B. Influence on foreign cultural productions

1. Influencing the cinema of others: the example of Hollywood

China’s strategy in the cultural sector and particularly in the production of cultural 

goods is often summarized by the expression “borrowing a boat out to sea” (借船出海). 

This Chengyu means in common parlance: “to benefit from someone’s help” or “to bor-

row someone else’s resources to achieve one’s own goals.” And, as the journalist Bethany 

Allen-Ebrahimian puts it, “Hollywood is the world’s largest and most powerful boat,”1062 

in the sense that it is arguably the most influential artistic and cultural medium. 

In a particularly comprehensive report on the subject, the NGO PEN America, which 

defends freedom of expression in the country and around the world, shows how, in order 

not to upset Beijing and maintain an access to the gigantic Chinese market, “[as] 

U.S. film studios compete for the opportunity to access Chinese audiences, many 

are making difficult and troubling compromises on free expression: changing the 

content of films intended for international – including American audiences; engaging 

in self-censorship; agreeing to provide a censored version of a movie for screening in 

China; and in some instances directly inviting Chinese government censors onto their 

film sets […].”1063

This growing acceptance of Chinese censorship, PEN America points out, is 

all the more disturbing because, while regularly producing “patriotic” films that con-

tribute significantly to American soft power, Hollywood does not hesitate to chip away 

at the U.S. political life and is seen as being out of Washington’s control – but not of 

Beijing’s. 

The problem is even more acute today as the Chinese film market is on its way to 

become the world’s largest market. China’s quarterly box office revenues exceeded those 

of the United States for the first time in the first quarter of 2018 and were expected to 

surpass yearly U.S. revenues in 2020, becoming the world’s largest market, according to 

estimates made prior to the Covid-19 pandemic that hit the film industry hard around the 

world. Even though China became the world’s first market to regain its box office in August 

2020,1064 the latest estimates indicated that the Chinese market will have to wait a few more 

years before outperforming the U.S. market.1065 In any case, a trend is observable, and 

because of its size, the Chinese market has become unavoidable for major American 

studios. In recent years, blockbusters such as Avengers: Endgame (2019), Spider-Man: Far from 

Home (2019), and Fast & Furious Presents: Hobbs & Shaw (2019) generated more money in 

China than in the U.S.1066

Chinese investments in Hollywood films have also grown considerably in recent 

years: in the top 100 most profitable films worldwide, China contributed to financing 12 

Hollywood films in 17 years (between 1997 and 2013), and 41 in just 5 years (between 2014 

1062. Cited in Made in Hollywood, Censored by Beijing: The U.S. Film Industry and Chinese Government Influence, PEN 

America (August 2020), 21.

1063. Made in Hollywood, 2.

1064. Rebecca Davis, “China is World’s First Market to Achieve Full Box Office Recovery, Says Analytics Firm,” 

Variety (27 Aug. 2020).

1065. Marrian Zhou, “China’s Movie Industry Won’t Surpass US in 2020 After All: Report,” Nikkei Asia (23 Sept. 

2020).

1066. Made in Hollywood, 8.

351

and 2018).1067 The offensive is blatant, and these Chinese investments give Beijing consid-

erable leverage over the U.S. studios that benefit from them. 

This dependence is not reciprocal: while Hollywood needs China more and more, 

China needs Hollywood less and less, not only because the technical progress made by 

the Chinese film industry in recent years allows for more Chinese productions to satisfy 

their audiences’ thirst for blockbusters, but also because the “Cold War” with the United 

States makes Chinese authorities and its public more hostile to U.S. productions. Whereas 

Hollywood productions dominated the top 10 biggest hits in China before 2018, in 2020, 

only one did, the other spots being taken by Chinese and Hong Kong films.1068 As the 

Chinese market becomes increasingly important but also competitive, American 

studios are encouraged to double down on their efforts to please Beijing.

a. Access to the Chinese market

There are three ways to access the Chinese market. The first is quota: according to 

a Sino-American agreement of 2012, American films have 34 spots per year on the Chinese 

market. These coveted seats are, in fact, almost exclusively occupied by blockbusters. For 

some, this ceiling is more problematic than content censorship: the limited number of 

American films authorized in China “is the real censorship that is going on. That 

is the real limit on [freedom of] expression,” explained a Hollywood writer.1069 The deci-

sion-making process – the acceptance or rejection of a film – is vague. And this opacity 

contributes to self-censorship because, as the limits of what is acceptable are blurred, 

studios take as few risks as possible to maximize their chances. 

The second way to distribute a film in China is the fixed fee or buy-out model, 

whereby the foreign studio agrees to transfer all profits made in China to the Chinese 

distributor in exchange for a flat fee. Thirty to forty films a year enter the Chinese market 

this way, primarily independent films (blockbusters occupying most of the quota spots), to 

which censorship is also applied.

The third way, which is increasingly used, is the co-production of a foreign movie 

with a Chinese studio. It has several advantages, as the films in question are not consid-

ered foreign (e.g., they are not affected by the periods during the year when Beijing prohibits 

the screening of foreign films to promote its domestic film industry).1070 However, co-pro-

duction is also the formula that allows Beijing to exert the most significant influence 

on content, with the Chinese partner playing an intermediary role with the censors: they 

are present from the beginning and at each stage of the film’s creation. Besides, the China 

Film Coproduction Corporation (CFCC), a division of CFGC, sets artistic limitations: at 

least one-third of the financial investment and casting must be Chinese, and at least one 

scene must be shot in China. For example, when a Chinese production company funded 

40% of Looper (2012), reclassifying the film as a co-production, the character played by 

Bruce Willis, who was to divide his time between Paris and Kansas, finally split it between 

Paris and Shanghai, and was united with a Chinese woman played by Xu Qing.1071 Similarly, 

in the book on which the film The Meg (2018) was based, the events took place in Hawaii, 

1067. Amy Qin and Audrey Carlsen, “How China Is Rewriting Its Own Script,” The New York Times (18 Nov. 2018).

1068. Made in Hollywood, 8.

1069. Ibid., 34.

1070. Ibid., 36.

1071. Jonathan Landreth, “Endgame, DMG Team to Make Rian Johnson’s ‘Looper,’” Hollywood Reporter (18 Jan. 

2011).

352

whereas the film script of a U.S.-China joint production relocated it to China. In addition, 

the scientists who were Japanese in the book became Chinese. 

Co-productions are sometimes more or less hidden. For example, China: Times of 

Xi, a three-episode documentary series aired on Discovery Channel in October 2017, was 

presented as “an independent television production” when, in fact, it was the brainchild of 

“a three-year content coproduction deal inked in March 2015 between Discovery Networks 

Asia-Pacific and China Intercontinental Communications Centre (CICC), a company oper-

ated by the State Council Information Office (CSIO) – the Chinese government organ shar-

ing an address with the Central Propaganda Department’s Office of Foreign Propaganda 

(OFP).”1072 

PEN America pointed out that what appears to be a protectionist measure on the outset 

has another dimension in an authoritarian state where production companies are almost all 

state-owned or controlled in some way by the state, where the actors are those authorized 

by the Party, and where the authorities decide which scenes should be shot in China, where 

and how, to portray only “a sanitized image of China.”1073 

Furthermore, co-productions must also comply with a set of rules (Provisions on the 

Administration of Sino-Foreign Cooperative Production of Films, 2004). Article 6(a), for example, 

obliges co-productions to “be in accord with the Constitution, laws, regulations and the 

relevant provisions of China,” to “respect the customs, religions, beliefs and living habits 

of all ethnic groups in China”, to “facilitate the propagation of the refined indigenous 

culture and traditions of China” and “the social stability of China” (social stability which, 

PEN America noted, is one of the arguments used against dissidents or ethnic minorities, 

especially the Uyghurs). Furthermore, Article 16 states that the film can only be screened 

“inside or outside China” after it has passed the government’s “examination,” or censorship, 

which occurs at any time, from the preliminary examination of the script to the verification 

of the finished film, – and is conducted by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department. 

Government censors were present on the Chinese campus of DreamWorks Animation 

to oversee the creation of Kung Fu Panda III (2016) for instance, a Chinese-American joint 

production (China Film Group, DreamWorks Animation and Oriental DreamWorks).1074

b. Blacklists

The turning point came in 1997, with the successive release of Kundun, on the youth 

of the Dalai Lama; Seven Years in Tibet, which showed, among other things, the invasion 

of Tibet by China; and Red Corner, the story of an American lawyer wrongly accused of 

murder in China. Not only did Beijing refuse to authorize their release in China, but their 

directors and main actors were allegedly blacklisted and the production companies involved 

prevented from working in China for five years.1075 Although China’s market was modest 

in size at the time, comparable to Peru’s, Hollywood immediately got the message. Michael 

Eisner, the then-CEO of Disney, which had produced Kundun, met with Chinese Prime 

Minister Zhu Rongji in October 1998 in Beijing, apologized, and promised that it would 

1072. Christopher Walker, “China’s Foreign Influence and Sharp Power Strategy to Shape and Influence Democratic 

Institutions” (U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, National Endowment for Democracy, 16 May 

2019). 

1073. Made in Hollywood, 37.

1074. Ibid., 37.

1075. Ibid., 8-9.

353

not happen again.1076 Indeed, the U.S. studios gradually conformed to the expectations of 

the Chinese government afterward. 

