 Apr. 2020), https://

archive.vn/6iGfs. 

54. “Pékin contre-attaque: le laboratoire militaire américain de Fort Detrick à l’origine du Covid?” (“Beijing 

strikes back: the US military laboratory at Fort Detrick is the source of Covid”) (from: voltairenet.org), Egalité et 

réconciliation, June 29, 2021 (https://archive.vn/uNwtp).

55. https://www.conspiracywatch.info/le-grand-soir.

56. Martin Svárovský, Jakub Janda, and Veronika Víchová, Handbook on Countering Russian and Chinese Interference in 

Europe, European Values et Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2019), 16. 

57. Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A Data-Driven Approach to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon, The Soufan Center 

(Apr. 2021), 26.

58. David Gilbert, “No, Russia and China Didn’t ‘Weaponize’ QAnon. It’s a Homegrown Nightmare,” Vice (22 Apr. 2021).

628

caricature (see below) that has largely been interpreted as conspiratorial and anti-Semitic 

(the Israeli flag on the scythe of Death seemed to imply that the Israeli-American alli-

ance sawed death in a number of countries and, here, in Hong Kong) before it deleted 

the message and claimed its account had been “falsified.” The explanation did not con-

vince anyone because, as Antoine Bondaz noted, the caricature continued to be “liked” 

by the Embassy’s account (not to mention that it was republished in April 2021, by the 

account of the Chinese embassy in Japan this time, before being deleted again – see 

image below).59 Another example was also caught by Antoine Bondaz: on March 23, 

2021, the journalist and writer Zheng Ruolin (郑若麟) – and “old friend” of Maxime 

Vivas (→ p. 335)60 – attacked the French MEP Raphaël Glucksmann on Weibo, high-

lighting that “his whole family was Jewish,” with an image on which the star of David 

was added (Glucksmann was also deemed responsible of the death of Samuel Paty, 

the French teacher who was beheaded by an islamist terrorist, because he had presum-

ably “attracted Chechen refugees to France and […] a Chechen terrorist decapitated the 

French professor” – see the image below). 

Sources: “Chinese embassy in France says its Twitter account was ‘falsified’ after polemical tweet,” La Libre (25 May 2020); 

https://www.sankei.com/article/20210430-4QVL4S364FMCTPP7KOBFEJBW7A/; https://twitter.com/AntoineBondaz/

status/1374617640598126595/photo/2.

We can add to the list the influencer Lu Kewen, author of several articles including 

“How to assess the value of Jews?” (May 29, 2021), with comments on their physical 

peculiarities, illustrated by a profile photo showing a characteristic nose, or “What kind 

of people are today’s Jews really?” (June 28, 2021).61 In another article (August 9, 2021), 

he addresses the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, whom he reminds that he is 

“Jewish” in these terms: “You, the rulers of the American Empire, the Jews who control 

59. https://twitter.com/AntoineBondaz/status/1264851073929445376.

60. Thaïs Chaigne, “Qui est Maxime Vivas, ce Français qui dénonce les ‘fake news’ sur les Ouïghours et fait le 

bonheur de Pékin?” (“Who is Maxime Vivas, the Frenchman who Denounces ‘Fake News’ on Uyghurs and Pleases 

Beijing”), Libération (30 Mar. 2021).

61. He has 400,000 subscribers on Zhihu and 1,450,000 on bilibili. The first article is: “如何评价犹太

人？” (“How to assess the value of Jews?”), WeChat account 卢克文工作室 (29 May 2021), https://mp.weixin.

qq.com/s/CRemOpfC_0ZHgSsxtHV1Ew; the second: “今天的犹太人到底是一群什么人？” (“What kind of 

people are today’s Jews really?”), WeChat account 卢克文工作室 (28 Jun. 2021), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/

X3DcNenhxA95Wb_mRemFMg. 

629

finance and the media, and the Japanese invaders of the small islands, cannot imagine 

what each of us, a member of the Chinese nation, is willing to consent to in order to con-

tribute to the rebirth of this country, and how much we have accepted humiliation for so 

many years, only to recover the glory of our most illustrious forefathers.”62 In May 2021, 

it was CGTN’s star presenter Zheng Junfeng who drew the ire of the Israeli authorities 

for explaining U.S. support for Israel by the power of Jewish lobbies in the country.63 

The Israeli embassy in China reacted by saying that it showed “blatant anti-Semitism.”64 

These examples are so far isolated, and nothing indicates a more widespread tendency: 

China is possibly using all the levers in its hands against its enemies, in an uninhibited 

discourse that no longer forbids itself anything. Yet, this lever could find an echo in sev-

eral anti-Semitic groups in Russia, in Europe, or in North America for instance. 

Source: https://twitter.com/MEMRIReports/status/1395818681628778496.

• 11) In instrumentalizing the terrorist specter in discussing Uyghurs. It brandishes 

the terrorist threat, but also the myth of a happy population (Chinese media circulate 

many images of the happy daily life in Xinjiang), and attacks against the presumably 

ignorant, lying, and interfering Western outlets – all of which “reflect many classic ele-

ments of Russian disinformation with a uniquely Chinese twist.”65

• 12) In using “gangster methods.” The examples of pressure, intimidations, aggres-

sions, arbitrary arrests, kidnappings, breaks in, hackings, sabotages that are described in 

this report show that Beijing is willing to use “gangster methods,”66 in sharp contrast to 

the ethos that it apparently hoped to project on the international scene – a benevolent and 

pacific power – and in an attitude which is closer to the brutal image that never really 

bothered Moscow. 

62. The Chinese term used here (倭寇 - wokou) refers to the pirates who plundered the Chinese coasts between 

the 13th and 16th centuries and who were not only ethnically Japanese but also Korean and even Chinese. The term 

underwent a semantic shift in the 20th century to qualify the Japanese invader. It has an obvious depreciative connotation.

63. “布林肯的野望：围堵中国大战略” (“Blinken’s ambition: a grand strategy to encircle China”), WeChat 

account 卢克文工作室 (9 Aug. 2021), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/7XkWDQlyXbILR4SWivIMBQ. 

64. https://twitter.com/IsraelinChina/status/1394653723901579264.

65. Brandt and Schafer, “Five Things to Know.”

66. Reporters Without Borders, China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order (2019), 19. 

630

Hence, to discredit “the West,” it is now obvious that Beijing has adopted the Russian 

approach that Ben Nimmo summed up in 2015 as the “4Ds:”67 dismiss (“If you do not 

like what your critics say, insult them”), distort (“If you do not like the facts, twist them”), 

distract (“If you’re accused of something, accuse someone else of the same thing”68), and 

dismay (“If you do not like what someone else is planning, scare them off.”).69

Unlike Russia, China has often been described as refraining from using aggres-

sive disinformation campaigns targeting the divisions of a society, and also as not 

having a global field of intervention (only a regional sphere).70 These two elements 

were the two missing pieces of a hybrid arsenal, according to the infographics of the 

Ukrainian Crisis Media Center (below). But if it was true a few years ago, this is no longer 

the case today, as this report shows. China now checks the two elements. In fact, it 

checks all of them: China has the most comprehensive arsenal of any country. 

Finally, the Russification may also be partly a Sovietization. In other words, it could 

reach beyond information manipulation on social networks to a return to tradition as a 

way to counter more and more frequent detections (as shown in the exponential growth 

of reports on Chinese operations). Like the jihadists who use short waves to prevent the 

interception of their (GSM or satellite) phone communications, the more observers scruti-

nize and denounce Chinese actions on social networks and on the Internet, the more China 

could be tempted to implement disinformation on other channels. To do that, the reper-

toire of actions elaborated by the KGB’s Service A constitutes a precious source of inspi-

ration for the Chinese preparing influence operations. Bound to grow in the years ahead, 

this tendency is well illustrated by the operation that we named “Infektion 2.0” which subtly 

mixes disinformation on social networks and controlling front organizations. 

