A. Citizen movements

1. Pro-independence movements: New Caledonia and Okinawa

Encouraging independence movements fits Beijing’s agenda as it seeks to regain 

market shares and make potential adversaries more fragile, two non-mutually exclu-

sive goals that can be found in these two examples.

First: New Caledonia. There were suspicions of Chinese interference in the 2018 referen-

dum on the independence of New Caledonia,1300 and Beijing is known to be closely following 

the progress of the pro-independence camp – something confirmed by the 2020 referendum – 

precisely because an independent New Caledonia would de facto find itself under Chinese 

influence. This would bring two key benefits for the Party-State. First, China would be able to 

rely on New Caledonia to “become the cornerstone of the Chinese anti-encirclement strategy,” 

while at the same time isolating Australia “since, in addition to relying on Noumea, Beijing would 

be able to rely on Port Moresby, Honiara, Port-Vila and Suva.”1301 It would also ensure a supply of 

raw materials, i.e. nickel, to China. So, there are several reasons why Beijing pushes for indepen-

dence while maintaining relationships with the local political and economic elite. “China moves 

forward by gaining control of the economy from within, by getting closer to political and 

tribal leaders, because that is the most efficient and discrete method. China’s strategy is perfectly 

well-oiled and has worked elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region.”1302

The Association de l’amitié sino-calédonienne [Sino-Caledonian Friendship 

Association] plays such a role, carrying out a United Front work locally.1303 We 

should note that its former president, Karine Shan Sei Fan, is also the former chief 

of staff of the pro-independence leader1304 “whose previous two chiefs of staff are 

valued members” of the association.1305 Generally, the Chinese “diaspora and its 

representative organizations, at least some of them, are extremely close to some 

pro-independence officials.”1306 Karine Shan Sei Fan invited the Chinese ambassador 

to France on the island in October 2017, a year before the referendum. The ambassa-

dor spent the week there with his spouse and some advisers: “they saw everybody, they 

1300. Antoine Pecquet, “Nouvelle-Calédonie: ‘Si c’est ‘oui’, on deviendra une colonie chinoise,’” (“New Caledonia: 

“if It’s a ‘Yes’, We’ll Become a Chinese Colony”), Liberation (9 Oct. 2018). 

1301. “Quoi de mieux pour entrer en Nouvelle-Calédonie que de s’emparer du nickel”, explique Bastien Vandendyck, 

analyste en relations internationales” (“What Better Way to Get into New Caledonia then by Seizing Nickel,” according 

to international relations analyst Bastien Vandendyck”), France Info (25 Jan. 2021). See also, from the same author, Le 

développement de l’influence chinoise dans le Pacifique océanien (The development of Chinese influence in the Pacific Ocean), Asia Focus #61, IRIS, 

February 2018; “Pacifique: la position chinoise renforcée par la crise sanitaire?” (“Pacific: the Chinese position strengthened 

by the health crisis?”) Revue juridique politique et économique de Nouvelle-Calédonie, n°36, 2020, 173-177. 

1302. Ibid.

1303. Harold Thibault, “China is Eying New Caledonia and its Nickel Reserves,” Le Monde (2 Oct. 2020).

1304. During three terms, in 2012, 2013-2014 and 2019-2020. Karine Shan Sei Fan is also a founding member of 

the Sino-Caledonian Friendship Association, which she chaired between 2016 and 2018, and from which she resigned 

on August 31, 2020 (source: letter from Karine Shan Sei Fan to Patrice Faure (24 Sept. 2021)).

1305. “What Better Way to Get into New Caledonia.” 

1306. Ibid.

402

asked what we needed: tourism, aquaculture, anything that could be of interest, they 

would offer it,” parliament member Philippe Gomès remembers.1307 

Okinawa is another example. Japan has a strong national identity, even a sense of insu-

larity (→ p. 191). But Okinawa – as well as the entirety of the Ryukyu Islands – is an exception 

because its inhabitants were abused by the Japanese during the Second World War. The pop-

ulation is divided on the subject of Japan. Pro-Chinese feelings are then widespread and 

sustained by the fact that inhabitants benefit from trading with China. For Beijing, this is a 

weakness that can be exploited, and a strategic opportunity: their location ensures an access to 

the second chain of Pacific Islands. With these islands, they kill two birds with one stone, 

by hindering both the Japanese and the Americans who are present there.

Okinawa is a fertile ground for such operations because indigenous pro-indepen-

dence movements, who are also hostile to the presence of an American base on the 

island, already exist. The majority of the island is anti-Tokyo and anti-central government, as 

evidenced in the election of Denny Tamaki as governor (a longtime opponent to the American 

presence), in October 2018. The Okinawa prefecture hence advocates for the departure of some 

of the troops (navy and air forces). The risk of Okinawa unilaterally declaring its independence 

in the future is taken seriously by Tokyo. At the same time, “China encourages this objective 

through diplomacy, disinformation, and investments in the northern part of the island 

near the U.S. bases.”1308

In 2013, the Global Times already warned about Beijing potentially “fostering forces 

that seek the restoration of the independence of the Ryukyu Chain in Okinawa,” and, 

in doing so, “threatening the country’s integrity,” as it tries to defend China against the 

US-Japan alliance.1309 Beijing did just that. In December 2016, the Japanese Public Security 

Intelligence Agency (PSIA) revealed that Chinese universities and think tanks were trying to fos-

ter connections with pro-independence activists in Okinawa. Meanwhile, the Chinese press 

regularly publishes articles questioning Japan’s sovereignty on Okinawa. According to Professor 

Yuichi Hosoya, Beijing is “influencing Okinawan public opinion to push for Okinawan 

independence and the removal of U.S. forces.”1310 

“There are also increasing economic ties between China and Okinawa: Chinese investors are 

engaged in the northern areas of Okinawa, which are rich in natural resources and populated by U.S. 

military facilities. Additionally, there has been a significant increase in the number of Chinese tour-

ists in Okinawa in recent years, as well as an increasing number of sister-city relationships formed 

between Chinese cities and Okinawa. The PRC government has also actively courted members of 

the former Okinawan royal family. In 2018, Shō Masamu, the great grandson of the last Ryukyu 

king, visited China. In March of that year, Masamu led a 22-member delegation to visit Fujian for a 

four-day ‘root-seeking’ tour [while at the same time a conference] was organized to explore the his-

torical ties between Okinawa and China.”1311 Beijing also develops relationships between Chinese 

researchers, think tanks (the Academy of Social Science) and pro-independence activists: 

they invite them to China to improve their image and provide a platform to them. 

There also is a convergence between, on the one hand, independists and those opposed 

to the U.S. presence in Okinawa and, on the other hand, leftist and pacifist activists, who 

oppose the revision of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution (renouncing war) and the rein-

1307. Thibault, “China is Eyeing New Caledonia and its Nickel Reserves.” 

1308. Devin Stewart, China’s Influence in Japan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular, CSIS (Jul. 2020), 3.

1309. “Ryuku Issue Offers Leverage to China,” Global Times (10 Mar. 2013). 