The blacklistings of producers, directors, or actors deemed hostile to China are 

of varying intensity: they may be limited to a warning; one or more visa refusals; or 

last for decades. Brad Pitt, who was (presumably) blacklisted for acting in Seven Years in 

Tibet, was able to return to China in 2014 solely, while the director Jean-Jacques Annaud was 

asked as early as 2009 to direct a Franco-Chinese co-production. On this occasion, in a let-

ter in Chinese published on Weibo, which is now deleted but preserved and reproduced by 

PEN America, Annaud issued an apology. He expressed his “deep regret” for the negative 

impact that Seven Years in Tibet had in China and declared that he had “never participated in 

any organization or association related to Tibet.” Furthermore, he had “never supported 

Tibetan independence, nor […] had personal contact with the Dalai Lama, let alone been 

his friend.”1077 After making amends in 2009, Annaud made up for his past decision by 

making a film co-produced by a Chinese company (The Last Wolf, 2015). He also signed 

“a strategic partnership agreement with China for two films in the next three years,”1078 

also becoming a member of the Strategic Committee of the France China Foundation 

(→ p. 268)1079 (and his biography on their website, which cited many of his films, still omits 

to mention Seven Years in Tibet).1080

c. Cut or modify to suit

One of Beijing’s objectives is to censor content perceived as threatening, particularly the 

five “poisons” (Uyghurs, Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, pro-democracy activists and 

Taiwanese independence supporters) but also, more broadly, anything that could question 

the CCP’s authority.

The simplest censorship is removing a scene, a shot or a line of dialogue following 

a demand by Chinese authorities as a condition to access to the Chinese market. 

Thus, in Pirates of the Caribbean 3 (2007), half of the appearances of Captain Sao Feng, 

played by the Hong Kong actor Chow Yun-Fat, were suppressed in a completely assumed 

manner (according to Xinhua), as Beijing considered them to be “vilifying and defacing the 

Chinese.”1081 Similarly, the Chinese version of Men In Black 3 (2012) is 13 minutes shorter 

than the original one: among the deleted scenes are references to Internet censorship by the 

Chinese government – an ironic and self-defeating censorship, since it confirms what they 

intended to conceal – but also the scene of a fight in Chinatown. 

Hollywood studios also produced a Chinese version of Mission Impossible III (2006) with-

out the scene in which Ethan Hunt kills a Chinese henchman and without a shot showing 

tattered underwear hanging from the clothesline of a Shanghai apartment; or a Chinese 

version of the James Bond movie Skyfall (2012) without the scene during which a Chinese 

security guard is killed and without lines of dialogue referring to prostitution and torture by 

the police. Same-sex kissing was also removed from the films Cloud Atlas (2013), Star Trek 

1076. Ben Cohen, Erich Schwartzel, and James T. Areddy, “NBA Stars study Hollywood’s playbook in China,” Wall 

Street Journal (12 Oct. 2019).

1077. Letter of December 28, 2009 published on Weibo and reproduced in Made in Hollywood, 17.

1078. “Annaud signe un nouveau film en coproduction avec la Chine” (“Annaud Signs for a New Movie coproduced 

with China”), France Info (27 Mar. 2014).

1079. On the FCF, see Harold Thibault and Solenn de Royer, “Dans les coulisses de la France China Foundation, 

pépinière à élites entre Paris et Pékin” (“Behind the Scenes of the France China Foundation, an Incubator for the 

Elites Between Paris and Beijing”), Le Monde (26 May 2020).

1080. France China Foundation, Strategic Council, https://francechinafoundation.org/strategic/?lang=fr.

1081. “Disney’s ‘Pirates 3’Slashed in China,” China Daily (15 Jun. 2007).

354

Beyond (2016) and Alien: Covenant (2017).1082 Of course, PEN America noted that China is 

not the only country in the world to censor films. However, the size of its market gives it 

unparalleled leverage over Hollywood: while other states cut foreign films themselves, 

after their initial release, sometimes in an artisanal way, and without informing the 

producers, Beijing can force U.S. studios to produce an altered version of their film, 

i.e. to do “the dirty work for them,” which also has the advantage of concealing censor-

ship.1083 

U.S. studios have an interest in internalizing the constraint because external and 

post facto censorship can cost them time and money: time for the Chinese censors to 

evaluate the film once it is made, to ask for the withdrawal or the modification of certain 

scenes, which sometimes have to be entirely re-shot. All of this has a cost – and a delayed 

Chinese release may incur additional costs if it comes after the U.S. release and requires 

to reschedule the planned communication plan. Therefore, U.S. studios had adopted 

internal and ex-ante censorship, i.e., self-censorship, producing from the outset the 

most irreproachable film possible, being complacent toward Beijing to maximize 

their chances of quickly obtaining an imprimatur from Chinese authorities. Meanwhile, and 

to know in advance what Beijing’s red lines could be, the studios call on consultants, open 

informal channels of communication with Chinese authorities, and use their Chinese part-

ners – their Chinese distributor or instance – as “cultural intermediaries between Hollywood 

and the censors.”1084 Throughout filmmaking (at the script, casting, shooting, production 

stages), they hope to anticipate and avoid potential irritants, hence ensuring that the film 

remains within the limits of what is acceptable to Beijing.

The examples of censorship cited above deal with Chinese versions that exist alongside 

the original version. In some cases, however, self-censorship implies modifying the 

original version, as shown by several examples involving Sony. The best-known is the film 

Red Dawn (2012), which was supposed to tell the story of a group of Americans resisting 

a Chinese occupation of the United States. That was the plan, and that is what the studio 

filmed. However, after the filming, the Chinese soldiers were replaced by North Korean 

soldiers “by digitally altering the Chinese flags and insignias into North Korean ones” (see 

image below).1085 This change occurred after Chinese diplomats made the film’s producers 

aware of the issue by using a production company with offices in both the US and China 

“as a go-between and mediator.”1086 

1082. Made in Hollywood, 21.

1083. Ibid, 22.

1084. Ibid, 23

1085. Ibid, 24 

1086. Ibid., 24.

355

Similarly, Sony also altered the film Robocop (2014) to downplay the historical ties 

between the US company Omnicorp and the Chinese government in the storyline, while 

acknowledging in an email that this was indeed “censorship” (see below).1087 Also, Sony 

had several scenes removed from the film Pixels (2015), including one in which extra-

terrestrial beings pierced the Great Wall: they decided to blow up the Taj Mahal instead. 

Justifying the decision to change the original version of the film, one of Sony’s execu-

tives explained in an email that changing the sole Chinese version would have attracted 

the attention of “the press to call us out for this when bloggers invariably compare the 

versions.”1088

Source: https://wikileaks.org/sony/emails/emailid/182471.

1087. Clare Baldwin, “How Sony Sanitized Films to Please China’s Censors,” Japan Times (26 Jul. 2015).

1088. Made in Hollywood, 24.

356

Source: https://wikileaks.org/sony/emails/emailid/184517.

Other examples of rewriting include changing a dialogue about 

the origin of the virus in the zombie movie World War Z (2013), 

which was China in the original script based on Max Brooks’ 

(2006) eponymous novel (based on the SARS epidemic of 2002-

2004). Dialogues were changed to conceal this Chinese origin, at 

the request of the production company Paramount in the hope 

of passing Beijing’s censorship – but this was evidently not 

enough, since the film was not allowed in China, perhaps for 

other reasons (Brad Pitt, perhaps still blacklisted, starred in it 

and also co-produced it).1089 A Tibetan character was replaced by 

a Celtic one in Dr. Strange (2016) and the Japanese and Taiwanese flags on Tom Cruise’s 

leather jacket were erased from the trailer of Top Gun: Maverick (2020), a movie partly pro-

duced by Chinese Tencent Pictures. It did not go unnoticed. 

Hollywood is a spectacular yet not unique case: there are other examples, else-

where in the world, of films modified to avoid displeasing Beijing. A famous case is 

the decision to cut the contribution of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, a figure of the Chinese 

political opposition, from the German collective movie Berlin, I Love You (2019), a compila-

tion of ten short films.1090

“Over time, writers and creators do not even conceive of ideas, stories, or charac-

ters that would flout the rules [established by Beijing], because there is no point in 

doing so. […] This all means, that censorship is most notable not for its presence, 

but for the absence it creates: the absence of films, stories, characters, and plotlines 

that would have existed – or existed in a different form – were it not for the power 

of the censor.”1091 

1089. Made in Hollywood, 28-29.

1090. Scott Roxborough, “Ai Weiwei Was Cut from ‘Berlin, I Love You’ Because Backers Feared a China Backlash,” 

Hollywood Reporter (18 Feb. 2019).

1091. Made in Hollywood, 4.

357

d. Add or modify in order to please

Chinese authorities do not simply have a negative objective (avoiding some con-

tent), they also have a positive objective: to promote certain other content, i.e. to 

shape the Hollywood narrative on China in order to show the country in a positive, pow-

erful, rich, stable, harmonious way. Speaking in Los Angeles in 2013, the president of the 

China Film Group Corporation (CFGC), the largest state-owned film production and dis-

tribution company in China, reached out to US filmmakers (“We have a huge market and 

we want to share it with you”), but with one condition to cooperation: “[we] want films that 

are heavily invested in Chinese culture, not one or two shots […]. We want to see positive 

Chinese images.”1092 

Some had understood this for a long time, taking several measures such as including 

“good” and empowed Chinese characters (which in itself is a good thing if it corrects 

racist stereotypes on Asians previously found in Western cinema). But also filming more 

in China and giving China the “right” role in screenplays, that of a country help-

ing others and even saving the world – the films 2012 (2009), Gravity (2013) and Arrival 

(2016) are examples of this trend.1093 Additionally, it can mean depicting China as the future 

of the world: in Looper (2012), a character from the future invites the hero to go to China. 

