E. The Case of Africa 

The major agencies – Xinhua, CGTN and China Daily – have offices in Africa. In 

2012, Xinhua and CCTV installed their African headquarters in Nairobi, from where they 

produce content in English and French for the entire continent. China Radio International 

(CRI) is based in Dakar. In general, the editorial structure is dual, with draft articles reviewed 

first by African editors and then (censored by) Chinese editors in Beijing. There are few 

constraints on African journalists when they write, but they subsequently quickly realize 

that the published text may be very different from what they have submitted.239

Chinese censorship and procedures heavily impact the format of the broadcasts 

and the daily work of the staff, as Selma Mihoubi explained: “[the] journalists and trans-

lators working for CRI are subject to strict rules of compliance with the communiqués 

issued by the authorities. They must conform to the terminology used in Chinese, and 

thus act as a mouthpiece for the government. Also, live broadcasts are impossible or very 

rare on CRI, as all information must be double-checked by the CCP. All stories must be 

checked again before being broadcast, a time-consuming task that prevents Chinese 

radio from being first in broadcasting international news.”240 All of this undermines the 

popularity of Chinese broadcasts in Africa, which are less responsive and always very 

official in tone, a contrast with competing Western or Russian media “that rely on speed 

and sensationalism to hook their listeners.”241

The vast majority of African journalists are critical, and they willingly “denounce 

the bad journalistic practices of Chinese media, some of which are considered anti-dem-

ocratic, such as the censorship and systematic proofreading of articles by an officer of 

the Chinese Communist Party, or the ban on live broadcasts.”242 African populations are 

apparently not fooled and do not trust Chinese media more than African media.243 “Most 

Africans realise the subjectivity of the news programmes broadcast by China. They con-

sume all kinds of content distributed by the Chinese media, but mistrust the news pro-

grammes.”244 On the other hand, they appreciate the positive tone of Chinese media: 

there is a widespread belief that Western media are biased and convey a catastrophic and 

miserable vision of Africa that focuses on conflicts, natural disasters, and governance prob-

lems. From this point of view, the Chinese approach of “constructive” or “positive” jour-

nalism (to tell “good stories” about China but also about China-Africa relations and their 

successes, etc.) is attractive. There is a need for positivity to which Chinese media responds 

by emphasizing economic development, infrastructure, or a modern Africa that is moving 

on, on path to development, etc.245

Beijing has made significant efforts to attract African journalists, with dona-

tions of equipment to local newsrooms (computers, printers, microphones, smartphones, 

etc.) and frequent invitations to China. Each year, the China-Africa Media Cooperation 

Forum invites about 30 African journalists for training trips that last from six to ten months. 

239. “China’s Influence on African Media,” a meeting organized by the International Forum for Democratic 

Studies (National Endowment for Democracy) and the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) 

(Accra, Ghana, 22-23 Feb. 2018). 

240. Selma Mihoubi, “Géo-histoire de l’implantation de la radio chinoise en Afrique francophone” (“Geo-History 

of the Implantation of Chinese Radio in Francophone Africa”), Revue de Géographie historique (May 2018). 

241. Ibid. 

242. “Soft Power au service de l’influence,” 116. 

243. “China’s Influence on African Media.”

244. RSF, China’s Pursuit of a New World Media Order, 28.

245. “China’s Influence on African Media.” 

203

African journalists who participated quickly understood that there were not there to receive 

training: they were embarked on visits of cultural sites and infrastructure projects, attended 

lectures on the Chinese system of governance, and they met with representatives of official 

Chinese state media.246

In order to seduce the local populations, Beijing is also developing a pro-Third-World 

discourse, reminding its audience of the Chinese commitment to African independence and 

that, “from a historical point of view, there is no colonial history between China and Africa, 

on the contrary, China and Africa have been the object of colonial aggression; they have 

the same experience.”247 To move in this direction, Beijing introduced a resolution against 

colonialism at the UN Human Rights Council (→ p. 216) on September 29, 2021, a few 

days after the deputy spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian (→ p. 232), 

denounced the “historical debts,” which included “the colonial system” of “some Western 

countries.” According to Antoine Kernen, a researcher at the University of Lausanne, “in 

many respects, China is pursuing a colonial policy in the regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, exploit-

ing the resources there and pushing aside the local populations. [However,] China’s maneuver 

at the Human Rights Council is not directed at the West, as it gave up trying to convince it, 

but at Africa. The anti-Western discourse is aimed at an increase of its sphere of influ-

ence.”248 That said, and despite their efforts, Chinese media sometimes harm themselves by 

portraying a stereotypical or even racist image of local people, as illustrated by the annual 

Spring Festival Gala on CCTV, which sparked controversy.249

“A Chinese actor in blackface in a skit on a Lunar New Year Gala TV show” (15 Feb. 2018).250

These persisting blunders may be explained in the same way as those committed by 

Beijing elsewhere in the world, notably in Europe: Chinese state media are primarily 

tasked with projecting the image of a strong and powerful China among its people 

– as such, the incidence of propaganda abroad is often an afterthought.251

246. Ibid.

247. “Qui pratique donc le néo-colonialisme en Afrique? [“Who Practices Neo-Colonialism in Africa?”]” CRI (24 

Oct. 2006).

248. Simon Petite, “La Chine s’en prend au colonialisme” (“China Attacks Colonialism”), Le Temps (1 Oct. 2021), 6.

249. Dani Madrid-Morales, “China’s Media is Struggling to Overcome its Racial Stereotypes of Africa,” Quartz 

Africa (27 Feb. 2018). 

250. Ibid. 

251. “China’s Influence on African Media.” 

204

In terms of content, as often, China talks a lot about itself, most prominently about 

its president (news about Xi Jinping), its companies and their activities in Africa, its devel-

opment aid (especially in the agricultural and medical fields), its history and culture. It is an 

exclusively ameliorative coverage (for China), and potentially controversial subjects are 

avoided: “subjects such as the exploitation of oil or uranium, or the use of fishing resources 

by Chinese companies are not covered.”252 In the Sahel, their coverage of the conflict in 

Mali focuses on the MINUSMA, which again deals with itself since the MINUSMA has a 

large contingent (400) of Chinese Blue Helmets.

The Chinese media also played a role in Burkina Faso’s decision to abandon Taiwan in 

May 2018, as they helped isolate the country in the region: “[it] was indeed their isolation, 

accompanied by a Chinese offensive to gain a foothold in the Sahel – for example with the 

opening of a Chamber of Commerce in Burkina Faso, the recruitment of local journalists 

and the creation of an Association of Friends of China in Burkina Faso – that led to the 

decision.”253

In any case, “contrary to Russian organizations, Chinese agencies remain focal-

ized on the diffusion of narratives on the Chinese regime, without trying to adapt 

themselves to the local problematics and arguments, which heavily limits their pop-

ularity and ultimately their propagation in Africa.”254 (See box below).

Russian media are much more reproduced than Chinese media

A French team from the GEODE research lab (University of Paris 8) analyzed “content written 

in French by two Russian agencies (548 articles from RT and Sputnik) and five Chinese agen-

cies (230 articles from Xinhua, CCTV, CRI, CRI Senegal, and China Daily) on topics dealing 

with Africa,” i.e., 3,889 pages that reproduced all or part of the stories written by the Russian 

media and 484 pages that reproduced the Chinese media. First observation: Russian content 

was reproduced much more often (7.09 times on average) than Chinese content (2.1).255 The 

authors explained this by the fact that “most of the content published by Chinese media out-

lets dealt with Chinese preoccupations and not African issues […] the diplomatic, national-

istic, and defense nature of Chinese media publications hindered their popularity in 

African publics, as their content is not very relevant to their concerns. The content produced 

by Russian media, on the other hand, dealt with much more diverse and politically engaged 

themes and issues, which explained why there were many more platforms that pick up Russian 

content.”256 There were variations between the countries: for example, the largest number of 

websites relaying Chinese media was found in Guinea, Senegal, Algeria, Morocco, Ivory Coast, 

and Benin, and the most consulted relaying websites were in Ivory Coast, Morocco, Tunisia, 

and Niger.257 The researchers also believed that “the coverage of Chinese content in Africa 

was not an ideological and activist phenomenon on the part of relaying websites, but usually 

an “easy” solution as the articles were freely available and allowed African outlets to relay or 

cover the relations between China and African countries.”258

252. “Soft Power au service de l’influence,” 116.

253. Ibid., 117.

254. Frédérick Douzet, Kévin Limonier, Selma Mihoubi and Élodie René, “Mapping the Spread of Russian and 

Chinese Contents on the French-speaking African Web,” Journal of Cyber Policy, 6 (2021). 

255. Ibid., 84.

256. Ibid., 84.

257. Ibid., 86 

258. Ibid., 97. 

205

III. Diplomacy 

A. International Organizations and Standards

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a permanent member of the U.N. Security 

Council, with a veto power, and it holds several key positions in the organization, 

including the top executive position in four of the fifteen specialized agencies. It provides 

one of the largest financial contributions and has more peacekeeping troops deployed 

around the world than the other four permanent members of the Security Council – the 

US, Russia, France, and the U.K. – combined. Hence, it has unquestionably become a major 

player on the international scene since joining the UN in 1971.