67. Ben Nimmo, “Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda Machine Works, and How to Counter It,” 

StopFake (19 May 2015). 

68. An argumentative figure also kown as a metastasis. 

69. https://twitter.com/benimmo/status/670230827377295360; https://twitter.com/benimmo/

status/670230827377295360. 

70. “Hybrid Tactics of Russia, China and Iran,” Ukraine Crisis Media Center (22 Dec. 2020). 

631

B. Some differences subsist

• 1) China has a more complete toolkit, not only because its own platforms (WeChat, 

Weibo, TikTok) are used worldwide, while the Russians rely on U.S. platforms (Facebook, 

Twitter, and Instagram), but also because it has real “offline” influence: “China’s online 

activities frequently support offline influence operations that make extensive use of 

in-person networks of human agents of influence, overtly attributed state media in 

English and other non-Chinese languages, and ‘grey propaganda’ with less obviously 

attributable ties to the mainland. This robust and well-resourced collection of tools 

should equip China to execute integrated influence operations on a scale that Russia 

cannot match.”71 Generally speaking, Beijing has many more levers than Moscow, in 

particular economic ones. 

• 2) China also benefits from a plethoric workforce. “Russians still rely very much 

on bots, so its computers, and zombie computers that are propagating disinformation, 

whereas the Chinese still seem to be using human beings, which means that the content 

can react more quickly to situations. All of that is probably also augmented by cyborgs, 

so basically the original information is generated by human beings, and then it is spread 

by computer systems, and all that, so to saturate the environment, but one thing is sure, 

is that China has a lot more people that can produce disinformation content than Russia 

does.”72 This comparative advantage is however countered by the growing use 

of artificial intelligence in informational operations, including in the production of 

content. 

• 3) Still, Russian information manipulations are more sophisticated. The Chinese 

operations that have targeted Western social networks after 2017 are impressive by their 

sheer number but usually hastened and of poor quality, hence easier to notice. Russians, 

on the contrary, are more meticulous and have a more precise knowledge of local 

media ecosystems and public opinions. Like KGB officers before them, Russians 

“do ethnographic research (IRA operatives toured the United States) and ingratiate 

themselves into the communities they are pretending to be members of (e.g., Black 

Lives Matter activists or Texas secessionists). They put in effort to build relationships 

with influencers, to ensure that authentic influential voices amplify their content.”73 The 

Chinese generally learn languages but not cultures, and they lack of adaptive 

capacity: “we see young people speaking the language fairly well but showing really 

inappropriate behaviors,” a Swedish interlocutor told us.74 Yet, it appears that in Middle 

Eastern countries (especially in Gulf states and in Algeria), Chinese diplomats not only 

speak the language quite well – in both its classical and dialectal forms – but also have a 

precise knowledge of local cultures.75

• 4) Russia better integrates cyber with the rest: its cyberoperations are conceived 

as parts of wider campaigns of influence (such as hack-and-leak). They are used in a 

sequence that brings in intelligence services, but also media outlets, as we have seen over 

71. Renée Diresta et al., Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives, Stanford 

Internet Cyber Policy Center, Hoover Institution (Jul. 2020), 3. 

72. Cole, “A Conversation about China’s Sharp Power,” 3. 

73. Diresta et al., Telling China’s Story, 44. 

74. Interview with one of the authors, Stockholm (Feb. 2020). 

75. Interview of the authors with Fatiha Dazi-Héni, Paris (Feb. 2021). 

632

the years, especially with the DNC Leaks and the Macron Leaks.76 Beijing, however, seg-

ments its operations (cyber on one side, then the rest): Chinese cyberoperations are 

numerous and sophisticated, but they are not (yet) integrated into wider informa-

tional operations despite knowing that several actors, such the MSS, have come 

to master the entire process. The fusion ultimately looms ahead if the Russification 

continues. 

• 5) China still believes in the attractiveness of its model. As they attack Westerners, 

Chinese media outlets are still mainly focused on promoting China and its model of 

governance. CGTN and Xinhua do not behave like RT and Sputnik. China talks a lot 

more about itself than Russia does: more than 50% of the content circulated on the 

YouTube channels of CGTN and CCTV focus on China, compared to only 4% of the 

content released on the YouTube channels of RT America and RT UK dealing with 

Russia.77 RT France’s website does not have a Russian news tab, for example, while that 

of CGTN Français even places the “China” tab first on its toolbar. In a word, Chinese 

outlets are ego-centered. 

• 6) Consequently, the differences are not playing in China’s favor: Russian media are 

better implanted in their local ecosystems, their websites receive a lot more vis-

its, and their profiles on social networks more engagement because they deal with 

French topics in the French context, for instance, and with divisive issues (unemploy-

ment, demonstrations, crimes, immigration etc.). Chinese platforms, however, usually 

speak about China in France, which is less interesting to many readers. In other words, 

China stands far above Russia in its artificially high number of followers on social 

networks but the Russians are more efficient, more convincing. Thus, they have 

comparatively more impact on social networks. It does not seem to be a Chinese pri-

ority however: they want to “demonstrate to superiors total commitment by generating 

high levels of activity […] while actual efficacy or impact may be secondary.”78 As such, 

the disciplinary campaign marshaled by Xi Jinping probably reinforced the propensity 

of actors on the field to favor quantitative operations at the expense of real success. 

Obviously, they may figure that out and make their future operations more subtle, thus 

less detectable and more influential. 

To sum up, Beijing has an advantage in several domains, Moscow in others, and it can 

be said that “China copied Russia’s tactics […]. But it lacks Russia’s skillset.”79 It 

does not mean, however, that one is less dangerous than the others, none the least because 

China’s room for improvement is considerable. Furthermore, we should not confuse the 

whole with the part: the Russian superiority on information manipulation is evident, 

but when we account for all influence operations, the reverse is true. First, Beijing fol-

lows the same tradition (communist techniques refined all through the 20th century) and the 

country is on a path to acquire the same expertise, perhaps even a better one in some areas. 

Also, China’s economic might and the attractiveness of its internal market means that it is 

harder to say no to. Finally, the country is both more subtle and apparently innocuous in 

76. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, The ‘Macron Leaks’ Operation: A Post-Mortem, IRSEM/Atlantic Council (Jun. 

2019). 

77. Brandt and Schafer, “Five Things to Know.” 

78. Diresta et al., Telling China’s Story, 44. 

79. Edward Lucas, Jake Morris, and Corina Rebegea, Information Bedlam: Russian and Chinese Information Operations 

During Covid-19, CEPA (Mar. 2021), 3.

633

its operations. What To wrote about the efforts directed at overseas Chinese, the qiaowu (侨

务) – i.e. “an effective tool for intensive behavioral control and manipulation, yet appearing 

benign, benevolent, and helpful”80 – can apply to the entire effort of the United Front, and 

to most Chinese influence operations. Finally, as Ryan Fedasiuk noted, “if the past twenty 

years are any indication, foreigners should expect the CCP’s influence operations to 

continue growing in size and sophistication.”81 The Party-State learns fast and it can 

enjoy considerable resources at its disposal.