Correlatively, the same desire to please explains that, for some years now, “there [has 

been] no more Chinese villains in American films.”1094 Americans are sometimes even 

described in a less flattering way than the Chinese: in Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014), 

for example, the bad guys were CIA agents whereas the Chinese government was respon-

sible, efficient and benevolent, and on the “good” side – which made journalist David S. 

Cohen say that it was “A Splendidly Patriotic Film, If You Happen To Be Chinese.”1095 As 

a result, the film broke audience and revenue records in China. Another example that put 

a smile on people’s faces was the Megalodon in The Meg (2018), whose action took place in 

China: it seemed to prefer to devour and cut Westerners to pieces, while Chinese characters 

fared better.1096

Other cases are more political. In Abominable 

(2019), a Sino-American co-production (Pearl 

Studio and DreamWorks Animation), a map of 

the region that appeared in one scene displayed 

the “nine-dash line,” i.e., Beijing’s territorial 

claim on the South China Sea, a claim contested 

by its neighbors. The UN Permanent Court of 

Arbitration ruled in 2016 on a dispute between 

China and the Philippines that this claim was con-

trary to international law (maritime law in that 

case). This judgment, however, did not prevent 

China from defending the “nine-dash line” by printing it in its passports, on T-shirts worn 

by Chinese tourists (→ p. 405) or by slipping it into a Hollywood film. This practice did not 

escape the notice of its neighbors: Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines were outraged 

1092. Qin and Carlsen, “How China Is Rewriting Its Own Script.”

1093. Made in Hollywood, 31.

1094. Yuval Bustan, “Why are There No More Chinese Villains in American Films?” Forbes (18 Nov. 2018).

1095. David S. Cohen, “‘Transformers:’ A Splendidly Patriotic Film, If You Happen To Be Chinese (Opinion),” 

Variety (3 Jul. 2014).

1096. Josh Ye, “Is Global Box Office Smash the Meg Pandering to China?” South China Morning Post (16 Aug. 2018).

358

and called to boycott the film. The Malaysian government demanded that a version without 

this controversial plan be produced for the Malaysian public, which DreamWorks refused, 

leading the Malaysian government to ban the film. This case is an example of “a major 

Hollywood studio refusing censorship from one government, for the purpose of better 

adhering to the propagandistic expectations of another government – in essence, prioritiz-

ing the wishes of one country’s censors over another’s.”1097

#SupportMulan (2019)

In August 2019, when the shooting of the film Mulan (2020) neared completion, the Chinese-

American actress Liu Ximeizi (刘茜美子) better known by her stage name Liu Yifei (or Crystal 

Liu) shared on Weibo an image supporting Hong Kong police forces that read: “I support the 

Hong Kong police. You can beat me up now. What a shame for Hong Kong.” She also added 

the hashtag #ISupportHongKongPolice. It was shared more than 65,000 times in less than 24 

hours. 

Supporters of Hong Kong demonstrators then called for a boycott of the film using the 

hashtag #BoycottMulan, after it first emerged on the Hong Kong discussion forum LIHKG 

and quickly spread around the world. Beijing seized the opportunity to make the film a “loyalty 

litmus test”1098 by supporting a counter-campaign using #SupportMulan on social networks, 

going so far as to associate this hashtag with images comparing Hong Kong militants to the 

terrorist group Islamic State. This coordinated campaign proved “inauthentic” because it used 

fake accounts and bots – pushing Twitter and Facebook to delete incriminated accounts and 

their associated pages.1099

Disney, which produced the film, was careful not to intervene in this controversy. PEN 

America blamed it for its silence, which “further enabled Beijing to utilize the studio’s movie as 

a tool of antidemocratic propaganda without pushback. [In conclusion,] the #SupportMulan 

government-backed “movement” goes to show that even if Hollywood studios aim to make 

their movies as inoffensive as possible – with the definition of “inoffensive” being highly 

responsive to what Beijing declares as offensive – the CCP is more than willing to impose a 

political agenda on these films, leveraging even unanticipated controversies as opportunities to 

pursue their creative propaganda while pulling studios along for the ride.”1100

1097. Made in Hollywood, 40.

1098. Ibid., 32.

1099. Jude Dry, “Twitter Deletes Chinese Accounts That Spread Misinformation About ‘Mulan’ Boycott,” IndieWire 

( 20 Aug. 2019).

1100. Made in Hollywood, 32.

359

Sometimes, studios produce a Chinese ver-

sion that goes even further, adding scenes, 

products, dialogues, and cultural references 

for the Chinese audience. For example, the 

Chinese version of Looper (2012) contains several 

scenes shot in Shanghai absent from its interna-

tional version. Another known example is Iron 

Man 3 (2013). The film had benefited from a sig-

nificant investment by a Beijing production company and had partly been filmed in Beijing. 

Subsequently, Marvel Studios made a Chinese version with several additional scenes to 

include Chinese actors (including the actress and singer Fan Bingbing) and Chinese product 

placement: For instance, to revitalize himself, Iron Man drank “Gu Li Duo,” a milky drink 

from the Yili brand (which could be an attempt by the company to regain credibility after a 

health scandal revealed abnormally high levels of mercury in their mother’s milk). Other 

Chinese brands are also highlighted (TCL, Zoomlion). A group of Chinese schoolchildren 

and Chinese doctors was also featured trying to save Iron Man’s life. In exchange, the film 

received many “benefits, including an optimal release date, a more permissive government 

attitude toward their film advertisements, and a ‘high degree of media access in China’ [and] 

a promotional segment for the film on CCTV’s annual Chinese New Year gala, a highly 

visible placement that would not have been possible without the Party’s active acquies-

cence.”1101

2. Other cultural sectors

The case of Hollywood is emblematic of China’s willingness and ability to influence 

the messages conveyed by cinema. However, other cultural sectors are also victim of 

pressure from Beijing to produce art that is compatible with the CCP’s expecta-

tions. 

Denying access to the Chinese market is a common practice that targets all 

artists critical of the Party-State, especially those supporting one of the five “poi-

sons.” Many musicians, including Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga, Oasis, Guns N’ Roses, Elton 

John, Maroon 5, Linkin Park, Björk and Katy Perry, are persona non-grata in China because 

they have supported Tibet, Taiwan, or “Chinese Democracy” (the title of a Guns N’ 

Roses album).1102 Through other types of pressure, Beijing hopes to encourage artists 

to alter their works, to stop showing them elsewhere in the world, and even to 

do the work of Chinese censors. In the following lines, we will only provide a few 

examples of this practice. 

First, regarding museums. In a context of “a hardening [in the summer of 2020] of 

the Chinese government’s position against the Mongolian minority,” Beijing put pressure 

on the Museum of Nantes, which had been planning an exhibition on Genghis Khan 

and the Mongolian empire. To that end, Nantes’ museum had signed a piece loan agree-

ment with the Inner Mongolia Museum in Hohhot (China), but the authorities wanted 

them to remove the words “Genghis Khan,” “empire,” and “Mongolian” from the title. 

Subsequently, the Chinese authorities sent a new contract to the museum in Nantes indi-

1101. Ibid., 26.

1102. Amy X. Wang, “Justin Bieber Joins the Illustrious List of Musicians Banned from China”, Quartz (21 Jul. 

2017).

360

cating “that all the exhibition and catalog texts and the cartographic elements need to be 

sent to China for validation,” as well as a new text introducing the exhibition in which 

“the word Mongol appears on the twelfth page, Genghis Khan completely disappeared, 

and the viewpoint centered on the Han dynasty.”1103 In other words, Beijing wanted to 

make the Mongolian culture disappear and to use this exhibition as propaganda 

for its national narrative. “Inner Mongolia, an autonomous territory, in theory, is very 

much controlled by the central government, which intends to impose its language and 

religion, those of the Hans. [For Beijing,] it is not acceptable that the exhibition puts 

forward a discourse that breaks with the national narrative,” explained historian Marie-

Dominique Even.1104 Hence, Nantes’ museum decided to postpone its exhibition until 

2024 to find pieces from European and American museums instead.

Second, the video game industry. On October 6, 2019, during the Hearthstone 

Grandmasters in Taiwan, Ng Wai Chung (吳偉聰), a Hong Kong-based professional 

gamer known as “Blitzchung,” opted for mask similar to those worn by Hong Kong 

protesters. He then declared “Liberate Hong Kong, the revolution of our times.” Shortly 

afterwards, electric power was cut off at the event. The next day, the Blizzard Company, 

in which Tencent owns 5%, announced that Blitzchung was banned from participat-

ing in its tournaments for one year because he had allegedly offended the public and 

damaged the company’s image. The Party, in this case, did not necessarily ask Blizzard 

to sanction the professional gambler. However, the risk of seeing its market share 

decline in China led the video game company to anticipate the Party’s demands. 

In theater also, Chinese diplomats regularly try to ban performances they con-

sider contrary to the CCP’s interests. For example, in 2017, the Chinese embassy put 

pressure on the Royal Danish Theatre to stop a planned performance by the Shen Yun 

dance company, which is linked to Falun Gong. Sometimes the coercion is so inter-

nalized by China’s partners that the Party no longer needs to exert pressure; local 

authorities volunteer. For example, in 2018, the Royal Court Theatre in London gave 

up performing a play about Tibet, not after being pressured by Chinese authorities, but 

by the British Council, which noted that performing the play could harm the Royal Court 

Theatre’s activities in China.1105 It was, therefore, a case of British self-censorship, so as not 

to risk harming business in China. Notwithstanding, the play was eventually performed in 

2019.1106 Self-censorship – allowing Beijing to win without a fight – is the desired 

end effect.

