Chapter 1

THE PARTY

At least five entities within the Party are important actors in influence operations: The 

Propaganda Department, the United Front Work Department, the International Liaison 

Department, the Communist Youth League, and the 610 Office.

I. The Propaganda Department

The Propaganda/Publicity Department (中央宣传部)1 oversees the ideological work,2 

as much in its conception as in the coordination between the structures that teach it to the 

members of the Party and diffuse it to the masses.3 It develops the training programs 

for Party members and for the national school curriculum, establishes the propaganda 

policies to be implemented and plays a role in the nomination, promotion, and firing of 

the executives in the bureaucracies that make up the propaganda system. The department 

also controls the entire media spectrum – press, books, radio, television, Internet – to 

which it provides the news items to cover and those not to mention, both for a domestic 

audience and abroad.4

As the promoter of a unified thought, the Propaganda Department controls not only 

information but also the entire cultural production of the country, leaving as little space 

as possible for critique and creativity. With the 2018 reforms, the Party reclaimed certain 

prerogatives previously in the hands of the state, further reinforcing its control over the 

development of the Party’s narrative strategies. The Propaganda Department notably inher-

ited supervisory and regulatory authority over the audiovisual industry,5 allowing the 

Party to promote patriotic movies or those presenting China as a responsible power for 

1. The CCP modified the English translation of the department’s name to replace propaganda with publicity, 

without changing the Chinese name, xuanchuan 宣传, which refers to communication, diffusion, announcement, public 

declarations. 

2. In Chinese: yishi xintai (意识心态). The expression is commonly translated as “ideology,” but yishi refers to the 

conscience, to being aware of something, and xintai refers to the state, the mentality. 

3. For further details on the Propaganda Department, see Anne-Marie Brady’s benchmark work, which has 

unfortunately not been updated since its publication: Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary 

China (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). See also David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: 

Institutions, Processes and Efficacy,” The China Journal, 57 (2007). 

4. “中共中央宣传部主要职能” (“Principal Functions of the Central Propaganda Department”), 人民日报 

(People’s Daily) (6 Jun. 2013), http://archive.vn/nWZBK. 

5. “中共中央印发 “深化党和国家机构改革方案”” (“The Central Committee of the Party Published the ‘Plan 

for Deepening Reforms of Party and State institutions’”), Xinhua (21 Mar. 2018), http://archive.vn/ qBoDP. See the 

analysis and translation by David Bandurski, “When Reform Means Tighter Controls,” China Media Project (22 Mar. 

2018). 

example,6 but also to censor those that do not align with the Party’s vision (→ p. 346).7 This 

department is thus a powerful machine, allowing the Party to shape the dominate dis-

course, control mass media, limit the freedom of expression and critical thought, 

orient – and manipulate – public opinion, defend its interests, justify its actions, and 

present itself in the best light. 

Created in 1924, eliminated during the Cultural Revolution, then reestablished in 1977, 

the Propaganda Department has been given a growing role since Xi Jinping came to power. 

Its current director, Huang Kunming (黄坤明), is a Politburo members, as his predecessors 

were, and is close to Xi Jinping with whom he worked for 20 years in Fujian and Zhejiang.8 

The Propaganda Department, whose offices are located at 5 West Chang’an Boulevard (西

长安街5号) in Beijing, remains an opaque institution, but it is nevertheless known to employ 

200 to 300 employees, all Party members, and to have about ten offices.9 Its budget probably 

reaches RMB2.5 billion, or €317 million.10

The Propaganda Department is at the heart of the vast bureaucracy of the propaganda 

system (宣传系统). At its head are several small leading groups and commissions. The 

Secretariat of the Party’s Central Committee serves as an intermediary between them and 

the Propaganda Department, whose director is usually a Secretariat member, as is the case 

with the current one.11 The department then serves as an agency coordinating all the bodies 

in charge of implementing propaganda.

The Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology (中央宣传思想工作领导

小组), formed during the 1980s, is the principal authority elaborating the policy whose 

implementation is coordinated by the Propaganda Department. It is currently run by Wang 

Huning (王沪宁), fifth member of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Politburo, with 

Huang Kunming as deputy. In 2018, the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and 

Informatization was elevated to the rank of commission (中央网络 安全和信息化

委员会), and it is now presided by Xi Jinping. The Internet being an indispensable plat-

form for the diffusion of propaganda, there is no doubt that the Propaganda Department 

follows this commission’s directives. The General Affairs Office of this commission is, for 

that matter, run by the deputy director of the Propaganda Department, Zhuang Rongwen 

(庄荣文).12 Likewise, the department seems to rely on another central leading group, 

which also became a commission in 2018, on Foreign Affairs (中央外事工作委员会) and 

dealing with questions of overseas propaganda. The Central Guidance Commission on 

Building “Spiritual Civilization” (中央 精神文明建设指导委员会), similarly presided by 

Wang Huning with Huang Kunming as deputy, can also be mentioned; its office is run by 

the Propaganda Department. These leading groups ensure that the subordinate structures, 

in this case the Propaganda Department, correctly apply the directives passed down from 

higher Party authorities.

6. Such as, for example, Wolf Warrior 2 (2017) or The Wandering Earth (2019). 

7. James Griffiths, “The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party-Approved Blockbuster,” CNN (1 Oct. 2019). 

8. “黄坤明同志简历” (“CV of Comrade Huang Kunming”), 中央领导机构资料库 (Database of Central Committee 

Bodies), http://archive.vn/MEzdz. 

9. In Chinese Yuan, or renminbi (RMB). For a (dated) introduction to the internal structure of the department, see 

Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System.” 

10. A rare source on the Party’s finances, see: 杨志锦 (Yang Zhijin), “学习党部预算: 五部 门公共预算支出37.68

亿” (“Studying the Budgets of the Party Departments; Five Departments Publish Their Budget of 3.768 Billion”), 21

财经 (21 Caijing) (18 March 2015), http://archive.vn/Oqqzm. Cited in Damien Ma and Neil Thomas. “In Xi We Trust: 

How Propaganda Might Be Working in the New Era,” Macro Polo (12 Sept. 2018). 

11. Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System.” 

12. “CPC Releases Plan on Deepening Reform of Party and State Institutions,” 人民网 (People’s Daily) (22 Mar. 

2018), http://archive.vn/ahF8c. 

65

To ensure the implementation of the Party’s policies on propaganda and ideology, the 

department of the same name exercises direct control or supervision over a broad range of 

organizations, each with its own means to influence society. The following non-exhaustive 

list presents the main ones:

• The General Administration for Press and Publications (国家新闻出版署) imple-

ments propaganda while supervising the entire press and publishing sector. Among other 

things, it manages the content and quality of publications, printings, royalties, and the 

import of printed works.

• The State Council Information Office (国务院新闻办公室) is in actually the same 

structure as the Central Committee’s Foreign Propaganda Office (中央对外宣传办公

室).13 The deputy director of the Propaganda Department, Zhuang Rongwen, is also the 

deputy director of this office. It regularly organizes press conferences, ensures that Chinese 

media correctly present China abroad and accurately “explain” and “narrate” China, but 

also makes sure that foreign news is communicated to the national audience with an angle 

favorable to Party interests.

• The Cyberspace Administration (国家互联网信息办公室), another structure 

with two different names, corresponds to the office of the Central Leading Group for 

Cybersecurity previously mentioned. Its director is also Zhuang Rongwen, deputy director 

of the Propaganda Department. This administration executes propaganda policy on the 

Internet. 

• The Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization (中央精

神文明建设指导委员会办公室) is generally managed by the deputy executive director 

(常务副部长) of the Propaganda Department, currently Wang Xiaohui (王晓晖). The 

Propaganda Department and this commission’s office manage the “Chinese Civilization” 

(中国文明网) portal together, presented as the principal platform for promoting propa-

ganda and “spiritual civilization” efforts;14 the latter refers to the promotion of the rules of 

good manners, morals, and hygiene for instance.