1310. Stewart, China’s Influence in Japan, 10.

1311. Russel Hsiao, “A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan,” China Brief, 19:12 (26 Jun. 2019). 

403

forcement of Japanese self-defense capabilities. Beijing thus supports these movements as 

well, which fits neatly with China’s agenda by impeding and inhibiting Japanese mili-

tary developments. This is particularly the case for the Buddhist group Soka Gakkai, and its 

political party Komeito, which are working toward a Sino-Japanese rapprochement. As a result, 

it is for example commonplace to see Japanese left)wing activists and pacifists share Chinese 

articles against the U.S. base in Okinawa.

2. Pacifist movements: the example of the group No Cold War 

The CCP put together a support group that blames 

U.S. actions, its interpretation of the “wolf warrior” 

diplomacy, and the establishment of a new Cold 

War era.1312 Among the first signatories where: Dianne 

Abbott, Max Blumenthal, Barbara Finamore, Martin 

Jacques, Wang Wen, Ken Loach, and Yanis Varoufakis. 

We find not only anti-American organizations in this list, 

but also front organizations in the Soviet sense, in 

other words intermediaries working for Beijing. The 

movement adopted a logo symbolically re-interpreting the U.S. flag to better highlight U.S. 

aggressiveness and warmongering. The No Cold War inaugural conference was a conference 

with 48 academics from a number of countries organized on July 25, 2020 to speak out 

against the risk of a cold war imposed by the United States on the rest of humanity. Chinese 

diplomatic authorities quickly spread the word about the event. 

On the left, an extract from the No Cold War website (https://www.nocoldwar.org/statement). On the right, a conference 

organized by the Stop the War coalition.

Wang Wen, director of the Chongyang Institute,1313 summed up the event on his insti-

tution’s website.1314 The event was simultaneously broadcast on Zoom, Facebook and 

1312. See the No Cold War website (https://www.nocoldwar.org/) on which we find a list of organizations that supported 

the call as soon as it was published: ANSWER Coalition (US); Black Alliance for Peace (US); Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 

(UK); Coalition Against US Foreign Military Bases; CODEPINK (US); Hamilton Coalition to Stop the War (Canada); International 

Action Center (US); No to War – No to NATO; Peace for Okinawa Coalition; Pivot to Peace (US) Simon Bolivar Institute for Peace 

and Solidarity Among Peoples (Venezuela); South African Peace Initiative; Stop the War (UK); US Peace Council

1313. Attached to the People’s University of China (人民大学).

1314. “48国学者警告美国 ‘活动惊动全球，近2亿人关注,’ 人大重阳” (Chongyang Institute) (29 Jul. 2020). 

404

YouTube, and viewed by 200 million people, according to the Chongyang Institute. The 

institute also published screenshots of public comments. Several Chinese state media, such 

as the China Daily, CCTV, China News Network, Guancha, reported on the event the follow-

ing day. CYL outlets were also very active, and multiples messages were shared on WeChat. 

The Global Times launched a thread called “48 academics warn the United States” (#48国

学者警告美国) that generated more than 82 million views. Hua Chunying put herself for-

ward as the spokesperson for this movement, which she painted as a transnational move-

ment against U.S. policies, using quotes from John Ross, a researcher at Renmin University 

(→ p. 48). Ross actually relayed an open letter on Twitter and on the website of No Cold 

War that denounced Ofcom’s decision to withdraw CGTN’s broadcasting rights in the 

United Kingdom (Ofcom is the British telecommunication regulatory agency).1315 These 

initiatives show that the CCP has probably increased its coordination capacities for this 

kind of operation, a new development that would deserve further and more in-depth inves-

tigations.

The CCP’s narrative strategy consists in highlighting over and over the bellicosity 

of the United States and the consequences of its policies on the rest of humanity. 

The goal of this strategy is undoubtedly to turn the international public opinion against 

Washington, by making it responsible for the tensions. Bill Bishop noted in Sinocism that 

Beijing seems to be ready for a rupture and wishes to control how it will be narrated. This 

concomitant evidence suggests that Beijing does not intend to reverse its course from 

this Machiavellian turn (→ p. 619). In fact, the anti-cold war movement was not founded 

on a unique event, but instead seems to be here for the long haul. Other mobilization drives 

have already been announced. The narratives circulated by No Cold War are also endorsed 

by other movements and members of political parties. Diane Abbott, for instance, a Labour 

member who signed the first petition launched by No Cold War, participated in a confer-

ence on the threat of a new cold war organized by the Stop the War coalition, along with 

other Labour members (see images above). 

1315. https://twitter.com/JohnRoss43/status/1369216867517267970; “News: Letter: Opposing Ofcom’s Ban on 

CGTN and Defending Free Speech,” No Cold War, https://archive.vn/qM1Gg.

405

B. Chinese tourists

Chinese tourists have been the sector’s biggest market since 2012, because they 

are the most numerous, the biggest spenders, and because this is a fast-growing mar-

ket.1316 Controlling the number of tourists is an important leverage for Beijing to pres-

sure some foreign governments. This weapon has been used in Taiwan (→ p. 453) and in 

Australia, where Chinese tourism increased by 297% between 2009 and 2019, as reported by 

Global Times. The newspaper added that this number could drastically decrease in 2020, not 

only because of the pandemic, but also because the Chinese Ministry for Culture published 

a warning advising against traveling to Australia because of the “racial discrimination” and 

“violence” against Chinese people that it claimed to have witnessed1317. In reality, both tour-

ists and trade sanctions are part of the leverage used by Beijing in its standoff with Canberra 

(→ p. 246).1318 This weapon was also used against Sweden (→ p. 528), South Korea (where the 

decreased number of Chinese tourists was one of the retaliatory measures implemented by 

Beijing against the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile defense system THAAD) and oth-

ers. It was identified as an important vulnerability in a lot of countries, including Japan, which 

is quite dependent on Chinese tourists (they make up around 30% of the overall number of 

tourists and 34% of the money spent by foreign tourists).1319

In addition to controlling the number of tourists, Beijing can also use them to 

circulate messages, as seen in Vietnam. Chinese tourists in Vietnam – there are more 

than 4 million of them every year, more than 30% the total number of tourists – are usually 

badly perceived. In May 2018, some of them led provocative actions: they landed in the 

Cam Ranh airport, in the south of the country, wearing T-shirts displaying the South 

China Sea and the nine-dash line, a delineation contested by China’s neighbors, includ-

ing Vietnam. In fact, the delineation was rejected by the Permanent court of Arbitration in 

The Hague in 2016. The images triggered strong reactions, both in the airport and on social 

media, many Internet users calling for their expulsion from the territory.

Source: https://twitter.com/georgewilluk/status/996440699162845185.

1316. Alex Dichter et al., Chinese Tourists: Dispelling the Myth. An In-Depth Look at China’s Outbound Tourist Market, 

McKinsey & Company, New York (Sept. 2018); Guidelines for Success in the Chinese Outbound Tourism Market, UNWTO 

and China Tourism Academy (2019). 

1317. Yin Yeping, “Australia could lose all Chinese tourists post-COVID-19 this year if safety issue not addressed: 

industrial insider”, Global Times, June 6, 2020 (https://archive.vn/JHStF).

1318. Kath Sullivan, “China’s List of Sanctions and Tariffs on Australian Trade is Growing. Here’s What Has Been 

hit So Far,” ABC (16 Dec. 2020). 

1319. Rupakyoti Borah, “Japan’s Successful Wooing of Chinese Tourists May be Too Much of a Good Thing,” 

South China Morning Post (10 Feb. 2020). 