Finally, in areas where the work needs a medium to be disseminated, such as pictures on 

websites or social network accounts, Beijing frequently succeeds in having the content 

removed by putting pressure on publishers. This is what the photographer Patrick Wack, 

author of a photography book on Xinjiang (Dust, André Frère Editions, 2021), was made 

to understand. Kodak had initially asked him to publish a dozen images on their Instagram 

account, which they did, with an accompanying text provided by the author that denounced 

the repression in Xinjiang. Then Kodak suddenly removed them, explaining that “the views 

1103. Pierre-Baptiste Vanzini, “À Nantes, la Chine tente de censurer une exposition sur l’empire mongol” (“In 

Nantes, China Tries to Censor an Exhibition About the Mongol Empire”), Le Parisien (14 Oct. 2020) (All the quotes in 

the paragraph are taken from this article).

1104. Sylvie Kerviel, “Une exposition sur Gengis Khan au Musée d’histoire de Nantes censurée par la Chine” (“An 

Exhibition on Gengis Khan at the Nantes Museum of History Censored by China”), Le Monde (13 Oct. 2020).

1105. Ben Quinn, “Royal Court Dropped Tibet Play after Advice from British Council,” The Guardian (4 Apr. 2018).

1106. Georgina Choekyi Doji et al., “Pah-La – A shallow and Confusing Examination of Tibetan Non-Violent 

Resistance,” Tibetan Review (18 Apr. 2019).

361

expressed by Mr. Wack do not represent those of Kodak and are not endorsed by Kodak. 

We apologize for any misunderstanding or offense this post may have caused.” “I think they 

got harassed by Chinese nationalists, and management got scared,” Wack believed.1107 The 

message published by Kodak is indeed very similar to those published by the many private 

companies that yield to Chinese censorship → p. 247).

1107. Laurence Defranoux, “Photos du Xinjiang: Wack assume, Kodak s’écrase” (“Xinjiang photos: Wack assumes, 

Kodak crashes”) Libération (21 Jul. 2021). 

362

IX. Information Manipulations

According to our analysis from our namesake 2018 report, information manipula-

tions are intentional (thus assuming the intention to harm), clandestine (their victims 

are unaware of it), and coordinated campaigns of dissemination of false or deliberately 

distorted news.1108 They are therefore distinct from propaganda and public diplomacy, 

which are carried out openly, in an assumed way. These manipulations correspond to 

what Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, in a 1984 study on Soviet “active measures,” 

called covert disinformation, defined as “a non-attributed or falsely attributed communica-

tion, written or oral, containing intentionally false, incomplete, or misleading informa-

tion (frequently combined with true information), which seeks to deceive, misinform, 

and/or mislead the target. […] In comparison with overt propaganda, covert disinfor-

mation usually is employed in a selective and discriminatory manner. This technique may 

be advanced through rumors, forgeries, manipulative political actions, but also agents of 

influence, front organizations, and other means.”1109 Today, the tools have changed – the 

Internet and social networks have changed the information environment – but the idea 

remains the same.

For Beijing, information manipulation, or secret disinformation, is just one lever 

among others to infiltrate and coerce, as suggested by the position of this section 

in this report, but an exceptionally dynamic and well-documented lever. Here, the 

main actors are the PLA, notably Base 311 (→ p. 89), the CYL (→ p. 72), state media 

– it is well established that, generally speaking, state media aligned with authoritarian 

powers, notably Russia, China, Iran and Turkey, are both producers and amplifiers of 

online information manipulation1110 – but also private intermediaries such as content 

farms.

A. Simulate authenticity

1. Trolls, sock puppets and astroturfing

The creators of disinformation have a wide array of possibilities at their disposal on 

social networks. False accounts or sock puppets are social accounts created under fake 

personas by a person or group of persons to promote certain ideas or spread false informa-

tion. These accounts are administered “manually,” by real people (they are not who they 

claim to be) – unlike bots, which are automated accounts (robots), amplifying an activity.1111 

Trolls, for their part, are Internet actors whose objective is to provoke controversy and 

polemics. When these tools are used massively, it may create the illusion of authentic and 

popular support for a policy or, if the actor is a company, for a product. In the latter cases, 

1108. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Alexandre Escorcia, Marine Guillaume, and Janaina Herrera, Information 

Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, Policy Planning Staff (CAPS), Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 

Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM), Ministry of the Armed Forces, Paris (Aug. 2018), 21

1109. Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia, Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington DC: 

Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984), 38.

1110. Katarina Rebello et al., Covid-19 News and Information from State-Backed Outlets Targeting French, 

German and Spanish-Speaking Social Media Users, Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford (29 Jun. 2020).

1111. Ben Nimmo, “Les techniques d’amplification sur les réseaux sociaux” (“Amplification Technics on Social 

Networks”), in Céline Marangé and Maud Quessard, eds., Les Guerres de l’information à l’ère numérique (Information Wars in 

the Digital Era) (Paris: PUF, 2021), 90-93.

363

the practice – disinforming by simulating a spontaneous popular movement – is called 

astroturfing, in reference to AstroTurf, a carpet brand imitating grass (and a wordplay 

based on the word grassroots).1112 Almost systematically included in Russian informa-

tional operations,1113 these tactics have been adopted by China, first internally, to 

target its population, and then on the international scene.

a. Domestically: A distraction strategy to prevent dissident collective action

In 2017, an empirical study estimated that “the [Chinese] government fabricates and 

posts about 448 million social media comments a year, [whose purpose is] to avoid 

arguing with sceptics of the party and the government, and not even discuss controversial 

issues. [But rather] to distract the public and change the subject, as most of these posts 

involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other 

symbols of the regime”1114. What is commonly referred to as the “50 Cent Army,” or “50 

Cent Party,” because they are presumably paid 50 cents (€0.06) per post – a false rumor1115 

– are more formally known as “Internet commentators” (网络评论员).1116 A 2021 study 

shows that the Party has 2 million paid commentators, directly employed by Cyber Affairs 

Commissions (网络安全和信息化委员会) and Propaganda Bureaus nationwide,1117 along 

with more than 20 million part-time trolls, most of them students and CYL members.1118 

The objective is to have as many of them as possible defend the same discourse so that 

genuine network users do not dare express divergent opinions because they would seem to 

be in the minority. Therefore, the goal is to frame the debate or, to use the Chinese govern-

ment’s terminology, to “guide” (引导) public opinion, i.e., to manipulate it. 

E-mails written in 2023-2014 and leaked from the Zhanggong district Internet Propaganda 

Office, in which these “commentators” reported on their activity, provided the authors of 

this study with a sample of more than 43,000 comments posted by Internet users identi-

fied as members of this “50 Cent Party.” King et al. maintained that they searched in vain 

for evidence that some of these comments had been created automatically by bots. But 

evidence pointed to the conclusion that “each was written by a specific, often identifiable, 

human being under direction from the government.”1119

They concluded that there was a “strategy of distraction,” with peaks in the activity 

of these commentators during events with “collective action potential”, like demon-

strations or an explosion, but also during vacations, when idle people are more likely to 

mobilize for causes, and before political meetings (strategic periods during which strategic 

distraction is used in conjunction with, and complementary to, redistribution and repres-

1112. Thomas Zerback, Florian Töpfl and Maria Knöpfle, “The Disconcerting Potential of Online Disinformation: 

Persuasive Effects of Astroturfing Comments and Three Strategies for inoculation Against Them,” New Media & 

Society (4 Mar. 2020).

1113. Clint Watts, “Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,” Statement 

Prepared for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing (30 Mar. 2017). See also: Tania Rakhmanova, 

“Le trolling, au service du Kremlin” (“Trolling Serving the Kremlin”), Arte, (2017). https://www.arte.tv/fr/

videos/079332-017-A/le-trolling-au-servicedu-kremlin/.

1114. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media 

Posts for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument,” American Political Science Review, 111:3 (2017), 484.

1115. Ibid.

1116. Ibid. 

1117. Ryan Fedasiuk, “Buying Silence: The Price of Internet Censorship in China,” China Brief, 21:1 (12 Jan. 2021).

1118. Ryan Fedasiuk, “A Different Kind of Army: The Militarization of China’s Internet Trolls,” China Brief, 21:7 

(12 Apr. 2021).

1119. Ibid, 489. 

364

sion measures).1120 In these sensitive periods, Internet commentators are asked to 

“promote unity and stability through positive publicity” and “actively guide public 

opinion.”1121 Approximately 80% of the posts fall into this category, which the authors call 

cheerleading, i.e. promotion, positive advertising instead of debate and argumentation.1122 

Contrary to the dominant thesis, which the authors call the “state critique theory” (censor-

ship aimed at suppressing dissent), they defend a theory of “collective action potential.” 