• The Foreign Language Publishing Administration (中国外文出版发行事 业局), 

also known as the China International Publishing Group (中国国际出版 集团), is the 

largest foreign-language publishing house in China.

• The Propaganda Department supervises numerous newspapers and press agen-

cies such as the People’s Daily, the bi-monthly Qiushi, the Guangming Daily, or even Xinhua, 

and heads the China Media Group – also called Voice of China – which brings together 

the major Chinese media outlets like CCTV, China National Radio, and Radio China 

International since 2018.

• The Propaganda Department is known to be influential in institutions such as the 

Ministry of Culture and of Tourism, the Academy of Social Sciences, but also with 

some professional associations such as the Association of Chinese Writers (中国作家协

会) or that of journalists (中华全国新闻工作者协会).

• Finally, the Propaganda Department has local ramifications at the provincial, munic-

ipality, and district levels and extends even to neighborhoods or village committees. Local 

departments have been entrusted with a broad range of activities including the control of 

newspapers, media, and local cultural associations. They also manage education at their 

level and health policy through anti-epidemic centers and clinics.

13. “国务院关于机构设置的通知” (“Directive of the State Council on the Implementation of Structures”), 中

华人民共和国中央人民政府 (Website of the PRC Central Government) (2018), http://archive.vn/5AHU4. 

14. “关于我们” (“About”), 中国文明网 (Chinese Civilization Portal), http://archive.vn/OXGpZ. 

66

The Propaganda Department therefore manages a vast network of structures that 

control different vectors of information capable of influencing the Chinese and 

overseas populations. The content they spread is the result of the department’s pro-

paganda policy and must conform to the Party’s ideology. The most commonly used 

method to make known what should be said or omitted is to issue spoken or written 

instructions. These directives have a presumably higher status than national laws:15 sim-

ply questioning them is liable to punishments including dismissals, firings (for journalists), 

closures (for media organizations), and even jail time; instructions can sometimes contain 

threats if the directives are not carried out.16 Such directives are apparently adopted weekly 

by groups of five or six officials within the department and delivered during weekly meet-

ings with editors in chief and journalists, followed by phone calls in subsequent days to 

check in on their implementation.17

The Propaganda Department is at the head of a system that manipulates the infor-

mation delivered to the Chinese each day, and which now dares to be more aggres-

sive abroad. The importance given to propaganda meant for overseas audiences is growing, 

even as it becomes less and less distinguishable from internal propaganda due to the increas-

ing number of Chinese able to access news in a foreign language, to the size of the Chinese 

diaspora, and to the growing ability of foreigners to read the Chinese-language press.

II. The United Front Work Department (UFWD)

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Party’s Central Committee (中

央统一战 线工作部) is the only department that constitutes the bureaucratic embodi-

ment of a political concept, as introduced in the preceding section (→ p. 35). Emmanuel 

Jourda presented the UFWD as “a sort of permanent secretariat for United Front issues,” 

although it does not have a monopoly on this political action.18 Since 2017, the UFWD 

has been run by You Quan (尤权), a member of the CCP’s General Secretariat managed by 

Wang Huning, who oversees ideological activities and propaganda.19

15. Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” Wilson Center (26 Oct. 2015), 17.

16. Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Informational Warfare and Cyber Operations (Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 

2017), 10-11.

17. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 19.

18. Emmanuel Jourda, Les usages postrévolutionnaires d’un canon orthodoxe: le Front uni et l’invention politique de l’après-

révolution en Chine (The Post-Revolutionary Uses of an Orthodox Canon: The United Front and the Political Revolution of the After-

Revolution in China), PhD Thesis, EHESS, 2012, 193.