C. Cooperation 

The Sino-Russian – or, more accurately, Sino-Soviet – cooperation on informa-

tion manipulation is not a new phenomenon. When, in 1949-1950, Soviet propaganda 

accused the United States of testing biological weapons on the Inuit populations of Alaska, 

this fake information was relayed by Chinese state propaganda, which asserted that the 

United States was then collaborating with the former chief of the Japanese program on bio-

logical weapons, and ready to use these weapons against China. In 1952, during the Korean 

War, the Soviets in turn relayed a Chinese and North Korean disinformation campaign 

averring that the United States was conducting a bacteriological war by airlifting insects 

infected with microorganisms carrying diseases such as the plague and cholera. Together 

with the Soviets, they doctored the evidence by creating two fake zones of contamination.82

Nowadays, the Sino-Russian relationship is growing stronger. For more than a decade, 

the two powers have continuously come closer as the distance with the United States 

widens. After 2014, the fallout of the annexation of Crimea and of the Donbass War – that 

is, the rupture with Europe – contributed to reinforcing the partnership between Moscow 

and Beijing. More recently, the Covid-19 pandemic gave the impression of a “united front” 

in defense of the authoritarian model of crisis management to counter presumably inef-

ficient, even chaotic, liberal democracies, as described by the media of the two countries. 

Although specialists have repeatedly emphasized the fragility, or at least the somewhat arti-

ficial and unsustainable nature of this profoundly asymmetrical agreement – the gap having 

widened between the two – the fact remains that in the field of influence operations, and 

more precisely in the informational sub-field, the two powers are undertaking a clear rap-

prochement. 

• 1) Media cooperation. An annual Russia-China Media Forum debuted in 2015, 

during which dozens of contracts are signed between media outlets from both coun-

tries. In 2017, Sputnik signed cooperation agreements with Xinhua, the Guangdong 

radio and TV channels,83 and the Global Times;84 while Rossia Segodnia (RS, overseeing 

RT and Sputnik) partnered with Alibaba Culture Communication.85 In 2018, RS and 

80. James Jiann Hua To, Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 50. 

81. Ryan Fedasiuk, “A Different Kind of Army: The Militarization of China’s Internet Trolls,” China Brief, 21:7 (12 

Apr. 2021). 

82. Milton Leitenberg, “China’s False Allegations of the Use of Biological Weapons by the United States during the 

Korean War,” Working Paper, 78, Cold War International History Project (Mar. 2016); Milton Leitenberg, “False Allegations 

of U.S. Biological Weapons Use during the Korean War,” in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, eds., 

Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008); Wu Zhili, 

‘The Bacteriological War of 1952 is a False Alarm’” (Sept. 1997), History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 

Yanhuang Chunqiu 11 (2013), 36-39. 

83. “Sputnik Signs Cooperation Agreements with China’s Xinhua, Guangdong Agencies,” Sputnik (4 Jul. 2017). 

84. “Global Times Begins Cooperation with Sputnik,” Global Times (19 Apr. 2017). 

85. “Sputnik News Agency, Alibaba Group Sign Memorandum of Strategic Cooperation,” Sputnik (6 Sept. 2017). 

634

China Media Group (CMG, controlling CGTN and RCI) signed a strategic coopera-

tion agreement to officially develop common content (documentaries, news reports) 

and promote each other’s national content on their respective platforms. They 

also set up a platform to release content translated from Russian or Chinese and pro-

duced by media in each countries (www.sinorusfocus.com). In 2019, agreements were 

signed between RS and Huawei,86 and again between Sputnik and Xinhua (to share 

content in Spanish and Arabic this time).87 An agreement with Roskomnadzor – the 

Russian regulatory authority in charge of media and communications – granted a cable 

and digital broadcasting license to the Russian version of CGTN, another type of 

decision made at this event. At the Russian political level, the vice-minister of Digital 

Development and Mass Communications, Alexei Voline, seems to be shepherding the 

negotiations. 

Besides, several Chinese journalists are invited every year to the Russian Young 

Leaders program, “Новое поколение” (New Generation), organized by the agency 

Rossotrudnichestvo, in cooperation with Sputnik. These are master classes where RS 

employees train individuals to the “Russian methods of international journalism pertain-

ing to media production and social network uses.”88

This rapprochement is motivated by a shared belief in the competitiveness of the inter-

national mediatic field, and in the necessity – for Russian and Chinese outlets – to ally 

themselves in the face of Western heavyweights (notably CNN and the BBC) and 

offer an “alternative” editorial line. During the state visit of Xi Jinping in Moscow, in July 

2017, RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonian intervened in front of both heads of state 

at the Kremlin: she endorsed the framework of an “informational war” and asked them 

to increase cooperation between Russian and Chinese outlets to ensure “the survival of 

our resources […] in the face of the powerful Western mainstream journalism.”89 One 

RT employee interviewed by the researcher Maxime Audinet in 2015 even admitted that 

several producers and journalist from CCTV came to observe the editorial meth-

ods of the Russian channel and the construction of its pretended “alternative” 

editorial line, which is both incisive and very offensive toward the West (during the 

Ukrainian crisis in particular).90

In 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic provided another reason to call for a deeper coop-

eration between Chinese and Russian media to form a common front against critics. 

For instance, during the 2020 China-Russia Online Media Webinar, which took place 

on December 18, 2020, Niu Yibing, the Deputy-Director of the Office of the Central 

Cyberspace Affairs Commission (中央网络安全和信息化委员会), called on Russian 

and Chinese media to “work together to tell more vivid stories about the fight against 

the pandemic, jointly fight against attacks and provocations from Western coun-

tries.”91

86. “Huawei & Russian Media Group Rossiya Segodnya Sign Deal on Strategic Cooperation,” RT (4 Sept. 2019). 

87. Janaina Camara da Silveira, “Time for BRICS Media Groups to Strengthen Cooperation,” China Daily (1 Nov. 

2019). 

88. See: Audinet, A State’s Construction of Soft Power. 

89. “Симоньян: Ни одна война в последние годы не начиналась без поддержки прессы” (“Simonian: No 

Recent War Has Begun without Support from the Press”), RT Russia (4 Jul. 2017), https://youtu.be/ FX3Me2Yxv1Q. 

90. Interview with Maxime Audinet, Paris (Nov. 2020). 

91. Ren Qi, “Chinese, Russian Media Have Role in Virus Fight,” China Daily (19 Dec. 2020), https://archive.vn/

lQ19L.

635

2020 China-Russia Online Media Webinar (©Zhu Xingxin/chinadaily.com.cn).92

• 2) Cooperation on social networks. During the 2019 Hong Kong crisis, RT broadcast 

a thirty-minute documentary untitled “Hong Kong Unmasked,” which concluded that 

the U.S. government had intervened in the crisis through think tanks, NGOs, and state 

agencies, including the CIA. The documentary was posted on YouTube on November 

29, and viewed more than 100,000 times before being abundantly relayed on Weibo and 

other social networks.93

“Hong Kong Unmasked | Exclusive Report,” video published 

on the YouTube account of RT America, November 29, 2019.94

That same day, the website RIAFAN.ru, which belongs to the network of troll farms 

of the Internet Research Agency, published a particularly biased article on the Hong 

Kong opposition that contained many inexactitudes, including fake quotes from Joshua 

Wang.95

As a rule, Chinese and Russian (but also Iranian) propaganda websites help 

each other, quote each other, and amplify the same anti-Western content in an 

92. Source: https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202012/19/WS5fdd3bb7a31024ad0ba9cc21.html.

93. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CUgy-Hzyfo; Simone McCarthy, “Russian TV Production Echoes 

China’s Line on Hong Kong Protests,” South China Morning Post (9 Dec. 2019); Jane Li, “Russia Is Beijing’s Best Ally in 

the Disinformation War against Hong Kong,” Quartz (11 Dec. 2019). 

94. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CUgy-Hzyfo&feature=emb_logo. 

95. Fatima Tlis, “Russian ‘Troll Farm’ Posts Ersatz Report on Hong Kong Thanksgiving Rally,” Polygraph.info (3 

Dec. 2019). 