Accordingly, censorship aims to prevent collective actions not generated or con-

trolled by the state, whatever their purpose or, in other words, whether or not this collec-

tive expression opposes the state or is even political in nature.1123

Another study identified several cases of mass publications of comments supported 

by the Chinese government, including one connected to the G20 summit in Hangzhou 

in 2016 and another to the explosions in the port of Tianjin in the summer of 2015.1124 

In both cases, the effort was shiefly about writing “positive energy” comments (正能量) 

in support of the Chinese communist regime. During the G20 summit, many messages 

such as “I firmly believe that the Chinese people will be more united under President Xi” 

and “let’s trust that our nation will be more prosperous and stronger under President Xi’s 

leadership” poured onto Chinese networks while the Internet was being severely cen-

sored. It was partially meant to block humorous references to Xi Jinping’s gaffe during 

his speech. He said “宽衣” (kuan yi) rather than “宽农” (kuan nong) – the characters yi 

and nong being close – hence calling for “taking off one’s clothes” rather than to “ease 

agricultural policy.”1125

Similarly, after the explosions in the port of Tianjin, astroturfers massively relayed praises 

for the firemen and first-line workers, and support for the victims, keeping the discussion 

away from any reference to corruption or to the government’s mismanagement of the crisis. 

It involved messages such as: “Do not believe in rumors or spread rumors. Rumors cease 

with the wise people. Let us all pray for [victims] and hope for their safety.”1126 Once again, 

it was meant to “guide” the population and prevent the spread of feelings that could lead 

to collective actions against the government and opinions that could tarnish the regime’s 

reputation.

Finally, a more recent study based on the theft of more than 3,200 directives and 1,800 

internal notes from the Cyberspace Administration Offices in Hangzhou City at the onset 

of the coronavirus epidemic in January-February 2020 showed a more sophisticated cen-

sorship that involved discretion. According to the instructions, “[as] commenters fight to 

guide public opinion, they must conceal their identity, avoid crude patriotism and sarcastic 

praise, and be sleek and silent.”1127 The Cyberspace Administration issued its first direc-

tives in the first week of January, instructing news websites “to use only government-pub-

lished material and not to draw any parallels with the deadly SARS outbreak in China and 

1120. Ibid.

1121. Ibid. 

1122. Ibid, 490.

1123. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism 

but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review, 107:2 (2013), 326-343.

1124. Blake A. Miller and Mary Gallagher, “Astroturfing in China: Three Case Studies,” source (17 Feb. 2017). Blake 

Miller, “Automated Detection of Chinese Government Astroturfers Using Network and Social Metadata,” source (21 

Apr. 2016).

1125. Catherine Lai, “President Xi Jinping’s ‘Take Off Clothes’ G20 Gaffe Censored in China,” Hong Kong Free Press 

(6 Sept. 2016).

1126. Miller and Gallagher, “Astroturfing in China,” 7. 

1127. Raymond Zhong, Paul Mozur, Jeff Kao, and Aaron Krolik, “No ‘Negative’ News: How China Censored the 

Coronavirus,” The New York Times/ProPublica (19 Dec. 2020).

365

elsewhere that began in 2002.” In early February, a directive required them to do more 

than simply control information in China but to work to “actively influence international 

opinion.” The press was asked not to use words such as “incurable” or “fatal” to describe 

the virus or “lockdown” to describe restrictions on movements. A directive invited them 

to avoid “giving the false impression that our fight against the epidemic relies on foreign 

donations.” The documents also reveal that each of the “commenters” mobilized to shape 

opinion about the coronavirus in Guangzhou alone received $25 for an original message 

longer than 400 characters, 40 cents to report a negative comment to be deleted, and 

one cent per repost.1128

b. Internationally: A more offensive strategy to defend Chinese interests

On the international stage, trolls are a lot more aggressive. They defend, attack, 

sustain polemics, insult, and harass. In March 2019, many Reddit users felt that trolls 

supported by the Chinese government were engaged “in a coordinated effort to spread 

propaganda and bury anti-China messages on Reddit.”1129 Many newly created 

accounts were massively intervening in the discussion, systematically defending Beijing 

and attacking anyone critical of China. They upvoted or downvoted posts to promote 

them or, on the contrary, make them disappear accordingly. The battle raged on certain 

forums, including /r/geopolitics and Canadian subreddits (notably threads on Huawei 

→ p. 133). The scale of this Chinese offensive was beyond what Reddit users had 

become accustomed to with Russian trolls. A person knowledgeable on the moderation 

of the /r/geopolitics forum explained that “in the past, /r/geopolitics had been targeted 

by Russian trolls, who are generally the most well-known and active across various social 

media platforms. However, in our situation, the pro-CCP effort vastly overshadows any 

operation by the Russians.”1130 Here, again, it is difficult to know whether these trolls 

worked for the Chinese government or were simply patriotic users. The fact that they 

were so numerous, seemingly coordinated, and all repeated the same elements of language 

(“You mention Falun Gong and it’s amazing, they just come out of the woodwork and all 

say the same thing,” remarked one user),1131 however, seemed to indicate a certain degree 

of organization. 

While the PLA has developed its capacity to conduct trolling and sock-puppet opera-

tions, particularly on the domestic front (the so-called “50 Cent Army”), the Communist 

Youth League (CYL) is also capable of conducting this type of operations both 

domestically and abroad. It was behind the trolling campaign that hit the swimmer Mack 

Horton after he defeated the Chinese champion Sun Yang in the 400m freestyle at the 

Olympics.1132 The Australian athlete was subjected to a campaign of insults on his Facebook 

page, receiving more than 40,000 messages from Sun “fans.” The CYL is better able to 

work with targets between the ages of 14 and 28,1133 who make up a large proportion of 

athletes’ fans. 

1128. Ibid. for all the citations of the paragraph. 

1129. Craig Silverman and Jane Lytvynenko, “Reddit Has Become a Battleground of Alleged Chinese Trolls,” 

BuzzFeedNews (14 Mar. 2019).

1130. Ibid.

1131. Ibid.

1132. Peter Farquhar, “Olympic Champ Mack Horton’s Facebook Bombarded with 40,000 Insults from Chinese 

Swim Fans,” Business Insider Australia (8 Aug. 2016).

1133. Tara O, “Chinagate: Chinese Trolls, Sockpuppets in South Korea to Manipulate Public Opinion Online, 

Impact Politics, and Intervene in Internal Affairs,” East Asia Research Center (8 Mar. 2020).

366

To conduct operations against foreign targets, the CYL often uses Chinese stu-

dents, who are the largest overseas student community, as well as Chinese of foreign 

descent, to improve the quality of messages both in their substance – to resonate with 

the target’s concerns – and in their form – so that the message appears to have been writ-

ten by a local. For example, Beijing uses Chinese of Korean origin (朝鮮族 or Joseonjok in 

Korean),1134 a minority that is very present in northeast China (dongbei) and among Chinese 

students living in Korea. 

Message in Chinese giving instructions to 

sign the petition in favor of Moon Jae-in.

Tara O unveiled a Chinese operation of active 

measures in South Korea based on the stu-

dent community of Korean origin mentioned 

previously.1135 At the beginning of the coronavi-

rus epidemic, president Moon Jae-in decided not 

to prevent Chinese nationals from entering 

Korean territory – against the advice of the 

Korean Medical Association, which feared a rapid 

spread of the virus. The Blue House subsequently 

received a lot of criticism. A South Korean citizen 

started a petition on the presidential website on 

February 4, 2020, calling for the removal of 

Moon, believing that his failures no longer con-

ferred him the legitimacy to perform his duties. 

By February 25, the petition had been signed 300,000 times, and it passed the one-mil-

lion mark two days later.1136 On February 26, as the number of signatures approached 

800,000, a second petition, “We Support President Moon Jae-in,” appeared on the Blue 

House website. In two days, it obtained more than 800,000 signatures, an exceptional 

phenomenon (it took 21 days for the first petition, against President Moon, to reach 

that number). The fact is even more disturbing since this mass signing occurred when 

the epidemic was growing on Korean soil, in other words, when discontent against 

Moon was high. On February 27, a Chinese of Korean origin revealed the existence of 

messages in Chinese calling on PRC citizens present in Korea to sign the petition in 

support of President Moon (see screenshot above). Of course, there is no irrefutable 

evidence of the CCP’s involvement in this affair, but the cluster of evidence points to 

Beijing and, more specifically, to the CYL. In just a few days, this operation reached 

nearly a million signatures, which could only have been possible with a mobili-

zation organized by an extremely powerful structure like the CYL (it can mobi-

lize student networks in South Korea). In this case, it would constitute a new 

example of active measures implemented by the Chinese to support a leader consid-

ered to be a friend of China, and to prevent the emergence of a popular anti-China 

sentiment in a public opinion abroad. That said, the revelations in this affair made it 

probably counterproductive.

1134. O, “Chinagate.”

1135. Ibid.

1136. Tara O, “Over 1,000,000 Urge the Impeachment of Moon Jae-in of South Korea for his Poor Handling of 

the Wuhan Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak,” East Asia Research Center (27 Feb. 2020). The text of the petition 

appears in the body of the article.

