Fourth Part 

CASE 

STUDIES

421

Taiwan and Hong Kong are at the forefront of Beijing’s “political warfare,” both 

democratic and liberal strongholds over which China claims sovereignty. China’s willingness 

to intervene is made more important and facilitated by a few factors, such as a common 

language (notwithstanding a few variations), an economic dependency, and the freedom 

of the press that is the rule in these territories – which allows China to influence local 

narratives. For all these reasons, Taiwan and Hong Kong have been outposts, the first 

ones confronted to Chinese influence operations. But for Beijing, these territories are also 

training grounds, “R&D labs” for operations that can subsequently be refined and 

implemented in other targets globally1 – such as Georgia and Ukraine were for Russian 

operations (→ p. 626). As such, they are important cases to study because they amount to 

sentinels, “canaries in the mine,”2 and indicators of what could happen next. 

For a long time, one could question the similarity in the trajectories, because there are 

essential differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan on the one hand, and all of the other 

cases on the other: Beijing does not claim sovereignty over Australia, Canada, and Sweden, 

for example, and people do not speak Chinese there. How could Taiwan and Hong Kong 

be seen as relevant precedents for these countries and for the rest of the world? Yet, two 

things have happened in recent years: one, intensified attacks against Hong Kong and 

Taiwan (so much so that, since 2019, Twitter and Facebook have formally attributed to 

Beijing dismantled operations on their platforms)3 and, second, some tactics, hitherto 

limited to Taiwan and Hong Kong, have been extended to other targets. A difference 

remains, admittedly, but in the intensity of the operations, not in their nature. Currently, 

there is no doubt that Beijing implements tactics against these two targets that will later be 

used against the rest of the world. 

The first step in the expansion of Chinese operations occurred in Australia and 

New Zealand. Retrospectively, from a European or North American perspective, these 

two countries appear to have been used as “guinea pigs” of Chinese interference – John 

Garnaud uses the same metaphor of the “canary in a coal mine” to describe their respective 

situations and that of Australia4 – because they had noted very early on the implemen-

tation of tactics subsequently used elsewhere in the world. Why these two countries? 

1. Chris Horton, “China Uses Taiwan as R&D lab to Disrupt Democracies,” Nikkei Asian Review (27 Dec. 2018).

2. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Michael S. Chase, Borrowing a Boat Out to Sea: The Chinese Military’s Use of Social 

Media for Influence Operations, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Foreign Policy Institute, Policy 

Papers (2019), 81.

3. Twitter Safety, “Information Operations Directed at Hong Kong,” Twitter (19 Aug. 2019), https:// blog.

twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/information_operations_directed_at_Hong_Kong.html; “Removing 

Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior from China,” Facebook (19 Aug. 2019), https://about.fb.com/ news/2019/08/

removing-cib-china/.

4. John Garnaut, “How China Interferes in Australia And How Democracies Can Push Back,” Foreign Affairs (9 

Mar. 2018).

422

Because of their large diasporas (relative to their population) out of which “a considerable 

numbers [are] recent immigrants with relatives and close ties to China”5; because they are 

located in what Beijing sees as its sphere of influence, because their economies are highly 

dependent on China, because they attract a high number of Chinese students and, finally, 

because of their relative lack of regulations on financing political party (up until recent-

ly).6 According to former diplomat Chen Yonglin, who defected in 2005, Australia was 

identified very early on as the “weak link in the Western camp,” and it became the place 

where the Party-State was able to “test its infiltration and subversion methods” given its 

openness, its demographics, its proportion of Chinese immigrants and its multicultural-

ism.7 

The second step of this expansion focused on the rest of the world, particularly 

– but not only – on Europe and North America.8 

Australia9 and the United States10 have led to a sizable scholarly literature. In Europe, 

the United Kingdom,11 the Czech Republic,12 and, to a lesser extent, Germany13 have 

also been studied. All these countries – that we also visited to prepare this report – are men-

tioned in the previous sections and included in our many examples. Yet, for our in-depth 

case studies, we decided to focus on other places: Taiwan, Singapore, Sweden, 

Canada, but also the operations that targeted Hong Kong protestors in 2019, and 

framed the Covid-19 as an American virus in 2020. 

5. Charles Parton, China-UK Relations: Where to Draw the Border Between Influence and Interference? Royal United Services 

Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), Occasional Paper, (Feb. 2019), 12. 

6. In New Zealand, the Parliament Justice Select Committee carried out a one-year investigation on foreign 

interference between 2018 and 2019, following which a new law on campaign financing was passed; it then announced 

a new investigation, this time on local political interference. The Australian reaction is described further down 

(→ p. 544). 

7. Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s Influence in Australia (Richmond: Hardie Grant Books, 2018), 3.

8. Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World 

(Richmond: Hardie Grant Books, 2020). 

9. See Hamilton, Silent Invasion; See also, the excellent work by the ASPI, which is one of the most knowledgeable 

institutions on Chinese influence in the world, and in Australia in particular.

10. See, for example, Chinese Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance, Report of the Working 

Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States, co-chaired by Larry Diamond and Orville Schell (Stanford: 

Hoover Institution Press, 2018). 

11. See for example Parton, China-UK Relations. 

12. See the excellent work published by the Sinopsis think tank: https://sinopsis.cz/en/.

13. See for example Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Mapping China-in-Germany,” Sinopsis (2 Oct. 2019). 

423

Chapter 1 

TAIWAN

Chinese influence operations had already targeted Taiwan, its institutions, political par-

ties, civil society before, even when Kuomintang (KMT) – which is favorable to mainland 

China (One China policy) – ruled the country, for example during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency 

(2008-2016). Truth be told, the United Front has always been very active in Taiwan.1 But 

these maneuvers intensified after the Sunflower Student Movement that saw students 

occupy the legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese parliament, in March and April 2014: at that 

point, Beijing certainly came to the conclusion that Ma did not have enough control over 

the situation to implement a pro-Chinese agenda. Their concerns were confirmed two years 

later when, in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president and her Democratic Progressive 

Party (DPP), which supports Taiwan independence, won a majority of the seats in parlia-

ment. 

Since 2016, cross-strait relations have deteriorated, and China’s “political war-

fare” in Taiwan has become harsher. As J. Michael Code explained, the Chinese strategy 

in Taiwan usually consists in combining incentives (to “win hearts and minds”) and coer-

cive measures to constrain decision-makers while weakening democratic institutions. The 

DPP’s rise to power pushed Beijing to review the balance between these two poles.2 The 

hope of seducing Taiwanese people is now relatively faint,3 first because the feeling 

of belonging to the Chinese nation has deteriorated in recent years, so much so that only 

2% of Taiwanese inhabitants define themselves as only Chinese compared to 62.6% as 

solely Taiwanese.4 Then, Xi Jinping’s martial speech in January 2019, which mentioned a 

potentially forced reunification if necessary, and the Hong Kong crisis during the summer 

and the fall of that year acted as powerful repellents. China now focuses on coercive 

measures. They have become easier to implement because, during Ma Ying-jeou’s eight 

years in power, “cross-Strait ties were opened up […] his administration made little effort to 

increase its counterintelligence capabilities in a manner commensurate with the new oppor-

tunities for penetration from China that resulted from the loosened restrictions. That cre-

ated a number of new avenues for the CCP to penetrate, influence, and corrode Taiwanese 

institutions.”5 Taiwan perfectly illustrates the Chinese “Machiavellian moment,” 

i.e. the conviction that it is safer to be feared than to be loved (→ p. 619).

1. 吳俊德 (Wu Jun-deh), “中國與俄羅斯資訊戰手法初探” (“A Preliminary Compared Study of Chinese and 

Russian Information War Methods”), 國防情勢月報 (Defense Situation Monthly), 國防安全研究院 (INDSR), 144 (27 

Jun. 2019), 32-39. 

2. J. Michael Cole, Democracy Under Fire: China’s Political Warfare Against Taiwan During President Tsai Ing-Wen’s First Term 

(Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Jun. 2020), 10. 

3. It is the “End of An Illusion” – the subtitle of J. Michael Cole ‘s book, Cross-Strait Relations Since 2016: The End 

of the Illusion (London: Routledge, 2020). 

4. According to a survey from a Taiwan think tank, https://fr.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/92859. 

5. Cole, Democracy under Fire, 11. 

424

Overall, the Taiwanese society is particularly vulnerable to Chinese operations 

for a plethora of reasons, and first because China claims sovereignty over this ter-

ritory where the same language, or even languages, are spoken. Mandarin (Guoyu in 

Taiwanese) is the official language but the mother tongue of less than 20% of the pop-

ulation; 70% of the population speaks Taiwanese, which is essentially derived from the 

Minnan dialect, 10 to 15% of the population speaks Hakka, and 2% an aboriginal language. 

Young Taiwanese born after 1990 are very attached to democratic and liberal values – but 

the risk is that they are not mobilized during elections, particularly among those working in 

Taipei who must go back to their district of origin to vote.

Another weakness is that the Taiwanese society is polarized around several issues. 

The polarization is first reflected in Taiwan’s relationship with China (pro-unification/

pro-independence) even if this divide has lessened in the past few years. The population 

is also divided over societal questions such as gay marriage, pension reform, agriculture, 

and so on. The media landscape is likewise polarized, as it reflects the society and 

is also largely infiltrated by Beijing. The Online Media Fractionalization indicator devel-

oped by the Digital Society Project (DSP)6 showed that “major online media outlets in 

Taiwan provide very different presentations of the same events. Since Taiwanese people 

consume online media quite extensively […] the Chinese disinformation strategy and 

resulting online information fractionalization is likely to have a detrimental impact on 

Taiwan’s democracy.”7 

Taiwanese media also suffer from a concentration of capital, from a race for clickbait 

(a “tabloidization” of outlets) and overwork (some journalists having to produce 4 to 

8 articles a day).8 As a result, journalists do not take enough time to cross-check their 

sources or to verify information. J. Michael Cole, who worked at the Taipei Times – owned 

by the biggest press holding on the island – for more than seven years, explained that this 

“very poor tradition of fact checking, or double-checking, or corroborating information 

[…] makes Taiwan ripe for the injection of disinformation in its bloodstream.”9 Finally, 

the verticality of relationships inside a newsroom, which stiffles young reporters, and 

the lack of incentive (or time) for investigative journalism are additional vulnerabilities.10 

Besides, Taiwan has the second highest social network penetration in the world 

(88%)11: 83% of the population gets its information online and 59% through social net-

works.12 In other words, Taiwanese people are very “connected,” most of them have an 

account on one or several social media platforms, and they are incidentally particularly 

vulnerable to the disinformation that circulates on these networks. All these reasons 

explain why, according to several reports, Taiwan is one of the countries most at risk 

of disinformation in the world.13

6. The Digital Society Project (See Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, and Steven Wilson, Measuring 

Internet Politics: Introducing the Digital Society Project, DSP, (May 2019)). 

7. Democracy Facing Global Challenges, V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019 (Gothenburg: University of 

Gothenburg, May 2019), 35. 