19. A former professor at Fudan University, advisor to Jiang Zemin then to Hu Jintao, Wang Huning is today a 

member of the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee and directs, within the Central Committee, the Secretariat and 

the Policy Research Office (中共中央政策研究室). 

67

A Brief History of the UFWD

• In 1937, at the beginning of the anti-Japanese United Front, the CCP sent a delegation to 

Wuhan to manage relations with the KMT; this was the first structural formalization of the 

United Front.20

• In January 1939, the General Secretariat of the CCP decided to create a central United Front 

department overseen by Wang Ming (王明) and, in March, ordered to all services, provincial 

committees, and special committees, to create a structure at their level and implement United 

Front efforts.21

• From May 1944 to April 1945, the CCP established the Central City Work Department (中

央 城市工作部), overseen by Peng Zhen (彭真), who took over leadership of United Front 

resistance against Japan. It ceased to function after the victory over the Japanese.22

• In April 1946, the Central Committee reactivated the Central City Work Department, with 

Zhou Enlai at its head.23

• In September 1948, the Central Committee renamed it the United Front Work Department. 

Lei Weihan (李维汉) took over management.24

• In 1949, the UFWD contributed to the preparation of the Chinese People’s Political 

Consultative Conference (CPPCC), set up in June.25

• With the Cultural Revolution, the activities of the UFWD were interrupted.26

• In July 1968, two PLA officers secretly restored the UFWD.27

• In June 1973, the Central Committee of the Party officially restarted the UFWD with the 

provisional nomination of Liu Youfa (刘友法) at its head.28

• In 1979, the 14th United Front Work Conference fully reestablished the UFWD structures.29

• In March 2018, the reforms launched at Xi Jinping’s instigation resolved the issues of over-

lapping responsibilities and lack of coordination that interfered with the efficiency and im-

plementation of the United Front policy. The UFWD notably recovered its authority over 

the State Administration for Religious Affairs, the The National Ethnic Affairs Commission, 

and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Its authority over attachés and consuls in charge of 

United Front activities aimed at the Chinese diaspora also increased, positioning the Minister 

of Foreign Affairs in a relatively subordinate position to the UFWD on these questions. 

The UFWD’s offices highlight United Front targets. Certain among them have long 

existed: in 1948, the young UFWD was already taking an interest in ethnic minorities and in 

the Chinese diaspora in KMT-controlled territories.30 With successive reforms, the number 

of branches grew with the creation of offices for Xinjiang and the Chinese diaspora, rising 

to nine in 2017 and twelve in 2018. Chinese students abroad have also become an explicit 

target of the United Front policy.

20. “本部介绍” (“Presentation of our Department”), 中共中央统一战线工作部 (The United Front Work 

Department of CPC Central Committee) (10 Dec. 2010), https://archive.vn/8ilPa. 

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Jourda, Les usages postrévolutionnaires, 42. 

26. Ibid., 55. 

27. Ibid., 197. 

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 91. 

30. Ibid., 196. 

68

The 12 Bureaus of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), 

with the names of the last known director in each of them

1. Party Work Bureau

党派工作局

Dir: Sang Fuhua 桑福华

Targets: the “8 democratic parties” 

allied with the CCPa

2. Ethnic Minority Work Bureau

民族工作局


Dir: Ma Lihuai 马利怀

Targets: China’s 55 “ethnic 

minorities”b

3. Hong Kong, Macau, and 

Taiwan United Front Work 

Bureau

港澳台统战工作局


Dir: Wang Ping 王萍


Targets: “compatriots” of Hong 

Kong, Macau, and Taiwanc

4. Non-Public Economic Work 

Bureau

非公有
制经济工作局 

Dir: Zhang Tianyu 张天昱

Targets: Managers in private 

companiesd

5. Independent and Non-Party 

Intellectuals Work Bureau

无党派、党外
知识分子工作局 

Dir: Li Li 李莉 

Targets: intellectuals who are not 

CCP memberse

6. New Social Class Members Work 

Bureau

新的社
会阶层人士工作局 

Dir: Zhang Ming 张明

Targets: Managers of foreign 

companies, NGOs, self-employed 

workers, “new media,”…f

7. Tibet Bureau

西藏工作局 (?) 