367

2. Hiring middlemen

Another way to simulate authenticity is to have content published by third parties 

in exchange for money – hence “hiring” intermediaries. A simple way, and one regularly 

used by Beijing, is to use content farms: they create news for money. The purchase can also 

target a one-time message or influence on a page or on an account, that page or account 

altogether, or the recruitment of a person.

a. Content farms

Content farms (内容农场) are platforms hiring independent contributors to create 

“clickbait” content that looks journalistic, but that is usually poorly-written and not very 

original, uses keywords so as to be well ranked by search engines, maximize their views, 

and generate advertising revenue.1137 “After creating the articles, content farm operators 

recruit – and often financially compensate – individual social media users to help spread 

them.”1138 The origin of this content, created by third parties and distributed by yet 

another set of actors, is therefore difficult to trace, which is why Beijing makes exten-

sive use of this subcontracting. “The PLA relies on outsourced freelancers in Malaysia 

or overseas Chinese nationals to disseminate [disinformation] content” via content 

farms,1139 paying between RMB100 and 1,000 (from €12.6 to €126) per message, based 

on the length).1140

Earning money with KanWatch

The KanWatch Content Farm “was designed explicitly for users to be remunerated for sharing 

its content. To sign up for an account, a user must first fill out basic information along with 

an associated PayPal account. There are two ways to make money off of the platform: a user 

can either share articles on their social media accounts or they can write articles. According 

to the Taiwan Gazette, a single user can make about 10 Singapore dollars [6.2 euros] […] for 

every thousand views a shared article receives. Users can also easily rewrite articles by pushing 

a clone button. Other features on the KanWatch platform make it user-friendly and simple to 

use. For example, a user can track their cash flow to see how much money they have made. 

Offering monetary incentives for users to produce and disseminate content, regardless of 

veracity, has proven to be a highly effective strategy for the CCP.”1141 

An interesting development, notably observed during the 2020 general elections cam-

paign in Taiwan (→ p. 461), is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by these farms 

to generate content. The use of AI in Chinese influence operations targeting Taiwan 

had already been mentioned in a May 2019 report by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council 

1137. Daniel Chandler and Rod Munday, A Dictionary of Social Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). See 

also Jason Liu, Ko Hao-hsiang, and Hsu Chia-yu, “How A Content Farm in Malaysia Turned Fake News Directed At 

Taiwan Into A Moneymaker,” The Taiwan Gazette (12 Mar. 2020).

1138. Alicia Fawcett, Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global 

Competition, DFRLab, Atlantic Council (2020), 22.

1139. Ibid.

1140. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of 

Social Media for Influence Operations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, 

Policy Papers (2019), 28.

1141. Fawcett, Chinese Discourse Power, 23.

368

 (MAC) and has since been confirmed by Peng Kuan Chin (彭冠今). He “created a ‘Content 

Farm Automatic Collection System’ that crawled the Internet for Chinese articles and posts 

and reorganized the words and sentences into new text, generating thousands of articles 

per day. Peng’s software was modeled on automated software he saw in China, which he 

believed no one else outside the mainland had.”1142

According to the Taiwanese fact-finding group MyGoPen, at least 60 % of controver-

sial content and misinformation disseminated in Taiwan from these content farms came 

from abroad. Most of the posts and articles that resonated with Taiwanese Internet users 

appeared not to be spread from Taiwan.1143 In 2016, mobile01.com, teepr.com, bomb01.

com, ptt01.cc, shareonion.com, buzzhand.com and gigacircle.com were among the 100 

most visited content farms in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore.1144 Some are 

successful as quickly as they are forgotten; others thrive lastingly. 

In general, websites referred to as “content farms” catch the attention of Internet users 

on social networks. Facebook, which is used by more than 80 % of the Taiwanese popula-

tion,1145 is a preferred platform to circulate these articles via pages that users can subscribe 

to or within groups that they can join. Other networks can also be used: YouTube, Twitter 

or LINE (a private messaging system from which users can receive website articles).

Mission

In Taiwan, the “Mission” content farm (密訊) was successful, particularly among com-

munities that were politically positioned with the far right, sympathetic to the “Pan-Blue” 

coalition around the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and opposed to the ruling Democratic 

Progressive Party (DPP) and its President Tsai Ing-wen.1146 A study by Cheng Yu-chung (鄭

宇君), a professor at the National Chengchi University, confirmed that Facebook pages 

supporting the KMT tended to share Mission’s content. The latter even became 

the first source cited in the week preceding the 2018 local elections in Taiwan.1147 In 

October 2019, Facebook decided to suspend several content farms, including Mission, for 

violating the platform’s rules.1148

To circumvent Facebook’s filters, Mission repeatedly resurrected itself by copying its 

content onto various other domains such as missiback.com, pplomo.com, gyfunnews.

com, kowwno.com – which all share a common Google Analytics Tracking ID (UA- 

135651881). The existence of this ID reveals at least two pieces of information: the first 

is that the public was made up of Internet users who used Google; the second is that 

the same webmaster, who managed the traffic on these websites to improve the statis-

tics, hid behind the same ID, so that the link between the domains that share the same 

1142. 孔德廉 (William Kung), 劉致昕 (Liu Chih-hsin), “寫手帶風向不稀奇：AI產文、侵入私人LINE群，

輿 論軍火商已全面升級” (“It is Not Uncommon for Writers to Fuel the Fire: AI Produces Literature, Invades Private 

Groups on LINE, and Dealers of Public Opinion Have Been Promoted”) (6 Jan. 2020), https://www.twreporter.

org/a/information-warfare-business-weapons. Cited in Insikt Group, “Chinese Influence Operations Evolve in 

Campaigns Targeting Taiwanese Elections, Hong Kong Protests,” Recorded Future (29 Apr. 2020), 5.

1143. “The Content Mill Empire Behind Online Disinformation in Taiwan,” The Reporter (26 Dec. 2019).

1144. Wan Qing Tung, 1, note 6.

1145. “Internet Usage in Asia,” Internet World Stats.

1146. Nick Monaco, Melanie Smith, and Amy Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints: Tracing Chinese Disinformation in 

Taiwan, joint report by Graphika, the Institute for the Future’s Digital Intelligence Lab, and the International Republican 

Institute (Aug. 2020), 36.

1147. The Reporter, “Uncovering the Money and China Factor Behind ‘Mission’ – Taiwan’s Most Controversial 

Content Farm,” The Taiwan Gazette (24 Jul. 2020).

1148. Monaco, Smith, Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints, 36; Insikt Group, “Chinese Influence Operations,” 5, 

reference 3.

369

ID was very strong. It is a sign that allowed us to identify an entire network of content 

farms that, at first glance, did not seem to be linked, as we will see later. Despite the 

measures taken by Facebook, Mission broke the record of the most widely-shared web-

site among Facebook users in Taiwan in one week in April 2019, with five times more 

shares than the Liberty Times (自由時報).1149

Screenshot of the mission-tw.com domain taken on 03/15/2021.

The presence of content farms such as Mission was problematic because of their abil-

ity to produce content that can influence political debates and opinions. Mission fueled 

narratives critical of Tsai Ing-wen’s government. It relayed information based on 

real facts but framed in a misleading manner, for example, by creating the illusion that the 

Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) was going to waste money by investing 

in an old model of fighter plane (F-16A/B) when it was in fact a new model (F-16V). Or, 

by distorting the $71 million in aid granted to Paraguay under President Chen Shui-bian (

陳水扁) for social housing construction: they claimed that $102 million was spent by the 

Tsai government in Paraguay which supposedly resulted in Taiwanese “deaths.”1150 

An investigation by The Reporter (報導者) revealed links between Mission and the 

Taiwanese New Party (NP) (→ p. 447), which defends a pro-reunification position, 

as well as with Chinese media.1151 The original source code of the Mission website con-

tained the names of Lin Cheng-kuo (林正國) and of the Fang Hang Integrated Business 

Marketing Co. Ltd. The spouses Lin Cheng-kuo and Liu Fang-yu (劉芳妤), the latter being 

the Fang Hang company representative, are both members of the Taiwanese New Party’s 

Youth Committee.1152 An analysis of the content shared by Mission also showed that if 

often mentioned the Chinese website China-Taiwan.net (中國台灣網, taihai.net). The 

website was piloted by the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) in Beijing. Once these links were 

established, it was not surprising to observe the Mission platform relaying news under-

1149. The Reporter, “Uncovering the Money and China Factor Behind ‘Mission.’”

1150. Ibid.

1151. Ibid.

1152. Publication on the account of the Taiwanese New Party’s Youth Committee (新黨青年委員會), Facebook (31 

Dec. 2017), https://archive.vn/jZZ5L.

370

mining the legitimacy of the ruling party and promoting a pro-China and pro-unification 

discourse. 

Evan Lee and Yee Kok Wai

When Mission was confronted with Facebook’s suspension measures, the pages that reg-

ularly shared its content on this platform turned to other farms with similar content, such 

as Big Durian.1153 Mission’s content was also copied onto other domains such as beeper.

live.1154 Big Durian and beeper.live are part of the same extensive network of con-

tent farms linked to an Evan Lee. Research conducted by The Reporter and Nick Monaco, 

Melanie Smith and Amy Studdart’s investigations, showed that 431 Malaysia-based con-

tent farms had links to Evan Lee. 

The Reporter described him as a man with a rich experience managing content farms 

and as someone who would share his expertise with those experiencing difficulties via 

a discussion group on Telegram.1155 In an interview with them,1156 “Evan Lee” denied 

having a political agenda and asserted that his platforms are places of free expression. 

The biggest “content farm”, according to him, is YouTube. He said he knew of six 

Chinese-controlled content farms and three Taiwanese content farms with over 100 mil-

lion subscribers, which work in conjunction with Facebook and LINE, but refused to 

name them.1157

The purely commercial motivation of most players in content farms does not pre-

vent some “farmers” from using them to advance their personal political opinions. 