8. J. Michael Cole, “A Conversation about China’s Sharp Power and Taiwan,” Brookings Institution (11 Sept. 2018), 9. 

9. Ibid.

10. Cole, Democracy under Fire, 22.

11. “Active Social Network Penetration in Selected Countries as of January 2020,” Statistica (14 Feb. 2020). The 

share of social network penetration measures the share of Internet users visiting social networking in selected countries 

or regions.

12. Nic Newman et al., Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020, 103. 

13. Huang Tzu-ti, “Taiwan Most Vulnerable to Disinformation Attacks: Swedish Survey,” Taiwan News (28 Sept. 

2019); Mechkova, Pemstein, Seim, and Wilson, Measuring Internet Politics, 18. 

425

That being said, Rush Doshi insists that it is not only about disinformation and propa-

ganda. In Taiwan more than anywhere else, Beijing’s goal is to “control every step of 

the information supply chain. Targets range from those that create content (journalists 

and researchers) to the institutions that publish and validate it (television stations and wire 

services) and, finally, to the platforms that often provide the final outreach to consumers 

(social media websites and digital TV infrastructure).”14 We will see that Beijing uses both 

the carrot and the stick, both positive measures (incentives, rewards) and negative 

actions (intimidations, threats, sanctions) at each of these stages. 

More broadly, in applying the full repertoire of “political warfare” tactics, the CCP 

has two main goals in Taiwan: first, weaken its democratic institutions, including 

elections, and the trust, morale, and resistance of the population. Second, divide the soci-

ety by exacerbating its weaknesses: Chinese state media ostensibly want to “lebanize”15 

Taiwan: they strive to pit communities against each other, target the country’s cohesion, 

including its territorial cohesion by pitting regions against each other and paying particular 

attention to the islands. To reach that goal, the Party uses two types of resources: traditional 

Chinese media and local relays. 

I. From the outside: How traditional Chinese media penetrate 

Taiwan 

Traditional media stands for the media that existed before the advent of the Internet and 

of new communication technologies, mainly in print (press and books), radio and television 

formats – even though they have also developed new digital platforms since then. Among 

the traditional Chinese media, we distinguish the traditional (or generalist) media which 

cover all sorts of topics and do not target one particular audience, for instance the news-

papers Global Times and People’s Daily and media outlets specifically dedicated to Taiwan, 

such as the Voice of the Straits radio, the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation and the Haifeng 

publishing company (→ p. 100).

A. The use of conventional media

Chinese conventional media are a powerful vector to spread the Party’s propa-

ganda, but they only exert a limited influence on Taiwan and on Taiwanese people. 

Apart from the radio, (that can be freely listened to if it is aired close enough to Taiwan) it 

is impossible for other channels (press, television) to open in Taiwan without the approval 

of Taiwanese authorities. This is the reason why radio has historically been the preferred 

mean of diffusion of the Party’s propaganda in Taiwan, being a rather inexpensive tool that 

is easy to set up.16

14. Rush Doshi, “China Steps Up its Information War in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs (9 Jan. 2020). 

15. “官媒: 解放军可将台湾 ‘黎巴嫩化’ 逼其修改激进政策” (“Official Media: the PLA Wants to “Lebanize” 

Taiwan and Force it to Change its Radical Policies”), Sina (3 Apr. 2019), https://archive.vn/miB8V. 

16. On the benefits of the radio, see 许丽华 (Xu Lihua), “海峡两岸广播媒体交流的优势与困境” (“Benefits 

and Dilemmas from Radio Media Cross-Strait Exchanges”), 新闻爱好者 (Xinwen Aihaozhe), 4 (2011), http://archive. 

ph/BF1Rf. 

426

Nowadays, Chinese television channels such as CCTV or CGTN seem to have a 

limited potential for influence because they do not broadcast in Taiwan, and even though 

Taiwanese inhabitants can access their content online. But this latter option requires active 

engagement from viewers, unlikely to be taken given the current context of relative distrust 

toward Chinese narratives and the increased competition for the viewers’ attention in the 

current media landscape.17 

With the Internet, Chinese newspapers can offer web versions of print articles, mak-

ing sharing or viewing content particularly easy online, regardless of where readers are. 

While their content is easy to access, it is not the most attractive to Taiwanese 

audiences who enjoy a large variety of national newspapers. Besides, Chinese news-

papers are not always available in traditional characters. Taiwanese people can generally 

read simplified Chinese characters, but most prefer traditional characters, out of conve-

nience or by choice, given the simplified characters’ political connotations, as they are 

immediately linked to the language of the CCP. Hence, Chinese articles with a version 

in traditional Chinese characters are more likely to be read by Taiwanese audiences than 

articles solely written in simplified Chinese characters. As a result, many newspapers 

have a web version in traditional characters, for example the Xinhua press agency and 

the PLA Daily.18 The People’s Daily, the China Daily and the Guangming Daily do not appear 

to offer it. However, almost all offer an English version for their international audiences 

and some – such as Xinhua and the People’s Daily – have an entire section dedicated to 

Taiwanese news. 

Radio programs are now also available online. And, very early on, the main Chinese 

networks, such as CNR and CRI, set up networks dedicated to Taiwanese audi-

ences. In 1954, as nationalist and communist forces were still fighting, the CNR had 

already opened two channels for Taiwanese audiences. The “Chinese Voice”, or CNR-5, 

now covers cross-strait and Taiwanese news in Mandarin. The “Shenzhou Voice”, or 

CNR-6, offers cultural programs in Mandarin, Hakka, and Minnan dialects.19 The latter 

two dialects are the most widely used languages in Taiwan and in the Chinese province 

of Fujian, which faces the island from the other side of the strait. Chinese media 

often claim that these programs are highly successful in Taiwan: they recently 

reported approximately 2 million Taiwanese listeners.20 Likewise, CRI, which was cre-

ated in 1949, developed programs in various dialects, including Minnan and Hakka, for 

people of Chinese descent. Today, the radio station “Chinese Voice in the World” offers 

programs in these two dialects as well as in languages from Guangzhou, Chaozhou, and 

Wenzhou.21

In addition to the two radio programs dedicated to Taiwan, the CNR set up a web 

portal, HelloTaiwan – or Nihao Taiwan in 2000 to reach a younger audience. The 

stated objective is to promote China-Taiwan relations and to allow people of Chinese 

17. The current context is indeed characterized by an increase of negative opinions about the PRC and by an 

increasingly defined Taiwanese identity. See Voir Kat Devlin, Christine Huang, “In Taiwan, Views of Mainland 

China Mostly Negative,” Pew Research Center (12 May 2020); Chung Li-hua and Jake Chung, “Most Taiwanese 

Feel that China is Unfriendly: Poll,” Taipei Times (28 Mar. 2020); Keoni Everington, “Record 83% of People in 

Taiwan Identify as Taiwanese Amid Wuhan Virus Outbreak,” Taiwan News (24 Feb. 2020). 

18. For Xinhua’s edition in traditional characters, see http://archive.vn/ymnbx; for the PLA Daily, see http://

archive.vn/T1Fuc.

19. For the CNR-6 program page, see CNR-6, “Shenzhou Voice,” see http://archive.vn/e0nFN; for CNR-5 

program, “Chinese Voice,” see http://archive.vn/99QBF.

20. “中央电台对台广播推出中华之声神州之声 (“Chinese State Radio Launches the “Chinese Voice” and 

“Shenzhou Voice” for Taiwan”), Sina (21 Jan. 2004), http://archive.vn/tRlWs.

21. “世界华声” (“Chinese Voice in the World”), CRI, http://archive.vn/1ecuC.

427

descent to “better understand” China. Chinese sources say that the website is visited 

around 12 million times each day, which would make HelloTaiwan one of the main plat-

forms for Chinese propaganda in Taiwan. This platform is part of the nexus of 

informational operations within which we found units of the PLA’s Base 311, 

such as the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC) and Voices of the 

Strait (VTS).22 In fact, Zhang Xida, a HelloTaiwan and CNR journalist, was found 

spreading false information on YouTube and Facebook through videos in which he pre-

tended to be Taiwanese (→ p. 467).

Finally, publications from major publishing companies in China such as the 

ones tied to Beijing University (北京大学出版社), East China Normal University (华

东师范大学出版社), the Red Flag University (红旗出版社) or the Chinese Academy 

for Social Sciences Press (社会科学文献出版社) can be accessed from Taiwan, at 

least on the main book vendors’ websites such as Bokelai (博客来).23 Books do not 

allow reacting on breaking news as easily as newspapers, radio, and television can. But 

they can help shape the long-term intellectual landscape. Many Chinese initiatives thus 

promote cross-strait relationships in the publishing sector, which is considered 

as playing an important role in the pursuit of the “cultural fusion” between Taiwan 

and China.24 The goal reflects Beijing’s ambition to influence or even control 

narratives and ideas in the Taiwanese intellectual world. An organization subor-

dinate to the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO → p. 84), the Jiuzhou Center for Cultural 

Communication (九州文化传播中心), organized a cross-strait forum for the pub-

lishing industry in 2018, together with the Fujian Academy for Social Sciences, to 

celebrate thirty years of cooperation in the sector.25 

In Taiwan, structures such as the Tonsan (唐山出版社) and Renjan (人間出版

社) publishing companies, the Observer (觀察) and Yuanwang (遠望) journals, or The 

Commercial Press Taiwan (臺灣商務印書館) have already participated in this type of 

cross-strait forums; some of their leaders pleaded for a better diffusion of Chinese 

books in Taiwan during these events.26 Some actions are even instigated by Taiwanese 

people, such as the forum organized by the dean of the private Nanhua University in 

Taiwan (南华大学),27 which has convened every year since 2005 around themes such 

as the construction of China’s soft power, cultural fusion, or the impact of digitaliza-

tion on the publishing sector.28

While conventional media are not the most efficient in decisively influencing 

the Taiwanese audience nowadays, they still play an important role in relaying 

the official Chinese narrative. Incidentally, the more a narrative is repeated, the more 

22. These actors organised events together several times. See for example “中华文化之旅’活动 人员河南新郑拜

谒黄帝” (“Participants to the ‘Chinese Cultural trip’ Went to Pay Homage to the Yellow Emperor in Xinzheng, Henan 

province”), 华夏经纬网 (Huaxia jingwei) (2 Jun. 2010), http://archive.ph/HiaJu.

23. https://www.books.com.tw.

24. “厦门举办两岸出版与人文智库论坛” (“The Cross-Strait Forum of Social Science Publishing Companies 

and Think Tanks was Held in Xiamen”), Xinhua (30 Oct. 2019), http://archive.vn/98Xlc.

25. “2018两岸出版论坛在厦门开幕” (“The 2018 Cross-Strait Forum Started in Xiamen”), China Council for the 

Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (2 Nov. 2018), http://archive.vn/XgLck.

26. “厦门举办两岸出版与人文智库论坛” (“Cross-Strait Forum”).

27. “The Origin and Development of the Forum,” 海峡两岸华文出版社与文化创意学术论坛 (Academic Forum 

on Chinese Publishing and Cultural Creativity held by both sides of Taiwan and Mainland China) (14 Jul. 2013), https://archive.

ph/mgybQ. 

28. “The Main Data of Each Forum,” 海峡两岸华文出版社与文化创意学术论坛 (Academic Forum on 

Chinese Publishing and Cultural Creativity Held by Both Sides of Taiwan and Mainland China) (5 Sept. 2014), http://

archive.vn/w98DR. 