406

The same nine-dash line can be found on a page of the Chinese passport that, for this 

reason, some agents at the Vietnamese border frequently refuse to stamp.1320 Chinese tour-

ists are also criticized for bringing their own touristic guides, who are accused of rewriting 

history (and maritime law), thus provoking opposition from local tourist guides. 

Since 2013, China has also been using tourism as a leverage to strengthen its 

claims in the South China Sea. Two Chinese companies, the Hainan Strait Shipping 

Co Ltd (HNSS) and the Nanhai Cruse Entreprise (NHC) offer cruises in the Paracel 

Islands, also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam. Since then, more than 10,000 Chinese tour-

ists paid between RMB4,280 and RMB29,300 per person (€550 and €3,800) for the trip.1321 

Beyond economic issues, the development of these activities fits within a wider policy of 

integration of the South China territories to the Chinese area. When the town of Sanya, in 

the south of the Hainan Island, became a prefecture in 2012, to administer the entirety of 

the territories inside the nine-dash lines, the same political message was being conveyed: 

these territories are Chinese. 

The government overtly recognizes the political significance of these touristic activities. 

According to Wang Zhifa, former director of China’s National Tourism Administration, 

“developing Xisha [Paracel islands] tourism can be conducive to defending the border, 

declaring our sovereignty, and solving the problems of other islands in the South China 

Sea.”1322 As noted by Yan Huang and Samid Suliman, tourism is indeed perceived by Beijing 

as a tool to reinforce the legitimacy of its claims on this area. The presence of Chinese 

tourism proves, in the eyes of the Party, that China has been managing this area regularly, 

which in return legitimates China’s rights over these territories. This tourism also allows the 

construction of the Chinese population’s “territorial consciousness.”1323 Cruses are 

indeed deploying all available tools to favor the emergence and consolidation of patri-

otic feelings toward South China Sea islands. Tourists were invited to watch a 1976 

movie, The Story of the South China Sea, recounting the events of the Vietnam War, and had 

to pledge to love the Paracel Islands and China.1324 Finally, the development of tourism in 

the area is an undeniable tool to apply pressure on its neighbors, some of which have 

also started to develop touristic activities. Beijing also wishes to extend touristic activities in 

the South China Sea to the Spratly Islands farther to the south.

C. Foreign influencers 

For various reasons – because they are forced, bought or simply seduced – many for-

eigners act as relays or vectors of Chinese influence in the world. Beijing particularly appre-

ciates those of them who are Westerners, since they come from the opposite camp. “It 

is a strategy of envelopment, using as levers a priori contrary currents to give the 

illusion of unanimity around Chinese positions,” explained Emmanuel Lincot.1325 The 

1320. Decision which has been taken by the Ministry of Public Security without informing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 

1321. Serenitie Wang, “Contentious Cruising: China’s Paracel Island Tourism is About More Than Travel,” CNN 

(25 Jan. 2021).

1322. Yan Huang and Samid Suliman, “Geopolitics, (Re)territorialization, and China’s Patriotic Tourism in the 

South China Sea,” Geopolitics (Jul. 2020).

1323. Ibid.

1324. Wang, “Contentious Cruising.” 

1325. “Situation des Ouïghours en Chine: qui sont ces ‘sino-béats’ qui dénoncent des fake news de l’Occident?” 

(“Situation of the Uyghurs in China: Who are the “Sino-beats” Denouncing Western Fake News?”), AFP (4 May 2021).

407

preceding pages have already given numerous examples of this, of different calibers, more 

or less aware of being instrumentalized and more or less useful to the regime (which is why 

not all of them fall into the Soviet category of “useful idiots”). This section will present 

two additional categories of influencers particularly sought after by the CCP: YouTubers 

and academics.

1. YouTubers 

The Canadian YouTuber J.J. McCullough (→ p. 375) is a good case of a Westerner used 

to hide the origin of a message, because in this case not only did a person by the name 

of “Franco” (a non-Chinese name) tried to release a video via the Canadian YouTuber, but 

the video itself, while being Chinese propaganda, was also narrated by a Western individual.

Among other examples of YouTubers relaying Chinese propaganda, the most 

famous is undoubtedly Nathan Rich, an American living in China, followed by half a mil-

lion subscribers,1326 who holds pro-Beijing and virulent anti-American views. He is particu-

larly involved in defending Beijing’s action in Hong Kong. Many other YouTubers in China 

are convinced that he is “paid to publish propaganda, either by the CCP, or by agents in the 

name of the CCP.”1327 Can also be added to the list Barrett, a British father-and-son duo 

living in China (268,000 followers),1328 also very aggressive in their defense of the Chinese 

regime, as shown by the titles of their videos (“Western media lies about China”, “Camera 

surveillance is great in China”); Jason Lightfoot (120,000 subscribers),1329 another British 

citizen who has been living in China for about ten years, and who record videos on Xinjiang 

have been widely relayed by the Chinese authorities (below); or Gweilo60 (85,000 subscrib-

ers),1330 a retired Canadian married to a Chinese woman and living in China. Of course the 

question arises of their motives, which can be diverse: have they been forced to do it, 

bought, or simply seduced?

Whatever their motives may be, some of them have led full-fledged harassment 

campaigns against YouTubers who criticized the Chinese regime. SerpentZA and 

laowhy86 (→ p. 375) who were initially mostly neutral, have gradually become critical of 

the Chinese regime, and have incidentally become the targets of hate and harassment cam-

paigns on YouTube (including from other YouTubers, particularly the Barretts) and on 

other social media. For instance, they were denounced on a website set up in 2019 by the 

government to allow Chinese to denounce “foreign spies.”1331 And the pressure exerted 

by authorities has increased: monthly police inspections of their homes, their spouses and 

their children were harassed – including SerpenZA’s family in South Africa (trolls even 

attacked people in South Africa who merely had the same last name). They were branded 

as racists paid by “the West” or by the CIA, and so on. 

1326. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCaSlyjhR4WC7QhYuaivxb6g/videos.

1327. Brown, “How China is Influencing.” 

1328. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1XG7bJnYqta_ezr12WZp7w/videos.

1329. https://www.youtube.com/user/JasonLightfoot.

1330. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChXOhG9bRDb3vSTg-qkPAZg. 

1331. “China Launches Website to Report Foreign Spies, Corrupt Officials,” South China Morning Post (16 Apr. 

2018). 

408

On April 3, 2021, CGTN released this video of Jason Lightfoot refuting Western accusations about Xinjiang.1332 It was widely 

relayed by the authorities, for example the Chinese embassy in France.1333

2. Academics 

Foreign academics are additional levers at the Party’s disposal. We already men-

tioned several researchers who defended Chinese positions or promoted Party narratives. 

An operation of seduction usually starts with an invitation to China, all expenses paid. 