Previous work, notably by The Reporter, have identified a Yee Kok Wai (余國威), a 

member of Evan Lee’s extensive network, allegedly from Puchong, Malaysia, and 

whose account was already suspended by Facebook for violating the platform’s reg-

ulations. According to Yee Kok Wai, the pages he manages on Facebook have some 

300,000 subscribers,1158 and the shared content generally comes from content farms 

already mentioned, such as kanwatch, beeper.live and qiqu.news.1159 The pages he had 

allegedly created after 2014 generally have a name that begins with “全球華人” (Global 

Chinese), such as Global Chinese Military Alliance (全球華人軍事聯盟), Global Chinese 

Golden Age Union (全球華人盛世聯盟), and Global Chinese Weather Union (全球華人風

雲聯盟). His positions in favor of the Chinese Communist Party – celebrating 

the CCP’s anniversary or supporting the Hong Kong police for example – are in 

line with the pro-Chinese content that is massively broadcast from the platforms 

he manages.1160 Yee Kok Wai has also made Chang Dong-nan (張東南), from Taiwan’s 

Chinese Unification Promotion Party (中華統一促進黨), one of the administrators of 

his Global Chinese Alliance Facebook community.1161 He may also be associated with 

the “Qiqi” network, for which he reportedly manages some Facebook pages.1162

1153. The Reporter, “The Content Mill Empire Behind Online Disinformation in Taiwan.”

1154. The Reporter, “Uncovering the Money and China Factor Behind ‘Mission.’”

1155. The Reporter, “Meet Boss Evan －The Man Behind Taiwan’s Zombie Content Farms,” The Taiwan Gazette 

(16 Mar. 2020).

1156. Ibid.

1157. Ibid.

1158. The Reporter, “The Content Mill Empire Behind Online Disinformation in Taiwan.”

1159. The Reporter, “How A Content Farm in Malaysia Turned Fake News.”

1160. Ibid.

1161. The Reporter, “The Content Mill Empire Behind Online Disinformation in Taiwan.”

1162. Ibid.

371

Qiqi 

The Qiqi network, which relayed the false information according to which Hong Kong 

protesters offered rewards of up to $2.5 million for those who killed police officers,1163 

is also part of the nexus to which Yee Kok Wai and Evan Lee belong. This fake 

news, released in November 2019, originated from the official Weibo account of the par-

ty’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (中共中央政法委员会).1164 The Qiqi 

News Network is made of many pages whose names begin with “Qiqi” (琪琪 or 琦琦), 

such as “Qiqi World” (琪琪看世界), “Qiqi News” (琦琦看新闻), “Qiqi Military” (琦琦看

军事), “Qiqi life” (琪琪看生活). According to The Reporter, these pages operate similarly to 

the Global Chinese network and were created by Yee Kok Wai after 2017. They have reached 

several tens of thousands of subscribers.1165 The Google Analytics Tracking ID of these 

pages is also the one mentioned above, which links back to Evan Lee: UA-19409266904.1166 

According to a joint report by Graphika, the Institute for the Future’s (IFTF) Digital 

Intelligence Lab and the International Republican Institute (IRI), they act in a coordi-

nated manner: in the months preceding the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, at 

least 48 Facebook pages simultaneously promoted the same content from the same 

domains of the Qiqi network.1167 

During the campaign, Qiqi promoted discourses hostile to President Tsai Ing-wen and 

to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in general. For example, Qiqi helped popularize 

the expression “Green Terror” used to denigrate the DPP (whose color is green, while the 

KMT’s is blue); it refers to the “White Terror” (白色恐怖), the authoritarian period in the 

country’s history (between 1947 and 1987). The website “Qiqi pushes a worldview closely 

aligned with the CCP, frequently uses mainland Chinese phrasings, and recycles articles 

from other news outlets, often Chinese state-owned media.”1168

However, the Qiqi network, like other farms, publish content that is often apo-

litical (cooking, fashion, lifestyle, etc.). This phenomenon can be interpreted in two ways 

according to Nick Monaco, Melanie Smith, and Amy Studdart. Firstly, as a way to build a 

much larger audience than the one interested in political content, so that when the time 

comes, political messages can be distributed to many more people. Secondly, as a more dis-

creet way to convey a political vision of the world within or between these seemingly innoc-

uous messages – a technique proven efficient by Moscow according to a former employee 

of the Russian IRA (Internet Research Agency).1169

1163. “[錯誤] 網站文章「香港暴徒的酬勞曝光：『殺警』最高給2000萬！」？” (“[False] Revelations 

Concerning the Article Claiming that Hong Kong ‘Thugs’ Would Pay Up to 2 Million for the Killing of Policemen”), 

Taiwan FactCheck Center (15 Nov. 2019).

1164. Monaco, Smith, and Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints, 45.

1165. The Reporter, “How A Content Farm In Malaysia Turned Fake News.”

1166. The Reporter, “Meet Boss Evan －The Man Behind Taiwan’s Zombie Content Farms.”

1167. Monaco, Smith, and Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints, 46.

1168. Ibid., 39-40.

1169. Ibid., 45, reference 80.

372

Screenshots of the homepage of the domains (from top to bottom, from left to right)

newqiqi.com, qiqis.org, xqiqis.com, hotqiqi.com, taken on 03/15/2021.

A series of new “Qiqi” domains have been created with the Covid-19 pandemic. 

The “Qiqi News” page (琦琦看新闻 or 琪琪看新闻) has multiplied in several domain 

names: newqiqi.com, qiqis.org, allqiqi.com, iqiqis.com, xqiqis.com and hotqiqi.com. 

According to Cutestat data, the first four websites were created in February 2020, the last 

two in June 2020. This new wave seems to be more sophisticated than the previous ones: 

none of these domains gives an access to their source page, and they are not linked to 

the same Google Analytics ID,1170 contrary to the examples previously mentioned, which 

makes the visualization of the entire network less apparent. The topics covered by the 

“Qiqi News” pages are much more politicized: the articles often deal with the management 

of the coronavirus epidemic, particularly the efficiency of Chinese management and the 

American mismanagement, Sino-American relations, Sino-Taiwanese relations, and polit-

ical news from the Asia-Pacific region in general. According to Alexa and Cutestat data, 

however, these websites do not attract much traffic. The dissemination of their content is, 

once again, done via Facebook pages and groups, most notably the namesake “Qiqi News” 

(琦琦看新闻), which has some 30,000 subscribers,1171 as well as the “Global Chinese” net-

work mentioned earlier.1172

During the pandemic, this network spread many false news, including the con-

spiracy theory of the American origin of the virus (→ p. 589), either directly, via 

iqiqis.com for example (one article entitled: “Confirmed: America is the source of the 

Coronavirus. America has lied to the whole world,” one week after the Chinese MFA itself 

launched this rumor);1173 or indirectly, by suggesting that non-Chinese sources came to the 

1170. The Google Analytics domains newqiqi.com, qiqis.org, allqiqi.com et iqiqis.com are the following: UA- 

161511720, UA-161524355, UA-161578722 and UA-161561752.

1171. https://www.facebook.com/qiqi.news/.

1172. Like the Global Chinese Military Alliance Facebook page (全球華人軍事聯盟) which is followed by over 

70,000 people, https://www.facebook.com/cbcarmy/.

1173. “定了！新冠源头就在美国，美国欺骗了全世界！” (“Confirmed: America is the Source of the 

Coronavirus. America Lied to the Whole World”), 琦琦看新闻 (Qiqi kan xinwen) (19 Mar. 2020), https://archive.is/

upoO6.

373

same conclusion: for example, a video from another website belonging to the Qiqi network 

claimed that the Japanese television channel Asahi Shimbun (ANN) suspected that the 

virus originated in the United States (a theory also pushed by Chinese state media) – which 

was false, as shown by the Taiwan FactCheck Center.1174 

Moreover, a DFRLab investigation proved that Qiqi and Qiqu (趣享网), another 

Malaysian-based content farm, fed two pro-Chinese and anti-Trump Facebook networks 

through coordinated inauthentic behavior.1175

Happytify 

Happytify (歡享網) is another successful network with KMT-sympathetic communities 

that has promoted sensationalist anti-DPP articles, especially in 2018-2019.1176 Interestingly, 

the network was created by the Chinese company Nothing Tech Inc. (無為科技, or 

Wuwei Technologies),1177 which is owned by Wu Junxian (吴俊显) and opened in 2014 

with its headquarters in the Hebei Province.1178 The company presents itself as “the world’s 

largest overseas Chinese we-media operator,” offering various services, including software 

development.1179 “We-Media,” or “self-media” (自媒体), refers to media platforms whose 

content can be produced by anyone such as with a personal blog. Nothing Tech offers to 

help its clients promote their products on Facebook, design multimedia content, and 

develop an international audience. Nothing Tech’s flagship product would be Happytify, 

presented as a We-Media platform in traditional Chinese that operates outside of China. 

The platform apparently attracts more than 6 million daily viewings – mainly Internet users 

based in Taiwan, Malaysia, and in other Chinese-speaking regions – and appears to be the 

most important platform producing traditional Chinese content on Facebook.1180 

More than 114,000 subscribers follow the @happytify page created in 2017.1181 However, 

some Facebook initiatives call for caution: the “Content Farm Terminator” page (終結內

容農場) published a list of 84 domains affiliated to Happytify in January 2019 to teach 

users to be wary of content farms.1182 The domain happytify.cc also changed its name and 

visual identity in 2018 to Huayu Redian (華語熱點), to cast off the tarnished reputation 

undoubtedly.1183 Investigations on Happytify, however, could not prove any link between 

the platform and Chinese state actors. The motivations may, therefore, not be political. 