428

familiar it becomes, and the more likely is it that its audience will adhere to it. Chinese 

media thus regularly repeats narratives reinforcing the idea that “reunification” 

with Taiwan is unavoidable and legitimate,29 criticizing official Taiwanese posi-

tions and the support Taiwan may receive from the United States,30 and also nar-

ratives that are part of a “psychological warfare” aimed to discredit the Taiwanese 

armed forces’ ability to defend themselves against the PLA, hence fostering fear among 

the public.31 The Global Times, for example, frequently contributes to psychological war-

fare operations by maintaining a constant military tension, as if a Chinese invasion was 

imminent, and by systematically exaggerating the reach of ongoing military exercises 

(→ p. 478).32

Chinese media can also relay manipulated information intended for Taiwanese 

audiences. This was the case with an operation that tried to make people believe that 

President Tsai Ing-wen had lied about receiving her PhD from the London School 

of Economics (→ p. 464),33 or another operation that pushed people to believe that 

some Taiwanese tourists that had been stuck in Japan during typhoon Jebi were evac-

uated with a Chinese embassy bus, but only after accepting to identify as Chinese34 

(→ p. 456). 

To make up for the weaknesses of traditional “general” Chinese media and to increase 

their influence capabilities in Taiwan, China also put together media outlets specifically 

dedicated to a Taiwanese audience.

B. The creation of dedicated outlets

In Part II, we briefly introduced three media dedicated to Taiwan, all of them Base 311 

offshoots: VTS, CHBC, and Haifeng. In this case study of Taiwan, we will further study 

how they work and what practical actions they carry out against the island. 

1. The Voice of the Strait (VTS)

VTS is a front organization for a unit of the PLA Base 311 (→ p. 101). Before 

its creation, other radios from Shanghai, Huadong, or Fujian had developed programs 

in Mandarin, as well as in the Minnan and Hakka dialects, for Taiwanese audiences. 

Eleven Chinese radios focused on communication with Taiwan in 2011, VTS and 

CHBC included. In fact, radio is seen as an essential tool in the United Front’s 

29. “Reunification Only Acceptable Option for Taiwan Question: Experts,” Global Times (21 Dec. 2019), http:// 

archive.vn/faBcH. 

30. Zhou Wenxing, “Stronger Ties with Washington Won’t Buy Time for Taiwan,” Global Times (20 July. 2020), 

http://archive.vn/kT3ZA. 

31. Liu Xuanzun, “Taiwan’s Counter-Landing Drill with PLA in Mind a ‘Naïve, Meaningless Show,’” Global Times 

(16 Jul. 2020), http://archive.vn/Pvvkf. 

32. “解放军空军放出一张图，台湾岛内炸锅” (“Air Forces Publish a Photo, Taiwan Panics”), Huanqiu (19 Dec. 

2016), http://archive.vn/eA06w.

33. Li Ping and Fan Lingzhi, “British Universities Under Fire for Politicizing Honorary Degrees,” Global Times (7 

Nov. 2019), http://archive.vn/gHJjk; 李名 (Li Ming), “疑点重重! 论文被发现缺页错字，蔡英文博士学历再被

爆造 假” (“Suspicious! Missing Pages in Tsai Ing-wen’s Thesis, Her PhD under Scrutiny Again”), 环球网 (Huanqiu) 

(30 Aug. 2019), http://archive.vn/CapFU. 

34. Keoni Everington, “Witnesses Refute Report Stranded Taiwanese in Japan Had to Identify Themselves as 

Chinese,” Taiwan News, (7 Sept. 2018). 

429

strategy to ensure “Taiwan’s liberation35” because it has many advantages: contrary 

to newspapers and TV, it can be freely broadcast from China to Taiwan, requires little 

financial resources and staff and it can interact with listeners who can participate.36 

Besides, the human voice, as opposed to the neutrality that comes with a written piece, 

is seen as being more persuasive. Hence the value in airing recorded messages of 

support such as “Strength to Wuhan!” or celebrating the solidarity between the 

two shores during the Covid-19 pandemic using people with a Taiwanese accent. 

These help persuade listeners that China was supported by the Taiwanese pop-

ulation.37

Radio is a media that also draws its strength from its capacity to respond quickly to an 

event. Since audiences are always more marked by the first version of events that 

they hear than by subsequent versions – a cognitive psychology bias known as anchor-

ing – VTS’ former director Liu Linlan (柳林岚) claimed that politically-aimed radios 

such as VTS are playing a crucial part in quickly reacting to impose the adequate 

version of facts first, particularly on topics pertaining to the cross-strait relationship.38 

In 2005, she wrote that VTS’ mission was to improve knowledge and understanding of 

reforms and modernization in China and various types of exchanges between the two 

sides of the strait, to contribute to reinforcing the feeling of fraternity between popula-

tions and the feeling of belonging to the Chinese Nation, but also to promote Chinese 

culture and values.39

a. Using “voice carriers” to reach a wider audience

It seems that VTS launched an offensive to penetrate the Taiwanese media landscape 

after its 50th birthday celebrations. Since the beginning of the 2010s, VTS has indeed sought 

to build a network of collaborators in some Taiwanese media to use them as “voice 

carriers” (借台唱).40 By letting its stories be aired to already-established audiences, VTS 

is widening the reach of its messages in an increasingly competitive media landscape.41 For 

example, VTS signed a cooperation agreement with Libra Radio (非凡音联播网) in 2008 

that provided for shared programs, the transmission of Libra Radio’s audience measure-

ments to VTS, and for the broadcasting of VTS’ news reports on Libra Radio for forty 

minutes every day.42 Libra Radio broadcast on the Matsu Islands, north of Taiwan, as well 

as on the coastal cities of Fujian.43 Hence, its audience is both Taiwanese and Chinese. 

VTS also targets Chinese who maintain close ties with Taiwan because, if they are 

convinced by the content of the shows, they can become efficient relays sharing these 

35. 许丽华 (Xu Lihua), “海峡两岸广播媒体交流的优势与困境” (“Advantages and Dilemmas of Cross-Strait 

Radio Exchanges”), 新闻爱好者 (Xinwen Aihaozhe), 4 (2011), http://archive.ph/BF1Rf. 

36. Ibid.

37. “666新闻特快” (“News”), 海峡之声广播电台 (Voice of the Strait) (21 Mar. 2020), 7am Show (Beijing time), 

55 minutes.

38. 柳林岚 (Liu Linlan), 郭红斌 (Guo Hongbin), and 刘洪涛 (Liu Hongtao), “按照大众传媒规律办好对

台广播” (“Communicate Well Toward Taiwan by Following Mass Communication Rules”), 军事记者 (Military 

Correspondent), 10 (2005), http://archive.ph/rOgC6. 

39. Ibid.

40. 陈国团 (Chen Guotuan) and 程岚 (Cheng Lan), “关于如何做好对台文化节目的思考” (“Thoughts on the 

Best Way to Carry Out Cultural Programs in Taiwan”), Voice of the Strait, (21 Dec. 2011), http://archive.ph/Di0tD.

41. 钟志刚 (Zhong Zhigang), “通过媒体融合加强对台舆论引导” (“Reinforce the Orientation of Taiwanese 

Public Opinion by Media Integration”), 军事记者 (Military Correspondent) (2014), http://archive.ph/RKt9T.

42. “海峡之声电台与台湾非凡音联播网签新闻合作协议” (“Voice of the Strait and Libra Radio Sign a 

Partnership Agreement”), 中央政府门户网站 (PRC Central Gouvernment) (27 Jun. 2008), http://archive.ph/8BwQj.

43. “电台介绍” (“Radio Presentation”), 非凡音广播电台 (Libra Radio), http://archive.vn/727h9.

430

ideas with Taiwanese people.44 In addition to local radios, VTS has also partnered with 

local newspapers. According to its former director, Zhong Zhigang (钟志刚), VTS regu-

larly cooperates with several Taiwanese publications such as Want Daily, (旺報), the Taiwan 

Daobao (臺灣導報), or the Liberty Times (自由時報) in the hopes of increasing its influence 

in Taiwan.45 

b. Using local dialects for a rapprochement

The Minnan and Hakka dialects are spoken on both sides of the strait and are 

used to bring the continent and the island closer together. Taiwanese people speak 

mandarin – calling it guoyu (國語) rather than putonghua (普通话) as Chinese do – but 

more than 70% of the population speaks Minnan and around 15% belong to the Hakka 

ethnic group. As such, collaborating with Taiwanese radio broadcasting in Minnan 

or Hakka was identified as an efficient tool to penetrate the Taiwanese society.46 

In 2009, VTS partnered with six Taiwanese radios broadcasting in Hakka to create a 

group of channels operating in Taiwan’s region.47 According to former VTS director 

Zhang Zhigang, this action is considered to have marked the actual entry of continental 

China into the Taiwanese radio environment.48 VTS aired its first show, co-hosted with 

a Taiwanese radio station, Formosa Hakka Radio Station (寶島客家廣播電台), in May 

2009.49 VTS joined the Hakka Radio Cooperation network (客 属电台协作网) created 

by the China Radio and Television Association (CRTA, 中国广播电视 协会)50 in 2012. 

Similarly, in the Minnan dialect, VTS joined the Broadcast Cooperative Network for 

the Minnan Dialect (闽南话广播协作网), also created by the CRTA, in 2010. The five 

remaining members of this network are the Taiwan Broadcasting Center of the China 

National Radio (中央人民广播电台对台湾广播中心), the Southeast Broadcasting 

Corporation (东南广播公司), the Minnan Voice Broadcasting of the Xiamen Media 

Group station (厦门广播电视集团闽南之声广播), the Citong Voice Broadcasting of 

the Quanzhou Radio station (泉州人民广播电台刺桐之声广播) and the Zhangzhou 

Radio Station (漳州人民 广播电台).51

c. Diversifying communication supports

Originally, VTS was a traditional organ of propaganda, but after more than 60 years, 

the old radio station had to evolve to keep pace with new technologies and to adapt to 

the needs of the new generations to maintain an influence. One of the major compo-

nents of this strategy was to diversify its supports of communication. In 2000, VTS 

set up a website at about the same time HelloTaiwan was created (你好台灣), and both 

hoped to target younger audiences. The website allowed VTS to adopt different sup-

44. 柳林岚 (Liu Linlan), 郭红斌 (Guo Hongbin), and 刘洪涛 (Liu Hongtao), “按照大众传媒规律办好对台广

播” (“Communicate Well Toward Taiwan by Following Mass Communication Rules”). 

45. Zhigang, “Reinforce orientation.”

46. “闽南话广播协作网成立” (“Creation of a Cooperation Network of Radios Offering Programs in Minnan”), 

中央人民广播电台 (China National Radio) (19 Sept. 2010), http://archive.ph/vjQnv.

47. Name of the Network in Chinese: 海峡之声广播电台台湾地区调频联播网.

48. Zhigang, “Renforcer l’orientation.”

49. 陈国团 (Chen Guotuan) and 程岚 (Cheng Lan), “关于如何做好对台文化节目的思考” (“Thoughts on the 

Best Way to Carry Out Cultural Programs in Taiwan”), Voice of the Strait (21 Dec. 2011), http://archive.ph/Di0tD.