Rather than adapting itself to international norms, the PRC has shown that it seeks 

instead to overhaul the international system (→ p. 148). Since Xi Jinping came to power, 

the PRC has defended the vision of a “community of common destiny,” “a shared future 

for mankind,” where a logic of “win-win cooperation” would allow all states to develop and 

every individual to “enjoy human rights.”259 This ambition is presented as a project for a 

“better world” carried out by China. In fact, it is a plan to reshape the world to conform to 

the CCP’s goals, and to “Sinicize international norms.”260 And these ideas have already pen-

etrated UN institutions. Several resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, 

the Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Council have used language coined 

by the Party.261 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), presented as a project of global 

connectivity and win-win cooperation, but which is above all the projection of a strategy 

of influence, has been approved by the UN for instance (→ p. 206). Secretary-General 

António Guterres stated that the BRI was aligned with the 2030 Sustainable Development 

Goals (SDGs) UN Agenda, and that the UN would therefore support member states that 

wish to integrate BRI projects into their economies and societies.262

International organizations are seen by Chinese authorities as instruments to project 

its influence, and thus the UN is the first platform that China seeks to control. One of its 

strategies is to “form voting coalitions in the United Nations, then use them as lever-

age to propel its citizens or allies to the head of strategic international organizations with 

the aim of imposing its vision on the entire global community.”263 These voting coalitions 

notably include African countries for which China is the largest trading partner, or which 

are heavily indebted and therefore obliged to China.

Beijing does not hesitate to use classical diplomacy, as well as clandestine influ-

ence operations, to exert economic and political pressure, to use cooptation, coercion and 

corruption to strengthen its presence in key positions, to frame debates and control the 

259. See Xi Jinping’s speech at the United Nations in 2017, http://archive.vn/kzOlM. Also see supra. 

260. Emmanuel Véron and Emmanuel Lincot, “Organisations internationals: le spectre d’une hégémonie chinoise 

se concrétise” [International Organizations: the Specter of a Chinese Hegemony is Getting More Real”], The Conversation 

(21 Apr. 2020). 

261. See for example the following resolutions: Security Council, Resolution 2344 (2017) Adopted by the Security 

Council at its 7,902nd meeting,” United Nations, S / RES / 2344 (17 Mar. 2017); Economic and Social Council, “Social 

Aspects of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” United Nations, E / RES / 2017/11 (8 Aug. 2017); 

General Assembly, “Non-deployment of Weapons in Outer Space First,” United Nations, A / RES / 72/27 (11 Dec. 

2017); Human Rights Council, “Promotion of Mutually Beneficial Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights,” United 

Nations, A / HRC / 37 / L.36 (19 Mar. 2018); General Assembly, “New Concrete Measures to Prevent an Arms Race 

in Outer Space,” United Nations, A / RES / 74/34 (18 Dec. 2019).

262. “United Nations Poised to Support Alignment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Sustainable 

Development Goals, Secretary-General Says at Opening Ceremony,” United Nations, SG/SM/19556 (26 Apr. 2019). 

263. La Chine démasquée, 14. 

206

discourse, to obtain the support it needs, to impose its agenda and to influence the elabo-

ration and interpretation of international standards.264 Some are punctual operations, such 

as paying $1.3 million in bribes to the Antiguan diplomat John Ashe, then president of the 

68th session of the UN General Assembly in 2013-2014, and to the Dominican Republic’s 

deputy ambassador to the UN, to encourage the two men to help a Chinese entrepre-

neur, Ng Lap Seng, build a UN-sponsored conference center in Macau (which ultimately 

never saw the light of day).265 This was probably not a private initiative, since Ng Lap Seng 

is a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, which Peter Mattis 

described as “the militia of the United Front.”266

Other operations are more about shaping the world for the long haul. Through the 

strength of its financial contributions, China has the means to influence the UN agenda. 

For example, it is the only contributor to the United Nations Trust Fund for Peace and 

Development, which was established in 2016; it thus occupies four of the five seats on its 

steering committee. The steering committee advises the UN Secretary-General on which 

projects should receive funding, making it easy for the PRC to lobby for the BRI.267

Through its growing presence in organizations that produce international stan-

dards and norms, the PRC has also shown that it has the capacity, and above all the will, 

to change the “rules of the game,” to develop a normative power. This is particularly the 

case with the concept of human rights, which it seeks to subordinate to the right to state 

development (→ p. 216); it is also the case with the responsibility to protect, the norms of 

Internet governance, or maritime law – to name but a few examples.

China’s strategy of influence in international organizations therefore takes several 

forms, including control of the narratives, for example within the WHO, encouraging 

inhibitions, as illustrated by the Human Rights Council, or highjacking the institutions, 

the NGO committee for instance. The Party targets not only global organizations but also 

regional organizations, as we shall see in the case of the European Union.

1. Controlling high-level positions at the UN

Compared to the other permanent members of the Security Council, especially the 

United States (in 2020, out of 170 senior UN positions, three were held by Chinese, com-

pared to twenty or so by Americans268), but also France and the United Kingdom, and even 

other large countries such as Germany and India, China has very few staff members in 

UN bodies, a fortiori in proportion to its own population and to its ambitions. The reasons 

are well known: its late entry into the UN system, the UN bureaucracy, what it may perceive 

as cultural differences, its lack of experience on peace and security issues, and the growing 

264. After benefitting from Chinese investment, Greece blocked a European Union condemnation of human 

rights violations in China in 2017. See Helena Smith, “Greece Blocks EU’s Criticism at UN of China’s Human Rights 

Record,” The Guardian (18 Jun. 2017). 

265. “Corruption à l’ONU: 4 ans de prison pour un entrepreneur chinois” (“Corruption at the UN: 4 Years in Jail 

for a Chinese Entrepreneur”), Le Figaro (11 May 2018).

266. Schrader, Friends and Enemies, 14.

267. For instance, a project of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs – controlled by the PRC since 2007 

– to promote the BRI was accepted in 2017. See Pingfan Hong, “Strengthening National Policy Capacity for Jointly 

Building the Belt and Road Toward the Sustainable Development Goals: A Capacity Development Project Financed 

by UN Peace and Development Trust Fund,” Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations (14-15 

May 2017). 

268. This includes posts from category B to category E “Senior officials of the United Nations and Officers of 

Equivalent Rank Whose Duty Station is in New York” United Nations, (1 Apr. 2020 update). https://protocol.un.org/

dgacm/pls/site.nsf/files/SeniorOfficials/$FILE/ListofUNSeniorOfficials.pdf.

207

distrust it arouses around it.269 There is, however, an exception: China has provided the larg-

est number of interns, in 2018 at least.270 In any case, the quantity or proportion of positions 

held is not the only criterion to assess the degree of Chinese infiltration in international 

bodies. The nature of the positions must also be considered. In 2017, Liu Zhenmin (刘

振民), a former Chinese vice-minister of foreign affairs, succeeded Wu Hongbo (吴红波) 

as the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, 

a position held by a Chinese since 2007. In 2019, Xu Haoliang (徐浩良) was appointed 

assistant secretary general at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 

and director of the Bureau for Policy and Program Support. His career at the UNDP began 

as early as 1994. Also in 2019, Xia Huang (夏煌), a former Chinese ambassador to several 

African countries, was appointed as special envoy for the Great Lakes region, despite 

attempts by Nikki Haley, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., to block his appointment.271

These positions, in particular in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 

(DESA), provide the PRC with visibility, legitimacy, and a semblance of impartiality that is 

very useful to advocate for the Party’s interests, such as promoting the BRI and encour-

aging more states to join.272 In 2016, DESA published a study, led by a Chinese econo-

mist, Hong Pingfan, that showed how the BRI could help the UN achieve its Sustainable 

Development Goals.273 For some diplomats, as reported by Foreign Policy, DESA seems to 

be nothing more than a “Chinese enterprise” that serves Beijing’s goals of becom-

ing the world’s development leader: “everybody knows it and everybody accepts 

it.”274

DESA leaders Wu Hongbo and Liu Zhenmin both used their influential positions to 

block the participation of Dolkun Isa, president of the World Uyghur Congress, at the 

United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2017 and again in 2018.275 

These positions of responsibility allow those who hold them to use the power entrusted to 

them to limit the participation of individuals or groups perceived as challenging the 

authority of the Party.

Invited on a CCTV program to share his experience with a young Chinese audience, 

Wu Hongbo explicitly stated that, as an international civil servant, he has a duty to defend 

Chinese interests,276 which is in direct conflict with the norms of conduct of the inter-

national civil service, according to which an international civil servant “should not seek 

269. Courtney J. Fung and Shing-Hon Lam, “Staffing the United Nations: China’s motivations and prospects,” 

International Affairs, 97:4, 2021, 1143-1163. 