Laurent Grosclaude, the former vice-president for international relations of the University 

of Toulouse I-Capitole, testified that “the Chinese artfully flatter our ego.” First-class plane 

tickets, nice hotel, a driver… “Sometimes, a Mercedes came to pick me at the hotel to bring 

me to my meeting with the president of a university. It gave me the feeling that I was a min-

ister.”1334 Not everyone falls for it however. Moreover, the foreign academics that become 

relays for the CCP have various motivations. We can distinguish three main categories: 

the opportunists, who do not necessarily share Beijing’s views and are simply looking 

for (in kind or symbolic) benefits; those for whom China is a simple rhetorical instru-

ment to denounce the United States, Beijing taking on what used to be the USSR’s role 

during the Cold War; finally, those who develop an apologetic pro-Chinese discourse 

out of conviction. We must immediately note that these categories are not mutually exclu-

sive, some academics being both admirers of the Chinese model and anti-American. This 

is likely the case for Martin Jacques, who seems to see a viable form of Marxist-Leninism 

in the Chinese system, while clearly showing his anti-American views.1335

Among those defending the Chinese model, Daniel Bell deserves to be introduced. A 

Canadian national, Daniel Bell is dean of the Department of Political Science and Public 

Administration at Shandong University. He also teaches at the University of Tsinghua in 

Beijing. He has published many books and articles painting the Chinese political 

system as a model for the West.1336 He found the possibility of a Chinese humanism, 

and even a solution to the crisis of liberal democracies, in the Confucian renewal running 

through the Chinese society since the 1990s. In his opinion, representative democracies 

1332. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dQnupERMuQ.

1333. https://twitter.com/AmbassadeChine/status/1379786496987791361.

1334. Jérémy André, “Comment la Chine profite de nos chercheurs” (“How China Takes Advantage of Our 

Scholars”), Le Point, 2535 (18 Mar. 2021), 48-51.

1335. See Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World (New York: Penguin, 2012); “Where will the Pandemic Take 

the US?” Global Times (1 Dec. 2020). 

1336. See, for example: The China Mode: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (2015); Beyond Liberal Democracy: 

Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (2006); and China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life for a Changing 

Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

409

suffer from two main ills: on the national scale, they make it structurally impossible for 

elected officials to take into account the interests of future generations or of the rest of the 

world; and then, insofar as they base their policies on the erratic decisions of voters, they 

are condemned to be inefficient. In that regard, Bell picked up on Bryan Caplan’s thesis on 

the irrationality of homo politicus.1337 

Bell suggests adopting the Chinese system as a way forward, with the selection of 

officials through meritocratic contests. These contests, he argued, are the only one able to 

produce wise leaders, the idea being that leaders will be better able to take rational decision 

that take into account the next generations and global issues when they are not constrained 

by elections. He believes that such a system wouldn’t be authoritarian, but simply more 

efficient. If this report does not intend to discuss Bell’s theories, we should note that his 

hypothesis ignores the fundamental question of the consent to be governed, and clumsily 

avoids to discuss the nature of the authority vested with the power to select the wisest 

leaders.1338 

In any case, these stances taken by Westerners largely serve the CCP’s interests, which 

sees its authoritarian model presented as superior to the liberal democratic model and, as 

such, legitimized by outsiders. Hence, the CCP benefits from encouraging these academics 

to speak out, as they contribute to the diffusion of a positive image of the Chinese regime. 

Besides, these intellectuals, who are often active in public debates, offer a possibility for the 

Party to externalize the fight against its critics, in conformity with the strategy of the United 

Front.

The case of Dean Mestre (France)

On February 25, 2021, Jérémy André, the correspondent of the French weekly Le Point, pub-

lished an article untitled “How China pushes its pawns in universities,”1339 which highlighted 

a problem to which other countries had been cognizant for years (Australia first, followed 

by Canada and the United States) but that had remained under the radar in France. This 

was a symptom of what we call the “French Awakening” in the conclusion of the report 

(→ p. 640). This article opened with the example of Christian Mestre. While he was the 

honorary dean of Strasbourg’s Faculty of Law, Mestre travelled to Urumqi (capital of the 

Xinjiang) in September 2019 to participate in an “International Seminar on Counter-terrorism, 

De-radicalization and Human Rights Protection” during which, according to Chinese state 

media, he declared that he had “found that efficient measures had been taken in the region 

against terrorism and extremism, and that these measures had improved the socio-econom-

ic development of the region.”1340 He subsequently shared his hope that “France and other 

European countries could adopt the solutions used in Xinjiang,” adding that “these people are 

not sent to jail but to compulsory training.” His colleague Thomas Boutonnet, director of the 

Department of China studies at the University of Strasbourg, believed that “this is no longer 

sheer naivety, it amounts to a negationist stance.” 

Several years before, in May 2013, the same Christian Mestre had “proposed to install a 

Confucius Institute in his [law] department,” to the dismay of his China Studies colleagues who 

1337. Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton University Press, 

2008). 

1338. For a more in-depth discussion on Daniel Bell’s theories, see Paul Charon and Guillaume Dutournier, 

“Confucianism, a Political Model? An Answer to Daniel A. Bell,” La Vie des Idées (15 Jun. 2020). 

1339. Jérémy André, “Comment la Chine pousse ses pions à l’université” (“How China Pushes Its Pawns at the 

University”), Le Point, 2532 (25 Feb. 2021), 46-50. Unless stated otherwise, all the quotes from this box are taken from 

this article. 

1340. “Séminaire sur l’anti-terrorisme, la déradicalisation et la protection des droits de l’homme tenu au Xinjiang” 

[“Seminar on Counterterrorism, deradicalization and the protection of Human Rights held in Xinjiang”], French.China.

Org.Cn (7 Sept. 2019), https://archive.vn/V6H1E. See also Xie Wenting and Bai Yunyi, “French Professor Praises 

China’s de-Radicalization Measures in Xinjiang,” Global Times (10 Sept. 2019), https://archive.vn/Zr7IN.

410

found it surprising that Mestre, an expert on European Law, started to “champion Beijing 

at the University.” In September 2014, “following a demand of the General Consulate of 

China in Strasbourg,” the Faculty of Law hosted a series of events on Tibet, including “an 

inaugural conference which defended that Tibet had never be annexed, and that the 1950 

Chinese intervention had been demanded by the Tibetans.” In 2015, responding to an initiative 

of the Chinese Society for the Study of Human Rights, a pseudo-NGO (GONGO → p. 220), 

whose executives are members of the Propaganda Department and other CCP agencies,1341 

Mestre “co-organized a China-Europe forum on human rights at the European Court of 

Human Rights” – which was nothing less than “a whitewashing operation at the heart of 

European institutions.” Since at least 2018, he has been an adjunct professor at the Southwest 

University of Political Science and Law, in Chongqing, China.1342 In 2020, Lu Rucai, the French 

editor-in-chief of La Chine au present (French version of China Daily), a monthly magazine of 

the CCP Propaganda Department, invited Mestre to join the committee of experts of the new 

magazine Dialogue Chine-France (→ p. 341).1343 

Finally, in December 2020, he was appointed ethics officer to the Strasbourg Eurometropolis, “a 

key position to assess conflicts of interest knowing that Alsace will soon host a Huawei mega-fac-

tory and debates the implementation of the 5G.” According to Jérémy André, “the very fact that 

Christian Mestre teaches at Changqing University puts him in a conflict of interest in a region 

that welcomes very important Chinese investments. Remunerated by the Chinese state, he 

was in no position to [conveniently] scrutinize whether elected officials were receiving money or 

exercising activities that tied them to Chinese investors.”1344 MEP Raphaël Glucksmann, president 

of the Special Commission for Foreign Interference, also reacted to his appointment: “this cocktail 

of cynicism and naivety creates legitimate problems for the national security and the sovereignty 

of democratic institutions. If the elite sells itself to China and mandarins turn themselves 

into lobbyists, whitewash the largest mass internment of our time, this shows that there 

is a grave ethical problem among the French elite.” One day after the revelations of Le Point, 

Christian Mestre resigned from his position as ethics officer for the Strasbourg Eurometropolis.1345

The case of Professor Lange (Germany)

From influence to espionage, there is only one step, as illustrated by the case of Klaus Lange, a 

German political scientist specialized in international relations, who for 50 years, and in 

parallel to his academic career, was also an agent of the German Federal Intelligence Service 

(BND), which he informed in particular on Asian issues. But in 2010, on the occasion of a lecture 

he gave at Tongji University in Shanghai, he was recruited by the Chinese services (the MSS). 