50. “客属电台协作网” (“Hakka Radio Cooperation Network”), 你好台湾 (Hello Taiwan), http://archive.ph/ 

BETke.

51. Gai Shuqin, “Taiwan Radio Stations to Promote Minnan Dialect Broadcasting,” China Daily, 6 November 2012, 

http://archive.ph/ZQV2Z.

431

ports: articles, podcasts, and videos of variable length, in order to target and adapt 

its content to different audiences. In August 2013, VTS even published the first online 

video streaming channel aimed at Taiwan: the Huaxia Jingdian (華夏經典網絡電

台).52 In 2015, two years after former VTS director Liu Linlan published an article on 

the important opportunities offered by WeChat53 as a powerful application for mes-

saging, information sharing and services, VTS created an account on the platform.54 

The “New Media” (新媒体) – WeChat, Facebook, Twitter, Weibo, Plurk,55 attracted 

a lot of attention, as evidenced by the high number of articles from VTS affiliates and 

others on the topic. They are a significant challenge because they intensify competition 

for the public’s attention but also an opportunity because they are additional tools to 

penetrate and manipulate the Taiwanese “public opinion environment.”56 In his 

2013 speech at the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work (全国宣

传思想工作会议), Xi Jinping claimed that the Internet had become the main fighting 

ground of the war on public opinions and that victory there was crucial.57 Ultimately, 

in line with the secretary general of the Party, VTS has been striving to win the war on 

public opinions. 

d. Turning VTS into a mass media

If the diversification of the means of communication was necessary, so was the evo-

lution of the content of the messages. Mid-2000s, executives thought that VTS was too 

specialized and that it needed to become a mainstream or “mass” media.58 This was 

considered to be the most efficient way to spread propaganda in Taiwan. Answering the 

question: “how to lower [the target audience’s] mistrust and hostility?” former director 

Lui Linlan wrote in 2005 that “there is only one way to do that. Communication toward 

Taiwan has to be conducted through mass media. Propaganda needs to be integrated in a 

real radio [programming]. Circulating propaganda must be implemented in a subtle 

fashion, without leaving traces. Only then will [the target audience] let its guard 

down, forget you are United Front, be willing to listen to your programs, and they 

will ultimately trust the broadcast content.”59 In other words, by becoming a mass 

media, VTS aims to drown its propaganda in a flow of information, sneaking it to 

the audience. 

52. “大陆首家对台网络电台开播 传承中华优秀文化” (“The First Video Streaming Channel from China to 

Taiwan is Now Online”) Sina (26 Aug. 2013), http://archive.vn/lh8kH. The list of aired programs in 2016 is available 

here: “华夏经典网络电台节目时间表” (“Schedule of Shows on the Huaxia Jingdian Channels”), Voice of the Strait, 

http://archive.vn/gtme8.

53. 柳林岚 (Liu Linlan), “微信, 一个强大的传播新平台” (“WeChat, a Powerful Dissemination Platform 

WeChat”), 声屏世界 (Voice and Screen World), 10 (2013), http://archive.ph/i17dq.

54. “海峡之声广播电台官方微博正式上线了” (“Voice of the Strait Officially Opens a WeChat Account”), 

Voice of the Strait (6 Mar. 2015), http://archive.ph/Pnt5z.

55. Zhigang, “Reinforce the Orientation.” 钟志刚 (Zhong Zhigang) and 姜红星 (Jiang Hongxing), “运用新媒 体

拓展对台广播舆论引导空间初探” (“Preliminary Study of the Use of New Medias to Widen the Space to Direct the 

Public Opinion of Media Communicating Toward Taiwan”), 中国广播 (China Broadcasts), 10 (2014), http://archive.

ph/7krUU.

56. Zhong, “Reinforce orientation.”

57. “互联网已经成为舆论斗争的主战场”, in “网传习近平8•19讲话全文: 言论方面要敢抓敢管敢于 亮剑” 

(“Xi Jinping’s Full Speech, 19 August”) China Digital Times (4 Nov. 2013), http://archive.ph/ cjZU1.

58. 柳林岚 (Liu Linlan), 郭红斌 (Guo Hongbin), and 刘洪涛 (Liu Hongtao), “按照大众传媒规律办好对台

广播” (“Well Communicate Toward Taiwan by Following the Rules of Mass Communication”), 军事记者 (Military 

Correspondent), 10 (2005), http://archive.ph/rOgC6.

59. Ibid. 

432

e. Adapting its message to the target audience

Likewise, VTS executives were aware of the need to use the target audience’s language in 

order to fulfill their goals. This meant adapting the content to local specificities, for example 

by speaking the audience’s specific dialect, but also adapting the message to different age 

groups, with a style that “spoke” to young people. On the matter of military-related propa-

ganda toward Taiwan (对台军事宣传), its former director Zhong Zhigang explained that 

a communication strategy tailored to each identified audience had to be adopted. 

He highlighted three such categories: ordinary Taiwanese soldiers, pro-independence 

forces, and the Taiwanese population. According to Zhong, a Taiwanese soldier’s only 

concern was “not knowing for whom he is fighting” (不知为谁作战) and, for that reason, 

he described them as having only “vague” patriotic aspirations (国家民族精神模糊). As 

a result, the PLA’s communication strategy needed to guide them positively, and to lead 

them toward the “truth.” However, he noted that a harsher tone needed to be used against 

pro-independence Taiwanese forces. The PLA’s commitment and willingness to fight had 

to be made blatant and dissuasive narratives chosen. Finally, the civil population had to be 

told in a reassuring and educational tone that the PLA’s mission was only to protect its fel-

low citizens.60 Here, Zhong relied on basic principles of psychological warfare, and made 

them more prominent in public opinion warfare. 

f. Quickly reacting

Former VTS directors Liu Linlan and Zhong Zhigang have insisted on the importance 

of reacting quickly and efficiently to impose a specific version of events and frame 

the debate, and for the “PLA’s good image to penetrate the head of the population in 

Taiwan.”61 Given that VTS gives a lot of importance to military and defense-related issues 

– several of its programs are actually dedicated to them62 – Zhong pointed to a few exam-

ples of news that needed to be followed and well-covered, such as the PLA’s peacekeeping 

operations abroad, the protection of China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea, joint 

Sino-Russian military exercises, and news on flagship technologies such as the J-20 fighter 

aircraft or the Liaoning aircraft carrier. However, this did not only apply to military issues. 

When a columnist for the Taiwan Daobao published an op-ed titled “[the] Chinese dream 

and the Taiwanese dream of independence are both just dreams,63” VTS responded in the 

same breath with articles such as “[the] Chinese dream is the highest common denominator 

between both sides of the Strait – a discussion with M. Mo Shangsang”64 and “[how] could 

one compare the Taiwanese dream of independence with the Chinese dream”65; both were 

published on its own website and on Taiwan Daobao.66 We were unable to find the colum-

nists’ publication, but VTS op-eds were still online years later. 

60. 钟志刚 (Zhong Zhigang), “强军目标下对台军事宣传的新探索” (“Military Affairs Propaganda Toward 

Taiwan as Part of Building a Strong Army”), 军事记者 (Military Correspondent), 11 (2013), http:// archive.ph/F6mW8. 

61. In Chinese: “让我军良好形象深入台湾民众心中.” 

62. Zhong says that six VTS programs are dedicated to military matters. Zhigang, “Military Propaganda.” 

63. The article by 陌上桑 (Mo Shangsang), “中国梦 台独梦 都是梦” (“Both the Chinese Dream and the 

Taiwanese Independence Dreams are Just Dreams”), does not seem to be on Taiwan Daobao. It appearently keep none 

of Mo’s articles from before 2017: https://Taiwanreports.com/?s=%E9%99%8C%E4%B8%8A% E6%A1%91. 

64. “中国梦是海峡两岸最大公约数——与陌上桑先生商榷” (“The Chinese Dream is the Highest Common 

Denominator between Both Sides of the Strait – Discussion with M. Mo Shangsang”), Voice of the Strait (25 Jun. 2013), 

http://archive.ph/ UV0v1. 

65. “‘台独梦’如何能与” 中国梦 “相提并论” (“How Could One Compare the Taiwanese Independence Dream 

with the Chinese Dream”), Voice of the Strait (25 Jun. 2013), http://archive.ph/5FlHj.

66. Zhigang, “Reinforce orientation.” 

433

2. The China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (CHBC)

CHBC is a front organization for a unit of the PLA Base 311 (→ p. 103) and it is 

particularly active in the organization of events promoting the Chinese culture and cross-

strait relations (more prominently than on VTS). 

a. The organization of events promoting the Chinese culture 

CHBC partnered with VTS and the Chinese National Radio (CNR) in 2009 to cel-

ebrate the Beijing–Hangzhou Grand Canal (京杭大运河), which was described as 

a precious legacy from centuries of imperial dynasties, and as still contributing to the 

economic development of the regions it connects.67 In 2013, CHBC partnered with 

the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (中国航天科技集团公司), 

the Fujian Provincial Development and Reform Commission (福建省发改委) and the 

Fujian Association for Science and Technology (福 建省科协) to organize a series of 

events on the “space dream”- (航天梦); according to that narrative, the “dream” 

could only be achieved if it was taken up by Chinese people on both sides of the 

Strait.68 In a very different field, CHBC has organized cultural competitions, such as 

the ocean-themed new songs contest for students on both sides of the strait, which 

took place in Fuzhou in 2013.69 

CHBC also sponsors events that contribute to the promotion of China, even if it 

does not directly organize them. In 2019, CHBC was among the seven sponsors of the third 

edition of the Chinese classical poetry recitation competition organized by Aiyinsitan FM 

Radio (爱音斯坦FM) on both sides of the strait, Hong Kong, and Macao (海峡两岸暨香

港 澳门地区中华经典诗文诵读大赛).70 In 2012, CHBC sent about forty of its journal-

ists to interview a hundred China-based Taiwanese entrepreneurs to collect their stories as 

part of an initiative of the China Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (中华文

化发展促进会). Testimonies were gathered during a five-month fieldwork and presented 

during the closing ceremony in Wenzhou. Wang Shu, CHBC’s director at the time, and a 

member of the military and Base 311 commander, said this action, called “Chinese Cultural 

Development Strategies – Four Cultural Salons Across the Taiwan Strait” (大陆台商财富

故事), was an opportunity to show the contribution of Taiwanese people to the economic 

development of the cities they settled in and to reveal the “real” family links between them 

and the local population.71

The flagship event to which CHBC takes part is the Forum for the Development 

of the Chinese Culture (中华文化发展论坛). This forum aims to strengthen ties 

between China and Taiwan and to promote the Chinese culture, in other words to 

increase China’s soft power. This forum, which was called “Strategy for the Development 

67. 王宗磊 (Wang Zonglei), 杨胜云 (Yang Shengyun), and 宋印伟 (Song Yinwei), “海峡之声广播电台” 大运

河千 里行 “媒体活动解读” (“Presentation of the Media Initiative ‘Travel Along the Big Canal,’ the Voice of the 

Strait”), People’s Daily (16 Jan. 2010), http://archive.vn/eNErq. 