270. Ibid., 1154.

271. Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “Haley Tried to Block Appointment of Chinese Diplomat to Key U.N. 

Post. He Got the Job Anyway,” Foreign Policy (14 Feb. 2019). 

272. Liu Zhenmin, “Statement: High Level Symposium on the Belt and Road Initiative and 2030 Agenda,” United 

Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (13 Jun. 2018); Wu Hongbo, “Welcome Remarks: The Belt and 

Road Initiative: Advancing Progress In SDGs,” UN DESA (11 Apr. 2017); “Remarks by UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional 

Director Haoliang Xu at the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Thematic Forum on Green Silk 

Road,” UNDP (24 Apr. 2019); “UNDP Experts Suggest Cooperation with China’s Belt and Road Initiative in War-

Torn Countries,” CGTN (2 May 2017). 

273. Hong Pingfan, “Jointly Building the ‘Belt and Road’ Toward the Sustainable Development Goals,” UN DESA 

(25 Jun. 2016). 

274. Colum Lynch, “China Enlists U.N. to Promote Its Belt and Road Project,” Foreign Policy (10 May 2018). 

275. “Former High-Ranking UN Official Represented Chinese State Interests at UN; Persecuted Chinese 

Minorities,” UNPO (26 Apr. 2019); “Press release: UNPO Vice President Prevented for Second Year in a Row from 

Participating in UN Indigenous Forum,” UNPO (17 Apr. 2018); “Dolkun Isa Participates in UN Indigenous Forum 

Despite Growing Chinese Influence,” European Interest (12 May 2019). 

276. To view the excerpt in question, see World Uyghur Congress, “CCTV Interview with Wu Hongbo,” Facebook 

(25 Apr. 2019), https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=649658305496919. The full show can be viewed on YouTube: 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmrI2n6d6VU&t=149. 

208

nor should they accept instructions from any Government, person or entity external the 

organization.”277 To support his point, he recalled that Interpol had issued a Red Notice for 

Dolkun Isa, whom he described as a terrorist. Interpol Red Notices serve as an informa-

tion-sharing mechanism to facilitate cooperation between police forces around the world, 

alerting and informing them of internationally wanted fugitives. Even if they do not consti-

tute arrest warrants, such notices, once made public, can ruin the reputation of the individ-

uals concerned, while the evidence that is supposed to justify such accusations is often not 

made public. It is therefore difficult to determine, especially when such charges are pressed 

by authoritarian states, whether these red notices are in fact disguised political persecution 

of dissidents, journalists and activists. The Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui, who has prom-

ised to bring down the communist regime, is also the subject of a Red Notice.278 Hence 

the interest for Beijing to have been able to place in the position of Secretary General of 

Interpol, from 2016 to 2018, Meng Hongwei, former Vice Minister of Public Security of 

the PRC. But this is a position that China lost following the arrest of the Chinese executive 

by the authorities of his own country. The organization is now headed by a German.

Xu Haoliang also sought to promote the BRI within the UN institutions he worked for. 

While still the head of the UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific in 2016, he was 

reportedly the one who prompted the then-administrator Helen Clark to sign the first mem-

orandum of understanding between the UNDP and the PRC for a better cooperation in the 

implementation of the BRI and the 2030 SDGs agenda.279 It can be noted that at that time, 

Helen Clark was campaigning for the position of UN Secretary General and hence sensitive to 

Chinese support.280 Regardless of their degree of responsibility, Chinese officials have 

shown that they serve above all the interests of the Party, of which they are members.

2. Management of four norm-producing specialized agencies

China headed four UN agencies in August 2021281: the United Nations Industrial 

Development Organization (UNIDO), the International Telecommunication Union 

(ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Food and Agriculture 

Organization of the United Nations (FAO). By comparison, the United States, the United 

Kingdom and France each head only one agency, the World Bank, the International Labour 

Organization, and UNESCO respectively. While leading an agency does not mean having 

complete control over it, such a position certainly offers an opportunity to develop influ-

ence and have an impact on the interpretation or formulation of the standards produced 

by the agency.

As a specialized agency charged with promoting industrial development, UNIDO 

assists member states in complying with international standards to export their products, 

and it helps develop and form standards in various areas such as quality control, food 

safety, environmental impact, and social responsibility.282 In addition to this normative 

role, UNIDO promotes technical cooperation among member states and provides pol-

277. See Article 8, “Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service,” International Civil Service 

Commission (2013).

278. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Interpol Is Helping Enforce China’s Political Purges,” Foreign Policy (21 Apr. 

2017). 

279. “UNDP and China to Cooperate on Belt and Road Initiative,” UNDP (19 Sept. 2016).

280. Colum Lynch, “China Enlists U.N. to Promote Its Belt and Road Project,” Foreign Policy (10 May 2018).

281. Between August 2019 (beginning of Qu Dongyu’s term as head of the FAO) and August 2021 (end of Liu 

Fang’s term as ICAO Secretary General). 

282. “Standard-Setting and Compliance,” UNIDO.

209

icymaking advice.283 Li Yong (李勇), a former vice minister of finance of the PRC, has 

served as the director general of UNIDO since 2013. Re-elected in 2017 for four years, 

his term ends in 2021. He was a member of the CPPCC, the supervisory body of the 

United Front (→ p. 39) until 2016.284 As head of UNIDO, Mr. Li has created a new 

directorate for programs, partnerships, and field integration (which is particularly pow-

erful because it selects countries for partnership programs) and has appointed Ciyong 

Zou, a Chinese national, as its director. With no fewer than 19 Chinese nationals serving 

administrator positions in this organization, China controls its governance. The same 

trend can be observed elsewhere: there is evidence that “agencies headed by Chinese 

nationals show faster increases in Chinese staff members in both absolute and relative 

terms.”285 Director General Li Yong has more than once expressed UNIDO’s willing-

ness to become more involved in the Belt and Road initiative to “promote and accel-

erate inclusive and sustainable industrial development.”286 And, in November 2019, he 

signed a joint statement with the vice president of Huawei Technologies to strengthen 

the partnership between UNIDO and Huawei.

The ICAO works to establish standards, practices and policies in the civil aviation sector 

to ensure safety and efficiency worldwide. Liu Fang (柳芳) was the first woman and first 

Chinese to be elected to the position of ICAO Secretary General in 2015. Re-elected in 

2018, her term ended in August 2021. Liu Fang previously worked for the Civil Aviation 

Administration of China (CAAC). During her term running the agency, Taiwan was denied 

participation in the triennial assembly, despite protests from some countries.287 In 2020, 

during the Covid-19 crisis, ICAO came under heavy criticism when its Twitter account 

blocked several users who had criticized its policy of excluding Taiwan (→ p. 477).288 

The ITU sets standards and regulations for the information and communication tech-

nology sector, allocates radio frequency bands and satellite orbits, and assists in the oper-

ation of telecommunications services worldwide. ITU standards are frequently adopted in 

developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, whose infrastructures are often 

built by the Chinese. Zhao Houlin (赵厚麟) has served as secretary general of the ITU 

since 2015. Re-elected in 2018, his term ends in 2023. He joined the ITU in the 1990s and 

served as deputy secretary-general from 2007 to 2015, after working at the PRC’s Ministry 

of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Since taking office, Secretary General 

Zhao Houlin has more than once emphasized the importance of cooperating with 

China, including in its “Digital Silk Roads”289 project. The MIIT, for which he worked 

for before joining the ITU, signed a memorandum of understanding with the ITU in May 

2017 at the first New Silk Roads Forum.290 Zhao Houlin also stated that he did not con-

sider Huawei’s 5G technology to be a security issue, which has fueled suspicions that the 

283. “UNIDO in brief,” UNIDO.

284. “Liste des 27 membres du 12e comité national de la CCPPC évincés pour violations disciplinaires” (“List of 

the 27 Members of the 12th National Committee of the CCPCC Evinced for Disciplinary Violations”), Quotidien du 

peuple (6 Sept. 2016), http://archive.vn/DL7Hc. 

285. Courtney and Lam, “Staffing the United Nations,” 1147. 

286. “UNIDO Further Engages with the Belt and Road Initiative,” UNIDO (25 Apr. 2019). 

287. J. Michael Cole, “ICAO Refuses to Invite Taiwan to Assembly,” The News Lens (23 Sept. 2016); “Ally Backs 

Taiwan’s ICAO Participation,” Taipei Times (3 Oct. 2019). 

288. “U.S. Denounces ICAO for Blocking Critics Supportive of Taiwan Inclusion,” Focus Taiwan (28 Jan. 2020); 

J. Michael Cole, “ICAO Twittergate-Taiwan Scandal Highlights Deeper Problems at the UN,” Macdonald-Laurier 

Institute (6 Feb. 2020). 

289. “Top Official Says ITU Can Help in Digital Silk Road,” China Daily (16 Dec. 2015). Kong Wenzheng, “ITU 

vows to join hands with China,” China Daily (24 Apr. 2019). 