Dir: Zhang Dongliang 张东亮

Targets: Populations of Tibetg

8. Xinjiang Bureau

新疆工作局 (?) 

Dir: Yang Bingjian 杨丙见

Targets: Populations of Xinjiangh

9. Overseas Chinese Affairs 

General Bureau

侨务综合局


Dir: Liu Yujiang 刘玉江

Regional sub-bureaus (ex. America 

and Pacific)i

10. Overseas Chinese Affairs 

Bureau

侨务事务局


Dir: Xu Yuming 许玉明

Responsibilities include: media, 

education, culturej

11. Religious Affairs General 

Bureau

宗教综合局 

Dir: Han Song 韩松

General responsibilities, including 

supervision of religious schoolsk

12. Religious Affairs Bureau

宗教业务局

Dir: ?

Division dedicated to Protestantism, 

Taoism, Buddhism, Catholicism, and 

Islaml

a. “中央统战部一局局长桑福华来我省 作专题辅导报告” (“Director of the 1st UFWD Bureau Sang Fuhua Visits Our 

Province”), 根在中原 (Root in Henan) (24 Oc. 2019), http://archive.vn/OdCh1; “中央统战部调研组来我区调 研” (“A 

UFWD Research Team Visits Our District”), 中共南京市鼓楼区委统一战线工作部 (UFWD Committee, Gulou District, 

Nanjing) (9 Mar. 2017), https://archive.vn/4ADS8. 

b. “中央统战部二局局长马利怀一行到我盟调研” (“Director of the 2nd UFWD Bureau Ma Lihuai Visits Our League”), 

兴安盟委统战部 (UFWD Committee, Xing’an League) (17 Oct. 2019), http://archive.vn/8cqLV; “中央统战部调 研组来我

市调研民族工作” (“A UFWD Research Team Visits Our City as Part of Their Work on Ethnic Groups”), 中共张掖市委

统战部 (UFWD Committee, City of Zhangye) (24 Jul. 2018), https://archive.vn/0fKzD. 

c. “张荣顺出席第十届世界缅华同侨联谊大会暨第二十四届澳门缅华泼水节开幕式” (“Zhang Rongshun Attends 

the 10th World Overseas Chinese Friendship Conference in Myanmar and the Opening Ceremony of the 24th Macau and 

Myanmar Water Festival”), 雪花新闻 (Xuehua Xinwen) (1 May 2019), https://archive.vn/INBGd. 

d. “全国工商联十二届三次执委会议在南昌开幕” (“The Third Meeting of the 12th Executive Committee of the All-

China Federation of Industry and Commerce Opened in Nanchang”), 人民网 (People’s Daily) (18 Dec. 2019), http:// 

archive.vn/JL0DZ. 

e. “中央统战部副部长邹晓东来山东大学调研” (“UFWD Deputy Director Zou Xiaodong Visits Shandong University”), 

山大视点 (Shandashidian), 5 May 2019, http://archive.vn/zq5XQ; “中央统战部五局调研组来鄞” (“The Director of the 

5th UFWD Bureau Visits Yinzhou”), 鄞州新闻网 (Yinzhou xinwenwang) (8 Mar. 2019), http://archive.vn/MnuoN. 

f. “中央统战部六局局长张明考察调研新城区民营企业新社会阶层统战工作” (“Director of the 6th UFWD Bureau 

Zhang Ming Inspects United Front in Xincheng District Toward the New Class of Private Entrepreneurs”), Sohu (31 Jul. 

2019), http://archive.vn/GTdJ4; “中央统战部正式组建八局,全名叫“新的社会阶层人士工 作局”” (“The UFWD 

Officially Establishes an Eighth Bureau, Whose Full Name is the “New Social Class Members Working Bureau”), 澎湃 

(The Paper) (4 Jul. 2016), https://archive.vn/1TLVc. 