68. “航天科技文化海峡两岸系列交流活动正式启动” (“Official Launch of Cross-Strait Exchanges for Culture 

and Social Sciences”), Taiwan.cn (19 Jun. 2013), http://archive.vn/4TxBL.

69. “‘美丽海洋我的家’两岸(大学生)原创歌曲大赛启动” (“Launch of the Contest of New Songs for Students 

on Both Sides of the Strait”), 中国新闻网 (China News) (6 Mar. 2013), http://archive.vn/iWw06. 

70. “‘第三届海峡两岸暨香港、澳门地区 中华经典诗文诵读大赛’年度总决赛选手招募” (“List of Finalists 

in the Third Edition of the Classical Poetry Contest for Both Sides of the Strait Hong Kong and Macao”), 大风号 

(Feng Media) (7 Nov. 2019), http://archive.vn/2ebmU.

71. “‘大陆台商财富故事’历时5月温州收官” (“Closing Ceremony in Wenzhou for the “Success Stories for 

Taiwanese Entrepreneurs in Mainland China”), 台海网 (Taihainet) (22 Dec. 2012), http://archive.vn/2ebmU. 

434

of Chinese Culture – Cultural Salon for Both Sides of the Strait” (中华文化发展方

略—两岸四地文化沙 龙) during its first three editions, was launched by the China 

Academy of Culture (中国文化院) – which is owned by the CEFC China Energy Co. 

Ltd. (→ p. 117) – and the CAPCC (→ p. 124).72 CHBC participated in the organization 

of its second edition in 2014,73 which allowed the forum to gain in depth and influence. 

The seventh edition took place in Beijing in August 2019 and gathered 180 experts, 

journalists, and young people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, compared to only 

30 people during the first edition.

Seventh edition of the Forum on the development of Chinese Culture, Digital Culture and Media Communication, China – 

Beijing, August 2019. Organizers: China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation, Internet Society of China (http://www.chbcnet.com/

web/remit/special/zhwhfzlt2019/index.shtml).

Each edition has a specific theme. The 2019 edition, co-organized with the Internet 

Society of China, focused on “Internet culture and media communication” (网络文化

与媒体传播). Executive Director Chen Guojun (陈国军), who is also a member of 

the military, spoke for CHBC at the event and called for the media to guide the popu-

lation on both sides of the Strait in recognizing China’s “real history” and reject-

ing independence movements; he reminded his audience that modern dissemination 

channels created “historic opportunity” (历史机遇) to “[tell] China’s history correctly” 

and “to correctly recount the story of the relations between China and Taiwan” (讲好

中国故事，讲好两岸故 事).74 The fifth edition, taking place in 2017 in Fuzhou, and 

named “One only Chinese family on both sides of the Strait” (两岸族韵·中华一家) 

set for itself to explore the cultural legacies of ethnic minorities in China and Taiwan 

in order to intensify cultural exchanges between ethnic groups on both sides of 

the Strait and create collaboration opportunities.75 Zhu Xi (朱瓯), the secretary general 

of the Foundation for the Development of the Chinese Nation (中华民族发展基金

会), claimed that the ruling DPP had launched an anti-Chinese campaign since he took 

power in 2016, and that it and was embracing indigenous population with the sole goal 

72. “首届” 中华文化发展方略——两岸四地文化沙龙 “形成共识” (“First Edition of Chinese Cultural 

Development Strategies – Four Cultural Salons Across the Taiwan Strait”), 网易 (Wang yi) (7 Nov. 2013), http://

archive.vn/Pyg3X. 

73. “第二届” 两岸四地文化沙龙 “将于福州召开” (“Second Edition of the Cultural Exhibition of of Both 

Shore is Inaugurated in Fuzhou”), Taihainet (13 Oct. 2014), http://archive.vn/cLMUt.

74. “聚焦 ‘网络文化和媒体传播’ 第七届中华文化发展论坛在京举办” (“The Seventh Forum on the 

Development of Chinese Culture was Held in Beijing”), 观察 (Guancha) (23 Aug. 2019), http://archive.fo/PVUDK. 

75. “第五届 ‘中华文化发展论坛’ 研讨两岸少数民族文化渊源与传承” (“The Fifth Edition of the Forum 

for the Development of Chinese Culture Discusses the Origins and Cultural Heritage of Ethnic Minority on Both 

Shores”), Xinhuanet (29 Dec. 2017), http://archive.vn/oR0xO.

435

of winning over their votes and advancing their pro-independence cause.76 This forum 

thus contributed to reinforcing ties between all ethnic groups and the “big Chinese 

family” and to press for the big “Chinese dream” according to Zhao Yixian (赵一先), 

deputy director of the KMT’s Working Commission on Ethnic Minorities (中国国民党

少数民族工作委员会).77

The fourth and sixth editions of the forum were held in Xiamen and focused on “the 

legacy of the Chinese culture and the responsibility of the contemporary youth” (中华

文化传承与当代青年担当) and on “Cultural innovation and the responsibility of the 

youth” (文化创新与青年担当) respectively.

b. The youth: A key target group

The youth is a key target group because it embodies the future of cross-strait 

relations. Some of CHBC’s shows are incidentally explicitly conceived for young 

audiences, as with “Liang’an qingnianhui” (两岸青年汇). CHBC president Qui Yu, 

otherwise known as General-Major Yue Lei, pointed out in a 2017 speech that the 

youth on both sides of the Strait had a role to play in the “protection of Chinese cul-

ture.”78 CHBC regularly organizes actions specifically dedicated to young Taiwanese 

people, with the goal of making them like Chinese culture, to instill a sense of pride 

in them as part of the same Chinese nation, and ultimately to strengthen a sense of 

belonging.

In 2018, for example, and together with the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC’s State 

Council, CHBC organized an exchange program for 50 Taiwanese students and 

10 Chinese students to show them opportunities in the academic and business 

sectors in several Chinese mainland towns.79 CBHC had previously co-organized an 

Exchange Forum for Taiwanese students wishing to study or work in China (

台生大陆求学就业交流汇) in 2015.80 According to its president, Qiu Yu, this forum 

aimed to inform young Taiwanese people about opportunities in China, to offer them 

support and to create a communication platform between the two sides of the Strait. 

Similarly, CHBC invited around twenty Taiwanese students to discover Qinghai in July 

2016, in the hopes of fostering exchanges between that province and Taiwan. An exec-

utive from the Qinghai–Tibet railway company (青藏铁路公司) told them about the 

company’s history and its weight on the socio-economic development of these two 

huge provinces located in Western China.81 These actions targeting the youth show 

that Chinese are betting on the long-term: to shape the youth’s opinions in such 

a way that it favors Taiwan’s reunification with China, which would win back the island 

without using military might.

76. “中评现场: 第五届中华文化发展论坛在榕开幕” (“The Fifth Edition of the Forum for the Development 

of Chinese Culture Has Been Launched”), China Review News Agency (29 Dec. 2017), http://archive.vn/dkQV8. 

77. Ibid.

78. Video published on CHBC’s website by Miaopai (秒拍) (30 Dec. 2017), http://n.miaopai.com/media/ 

bBnT7Kgmdqrgy23PZ5n0FW1CvBfxLzdv.

79. 王乾宏 (Wang Ganhong), “‘华广青年汇·双创趴趴走’ 两岸青年交流周圆满收官” (“Closure of the Week 

for Cross-Strait Exchanges for the Youth”), 中华时报 (Chuang Hua Times) (20 Aug. 2018), http://archive.md/BbKYV. 

80. “海峡两岸大学生重走青藏铁路活动在青海启动” (“Launch of the Initiative “Students from both Shores 

Travel the Qinghai-Tibet Railway”), 中国台湾网 (Taiwan.cn) (4 Jul. 2016), http://archive.vn/fPe4J.

81. “海峡两岸大学生重走青藏铁路活动在青海启动” (“Launch of the initiative “Students from both Shores 

Travel the Qinghai-Tibet Railway”). 

436

c. One galaxy 

The partners of the events organized by CHBC usually belong to the same gal-

axy: without surprise, there are VTS and the Haifeng publishing company, the other two 

organizations directly affiliated to Base 311, but also the media partners such as the Want 

Daily, the Chinese National Radio, the China Review News Agency or the HelloTaiwan 

web platform. Most of these events are held under the aegis of the Taiwan Affairs 

Office or of civilian organizations promoting cross-strait relations, including the China 

Association for Promotion of Chinese Culture (CAPCC, 中华文化发展促进会), the 

All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (中华全国台湾同胞联谊会) or also the 

Collaborative Innovation Center for Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations (两

岸关 系和平发展协同创新中心). The CAPCC was created in 2001 and it is now seen 

as the PLA’s main platform for informal exchanges with Taiwan. It is probably run by 

the former General Political Department’s Liaison Office of the CMC. In fact, two general 

officers in that bureau held senior positions in the CAPCC (→ p. 124).82 Additionally, the 

All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots was created in 1981 and acts as a “bridge and 

link” between Taiwanese people, the CCP, and the Chinese government.83 The Collaborative 

Innovation Center for Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations is another organi-

zation: created at the initiative of Xiamen University in 2013, the center brings together 

the University of Fudan, Fujian Normal University and the Chinese Academy of Social 

Sciences to work toward a peaceful reunification with Taiwan.84

d. A Collaboration with local media

Not unlike VTS, CHBC has tried to penetrate the Taiwanese media landscape by 

cooperating with local media. One of its most successful collaborations was set up with 

Happy Radio (快樂聯播網). In October 2010, they partnered for the diffusion of a show 

82. Mark Stokes and Russel Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare 

with Chinese Characteristics,” Project 2049 Institute (2013), 21. The CAPCC website was still accessible in July 2019 

http://www.chinaapc.org/index_utf8.php. It should not be mistaken with the Chinese Cultural Promotion Society (

中华文化促进会).

83. “全国台联简介” (“Federation Presentation”), 中华全国台湾同胞联谊会 (All-China Federation of Taiwan 

Compatriots) (1 Jan. 2018), http://archive.vn/GHG3L.

84. “中心简介” (“Center’s Presentation”), Collaborative Innovation Center for Peaceful Development of Cross-

Strait Relations, http://archive.vn/qvQGQ. “‘两岸关系和平发展协同创新中心’在厦门揭牌” (“Center for 

Collaboration and Innovation for the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relationships in Xiamen”), 中华人民共

和国中央人 民政府 (Central government of People’s Republic of China) (25 Mar. 2013), http://archive.vn/lixDn.

