Conclusion

Countries that embrace risk and innovation must protect their investments and advantages from attempts by other countries to access them at no cost, and from people within their own borders who profit at the expense of the commonwealth. We offer a few suggestions on how this may be done.

Managing "cheaters" in a global society

We can recover our competitiveness by manufacturing what we invent and rebuild the scientific foundation on which our competitive edge depends. But unless we deal with non-reciprocators who bypass the costs of innovation that the rest of us bear, our efforts at national reconstruction will be wasted. As we have shown, our current defense of intellectual property has not been effective in refuting appropriation by China, by all accounts the world’s worst offender. It makes no sense to rebuild our scientific base – however much we need to do so – when our advantages are sapped from under us.

To address this problem we need to take a hard look at its causes. On the one hand, we should investigate – formally and in greater depth – how a foreign state with dubious intent was able to access our technology and use it to push US manufacturers out of the marketplace. That done, measures should be taken to insure that the interests of the United States are not sacrificed to narrow constituencies who benefit from these one-sided transactions. On the other hand, we must recognize that the root cause of the problem is nothing less than our own individualism and find ways as a nation to take collective action against the common threat, because the same trait that makes us good at creating things makes it hard for us to defend our national interests.

It is ironic that we do so badly as a nation what humans are wired from birth to perform, namely to work with other members of society to thwart “cheaters” who benefit at the expense of society. This innate talent, an adaptation for group survival, is documented in evolutionary psychology and executed by the laws a country makes to protect itself. A successful group expects members to act altruistically on its behalf. In an individualistic society such as ours, however, altruism can be trumped by short-term goals. What do I gain personally by shunning cheap goods built with stolen technology? Don’t we benefit through lower prices? Read Brett Kingstone’s account of how China looted his firm and ask yourself honestly if you really care.¹

Recognizing that arguing for national interests in the United States is an uphill battle, we propose a few points for consideration.

First, we need a better understanding of the benefits and costs of admitting large numbers of foreign students to our academies. We have already given many reasons why the presence of nearly 194,000 PRC students on US campuses is not an unqualified blessing. We all know the justifications: American students don’t study science. University departments cannot stay open without them. PRC students are brilliant lab workers who give as much as they take. They return to China spreading goodwill and democracy. Their presence here gives us an insight into what is happening there, and so on.

Each of these arguments is overstated and, in the “empty chair” case, tends to perpetuate the problem that immigrant students are supposed to solve. Moreover, there are two glaring policy problems related to PRC students in the United States – separate from the fact that US taxpayers are funding their training – neither of which is easy to solve. The first is simply knowing who is here and where they are studying, should the need arise to investigate their activities. The current system, known as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS),² is designed “to track and monitor schools and programs, students, exchange visitors and their dependants while approved to participate in the US education system.” SEVIS collects data on surnames and first names, addresses, date and country of birth, information on dependants, nationality/citizenship, funding, school, program name, date of study commencement, education degree level, and authorization for on-campus employment.³

The good news is that the FBI has access to all of the student data contained in SEVIS, and no longer needs the permission of DHS to initiate investigations of foreign students.⁴ The bad news is that the laws, regulations, and directives governing SEVIS do not require some additional critical pieces of information, which are nonetheless perceived to be important in order to manage the program. According to GAO,

 The non-immigrant visa number, expiration date, and issuing post are optional and only captured if entered into the system by the school or exchange visitor program.

 The non-immigrant driver's license number and issuing state were imposed by the interagency working group and support investigative efforts.

 The non-immigrant passport number, passport expiration date, and passport issuing country are optional and are only captured if entered into the system by the school or exchange visitor program.⁵

It is difficult to ascertain from open sources whether these problems have been fixed, but the non-mandatory data are key investigative input that would be critical for Federal law enforcement seeking to assess possible illicit technology transfers by students.

The second major policy problem involves PRC student access to controlled technology under the deemed export system. According to the Commerce Department, a deemed export is defined as follows: “An export of technology or source code (except encryption source code) is ‘deemed’ to take place when it is released to a foreign national within the United States.”⁶Under these rules, a university or research lab does not “need a license or authorization for the mere presence of a foreign graduate student,” but does need a deemed export license if they “plan to transfer controlled technology to a foreign national and the export of that technology is restricted to the foreign national’s home country.”

Following from recommendations in a 2004 US Department of Commerce

Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report entitled “Deemed Export

Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign

Nationals in the US,” Commerce published an “Advance Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking: Revision and Clarification of Deemed Export

Related Regulatory Requirements" (ANPR) in the Federal Register on March 28, 2005.⁷Following an avalanche of largely negative public comments, primarily from universities and research labs, Commerce withdrew the ANPR and issued “Revisions and Clarification of Deemed Export Related Regulatory Requirements” (RIN 0694-AD29) on May 31, 2006, which reiterates that the “current BIS licensing policy related to deemed exports is appropriate and confirms that the existing definition of ‘use’ adequately reflects the underlying export controls policy rationale in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).”⁸ Yet the continued sieve of controlled technology to the PRC and the findings of GAO studies on the problems of university oversight⁹ strongly suggest that the 2004 OIG recommendations should be re-examined, as our research shows that the flow of technology “back” to China has continued unabated.

Second, S&T collaboration with China isn’t just a feel-good part of the Sino– US relationship, but is something that is important to Beijing and something that they want, as it helps them build capabilities they still need help with. It would seem that US advantages here could be employed to good effect.

Third, given its well-documented weaknesses, gaps, and implementation problems in the post-Cold War era, another way to restore the balance would be to reform the export control system. In 2009, President Obama “directed a broad-based interagency reform of the US export control system with the goal of strengthening national security and the competitiveness of key US manufacturing and technology sectors by focusing on current threats and adapting to the changing economic and technological landscape.”¹⁰ In simple terms, the White House seeks “fundamental reform in all four areas of our current system – in what we control, how we control it, how we enforce those controls, and how we manage our controls.”¹¹ Specifically, the

Export Control Reform Initiative aims to build higher fences around a core set of items whose misuse can pose a national security threat to the United States. By facilitating trade to close partners and allies, the Commerce Department can better focus its resources ensuring the most sensitive items do not end up where they should not.¹²

In concrete terms, the reform initiative is synchronizing the two existing control lists, the Munitions List and the Commerce Control List, so that they:

 are "tiered" to distinguish the types of items that should be Subject to stricter or more permissive levels of control for different destinations, end uses, and end users;

 create a "bright line" between the two current control lists to clarify which list an item is controlled on, and reduce government and industry uncertainty about whether particular items are subject to the control of the State Department or the Commerce Department;  are structurally aligned so that they can potentially be combined into a single list of controlled items.¹³

Moreover, the lists will be transformed into a “positive list” that describes controlled items using objective criteria (e.g., technical parameters such as horsepower or microns) rather than broad, open-ended, subjective, generic, or design intent-based criteria.¹⁴ After applying these criteria, the list will be divided into three tiers:

1.  Items in the highest tier are those that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage to the United States and are available almost exclusively from the United States, or are weapons of mass destruction or related items.

2.  Items in the middle tier are those that provide a substantial military or intelligence advantage to the United States and are available almost exclusively from our multilateral partners and allies.

3.  Items in the lowest tier are those that provide a significant military or intelligence advantage to the United States but are available more broadly.¹⁵

The designers hope that this system will “permit the government to adjust controls in a timely manner over a product’s life cycle in order to keep lists targeted and current based on the maturity and sensitivity of an item.”¹⁶ Once a controlled item is placed into a tier, a corresponding licensing policy will be assigned to it to focus agency reviews on the most sensitive items. The Administration has developed an initial set of proposed licensing policies for dual-use items:

 A license will generally be required for items in the highest tier to all destinations. Many of the items in the second tier will be authorized for export to multilateral partners and allies under license exemptions or general authorizations. For less sensitive items, a license will be required for some, but not all, destinations.

 For items authorized to be exported without licenses, there will be new limitations imposed on the re-export of those items to prevent their diversion to unauthorized destinations.¹⁷

On the one hand, these reforms could greatly improve the efficiency of the export control bureaucracy, preventing fewer technologies from slipping between the cracks and finding their way to China. They could also make the system and its control lists more flexible and better able to keep pace with technological change, which had been a major problem with the old system, particularly with regard to fast-moving information technologies. On the other hand, the reforms appear to loosen controls over dual-use technologies, which China has a long and successful track record of integrating into advanced systems, and which can form the core of new innovations, since much of the cutting-edge research is not yet controlled while it is still in the lab.

Fourth, as defined by a 2010 General Accounting Office report, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an interagency committee that serves the President in overseeing the national security implications of foreign investment in the economy.¹⁸ As China’s economy and financial weight has grown, CFIUS has reviewed an increasing number of proposed acquisitions of American companies and infrastructure by Chinese entities. Many of these proposed mergers have received high levels of media and Congressional attention, and most of the high-profile cases have ended in rejection or strong discouragement leading to abandonment of the deal:

 The decision by the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) to drop its proposed acquisition of Unocal oil company in 2005 was partly due to concerns about an impending CFIUS investigation of the transaction.¹⁹

 In February 2008, Bain Capital and Huawei Technologies withdrew its offer to acquire the network and software firm, 3Com, for $2.2 billion, due to an inability to successfully negotiate a mitigation agreement with members of CFIUS. Bain Capital is a privately held asset management and investment firm, and Huawei Technologies is the largest networking and telecommunications equipment supplier in

China. 3Com is a publicly held company that specializes in networking equipment and in the Tipping Point network intrusion prevention software, which is used to protect some DoD networks. Bain Capital and Huawei reportedly withdrew their proposal after they failed to agree to terms with CFIUS over a mitigation agreement and stated that they would restructure the deal and resubmit it at a later date in 2008.²⁰

 In December 2009, the Chinese firm Northwest Nonferrous International Investment Corp., a subsidiary of China's largest aluminum producer, attempted to acquire US-based Firstgold, but failed due to objections by the US Department of the Treasury that

Firstgold had properties near sensitive military bases.²¹

 In June 2010, China's Tangshan Caofeidian Investment Corporation withdrew its proposed acquisition of Emcore, which makes components for fiber optics and solar panels, due to "regulatory concerns."²²

 In May 2010, Huawei bought the bankrupt intellectual property of

3Leaf server technology Company for $2 million, but did not file with

CFIUS until November of that year.²³ By February 2011, Huawei said it would back away from the deal, bowing to pressure that it should divest the assets.

While the CFIUS process may have prevented individual cases of sensitive or illegal technology transfer by scotching these deals, it could also have had the unintended effect of forcing Chinese actors to steal the data through espionage owing to their inability to obtain them through globalized commerce.

Fifth, a final channel for restoring the balance might be the bilateral Sino– US dialogues, including the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD). The origins and purpose of the dialogues are summarized by Glaser and Freeman:

The US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was established by President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao during their first meeting in April 2009 and represents the highest-level bilateral forum to discuss a broad range of bilateral, regional, and global issues between the two nations. The upgraded mechanism replaced the earlier Senior Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue, which were initiated under the George W. Bush administration. By merging the economic and security tracks, the Obama administration seeks to break down the barriers inside both the US and Chinese governments to more effectively tackle cross-cutting issues such as climate change, development, and energy security.²⁴

Issues related to technology security and trade are actually ideal for the S&ED, as well as one of its new components, the SSD – a joint civilian– military dialogue. Of course, there are significant obstacles. First, the Chinese side will strongly resist discussing technology espionage at the bilateral level, denying the content of the accusations and condemning them as arising from a “Cold War mentality.” Second, even if the Chinese were willing to discuss it, American companies are reluctant to go public with the details of their losses and their unwillingness to credibly threaten to back out of the China market. In a sense, only Google could leave China, because its business model does not require a bricks-and-mortar presence and retail distribution relationships. The Ciscos and Microsofts of the world do not have the same luxury, undermining any threats made in a bilateral economic dialogue.

Some China shibboleths

This completes our study of China’s “informal” technology transfer practices. Aware that our thesis is contentious, and taking a cue from the “Communist Party that does not fear criticism,”²⁵ we conclude with a catechism of replies to anticipated complaints.

1 It's normal business practice

China has gained enormous traction in the world by calling itself a “special case,” and we are inclined to agree here. No other country approaches China’s efforts and success at raiding foreign sources of technology. It is neither “normal” nor “business” but a state-sponsored assault on foreign invention that includes every dodge and malpractice up to and including espionage – then goes beyond espionage through a Gulag of “transfer centers” that ensure the pillage goes into products.