636

apparently “circular” fashion.96 “Since November 2019, three of the top five most 

retweeted news outlets (not including China’s state-backed media), were funded by the 

Iranian or Russian governments. PressTV, RT, and SputnikNews were the third, fourth, 

and fifth most retweeted outlets.”97 “So we saw that in Italy, we saw Russian-linked 

social media accounts were amplifying content that was promoting pro-Chinese 

narratives. So, tweets, for example, from China’s MFA and the Global Times to Italian 

audiences.”98 Russian intelligence services (GRU) may have contributed to amplifying 

manipulated information on the coronavirus, more specifically in circulating the Chinese 

conspiracy theory on the American origin of the virus.99

• 3) Cooperation in the “fight against disinformation.” In September 2020, the 

spokeswoman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the minister 

and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, had reached “an important consensus on 

the fight against disinformation.” She denounced the countries that, “in the context of 

the Covid-19,” were circulating disinformation and invited them “to respect the facts.” 

Sources: https://twitter.com/SpokespersonCHN/status/1304445728907952129; 

https://twitter.com/mlrchtr/status/1304822970368569345.

Because Russia and China are largely seen, by the rest of the world as two of the largest 

producers of disinformation, this announcement provoked many ironic comments. But 

for attentive observers of influence operations, it was perceived as an avowed sign of 

cooperation in the field, not to “fight” disinformation, but to produce it. This is 

also suggested by the Chinese use of narrative materials usually adopted by the Russians. 

96. Brandt and Schafer, “Five Things to Know.” 

97. Ibid. 

98. Gabrielle, “Briefing with Special Envoy.” 

99. Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger, “Russian Intelligence Agencies Push Disinformation on Pandemic,” The 

New York Times (28 Jul. 2020). 

637

Thus, after the publication by the Jyllands-Posten of caricatures of the PRC flag, Chinese 

Internet users (including the Diba group) mocked the “weakness” of the Danes, who 

were only able to resist the German invasion for 4 hours on 9 April 1940, which is a 

recurring argument in Russian disinformation campaigns.100 The presence of this “refer-

ence” in Chinese campaign makes it possible to suppose that the two countries practice 

transfers of competences.

• 4) The use of common relays. As a consequence of the fact that, as we have seen, the 

Party-State no longer hesitates to keep company with the political extremes (→ p. 626), it 

frequently draws from the same sources as Moscow. Most of its anti-American relays 

are known to be, correlatively, pro-Russian. For example, in order to deny the oppression 

of Uyghurs, to discredit the German researcher Adrian Zenz,101 or to deny the Chinese ori-

gin of the coronavirus, Chinese authorities readily rely on Max Blumenthal, an American 

journalist, and his site The Grayzone, which are cited by the Chinese press as well as by 

the spokespersons of the Foreign Ministry.102-103 An article by Blumenthal published in The 

Grayzone on February 18, 2021 was relayed on Twitter by Zhao Lijian, spokesman for the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by CGTN, which gave an interview to Blumenthal for the 

occasion, and by a number of embassies. Some even reproduced the article in its entirety 

on their websites.104 However, Blumenthal, who founded his site one month after a trip to 

Moscow for the tenth anniversary of RT, was until then known mainly for being a relay of 

Russian propaganda (and an advocate for Bashar al-Assad).105 His site The Grayzone was 

also cited by the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry.106 He is now one of the 

many common sources of Beijing and Moscow.

• 5) Cooperation between security services? We can suppose – without concrete 

evidence however – that media outlets and diplomats from both countries are not the 

only ones cooperating on influence operations (which they call operations of count-

er-influence) and that their armed forces and intelligences services, for instance, are 

also exchanging information, and perhaps “good practices,” when their common objec-

tive is to weaken and divide liberal democracies. It is all the more logical to assume it 

that cooperation between intelligence services already exists through the Shanghai 

100. Interview with the authors in Denmark (Feb. 2020). 

101. On this topic, see: Albert Zhang, Jacob Wallis, and Zoe Meers, Strange bedfellows on Xinjiang: The CCP, fringe media 

and US social media platforms, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (Mar. 2021).

102. At least 252 times in the state media Global Times, CGTN, and Xinhua, and 61 times in the People’s Daily 

between December 2019 and February 2021, according to Zhang, Wallis, and Meers (Ibid., 8). See, for example, Liu 

Xin, “Not anti-US, but speak for betrayed Americans: The Grayzone founder,” Global Times (25 Apr. 2020), https://

archive.vn/9zuh3; “Founder of The Grayzone disputes conspiracy theories targeting China,” CGTN (27 Apr. 2020), 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBp3oqTMRjs.

103. See, for example, “April 1, 2020 Press Conference Held by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying,” 

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1 Apr. 2020), https://archive.vn/zAuDc; “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang 

Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on April 20, 2021,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (20 Apr. 2021), https://archive. 

vn/wH3g8; “What’s False and What’s True on China-related Human Rights Matters,” Office of the Commissioner 

of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC in the Hong Kong special administrative region (2 Jul. 2020), https://

archive.vn/UUHb9.

104. Gareth Porter and Max Blumenthal, “US State Department accusation of China ‘genocide’ relied on data 

abuse and baseless claims by far-right ideologue,” The Grayzone (18 Feb. 2021), https://archive.vn/w9gKk; Zhao 

Lijian’s tweet can be found here: https://twitter.com/zlj517/status/1363852209272676356; the interview is available 

here: https://archive.vn/Pk778; see the tweet posted by the Chinese embassy in Brussels, on March 1, 2021: https://

archive.vn/qcxwX.

105. Sam Charles Hamad and Oz Katerji, “Did a Kremlin Pilgrimage cause Alternet blogger’s Damascene conversion?,” 

Pulse (22 Aug. 2017).

106. “Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow on February 26, 2021,” Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (26 Feb. 2021), https://archive.vn/YHjLh.

638

Cooperation Organization (tasked with fighting terrorist threats and illegal drug traffick-

ing for instance). What is certain, as the Chinese military publications demonstrate, is 

that there is at least a Chinese interest in Russian tactics and, as the Chinese grow more 

powerful, probably a reciprocal interest on the Russian side for Chinese experiences. 

II. Some Tactical Successes but a Strategic Failure

Machiavelli affirmed that “it is much safer to be feared than to be loved.” Yet, having 

read Cicero,107 he immediately added that “a prince must nevertheless make himself feared 

in such a way that he will avoid hatred, even if he does not acquire love; since one can very 

easily be feared and yet not hated.”108 This is precisely what Beijing has failed to do. 

Chinese influence operations have been met with tactical successes. China is able to 

constrain private companies, such as airlines or hotel chains, to name their destinations dif-

ferently (“Taipei, China”), or the NBA to apologize for the tweet of a club official. It also 

demonstrated an ability to inflict high financial damages (when it blocked the website of 

The New York Times in 2012, as a retaliation for an article Chinese authorities did not like, 

the group’s stock market value fell by 20% in twenty-four hours). Additionally, from fear of 

retributions, many companies refrain from publishing ads in media outlets critical of China, 

which impoverishes these outlets. Yet, despite these little victories, the offensive has been a 

strategic failure. China’s influence in the world has led to a backlash against it that is both 

widespread and growing. 