They seem to be interested in him at first to obtain information on Uyghurs, knowing that the 

World Uyghur Congress is based in Germany, in Munich, and because Klaus Lange had directed 

a publication on Islamist terrorism four years earlier for which he had entrusted a chapter to a 

Chinese colonel, deputy defense attaché of the PRC in Berlin.1346 As founder and director of the 

German think tank Institute for Transnational Studies (ITS) and senior consultant for the Hanns 

Seidel Stiftung, a political foundation named after the co-founder of the CSU (Christian Social 

Union) party in Bavaria, he was particularly well placed and politically connected to be useful 

to Beijing. His wife, Klara Knapp, deputy director of the ITS, was recruited at the same time.

Initially, in 2010, Lange had informed the BND of the Chinese approach, and the German 

service had agreed that he should continue the relationship, in order to learn more about what 

1341. Geoffrey Roberts, “One Chinese GONGO’s War Against Global Human Rights,” China Change (1 May 2020).

1342. His academic page was archived: https://english.swupl.edu.cn/academics/faculty/286653.htm, https://

archive.vn/8RQh8. He already had this title in November 2018, as indicated by this academic conference: https://

archive.vn/q80Gr; and the December 2018 Issue of this Review of Rural Law: https://archive.vn/0s1go.

1343. Jenny Che, “Dialogue Chine-France, l’étrange revue d’influence chinoise” (“Dialogue China-France, the 

Strange Review of Chinese Influence”), Intelligence Online, 210315 (5 Mar. 2021). 

1344. Jérémy André, “Strasbourg: pressions de la Chine dans les universités, ‘Christian Mestre est un exemple, 

mais il y en a d’autres’” (“Strasbourg: Chinese Pressures in Universities, ‘Christian Mestre is an Example, but there are 

Others’”), France Info Grand Est (28 Feb. 2021).

1345. “Soutien à la Chine: le déontologue de la métropole de Strasbourg démissionne” (“Chinese Supporters: The 

Ethics Officer of the Strasbourg Metropolis Resigned”), Le Point (26 Feb. 2021). 

1346. Volker Foertsch and Klaus Lange (Hrsg.), Islamistischer Terrorismus und Massenvernichtungsmittel, Hanns Seidel 

Stiftung, 2006 (le chapitre rédigé par le colonel Chuan Chen se trouve p. 127-133).

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they were looking for. But gradually, Lange reported less to the BND, which “was not aware 

of the deepening [of his] contacts with the Chinese.”1347 This is precisely what he is accused of 

today. Arrested a first time in November 2019 “when the couple was about to fly to Macau, to 

meet their Chinese secret service officer,” Lange was imprisoned, released, and then arrest-

ed again in July 2021. The Karlsruhe public prosecutor’s office accuses him of “intelligence 

activities for the benefit of a foreign power.”1348

The investigation could have a bilateral cooperation component, and investigations could lead 

to South Tyrol because of the nationality of his wife, Klara Knapp, who comes from the vil-

lage of Gais (Italy). The investigation will have to determine when Klaus Lange crossed a red 

line, first by taking on more and more autonomy vis-à-vis the BND, and then what was the 

nature of the information transmitted. At this stage, little information has been released 

on this point. It is likely that Lange did not pass on sensitive information about internal BND 

files (to which, as an honorable correspondent, he did not have access), but rather that he put 

his political expertise on Asia, on the German political landscape on the positions of these 

countries on China, and of course his very extensive address book, at Beijing’s service. He was, 

however, a close associate of Volker Foertsch (with whom he co-edited the aforementioned 

2006 publication), who for years headed the BND’s China department: through him, he could 

therefore have had knowledge of the service’s operations in China.

His dense network of contacts, especially within the Uyghur and Tibetan diasporas (he organized 

a summit between ministers and representatives of the Tibetan parliament in exile in Dharamsala 

in 2009), legitimized by his functions as a political science researcher, allowed him to collect valu-

able data in terms of political intelligence. The fact that he had risen through the ranks of the 

Hanns Seidel Stiftung (director of the Security Studies Department) gave him an inside view on 

Bavarian decision-makers and security issues. Bavaria is particularly targeted by China, and 

its CSU leaders are particularly accommodating given the weight of Chinese economic and sci-

entific interests in the state. His regular travels and his exchanges with the director of the Russian 

Academy of Sciences, the Pakistani ambassador and numerous think tanks around the world, 

made him an attractive target for a foreign intelligence service.

Money does not appear to have been Lange’s primary motivation: investigators have found ev-

idence of only one payment. Rewards appear to have taken the form of all-expenses paid trips 

and “support programs.”1349

D. Hostages

China practices “hostage diplomacy” (such as Iran, Turkey, and North Korea), and it 

was confirmed by the release of the “two Canadian Michaels”1350 (→ p. 546) only hours 

after Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, who had been under house arrest in Canada, was allowed 

to return to China on September 25, 2021. Arrested in China shortly after she was arrested 

in Canada at the request of the United States in late 2018, the transactional nature of this 

exchange was clear from the beginning: “It was give and take: Meng against the two 

Michaels.”1351 By releasing them the same day, Beijing was fully assuming this hostage diplo-

macy and sending a message to the rest of the world. In fact, the Party-State has been devel-

oping this practice for years. The best-known case, apart from the “two Canadian Michaels,” is 

that of the Swedish citizen Gui Minhai (→ p. 527), Yet, Beijing also took Australian citizens 

1347. David Philippot, “Le couple espionnait pour la Chine en Allemagne” (“The couple was spying for China in 

Germany”), Le Figaro (6 Aug. 2021), 6.

1348. Ibid. 

1349. Lea Sahay and Ronen Steinke, “Der Vorwurf: Spionage für China” (“The accusation: Espionage for 

China”), Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 6, 2021. See also: “Spionage: Auch gegen Südtirolerin wird in Deutschland ermittelt” 

(“Espionage: South Tyrolean woman is also investigated in Germany”), Tagesschau (7 Jul. 2021).

1350. Brice Pedroletti, “Deux Canadiens détenus en Chine sont inculpés pour espionage” (“Two Canadians 

detained in China are charged with spying”), Le Monde (19 Jun. 2020). 

1351. David Webster, “Meng contre les deux Michael: des leçons pour le Canada et le monde” (“Meng vs. the Two 

Michaels: Lessons for Canada and the World”), The Conversation (28 Sept. 2021).