2 There is no evidence China makes use of "informally" transferred foreign technology.

This is precisely the function of China’s National Technology Transfer

Centers (NTTCs,  or National Technology Transfer Demonstration Organizations , introduced in September

2001 and established in policy in December 2007 through the “National Technology             Transfer       Promotion Implementation Action           Plan” . Examples of NTTCs are provided in Chapter 4.

Some 202 “demonstration” centers exist today, built up in three “batches” of 76, 58, and 68. Bear in mind that these centers are models for emulation by other transfer facilities; we have no figures on their true number. Their charters explicitly name “domestic and foreign technology” as targets for “commercialization.”

3 China is changing into a creative nation; or conversely, China is not creative at all

It is hard to assess China’s creative output given the ambiguity in what China manufactures, borrows, and steals. More fundamentally, traditional assessments of China’s output – numbers of patents and publications – do not take into account the degree of novelty. Tweaks to foreign patents and expansions of paradigms conceived outside China should be weighed differently than native creation. In addition, whereas China’s S&T leadership accepts innovation in principle, until recently it has caveated its acceptance with reminders of the need for practical results. It is unclear what the impact of this approach will be as China moves in some areas to change its educational system and culture in the lab. Assuming China’s efforts succeed – which is likely for some areas – it becomes more important to protect ourselves from a peer competitor who makes its own rules.

4 The book is yet another example of Western "racism" toward China

Our focus is national practices. Is it “racism” when the Japanese complain about the same thing? Nonetheless, there will be groups in the US, such as the Committee of 100, that decry our work in the same way they did the Cox Report and the Wen Ho Lee case, where they likened the US government to a third world dictatorship.²⁶ One cannot help but be amused by the irony here. While we do not fear criticism from these parties, we challenge them – given the information presented in this book and their stated charter of fostering constructive relationships – to demonstrate their objectivity by being as forceful with the Chinese government as they have been with their own in addressing this issue and in using their influence to protect US competitiveness and, dare we say, US interests.

5 The bilateral relationship and hundreds of billions in bilateral trade are "more important"

Some analysts who approach US–China relations from a predominantly realist perspective argue that the pure calculation of the United States’ selfinterest demands less confrontation and more cooperation between the two countries. Proponents of this laissez-faire view point to the (present) differentials in growth rates and the inevitability of parity as the key determinants of long-term US strategy:

We must consider the facts. China will continue to grow four to five times faster than the US. In less than 30 years China’s GDP will equal that of the US and we will live in a world of two great and equal powers.²⁷

In a period of global economic recession these facts become even more dispositive, since strategic tensions may dampen trade flows, hurt American job growth, and reduce national prosperity. These realists would no doubt object to our book on the grounds that it unnecessarily introduces areas of conflict into the relationship and does not see the “big picture.” But for us, the big picture is that long-term, dedicated Chinese strategies designed to acquire and exploit science and technology are fundamentally damaging US military advantage, technological competitiveness, and future economic prosperity. In that respect, we believe the realists are too focused on the short term at the expense of the future.

6 Most examples are not espionage, just a consequence of globalization and outdated US technology policies

We must move beyond thinking of espionage in the traditional sense and look at this issue based on its impact on the US. Globalization will work only if we have the same broad view of its benefits. As previous chapters have shown, the PRC government still looks to collaboration as a way to forge ahead, not to share. We recognize the need for collaboration and agree it is part of the scientific endeavor, but argue that “collaboration” without transparency is a one-way street.

7 Chinese scientists and businessmen are like us and work for themselves

China has changed in the past decade and its citizens enjoy more personal freedom than at any other point in time. However, one cannot look at China’s appalling human rights record, as documented by the US Department of State,²⁸ and not wonder what impact this has on a person’s free will not to participate in central government programs that are deemed a priority. Chinese students and scientists who study or work abroad are sometimes debriefed – obligatorily – after their return.²⁹ Team that disconcerting fact with the work of overseas-based advocacy groups that have the stated goal of making China stronger and that is a potent mix.

8 Why anger China unnecessarily?

China has built a cadre of international apologists because it plays hardball and uses its power to its advantage. If you want access to China or even a visa, you must play by China’s rules, which means being a “friend” of China and not embarrassing its leaders. This was recently brought to light by academics who had criticized China’s human rights policies and were refused visas, by a university that opened a Confucius Institute and saw its activities censored,³⁰ and by business persons taken to the cleaners who stay quiet because they did not want to make things worse.

9 We need China for our bottom line

This argument is almost an urban legend, as it has been used to justify any and all interaction between US businesses and China, whatever their outcome, as well as the unequal playing field and its negative impact on national security. The claim is that US businesses need China for cheap manufacturing and research talent – a classic case of self-fulfilling prophecy. We then go on to delude ourselves that if we yield on a few minor issues, or transfer more technology, China will surely acquiesce to international business practices. Somehow it never happens, and somehow we never learn that these compromises accrue to China’s advantage only.

Toward a new relationship

We offer the following challenges to our readers, in particular to those involved with the transfer practices we have described:

We challenge American business persons to think beyond the next quarter and ask yourselves why you are training your future competitors – because when you start cooperative programs with China, and transfer your core technology, that is exactly what you are doing.

We ask our colleagues in defense, intelligence, law enforcement, commerce, and homeland security to look beyond espionage as traditionally defined to this broader and more pervasive threat. The world is not as clear as it used to be. Deal with it.

To scientists and educators tuned to the big picture, please appreciate that many countries do not – and never will – share your high view of international society, and that politics, not wishful thinking, will continue to govern the behavior of successful nations.³¹

Finally, we appeal to the broad masses of Chinese, both in China and abroad, to adopt a more high-minded attitude that will better serve your interests and those of the world. You have come a long way and earned the world’s respect. Now make this final transition.

Notes

1    Brett Kingstone, The Real War Against America, Max King LLC, 2005.

2    General Accounting Office, “Homeland Security: Performance of Information System to

Monitor Foreign Students and Exchange Visitors Has Improved, but Issues Remain,” GAO04-69, June 2004, accessed at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d04690.pdf. SEVIS was mandated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 and augmented by the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, the Cyber Security Research and Development Act of 2002.

3    www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/quarterly_rpt_mar2011.pdf.

4    Matthew Gruchow, “FBI Gets Access to SEVIS,” Minnesota Daily, accessed at: www.mndaily.com/nuevo/2004/09/22/fbi-gets-access-sevis.

5    General Accounting Office, “Homeland Security: Performance of Information System to Monitor Foreign Students and Exchange Visitors Has Improved, but Issues Remain,” GAO04-69, June 2004, accessed at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d04690.pdf.

6    For               the          authoritative     FAQ         on            deemed                 exports,                 seewww.bis.doc.gov/deemedexports/deemedexportsfaqs.html.

7    US Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report entitled “DeemedExport Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the US,” (Final Inspection Report No. IPE–16176 – March 2004).

8    http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/E6-8370.pdf.

9    General Accounting Office, “Export Controls: Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities andImprove Guidance for Protecting Export-Controlled Information at Universities,” GAO-0770, accessed at: www.gao.gov/new.items/d0770.pdf.

10 www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press06162011.htm.

11 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “President Obama Announces First Steps TowardImplementation of New US Export Control System,” December 9, 2010, accessed at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obama-announces-first-stepstoward-implementation-new-us-export.

12 www.bis.doc.gov/news/2011/bis_press06162011.htm.

13 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “President Obama Announces First Steps TowardImplementation of New US Export Control System.”

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 James K. Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,” CRS ReportRL33388, July 29, 2010, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf (accessed June 13, 2011). 19 Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.”

20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.

22  Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “US Blocks China Fibre Optics Deal Over Security,” Financial Times, June 30, 2010.

23  Sinead Carew and Jessica Wohl, “Huawei Backs Away From 3Leaf Acquisition,” Reuters, February 19, 2011, accessed at: www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/us-huawei-3leafidUSTRE71I38920110219.

24  Charles Freeman and Bonnie Glaser, “The US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” May11, 2011, accessed at: http://csis.org/publication/us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-0.

25  .

26  October 13, 2000 by George Koo Member, Committee of 100 Remarks before the ChinaInstitute, New York, from Committee of 100 website.

27  William Owens, “America Must Start Treating China as a Friend,” Financial Times, November 17, 2009.

28  According to the US Department of State, China 2010 Human Rights Report, “A negativetrend in key areas of the country’s human rights record continued, as the government took additional steps to rein in civil society, particularly organizations and individuals involved in rights advocacy and public interest issues, and increased attempts to limit freedom of speech and to control the press, the Internet, and Internet access.”

29  See Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, Naval Institute Press, 1994, pp. 61– 65.

30  The censorship is now inserted up front in the contract that establishes the institute.

31  We note with wry amusement the prominent place in Chinese bookstores these days of theearly Republican-era Machiavellian classic Hou Hei Xue ( lit. “the science of thick [skin] and black [heart]” by Li Zongwu). A few decades ago it was available only on the back shelves of certain bookstores.

Appendix 1 Case Histories of Chinese Industrial Espionage¹

 Radiation-hardened aerospace technology to China - On September 30, 2011, defendants Hong Wei Xian, aka "Harry Zan," and Li Li, aka "Lea Li," were sentenced in the Eastern District of Virginia to 24 months in prison for conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act and conspiracy to smuggle goods unlawfully from the Uliited States, in connection with their efforts to export to China radiationhardened microchips that are used in satellite systems and are classified as defense articles. Both defendants pleaded guilty to the charges on June 1, 2011. The defendants were arrested on September 1, 2010 in Budapest by Hungarian authorities pursuant to a US provisional arrest warrant. On April 4, 2011, they made their initial court appearances in federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia after being extradited from Hungary. According to court documents, Zan and Li operated a company in China called Beijing Starcreates Space Science and Technology Development Company Limited, This firm was allegedly in the business of selling technology to China Aerospace and Technology Corporation, a Chinese governmentcontrolled entity involved in the production and design of missile systems and launch vehicles. According to Court documents, from April 2009 to September 1, 2010, the defendants contacted a Virginia company seeking to purchase and export thousands of Programmable Read-Only Microchips (PROMs). The defendants ultimately attempted to purchase 40 PROMs from the Virginia firm and indicated to undercover agents that the PROMs were intended for China Aerospace and Technology Corporation. The investigation was conducted by ICE and DCIS.

 Radiation-hardened defense and aerospace technology to China - On March 24, 2011, Lian Yang, a resident of Woodinville, Washington, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act by trying to sell radiation-hardened military and aerospace technology to China. Yang was arrested on December 3, 2010, pursuant to a criminal complaint filed in the Western District of Washington charging him with conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act. According to the complaint, Yang attempted to purchase and export from the United States to China 300 radiation-hardened, programmable semiconductor devices that are used in satellites and are also classified as defense articles under the US Munitions List. The complaint alleges that Yang contemplated creating a shell company in the United States that would appear to be purchasing the parts, concealing the fact that the parts were to be shipped to China. Yang allegedly planned that false purchasing orders would be created, indicating that parts that could be legally exported were being purchased, not restricted parts. Yang and his co-con-Spirators allegedly wire-transferred $60,000 to undercover agents as partial payment for a sample of five devices. As part of theconspiracy, Yang allegedly negotiated a payment schedule with the undercover agents for the purchase and delivery of the remaining 300 devices in exchange for a total of $620,000. This investigation was conducted by the FBI, ICE, and CBP.

 Military technical data to China — On March 8, 2011, Sixing Liu, aka "Steve Liu," of Deerfield, IL, was arrested in Chicago on a criminal complaint filed in the District of New Jersey charging him with one count of exporting defense-related technical data without a license. Liu, a native of China with a doctorate degree in electrical engineering, worked as a senior staff engineer for Space & Navigation, a New Jersey-based division of L-3 Communications, from March 2009 through November 2010. He was part of a team that worked on precision navigation devices and other innovative components for the US Department of Defense. Liu was never issued a company laptop or approved to possess the company's work product outside the firm's New Jersey facility. In November 2010, he traveled to China and, upon his return to the United States later that month, CBP inspectors found him to be in possession of a computer that contained hundreds of documents related to the company's projects, as well as images of Liu making a presentation at a technology conference sponsored by the PRC government. Many of the documents on his computer were marked as containing sensitive proprietary company information and/or export-controlled technical data. The State Department verified that information on Liu's computer was export-controlled technical data that relates to defense items on the US Munitions List. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and ICE.