This is not a new trend: China remains its own best enemy in terms of influence. It 

can be seen in Africa,109 where China’s image has changed: the honeymoon is over as the 

country is increasingly criticized as predatory– its projects not benefiting local populations 

– and for being as harmful as colonial powers were. In many places, as in Mali, the popu-

lations are exasperated, not only by the plundering of natural resources, particularly gold, 

but also by the working conditions, the illegal entry of Chinese workers and the pollution 

it generates. The fact that the leaders, benevolent towards the Chinese presence, generally 

do not take into account the complaints of the population on this subject contributes to 

the distrust of the elites and the polarization of societies. The BRI also faced numerous 

setbacks in the past couple of years, with the same complaints (“Chinese try to take every-

thing they can, without paying attention to the employees or the local companies. They act 

as if we were a colony. But we won’t let it happen,” according to people working in the port 

of Piraeus, which was bought by Cosco in 2016).110 The BRI is also “running out of steam” 

for economic reasons, as Jean-Pierre Cabestan reminds us: “not only because the countries 

of the South are finding it increasingly difficult to repay their debts to Chinese state banks, 

but also because Beijing needs more financing to support domestic growth.”111 The reflux is 

generalized and it had started before the more aggressive turn of the past couple of years. 

Now, with its “wolf warrior” diplomacy, its information manipulations and brutal 

107. Cicéron, De Officiis, Livre II, VII. The Roman author questioned the use of fear and love by governments. He 

asserted that only the second ensured durable power. 

108. Machiavelli, The Prince, 58. 

109. Luke Patey, “The Chinese Model is Failing Africa,” Financial Times (26 Aug. 2018). 

110. Marina Rafenberg, “Vent de fronde antichinois au port du Pirée” (“Winds of Anti-Chinese Revolt in the 

Pyraeus Port”), Le Monde (11 Mar. 2021). 

111. Jean-Pierre Cabestan, preface to Pierre-Antoine Donnet, Chine, le grand prédateur (Paris: éditions de l’Aube, 

2021), 14.

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methods, Beijing has definitely altered its image. It was a done deal: the CCP could not 

become as aggressive as Russia and, at the same time, maintain on the international stage 

the ethos of a responsible actor peacefully rising. 

This is precisely what some in China, more lucid than others, had feared, especially inside 

the CICIR, the think tank of the MSS (the main civilian intelligence agency). In early April 

2020, an internal report from the CICIR, presented to Xi Jinping, affirmed that the pan-

demic could provoke the strongest wave of anti-Chinese feelings in the world since 

Tian’anmen in 1989, and that it could also feed into the resistance against BRI projects 

and invite Washington to increase its financial and military support to Asian allies – increas-

ing the risk of confrontation.112 Meanwhile, Shi Zhan (施展), director of the World Politics 

Research Center at China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing warned that “this ‘wolf war-

rior’ diplomacy is unsustainable and risks isolating us.”113

Again, this Chinese fall from grace on the international scene is the latest trend of a down-

ward evolution that started before the pandemic. Several affairs, including the case of 

espionage against the African Union headquarters, the “hostage diplomacy” used to coerce 

Canada and a growing number of other countries, the revelations about the concentration 

camps for Uyghurs (“China Cables”)114 and the management of the Hong Kong crisis have 

all contributed to the deterioration of Beijing’s image after Xi Jinping came to power. 

However, this evolution is relative: it is among the developed economies, especially 

Western states (Europe and North America) and their allies (Japan, South Korea), that China’s 

image has deteriorated significantly. It remains correct, and is even improving in developing 

countries. This polarization reflects Beijing’s double discourse, which “plays on confron-

tation with the West and seduction of the South,”115 in Africa, Latin America and Asia. 

Source: Pew Research Center (5 Oct. 2020), https://pewrsr.ch/3lETMoy.

112. “Internal Chinese Report Warns Beijing Faces Tian’anmen-like Global Backlash over Virus,” Reuters (4 May 2020). 

113. Shi, quoted in Frédéric Lemaître and Brice Pedroletti, “Chine: la diplomatie du ‘loup combattant’” (“China: 

The ‘Wolf Warrior Diplomacy’”), Le Monde (30 Apr. 2020). 

114. Harold Thibault and Brice Pedroletti, “‘China Cables’: révélations sur le fonctionnement des camps 

d’internement des Ouïgours” (“‘China Cables:’ Revelations on the Working of Uyghur Internments Camps”), Le 

Monde (24 Nov. 2019). 

115. Mathieu Duchâtel, quoted in Sébastien Falletti, “Pékin veut conquérir la planète par le Sud” (“Beijing wants to 

conquer the planet from the South”), Le Figaro (2 Jun. 2021), 11.

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This deterioration has been gradual, but it seems to have accelerated since 2017-2018, 

especially in Australia (→ p. 544) and Sweden (→ p. 521) as noted previously, but also 

in Canada (→ p. 539) and elsewhere in the world. In the United States, the election of 

Donald Trump in 2017 catalyzed an ineluctable confrontation which the president dubbed 

a new “cold war.” Americans now measure the extent of Chinese influence at home. In 

July 2020, the director of the FBI explained that “the FBI is opening a new China-related 

counterintelligence case about every 10 hours.”116 Several months later, Newsweek noted that 

they had found “600 such groups in the U.S., all in regular touch with and guided by China’s 

Communist Party – a larger-scale version of a pattern found in other countries around the 

world.”117 In the United Kingdom, the deterioration of the relations – after the “golden 

age” lauded by David Cameron during the 2015 visit of Xi Jinping in London118 – acceler-

ated after 2019, first with the crisis in Hong Kong, which was particularly sensitive for the 

British as they retroceded the former colony to China in 1997, and later with the sanitary 

crisis (London criticized Beijing for its lack of transparency, the diffusion of fake news, 

and for the cyberespionage that targeted British laboratories). Also notable was the British 

change of mind that led to the exclusion of Huawei from British 5G networks, decided 

in July 2020 (the Chinese embassy described it as an “error” for which the British would 

“pay the consequences”) – a threat that apparently did not dissuade Germany and Romania 

from also banning Huawei from their future 5G networks in April 2021. On February 

4, 2021, OFCOM, the British media regulatory agency, cancelled CGTN’s broadcasting 

license based on the assessment that CGTN wasn’t the one making the editorial choices for 

the channel, but the CCP. This added to the deterioration of the bilateral relation.119 As in 

the United States, this changing attitude toward China is a bipartisan issue widely endorsed 

by a public opinion increasingly warry of Beijing. 

In France as well, awareness, although more discrete, is nevertheless palpable, with a 

clear acceleration in the first quarter of 2021 (see below). 

The French Awakening

As elsewhere, the image of China has deteriorated in France for the last couple of 

years, and especially after the appointment of Ambassador Lu Shaye in Paris (2019), a 

“wolf-warrior diplomat” who contributed to making the embassy more aggressive, especially 

on social networks, as we saw in this report (→ p. 234). The Covid-19 pandemic aggravated 

this tendency because the embassy was on the defensive and multiplied its attacks – such as 

an April 2020 article on the “EHPAD nursing staff ” (who had “abandoned,” “deserted” and 

“left their pensioners to die from hunger and illnesses”), following which the ambassador was 

summoned by the French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs (→ p. 238). 

Other cases have contributed to mobilizing the French public opinion against Beijing, includ-

ing the November 2019 revelation that Huawei was suing the researcher Valérie Niquet 

for libel (→ p. 53); she instantly received many messages of support. The persecution of 

Uyghurs, better and better documented, was a powerful accelerator to raise attention on the 

topic – especially thanks to researchers who have been mobilizing for years (in a collective 

116. Christopher Wray, “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the 

Economic and National Security of the United States,” FBI (7 Jul. 2020). 

117. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Exclusive: 600 U.S. Groups Linked to Chinese Communist Party Influence Effort with 

Ambition Beyond Election,” Newsweek (26 Oct. 2020). 

118. “China, Britain To Benefit from ‘Golden Era’ in Ties – Cameron,” Reuters (18 Oct. 2015). 