290. “ITU Secretary-General: BRI Helps Narrow World Digital Divide,” CGTN (1 May 2019). 

210

ITU could facilitate the global adoption of of Huawei’s 5G networks (→ p. 133).291 

Indeed, the Chinese company recently proposed to the ITU a new vision of the Internet, 

in a radical departure from the representation of networks we have today, and in which 

governments would have more control over the Internet.292 China’s position in the ITU also 

provides it with the opportunity to negotiate the best possible frequencies and orbital 

slot allocations for its Beidou satellite navigation system, and to leverage influence 

in favor of Chinese players in the submarine cable sector (→ p. 131). 

The FAO sets international standards for food security, assists member states in setting 

their agriculture and food policies, and develops international responses to crises in these 

areas.293 Qu Dongyu (屈冬玉) is the first Chinese to hold the position of director general. 

He was previously vice minister of agriculture and rural affairs of the PRC. Elected in 2019, 

his term ends in 2023. Media outlets reported that China had exerted political and eco-

nomic pressure on other countries to ensure the victory of its candidate: Uruguay, 

Brazil, and Argentina were reportedly threatened that they would no longer receive certain 

exports from China if they did not vote for the Chinese candidate, and Cameroon with-

drew its candidate, Médi Moungui, from the race some time after China quietly cancelled 

its $70 million debt.294

3. Leadership positions in other organizations

Former PRC Vice Minister of Commerce Yi Xiaozhun (易小准) is one of four deputy 

directors general of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Appointed in 2013, he was 

selected again in 2017 for a second four-year term. Xue Hanqin (薛捍勤) became the first 

woman and first Chinese to be vice president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 

in 2018 for a three-year term. She had been a member of the ICJ since 2010.

Zhang Tao (张涛) has been deputy managing director of the International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) since 2016.295 A former deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, 

he was the second Chinese national to join the IMF’s management after Zhu Min (朱

民), who joined in 2011.296 Ren Minghui (任明辉) is deputy director general at the World 

Health Organization (WHO) in charge of universal health coverage and communicable 

and non-communicable diseases. In open access publications, he presented the BRI as an 

opportunity to improve global health and China as the country that should take the lead in 

this area.297

These examples show how the PRC intends to use the high-level positions it manages to 

obtain in these normative institutions to develop a positive vision of China and of its projects, 

291. Alkesh Sharma, “UN’s ITU Says No Evidence Huawei 5G Equipment Poses Security Concerns,” The National 

(21 Apr. 2019); Tom Miles, “Huawei Allegations Driven by Politics Not Evidence: U.N. Telecoms Chief,” Reuters (5 

Apr. 2019). 

292. Anna Gross and Madhumita Murgia, “China and Huawei Propose Reinvention of the Internet,” Financial 

Times (27 Mar. 2020); Madhumita Murgia and Anna Gross, “Inside China’s Controversial Mission to Reinvent the 

Internet,” Financial Times (27 Mar. 2020). 

293. Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “Outfoxed and Outgunned: How China Routed the U.S. in a U.N. Agency,” 

Foreign Policy (23 Oct. 2019). 

294. Gerardo Fortuna, “China’s Qu Dongyu Beats EU Candidate for FAO leadership,” Euractiv (24 Jun. 2019); 

Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “Outfoxed and Outgunned: How China Routed the U.S. in a U.N. Agency,” Foreign 

Policy (23 Oct. 2019); Jenni Marsh, “China Just Quietly Wrote Off a Chunk of Cameroon’s Debt. Why the secrecy?” 

CNN (5 Feb. 2019). 

295. “Zhang Tao est nommé directeur général adjoint,” (“Zhang Tao Appointed Deputy Director General”), 

CCTV (23 Aug. 2016).

296. “Min Zhu,” International Monetary Fund (8 Apr. 2015).

297. Ren Minghui, “Global Health and the Belt and Road Initiative,” Global Health Journal, 2:4 (Dec. 2018).

211

such as the BRI, to influence the work of these organizations toward its own interests, and to 

make them work toward the revision of the international order dominated by the United 

States.

However, the PRC does not need to control all the key positions to infiltrate interna-

tional organizations. It can also use financial contributions: Beijing, for example, is the 

largest extra budgetary contributor to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 

(with $575,000, or 44% of voluntary contributions, far ahead of the United States, which 

contributes only 24%) to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 

(with a $1 million grant for five years), as well as the second-largest contributor to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 

Organization, behind the United States.

Many senior international officials have expressed support for China, often to con-

gratulate, thank or praise its contributions, sometimes even to promote its projects. For 

the director general of the International Labour Organization, Guy Ryder, the “very 

strong synergies” between the BRI and the 2030 SDGs Agenda should give China, in his 

words, “leadership in the multilateral system.”298 In an interview with Xinhua, the president 

of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, Gilbert Houngbo, praised 

the Chinese model for national economies in transition.299 Several other UN specialized 

agencies have officially expressed interest in, and support for, the BRI: the International 

Maritime Organization and the World Tourism Organization for instance. Others, such 

as the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, and the World Meteorological 

Organization, have already formalized their cooperation in the BRI with the PRC.300

Despite the aggressiveness of some Chinese maneuvers, they do not consistently suc-

ceed. In 2019, former Hong Kong police chief Andy Tsang Wai-hung was unable to secure 

the position of head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime he coveted.301 

Last year, China failed to win the position of director general of the World Intellectual 

Property Organization (WIPO). Wang Binying, WIPO’s deputy director general, lost to 

the Singaporean candidate Daren Tang, who had been supported by the United States and 

others.302 The possibility that China could get its hands on a fifth specialized UN agency, 

especially the one in charge of the strategic intellectual property patents, certainly attracted 

more attention and was compared to “appointing the fox to guard the hen house.”303 

The former director of WIPO, Francis Gurry, had already been criticized for his secret 

negotiations with China and Russia that led to the establishment of two WIPO offices in 

these countries.304

298. “Guy Ryder s’adresse au forum ‘La ceinture et la route, pour une coopération internationale’” (“Guy Ryder to the 

Forum ‘The Belt and the Road, for an International Cooperation’”), International Labour Organization (14 May 2017). 

299. Eric J. Lyman, “Interview: IFAD Chief says China’s Poverty Reduction Model for Other Economies in 

Transition,” Xinhuanet (4 Aug. 2017). 

300. “ILO Broadens Cooperation with its Chinese Partners Under the Belt and Road Initiative,” ILO (29 Apr. 2019); 

“UNESCO Strengthens Collaboration for Science with Key Chinese Institutions,” UNESCO (7 Nov. 2018); “Overview 

of meteorological support for Belt and Road Initiative 2017,” China Meteorological Administration (11 Jan. 2018). 

301. Stuart Lau, “Former Hong Kong Top Cop Andy Tsang Misses Out on Plum UN Posting,” South China Morning 

Post (23 Nov. 2019). 

302. Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.S.-Backed Candidate for Global Tech Post Beats China’s Nominee,” The New York 

Times (4 Mar. 2020); Colum Lynch, “China Bids to Lead World Agency Protecting Intellectual Property,” Foreign Policy 

(26 Nov. 2019). 

303. Katrina Manson, Primrose Riordan, and James Kynge, “US-backed Candidate Nominated to Lead UN Body 

After Anti-China Campaign,” Financial Times (4 Mar. 2020). 

304. Steve Brachmann, “Whistleblowers Testify on Alleged Gurry Abuses at WIPO to House Foreign Affairs 

Committee,” IPWatchdog (29 Sept. 2016). 

212

With six of the fifteen ongoing terms ending in 2021, Beijing is already maneuvering to 

maintain its presence at the head of these institutions and to win new ones.

Furthermore, China’s influence is not limited to UN-affiliated organizations. As mentioned 

earlier, Interpol is not protected from potential abuses in the use of Red Notices by author-

itarian regimes such as China. The surprise arrest of its former head, Meng Hongwei, the 

first Chinese national to head the organization, raised a number of questions about Interpol’s 

potential complicity, or at least complacency, with the Chinese government.305 ICANN is 

another example: the California-based non-profit corporation allocates domain names and 

numbers on the Internet, and it maintains an “unusual” relationship with the Chinese gov-

ernment.306 The decision of its former CEO, Fadi Chehade, to accept to preside the World 

Internet Conference, an initiative of the Chinese government, came as a surprise.307 The issue 

at stake here, for the Party, is to influence the development of Internet standards. It is also 

noteworthy that structures such as the CICIR, a think tank of the MSS, participate in the 

World Internet Conference alongside the Cyberspace Administration of China.

China seeks to penetrate and influence as many standards-setting institutions 

as possible, regardless of the subject matter. Perhaps more than any other country, it 

has the means and the will to train experts to take on more and more leadership positions. 