 Dow trade secrets to China - On February 7, 2011, a federal jury in the Middle District of Louisiana convicted Wen Chyu Liu, aka "David W. Liou," a former research scientist, of stealing trade secrets from Dow Chemical Company and selling them to companies in the People's Republic of China. According to the evidence presented in court, Liou came to the United States from China for graduate work. He began working for Dow in 1965 and retired in 1992. Dow is a leading producer of the elastomeric polymer, chlorinated polyethylene (CPE). Dow's Tyrin CPE is used in a number of applications worldwide, such as automotive and industrial hoses, electrical cable jackets and vinyl siding. While employed at Dow, Liou worked as a research scientist on various aspects of the development and manufacture of Dow elastomers, including Tyrin CPE. The evidence at trial established that Liou conspired with at least four current and former employees of Dow's facilities in Plaquemine, Louisiana, and Stade, Germany, who had worked in Tyrin CPE production, to misappropriate those trade secrets in an effort to develop and market CPE process design packages to Chinese companies. Liou traveled throughout China to market the stolen information, and he paid current and former Dow employees for Dow's CPE-related material and information. In one instance, Liou bribed a then-employee at the Plaquemine facility with $50,000 in cash to provide Dow's process manual and other CPE-related information. The investigation was conducted by the FBI.

 Stealth missile exhaust designs and military technical data to China — On January 24, 2011, a federal judge in the District of Hawaii sentenced Noshir Gowadia, 66, of Maui to 32 years in prison for communicating classified national defense information to the People's Republic of China (PRC), illegally exporting military technical data, as well as money laundering, filing false tax returns, and other offenses. On August 9, 2010, a federal jury in the District of Hawaii found Gowadia guilty of 14 criminal violations after six days of deliberation and a 40-day trial. These included five criminal offenses relating to his design for the PRC of a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system capable of rendering a PRC cruise missile resistant to detection by infrared missiles. The jury also convicted Gowadia of three counts of illegally communicating classified information regarding lock-on range for infrared missiles against the US B-2 bomber to persons not authorized to receive such information. Gowadia was also convicted of unlawfully exporting classified information about the B-2, illegally retaining information related to US national defense at his home, money laundering, and filing false tax returns for the years 2001 and 2002. Gowadia was an engineer with Northrop Grumman Corporation from 1968 to 1986, during which time he contributed to the development of the unique propulsion system and low observable capabilities of the B-2 bomber. Gowadia continued to work on classified matters as a contractor with the US government until 1997, when his security clearance was terminated. Evidence at trial revealed that from July 2003 to June 2005, Gowadia took six trips to the PRC to provide defense services in the form of design, test support, and test data analysis of technologies for the purpose of assisting the PRC with its cruise missile system by developing a stealthy exhaust nozzle and was paid at least $110,000 by the PRC. The jury convicted Gowadia of two specific transmissions of classified information: a PowerPoint presentation on the exhaust nozzle of a PRC cruise missile project and an evaluation of the effectiveness of a redesigned nozzle, and a computer file providing his signature prediction of a PRC cruise missile outfitted with his modified exhaust nozzle and associated predictions in relation to a US air-to-air missile. The prosecution also produced evidence which documented Gowadia's use of three foreign entities he controlled, including a Liechtenstein charity purportedly for the benefit of children, to disguise the income he received from foreign countries. This case was investigated by the FBI, the US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the IRS, US Customs and Border Protection, and ICE.

 Electronics used in military radar and electronic warfare to China — On January 27, 2011, Yufeng Wei was sentenced in the District of Massachusetts to 36 months in prison, while on January 26, 2011 her codefendant, Zhen Zhou Wu, was sentenced to 97 months in prison. Their company, Chitron Electronics, Inc., was fined $15.5 million. Wei, Wu, and Chitron Electronics, Inc. were convicted at trial on May 17, 2010 of conspiring for a period of more than ten years to illegally export to the People's Republic of China military electronics components and sensitive electronics used in military phased array radar, electronic warfare, and missile systems. Several Chinese military entities were among those receiving the exported equipment. Wu and Wei were also both convicted of filing false shipping documents with the US government. As proven at trial, the defendants illegally exported military electronic components to China through Hong Kong. The electronics exported are primarily used in military phased array radar, electronic warfare, military guidance systems, and military satellite communications. The defendants also illegally exported Commerce Department controlled electronics components to China with military applications such as electronic warfare, military radar, and satellite communications systems. Wu founded and controlled Chitron, with headquarters in Shenzhen, China, and a US office located in Waltham, MA, where defendant Wei served as Manager. Wu and Chitron sold electronics from the US to Chinese military factories and military research institutes, including numerous institutes of the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, which is responsible for the procurement, development, and manufacture of electronics for the Chinese military. Since as early as 2002, Wu referred to Chinese military entities as Chitron's major customer and employed an engineer at Chitron's Shen-zhen office to work with Chinese military customers. By 2007, 25 percent of Chitron's sales were to Chinese military entities. Shenzhen Chitron Electronics Company Limited, Wu's Chinese company through which US electronics were delivered to the Chinese military and other end users, was also indicted. On February 9, 2011, Chitron-Shenzhen received a fine of $1.9 million for refusing to appear for trial. Codefendant Bo Li, aka "Eric Lee," previously pleaded guilty to making false statements on shipping documents. The case was investigated by the BIS, ICE, FBI, and DCIS.

 Restricted electronics to China - On October 11,2010, York Yuan Chang, known as "David Zhang," and his wife, Leping Huang, were arrested on charges in the Central District of California of conspiring to export restricted electronics technology to the People's Republic of China (PRC) without a license and making false statements. According to the October 9, 2010 criminal complaint, the defendants are the owners of General Technology Systems Integration, Inc. (GTSI), a California company involved in the export of technology to the PRC. GTSI allegedly entered into contracts with the 24th Research Institute of the China Electronics Technology Corporation Group in China to design and transfer to the PRC technology for the development of two types of high-performance analog-to-digital converters (AD.Cs). The defendants allegedly hired two engineers to design the technology and provide training to individuals in the PRC. Twice in 2009, US Customs and Border Protection officials stopped the engineers upon their return to the United States and allegedly found computer files and documents indicating illegal technology transfer involving GTSI and China. According to the complaint, Chang and Huang allegedly sought to cover up the project after the authorities contacted the engineers. The ADCs that the defendants allegedly attenipted to export to the PRC are subject to export controls for national security and anti-terrorism reasons. This investigation was conducted by the FBI, BIS, ICE, IRS, and DCIS.

 Sensitive military encryption technology to China — On September 13, 2010, Chi Tong Kuok, a resident of Macau, China, was sentenced in the Southern District of California to serve 96 months in prison for his efforts to obtain sensitive defense technology used in encrypted US military or government communications and to cause them to be illegally exported to Macau and Hong Kong. On May 11, 2010, Kuok was convicted at trial of conspiracy to export defense articles without a license and to smuggle goods, attempting, to export defense articles without a license, and money laundering. Kuok was arrested on June 17, 2009 in Atlanta, GA after he arrived from Paris to catch a connecting flight to Panama in order to meet with undercover federal agents to take possession of controlled US technology. Kuok sought to obtain a variety of encryption, communications and global positioning systems equipment used by the; US and NATO militaries. For instance, Kuok negotiated with undercover agents to obtain PRC-148 radios and a KG-175 Taclane Encryptor. The PRC-148 is a multi-band radio originally designed for the US Special Operations Command. The KG175 Taclane Encryptor was developed by General Dynamics under a contract with the National Security Agency for use by the US military to encrypt Internet Protocol communications. This investigation was conducted by the ICE and DCIS.

 Stolen US military night vision and optics to China and England On September 9, 2010, a grand jury in the Southern District of California returned an indictment charging Phillip Andro Jamison with trafficking in stolen government property, interstate transportation of stolen goods, and exporting defense articles without a license. Jamison, a US Navy employee stationed aboard Naval Amphibious Base in

Coronado, California, allegedly stole more than 280 items from the US Navy between October 2008 and September 2009 and then sold these items to customers via eBay, an Internet auction and shopping website. The indictment further alleges that Jamison illegally exported to Hong Kong and England combat-grade night vision devices, riflescopes and laser aiming devices without first obtaining the required export licenses from the State Department. The investigation was conducted by the ICE and NCIS.

 Dow trade secrets to China — On August 31, 2010 an indictment was unsealed in the Southern District of Indiana charging Kexue Huang with economic espionage intended to benefit a foreign government and instrumentalities, as well as interstate and foreign transportation of stolen property. Huang was arrested onjuly 13, 2010 in Massachusetts. The indictment alleges that Huang, a Chinese national and US permanent legal resident, misappropriated and transported trade secrets and property to the People's Republic of China (PRC) while working as a research scientist at Dow AgroSciences LLC (D ow). While he was employed at Dow, Huang directed university researchers in the PRC to further develop the Dow trade secrets. He also allegedly applied for and obtained grant funding that was used to develop the stolen trade secrets. The investigation was conducted by the FBI.

 Thermal imaging cameras to China - On May 14, 2010, Sam Ching Sheng Lee, part-owner and chief operations manager of Multimillion Business Associate Corporation ("MBA"), pleaded guilty in the Central District of California to conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers for illegally exporting national securitycontrolled thermal imaging cameras to China. His nephew, Charles Yu Hsu Lee, pleaded guilty on the same day to misprision of a felony for the same activity. The Lees were arrested on December 30, 2008 in Hacienda Heights, CA, pursuant to a December 16, 2008 indictment charging them with conspiracy to export and exporting national security-controlled items without a license in violation of the IEEPA.

The indictment alleged that the defendants, doing business as MBA, an import/export business located in Hacienda Heights, assisted persons in China to illegally procure export-controlled thermal-imaging cameras. During the period between April 2002 and July 2007, the defendants allegedly exported a total of ten thermal-imaging cameras to China in circumvention of export laws. After being advised of strict export restrictions, Charles Lee allegedly purchased the cameras from US suppliers for approximately $9,500 a piece by withholding the fact that the devices were destined for China. His uncle, Sam Lee, then received the devices and, through his company, arranged for their shipment to Shanghai, China without obtaining proper licenses. One of the recipients is alleged to be an employee of a company in Shanghai engaged in the development of infrared technology. The thermalimaging cameras are controlled for export to China by the Department of Commerce for national security and regional stability reasons because of their use in a wide variety of military and civilian applications. This investigation was conducted by the EAGLE Task Force in the Central District of California,

 Military flight simulation technology overseas - On March 25, 2010 an indictment was unsealed in federal court in the District of Massachusetts charging Hok Shek Chan, Wong Fook Loy, and Ngo Tek Chai with conspiring to and attempting to illegally export munitions without the required licenses. According to the October 2008 indictment, Chan, a Hong Kong citizen, conspired with two Malaysian nationals, Wong Fook Loy and Ngo Tek Chai, and others to cause the export of 10 indicator servo tachometers used in C-130 military flight simulators from the United States without the required license from the State Department. Chan was extradited from Hong Kong to face the charges against him in Boston. The case was investigated by the ICE, BIS, and DCIS.

 Economic espionage I theft of space shuttle and rocket secrets for China - On February 11,2010 former Rockwell and Boeing engineer Dong-fan "Greg" Chung was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release following his July 16, 2009 conviction in the Central District of California. Chung was convicted of charges of economic espionage and acting as an illegal agent of the People's Republic of China (PRC), for whom he stole restricted technology and Boeing trade secrets, including information related to the Space Shuttle program and the Delta IV rocket. According to the judge's ruling, Chung served as an illegal agent of China for more than 30 years and kept more than 300,000 pages of documents reflecting Boeing trade secrets stashed in his home as part of his mission to steal aerospace and military trade secrets from Boeing to assist the Chinese government. Chung sent Boeing trade secrets to the PRC via the mail, sea freight^ the Chinese consulate in San Francisco, and via a Chinese agent named Chi Mak. On several occasions, Chung also used the trade secrets he misappropriated from Boeing to prepare detailed briefings that he later presented to Chinese officials in the PRC. Chung was originally arrested on February 11, 2008 in Southern California after being indicted on eight counts of economic espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, one count of acting as an unregistered foreign agent, one count of obstruction of justice, and three counts of making false statements to the FBI. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and NASA.