119. Alex Hern, “Chinese State Broadcaster Loses UK Licence after Ofcom Ruling,” The Guardian (4 Feb. 2021). 

641

op-ed in Le Monde in 2018 for instance120), as well as to the commitment of several politicians, 

including the French MEP Raphaël Glucksmann, who has incidentally become a target of the 

embassy.121 In September 2020, President Macron publicly denounced “unacceptable practic-

es” in Xinjiang for the first time.122 Meanwhile, a growing number of investigative reports 

have documented the Chinese power, influence, or espionage – including several issues 

and special issues in several French magazines in 2020.123 

The negative view of China in France can be measured: a poll conducted in October and 

November 2020 showed that “62% of those polled have a negative or very negative view […] 

regardless of political affiliation, suggesting that there is a high level of consensus,” which 

puts China “the second most negatively-perceived country […] just after North Korea, 

and followed by Russia.”124 And several stars have contributed to this awakening, such as the 

football player Antoine Griezmann who, in December 2020, announced he had terminated his 

contract with Huawei, “due to the strong suspicions that [the company] had contributed to the 

development of a “Uyghur Alert” thanks to a facial recognition software.”125

In October 2020, an article by Laurence Defranoux in Libération noted a “change of tone” 

in France vis-à-vis Beijing. While, “for a long time, in the face of Beijing’s propaganda and 

attempts at censorship and intimidation, the response in France was muted, if not non-exis-

tent, as the fear of economic retaliation was great,” things were visibly beginning to change.126

During the first months of 2021, several elements testified to an acceleration of the French 

awakening. On January 21, the Ministry of the Armed Forces published its 2021 Strategic 

Update, updating the 2017 Strategic Review: the document mentioned China not only more 

times than in 2017, but also more than Russia. It also presented the country first and foremost 

as a “strategic rival.”127 Media have also increasingly reported on the growing aggressive-

ness of Beijing. And they have broadened their audience, for instance with the 70-minute 

TV documentary “China, the great offensive” broadcast on France 2 on February 25. The 

following day, a long investigation was printed in the weekly Le Point on “how China pushes 

its pawns at the University,”128 which notably charged Christian Mestre, the former president 

of the University of Strasbourg, who subsequently resigned his position as ethics officer of 

the Strasbourg Eurometropolis (→ p. 409).129 On March 18, the same Le Point journalist, 

Jérémy André, the weekly’s correspondent to Hong Kong, published another investigation on 

“[how] Beijing takes advantage of our researchers.”130 These demonstrations had already been 

common in Australia, in the United States, in Canada and even in the United Kingdom, as we 

showed in this report, but they had never been done with such a level of details in France.

The persecution of Uyghurs is also more insistently denounced from the printed press – 

which no longer hesitate to discuss “the hidden genocide” on its cover, such as L’Obs did in 

early March131 – to the political class. The Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-

Yves Le Drian, denounced in several official speeches “the unjustifiable practices used 

120. “La Chine doit fermer les camps de rééducation politique en région ouïgoure” (“China must close political 

re-education camps in Uighur region”), Le Monde (10 Oct. 2018).

121. “Vive altercation entre Raphaël Glucksmann et l’ambassade de Chine au sujet des Ouïghours” (“Lively 

Altercation Between Raphaël Glucksmann and the Embassy of China on Uyghurs”), L’Obs (14 Oct. 2020).

122. Laurence Defranoux, “Macron condamne publiquement la répression des Ouïghours” (“Macron 

Condemns the Uyghur Repression Publicly”), Libération (8 Sept. 2020).

123. For instance: “Espionnage: l’offensive chinoise” (Espionnage: the Chinese Offensive), Le Figaro Magazine 

23613 (17 Jul. 2020); La Chine démasquée, Les dossiers du Canard enchaîné (China Unmasked, the Investigations of Le 

Canard enchaîné), 157 (Oct. 2020).

124. Marc Julienne et al., French Public Opinion on China in the Age of COVID-19: Political District Trumps Economic 

Opportunities, “Sinophore Borderlands Europe Survey,” Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic, IFRI (2020). 

125. “Antoine Griezmann rompt son contrat avec Huawei, accusé de participer à la surveillance des Ouïgours” 

(“Antoine Griezmann Broke Off his Contract with Huawei, Allegedly Involved in the Surveillance of the Uyghurs”), 

Le Monde (10 Dec. 2020).

126. Laurence Defranoux, “Vers la fin de la ‘diplomatie du paillasson’ face à la Chine?,” Libération (15 

Oct. 2020).

127. Ministry of the Armed Forces, Actualisation stratégique 2021, https://bit.ly/3aqJnrm. See also, the Twitter threat 

written by Antoine Bondaz: https://twitter.com/AntoineBondaz/status/1355140803572752385.

128. Jérémy André, “Comment la Chine pousse ses pions à l’université” (“How China Pushes Its Pawns at the 

University”), Le Point, 2532 (25 Feb. 2021), 46-50.

129. “Démission du déontologue de l’Eurométropole de Strasbourg” (“Strasbourg Metropolis Ethics Officer 

Resigns”), Les Echos (3 Mar. 2021).

130. Jérémy André, “Comment la Chine profite de nos chercheurs” (“How China Takes Advantage of Our 

Scholars”), Le Point, 2535 (18 Mar. 2021), 48-51.

131. “Ouïghours. Le génocide caché” (“Uyghurs: The Hidden Genocide”), L’Obs, 2940 (4-10 Mar. 2021).

642

against Uyghurs, and [a] large-scale institutionalized surveillance and repression system” 

(February 16); or “the forced sterilization, the sexual abuses in the camps, the disappearances, 

massive detentions, the forced labor, the destruction of the cultural heritage, starting with the 

places of worship, and the generalized surveillance aver the population” in Xinjiang. He re-

newed his “insistent call for an impartial, independent and transparent mission of internation-

al experts to be sent to Xinjiang, as soon as possible, supervised by the High Commissioner 

for Human Rights” (March 10).132 He also stated that the term “genocide” “deserves to be 

discussed and we are ready to consider it.”133

Finally, a new level was reached when, within a few days (March 15-22), it was revealed 

that the Embassy of China had pressured senators to cancel a planned visit to Taiwan 

and insulted the researcher Antoine Bondaz, who had defended them. The Twitter ac-

count of the embassy called him a “small strike,” a “mad hyena”, and an “ideological troll,” 

leading to a unanimous condemnation and a high diplomatic coverage – a symptomatic ep-

isode of the perverse effect (which we labelled the “Bondaz Effect”) of the “wolf-warrior” 

diplomacy (→ p. 237). And it did not stop there: at approximately the same moment, Beijing 

announced sanctions against 10 Europeans, including the French MEP Raphaël Glucksmann, 

in retaliation for sanctions adopted by the EU due to the repression of Uyghurs. For all these 

reasons (insults and sanctions), the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs summoned the 

Chinese ambassador on March 22 but the latter did not come to the meeting, which pro-

voked the anger of Clément Beaune, the secretary of state for European Affairs: “France and 

Europe are no doormats. Someone summoned ought to oblige.”134 When the ambassador 

finally came to the Quai d’Orsay, the following day, he was received by the director of the 

Directorate for Asia and Oceania, Bertrand Lortholary, who told him that “the methods of the 

embassy, and the tone of its public communication, are totally unacceptable and cross the line 

of what is commonly deemed acceptable for any diplomatic representation, wherever it may 

be.”135 This sequence in March 2021 was disastrous for the image of China in France 

and contributed to a heightened awareness among politicians and the general public 

of the unacceptable practices of Chinese authorities.