By mass broadcasting their articles on social networks to attract attention rather than 

inform, content farms have become powerful vectors of misinformation, but also plat-

forms that actors with an agenda can easily exploit. While it is difficult to prove a clear 

and direct link between Chinese state actors and coordinated campaigns to manip-

ulate information via these farms, the examples presented above do add some clues. 

1174. https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/articles/2867.

1175. Iain Robertson, Descendants of the Dragon: China Targets its Citizens and Descendants Beyond the 

Mainland, DFRLab, Atlantic Council (Dec. 2020), 10-16.

1176. Monaco, Smith, and Studdart, Detecting Digital Fingerprints, 18.

1177. 龔雋幃 (Gong Juanwei), “歡享網揭密 只靠1萬人民幣起家　日流量今號稱破千萬” (“Revelations 

about the Happytify Network: Only RMB10 000 of Capital, but the Daily Traffic Tops 10 Million Visits”), 今周

刊 (Business Today) (13 Apr. 2018). Gong Juanwei, “看不見的黑手？泛藍社群遭「內容農場」攻陷” (“Invisible 

Manipulators? Pan-Blue Coalition Groups are Infested with ‘Content Farms’”) Business Today (27 Mar. 2018).

1178. “秦皇岛市无为网络科技有限公司” (“Nothing Tech Inc.”), 爱企查 (Aiqicha).

1179. Company homepage: http://0335.com. Archived here: https://archive.vn/yqVa1.

1180. “秦皇岛市无为网络科技有限公司” (“Nothing Tech Inc.”), 大街 (Dajie), https://archive.vn/0MXQU.

1181. https://www.facebook.com/happytify/.

1182. Publication of Content Farm Terminator (終結內容農場) (24 Jan. 2019), https://archive.vn/77bLw.

1183. https://web.archive.org/web/20180625074428/http://happytify.cc/.

374

They show that the Taiwanese public is indeed manipulated to divide the population and 

break the bond of trust with the government, which benefits Chinese interests, as we will 

see in the case study on Taiwan (→ p. 453).

b. Other methods

To simulate authenticity by hiring intermediaries, operators can also use the following 

methods:

• 1) Purchase one-time messages. The objective is to have a pre-written message 

published by credible third parties. And this practice is used both online and offline. 

For example, in April 2020, an intermediary offered 20,000 pesos (about 200 euros) 

to the editors of several Argentinean newspapers – including El Cronista Comercial, 

Diario Popular and the online platform Infobae (which allegedly asked for a higher price, 

without success).1184 The intermediary wanted them to publish an anti-Falun Gong 

article in “poorly written Spanish,” which contained false information intending to dis-

credit this practice in the Argentinean opinion. It claimed that Falun Gong practitioners 

in Argentina did not allow themselves to consult a doctor or seek hospital treatment. It 

thereby suggested, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, that they would not make 

themselves known to health authorities if they were carriers of the coronavirus, thus 

putting the rest of the population at risk.1185 “What would happen,” the article asked, “if 

a large number of these people refuse to go seek medical services in the midst of a global 

pandemic?”1186 The article used the slanderous and demonizing expressions generally 

used by Chinese propaganda to characterize Falun Gong practitioners1187 and a mislead-

ing version of the facts to present the history of the practice.1188 The case reached public 

audiences thanks to one of the Argentine editors approached by the intermediary who 

opted to contact an Argentine colleague who practiced Falun Gong instead. As a result, 

the Falun Dafa Information Center and the Epoch Times newspaper obtained a draft and 

exposed the attempt. The intermediary who made the proposal reportedly confessed 

that he was working for “some Chinese” without any further details, while one media 

outlet speculated that it was a request from the Chinese Embassy in Argentina.1189

Another example of one-off message buying, this time on social networks: some own-

ers of Chinese-speaking Twitter accounts with more than 10,000 subscribers were 

offered via private messages to publish posts for money, from RMB400 to 2,500 

(€51 to 320) per post. The Australian artist of Chinese origin Badiucao (73,500 Twitter 

subscribers) was offered RMB1,700 (€217) per message. He shared with ProPublica the 

15-second propaganda clip he was supposed to post. His correspondents had apparently 

not understood that Badiucao, one of China’s most prominent political cartoonists, was 

an activist in exile because he was deemed a dissident by Beijing. This incident gave cre-

dence to the thesis of the use of commercial intermediaries who “are marketing 

1184. Nicole Hao, “Media Outlets in Argentina Offered Money to Run Articles Defaming Falun Gong,” The Epoch 

Times (12 Apr. 2020).

1185. “News Outlets in Argentina Offered Cash to Publish Articles Defaming Falun Gong,” Falun Dafa Infocenter 

(27 Apr. 2020).

1186. Hao, “Media Outlets in Argentina.”

1187. “News Outlets in Argentina Offered Cash.”

1188. Hao, “Media Outlets in Argentina.”

1189. “Embajada China en Argentina Ofrece Dinero a Periodista Para Difamar Disciplina Espiritual, Falun Dafa 

en Medio de Pandemia,” Miami Diario (5 Apr. 2020). 

375

pros but, they do not have a nuanced political understanding.”1190 Another exam-

ple: in May 2019, the Canadian YouTuber J.J. McCullough (250,000 subscribers),1191 who 

was not particularly pro-Chinese (to say the least),1192 received an email from a certain 

“Franco” offering him $500 (later $1,350) to broadcast an anti-Falun Gong video 

– an offer that he not only refused but to which he devoted a video entitled “Chinese 

propaganda and me.”1193

• 2) Purchase influence over an account. The YouTubers SerpentZA (South African, 

781,000 subscribers) and laowhy86 (American, 544,000 subscribers), both married to 

Chinese women and who have lived in China for more than a decade, are among the 

most-watched YouTubers on the topic of China and they often collaborate to create 

videos. They admitted that they were approached on numerous occasions by Chinese 

“organizations” that offered them money and a very large audience if they altered 

their content. For example, they explained that they were “offered [financial] compen-

sation to play down some of the western media claims that Tibet and Xinjiang CCP 

governments are oppressive toward their citizens, and even offered to fly us out to shoot 

some positive videos promoting tourism in the region.”1194

• 3) Purchase an account or a page. Facebook is a major vector of disinformation in 

Taiwan, and therefore logically a principal vector of diffusion for content farms. However, 

many of the pages they used were removed in 2019. Therefore, content farms have tried 

to buy Facebook fan pages: several page moderators were contacted by individuals 

(whose origin was revealed by the expression “管管,” more commonly used in 

mainland China to designate moderators) offering to buy their page. At the time, 

the researcher Puma Shen (沈伯洋) recalled that “many people […] were selling fan 

pages that they weren’t using anymore. This was just a way to make money.”1195 

Examples of proposals to buy Facebook fan pages.1196

1190. Jeff Kao and Mia Shuang Li, “How China built a Twitter Propaganda Machine Then Let It Loose on 

Coronavirus,” ProPublica (26 Mar. 2020).

1191. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyhOl6uRlxryALlT5yifldw.

1192. He has written articles that he has called “highly critical of the Chinese government” in The Washington Post.

1193. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2mQ8plzWl9g&t=329s.

1194. Thomas Brown, “How China is Influencing YouTubers Into Posting State Propaganda,” medium.com (21 

Jan. 2020).

1195. Brian Hioe, “Fighting Fake News and Disinformation in Taiwan: An Interview with Puma Shen,” New Bloom 

(6 Jan. 2020).

1196. Ibid.

376

During Taiwan’s 2020 presidential campaign, PTT accounts, the island’s most popular 

bulletin board system, were also sold – some on Taobao, China’s leading online sales 

website. The most expensive accounts, the oldest and therefore most credible, 

sold for no less than 200,000 Taiwanese dollars (€5,874).1197

• 4) Recruit a person. Social networks can also be used to recruit paid intermediar-

ies. Amidst the political war against Taiwan, for example, there have been advertise-

ments to recruit streamers, especially attractive young women between 20 and 25 

years old, paid between RMB5,000 and 10,000 (630-1,260 €) per month to spread 

pro-unification propaganda.1198

Examples of pro-unification influencer recruitment ads.1199

1197. Robertson, Chinese Messaging Across the Strait, 19.

1198. Brian Hioe, “Is China Attempting to Influence Taiwanese Elections Through Social Media?” New Bloom (3 

Apr. 2019).

1199. Sources: 李虎門 (Lee Hu Men), “收買《大學生了沒》前女星招募台網紅？國台辦：自導自演的假 

新聞” (“Former University Star Recruits Taiwanese Internet Celebrities? The Taiwan Affairs Office Retorts that this is 

Fake News Created Out of Thin Air”), 香港01 (HK 01) (10 Apr. 2019), http://bit.ly/3nR0ZSd; Hioe, “Fighting fake 

news and disinformation in Taiwan.”

377

The fake articles that supported the takeover bid on Club Med by a Chinese company

At the end of 2014, the French tourism company 

Club Med was the subject of a takeover bid that pit 

the Chinese conglomerate Fosun against the Italian 

businessman Andrea Bonomi. At the time, several 

articles attacking the Italian bid flourished in the 

French press,1200 all published under false identities. 

Some of them had been built up over several 

months and were present on several social net-

works, testifying to a relatively sophisticated influence operation.1201 These articles were appar-

ently the work of a communication agency. The well-known technique consists in publishing 

opinion articles benefitting the client, under false identities: “Invent a false name,” “both banal 

and singular,” “present yourself as an employee of a renowned institution,” or “create a digital 

universe to give credibility to the false identity.”1202 The client in question is usually easy to 

guess since they are the one who benefit from the maneuver.