 Carbon-fiber material with rocket and spacecraft applications to China — On October 8, 2009, three individuals were sentenced in the District of Minnesota for illegally exporting high-modulus, carbonfiber material to the China Academy of Space Technology. Jian Wei Ding was sentenced to 46 months in prison. Ivok Tong Lim was sentenced to just over one year of confinement because of his cooperation in the case, while Ping Cheng was sentenced to one year's probation due to his cooperation. On March 20, 2009, Ding pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Export Administration Regulations. Cheng entered his plea on February 13, 2009 and Lim entered his plea on March 9, 2009. All three men were indicted on

October 28^ 2008 for conspiring to illegally export to China controlled carbon-fiber material with applications in aircraft, rockets, spacecraft, and uranium-enrichment process. The intended destination for some of the materials was the China Academy of Space Technology, which oversees research institutes working on spacecraft systems for the PRC government. For national security, nuclear proliferation, and antiterrorism reasons, the US government requires a license to export these carbon-fiber materials. Jian Wei Ding was a resident of Singapore and owned or was affiliated with various Singaporean import/export companies, includingjowa Globaltech Pte Ltd, FirmSpace Pte Ltd, and Far Eastron Co. Pte Ltd. Kok long Lim was a resident of Singapore and was at one time affiliated with FirmSpace, Pte Ltd. Ping Cheng was a resident of New York and the sole shareholder of Prime Technology Corporation. This investigation was conducted by the ICE and BIS.

 Restricted integrated circuits with military applications to China - On August 3, 2009, William Chai-Wai Tsu, an employee of a Beijingbased military contracting company called Dimigit Science & Technology Co. Ltd, and the vice-president of a Hacienda Heights, CA, front company called Cheer-way, Inc., was sentenced in the Central District of California to 40 months in prison. Tsu illegally exported more than 400 restricted integrated circuits with applications in military radar systems to China over a 10-month period, according to court documents. These dual-use items are restricted for export for national security reasons. Tsu purchased many of the items from US distributors after falsely telling these US companies that he was not exporting the circuits abroad. According to court documents, Tsu supplied restricted US technology to several customers in China, including the "704 Research Institute," which is known as the "Aerospace Long March Rocket Technology Company" and is affiliated with the state-owned China Aerospace Science & Technology Corporation. Tsu's employer in China, Dimigit, boasted in brochures that its mission was providing the motherland with safe, reliable and advanced electronic technical support in the revitalization

of our national military industry." Tsu was indicted in the Central District of California on February 6, 2009 on charges of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. He later pleaded guilty to two federal counts of the indictment on March 13, 2009. This case was the product of an investigation by the Export and Antiproliferation Global Law Enforcement (EAGLE) Task Force in the

Central District of California, which includes the BIS, ICE, FBI, CBP, Diplomatic Security Service, and the Transportation Security Administration.

 Restricted thermal imaging technology to China - On july 27, 2009, Zhi Yong Guo, a resident of Beijing, was sentenced in the Central District of California to 60 months in prison, while Tah Wei Chao, also a resident of Beijing, was sentenced to 20 months in prison. Both were sentenced in connection with a plot to procure and illegally export thermal-imaging cameras to the People's Republic of China without obtaining the required export licenses. Guo and Chao were indicted on federal charges onjuly 17, 2008. Chao pleaded guilty to three federal counts in July 2008. On February 23, 2009, following a one-week trial, Guo was convicted of two federal counts, The case related to 10 cameras concealed in luggage destined for China in April 2008. The export of these thermal-imaging cameras to China is controlled by the Department of Commerce for national security and regional stability reasons because of their use in a wide variety of civilian and military applications. In March 2008, Chao ordered 10 thermal-imaging cameras from FLIR Systems, Inc. for $53,000. Representatives from FLIR Systems repeatedly warned Chao that the cameras could not be exported without a license. Both Chao and Guo were arrested at Los Angeles International Airport in April 2008 after authorities recovered the 10 cameras that had been hidden in their suitcases. In addition to the 10 cameras intercepted by the federal authorities, Chao admitted that, acting at the behest of Guo, he shipped three cameras to China in October 2007. The evidence at trial showed that Guo, an engineer and a managing director of a technology development company in Beijing, directed Chao to obtain the cameras for Guo's clients, the Chinese Special Police and the Special Armed Police. This case was the product of an investigation by the Export and Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement (EAGLE) Task Force in the Central District of California, including the BIS, ICE, FBI, CBP, DSS, and TSA.

 Military technical data on unmanned aerial vehicles to China - On July 1, 2009, Dr. John Reece Roth was sentenced in the Eastern District of Tennessee to 48 months in prison, two years supervised release and a $1,700 assessment for illegally exporting sensitive military technical data related to a US Air Force contract. Roth, a former Professor Emeritus at the University of Tennessee, was convicted on September 2, 2008 on 15 counts of violating the Arms Export Control Act, one count of conspiracy, and one count of wire fraud. Roth had illegally exported military technical data relating to plasma technology designed to be deployed on the wings of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or "drones" operating as weapons or surveillance systems. The illegal exports involved technical data related to an Air Force research contract that Roth provided to foreign nationals from China and Iran. In addition, Roth carried multiple documents containing controlled military data with him on a trip to China and caused other controlled military data to be e-mailed to an individual in China. On August 20, 2008, Atmospheric Glow Technologies, Inc (AGT), a privately held plasma technology company in Tennessee, also pleaded guilty to charges of illegally exporting US military data about drones to a citizen of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act AGT was sentenced on February 12, 2010 to a $4,000 assessment and a $25,000 fine. Roth and AGT were first charged on May 20, 2008. In a related case, on April 15, 2008, Daniel Max Sherman, a physicist who formerly worked at AGT, pleaded guilty to information charging him with conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act in connection with this investigation. Sherman was later sentenced to 14 months in prison on August 10, 2009 after cooperating in the investigation. The investigation was conducted by the FBI, ICE, US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, DCIS, and BIS.

 Military night-vision technology to China - On July 1, 2009, Bing Xu, of Nanjing, China, was sentenced in the District of New Jersey to 22 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release after pleading guilty on February 24, 2009 to conspiracy to illegally export military-grade night-vision technology to China. Xu, a manager at Everbright Science and Technology, Ltd, a company in Nanjing, China, admitted that he conspired with others at Everbright to purchase certain night-vision technology from a company in the United States, which required a license from the State Department for export. Xu admitted that he and others at Everbright first attempted to obtain the necessary export license for the night-vision equipment. When the license application was denied by the Department of State, Xu agreed with others at Everbright to take steps to export the night-vision optical equipment illegally. Xu has been in custody since his arrest in October 2007 pursuant to a criminal complaint. Xu arrived in New York on October 26, 2007 from China a day after his Chinese employer wire transferred $14,080 to agents as payment for the purchase of the equipment. The investigation was conducted by the ICE and DCIS.  Amplifiers and missile target acquisition technology to China - On May 14, 2009, Joseph Piquet, the owner and President of AlphaTronX, a company in Port St. Lucie, Florida which produces electronic components, was sentenced in the Southern District of Florida to 60 months in prison followed by two years' supervised release. On March 5, 2009 he was convicted of seven counts arising from a conspiracy to purchase military electronic components from Northrop Grumman Corporation, and to ship them to Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China without first obtaining required export licenses under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Among those items involved in the conspiracy were highpowered amplifiers designed for use by the US military in early warning radar and missile target acquisition systems, as well as lownoise amplifiers that have both commercial and military use. Piquet was first indicted on June 5, 2008, along with his company, AlphaTronX, Inc, as well as Thompson Tam, and Ontime Electronics Technology Limited, Tam is a director of Ontime Electronics, an electronics company in China. On March 2, 2009, the Court ordered the dismissal of the indictment against Alpha-TronX. This investigation was Conducted by the BIS and ICE.

 Trade secrets to China - On April 10, 2009 Yan Zhu, a Chinese citizen in the US on a work visa, was arrested in the District of Newjersey on charges of theft of trade secrets, conspiracy, wire fraud, and theft of honest services fraud in connection with a plot to steal software from his former US employer and sell a modified version to the Chinese government after he was fired. Zhu was employed as a senior environmental engineer from May 2006 until his termination in July 2008. Zhu worked for a comprehensive multimedia environmental information management portal that developed a proprietary software program for the Chinese market which allows users to manage air emissions, ambient water quality, and ground water quality. This investigation was conducted by the FBI.

 Restricted technology to China — On April 7, 2009, Fu-Tian Lu was arrested in San Francisco pursuant to an April 1, 2009 indictment in the Northern District of California charging him with lying to federal agents and conspiring to illegally export restricted microwave amplifier technology to China. According to the indictment, Lu, and the two companies he founded, Fushine Technology, Inc., of Cupertino, California, and Everjet Science and Technology Corporation, based in China, conspired to export sensitive microwave amplifier technology that was restricted for national security reasons to China without first obtaining a Commerce Department license. On February 17, 2010, a superseding indictment was returned charging Fu-Tian Lu, Fushine Technology, Inc., and Everjet Science and Technology Corporation with conspiracy to violate export regulations and making false statements. This investigation was conducted by the Department of Commerce (BIS), the FBI, ICE, and US Customs and Border Protection.

 Rocket/space launch technical data to China - On April 7, 2009, Quansheng Shu, a native of China, naturalized US citizen, and Ph.D. physicist, was sentenced to 51 months in prison for illegally exporting space launch technical data and defense services to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and offering bribes to Chinese government officials. Shu pleaded guilty on November 17, 2008 in the Eastern District of Virginia to a three-count criminal indictment. He was arrested on September 24, 2008. He was President, Secretary, and Treasurer of AMAC International, a high-tech company located in Newport News, VA, and with an office in Beijing, China. Shu provided the PRC with assistance in the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for space launch vehicles to be used at the heavy payload launch facility located in the southern island province of Hainan, PRC. The Hainan facility will house launch vehicles designed to send space stations and satellites into orbit, as well as provide support for manned space flight and future lunar missions. Shu also illegally exported to the PRC technical data related to the design and manufacture of a Standard 100 M3 Liquid Hydrogen (LH) 2 Tank. In addition, Shu offered approximately $189,300 in bribes to government officials with the PRC's 101 Institute to induce the award of a hydrogen liquefier project to a French company he represented. In January 2007, the $4 million hydrogen liquefier project was awarded to the French company that Shu represented. This investigation was conducted by the FBI, ICE, BIS, and DCIS.

 Miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicle components to China — On March 12, 2009 a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Yarning Nina Qi Hanson, her husband Harold Dewitt Hanson (an employee at Walter Reed Army Medical Center), and a Maryland Company, Arc International, LLC, with illegally exporting miniature Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) autopilots to a company in the People's Republic of China. The UAV components are controlled for export to China for national security reasons. According to court documents, beginning in 2007, the Hansons began attempting to acquire the autopilots from a Canadian manufacturer in order to re-export them to Xi'an Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group in China. Qi Hanson initially represented that the autopilots would be used for a model airplane civilian flying club in China. When Canadian company officials questioned the utility of autopilots — designed for use on unmanned aircraft — for flying club hobbyists, Qi Hanson claimed that autopilots would be used on US aircraft to record thunderstorm and tornado developments and ice-pack melting rates in the Arctic. On or about August 7,2008, after having fraudulently taken delivery of 20 of these autopilots (valued at $90,000), Qi Hanson boarded a plane in the United States bound for Shanghai, and hand-delivered the items to Xi'an Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group in China. Both Hansons ultimately pleaded guilty on

November 13, 2009 to felony false statement violations. On February 3, 2010 Harold Dewitt Hanson was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment, while his wife, Yaming Nina Qi Hanson, was sentenced to time served. The investigation was conducted by the BIS and FBI.  Restricted electronic components to China - On January 20, 2009 Michael Ming Zhang and Policarpo Coronado Gamboa were arrested pursuant to indictments in the Central District of California charging them with separate schemes involving the illegal export of controlled US electronic items to China and the illegal trafficking of counterfeit electronic components from China into the United States. Zhang was President of J.J.Electronics, a Rancho Cucamonga, CA business, while Gamboa owned and operated Sereton Technology, Inc., a Foothill Ranch, CA business. Zhang allegedly exported to China dual-use electronic items that have uses in US Army battle tanks. He also allegedly imported and sold in the United States roughly 4,300 Cisco electronic components bearing counterfeit marks from China. Gamboa was charged with conspiring with Zhang to import Sony electronic components with counterfeit marks from China for distribution in the United States. On July 9, 2009 Gamboa pleaded guilty on one count of the indictment and was later sentenced to five years' probation, and was ordered to pay $13,600 restitution to Sony Electronics. On July 6, 2009 Zhang pleaded guilty to count one in each of the indictments. The case was investigated by the FBI, BIS, DCIS, ICE, the US Postal Inspection Service, and the Orange County Sheriffs Department, in conjunction with the EAGLE Task Force in the Central District of California.