A few months later, another sequence drew attention to “Beijing’s offensive against aca-

demic freedom [which] calls for defensive measures,” as diplomat Pierre Buhler explained on 

June 10 in an article denouncing “a disturbing policy of Beijing, which constitutes a threat to 

higher education and research in democratic countries.”136 Early July, the Senate launched 

an information mission on “extra-European state influences on French universities, 

the academic world and on their impact,”137 which quickly heard Pierre Buhler and has 

since questioned a large number of French and foreign experts, including the authors of this 

report.138 The rapporteur is Senator André Gattolin, who is highly invested in the defense 

of human rights (having, for example, publicly displayed his support for the demonstrations 

in Hong Kong in 2019139), co-chair for France of the Inter-parliamentary alliance on China 

(IPAC → p. 252) and an excellent authority on China’s influence strategy in France.140 If the 

information mission is interested in several countries, the rapporteur believes that China rep-

resents “80% of the problem.”141 A few weeks later, several articles on “Chinese entryism in 

French universities” published in Libération (July 27, 2021) caused the embassy to react in a 

132. Speech at the high-level format of the 46th session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva (16 Feb. 2021), 

https://bit.ly/3sdCamr; Response of Mr. Jean-Yves Le Drian, minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, to a question 

on the situation of the Uyghurs in China, Sénat (10 Mar. 2021), https://bit.ly/3se4o06-.

133. Jean-Yves Le Drian, interviewed by France Info (26 Mar. 2021).

134. “Chine: la France et l’Europe ‘ne sont pas des paillassons’ déclare Clément Beaune” (“China: France and 

Europe are not Doormats,” declared Clément Beaune”), Le Figaro (23 Mar. 2021).

135. Christian Chesnot, “Qui est Lu Shaye, ambassadeur de Chine en France, ‘loup combattant’ de la diplomatie chinoise?” 

(“Who Is Lu Shaye, Chinese Ambassador to France, “Wolf-Warrior” of the Chinese Diplomacy?”), FranceInfo (23 Mar. 2021).

136. Pierre Buhler, “L’offensive de Pékin contre les libertés académiques appelle des mesures défensives” (“Beijing’s 

offensive against academic freedom calls for defensive measures”) Le Monde, June 10, 2021, 29.

137. See: http://www.senat.fr/commission/missions/influences_etatiques_extra_europeennes.html.

138. On July 13, 2021, for its first plenary hearing, the minutes of which are online: https://www.senat.fr/compte-

rendu-commissions/20210712/miie.html. 

139. “Manifestations à Hong Kong, un entretien avec le sénateur André Gattolin” (“Hong Kong protests, an 

interview with Senator André Gattolin”), Asia Pacific News, October 10, 2019.

140. Which he notably deciphered in an interview for New Tang Dynasty Television (NTD) broadcast on November 

5, 2020 (https://ntdtv.fr/andre-gattolin-senateur-dechiffre-la-strategie-insidieuse-dinfluence-du-pcc-en-france/).

141. Béatrice Bouniol, “Ingérences étrangères à l’université, l’autre menace” (“Foreign interference in the university, 

the other threat”), La Croix, July 27, 2021, 9.

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press release accusing, as usual, all critical voices of racism and confirming Godwin’s law (it 

said it was “revolted” by these articles “which, in a racist tone, publicly incite anti-Chinese and 

Sinophobic sentiment […]. It is astonishing to discover that in the 21st century, some people 

still use “Nazi-like” propaganda to advocate this kind of extreme racism in the media”).142 

Published on October 5, 2021, the Senate report considers that France is “an important target of 

these operations” and “would benefit from being inspired by foreign examples in raising aware-

ness, or even collaborating with certain states to develop appropriate responses”. This report, 

which was branded as “a first alert to the whole scientific community,” formulates several 

proposals.143

Finally, still in the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense adopted on September 

23, 2021, another information report which bore the question: “Can France contribute to the 

European awakening in a Chinese 21st century?”144 The two vice-presidents of the commission 

and rapporteurs, Sens. Pascal Allizard and Gisèle Jourda, respectively declared on this occasion 

that they “were very struck, four years ago, by the absence of Europe in the face of China’s 

global deployment. We must react and give ourselves the diplomatic, legislative and monetary 

means to face this power strategy”; “We must be aware of the weight of the Chinese United 

Front, which is not a form of influence, but of interference!”145 The French awakening is in fact 

part of a European awakening, that the MEP Nathalie Loiseau embodied when she declared 

in January 2021 that “the time to be naive is behind us.”146

In concrete terms, this means that, thanks to the vigilance of researchers, journalists, politicians, 

diplomats and the general public, France is now a less soft, less easy target for Chinese in-

fluence. Tongues are loosening, self-censorship is becoming less acceptable, pressure is being 

denounced, as is complacency. When Livres Hebdo published an article announcing that “The 

Frenchman Maxime Vivas receives a prize at the Beijing Book Fair,”147 as if it were neutral 

news, a few days later a score of researchers, sinologists, tibetologists, specialists of Uyghurs, 

including the president of INALCO Jean-François Huchet, published a tribune in which they 

condemned what “seems to be a copy-paste of what can be read in the official organs of the 

Chinese Communist Party […]. That Livres Hebdo highlights the prizes awarded by the Chinese 

Communist Party is fine, but one would expect from a magazine intended for book professionals 

that the reviews bring a critical, detailed and well-argued perspective and are not simple relays of 

Chinese propaganda.”148 This example, taken among others, illustrates the fact that the French, or 

at least a growing number of them, have finally “woken up” and are making the environment less 

permissive to the ambitions of the Party-State. In summary, awareness in France of the risks 

posed by Chinese influence has been strong and growing since 2019, with a clear accel-

eration in 2020-2021. It is in this context of a “French awakening,” which now seems 

irreversible, that the publication of this present report in September 2021 takes place.

Even Central and Eastern European countries, the traditional spearheads of Beijing 

in Europe (→ p. 310), are becoming more reticent: the “17+1” Summit, on February 9, 

2021, was actually a “17-6” meeting because, in front of Xi Jinping, six European states lim-

ited their participation to a mere ministerial delegation. The reasons for this loss of appetite 

are known: “the Chinese infrastructural promises have disappointed, trade exchanges have 

142. “Les échanges culturels entre la Chine et la France ne peuvent souffrir aucune stigmatization” (“Cultural 

exchanges between China and France cannot suffer any stigma”), Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the 

French Republic, August 2, 2021, https://archive.vn/Jq57U.

143. Sénat, Rapport d’information fait au nom de la mission d’information sur les influences étatiques extra-

européennes dans le monde universitaire et académique français et leurs incidence (Information report made on behalf 

of the information mission on extra-European state influences in the French university and academic world and their 

impact), by Sen. André Gattolin, submitted to the French Senate on September 29, 2021. 

144. An executive summary is available here: http://www.senat.fr/rap/r20-846/r20-846-syn.pdf. 

145. Virginie Robert, “Face à la Chine, les recommandations du Sénat pour l’Europe” (“Facing China, the Senate’s 

recommendations for Europe”), Les Échos (23 Sep. 2021), 12

146. Nathalie Loiseau, interviewed on Public Sénat (30 Jan. 2021).

147. Thomas Faidherbe, “Le Français Maxime Vivas reçoit un prix à la Foire du livre de Pékin” (“Frenchman 

Maxime Vivas Wins Award at Beijing Book Fair”), Books Weekly (24 Sep. 2021), https://archive.vn/L2Isc.

148. “Livres Hebdo, Maxime Vivas et les fake news” (“Livres Hebdo, Maxime Vivas and fake news”), Mediapart (3 

Oct. 2021).