69

g. “近视防控工作委员会成立,陈楠华任主任、李格华任秘书长” (“Creation of the Working Commission on the 

Prevention and Control of Short-Sightedness, with Chen Nanhua as Director and Li Gehua as General Secretary”), 国际

财经 (Guoji caijing (30 Dec. 2019), http://archive.vn/757sT. 

h. “鼓楼区2019年12月大事记” (“Events in Gulou District, December 2019”), 南京市鼓楼区人民政府 (Civil government 

of Gulou District, City of Nanjing), 22 January 2020, http://archive.vn/eLwVW. 

i. “中央统战部侨务综合局(九局)巡视员张健青一行赴玉壶侨联调研侨务工作” (“Inspector of 9th UFWD Bureau 

Zhang Jianqing Visits the Yuhu Federation of Overseas Chinese”), 文成县人民政府 (Wenchengxian Civil Government) (12 

Nov. 2018), https://archive.vn/akoQU. Liu Yujiang left his position in 2020 but the name of his replacement has not 

yet been made public, “中央统战部九局局长刘玉江转岗河南省政府党组成员” (“Director of 9th UFWD Bureau Liu 

Yujiang Named Member of the Party Committee of Henan Provincial Government”), 财新 (Caixin) (16 Apr. 2020), 

http://archive.vn/4GPhH. Alex Joske, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department: New Structures for a New Era 

of Work on Diaspora and Religious Affairs,” Jamestown Foundation, 19:9 (9 May 2019). 

j. “2019中国•济南华侨华人创新创业大会隆重举行” (“The 2019 Jinan Overseas Chinese Innovation and 

Entrepreneurship Conference Occurred”), 中共中央统一战线工作部 (The United Front Work Department of CPC Central 

Committee) (3 Jul. 2019), http://archive.vn/4ylt4; “官方证实潘岳出任国侨办主任” (“Official Confirmation that Pan Yue 

Becoming Director of Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau”), 星島日報 (Sing Tao Daily) (5 Nov. 2020), https://archive.vn/

JXy9R. Joske’s hypotheses, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department.”. 

k. ““我国宗教治理体系和治理能力现代化”理论研讨会观点摘编” (“Looking Back on the Theoretical Seminar ‘Our 

Country’s System of Religious Governance and the Modernization of its Governance Capacities”), 中央社会主义学院 

(Central Institute of Socialism) (18 Jul. 2019), http://archive.vn/UmVvi; “卢献匾率队赴中央统战部和全国人大汇报工 

作” (“Lu Xianbian and His Team Report to the UFWD and the People’s National Congress”), 广西壮族自治区人大常 

委会 (Permanent Committee of the People’s Congress of the Guangxi Autonomous Region) (4 Mar. 2019), https://archive.vn/sDODd. 

See Joske, “Reorganizing the United Front Work Department.” 

l. “文件16” (“Document 16”), 人民日报 (People’s Daily) (25 Nov. 2020), https://archive.vn/Xgn2i; See Joske, “Reorganizing 

the United Front Work Department.” 

A Global Network of “Service Centers”

In 2014, the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (subsequently integrated into 

the UFWD) created “Overseas Chinese Service Centers” (华助中心) with the goal of setting 

them up in 60 countries. At the end of 2018, it had 45 in 39 countries.31 Their raison d’être is 

the provision of services to the Chinese community, particularly newly–arrived migrants. For 

the most part, preexisting centers were simply labelled OCSCs. For example, in South Africa, 

13 “Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centers” in place since 2004 were certified 

as OCSCs. They are tasked with “protecting the lives and property of individuals of Chinese 

descent in South Africa by facilitating a more productive relationship with South African po-

lice.”32 In fact, they had long been financed by the Chinese Embassy in South Africa. The 

heads of this network (currently Li Xinzhu (李新铸), and his predecessor Wu Shaokang (吴

少康)) are two Chinese businessmen who made a career in South Africa, and who also 

head the African branch of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National 

Reunification (中国和平统一促进会) – which falls directly under UFWD supervision.