 Trade secrets to China - On December 9, 2008, in the Northern District of Illinois, Hanjuan Jin was charged in a superseding indictment that added three counts of economic espionage in violation of 18 USC. § 1831. The charges were added to an April 1, 2008 indictment that chargedjin with theft of trade secrets under 18 USC. § 1832. Jin is a former Motorola employee who joined the company in 1998. On February 28, 2007, one day after quitting Motorola, Jin was stopped at O'Hare Airport with over 1,000 Motorola documents in her possession, both in hard copy and electronic format. A review of Motorola computer records showed that Jin accessed a large number of Motorola documents late at night. At the time she was stopped, Jin was traveling on a one-way ticket to China. The section 1831 charges are based on evidence that Jin intended that the trade secrets she stole from Motorola would benefit the Chinese military. Motorola had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on research and development for the proprietary data that Jin allegedly stole. The investigation was conducted by the FBI, with assistance from US Customs and Border Protection.

 Stolen trade secrets to Chinese nationals - On November 21, 2008 Fei Ye and Ming Zhong were sentenced in the Northern District of California to one year in prison each, based in part on their cooperation, after pleading guilty on December 14, 2006 to charges of economic espionage for possessing trade secrets stolen from two Silicon Valley technology companies. The pair admitted that their company was to have provided a share of any profits made on sales of the stolen chips to Chinese entities. The case marked the first convictions in the nation for economic espionage. They were first indicted on December 4, 2002. The investigation was conducted by the ICE, FBI, and CBP.

 Military accelerometers to China - On September 26, 2008 Qing Li was sentenced in the Southern District of California to 12 months and one day in custody, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $7,500 for conspiracy to smuggle military-grade accelerometers from the United States to the People's Republic of China (PRC). Li pleaded guilty on June 9, 2008 to violating Title 18, USC Section 554. She was indicted for the offense on October 18, 2007. According to court papers, Li conspired with an individual in China to locate and procure as many as 30 Endevco 7270A-200K accelerometers for what her co-conspirator described as a "special" scientific agency in China. This accelerometer has military applications in "smart" bombs and missile development, and in calibrating the g-forces of nuclear and chemical explosions. The investigation was conducted by the ICE and DCIS.

 Military aircraft components to China and Iran - On August 28, 2008 Desmond Dinesh Frank, a citizen and resident of Malaysia, was sentenced to 23 months in prison after pleading guilty on May 16, 2008 to several felonies in the District of Massachusetts in connection with a plot to illegally export military items to China and Iran. A sixcount indictment returned on November 15, 2007 charged Frank, the operator of Asian Sky Support, Sdn., Bhd., in Malaysia, with conspiring to illegally export items to Iran, conspiring to illegally export C-130 military aircraft training equipment to China, illegally exporting defense articles, smuggling, and two counts of money laundering. Frank was arrested in Hawaii on October 8, 2007 by ICE agents. Frank conspired with others to illegally export and cause the re-export of goods, technology, and services to Iran without first obtaining the required authorization from the Treasury Department. He also conspired with others to illegally export 10 indicators, servodriven tachometers — which are military training components used in C-130 military flight simulators — from the United States to Malaysia and, ultimately, to Hong Kong, China, without the required license from the State Department. This investigation was conducted by the ICE, BIS, and DCIS.

 US military source code and trade secrets to China - On June 18, 2008 Xiaodong Sheldon Meng was sentenced in the Northern District of California to 24 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $10,000 fine for committing economic espionage and violating the Arms Export Control Act. Meng pleaded guilty in August 2007 to violating the Economic Espionage Act by misappropriating a trade secret used to simulate motion for military training and other purposes, with the intent to benefit China's Navy Research Center in Beijing. He also pleaded guilty to violating the Arms Export Control Act for illegally exporting military source code involving a program used for training military fighter pilots. Meng was the first defendant in the country to be convicted of exporting military source code pursuant to die Arms Export Control Act. He was also the first defendant to be sentenced under the Economic Espionage Act. Meng was charged in a superseding indictment on December 13, 2006. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and ICE.

 US naval warship data to China — On March 24, 2008 Chi Mak, a former engineer with a US Navy contractor, was sentenced in the Central District of California to 293 months (more than 24 years) in prison for orchestrating a conspiracy to obtain US naval warship technology and to illegally exporting this material to China. Mak was found guilty at trial in May 2007 of conspiracy, two counts of attempting to violate export control laws, acting as an unregistered agent of the Chinese government, and making false statements. The investigation found that Mak had been given lists from co-conspirators in China that requested US naval research related to nuclear submarines and other information. Mak gathered technical data about the Navy's current and future warship technology and conspired to illegally export these data to China. Mak's four co-defendants (and family members) also pleaded guilty in connection with the case. On April 21, 2008 Chi Mak's brother, Tai Mak, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment pursuant to a June 4, 2007 plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to export defense articles. On October 2, 2008, Chi Mak's wife, Rebecca Chiu, was sentenced to three years in prison for her role in the plot. On October 1, 2008, Fuk Heung Li was sentenced to three years' probation. On September 24, 2007 Yui Mak was sentenced to 11 months' imprisonment. The investigation was conducted by the FBI, NCIS, and ICE.

 Military amplifiers to China — On December 19, 2007 Ding Zhengxing, Su Yang, and Peter Zhu were indicted in the Western District of Texas for Arms Export Control Act violations in connection with an alleged plot to purchase and illegally export to China amplifiers that are controlled for military purposes. The amplifiers are used in digital radios and wireless area, networks. Ding and Yang were arrested in January 2008 after they traveled to Saipan to take possession of the amplifiers. Peter Zhu, of Shanghai Meuro Electronics Company Ltd in China, remains at large. On July 1, 2009 Ding was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment. He pleaded guilty on October 17, 2008 to count one of the second superseding indictment. The case was investigated by the ICE.

 Military night-vision technology to China - On December 3, 2007 Philip Cheng was sentenced in the Northern District of California to two years in prison and ordered to pay a $50,000 fine for his role in brokering the illegal export of a night-vision camera and its accompanying technology to China in violation of federal laws and regulations. Mr. Cheng pleaded guilty on October 31, 2006 to brokering the illegal export of Panther-series infrared cameras, a device which makes use of "night-vision" technology. He was indicted on June 3, 2004. The technology used in the device was controlled for national security reasons by the United States Department of State. The case was the result of a joint investigation by the ICE, the FBI, the Department of Commerce, and the IRS [Night Vision Technology Corp., a San Jose-based firm that procures infrared technology and other high-tech equipment for overseas buyers, particularly in Taiwan. The company is headed by Martin Shih, 62, a Taiwanese-Canadian executive with wide experience as an electrical engineer, working both in Canada and California with satellite communications company Loral Space & Communications Ltd. Mr. Shih's Taiwatiese-American consultant, Philip Cheng, was also charged].

 Restricted technology to China — On August 1, 2007 Fung Yang, the President of Excellence Engineering Electronics, Inc., pleaded guilty in the Northern District of California to a charge of illegally exporting controlled microwave integrated circuits to China without the required authorization from the Department of Commerce. Yang was charged by information on July 31, 2007. The investigation was conducted by the BIS and FBI.

Note

1 These case summaries were provided by the FBI. See www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/summary-eaca.pdf.

Appendix 2 Protecting against the China Cyber Threat

As difficult as it is to accept, high-tech and other strategic companies now fall into one of two categories: “those that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t yet know.”¹Before a single penny is spent mitigating the damage and risk, however, all personnel from the top to the bottom need to make three key changes in mindset. The first order of business is to admit that they have a cyber-security problem. Denial is not just a river in Egypt. The second major shift is philosophical. Companies have to abandon the quaint notion that perimeter cyber defense alone is still effective. In the modern cyber-threat environment it is simply not possible to build a higher wall, dig a deeper moat, or deploy a wider minefield. There are no “magic bullets,” either in terms of equipment (firewalls) or software (anti-virus) that will expel the intruders. Instead, companies need to accept that there is very likely advanced persistent threat permanently in their networks, as well as compromised hardware and software. Companies should replace a perimeter defense mindset with a strategy of “active defense” or “defensein-depth,” which focuses on risk mitigation and maintaining operations despite APT. The third important shift is financial. The discussion above clearly shows that risk mitigation against cyber threats will not be cheap.

But what are specific “best practices” for companies to follow? Overall, they must adopt a layered approach, combining three rough categories: personnel security, network security, and data security.² Personnel security is the most important, because insiders pose the gravest threat to corporate security given their ability to potentially bypass or undermine expensive technical measures.

Personnel security measures should include:

Mandatory insider security training for the entire staff

Personnel security and evaluation, including background checks

Non-disclosure agreements with employees and business partners Login "splash pages" and signed employee agreements outlining employee consent to monitoring on corporate machines

 Social networking policies, including rules about use during business hours and guidelines to prevent employee social networking data from being used to refine targeting of corporate networks

 Client machine monitoring software, capturing keystrokes, chat/IM, email, browsing history, and application use

 Foreign travel guidelines for transport of company equipment, including provision of "clean" phones and machines for travel purposes

Prohibitions and auditing of removable media and thumb drives Physical security of network infrastructure, including locks and biometrics

Separation network administration and security administration roles Employee exit procedures.

Network security measures should include:

 Spam and virus firewalls that protect e-mail servers from spam, virus,

spoofing, phishing, and spyware attacks Advanced intrusion detection/protection systems

Robust on-site and off-site network archiving and backup for full network restoration after an intrusion

 Multi-factor authentication for servers and clients, such as a combination of biometrics, PINs, and passwords

 A suite of anti-virus programs, since any one program will often fail to recognize the signatures of every malware

 Real-time auditing and monitoring appliances or tools, logging all network activity

Regular penetration testing by third parties

Regular testing of backup procedures

Compartmentation between different domains within the company, restricting, access to shared servers in different divisions (especially between headquarters systems and foreign representative offices)

Network forensics software for analysis of intrusions

Honeynets to capture intrusion signatures and adversary behavior Thin-client systems, permitting, control of the application baseline and patching, and sandboxing of proposed additions to the application baseline

Company-issued mobile phones with additional security layers Continuity of operations plans for restoring data and systems.

Data security measures should include:

 Robust public key encryption throughout the network, providing protection for data on servers, whole-disk encryption for client machines, and secure e-mail

 Document management software for classification and metatagging of company proprietary information

 Compartmented access to trade secrets and intellectual property servers.

Despite some or all of these measures, the adversary will likely still get in, but these represent the most robust risk mitigation strategies to deal with an advanced cyber-espionage actor like China.

Notes

1  Dmitri Alperovitch, Revealed: Operation Shady RAT, McAfee, August 2011.

2  Some of these suggested measures are taken from the excellent list found in the Office of theNational Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in

Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009– 2011, October 2011, accessed at: www.dni.gov/reports/20111103_report_fecie.pdf.