412

as hostages, including writer Yang Jun (known as Yang Hengjun) and the TV anchor Cheng 

Lei. An Australian citizen of Chinese origin, she was working for CGTN when she suddenly 

disappeared in August 2020. Locked up in a prison in Beijing, she had no access to a lawyer 

and was not allowed to talk on the phone to her two children, aged 11 and 9, who lived in 

Melbourne. In February 2021, Chinese authorities revealed that she was accused of “illegally 

supplying state secrets overseas,” without more details. Since then, a series of anonymous 

messages on WeChat have rewritten her biography and disseminated elements supporting this 

thesis – messages “written by Ministry of State Security (MSS) people to set the public tone,” 

according to Feng Chongyi, an academic who had himself been detained in China four years 

earlier. A hypothesis reinforced by the fact that one of the first articles incriminating Cheng 

Lei came from the WeChat account that had also been the first to spread false information 

about Vicky Xu (→ p. 167), another CCP target – an anonymous account presumably oper-

ated by Chinese services.1352 Another case of an Australian citizen of Chinese origin arbitrarily 

arrested in China is that of researcher and writer Yang Hengjun, detained since 2019, also for 

“espionage,” in reality for being the author of writings critical of the regime.1353

Some Japanese citizens have also been arrested. Recently, a professor of Chinese History 

at Hokkaido University, Nobu Iwatani, was arrested on spying charges while in Beijing for a 

conference to which he had been invited by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The 

Academy booked the hotel Iwatani was staying at, which was searched by MSS agents who 

then claimed to have found “illicit” publications in his room (books and newspapers on the 

1937-45 Sino-Japanese War that he had bought second-hand from a Beijing bookseller). He 

was detained in Beijing from the beginning of September 2019 to November 15. Before 

him, and since 2015, thirteen other Japanese visitors had been arrested in China for spying, 

nine of whom are still detained today.1354

The case of Taiwan has been less discussed because it is less publicized internationally. 

It does not theoretically fit the hostage “diplomacy” since – from Beijing’s point of view – 

Taiwan is not a foreign state with which they have diplomatic relations. But there is indeed an 

established practice of kidnapping Taiwanese people, one of the means to pressure 

the island. Some examples are known: Lee Ming-Che, a Taiwanese human rights activist and 

former DPP member, was arrested in March 2017 as he entered continental China though 

Macao. Charged with subversion – probably because he was exchanging on WeChat with 

Chinese friends about the Taiwanese democracy – he was sentenced to five years in prison 

in November 2017.1355 Tsai Chin-shu, a Taiwanese academic, was arrested in July 2018 and 

detained in a jail near Fujian.1356 His case is interesting because he is on the “blue” side – 

pro-unification – and supported former President Ma, contrary to the other two, who were 

clearly “green.” Morrison Meng-chu Lee, another Taiwanese citizen, was arrested when he 

entered China in September 2019 after participating in pro-democracy protests in Hong-

Kong.1357 But there could be many more cases that we do not know of.

1352. Bill Birtles, “Australian Mother Marks Nine Months in Chinese Prison as Curious Online Posts Emerge,” 

ABC News (28 Apr. 2021).

1353. Bill Birtles, “Australian Yang Hengjun Faces Court in China on Espionage Charges after Two Years in 

Detention,” ABC News (27 May 2021). 

1354. Andrea A. Fischetti and Antoine Roth, “Why Did China Detain a Japanese History Professor?” Tokyo Review 

(30 Dec. 2019).

1355. Brian Hioe, “Status of the Taiwanese Prisoners in China Unclear on the Third Anniversary of Lee Ming-Che 

Kidnapping,” New Bloom (20 Mar. 2020).

1356. Ko Yu-hao and Chung Li-hua, “Academic Held in China for 420 days,” Taipei Times (14 Sept. 2019).

1357. Brian Hioe, “Taiwanese Citizen Detailed in China After Participating in Protests in Hong Kong,” New Bloom 

(12 Sept. 2019).

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SUMMARY OF THE THIRD PART

The actions carried out by Beijing as part of its influence operations abroad fulfill two 

non-mutually exclusive goals:

• On the one hand, to seduce and subjugate foreign audiences by painting China in 

a positive light. Four key narratives testify to this goal: the “Chinese model” (a spectacular 

economic growth, an alleged administrative efficiency and a political regime superior to liberal 

democracy); tradition, illustrated by Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM); benevolence, to de-

monetize the “Chinese threat” that constrains the implementation of the Party’s foreign policy 

(and to which is then opposed the theory of the “peaceful emergence”); and power, which has 

become China’s main appeal in the past two decades. It is embodied in its military might but 

also in architectural, scientific and technological achievements, as well as in the organization of 

global events. 

• On the other hand, to infiltrate and constrain – a “harsher” category of operations that 

do not involve seducing its opponents but rather bending them. Through infiltration, Beijing 

seeks to slowly penetrate these societies to hinder any potential action against the Party’s in-

terests. Constraining them fits within a wider dynamic: a “punitive” or “coercive” diplomacy is 

gradually becoming a systematic policy of sanctioning any state, organization, company, or indi-

vidual that threatens the Party’s interests. The CCP uses an incredibly wide range of retaliatory 

measures, targeting all players in all fields – with a significant increase in these tactics since 2018. 

Infiltrations and constraints are usually carried out through a nexus of intermediaries. And these 

practices target the following categories:

- The diasporas, defined ethnically by Beijing. Beijing aims to create and sustain a feeling of 

belonging to one nation by blurring the distinction between Chinese citizens and overseas Chinese, 

hence homogenizing very heterogeneous communities. Its goal is twofold: on the one hand, to 

control these diasporas so that they do not threaten the government – Beijing is leading what the 

NGO Freedom House described as the “most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign 

of transnational repression in the world.” In practice, this involves surveilling these communities, 

identifying the members and infiltrating them, maintaining constant pressure on them, intimidat-

ing, threatening, and/or constraining them one way or another, even physically assaulting them; but 

also pressuring the states where they reside to possibly getting them arrested and extradited. On 

the other hand, the Party mobilizes these communities to serve its interests, benefitting from their 

knowledge of their country of residence. To convince and galvanize them, the Party uses more or 

less “gentle” cooptation methods. 

- The media, Beijing explicitly aims to establish a “new world media order.” To do so, the 

government has invested €1.3 billion per year since 2008 to better control its image in the 

world, via state media that “must work to speak for the party’s will and its propositions, and 

protect the party’s authority and unity.” These big media companies, which include CGTN, 

CCTV, China Daily and People’s Daily, China Radio International, Xinhua and China New Ser-

vice, enjoy a worldwide presence in several languages and on several continents. Still, the lack 

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of credibility of news reports and the Chinese media’s propagandist tone plays a key role in 

the difficulties they encounter when competing with Western media and when trying to estab-

lish themselves on the international market. Chinese state media are present on all social net-

works, including those blocked in China (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram), and they 

invest a lot of money to increase their online audience. Several elements indicate an artificial 

inflation of their number of followers, a substantial part of which could in reality be bots and 

fake accounts.

Beijing also tries to control Chinese-speaking media abroad through different means – includ-

ing buybacks, cooperation and/or pressure from local Chinese associations – that have proved 

quite successful, as the CCP is in a situation of near-monopoly. Its main leverage is not funding, 

but rather the WeChat social media, whose rules push Chinese-speaking media to register on 

its Chinese version, hence in China, where they are subjected to Party censorship. Because they 

do not know the red lines, i.e. what is allowed, they tend to censor themselves to avoid being 

suspended. 