However, China does not need to seize leadership positions in the majority of organiza-

tions to achieve its goals – nor does it necessarily have an interest in doing so. It is enough 

that the people in these positions support Chinese policies on their own, which often 

happens through elite cooptation or political opportunism. These efforts to infiltrate inter-

national organizations have allowed the party to silence some criticism, paralyze some 

structures and guide the development of international norms.

A former World Bank Chief Executive accused 

of having changed China’s ranking in report

In September 2021, the World Bank decided to stop publishing its influential annual Doing 

Business report, which since 2003 has assessed the international business environment by 

ranking 190 state economies, after irregularities in the 2018 and 2020 editions were report-

ed.308 An independent investigation commissioned by the World Bank has indeed conclud-

ed that senior officials at the institution, including its Chief Executive Kristalina Georgieva 

(now head of the IMF), lobbied the report’s authors to improve China’s ranking in the 

2018 edition.309 Beijing, which is the third largest contributor to the World Bank, after the 

United States and Japan, indeed challenged its fall of seven places to the 85th rank in the 

report meant to be published in October 2017. The investigation established that, under 

pressure from its general management, World Bank teams then changed data to allow 

China to retain its 78th place – an intervention that prompted protests and the resignation 

of Paul Romer, the World Bank’s chief economist, who now confirms that “Kristalina un-

dertook to doctor the report and cover it up.”310 It is not certain that, in this case, Beijing 

intervened directly, and this is precisely what makes it interesting since it could testify to 

the internalization of the constraint: the Party-State no longer even needs to apply 

305. Victor Mallet, “Interpol ‘Complicit’ in Arrest of its Chief in China,” Financial Times (7 Jul. 2019).

306. Kieren McCarthy, “China’s New Rules May Break the Internet Warns US Government,” The Register (16 May 2016). 

307. Kieren McCarthy, “The Firewall Awakens: ICANN’s Exiting CEO Takes Internet Governance to the Dark 

Side,” The Register (18 Dec. 2015). 

308. “World Bank Group to Discontinue Doing Business Report,” worldbank.org (16 Sep. 2021). 

309. Investigation of Data Irregularities in Doing Business 2018 and Doing Business 2020, WilmerHale, September 15, 2021: 

https://bit.ly/3B3124M. The irregularity found in the 2020 report had to do with Saudi Arabia. 

310. Richard Hiault avec AFP, “La directrice de la FMI accusée d’avoir exercé des pressions pour favoriser la 

Chine” (“IMF chief accused of lobbying for China”), Les Échos (17 Sep. 2021).

213

pressure directly, since others are doing it for it. This is a phenomenon found in some 

cases of self-censorship following pressure not directly from Beijing, but from local actors 

fearing the Party’s reaction (→ p. 360).

4. Controlling the discourse: the example of the WHO during the Covid-19 

pandemic

China first took over the leadership of a UN specialized agency in 2006 with the elec-

tion of Margaret Chan to head the World Health Organization (WHO). During her ten-

ure, she was criticized for her lack of diligence in handling the 2014 Ebola outbreak.311 

In 2016, she cancelled Taiwan’s observer status following the election of President 

Tsai Ing-wen. Since then, Taiwan has been systematically excluded from the World 

Health Assembly, WHO’s annual forum. In doing so, the organization has lost valuable 

experience, as Taiwan learned a lot from the SARS episode in 2003 during which “Beijing 

did not play the game of transparency.”312 In 2017, Margaret Chan was replaced by Tedros 

Ghebreyesus, a native of Ethiopia, a country with which China has an excellent relation-

ship. When he was still Minister of Health in Ethiopia, Dr. Tedros – who used his first 

name to campaign – was criticized for his handling of several cholera outbreaks.313 Since 

his appointment, he has more than once taken a public position in favor of China – 

which is the second largest financial contributor to the WHO among the 194 mem-

ber states, behind the United States only – going so far as sycophancy. 314 In particular, he 

praised its handling of the Covid-19 epidemic in January 2020. According to Tedros, the 

Chinese government should have been “congratulated” for its management, which report-

edly slowed the spread of the virus abroad. He praised China’s “impressive speed” with 

which it “detected the outbreak, isolated the virus, sequenced the genome, and shared it 

with WHO and the world,” but also applauded China’s “commitment to transparency,” and 

concluded that China was “setting a new standard for outbreak response.315

In reality, the reverse is more accurate: China tried to cover up Covid-19 at the beginning 

of the pandemic. The first cases, which appeared as early as October316, were ignored, as was 

the high level of contagiousness, which was established as early as December. Authorities 

ordered laboratories to stop testing, to destroy all existing samples, and then to publish noth-

ing on the subject.317 Some hospitals falsified diagnoses.318 Whistleblowers were punished. 

Some of them, doctors and journalists, simply disappeared. And while the danger of the 

virus was known, the January 18 banquet for 40,000 families in Wuhan was not cancelled. An 

Associated Press investigation found that the Chinese government balked for six days before 

311. “Emails Show the World Health Organization Intentionally Delayed Calling Ebola a Public Health Emergency,” 

Business Insider (20 Mar. 2015). 

312. F. Chih-Chung Wu, interviewed by C. Leblanc, “Taiïwan apparaît aujourd’hui comme le défenseur de la 

démocratie. Et cela mérite d’être soutenu” (“Taiwan Appears Today as the Defensor of Democracy. And It Deserves 

Being Said”), L’Opinion (10 May 2020). 

313. Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Candidate to Lead the W.H.O. Accused of Covering Up Epidemics,” The New York 

Times (13 May 2017). 

314. Niall McCarthy, “Which Countries Are the Biggest Financial Contributors to the World Health Organization? 

[Infographic],” Forbes (8 Apr. 2020). 

315. “WHO Director-General’s statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV),” 

World Health Organization (30 Jan. 2020). 

316. Jonathan Pekar et al., “Timing the SARS-CoV-2 index case in Hubei province”, Science, 18 Mar. 2021.

317. G. Yu et al., “How Early Signs of the Coronavirus Were Spotted, Spread and Throttled in China,” The Straits 

Times (28 Feb. 2020). 

318. J. Zaugg, “Comment la Chine a laissé échapper le coronavirus” (“How Did China Leave the Coronavirus 

Escape?”), Le Temps (17 Mar. 2020).

214

publicly declaring the coronavirus outbreak. During those key six days, between January 14 

and 20, 2020, more than 3,000 people were reportedly infected.319 Concealment of the disease 

at a critical moment in its development was costly in human lives: a study published in Nature 

estimated that if physical distancing had been implemented one, two, or three weeks earlier in 

China, the number of global cases could have been reduced by 66%, 86%, and 95%, respec-

tively.320 As is often the case, this concealment was motivated primarily by domestic political 

reasons (stability, confidence, and the image of the Party), and only secondarily by the preser-

vation of the country’s image on the international stage.

While it must be acknowledged that China did implement strict containment, controls, 

and population monitoring measures to contain the outbreak in the months that followed 

the start of the epidemic, this was not enough to set a “new standard” for all, as Tedros 

defended. To please Beijing, WHO ignored warning messages sent by Taiwan’s 

Centers for Disease Control as early as December 31, 2019 and delayed declaring a 

public health emergency of international concern because China opposed it.321 On 

January 12, the organization maintained that there was “no clear evidence” of human-to-

human transmission of the virus.322 On January 14, it only hypothesized “limited human-

to-human transmission.”323 It was not until January 22, three weeks into the epidemic, and 

after China finally agreed to allow WHO experts to visit Wuhan, that the organization 

confirmed that there was evidence of human-to-human transmission.324 Then, the WHO 

waited until March 11, when Italy had more than 10,000 confirmed cases and its population 

was under a lockdown, to finally declare Covid-19 a pandemic. According to the CIA and 

the BND, China threatened WHO that it would stop cooperating with the agency’s 

investigation of Covid-19 if it declared a pandemic.325 Moreover, while one of the first 

steps Taiwan took was to suspend air traffic in order to limit the spread of the virus, the 

WHO asserted that there was “no reason for measures that unnecessarily interfere with 

international travel and trade,” and recommended that there be no restrictions on trade or 

movement;326 this, again, was a position consistent with the PRC, which then criticized the 

United States for banning flights from China.

Controlling and shaping the discourse on organ trafficking

The CCP “oversees the largest state-run organ trafficking industry in the world: almost cer-

tainly deriving a large number of organs from prisoners of conscience who are… executed on 

demand for paying customers.”327 If this elicited almost no international reaction and if, iron-

ically, China had even helped create the WHO task force against organ trafficking, and placed 

319. “China Did not Warn Public of Likely Pandemic for 6 Key Days,” The Associated Press (15 Apr. 2020).

320. S. Lai et al., “Effect of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions to Contain COVID-19 in China,” Nature, 585 

(2020), 410-413.

321. P. Benkimoun, “Coronavirus: comment la Chine a fait pression sur l’OMS” (“Coronavirus: How China 

Pressured the WHO”), Le Monde (29 Jan. 2020); F. Godement, “L’OMS, la pandémie et l’influence chinoise: un premier 

bilan” (“WHO, Pandemic and Chinese Influence: A First Assessment”), Institut Montaigne (24 Mar. 2020).