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Index

Italic page numbers indicate Tables: with emboldened numbers for text boxes; notes are denoted by suffix “n”. Abbreviations: OCS = overseas Chinese scholars; S&T = Science and Technology

3Com: proposed acquisition of 249

3Leaf server technology company: proposed acquisition of 250 ABB: robotics R&D 68 ability to assimilate technology 13 absolute secrecy 28, 29 abstract thinking: and concrete/practical science 238, 239 academic plagiarism 156, 238

AD reports 27, 30

Alexander, [General] Keith 216, 217

All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese [Qiaolian] 96–7

All-Japan Federation of Overseas Chinese Professionals 234–5 Alperovitch, Dmitry 220 altruism 246

alumni associations, Chinese: in US 113–14

American Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers 109 analytical vs holistic thought 239

Arms Export Control Act: prosecutions under 256, 257, 264, 265, 269, 270

Asia–Silicon Valley Connection (ASVC) 123

Associated Press 223

Association of Chinese Entrepreneurs and Scholars 104n.129; see also Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs and Professional Association

Association of Chinese Professionals (ACP) 120–1

Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers (ACSE) 121, 133n.86

Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers in Japan (ACSEJ) 235

Association des Scientifiques et des Ingénieurs Chinois en France (ASICEF) 236–7

Auerswald, Philip E. 53

Bai, Xianyang 20, 21, 24–5

Bain Capital 249

Basic Knowledge About Chemical Literature [Yang & Yang, 1981] 29

Beijing Document Service (BDS) 21, 33, 40

Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI) 231

Beijing OCS Park 181

Beijing University 8, 21

Beijing ZGC International Incubator Co., Ltd 181, 182

Bellows Report 197

Bergersen, Gregg 194, 195, 199, 200, 202 bilateral [US–China] dialogues 250

bilateral [US–China] relationship: effects of 252; policy recommendations for 72–3

Blizinsky, Katherine D. 239–40

“bottom line”, effect of China on 252

Boursicot, Bernard 202

Boxer Indemnity Program 6–8, 10

Boxer Rebellion 7, 15n.19

“brain drain” vs “brain gain” 148–9, 161n.90

Brandon, Harry 196

Branscomb, Lewis 53

Brenner, Joel 187, 217, 218, 227 Brown, Gordon: aide to 202

bureaucracy [in PRC]: dysfunctional fragmentation of 191

Business Week 216, 223

Cai, Shaoji 7

Cai, Yuanpei 8

California: technology transfer groups in 122–8

Caohejing OCS Park [Shanghai] 182

Carlson, Bruce 187, 207

Carter, William 187

Cartwright, [General] James E. 216

CAS see Chinese Academy of Sciences case histories [of traditional espionage] 205–6, 256–70 CASIA Incubator Park 182 center(s) of excellence 56

Center for US–China Technology Innovation and Development (UCTID) 106, 107, 116–17, 131n.5

Chai, Ngo Tek 205, 262

Chan, Hok Shek 205, 262

Chang, York Yuan 205, 259–60

Changjiang Scholar Award program 87, 236

Chao, Tah Wei 263–4

Chao, Xiuli 112

“cheaters”: managing of, in global society 245–50 chemical literature: reference books 29

Chen, Fangyun 16n.60

Chen, Hengzhe 7

Chen, Heqin 8

Chen, Jiugeng 24, 36, 46

Chen, Nengkuan 193

Chen, Zeqian 20, 21, 24–5

Cheng, Jixi 45

Cheng, Philip 206, 270

Cheng, Ping 205, 262–3

Cheung, Mark 201

Chiao, Joan Y. 239–40

Chiao-Tung University Alumni Association in America 114

Chicago [PRC] consulate 106, 109, 144

Chin, Larry Wu-Tai 194, 196, 200, 201, 202

China Association for the International Exchange of Personnel (CAIEP) 89, 95–6; link with SAFEA 95–6, 110

China Association for International Science and Technology Cooperation 97–8; director 107

China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) 45, 97, 104n.111; International Affairs Department 97, 119

China Association for Science and Technology, USA (CAST-USA) 111–13

China Association of Technology Entrepreneurs: Returned Scholars Venture Park Alliance 180–1 China Defense Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC) 25, 33, 39–40; strategic intelligence database system 31

China Education Association for International Exchange 98

China Education and Research Network (CERNET) 99, 111

China Engineering and Technology Information Network (CETIN) 40–1

China–EU S&T Cooperation Promotion Office 236

China–Europe Technology Transfer Center 94

China Human Resources 99

China International Employment Net 99

China International Science and Technology Cooperation (CISTC) website 100

China Machine Industry Information Institute 34, 36

China Metallurgical Information and Standardization Research Institute 34, 36

China Military Power Report [annual assessment by Pentagon] 216

China National Chemical Information Center 34, 36

China National Institute of Standardization (CNIS) 42; document-sharing platform 43; National Library of Standards 33, 42, 48n.26; responsibilities 42–3

China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) 249

China Overseas Exchange Association (COEA) 80–1, 89, 95, 96

China Overseas Students and Scholars Pioneer (COSSP) 98

China Overseas Talent Network 82, 99

China Patent Information Center 33, 34, 42, 48n.25

China Patent Office Documentation Library 23

China Post-doctoral Science Foundation 82

China S&T Exchange Center 84, 85–6, 95, 233; China–EU S&T Cooperation Promotion Office 236

China Scholars Abroad (Chisa) 98

China Scholarship Council 87

China Society for Scientific and Technical Information (CSSTI) 21, 44–5

China Statistical Yearbook data 138, 157n.13

China Talents website 82, 99, 119, 152

China Trade Journal 232

China–US Joint Research Center for Ecosystem and Environmental Change [at University of Tennessee] 232

Chinese Academy of Agriculture Science: Library 34

Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) 60

Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) 83, 97, 197

Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences: Library 34

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 60, 87–8; Academic Meetings Financial Aid Program 157; High-level Visiting Scholar Plan 155; International Cooperation Bureau 88, 102n.54; National

Science Library 23, 33, 34, 35–6; and Natural Science Foundation of China 88; and SSTC/ MOST 102n.48; technology transfer programs 88, 94 Chinese alumni associations: in US 113–14

Chinese–American Association of Engineering 104n.120

Chinese–American Networking Symposium 113

Chinese American Professors and Professionals Network 127

Chinese–American S&T associations 114–21

Chinese American Science and Technology Advancement Foundation (CAS-TAF) 124

Chinese American Semiconductor Professional Association (CASPA) 126, 129, 134n.135

Chinese Association of Professionals in Science and Technology (CAPST) 119–20

Chinese Association for Science and Business (CASB) 117–18

Chinese Association of Scientists and Engineers in Japan (CASEJ) 235

Chinese character writing system 240

Chinese Educational Mission (CEM) 6

Chinese Information and Networking Association (CINA) 129

Chinese Institute of Engineers, USA (CIE-USA) 130, 135n.145

Chinese intelligence operations 186–215

Chinese Scholars Association, Southern California 127

Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange 99

Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA –US, 1992) 147

Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA), in US 141–5; branches [listed, by US state] 141–3

Chinese students in US universities: benefits and costs of their presence 246

Chinese University of Science and Technology Information 19

Chiu, Rebecca 269

Chu, June 110, 123

Chu, T.K. 7

Chung, Dongfan (“Greg”) 191, 193, 196, 197, 200, 201, 205, 218, 262

classified documents 28–9

Clement, Ian [Deputy Mayor of London] 202 Co-Way International Technology Transfer Co. 94 cognitive preferences: Eastern vs Western people 238, 239 collection of information: advantages of cyber espionage 218–19; collection taxonomy 27; efficiency measure 27; Huo and Wang’s recommendations 26–7

collectivist behavior: genetic factors affecting 239–40

Commerce Control List 248

Commission on Science and Technology Industry for National Defense (COSTIND): China Engineering and Technology Information Network 40– 1; S&T Intelligence Bureau 23, 25, 39; see also China Defense Science and TechnologyInformation Center

Committee of 100 252

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 249, 250; cases reviewed by 249–50 competitiveness: factors affecting 241

computer network operations (CNO): use by PLA 221–3 Congressional publications 29–30 cooperative R&D 58, 69–70 counterfeiting 232

Cox Commission Report 202–3, 252 creativity: of China 251; factors affecting 238, 240 criticisms of [this] book and its assessments: answers to 251–3 cultural exchange visas 145–6

“Cultural Revolution” [1966–1976] 5, 10; effects on education 10–11; effects on open-source system 21; rebuilding after 11–13

CUTM Returned Student Pioneer Park 181–2 cyber espionage 216–29; capability of Chinese hackers 226–7; Chinese government denials 225–6; intelligence collection advantages 218–19; and intelligence preparation of battlefield 221–3; protection against 271–3; scale of problem 216– 17; strategic context 217–18; and strategic intelligence 223–5; technological competitiveness advantages 219–20

Dalai Lama’s visits: Chinese students’ reactions 144 Dalian S&T Convention 92 data security measures [to protect against cyber threat] 272–3 database systems and sub-systems 31–2

declassification of US documents 28–9 deductive-type creativity 238 deemed export system 247 Deng, Nan 97

Deng, Xiaoping 8, 12, 137

Department of Commerce (DOC – US): Office of Inspector General (OIG) report on export controls 247

Department of Defense (DOD – US): classified networks 222; cyber intrusion 224

Department of Energy (DOE – US) reports 28, 30 Ding, Jian Wei 205, 262–3 diplomatic [PRC] embassies and consultates: technology transfer facilitated via 106–10, 173 diplomatic [PRC] missions [in US] 106– 10; Chicago consulate 106, 109, 144; Houston consulate 106, 119–20, 144; Los Angeles consulate 106, 109, 144; New York consulate 106, 107, 108, 144; San Francisco consulate 106, 109, 144, 155, 162n.116, 193; Washington embassy 106–7, 144

Doan, River 116–17, 132n.64

Dong, Jianlong 109

“early adapters” 25, 178, 241

East China (Huadong) University: National Technology Transfer Center 94 eBay: stolen government property sold on 260–1

economic espionage: prosecutions relating to 205, 206, 208, 261, 262, 267–8 Economist Intelligence Unit: report on R&D locations 67 economy, Chinese: transformation from export-led growth 52–6

Emcore: proposed acquisition of 250

Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act [1989] 147

Endo, Homare 92, 126, 134nn.116,122, 173 Entrepark [Guangzhou] 182 espionage: cyber espionage 216–29; industrial espionage 230–44; traditional espionage 186–215; types of economic and S&T espionage 207

ethnic professional organizations: in US 111–13 ethnic profiling by US counter-intelligence services 197, 198 ethnic targeting by PRC intelligence services 195–9 evidence of China’s use of transferred foreign technology 251 export control: prosecutions relating to 205–6, 256–7, 258–65, 266–7, 268–70 export control system 247; reform of 247–9 external cyber threats 220

F-1 [foreign student] visas 145, 146 facilitation company: in US 110

Fairbank, John 5

Fan, Qun 124–5, 134n.113

Federation of Associations of Chinese Professionals in Southern USA (FACPSU) 120, 133n.81

Federation of Chinese Professional Associations in Europe (FCPAE) 236

Feng, Changgen 97

Fiedler, Jeffrey L. 203

Financial Times 224

Firstgold: proposed acquisition of 250 Fondren, James 195, 199, 200 foreign direct investment (FDI): growth in 21st century 149; R&D-oriented 54–5 foreign patents: exploitation of 41–2 foreign R&D labs: increase in numbers 56–7; locations 57–8; national security implications 71–3; product development for global market 68; pros and cons 71–2; reasons for growth 58–70; staff availability and costs 68–9; ways of establishing 58, 69–70

foreign science and technology exchange centers 86 foreign student visas 145, 146 foreign students in US universities: benefits and costs of their presence 246

foreign technical standards: exploitation of 42–4 foreign technology: acquisition of 13–14 “Four Modernizations” 11–12 Frank, Desmond Dinesh 206, 268–9 front companies [in US] 202–4, 207–8

Gamboa, Policarpo Coronado 267

Garcia, Greg 217

General Electric: medical imaging technology R&D 68 genetic factors: and individualism/collectivism 239–40

GhostNet report 220, 225

Gilley, Bruce 25

Global Sourcing Alliance (GSA) 122, 133n.96

globalization 252 Godfrey 192, 193

Google: [alleged] intrusion into 220, 226 government organizations: innovation and 59–61

government regulations and laws: indigenous innovation encouraged by 59–65 Gowadia, Noshir 79, 194, 200, 201, 205, 258–9 graduate course in S&T information: first started 21

“Great Leap Forward” [1958–1960] 10, 19

“Green Channel” policy 169–70

Gu, Weihao 201

Guangzhou Convention of OCS in S&T 91, 112, 121, 180

Guangzhou Entrepark 182

Guangzhou OCS Pioneering Park 182

Guangzhou Overseas Scholars Innovation Fund and Service Center 90–1 guanxi networks: use in intelligence operations 190

Guo, Bingwen 7, 8

Guo, Wenwei 104n.120

Guo, Zhi Yong 206, 263–4

Han, Jianguo 102n.54

Hanson, Harold Dewitt 206, 266–7

Hanson, Yaming Nina Qi 206, 266–7 He, Defang 38 high-tech industries: R&D expenditure 56 holistic vs analytical thought 239

“honey traps” 201–2

Hong, Meng 220

Hou, Desheng 199

Houston [PRC] consulate 106, 119–20, 144

Hu, Jintao [(former) PRC President] 9, 61, 250

Hu, Side 193

Hua Yuan Science and Technology Association (HYSTA) 111, 123

Huang, Jing 125

Huang, Kexue 205, 261

Huang, Leping 205, 259–60 Huawei Technologies 249, 250 human rights record [of China] 253, 255n.28 Huo, Zhongwen 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 46 imitative innovation 178, 232 import–export companies: use by PLA 207–8 incentives for foreign companies 63

Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS) 147, 159n.45

“independent/indigenous innovation” strategy 55–6, 59

“indigenous innovation”: definition 62 “indigenous innovation” regulations 62, 64–5 individualism: genetic factors affecting 239–40; radical creativity and 240 inducing people to “give away secrets” 192–5 industrial plans/policies/regulations: innovation and 61–5 Information Warfare Monitor 220 innovation: globalization of 66–70, 178; imitative innovation 178, 232; indigenous innovation 62; leading innovation 178; meaning of term in China 237–8; regulations 62, 64–5; strategy 55–6, 59, 178; types 178

Innovation Service Centers for New and High Technology 84, 175, 176, 179, 181, 182 insider cyber threats 219–20

Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) 82–3, 193

Institute of High Energy Physics 14n.4, 157n.4

Institute of International Education: on Chinese students in US 139, 140, 148

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (ISTIC) 19, 22, 34, 34, 36–8; Chongqing branch 38; engineering branches 34, 36; Library of Standards 42; Patents Library 41–2; Service

Center for S&T Personnel Exchange and Development run by 84, 86 intellectual property rights (IPR): Chinese views on 232–3; protection of 54, 58; violation of 178 intelligence collection: advantages of cyber espionage 218–19; Huo and Wang’s recommendations

26–7

intelligence preparation of battlefield (IPB) 221–3

Intelligence Threat Handbook 195, 204

International Emergency Economic Powers Act: prosecutions under 261, 263, 265 international skilled person exchange service system 79

J-1 [cultural exchange] visas 145–6

Jamison, Phillip 205, 260–1

Jamison, Robert 217

Japan: Chinese students in 8, 9; occupation of Taiwan [1895–1945] 9; S&T “cooperative” ventures 233–4

Jiading National OCS Pioneering Park [Shanghai] 175–6

Jiang, Menglin 8

Jiang, Tingfu 7

Jiang, Yu 225

Jiang, Zemin 9, 99, 121, 179

Jiangsu International Technology Transfer Center 93

Jiaotong University: National Technology Transfer Center 94

Jin, Hanjuan 206, 267–8

Jin, Ju 107

Jing, Huang 125

Jinling OCS S&T Park 174–5 joint ventures (JVs) 58, 63, 70, 72 journals and periodicals, international: holdings in Chinese library systems 35, 36, 38; rise in Chinese authorship 13, 56; usefulness 31

Judd, Jim 188

Kang, Yu Xin 200

Khrushchev, Nikita: and Mao Zedong 11

Kingstone, Brett 246

Ku, Chenlung 196, 197

Kuo, Tai Shen 194, 195, 200, 201, 202

Kuok, Chi Tong 205, 260

Kurtz, Paul 216

Lardy, Nick 203

“lean to one side” policy 9

Lee, Charles Yu Hsu 261

Lee, David Yen 219–20

Lee, Eric see Li, Bo

Lee, Peter 193, 194, 196

Lee, Sam Ching Sheng 205, 261

Lee, Wen Ho 122, 193, 197, 252

Leung, Katrina 194, 200

Li, Bo [“Eric Lee”] 205, 259

Li, Lanqing 150

Li, Li [“Lea Li”] 205, 256

Li, Peng 9

Li, Qing 206, 268

Li, Robin 123

Li, Rongrong 135n.145

Li, Wanlin 67

Li, Wuqiang 112 Li, Yuanchao 133n.70

library science, S&T information work as branch of 21, 32

Lieberthal, Kenneth 191

Lilley, James 192

Lim, Kok Tong 205, 262–3

Lin, Minyue 131n.7

Liou, David W. see Liu, Wen Chyu

Liu, Sam 126

Liu, Sixing [“Steve Liu”] 205, 257

Liu, Wen Chyu [“David W. Liou”] 205, 257–8

Liu, Xielin 53

Liu, Yandong 59

Liu, Yaping 118, 133n.71

Liu, Yun 131n.8, 166, 167, 168

Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology [1956–1967] 19

Los Angeles [PRC] consulate 106, 109, 144

Los Angeles Times 203

“lost decade” 5, 14n.5

Loy, Wong Fook 205, 262

Lu, Fu-Tian 206, 266

Lu, Xun 9

Lundin, Nannan 53

Ma, Zhaoxu 226

McAfee reports 220

McConnell, John Michael 219

McGregor, James 56, 219

Maihesuti, Babur 200

Mak, Chi 190–1, 196, 200, 201, 206, 262, 269

Mak, Tai Wang 200, 201, 269

Mak, Yui 269

Mao, Zedong: “Cultural Revolution” 5, 10, 11; “Great Leap Forward” 10, 19; and Khrushchev 11;

“lean to one side” policy 9 Mao, Zhongying 112

market penetration: by adaptation to China market 65–6

Maryland, University of: and Zhongguancun science park 107, 113, 131n.6

Mattis, Peter 188, 189, 190, 191, 197, 207, 208

Medium and Long Term Plan for S&T Development, 2006–2020 (MLP) 12, 56, 61–4; definition of

“indigenous innovation” 62; implementation documents 64

Meng, Xiaodong Sheldon 206, 269

Miao, Qihao 20, 22 Microsoft: research center 68

military intelligence (2PLA) department: front companies run by 203, 207–8; and Ministry of State

Security 191 military standards, US: exploitation of 27–8

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 60

Ministry of Commerce (MOC): on foreign R&D expenditure 54, 67; role in S&T and innovation 60

Ministry of Education (MOE) 86–7; China Education and Research Network 99, 111; China Talents website 82, 99, 119, 152; Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange 99; International Cooperation and Exchange Department 86; overseas Chinese scholars database 87, 171; role in OCS program 180; “Spring Light” program 86–7, 125, 237; “Spring Sunshine” Plan 155; “Three First-rates” initiative 87; on various approaches to OCS recruitment 170–1

Ministry of Finance (MOF): role in S&T and innovation 60, 64, 65

Ministry of Foreign Trade and Commerce (MOFCOM): Mechanical, Electronic, and High-Tech

Industry Department 61

Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security see Ministry of Personnel

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 60, 75n.53; Science and Technology Department 61

Ministry of Personnel (MOP) 81–3; China Overseas Talent Network 82, 99; International Exchange and Cooperation Department 81–2; plan(s) [1996, 2006] on working with OCS 164–6, 169–70, 179; on returning overseas Chinese students 149, 150, 151; Short-term Return Financial Assistance Program 155–6; Specialized Technical Personnel Management Department 81;

Talented Persons Mobility and Development Department 81; “two bases” policy 172–3; see also Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security

Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 83–6; 863 Program 12; China International Science and Technology Cooperation website 100; China S&T Exchange Center 84, 85–6, 95, 233; delegation to Canada and US 108; Department of Basic Research 60; Department of Development Planning 60–1; Department of High and New Technology and Industrialization 60;

Department of International S&T Cooperation 84, 95; Department of Policy, Regulations and Reform 61; high-tech development zones 177, 179; innovation network proposal 178–9; Notice 618 issued by 64; regional offices 90; second-tier organizations 84–5; Service Center for S&T Personnel Exchange and Development 84, 86; Shanghai Training Center 84, 86; Sino-Japanese Technology Cooperation Center 234

Ministry of State Security (MSS): information sharing with military intelligence 191; and overseas

Chinese scholars/students 157 modern China: definition of term 14n.2

Monroe, Paul 8

Montaperto, Ron 212n.99

Monte Jade Global Science and Technology Association 130 Moore, Paul 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201, 207 multinational companies (MNCs): globalization of innovation 66–70; penetration of China market 65–6

Mulvenon, James [cited] 203 Mulvenon’s Third Law 186

municipal organizations: PRC-based technology transfer by 89–93

Munitions List 248; prosecutions relating to 257

Murray, Charles 238

Nakamura, Hajime 239

Nanjing University Alumni Association (NUAA) 113

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA – US): reports 30

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX): annual reports 219; Office of 187, 216

National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 60, 75n.52; High-Tech Industrialization Department 61; Notice 618 issued by 64–5

National Engineering and Technology Library (NETL) 34, 34, 36; components 34

National High-Tech R&D Program [863 Program] 12, 40

National Indigenous Innovation Products Accreditation Program [Notice 618] 64, 65

National Innovation Service Centers for New and High Technology 84, 175, 176, 179, 181, 182

National Institute of Metrology (NIM) 43–4

National Internet-based Science and Technology Information Service System (NISS) 35

National Library of Standards (NLS) 33, 42, 48n.26

National Natural Science Foundation (NNSF): “two bases” programs 172

National New and High Technology Development Zones 83, 163, 175, 179; see also science towns

National Outstanding Youth Science Fund 155

National S&T Information Work Meetings 19, 20, 21, 22

National Science Foundation (NSF – US): on Chinese students staying in US 145; on numbers of R&D personnel 69

National Science Library (NSL) 23, 33, 35–6; Lanzhou branch 36, 50n.81; Patents Section 41

National Science and Technology Library (NSTL) 23, 33; components/ divisions 33–6; distribution network 35; resource-sharing agreements 35

National Society of Medical Scientists – Chinese American Association (NSMS-CAA) 129

National Technical Information Service (NTIS – US) 27, 30

National Technology Transfer Centers (NTTCs) 93–4, 251

National Technology Transfer Demonstration Organizations 251

Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) 60, 75n.54; Bureau of International Cooperation 88–9,

102n.54; youth programs 89 Needham, Joseph 238–9

network security measures [to protect against cyber threat] 272

New York [PRC] consulate 106, 107, 108, 144

New York Times 217

Newsweek 224

Nie, Rongzhen 10

Night Dragon report 220

NIPRNET 221–2; intrusion into 216, 221, 223

Nisbett, Richard 23

Nokia: R&D center 68

“non-governmental” offices [in US] 110–11

“non-official” technology transfer organizations: PRC-based 94–8

“normal business practice” 251

North America Chinese Association for Science and Technology (NACAST) 118–19

North American Chinese Scholars International Exchange Center (NAIEC) 114–15

North American Chinese Semiconductor Association (NACSA) 127–8

Northrup Grumman report ' Chinese cyber espionage] 216–17, 226

Northwest Nonferrous International Investment Corp. 250 Nuclear Weapons Data Handbook 28

nuclear weapons program: Sino–Soviet development agreement 9–10

Obama, Barack [US President] 224, 247, 250

OCS see overseas Chinese scholars/students

OCS Pioneering Parks 83, 152, 163, 174, 179–81; central role of 181–3; first mentioned [in 1994]

179 open-source exploitation system: current structure 32–44; emergence and growth of 19–25; information holdings 24,26; number of organizations in 22, 27, 33; Sources and Methods book

25–32

open-source intelligence (OSINT): professionalization of 44–5

Operation Aurora intrusions 217

Opium Wars 5

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): on innovation policy in China

55, 58, 62, 63 outreach projects [to attract overseas experts] 81, 82

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) 80–1, 89; and alumni associations 113; Department 4 [for Economics, Science and Technology] 80, 81, 89, 98, 109; Guangdong office 124, 125; local offices 89; Shanghai office 89–90

Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs and Professional Association (OCEPA) 100

Overseas Chinese Physics Association (OCPA) 129–30

Overseas Chinese Professional Association Cooperation Network (OCPAN) 98–9

Overseas Chinese Scholars Business Founding Week(s) 92, 180 overseas Chinese scholars/students (OCS) 103n.73; academic level of students 139–40; compared with US students in China 139; current statistics and trends 138; destinations 6–7, 8–9, 9–10, 138–9; effect of Cultural Revolution 11, 137; effect of Tiananmen Square turmoil 137, 146–7,

159n.45; fields of study 140; in Japan [1896–1930] 8–9, 136; Liu and Shen’s article on “overseas S&T corps” 166–8; MOE database 87; MOP plan [1996] on working with OCS 164–6; numbers

[1872–1978] 137; numbers [1977– 1995] 164; numbers [1978–2011] 138; numbers [1978–2011] 138, 157–8n.13; numbers staying in US 145, 164; Pioneering Parks for returnees 83, 152, 163, 174, 179–83; policy support for OCS recruitment 164–8; reasons for staying in US 145–8; in Soviet Union 9–10, 136; sponsorship trends 140–1; top-level OCS to be targeted 169–70;