644

been tremendously advantageous to Beijing, and Chinese propaganda, in the early stages 

of the Covid-19 pandemic, has seriously tarnished the image of the Middle Kingdom.”149 

Some now believe that the ‘”17+1” format – which was meant to be a European door for 

Beijing – is becoming a “zombie mechanism” which could progressively unravel. Lithuania 

has led the way by withdrawing in March 2021 and calling on the other eleven European 

members to do the same.150 In September, the Lithuanian foreign minister explained that 

the only format in which the balance of power would be balanced would be a 27+1, which 

would require unity among European countries when facing China.151 The bilateral rela-

tionship had deteriorated sharply in July 2021 when Lithuania announced the opening of 

a representative office of “Taiwan” (not “Taipei”) in the country. The following month, 

Beijing and Vilnius recalled their ambassadors. In September, the Lithuanian National 

Cybersecurity Center issued a report concluding that the phones of three Chinese brands 

(Xiaomi, Huawei and OnePlus) posed risks, including remote censorship, and the deputy 

defense minister declared: “Our recommendation is not to buy new Chinese smartphones 

and to get rid of those already acquired as quickly as possible.”152 And the press emphasized 

how “small” Lithuania has become a symbol of resistance to the Chinese superpower.153 

The Czech Republic is another example: despite Beijing’s strong proxies in that coun-

try, particularly in the political (starting with President Miloš Zeman and several mem-

bers of the government) and economic spheres (PPF → p. 272), the Chinese influence is 

increasingly being challenged and denounced, from the resistance of the mayor of Prague 

(→ p. 266) to the Senate president’s visit to Taiwan (→ p. 267), to the exclusion of Huawei 

and ZTE from 5G-related tenders, and to the publication of reports by the cybersecurity 

agency (NUKIB) and the Security and Internal Intelligence Service (BIS), whose regular 

alerts contribute to the debate.

One after the other, states reevaluate their relations to China, taking legislative, 

economic and political actions to protect themselves from it. Increasingly, states also coor-

dinate their actions to “stand together” against China. Here, March 26, 2021 was rather 

exceptional: the diplomats of 26 countries – Canada, but also the United States, France, 

Germany, the United Kingdom and others – met in front of the Chinese tribunal where 

Michael Kovrig was tried154 – one of the two Canadians victim of the “hostage diplomacy” 

(→ p. 411). Meanwhile, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and 

Canada sanctioned several Chinese officials involved in the repression against Uyghurs, 

in a coordinated effort that sent “the clearest message […] that the international com-

munity will not turn a blind eye to such serious and systematic violations of basic human 

rights,” according to the UK Foreign Secretary.155 These were actually the first European 

149. Sylvie Kauffmann, “À l’appui de sa stratégie d’influence en Europe, Pékin dispose d’une arme redoubtable: 

les vaccins anti-Covid-19” (“To support its Influence Strategy in Europe, Beijing Owns a Redoubtable Weapon: Anti-

Covid-19 Vaccines”), Le Monde (10 Feb. 2021). 

150. Eglė Krištopaitytė, “Does Lithuania withdraw from the 17+1 format? The URM sees ‘more purpose 

participating in a format with all EU countries,’” 15MIN.LT EN (25 Mar. 2021), https://bit.ly/3sl3or7; Stuart Lau, 

“Lithuania pulls out of China’s ‘17+1’ bloc in Eastern Europe,” Politico (21 May 2021).

151. Teddy Ng, “Lithuania urges European Union to cut reliance on China,” South China Morning Post (4 Sep. 2021).

152. Nathalie Guibert, “Se débarrasser de ses smartphones chinois ‘aussi vite que possible’: le message d’alerte 

d’un ministre lituanien” (“Getting rid of your Chinese smartphones ‘as quickly as possible’: the warning message of a 

Lithuanian minister”), Le Monde (23 Sep. 2021).

153. Andrew Higgins, “Lithuania vs. China: A Baltic Minnow Defies a Rising Superpower,” The New York Times 

(30 Sep. 2021).

154. Teng Jingxuan, “Michael Kovrig a subi son procès en Chine” (“Michael Kovrig Was Tried in China”), La Presse 

(22 Mar. 2021). 

155. “Uighurs: Western countries sanction China over rights absuses, “ BBC (22 Mar. 2021). 

645

sanctions in more than thirty years, the last (an embargo on weapons) dating back to 

1989 – an additional sign of the degradation of the relations. Furthermore, and again, 

on that very day, the Chinese sanctions against four entities and ten European officials 

only reinforced the European solidarity against Beijing, at all levels, even among the 

civil society. Three days later, the directors of 32 European think tanks and research insti-

tutes, from more than twenty countries, signed a declaration denouncing Chinese sanctions 

against European researchers and the most important European research center on China, 

MERICS (→ p. 285).156 

The result is paradoxical: while one of the Party-State’s strategies is to divide Europe, 

its behavior unites Europe against itself, losing the levers (such as the 17+1) it had 

hoped to enjoy. In the same way, while one of the strategies of the Party-State is to weaken 

the transatlantic relationship, by making European countries keep their distance from the 

logic of the Sino-American “cold war” and adopt a third way instead, by its behavior it is 

bringing them closer to Washington – all the more so since, with the change of administra-

tion, the U.S. discourse on China is less caricatural, and therefore more acceptable. As Sylvie 

Kauffmann summarizes it well, “through clumsiness or hubris, China is pushing the 

Europeans into the arms of the Americans.157 It is, in short, self-sabotage.

This movement is not limited to state officials: populations are awakening to the problem 

and, in almost all countries, China’s image has never been as bad as it is today.158 China is 

facing an “unpopularity problem.”159 A European study, conducted in September and 

October 2020, confirmed the largely negative opinions of China, except in Serbia and in 

Russia.160 In Australia, “trust in China is at the lowest level ever recorded in the Lowy Institute 

Poll, with only 23% of Australians saying they trust China somewhat or a lot ‘to act respon-

sibly in the world’, a 29-point fall since 2018.”161 Even in South Korea, a country that has 

maintained close ties to China, the discontents toward China have reached 75%.162

Since 2020 approximately, and particularly after the start of the pandemic during which 

China became more aggressive, analysts have tried to explain the “counter-productive 

behavior”163 adopted by Beijing. Even if the explanation is known – for the Party-State, 

the priority is not to seduce local populations but to ensure its survival and to strengthen 

its power in China – the Party-State was probably not prepared for the fallout of such a 

behavior. Indeed, its unpopularity has become a problem so pregnant that it could 

indirectly weaken the Party, including vis-à-vis the Chinese population. Anyhow, this 

is certainly the message that needs to be carried to make Chinese officials more cognizant 

to the consequences of their actions. 

156. “Statement by European Research Institute Directors,” The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (25 

Mar. 2021), https://bit.ly/3sl1kiR.

157. Sylvie Kauffmann, “Par maladresse ou par hubris, la Chine est en train de pousser les Européens dans les bras 

des Américains” (“By Clumsiness or Hubris, China is Pushing the Europeans into the Arms of the Americans”), Le 

Monde (14 Apr. 2021).

158. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many 

Countries,” Pew Research Center (6 Oct. 2020). 

159. Elisabeth Braw, “China’s Unpopularity Problem,” Politico (6 Nov. 2020). 

160. Richard Q. Turcsanyi et al., European Public Opinion on China in the age of COVID-19: Differences and common 

Ground Across the Continent, “Sinophore Borderlands Europe Survey,” Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic, 

IFRI (16 Nov. 2020).

161. Natasha Kassam, Lowy Poll Institute 2020 (Jun. 2020), 4. 

162. Peter T. Charles, “Beijing’s “Wolf Warriors” Score Own Goals,” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute (22 Jan. 2021). 

163. Small and Jaishankar, “‘For our enemies, we have shotguns.’” 

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