322. “Novel Coronavirus – China,” World Health Organization (12 Jan. 2020).

323. “WHO Timeline – COVID-19,” World Health Organization (27 Apr. 2020). 

324. “Mission summary: WHO Field Visit to Wuhan, China 20-21 January 2020,” World Health Organization (22 

Jan. 2020).

325. Naveed Jamali and Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: As China Hoarded Medical Supplies, the CIA Believes It Tried 

to Stop the WHO from Sounding the Alarm on the Pandemic,” Newsweek (5 Dec. 2020).

326. “WHO Director-General’s Statement on IHR Emergency Committee on Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV),” 

World Health Organization (30 Jan. 2020). 

327. Matthew P. Robertson, “Examining China’s Organ Transplantation System: The Nexus of Security, Medicine, 

and Predation / Part 3: China’s United Front Tactics in Managing the Narrative on Organ Trafficking,” China Brief, 

Jamestown Foundation, 20:16 (16 Sept. 2020), 13. 

215

a representative of its choice at the head of the Transplantation Society (TTS), it was because 

it succeeded in controlling and shaping the discourse on this subject, with three objectives 

according to Matthew Robertson: “protect the political security and legitimacy of the re-

gime from the accusation that it systematically exploits prisoners of conscience as an 

organ source. The party’s second goal is to ensure the continued availability of trans-

plant organs for members of the party elite. The party’s third goal is to bolster China’s 

image on the global stage as a leader in a field of advanced medicine, while maintaining 

the prestige and access of Chinese surgeons to Western medical journals, conferences, and 

professional societies.”328 And, from this point of view, the CCP was clearly successful: both 

the WHO and the TTS helped spread the representation that China stopped these practices in 

2015, after which date organ removals are presumably voluntary (despite the fact that Beijing 

had been known to falsify data concerning voluntary transplantations).329

Beijing bought the cooperation of executives from relevant international organizations 

by convincing them that they were helping China reform itself – a gratifying idea – or that no 

one would gain from a scandal; but also with more concrete benefits such as all-expenses-paid 

trips to China to visit medical facilities, funding, including indirect funding (the annual TTS 

conference is funded by pharmaceutical companies dependent on the Chinese market), or by 

“cultivating” certain individuals, helping them to obtain positions, for example.330

When China showed a decline in the number of confirmed cases, the WHO chose to 

confirm these figures and again to congratulate the Chinese government,331 although many 

voices pointed out that these figures were probably out of sync with reality. The Chinese 

government had indeed decided to change its counting method by deliberately ignoring 

confirmed but asymptomatic cases.332 U.S. intelligence even believes that China deliber-

ately underreported both the number of sick people and the number of deaths to hide 

the extent of the epidemic in China.333 By late December 2020, figures provided by the 

Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suggested that the number of 

people infected in Wuhan might have been ten times higher than initially reported (nearly 

500,000 instead of 50,000).334 The official death toll (only 4,635) is also surprisingly low for 

a country of 1.4 billion people.

This pandemic has at least been able to reveal the extent of the Chinese influ-

ence within the WHO.335 The reaction of Bruce Aylward, a Canadian epidemiologist and 

head of the international coronavirus observation mission in China, to a question from 

the Hong Kong journalist Yvonne Tong about Taiwan was revealing in this respect. When 

she asked him whether the WHO would consider Taiwan as a member state, Aylward, 

328. Ibid., 13.

329. Ibid., 14.

330. Robertson, “Examining China’s Organ Transplantation System,” 15.

331. “Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” World Health 

Organization (16-24 Feb. 2020); “Steep Decline in Coronavirus Cases in China: WHO Expert,” The Economist Times 

(25 Feb., 2020). 

332. John Xie, “In China, Officials Exclude Asymptomatic COVID-19 Carriers from Data,” VOA (28 Mar. 2020); 

Vivian Wang, “How Many Coronavirus Cases in China? Officials Tweak the Answer,” The New York Times (12 Feb. 

2020); Ken Moritsugu, “New Coronavirus Cases Decline in China as Counting Method Revised Again,” The Diplomat 

(20 Feb. 2020); Yuan Yang, Nian Liu, and Tom Mitchell, “China fall in Coronavirus Cases Undermined by Questionable 

Data,” Financial Times (25 Feb. 2020). 

333. Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs, “China Concealed Extent of Virus Outbreak, U.S. Intelligence Says,” 

Bloomberg (1 Apr. 2020). 

334. 中国疾控中心 (Chinese Center for Disease Control), 科学认识人群新冠病毒抗体流行率——全国新

冠 肺炎血清流行病学调查结果问答, 微信 (Weixin) (28 Dec. 2020), https://archive.vn/4F9lz; Bang Xiao and Alan 

Weedon, “Coronavirus Cases in Wuhan May be Far Higher than Thought, According to China CDC study,” ABC 

News (31 Dec. 2020). 

335. Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup, “How WHO Became China’s Coronavirus Accomplice,” Foreign Policy (2 Apr. 

2020); Renaud Toffier, “L’OMS est-elle vendue à la Chine?” (“Is WHO Sold to China?”), Le Figaro (18 Apr. 2020). 

216

visibly caught off guard, did not know what to say for almost ten seconds, then suggested 

moving on to another question, cut the video call, which was restored a few seconds later, 

and finally, when the journalist insisted that he comment on Taiwan’s management of the 

epidemic, replied that they had “already talked about China.”336 This denial of Taiwan’s 

very existence as a distinct political entity is perfectly in line with the One China policy 

advocated by Beijing. Rather than engaging with a government that has proven its abil-

ity to handle a health crisis effectively and which has even been praised and held up as a 

model,337 the WHO director general accused the Taiwanese government of orchestrating 

a racist campaign against him on social networks;338 a campaign that was later revealed 

to be another information-manipulation operation presumably conducted by Beijing 

(→ p. 474). 

5. A Crippled U.N. Human Rights Council 

On April 1, 2020, China’s Jiang Duan (蒋端) was appointed to the United Nations 

Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Consultative Group alongside representatives from 

Chad, Slovenia, Mexico, and Spain for one year (2020-2021).339 The news led to an out-

pouring of criticism, the decision being compared to making a “pyromaniac into the 

town fire chief.”340 Sitting on the consultative group is not a trivial matter: the five mem-

bers of the HRC consultative group have the power to choose the experts who will 

be responsible for investigating, among other things, human rights violations in the 

framework of special procedures, and whose impartiality should be beyond reproach. 

China will be able to influence the selection of at least 17 experts over the course 

of the year, including potentially the special rapporteur on the promotion and 

protection of freedom of opinion and expression, or members of the working group 

on arbitrary detention. Each member of the consultative group chairs the selection pro-

cess for at least five terms, and the HRC generally appoints the experts selected by the 

consultative group.341 This means that China is likely to succeed in appointing at least five 

candidates who meet its criteria.

The Advisory Group should not be confused with the HRC Advisory Committee, which 

is the HRC’s “think tank.” The Advisory Committee is composed of 18 “independent” 

experts whose role is mainly to produce studies responding to the interests of the HRC.342 

These experts are nominated by their respective governments before being elected by the 

336. The video is online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlCYFh8U2xM; Helen Davidson, “Senior WHO 

Adviser Appears to Dodge Question on Taiwan’s Covid-19 Response,” The Guardian (30 Mar. 2020); June Cheng, “A 

Politicized WHO,” World Magazine (11 Apr. 2020). 

337. Nick Aspinwall, “Taiwan Is Exporting Its Coronavirus Successes to the World,” Foreign Policy (9 Apr. 2020); 

Andreas Kluth, “If We Must Build a Surveillance State, Let’s Do It Properly,” Bloomberg (22 Apr. 2020); “Taiwan: A 

Role Model for Pandemic Management,” Healthcare in Europe (3 Apr. 2020). 

338. “Taiwan Reveals Emails Warning WHO of Disease in December; Dr. Tedros Replies Accusing Taipei of a 

Hate Racist Campaign,” MercoPress (17 Apr. 2020). 

339. “Consultative Group: Nomination, Selection and Appointment of Mandate Holders,” United Nations Human 

Rights Council.

340. “China Joins U.N. Human Rights Panel, Will Help Pick Experts on Free Speech, Health, Arbitrary Detention,” 

UN Watch (3 Apr. 2020). 

341. “La Chine rejoint un groupe des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, suscitant des protestations” (“China Joins a 

Group of Human Rights at the UN, Leading to Protests”), UN Watch (4 Apr. 2020). 

342. “Background Information on the Advisory Committee,” Human Rights Council United Nations.