To influence non-Chinese mainstream media, Beijing uses a few tools. That includes penetra-

tion (by diplomats, the “China Watch” from China Daily and content provision); acquisition (with 

consequences on the editorial line); cooptation (with compensations such as adds, all-expenses 

paid trips/training courses in China, contracts for other companies of the same group, polit-

ical appointments); training and networking (thousands of journalists from all over the world 

are trained in China, on the condition of “correctly depicting China,” and Beijing also creates 

professional networks via regular events); constraint; using the visa weapon against journalists 

critical of the regime; family members and relatives who remain in China; but also various intim-

idation methods, including lawsuits (lawfare). 

Finally, Beijing is also versed in container control, influencing every step of the global 

information supply chain, with television, web platforms (WeChat, Weibo, TikTok) and 

smartphones. Despite these many efforts however, Chinese media remain relatively unpop-

ular abroad, particularly compared to Russian media, because they focus on China and rarely 

on local issues. 

- The diplomacy: two elements stand out. First, influence on international organizations and 

norms: Beijing holds several key positions at the UN, provides a large portion of the funding, 

deploys classic diplomatic efforts as well as clandestine influence operations (economic and po-

litical pressures, cooptation, coercion, and corruption) to strengthen its presence, frame debates 

and control narratives, obtain timely endorsements, impose its agenda and influence the elabo-

ration and interpretation of international norms. Its revisionist goal is to “change the rules of 

the game.” The example of the WHO during the Covid-19 pandemic, the way Beijing succeeded 

in controlling and shaping the international discussion on organ trafficking (of which China 

was accused), in putting roadblocks on the work of Human Rights Council, or in hijacking the 

Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations for political reasons – all show its influence, 

which also extends to regional organizations, as evidenced in the Chinese efforts to infiltrate 

European institutions and convince elites into relaying the Party’s propaganda, all in the name 

of a Chinese-European “friendship.” 

Second, the so-called “wolf warrior” diplomacy refers to the behavior of the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs’ spokespersons and of a dozen diplomats who are all exhibiting increased 

aggressiveness. Attacks can take traditional or newer shapes, using social media for instance, 

and an unabashed use of invectives, reprimands or even intimidation. The Chinese position 

is to systematically counter any speech running against the official CCP line, by blurring the 

line between the CCP and China as a country-culture. While this practice has emerged pub-

licly during the Covid-19 pandemic, in 2020, some particularly aggressive ambassadors had 

pioneered it before, first and foremost Gui Congyou in Sweden and Lu Shaye in Canada. One 

of the symptoms of this evolution is the “Twitterization” of the Chinese diplomacy: between 

March 2019 and March 2020, the number of Twitter accounts belonging to embassies, consul-

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ates, and Chinese ambassadors has grown by 250% – accounts often artificially amplified by a 

network of fake accounts. France has also observed a radical change in the embassy’s posture 

since Lu Shaye’s arrival in Paris in 2019. 

Globally, this aggressive turn from Chinese diplomacy is counter-productive and has largely 

contributed to the sharp deterioration of China’s image in the world these past years – which 

actually raised a debate within the Chinese Party-State itself. Still, there are reasons to believe that 

this is a long-lasting evolution, particularly because the aim is not so much to please us as it is to 

please Beijing. Zealous diplomats probably hope to be perceived by Beijing as particularly loyal 

and thus benefit from a career boost. 

- The economy: economic dependence to China is often the first leverage used by Beijing. 

Chinese economic coercion takes extremely various forms: denial of access to the Chinese mar-

ket, embargo, trade sanctions, and investment restrictions, but also limitations in the number of 

Chinese tourists (because some regions depend on them), or the organization of popular boy-

cotts – all these have hit many countries these past few years, such as Japan, South Korea, and 

now Australia. Additionally, Beijing is increasingly making censorship a prerequisite to access 

the Chinese market, and many companies end up caving under pressure. Economic sanctions in 

the world of professional sports are widespread and used by the CCP, with the NBA in 2019 for 

instance. Germany is another interesting case to study, because the exposure (or over-exposure) 

of the German economy to the Chinese market is the first policy variable in Berlin’s attitude 

toward Beijing. Besides, Western companies include members of the CCP, all potential sources 

of information for the Party.

- Politics. The overall goal is to penetrate target societies to influence public policy mechanisms. 

To do so, Beijing develops relationships directly with political parties. Through the networks woven 

by the ILD, it can identify and secure the loyalty of individual leaders who are ready to defend Chi-

na’s image, and also learn about local political dynamics, or identify potentially exploitable sources 

of tensions and vulnerabilities. Sustaining direct relationships with influential political figures of a 

given country allow Beijing to infiltrate target societies, to gather official and non-official support, 

and potentially circumvent obstacles within governments by relying on opposition or “retired” 

politicians. So, in parallel to its relationships with political parties, Beijing also cultivates ties with 

individuals, and these ties can take different shapes (contacts, “useful idiots,” agents of influence, 

or real recruits). 

Beijing also interferes in elections (during the past decade, China has apparently interfered 

in at least 10 elections in 7 countries). Taiwan’s case is the most documented example, but there 

were also cases of verified interference in local elections in Canada and Australia, each time in 

the most Chinese-populated constituencies. 

- Education, universities first and foremost, is among the Party’s most important targets. In 

some places, such as Australia, universities are financially dependent on China (because Chinese 

are the biggest group of foreign students by far), which makes these institutions less capable of 

resisting Chinese influence operations. This dependence actually pushes institutions to actively 

self-censor. Another problem is the surveillance and intimidation of Chinese students on for-

eign campuses, especially targeting students who are viewed as dissidents, the organization of 

violent counter-protests, and sometimes physical assaults. Intimidations also target university 

professors and staff members, pushing them to modify course content, teaching material and 

planned events. These actions are carried out by a minority of Chinese students and, in some 

cases, encouraged by Chinese authorities, through embassies and/or consulates. The main tool 

used to maintain some amount of control over Chinese students abroad and to galvanize them 

into defending China are the local branches of the Association of Chinese Students and Re-

searchers (CSSA). 

Another of Beijing’s goals is to shape China Studies, by giving researchers incentives (luxuri-

ous trips, part-time or full-time jobs in Chinese universities) and by pressuring them (visa denial, 

intimidation, pressures on publishing houses to deter them from publishing books criticizing 

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the regime, pressures on relatives in China, even kidnappings and arbitrary arrests) which usually 

lead to self-censorship.

The Party-State also uses universities to acquire new knowledge and technologies, either 

openly and legally through joint-research programs, or illegally and covertly through theft or 

espionage. To do so, China developed many recruitment programs, relying on a plethora of “re-

cruitment stations” abroad, which are tasked to recruit and bring potential candidates to China, 

and also to collect information on scientists and research programs in the host countries. Several 

Chinese databases contain millions of profiles of scientists in the world. In many cases, the work 

of recruited researchers actually contributes to the development of Chinese military capacities. 

Through joint programs involving researchers holding several positions, dozens of universities 

unintentionally help Beijing in building weapons of mass destructions or in developing surveil-

lance technologies that serve to oppress the Chinese population. Several related scandals broke 

out in 2020 and 2021. 

Finally, Confucius Institutes and Classrooms are another important player of Chinese in-

fluence on education, and they are found everywhere in the world. And, under the pretense 

of teaching Chinese language and culture, they can leverage influence over host institutions. 