“tweaking” of OCS strategy 168–71; in US [1872– 1881] 6; in US [1909 onwards] 6–7, 136, 138–9; see alsoreturned/returning students/scholars Overseas Doctor of Philosophy Association 98 overseas expert advisory committees 107– 8, 167 Overseas Scholars and Experts Service Center 82 Overseas Scholars Service Centers 90 overt use of cyber conflict 217–18 paradigm-breaking creativity 238

patent applications: rise in Chinese authorship 13, 56 Patent Documentation Library 23, 33, 34, 41, 48n.25 patents, foreign: exploitation of 41–2 Patents Library 41–2 payment for secrets 193, 194–5

Peng, Jack 125–6

People’s Daily 223

People’s Liberation Army (PLA): cyber operations 221–3, 224; front companies run by 203, 207–8; General Armaments Department 12, 45; military intelligence (2PLA) department 186, 191, 201, 207

People’s Republic of China (PRC): founding of 9; ties to Soviet Union 4, 9–10 personnel security measures [to protect against cyber threat] 271–2

Pioneering Parks for Overseas Chinese Scholars 83, 152, 163, 174, 179–81; central role of 181–3 Piquet, Joseph 206, 265 plagiarism 156, 238

“playing by China’s rules” 253

PRC-based technology transfer organizations see technology transfer organizations, PRC-based product localization: as reason for foreign R&D 65–6 provincial organizations: PRC-based technology transfer by 89–93

Qian, Ning 11

Qian, Sanqiang 10

Qian, Wen-Yuan 239

Qian, Xuesen 4, 7, 14n.1, 112, 157n.4, 197

Qiao, Hong 120

Qiaolian [All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese] 96–7 Qin, Gang 225, 226

qingbao system 20, 21; meaning of qingbao 32, 45–6

Qinghua University 7, 8; and Cultural Revolution 10–11; first president 7

Quan, Xiaohong 65, 66, 67, 68, 69–70

“racism” towards China 252 RAND Corporation 203 recruiting and placement networks, PRC-based 98–100 reform of Chinese economy 52–3, 137 research and development (R&D): spending by China compared with Japan and US 53, 56; see also foreign R&D labs

Returned Scholars Venture Park Alliance 180–1 returned/returning students/scholars: business parks for 153; central government policies 151–2; continuing problems for 156; factors motivating return to China 149–54; local government policies 153–4; Pioneering Parks for 83, 152, 163, 174, 179–83; PRC government policies 150–6; preferential policies for 152, 153, 170; short-term returnees 154–6; technology transfer by 156–7 Returning Overseas Scholars Innovation Week 112, 121 reverse innovation 68 Roth, John Reece 206, 264

San Francisco [PRC] consulate 106, 109, 144, 155, 162n.116, 193

Schmalzl, Johannes 188

Scholars Net 127

Science Research Management [journal] 232

Science and Technology Management Research [journal] 232

Science & Technology Progress and Policy [journal] 233

science towns 175, 177, 181; see also National New and High Technology Development Zones Scientific Information Institute 19 scientific progress, Chinese 237, 239 Serger, Syvlia Schwaag 54, 63, 66, 67

Service Center for S&T Personnel Exchange and Development 84, 86

“serving by multiple means” strategy 173–4

“serving in place” strategy 163, 171; see also “two bases” policy

Shady Rat report 220

Shandong University: first president 7

Shanghai: industrial parks/zones 90, 175; OCS parks 175, 182

Shanghai Association for the International Exchange of Personnel (SAIEP) 110–11

Shanghai International Technology Transfer Network 94

Shanghai Jiaotong University 8; Alumni Association 113

Shanghai National Technology Transfer Center 94

Shanghai New and High Technology Service Center 84–5, 93

Shanghai Technology Transfer Exchange 93–4

Shanghai Training Center 84, 86

Shanghai Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Industrial Zone 90, 175

Shen, Lin 131n.8, 166, 167, 168

Shenyang S&T Convention 92

Shenzhen: China Hi-Tech Transfer Center 91; “High-tech Fair” 91; High-tech Industrial Park 182; as possible Chinese Silicon Valley 125; recruitment of returned Chinese students 154, 162n.112

Sherman: Daniel Max 264

Shi, Pei Pu 202

Shih, Martin 270

Shriver, Glenn Duffie 194, 199

Shu, Quan-Sheng 206, 266

Silicon Valley 122, 148; Shenzhen as possible Chinese Silicon Valley 125

Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers Association (SCEA) 110, 122–3

Silicon Valley Chinese Overseas Business Association (SCOBA) 125–7, 134n.122

Silicon Valley Science and Technology Association (SVSTA) 124–5

Simon, Denis Fred 67

Sino–American Pharmaceutical Professionals Association (SAPA) 129

Sino–American professional organizations 105, 111–13

Sino–American S&T associations 114–21

Sino–American Technology and Engineering Conference (SATEC) 130

Sino–European S&T advocacy groups 236–7

Sino–Japan S&T advocacy groups 234–6

Sino–Japanese Technology Cooperation Center 234

Sino–Soviet cooperation 9–10; collapse of 10, 11, 137

Sino–US negotiations: characteristics of 7

Sino–US S&T advocacy groups 114–21

Sino–US S&T collaboration: China’s view of 252–3; usefulness of 247

Sino–US technology cooperation: MOST document on 85

Sivin, Nathan 13

Society of Competitive Intelligence of China (SCIC) 45

Sources and Methods of Obtaining National Defense Science and Technology Intelligence [Huo & Wang, 1991] 25–32

South China Sea: as potential flashpoint 221; US naval exercises 223

Soviet Union: technical support of China 4, 9–10; withdrawal from China 4–5, 10–11, 137

“special case”, China as 251

“Spring Light” program 86–7, 125, 237

“Spring Sunshine” Plan 155 spy tradecraft 199–201

staff employed: in open-source system 22, 23–4 Standardization Administration of China (SAC) 42, 43

State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs (SAFEA) 78–80; link with CAIEP 95–6; and New York consulate 108–9; New York office 110, 131n.13; public liaison organization 89; recruitment policy 79, 101n.5; role in OCS program 180

State Bureau of Technical Supervision Standards Information Center 23; see also China National Institute of Standardization

State Department [US]: cyber intrusions 223–4

State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) 41, 42

State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC): reorganization [1989, 2000] of S&T information system 22–4; S&T development plan [1977] 21; S&T Information Office 19, 22; see also Ministry of Science and Technology Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) 250

strategic intelligence: advantages of cyber espionage 223–5; database system [CDSTIC in 1980s] 31

Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) 250

Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) 246–7 student visas 146, 160n.76

Sun, Yat-sen 9

Sun, Yifei 71–2

Sun, Zi 186

Szady, Dave 186, 207, 219

Taiwan: occupation by Japan [1895–1945] 9; Sino-US conflict involving 221

Taiwan-oriented S&T groups: in US 130

“talent” recruitment offices 78–83

Tam, Thompson 265

Tang, Guo’an 7

Tang, Shaoyi 7

Tangshan Caofeidian Investment Corporation 250 Tao, Xingzhi 8 technical standards, foreign: exploitation of 42–4 technological competitiveness: advantages of cyber espionage 219–20 technology espionage: categories 207; students used in 136–62; traditional approach 186–215 technology incubators 176, 180, 181 technology transfer: “two bases” approach 89, 168, 171–4 technology transfer centers 93–4 technology transfer groups: in California 122–8

technology transfer organizations, PRC-based 78–104; foreign “talent” recruitment offices 78–83; Ministry of Science and Technology organizations 83–6; “non-official” transfer organizations 94– 8; other national-level organizations 86– 9; provincial and municipal organizations 89–93; recruiting and placement networks 98–100; technology transfer centers 93–4

technology transfer organizations, US-based 105–35, 231; Chinese alumni associations 113–14; Chinese– American S&T associations 114–21; Chinese tech-transfer groups [in California] 122–

8; diplomatic missions 106–10; ethnic professional organizations 111–13; facilitation company 110; “non-governmental” offices 110–11; specialty groups 128– 30; Taiwan-oriented S&T groups

130 technology transfer techniques 231–3

Thorpe, Evan 65, 66, 70

“thousand grains of sand” approach to intelligence operations 189–92 threats [in bilateral talks]: implausibility of 250

“Three First-rates” initiative 87

ti-yong concept 4; meaning of term 5–6; S&T development 13–14

Tian, Edward 123

Tiananmen Square turmoil [1989]: overseas Chinese students affected by 137, 146–7, 159n.45; President Bush’s reaction to 146–7

Tianjin University 8; first president 7

Tipping Point network intrusion prevention software 249 Torch Program 12, 55, 176; Incubator Management Office 181 trade secrets: prosecutions relating to 205, 206, 208, 257–8, 261, 265–6, 267–8 traditional Chinese espionage 186–215; case histories 205–6, 256–70; and “Old School” principles of intelligence gathering 188; scope and scale of problem 186–8; and spy tradecraft 199–201 Triway Enterprise, Inc. 110

Trulock, Notra 197

Tsinghua Alumni Association of Northern California 114

Tsu, William Chai-Wai 206, 263

TT91 website 93

“two bases” [technology transfer] policy 89, 168, 171–4

Union of Chinese American Professional organizations (UCAPO) 115–16 universities, Chinese: foreign R&D centers in 58, 69–70

universities, US: Chinese student associations in 141–5; joint [Sino–US] R&D centers in 107, 113, 131n.6, 242

Unocal oil company: proposed acquisition of 249

US, Chinese students in 136–62

US-based technology transfer organizations see technology transfer organizations, US-based

US–China Technology Innovation and Development, Center for (UCTID) 106, 107, 116–17, 131n.5

US companies: Chinese students staying to work in 148

US competitiveness: factors affecting 241

US immigration policies: and Chinese students 145–8

US military standards 27

US National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) annual reports 3n.1

US students in China 139

USA Today 187

“vacuum-cleaner” approach to intelligence operations 189, 191 Van Cleave, Michelle 187 verbal information 26 visas: US 145–6, 148 von Zedtwitz, Maximilian 67 Vrooman, Robert 197

Wall Street Journal 145, 187

Walsh, Kate 54, 67, 71, 72, 73

Wan, Gang 65

Wang, Baodong 225, 226

Wang, Bernard 122

Wang, Daheng 16n.60

Wang, Ganchang 16n.60

Wang Kuancheng Scientific Research Prize 156

Wang, Xiaochu 8

Wang, Zongxiao 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 46

Washington, Charles 197

Washington [PRC] embassy 106–7, 144

Wei, Yufeing 205, 259

Wen, Jiabao 59, 62 Wen, Ke 71–2

wholly owned foreign enterprise (WOFE) 58, 72

Widman, Eric 54, 63, 67

World Overseas Chinese Professional Association Cooperation Network (OCPAN) 98–9

Wortzel, Larry 189

Wu, Bin 207

Wu, Zhen Zhou 205, 259

Xian, Hong Wei 205, 256

Xie, Xuren 65 xinxi: meaning of term 46

Xu, Bing 206, 265

Xu, Jack 123

Yang, Chengzong 10 Yang, Fung 206, 270

Yang, Jerry 123

Yang, Jiachi 16n.60

Yang, Jingran 29

Yang, Lian 205, 256

Yang, Shangkun 194

Yang, Shanji 29

Yang, Su 206, 269–70

Yang, Yuanqing 123

Yao, Shibing 131n.4

Ye, Fei 206, 208, 268

Yoran, Amit 217

Yu, Xiangdong (“Mike”) 220

“Zan, Harry” see Xian, Hong Wei

ZGC Software Park Incubation Service Center Co., Ltd 181

Zhang, Boling 8

Zhang, Gaoli 133n.70

Zhang, Jianqing 109

Zhang, Michael Ming 206, 267

Zhang, Ping 65

Zhang, Vinnie 123

Zhang, Weichu 199

Zhang, Xiuqin 87

Zhang, Zhidong 4, 5

Zhangjiang Hi-tech Industrial Zone/Park [Shanghai] 90

Zhejiang University 8

Zhengxing, Ding 206, 269–70

Zhong, Jianhua 11

Zhong, Ming 206, 208, 268

Zhongguancun National Innovation Model Park (or Z-park) 107

Zhongguancun science park 113, 128, 181–2; and University of Maryland 107, 113, 131n.6

Zhonglin Science and Technology Transfer Co., Ltd 93, 94

Zhou: Enlai 9

Zhu, Daniel 125, 134n.116

Zhu, Lilan 111

Zhu, Peter 206, 269–70

Zhu, Yan 206, 265–6