437

co-hosted by a Chinese CHBC anchor and a Taiwanese Happy Radio anchor. The show 

was called Huaguang Kuaile Easy Go (华广快乐EZGO) – Huaguang referring to CBHC 

and Kuaile to Happy Radio. The hour was divided between a serious part dedicated to 

exchanging views on issues affecting both sides of the Strait, and a lighter part dealing with 

Chinese culture, travel stories, or food. Exchanging views in such manner was meant to 

show that, although there are disagreements between the two sides of the Strait, it 

was still possible to understand each other and to share a common history and cul-

ture.85 CHBC also wanted to be able to share the Chinese narrative to the audience of its 

Taiwanese collaborator. Happy Radio is indeed the second largest radio network in Taiwan, 

after UFO Radio (飛碟聯播網). The show was first aired on three of Happy Radio’s sta-

tions before being extended to the seven channels, covering the whole Taiwanese territory.86 

This partnership was the result of a rapprochement initiated by CBHC before 2010: CHBC 

had invited Happy Radio’s executive director to events in China, later to visit CHBC’s head-

quarters and to collaborate on some occasional projects. CHBC now seeks to increase its 

visibility in Taiwan, but also to increase China’s visibility (增进对大陆的理解认知) and 

reduce anti-China opposition (消除对大 陆的对抗) there.87 

3. Haifeng 

Haifeng is the publishing company of the PLA Base 311 (→ p. 106). According to 

the description of its activities on the Tianyancha trade database, Haifeng publishes pro-

paganda writing and illustrated books for Taiwan.88 The topics vary: politics, economy, 

history, law, culture, literature, arts. For instance, in 2011, the Haifeng publishing house 

won the second edition of the publishing award the Chinese government awards every 

three years (第二届中国出版政府奖), for its book Presentation of the cities in China (中国

城市巡礼).89 Published in 2009, for the 60th anniversary of the PRC, the book praised 

the successes and developments of modern Chinese cities since the economic reform. It 

was commended for including Taipei, Hong Kong, and Macao, thus taking a “true family 

photo” of Chinese cities. 

Several of Haifeng’s books promote national reunification, such as A Call from the Two 

Shores: Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland (海峡两岸的呼唤:和平统一祖国) published 

in 1999 by Xu Haoran (徐浩然), a former aid to Chiang Ching-kuo and member of the 

Kuomintang’s revolutionary committee in the Jiangxi province.90 That same year, Lee Teng-

hui’s Commentary on the “Two States” Theory (评李登辉及其’两国论’)91 was released. In it, 

85. 赵志刚 (Zhao Zhigang), 柳林岚 (Liu Linlan), and 周均 (Zhou Jun), “话语结构的交叉与重组——《华广

快 乐EZGO》节目形态探析” (“Huaguang Kuaile EZGO’ Programme Analysis”), 中国广播 (China Broadcasts), 7 

(2015), http://archive.vn/igyoq. 

86. “關於我們” (“About Us”), 快樂聯播網 (Happy Radio), https://archive.vn/p0olg.

87. 赵志刚 (Zhao Zhigang), 柳林岚 (Liu Linlan), and 周均 (Zhou Jun), “话语结构的交叉与重组——《华

广快 乐EZGO》节目形态探析” (“Huaguang Kuaile EZGO’ Program Analysis”), 中国广播 (China Broadcasts), 7 

(2015), http://archive.vn/igyoq. 

88. “编辑出版对台宣传的社科图书，以及画册，挂历类出版物” (“Profile of the Haifeng Publishing House 

on Tianyancha, updated on 20 December 2019”), https://www.tianyancha.com/company/270887829. Information 

also here: “海风出版社” (“Haifeng Publishing House”), 利酷搜黄页网 (Likuso), http://archive.vn/htNnj. 

89. 辛旗 (Xin Qi), 中国城市巡礼 (Presentation of the Cities in China), Haifeng Publishing House (2009), http://

archive.ph/ BgKZY.

90. The Kuomintang’s revolutionary committee is one of the eight democratic parties recognised by the PRC and 

supervised by the United Front Work Department. 徐浩然 (Xu Haoran), 海峡两岸的呼唤: 和平统一祖国 (The Call 

from the Two Shores: Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland), Haifeng Publishing House (1999), http://archive.vn/XGlI2. 

91. 评李登辉及其 ‘两国论’ (Commentary on the ‘Two States’ Theory by Lee Teng-hui), Haifeng Publishing House (1999), 

http://archive.vn/KHVuB.

438

Lee Teng-hui, the now-former Taiwanese president, rejected the idea of One China and 

defended the implementation of inter-state relations between Beijing and Taipei. Two 

years earlier, in 1997, Haifeng had published Hong Kong’s Retrocession and the Reunification of 

the Motherland (香港回归与祖国统一).92 There is no doubt that there is an interest in 

Taiwanese public affairs: a researcher at the CCP’s Central School published a book with 

Haifeng in 2006 untitled All Aspects of the Policies of the Democratic Porgressist Party, in Power for 

Four Years, toward Mainland China (民进党当局执政四年大陆政策面面观).93 A Taiwanese 

Affairs Handbook (涉台事务知识手册)94 was published the following year, followed by 

Policies and Rules toward Taiwan (对台政策法规)95 two years later.

Until then, former Haifeng directors had mostly published books on culture or art. 

For instance, Jiao Honghui wrote several books on Chinese calligraphers,96 on folk culture 

on both sides of the Strait,97 and on traditional Chinese celebrations.98 His successor Lu 

Fentang edited a poetry collection in Hakka,99 as well as travel photography book adapted 

from the “Photographers of the Two Shores” outings (see on the following page), such as 

Fifteen Years of Shadows and Light (光影十五年).100

Previous Base 311 commanders also published books with the company. Its first 

commander, Deng Changyu, published a book on autonomous regions in 2010.101 The 

following year, his successor Wang Shu, published a book on the 1911 Chinese Revolution 

under a pseudonym, for the revolution’s centennial.102 VTS also penned books published 

by Haifeng, including one in 1997 on the links between the nation and the army.103 More 

recently, in 2013, the VTS former editor-in-chief Lu Wenxing (卢文兴) published a book 

on propaganda toward Taiwan.104 Finally, in 2014, the VTS former director Zhong Zhigang 

authored a book on the Chinese dream.105 

Major General Xin Qi, former director of the former General Political Department’s 

Liaison Office, and a well-known figure in China,106 published a book with Haifeng on pho-

92. 香港回归与祖国统一 (Hong Kong’s Return and the Reunification of the Motherland), Haifeng Publishing House, 

(1997), http:// archive.vn/TtWda. 

93. 何仲山 (He Zhongshan), 民进党当局执政四年大陆政策面面观 (All Aspects of the Policies of the 

Democratic Porgressist Party, in Power for Four Years, Toward Mainland China), Haifeng Publishing House (2006), 

http://archive.vn/honIB. 

94. 佘友文 (Yu Youwen), 涉台事务知识手册 (Taiwanese Affairs Handbook), Haifeng Publishing House (2006), 

http:// archive.vn/sVbMq. 

95. 徐学 (Xu Xue), 对台政策法规 (Policies and Rules Toward Taiwan), Haifeng Publishing House (2008), http:// 

archive.vn/UFIVG. 

96. 焦红辉 (Jiao Honghui), 当代书法名家一李章庸 (Master of Calligraphy Li Zhangyong), Haifeng Publishing 

House (2008), http://archive.fo/hH64w. 

97. 焦红辉 (Jiao Honghui), 源与缘: 闽台民间风俗比照 (Origin and Destiny: Comparison of Popular Customs in Fujian 

and Taiwan), Haifeng Publishing House, 2008, http://archive.fo/Y4GFF. 

98. 焦红辉 (Jiao Honghui), 中华传统节日 (Traditional Chinese Celebrations), Haifeng Publishing House (2012), 

http://archive. fo/HMElR. 

99. 吕凤堂 (Lü Fengtang), 桐花客韵: 海峡两岸客家诗选 (Paulownia in Hakka Rymes: Poem Selection from Both Shores 

in Hakka), Haifeng Publishing House (2016), http://archive.vn/p3qP5. 

100. 吕凤堂 (Lü Fengtang), 光影十五年 (Fifteen Years of Shahow and Light), Haifeng Publishing House (2016), 

http://archive. vn/qNmMq.

101. 邓长宇 (Deng Changyu), 跨越 改革开放中的中国少数民族自治区 (Crossing Autonomous Regions in China 

During the Economic Reforms), Haifeng Publishing House (2010), http://archive.md/HEaye. 

102. 汪澍 (Wang Shu), 百年复兴忆辛亥 (Hundred Years of Renaissance and Memories of the 1911 Revolution), Haifeng 

Publishing House (2011), http://archive.md/deJXo. 

103. Voice of the Strait, 军人与祖国 (Militaries and the Motherland), Haifeng Publishing House (1997), http://

archive.fo/e1kUq.

104. 卢文兴 (Lu Wenxing), 传播问效 对台宣传探索文集 (Anthology of Studies on the Dissemination of Propaganda for 

Taiwan), Haifeng Publishing House (2013), http://archive.vn/g9iPR. 

105. 钟志刚 (Zhong Zhigang), 共叙中国梦 (Narrating our Chinese Dream Together), Haifeng Publishing House 

(2014), http://archive. fo/H5nqd. 

106. Stokes and Hsiao, “The People’s Liberation Army,” 21-23. 

439

tos of Lijiang in 2004.107 Incidentally, he edited the book prized by the Chinese government 

in 2011.108 Xin Qi is currently vice-president of the China Association for International 

Friendly Contact (CAIFC), which is, as previously explained, a political warfare platform 

affiliated with the PLA. Finally, another former vice-president for the CAIFC, Yi Xian, 

published a Taiwanese Population Stories Series (台湾百姓故事丛书), a trilogy, in 2015. 

Finally, it should be noted that Haifeng also published several books on psycholog-

ical warfare, including A selection of Psychological Wars Carried out by Foreign Armies (外 国

军队心理战战例选评)109 and Psychological Warfare Leaflets (心理战传单), written by three 

authors in 2009, including a professor at the National Defense University.110

Taiwanese people theoretically have access to books published by Haifeng inso-

far as they can be found on the websites of Taiwanese book vendors.111 However, the 

actual appeal of these books is doubtful, given that they are displayed on these websites 

without any picture or description, and they are relatively expansive. In addition, Haifeng 

books are published in simplified characters, whereas Taiwanese people are used to tra-

ditional characters. Here, the lack of efforts undertaken to market and promote them 

is surprising. Haifeng does not even have a website dedicated to its products, a catalogue 

or at least a system to present its new books to readers who might be interested in them. 

The publishing company did create a WeChat account in which it regularly publishes 

some short texts, but WeChat is not the preferred social network in Taiwan. With book that 

are not easily discoverable on the Taiwanese market and that do not necessarily correspond 

to the target audience’s tastes and expectations, we can question Haifeng Publishing’s 

actual ability to conduct “propaganda toward Taiwan” (对台宣传). 

a. The events it organizes involve the same galaxy

However, Haifeng’s actions go beyond publishing books: it also regularly takes part 

in events promoting Chinese culture and cross-strait relations. CHBC, VTS, and Haifeng 

often co-organize events together, such as a 2015 ceremony commemorating the 70th 

anniversary of the end of the Japanese War, which was attended by Jiao Honghui et Ai 

Songru, otherwise known as Ai Ke;112 or a cultural event organized in 2013 under the aegis 

of the CAPCC by CHBC, VTS, CNR and Haifeng.113 

Haifeng’s flagship project seems to be the “Photographers of the Two Shores,” an 

initiative it has organized yearly since 2002 with the Photographic Society of Taipei (

台北摄影学会, founded in 1956). It puts together a trip with a group of Chinese and 

Taiwanese photographers to visit several cities and territories displaying Chinese wealth, 

107. 辛旗 (Xin Qi), 丽江印象 (Impressions from the Lijiang), Haifeng Publishing House (2004), http://archive.md/

ogOc2. 