217

HRC. The expert appointed by the PRC is a diplomat, Liu Xinsheng (刘昕生), whose cur-

rent term does not end until 2022.343 

China’s strategy in this body is to change the general interpretation of the concept 

of human rights to one subordinate to national sovereignty. The two resolutions that 

China pushed through at the UNHRC on “the contribution of development to the enjoy-

ment of all human rights” in 2017, and then on “promoting mutually beneficial cooperation 

in the field of human rights,” in 2018, actually advocated for a regressive vision of rights.344 

This vision promoted by China is positively received by other authoritarian regimes, which 

unsurprisingly support a vision that insists on respect for non-interference.345 To build sup-

port for its human rights principles, China has already organized two editions of the South-

South Human Rights Forum, during which it advocates rights tailored to the regional, 

political, economic, social, cultural, historical and religious contexts of different countries; 

in other words, a vision that denies the universality of human rights.346

With the adoption of the first resolution in 2017, the UNHRC, at China’s request, solic-

ited the consultative committee to study the extent to which development contributes to 

the enjoyment of all human rights by all.347 This is not so much an academic research as a 

maneuver to further imprint the Chinese narrative and impose the Party’s agenda on the 

work of the UNHRC. The study commissioned by China, chaired by Liu Xinsheng and 

whose rapporteur was the committee’s Russian expert, concluded that human rights could 

only be guaranteed for all if the state enjoyed a situation of peace and stability, and that the 

development and stability of a state was intimately linked to human rights.348 As Andrea 

Worden pointed out, this is the kind of narrative that can be easily instrumentalized to 

justify violent repressive measures in the name of stability.349 According to the vision pro-

moted by the PRC, the state – rather than the individual – thus becomes the primary 

subject of development and human rights.

The PRC also takes advantage of its position in the UNHRC to block any criticism 

voiced against its policy, be it about Xinjiang, Tibet, or Hong Kong, and whether the crit-

icism comes from individuals or NGOs. In 2019, Chinese diplomats interrupted the speech 

of the Hong Kong activist and singer Denise Ho at the HRC.350 In June of the same year, 

China invited a UN counterterrorism official, Vladimir Ivanovich Voronkov, to visit Xinjiang, 

thus carrying out a public relations operation: they suggested that Uyghurs were terrorists, 

hence legitimizing Beijing’s repressive policy in the region.351 Michelle Bachelet, the UN High 

Commissioner for Human Rights, is still barred from visiting Xinjiang, despite her willingness 

to draw attention to the conditions of detention in Chinese camps.352

343. Andréa Worden, “The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: A New Tool in China’s Anti-Human 

Rights Strategy,” Sinopsis (6 Aug. 2019).

344. Frédéric Burnand, “À l’ONU, le travail de sape de la Chine contre les droits de l’homme” (“At the UN, China 

Undermines Human Rights”), Justice Info (26 Mar. 2018). 

345. Worden, “The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee.”

346. Melanie Hart, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on “A 

‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion on Alternative Global Norms and Standards” (13 Mar. 2020).

347. “Human Rights Council Adopts 10 texts, Requests a High-Level Panel Discussion on Genocide and a Study 

on the Role of Capacity Building in the Promotion of Human Rights” United Nations Human Rights Council (23 

Mar. 2018). 

348. Draft final Report on Contribution of Development to the Enjoyment of Human Rights, United Nations 

Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, A/HRC/AC/22/CRP.4 (18-22 Feb. 2019).

349. Worden, “The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee.”

350. Joshua Berlinger, “China Interrupts Hong Kong Pop Star during UN Speech,” CNN (9 Jul. 2019). 

351. “UN anti-Terror Official Makes Controversial trip to Xinjiang,” Associated Press (16 Jun. 2019). 

352. Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, “Xinjiang Visit by U.N. Counterterrorism Official Provokes Outcry,” Foreign 

Policy (13 Jun. 2019). 

218

It should be recalled that the PRC is obviously not the only country undermining the 

work of the HRC. Other authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Russia have also 

held or are still holding key positions in the HRC.353 For that matter, the PRC regularly 

seeks the support of these regimes. The difference between China and these regimes is 

that China is more active, and it is able to to influence or paralyze the UNHRC and to 

change the prevailing interpretation of international norms.

China’s influence at the UNHRC is mainly southern, as Beijing has significant 

leverage over the so-called developing countries: on June 30, 2020, a declaration supporting 

Hong Kong’s national security law was voted by 53 states (not only the big authoritarians 

such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and North Korea, but also all the African members of the coun-

cil) with 27 opposing it (mainly European countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 

Japan). This polarization is clearly visible on the map.

In green, the 53 states that voted for the declaration supporting the Chinese law and in red the 27 states that voted against, on 

June 30, 2020 at the UNHRC (© image Acalycine – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, 

https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=92271312).

6. A Committee on NGOs diverted from its mission

The Committee on NGOs is a standing committee of ECOSOC composed of 19 mem-

bers elected for a four-year term, but without a rule limiting the number of successive 

terms a member state can serve. China is currently serving for the 2019-2022 term. This 

committee has the power to approve – or reject – applications from NGOs to receive the 

consultative status that allows them to operate within the United Nations.354 The special 

consultative status gives recipients the power to submit written communications as well 

as petitions to ECOSOC, and the general consultative status also allows them to propose 

items to ECOSOC’s agenda.355 An NGO with consultative status is also able to attend and 

organize events, to expand its network, and conduct lobbying activities.356 Conversely, an 

NGO denied this consultative status has great difficulties acting within the United Nations 

framework.

The PRC has pressured the committee to block or delay granting a consultative sta-

tus to certain NGOs, particularly those working on human rights, but also all those that 

353. In 2015, Saudi Arabia’s presence in the advisory group was also criticized.

354. https://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/committee.htm.

355. “Working with ECOSOC: an NGOs Guide to Consultative Status,” United Nations (2018).

356. “China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE),” MDG World Centre of Excellence.

219

do not conform to the position and terminology that satisfies Beijing with regard to Tibet, 

an “autonomous region of the PRC,” and Taiwan, a “province of China.”357 By formulat-

ing and repeating questions that are often politically motivated or even inappropri-

ate, it postpones the application of some NGOs until the following session – which 

means two to seven months later. The PRC then manages to suspend applications. For 

example, in January 2013, when the NGO Children’s Rights Network (CRN), which had 

applied as early as 2010, was in its fifth round of questioning, the PRC made the following 

three requests rather than addressing CRN’s contribution to children’s rights: “1. Please do 

the necessary corrections to the organization’s website and publications in order to align to 

United Nations terminology when referring to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. 2. 

Please provide a written commitment to respect United Nations terminology when refer-

ring to certain regions of China. 3. Please provide what position the organization has with 

regards to the question of Tibet.”358

In 2015, the Chinese delegation to the Committee on NGOs attempted to make the 

committee’s deliberations even more opaque by proposing not to list the name of the 

member states that oppose or question an NGO’s application for consultative status. The 

proposal was withdrawn, but nonetheless reflects the PRC’s desire to hide its actions.359

In contrast, Chinese NGOs that are more or less openly linked to the Chinese govern-

ment and whose objectives are more or less explicitly aligned with those of the Party do not 

face as many difficulties in obtaining consultative status with ECOSOC. The China 

Foundation for Peace and Development and the China Women’s Development Foundation 

obtained it on their first attempt, in 2014 and 2016 respectively, even though they are both 

affiliated with the United Front (→ p. 62).360

Nearly 30 Chinese NGOs have been granted consultative status today, includ-

ing the United Nations Association of China (中国联合国协会),361 the Chinese People’s 

Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, 中国人民对外友好协会)362 

and the China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE, 中国民间组织国际交

流促进 会),363 which were granted consultative status in 2000, 2001, and 2008, respectively. 

The CNIE, which is a coalition of about 30 NGOs founded in 2005, is the Asia-Pacific 

regional coordinator of the informal UN-NGO-IRENE network;364 it has openly advo-

cated for stricter Chinese government control over NGOs and considers that there are still 

a small number of NGOs engaged in activities that violate Chinese law, threaten China’s 

reunification, security, and ethnic solidarity.365 The CPAFFC, meanwhile, is a United Front-

related organization.366 Other Chinese NGOs with consultative status include the China 

Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) 中国国际民间组织合 作促进会, or the 

357. Joe Sandler Clarke, “United Nations Failing to Represent Vulnerable People, warn NGOs,” The Guardian (11 

Aug. 2015).

358. “The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in the United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,” 

Human Rights Watch (2017). 

359. AFP, “UN Rejects China’s Move to Black Out NGO Criticism,” South China Morning Post (1 Feb. 2015); “The 

Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in the United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,” Human 

Rights Watch (2017). 

360. “The Costs of International Advocacy.”

361. http://www.unachina.org/en/.

362. https://www.cpaffc.org.cn/index/xiehui/xiehui_list/cate/11/lang/2.html.

363. “China NGO Network for International Exchanges (CNIE),” MDG World Centre of Excellence.

364. Ibid.

365. “Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for the Third Cycle of 

Universal Periodic Review of China,” CNIE (Mar. 2018).

366. John Doston, “China Explores Economic Outreach to U.S. States Via United Front Entities,” Jamestown 

Foundation (26 Jun. 2019).