A revenue-generating and all-expense-paid language center is difficult to refuse and it cre-

ates a form of dependence (even subordination). Besides, Confucius Institutes (ICs) often 

threaten academic freedom: teachers, often chosen by Beijing, must display “good political 

and professional capacities” and “love for the motherland”; all teaching materials are pro-

vided by Beijing and are consistent with a Chinese representation of the world; altogether, 

there are many documented cases of self-censorship in universities hosting ICs. It also 

creates divisions inside the teaching staff. Additionally, some think that ICs are potentially 

used to conduct espionage. For all these reasons, a growing number of ICs have been closed 

these pasts few years. 

- Think tanks, where Beijing’s strategy is dual. Firstly, Beijing is looking to settle branches of 

Chinese think tanks abroad, like the CGTN Think Tank which has signed about fifty partnership 

agreements with foreign think tanks, or the China-CEE Institute which shows Beijing’s interest 

in Central and Eastern European countries. These countries are also gathered in a 17+1 format 

where Beijing can promote its views and initiatives and divide Europe, trying to turn these coun-

tries against the EU. Second, Beijing exploits local intermediaries, sometimes think thanks. This 

usually follows one of three scenarios: occasional partners that allow Beijing’s voice to be heard 

locally (such as IRIS and its “Paris Forum on the Belt and Road Initiative,” co-organized with the 

Chinese embassy); circumstantial allies spreading the Party’s narratives on a regular basis (such as, 

also in France, the Fondation Prospective et Innovation), and accomplices sharing the CCP’s worldview 

and whose interests are in line with the Party (such as the Schiller Institute). Local intermediaries 

can also be publishing companies, as shown in France again by the La Route de la Soie publishing 

company. 

- Culture, first through the production and export of cultural products such as movies or TV 

shows, music or books, which are powerful seduction tools, as we saw with the patriotic action 

movies Operation Red Sea and Wolf Warrior I and II – all promoting the image of a responsible 

China, of a “motherland” ready to any sacrifice to protect its citizens in peril. These cultural prod-

ucts also demonstrate the PLA’s force projection and combat forces capacities. Chinese influence 

also reaches foreign cultural productions, including cinema, for example in Hollywood: to avoid 

upsetting Beijing and maintain an access to the Chinese market, many American film studios make 

compromises, or are even compromising themselves, while the Party-State blacklists producers, 

film directors, and actors seen as hostile to China. Film studios cut and change scenes to avoid dis-

pleasing Beijing. The goals of the Chinese authorities are not only negative (i.e. preventing certain 

content) but also positive (i.e. promoting different content). Beijing thus requires more filming in 

China, more “good” narratives on China, and “good” Chinese characters helping others, or even 

417

saving the world (hence the fact that, in recent years, evil Chinese characters have disappeared from 

American movies). 

Cinema is not an isolated case: other cultural sectors are under pressure from Beijing and are 

asked to produce art that is compatible with the interests of the CCP. Refusing access to the 

Chinese market is a systematic practice enforced against any artist criticizing the Party-State. 

Amongst other types of pressures, Beijing hopes to push artists to change their art, or to stop 

those who show their art in other parts of the world. It even pushes some to carry out the work 

of Chinese censors. This is shown by several examples in museums, the video games industry 

and in theaters, where some artists have censored themselves, which is the final goal – allowing 

Beijing to win without fighting. 

- Information manipulation is one of the most dynamic and documented tools. Beijing 

simulates the authenticity of its operations by using fake accounts on social media, trolls and 

astroturfing (to simulate spontaneous popular movements) – tactics almost systematically found 

in Russian operations. These tactics were picked up by China, first on a national level to target 

its own population, and then on an international level. The Party-State carries out a “distraction 

strategy” over its entire territory to prevent collective actions that it does not generate or control 

by using a high number of “Internet commentators” (incorrectly labelled “fifty cents’ armies”) 

to “guide” public opinions. These commenters are paid (for example $25 for a new message of 

more than 400 characters, 40 cents for reporting a negative comment that will be deleted). On 

the international stage, trolls are much more aggressive. Usually controlled by the PLA or the 

CYL, they defend, attack, feed controversies, insult, and harass. Another way to simulate authen-

ticity is to ask third parties to publish content in exchange for a compensation – which Beijing 

does by cultivating content factories (freelance Chinese-speakers based in Malaysia or elsewhere 

who produce content paid between €12 and €126 per piece, depending on the length), to use AI 

more and more often to generate texts, and to use other methods such as buying one-time mes-

sages, buying an influence over an account, buying an account or a page, and finally, recruiting 

an “influencer.” 

Actually, since 2019, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube have been keener on sounding the alarm 

about some campaigns from China. Dozens of thousands of accounts have been suspended for 

that reason. Among them was found an enduring campaign that started in 2017 and that has tar-

geted critics of the Chinese regime, adapting itself to various events (Hong Kong, the pandemic, 

and the U.S. elections), surviving successive interventions from these platforms because of their 

capacity to create or activate new accounts in a few days. The “Spamouflage Dragon” network 

was identified and analyzed by Graphika in four consecutive reports, which focused on dormant 

accounts and bought or stolen accounts amplifying Chinese propaganda and attacking the Unit-

ed States in Chinese or in English. Some of these accounts had AI-generated profile pictures 

– a practice now often observed in Chinese operations on social media. Other campaigns also 

highlighted the importance of the language used (use of vernacular Cantonese with traditional 

Chinese characters to pose as Hong Kong citizens) and the role played by private intermediaries, 

including by digital marketing companies.

An important component of these campaigns is that they do not only defend China: promot-

ing the Chinese model involves degrading others, including liberal democracies, similarly to what 

Russian operations have been doing for years. At least three tactics are used to that end: discredit 

the opponent’s capacities; fan the flames of controversial topics, particularly regarding racism 

and police violence in the United States; and try to create panics. 

The PLA is at the center of these maneuvers: it uses social media for “overt” influence by 

spreading propaganda, often for dissuasion and psychological warfare, and for covert hostile 

operations against foreign targets. Many publications have shown that its researchers do not con-

fine themselves to learning Russian and U.S. techniques, they also theorize “war through social 

media,” acknowledging using it for offensive purposes, including political interference. The PLA 

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also displays interest in the use of database and artificial intelligence to “guide public opinion on 

a large scale,” including to “influence electors in foreign countries.”

- Among other tools used by Beijing in its influence operations, we found citizen movements, 

particularly pro-independence movements (the Party-State has deployed the same strategy in New 

Caledonia and in Okinawa. They hope to gain control of the economy from the inside, getting 

closer to local political leaders through several friendship associations, even manipulating informa-

tion to encourage pro-independence movements following Beijing’s interests) and pacifist move-

ments, as shown by the No Cold War group. Chinese tourists (who make up the sector’s biggest 

market, because they are the most numerous, and spend the most) are another important leverage: 

by controlling the number of tourists, Beijing pressures other governments. Beijing also uses tour-

ists to spread messages and strengthen its claims in the South China Sea. Influencers are another 

category that the Party relies on, especially Western YouTubers, used to spread Chinese propagan-

da, whatever their personal motivations (they can be forced, bought or simply seduced). Foreign 

academics, whose motivations are similarly diverse, can be used as well. Finally, Beijing carries out 

a so-called “hostage diplomacy,” a significant tool in power relations and influence operations, as 

evidenced by cases in Sweden, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Taiwan.