31. Matt Schrader, “‘Chinese Assistance Centers’ Grow United Front Work Department Global Presence,” The 

Jamestown Foundation (5 Jan. 2019). 

32. Ibid.

70

III. The International Liaison Department

The International Liaison Department (ILD, 中共中央对外联络部) is an organ of 

the Central Committee in charge of the Party’s external work (党的对外工作). This work 

consists in maintaining party-to-party relations, also called “party diplomacy,” and is 

part of the PRC’s “general diplomacy” (总体外交). A “quiet but effective diplomacy,” to 

use David Shambaugh’s words,33 the ILD’s activities draw little attention for at least three 

reasons: when it comes to diplomacy, we think mainly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 

because party-to-party relations are not generally considered an important element of a 

country’s foreign policy; and because the ILD voluntarily keeps a low profile.34 Its actions 

are nevertheless not to be overlooked: the ILD has notably served as a parallel diplomatic 

channel to conduct sensitive and secret negotiations, promote the revolution (it has sent 

money and weapons to armed groups abroad), but also to act as a propaganda agent 

which can double as an intelligence collector.35

The ILD is the heir of several successive institutions: The Communications Office 

(交通局) created in 1927, the Overseas Work Commission (海外工作委员会) which 

seemingly replaced it in 1942, then the 3rd United Front Bureau which took over the liai-

son work in 1948.36 In 1951, the International Liaison Department was created, making 

a break with United Front structures. It took the name “International Department” in its 

English version in 1995, while its Chinese name remained the same.37 Originally, the IDL 

was in charge of the relations with other Communist parties worldwide: in the 1950s, it 

took an interest in Asian parties, on the one hand, and on Eastern European and Soviet 

parties on the other. With the 1955 Bandung Conference, the ILD also developed links 

with socialist parties in Africa and the Middle East.38 It was only from the 1980s onward 

that the ILD enlarged its range of interlocutors to include all types of parties, whatever 

their political stripes. The goal of the ILD indeed evolved: it was no longer a matter of 

exporting the revolution. This goal was abandoned with the emergence of the “Three 

representations” theory under Jiang Zemin – a sort of Chinese Thermidor – but to 

contribute to building a global consensus favorable to China.39 The ILD’s current 

four objectives are to maintain relations with foreign political parties; to serve as an 

analysis and observation platform allowing the Party to better understand the world; 

increase the number of “Chinese friends” of all political stripes; and to reinforce 

China’s soft power and discursive power abroad.40

Since Xi Jinping came to power, the Party has affirmed its will to further centralize 

the management of the general diplomacy and to strengthen a “new phase” (党的对

外工作新局面) of party diplomacy,41 which entails building a “new type of political 

33. David L. Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The International Department of the Chinese Communist 

Party,” China: An International Journal, 5:1 (2007), 54. 

34. Ibid., 28.

35. Ibid., 27-38.

36. Ibid., 34-35.

37. Ibid., 29.

38. Ibid., 35.

39. “Press Conference: CPC’s United Front and International Relations,” The State Council Information Office of the 

People’s Republic of China (23 Oct. 2017), https://archive.vn/TiDqv; Julia G. Bowie, “International Liaison Work for the 

New Era: Generating Global Consensus?” Party Watch Annual Report (2018), 43-44; “How China’s Communist Party 

Trains Foreign Politicians,” The Economist (10 Dec. 2020). 