220

China Academy of Culture. Founded in 1992, CANGO was granted the status in 2007 and, 

in 2018, it had over 160 members.367 As for the China Academy of Culture, it is the affiliate 

organization of the CEFC Huaxin conglomerate, whose links to the PLA were previously 

presented (→ p. 116). 

Because of their ties to the Party-State, Chinese NGOs are often referred to as 

“GONGOs,” an acronym for the oxymoron “government-organized non-governmental 

organizations.”368 Rather than representing civil society, Chinese GONGOs such as the 

China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture (CAPDTC, 中

国西 藏文化保护与发展协会)369 actually advocate for Party policies, which is legiti-

mized by the ECOSOC consultative status. One need only identify the members of the 

CAPDTC leadership to gauge its ties to the Party: its honorary chairman, Raidi (热地), and 

its president, Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai (帕巴拉-格列朗杰), both hold important positions 

within the Party. Raidi is a member of the Central Committee and Pagbalha Geleg Namgyai 

is vice-chairman of the CPPCC, the body that oversees the United Front (→ p. 39).370

The CAPDTC presents itself as a non-governmental organization promoting the pres-

ervation and development of Tibetan culture when, in fact, it serves as a platform to 

implement propaganda and intimidation campaigns against all individuals and orga-

nizations critical of China’s policies in Tibet. It also undermines the work of NGOs gen-

uinely interested in defending the rights of Tibetans and the preservation of the Tibetan 

culture.371

7. Influence on regional organizations: the Chinese-European “friendship”

The CCP’s influence on international organizations also extends to regional organizations 

such as the European Union.372 Lacking a seat in the EU, China hopes to infiltrate it 

through informal platforms. A study by researcher Jichang Lulu found that the EU-China 

Friendship Group (EUCFG, 欧洲议会欧中友好小组), the EU-China Friendship 

Association (EUCFA, 欧洲议会欧中友好协会), the EU-China Joint Innovation Centre 

(EUCJIC, 欧盟中国联合创新中心), and the Europe-China Culture and Economy 

Commission (EUCNC, 欧盟中国经济文化委员会) are all informal Chinese-European 

organizations allowing the PRC to surreptitiously turn European elites into instruments 

relaying the Party’s propaganda.373

These informal Chinese-European friendship organizations – which Jichang Lulu called 

friendship clusters – seek to seduce the European elites in order to cultivate a “docile 

neutrality” thanks to “knowledge asymmetry” and “weaponiz[ed] mediocrity.”374 

367. “2018 Annual report,” China Association for NGO Cooperation.

368. Moises Naim, “What is a GONGO?” Foreign Policy (13 October, 2009); Reza Hasmath, Timothy Hildebrandt 

and Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, “Conceptualizing Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations,” Journal of Civil 

Society, 15:3 (2019). 

369. http://www.tibetculture.org.cn. 

370. “中国西藏文化保护与发展协会理事会领导机构” (“CAPDTC Board of Directors”), CAPDTC (22 Apr. 

2019). 

371. Bhuchung K. Tsering, “This is how China Preserves and Develops Tibetan Culture,” Central Tibetan 

Administration (26 Mar. 2014); “China Fails to Shut Down Scrutiny of its Violations as UN Council Adopts China 

Rights Report,” International Campaign for Tibet (20 Mar. 2014); “Forum on Tibetan Cultural Preservation Upholds Party 

Development Policy,” Congressional-executive Commission on China (3 Nov. 2006). 

372. “La Chine à l’assaut de Bruxelles: un réseau d’organisations influentes (1/4)” (“China Storming Brussels: A 

Network of Influential Organizations (1/4),” Asie Pacifique News (11 Dec. 2018). 

373. Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing Democracy: The European Parliament China Friendship Cluster,” Sinopsis (26 

Nov. 2019). 

374. Ibid. 

221

Yet they have explicit links with Party organs such as the Chinese People’s Association for 

Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, 中国人民对外友好协会) and the China 

Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT, 中国国际贸易促进委员会), 

or even directly to the CCP International Liaison Department and the United Front Work 

Department (UFWD).375

The courted elites become potential vehicles for Chinese interests in the European 

Parliament. A former British MEP and EUCFA president Nirj Deva is a supporter of 

Chinese positions. In 2019, he said he could not think of “one big mistake” that China made 

in the last fifteen years, thus endorsing Beijing’s policies as nearly one million Uyghurs were 

massively interned in Xinjiang.376 He also took a stand in favor of Huawei and reportedly 

urged his fellow MEPs to do the same.377 In 2009, he made a name for himself during the 

visit of Rebiya Kadeer, president of the World Uyghur Congress. Addressing the European 

Parliament’s Human Rights Committee, she denounced the Chinese government’s misman-

agement of the bloody July riots in Urumqi, among other things.378 Nirj Deva replied: “If 

the Uyghur language is banned, how come she is fluent in it today?”; “If Rebiya Kadeer’s 

rights are indeed violated, how come she could become a member of the Chinese People’s 

Political Consultative Conference?”; “If Rebiya Kadeer is indeed discriminated against, 

how come she can become one of the richest women in China.”379 These ad hominem 

attacks sought to delegitimize her rather than to address the substance of the issues raised.

These questions were actually brought to Nirj Deva by his assistant and EUCFG secre-

tary general, Gai Lin (盖琳), who is of Chinese origin.380 Indeed, he reportedly suggested 

the idea to create the EUCFG to Nirj Deva, pointing out that there was an EU-Taiwan 

friendship group but none for the PRC.381 He also suggested that the mistrust or even 

anti-Chinese sentiment among Europeans was only due to the many prejudices they harbor 

toward China.382 Gai Lin is the first EU official of Chinese nationality. He was born in 

1981 in Shenyang, Liaoning, and he studied in Belgium. He reportedly first met Nirj Deva 

in a bar and was later recruited as his assistant. Deva is said to have made a special request 

to the president of the European Parliament to be authorized to recruit Gai Lin.383

In 2006, Gai Lin and Nirj Deva founded the EUCFG with the aim of promoting a 

better understanding of China. About 40 MEPs from about 20 countries and seven 

different political groups – the list was never disclosed – are apparently members 

of this friendship group. About ten of them held key positions such as president of a 

political group, parliamentary committee or delegation in the European Parliament.384 The 

EUCFG regularly organizes trips to China for its members, including trips to Tibet, while 

375. Ibid. 

376. Ibid. 

377. Leigh Baldwin and Peter Geoghegan, “Senior Tory Revealed as Huawei Cheerleader in Brussels,” Open 

Democracy (2 May 2019). 

378. Qu Bing, “European Parliament’s New Powers and the Implications for China,” GR:EEN Working Paper (11 

Nov. 2011). 

379. “Des eurodéputés réfutent les discours séparatistes de Rebiya Kadeer” (“MEPs Disproved the Separatist 

Speeches of Rebiya Kadeer”), China.org (3 Sept. 2009), http:// archive.vn/tzMuR. 

380. Gai Lin, My Experience in the European Parliament (Evanston: Northeastern University Press, 2009), 63, cited by 

Juchang Lulu, “Repurposing Democracy.”

381. “Une délégation du groupe d’amitié Parlement européen – Taiwan reçue à Taipei” (“A Delegation of the 

European Parliament – Taiwan Group hosted in Taipei”), Taiwan Info (19 Feb. 2019). 

382. Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing Democracy.”

383. “盖琳：欧洲议会的中国80后” (“Gai Lin: The Chinese 30-Year Old of the European Parliament”), Blog sina 

(12 Aug. 2010), http://archive.vn/fgmqd. 

384. “About Group,” EU-China Friendship Association.

222

the European Parliament’s official working group on China still has not been authorized 

into the region.385

Gai Lin is the secretary general of EUCFG and of the EU-China Friendship Association. 

While the group promotes Chinese-European relations from a political viewpoint, the 

association is dedicated to all non-political aspects such as culture, research, tourism, trade, 

etc.386 Gai Lin is also associate professor at the School of International Relations at the 

University of International Business and Economics and founding president of an asso-

ciation of Northeast Chinese (Dongbei) in Europe (欧洲东北同乡会暨商会).387 This 

association, which may have ties to the United Front, has also implemented a campaign to 

“present the Chinese experience in the fight against Covid-19” to the health services of the 

European Parliament.388 

In 2009, Gai Lin published a book about his experience in the European Parliament.389 

His personal ambition was to show the “true face” of China, especially with regard to the 

situation in Tibet, to MEPs.390 He was pleased with his “achievements”: the EUCFG sup-

ported the 2008 Olympic Games in China, but also the Chinese people after the earthquake 

in Wenchuan, Sichuan, by collecting tents, and the group was hosted several times by the 

highest authorities of the PRC, including then-President Hu Jintao. When the European 

Parliament received the Dalai Lama in 2012, Gai Lin strongly criticized this decision by 

signing an op-ed in European Voice, as secretary general of EUCFG, in which he urged 

Europe to “focus on helping its jobless rather than on Tibet.”391