40. These objectives are cited on the ILD presentation page, archived at: https://archive.vn/aFVh7. 

41. Bowie, “International Liaison Work for the New Era.”; “Xi Stresses Centralized, United Leadership of CPC 

Central Committee Over Foreign Affairs,” Xinhua (15 May 2018); “Xi Urges Breaking New Ground in Major Country 

71

party relations” (新型政党关系).42 This “party diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” 

is meant to allow foreign political parties to “understand and respect Chinese values 

and interests”;43 it serves as a vector to diffuse a positive image and history of the Party 

abroad.44

Based in Beijing, the ILD has been run since 2015 by Song Tao (宋涛), who graduated 

in economics and got some experience within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the 

former central leading group for Foreign Affairs. Internally, the ILD is currently made up 

of 16 bureaus, of which 8 are geographically specialized in the following regions: South and 

Southeast Asia; Northeast Asia and Indochina; Central Asia and North Africa; Sub-Saharan 

Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the CIS; 

North America, Oceania, Northern Europe; Western Europe. ILD attachés are sometimes 

posted in certain embassies – including Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin – with-

out necessarily declaring themselves as anything other than staff of the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs.45 The ILD also manages a front organization created in 1981, the Chinese 

People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (中国国际交流友好协会) 

whose Chinese name means “Chinese Association for Friendly International Exchange”; 

a publishing house, “Contemporary World” (当代世界出版社) founded in 1993; and the 

China Center for Contemporary World Studies (当代世界研究中心), a think tank created 

in 1994.46

The ILD officially maintains relations with over 600 parties or political groups in 

no less than 160 countries or regions.47 David Shambaugh delineates seven types of 

ILD activities: sending Party leaders abroad; receiving party leaders of foreign countries, 

especially from socialist countries; participating in, or organizing, international conferences 

of political parties; promoting China’s policies and achievements abroad; contributing to 

the “battle” against Taiwan on the diplomatic scene; working to advance China’s economic 

modernization; and visiting foreign countries to specifically study a subject, such as the 

causes of the USSR’s collapse.48 Between 1983 and 2003, the ILD might have received 

some 4,500 delegations of foreign political parties for a total of 26,000 individuals and sent 

abroad more than 1,500 delegations for a total of 10,000 participants.49 Since Xi Jinping, 

more than 158 “presentation sessions” (宣介 会) to explain how China “succeeds” have 

been organized worldwide with foreign political figures; more than three-quarters of them 

have taken place since 2016.50 In 2017, the ILD organized a global summit for the first time, 

the “High-Level Summit: The CCP in Dialogue with World Political Parties” (中国共产党

Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” Xinhua, (24 Jun. 2018). 

42. “不断推进党的对外工作理论和实践创新” (“Continuously Promote Innovation in the Theory and Practice 

of the Party’s External Work”), PRC Central Government Website (28 Sept. 2019), https://archive.vn/hm85K. 

43. 于洪君 (Yu Hongjun), 中国特色政党外交 (Party-to-Party Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics), (Beijing: Social 

Sciences Academic Press, Jun. 2017), 36-37, cited by Bowie, “International Liaison Work for the New Era,” 43. 

44. 金鑫 (Jin Xin), “国内外关于中国共产党对外交往的研究综述” (“Overview of Chinese and Foreign 

Research on Party Diplomacy”), CPC News (16 Mar. 2015), https://archive.vn/8bf89. 

45. Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’” 45. 

46. Ibid., 43; David Shambaugh, “China’s External Propaganda Work: Missions, Messengers, Mediums,” Party 

Watch Annual Report (2018), 32; Website of the China Center for Contemporary World Studies: http://www.cccws.org.

cn/list.aspx?clmId=89. 

47. “我部简绍” (“Department Presentation”), 中共中央对外联络部 (International Department. Central Committee of 

CPC), https://archive.vn/aFVh7. 

48. Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’” 48-51.

49. Ibid., 46.

50. According to the data collected by Macro Polo: https://macropolo.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ILD-

Foreign-Briefings-List-Updated.xlsx. 

72

与世界政党高层对话 会) which brought together more than 600 political leaders from 

300 political parties in 120 countries (→ p. 256).51