108. 乙先 (Yi Xian), 台湾百姓故事丛书 (History of the Taiwanese Population), Haifeng Publishing House, (2019), 

http:// archive.vn/BfF66. 

109. 尹西斌 (Yin Xibin), 外国军队心理战战例选评 (A Selection of Psychological Wars Carried out by Foreign Armies, 

Haifeng Publishing House (2002), http://archive.vn/txSJs. 

110. 刘凤健 (Liu Fengjian), 李绍新 (Li Shaoxin), and 欧立寿 (Ou Lishou), 心理战传单 (Psychological War Tracts), 

Haifeng Publishing House (2009), http://archive.vn/6BQ8Y. 

111. For example, https://www.sanmin.com.tw/Product/index/005897106; https://www.books.com.tw/web/ 

sys_puballb/china/?pubid=0000000419&sloc=main.

112. “‘两岸抗战老兵的故事’ 征文活动颁奖仪式在福州举行” (“Stories on Former Combattants from Both 

Shores During the War Against Japan: Writing Contest Award Ceremony Took Place in Fuzhou”), Voice of the Strait (17 

Nov. 2015), http://archive.md/OgoCW.

113. We note that the photographer of the event was Ai Ran (艾然), a CHBC and base 311 Unit-61070 

affiliate (→ p. 113). “‘台湾文化人在大陆’报道活动圆满落幕 发行同名图书” (“Closing of the Event and Book 

Publication”), China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation (2 Dec. 2013), http://archive. md/0Ww8B.

440

culture, and its successes to teach Taiwanese people about China and build friendships 

between both sides of the Strait. This project rests on the so-called “two Huis”: Haifeng 

executive Jiao Honghui, and Cai Denghui (蔡登辉) of the Photographic Society of Taipei. 

Since leaving their respective positions, Jiao Honghui has continued to take part to the trips 

as co-president of the Fujian Photographers’ Association and Cai Denghui as a member 

of the Taiwan Cross-Strait Peace, Culture and Arts Alliance (台湾两岸 和平文化艺术联

盟). Other local photographers’ associations have been invited to participate in the project: 

associations from the Chinese province of Yunnan and the city of Wuhan and from the 

Taiwanese city of Tainan, and the counties of Nantou and Hsinchu in 2016 for instance. 

Among the participants we also found several media. In 2016, it included the China News 

Service, the Chinese daily Sanmin (三明日报), and the Taiwanese magazines Dujia Baodao (獨

家報導) and Lianyi Sheying (聯藝攝影). The academic field was also included that year, with 

the participation of Cai Denglong, professor at the National Taiwan University of Sport 

and National Chung Cheng University in Chiayi (蔡登龍), and a teacher from the Chiayi 

Industrial Vocational High School. Finally, these Haifeng initiatives have often been carried 

out with the full support and occasional participation of the CAPCC.114 

II. From the inside: local intermediaries

Beijing goes around the Taiwanese central government by coopting a high num-

ber of local intermediaries: political parties, media, PR agencies, business persons, civil 

society organizations, or cultural institutions working on both sides of the strait, as well as 

diehard “blue” military communities, brought up with the myth of an unavoidable reuni-

fication. These local intermediaries are crucially important, first because they act as inter-

preters allowing cultural mediation; and second because they are already established and 

thus benefit from an immediately available credibility and audience. By using them, not 

only does Beijing cover its tracks (particularly because local intermediaries do not make 

linguistic mistakes that might give away their foreign origins), it also increases its chances 

of having an impact because the Taiwanese population will be reached out by people that 

it knows, in its language, with its own cultural references. “China just has to pay for these 

local groups to do the work for them,” a member of government summed up.115

A. Taiwanese media

The party is involved in an overt “media war on Taiwan,” the strategic goals of 

which were laid out in 2004 by President Hu Jintao, at the fiftieth anniversary of the first 

broadcast of the Chinese National Radio in Taiwan: ‘‘Entering the Island, Entering 

the Household, and Entering the Mind (of the people)’’ (“入 岛、入户、入心”).116 

In the early 2000s, China was mostly using outside media, from Hong Kong especially, to 

try and influence the Taiwanese public opinion. Beijing then took on Lenin’s idea: “the 

114. “两岸摄影家•两岸行风采录，看看有没有你” (“Photographs from the Two Shores”), 美篇 (Meipian) (30 

Oct. 2016), https://archive.vn/8uJXl.

115. Interview between the authors and a minister in Taipei (Apr. 2019).

116. Huang Jaw-nian, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” China Perspectives, 3 (2017), 30. 

441

easiest way to capture a fortress is from within.”117 Going through local intermediaries 

is all the more necessary since, contrary to Hong Kong, Taiwan forbids entities or individ-

uals from mainland China from buying Taiwanese media without governmental approval. 

Similarly, Taiwanese media cannot publish advertisements from the Chinese state. Beijing 

thus needs to rely on local intermediaries. 

This strategy of capture from within made headways during the presidency of 

Ma Ying-jeou (KMT, 2008-2016) as he promoted a deeper economic integration 

between Taiwan and mainland China. It facilitated the penetration of Taiwanese media 

by Beijing and, incidentally, self-censorship. This was confirmed by subsequent reports on 

global media freedom: Taiwan’s score has sharply deteriorated since 2008-2009118 – even 

though it remains #1 in Asia. RSF’s choice of setting up its East Asian office in Taipei 

was telling: Hong Kong had been an option until the Umbrella Revolution, after which 

Reporters without Borders reconsidered its decision given Chinese interference.119 

Huang Jaw-nian came up with a theoretical model to explain China’s influence on 

Taiwanese media,120 combining the “commercialization of censorship” model 

developed by Kurlantzick and Link121 and Wu Jieh-min (吳介民)’s “China Factor” mod-

el.122 According to the first, the CCP has not only used traditional methods, but also out-

sourced censorship to private media companies by threatening them when they refused to 

comply, which increased the tendency of Chinese media to censor themselves. According 

to the latter model, economic dependence is Beijing’s main tool of political influence on 

other countries. Combining both, Huang Jaw-nian focuses on mechanisms through 

which the Chinese government exports its censorship, including by outsourcing it 

to foreign private media companies. He subsequently distinguished three steps: first, 

make the target conntry economically dependent; then co-opt private media, either 

providing services to them (financial and advertising resources, capitalization, access to the 

Chinese market) or through threats to close them down; finally, implement and normal-

ize self-censorship within the media landscape of these countries to shape the narrative 

in favor of China. The author predicted that “a media company outside China will exercise 

self-censorship on Chinese-sensitive topics when it becomes commercially tied with the 

Chinese market”123 – an hypothesis that Huang confirmed by looking at Taiwan. Here, four 

specific levers can be distinguished.

1. Access to the Chinese market

Taiwan became economically tied to China during the 2000s, and after the 2010 

free trade agreement was signed. But the process had begun earlier: China has been 

Taiwan’s main trade partner since 2005, replacing the U.S. and Japan, its first export 

market since 2004 and the first investment market for Taiwanese businesses in 2002. 

Simultaneously there has been an exponential growth in the number of organizations, asso-

ciations, inter-strait forums in the economic and cultural fields. This environment has 

117. Hsu Chien-jung, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” Asian Survey, 54:3 (2014), 516.

118. See the archives from Reporters without Borders and Freedom House. 

119. Interview of the authors with RSF in Taipei (Apr. 2019).

120. Huang, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” 27-36. 

121. Joshua Kurlantzick and Perry Link, “China: Resilient, Sophisticated Authoritarianism,” in Christopher Walker, 

ed., Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2009), 13-28.

122. Wu Jieh-min, “The China Factor in Taiwan: Impact and Response,” in Gunter Schubert, ed., Handbook of 

Modern Taiwan Politics and Society (New York: Routledge, 2016), 425–445. 

123. Huang, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” 29. 

442

facilitated the co-optation of Taiwanese media: most of them are attracted by the 

enormous Chinese market whose access is conditioned to self-censorship. The Taiwan 

Affairs Office (TAO) slowly gave access to some Chinese media such as the United Daily 

News (UDN) which received an authorization to print and distribute its paper in the city of 

Dongguan, and the China Times (→ p. 144). Huan Jaw-nian noted that “despite these privi-

leges, the circulation of both Taiwanese newspapers in China has still been restricted to cer-

tain regions, organizations, and people, such as Taiwanese enterprises, foreign businesses, 

five-star hotels, and academic institutions for Taiwan studies.”124 Conditionality is always in 

order: Beijing only authorized the Taiwanese television channel TTV to set up its offices 

in several Chinese cities, including Beijing, after it stopped broadcasting a show on Falun 

Gong. This request immediately propelled self-censorship because, from that moment on, 

“most Taiwanese media planning to enter the Chinese market became reluctant to produce 

news reports and TV programs about Falun Gong.125”

This was not a matter of ideological convergence: even “green” media, that are pro-in-

dependence or, at least, in favor of a strengthened national identity, play along for com-

mercial reasons. This is illustrated by the SET television channel, which was initially 

pro-DPP and anti-CCP but began to censor itself after Ma’s election in 2008 because 

the network’s president wished to expand its business in mainland China. A quan-

titative analysis confirmed that the number of stories on Tian’anmen, for example, has 

continuously decreased since 2010.126 Besides, SET mainly airs Taiwanese TV shows – the 

“Taiwanese drama,” a genre in its own right. But, to please Beijing, the network, which pro-

duces a majority of them in Mandarin, renamed them “Chinese drama” in December 2011. 

This was not enough: Beijing demanded the cancellation of the very popular but 

particularly anti-CCP show Big Talk News (大話新聞), broadcast on SET. This hap-

pened gradually: first, the show was barred from speaking about topics that irritated Beijing 

(such as the Tian’anmen massacre, the Dalai-lama or Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer), from 

inviting guests seen as subversive (such as Amnesty International Taiwan’s president, a 

pro-Tibet activist) or simply from criticizing China. In the end, the network cancelled Big 

Talk News in May 2012, showing that the “China factor” could lead to self-censorship and 

even to the elimination of a popular TV show.127 

Among pro-Chinese media, Master Chain (大師鏈) is interesting. The online media was 

created in 2018 and based in Taipei: it was the first Taiwanese media accredited by the 

Chinese government, authorized to set up an office and broadcast in mainland China. The 

firm quickly expanded, going from 15 to 50 employees and recruiting with higher salaries than 

the average in the sector thanks to a 100-million-dollar subvention from Hasdaq, a company 

registered in the United States but headquartered in Hong Kong.128 Among the new recruits, 

were former Taiwanese military and intelligence officers, including good “catches” such 

as the former managing director of the National Safety Bureau Yang Kuo-chiang (楊國強) 

– now a consultant for Master Chain – and the former director of the Military Intelligence 

124. Ibid., 32

125. Ibid.

126. Hung Yao-nan, Yang Hsiu-Jing, and Chen Chun-Wei, How Did China Factor Influence Taiwanese Media? Taipei: 

Graduate Institute of National Development (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2014), 19-23, cited in Huang, “The China 

Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” 35. 

127. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 527-529. 

128. Sophia Yang, “Taiwan Media Outlet Master Chain Criticized for Being China Lackey,” Taiwan News (4 Dec. 

2019). 

443

Bureau Chang Kan-ping (張勘平),129 now the group’s vice-president. Master Chain decided 

to abandon its activity in Taiwan on January 1st, 2020, after the anti-infiltration law precisely 

aimed at countering Chinese interference on the island came into force. 

2. Advertising 

More or less covert advertising is another tool to shape Taiwanese narratives on 

China. Since the late 2000s, the TAO and some provincial authorities in mainland China 

have produced advertisings (to encourage doing business, or visiting China) for Taiwanese 

media. UDN and the China Times have frequently published them, for instance, and the We 

Want group even created an agency in Beijing (Want Want China Times Cultural Media 

Agency) to serve as an intermediary for the Chinese government and place ads in other 

Taiwanese media.130

3. Money

Participating in the capital of a company, and then taking control of it, by buying 

up shares is the third tool: in the late 2000s, TAO “prepared a huge amount of capital, at 

least US$300 million, with the clearly identified purpose of purchasing stock in Taiwanese 

media companies such as Television Broadcasts Satellite (TVBS) channels and the UDN 

Group’s affiliated institutions.”131 United Front agents apparently pressured Chinese com-

panies into buying Taiwanese media companies, in exchange of a two-year tax exemption. 

The United Front then places agents in the outlets so as to take control of their 

editorial line.132

4. Buyouts by Taiwanese tycoons

Finally, a fourth lever is to encourage pro-Chinese tycoons – or tycoons who have 

ties to the Chinese market – to buy Taiwanese media. This is what happened with 

Want Want. Want Want Holdings Limited is a Taiwanese food company founded in 1962 

by Tsai A-shi (蔡 阿賜). In 1987, the group went to his son Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明), who 

massively invested in China after the martial law was lifted at the beginning of the 1990s. 

The company created a Chinese branch in Shanghai, Want Want China Holdings, which is 

now the most important branch of the group, and the biggest Chinese manufacturer of 

rice crackers and flavored milk – and a global leader in the market. The group makes about 

90% of its profits in the Chinese market,133 which is where the group’s president built his 

fortune. Tsai Eng-meng, worth $6.6 billion nowadays, is the third richest man in Taiwan 

despite mainly residing in Shanghai.134 His group reportedly received at least $586.7 million 

in Chinese investment between 2004 and 2019.135 And Tsai Eng-meng returns the favor 

129. 羅添斌 (Lo Tien-pin), “台灣這家媒體竟能插旗北京 明邀連戰、吳斯懷見證” (“This Taiwanese Media 

Company Can Plant a Flag in Beijing and Invite Lien Chan and Wu Si-wei to Watch”), 台北報導 (Taibei Baodao) (12 

Mar. 2019). 

130. Huang, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media.”

131. Ibid., 33

132. Interview of one of the authors with a Taiwanese diplomat in Canada (Apr. 2019). 

133. Andrew Higgins, “Tycoon Prods Taiwan Closer to China,” The Washington Post (21 Jan. 2012).

134. “#308 Tsai Eng-meng,” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/profile/tsai-eng-meng/?sh=6769d9fb59f4.

135. Kenji Kawase, “Chinese Subsidies for Foxconn and Want Want Spark Outcry in Taiwan,” Nikkei Asian Review 

(30 Apr. 2019).

444

by regularly making pro-China public statements. In 2012, he said to The Washington Post: 

“[whether] you like it or not, unification is going to happen sooner or later. I really hope I 

can see that,” while denying the Tian’anmen massacre.136

The group, which had initially been specialized in the food industry, decided to diversify its 

activities by investing in the media. In 2006, it bought the Taiwanese television channel 

CTV, and then the China Times Group in 2008. The China Times Group is the island’s 

fourth biggest media conglomerate with its three dailies, including the China Times, which was 

founded in 1950 and has the fourth largest circulation in the country, three magazines, three 

TV channels – including CTi TV – and 8 news websites. It was subsequently renamed Want 

Want China Times Group and is now led by one of Tsai Eng-meng’s sons, Tsai Shao-chung 

(蔡紹中, president) and by KMT vice-president and former mayor of Taichung Jason Hu (

胡志強, vice-president). Want Want also created two platforms: another journal, Want Daily (

旺報) in 2009, and an English news website called the WantChinaTimes.com in 2010, which 

takes up so many articles from the Chinese press agency Xinhua that the website was nick-

named the “representative of the Xinhua news agency in Taiwan.”137 

“Since then, China Times has morphed from a mainstream publication into what 

critics call a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist party”138 – or a so-called ‘Red’ 

media, i.e., one that covers Beijing’s narratives, attacks the DPP’s government and largely 

censors itself. Hsu noted that even if self-censorship started before the newspaper was 

taken over (the initially hostile China Times has gradually shifted in its attitude toward Beijing 

since the mid-1990s),139 several elements showed that it has intensified since the buyup. 

First, the newspaper’s archives were purged of any mention of the Tian’anmen massacre.140 

The editorial line then changed: a comparison between articles published before and 

after the purchase showed its impact, with a drastic decrease in human rights-related news 

on China (two thirds fewer than before the purchase).141 Among the four biggest Taiwanese 

newspapers, comparing the ones that accept advertising from Chinese authorities (China 

Times and UDN) and the other two (Apple Daily and Liberty Times), we see that the former 

groups has “a tendency to have a more positive and detailed coverage of information on 

Chinese leaders and their official visits to Taiwan.” In the same vein, 100% and 77.78% of 

articles published by the China Times and UDN on Xinjiang were based on official Chinese 

sources only, and 100% and 83.33% of them blamed the conflict solely on protesters rather 

than on the Chinese regime.142

Besides, the editorial team’s obedience to Beijing is clear, highlighted by the following 

elements. First, the CCP’s Central Propaganda department was involved in Tsai’s 

purchase of the China Times Group, through the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), which 

is said to have intervened through a KMT leader to convince Tsai Eng-meng to buy the 

group. At the time, the CCP feared that the group might be bought by the anti-communist 

Next Media.143 Only two weeks after the purchase, Tsai instructed the China Times Group 

136. Higgins, “Tycoon Prods Taiwan Closer to China.” 

137. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 522.

138. Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan Primaries Highlight Fears over China’s Political Influence,” Financial Times (16 Jul. 

2019). 

139. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 519.

140. 陳政偉, “中國時報下架六四相關報導 對外沒有回應” (“The China Times Withdraws Articles from June 

4, No Reaction Abroad”), 中央社 (CAN) (13 Jun. 2019).

141. 李嘉艾 (Li Chia-ai), 台灣媒體生產政治中的中國因素與獨裁者邏輯: 以C集團為例, MA Thesis in 

Sociology, Tsinghua University, cited in Reporters Without Borders, China’s Pursuit of a New Global Order (2019), 40. 

142. Huang, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” 35. 

143. Ibid., 34.

445

managers to “strongly support the [KMT, pro-Beijing] Ma Ying-jeou administration, to 

improve cross-Strait relations, and to avoid discussing unification and independence in the 

Group’s media.”144 Two weeks later, Tsai met with Wang Yi, director of the PRC’s Taiwan 

Affairs Office (now minister for Foreign Affairs) to “report” on the purchase and his plans 

for the media group.145 Besides, within less than two years, the team covering the cross-strait 

relationship was moved from the political division to the group’s headquarters in mainland 

China, for the coverage of this sensitive topic to be directly controlled by the new executive 

team, in other words by Beijing.146 

Quickly, the journal parted ways with the authors of articles that had upset Beijing 

– and incidentally upset Tsai. In one instance, a journalist who was writing an article on China 

was also asked by his editor to first run it by the TAO.147 In March 2012, the China Times dedi-

cated its cover to the promotion of the Fujian governor’s visit to Taiwan. It was later revealed 

that the journal was following a document called “Propaganda plan for the Fujian gover-

nor’s tour in Taiwan in 2012” (福建省长访台宣传计画) that the province’s authorities had 

handed out in advance and that went so far as to plan the number of words needed for each 

article that the newspaper had to publish on the event.148 For this propaganda work, the group 

was paid through its intermediary in Beijing (Want Want China Times Cultural Media).149 But 

it ultimately cost more to the group because the coverage sparked outrage and an investi-

gation from the Mainland Affairs Council (the agency in charge of relations with mainland 

China). The journal was fined 1.8 million Taiwanese dollars (€53,200).150 It was criticized for 

disguising advertising texts paid by Beijing (advertorials, infomercials) as news and 

for working as an intermediary for Beijing to purchase spots in other newspapers – which is 

also illegal in Taiwan.151 In 2019, it was revealed that the editorial managers of the China 

Times and CTi TV were getting their instructions from the TAO in Beijing: “[they] call 

every day,” said one China Times reporter. “They do not meddle in everything, mainly topics 

related to cross-Strait relations and to China. They have a say in the angle of the story, and 

whether it goes on the front page.”152

The Want Want group is also involved in the dissemination of fake news. For example, 

in July 2012, when hundreds of students protested against Want Want’s project of purchas-

ing parts of Next Media, which would have further increased Beijing’s hold over Taiwanese 

media, Want Want accused researcher Huand Kuo-chang of paying the students to protest, 

but it admitted a month later that this claim was not supported by any proof.153 Anti-Want 

Want protests intensified (thousands of people took to the streets on September 1), and 

the international protest campaign became international, thus prompting Tsai to give up.

Furthermore, the group also organizes meetings and cross-strait cultural forums with 

Chinese organizations, associations and think tanks suspected of being tied to the United 

Front Work Department (UFWD) or to the PLA’s political warfare units.154

144. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 520-521.

145. Ibid., 521.

146. Huang, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” 34.

147. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 521-523.

148. 福建置入中時 陸官員: 發票來了 錢就匯過去” (“Fujian Invests in China Times. Lu Guanyuan: The Bill 

Arrives, the Money is Sent”), New Talk (30 Mar. 2012).

149. Huang, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Media,” 33.

150. One Country, One Censor: How China Undermines Media Freedom in Hong Kong and Taiwan, A Special 

Report by the Committee to Protect Journalists (Dec. 2019), 24.

151. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 532.

152. Cited in Hille, “Taiwan Primaries.” 

153. Hsu, “China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Media,” 535. 

154. Cole, Democracy under Fire, 21.

446

Finally, the group’s media outlets give maximal coverage to pro-Chinese candi-

dates during electoral campaigns. CTV and CTi TV ensured an uninterrupted coverage 

of pro-Beijing candidate Han Kuo-yu – for the Kaohsiung mayoral election (2018), for the 

KMT primaries (2019), and for the presidency (2020) – contributing to the creation of a 

“Han Wave” (→ p. 460). CTi TV was actually fined one million Taiwanese dollars (€29,500) 

by the National Communications Commission (NCC), the public authority regulating the 

media, because it found that CTi TV had given too much airtime to Han, violating princi-

ples of fairness and equal speaking time.155 

In 2017 and 2020, CTi News itself was the subject of 30% of all complaints to the 

NCC, which decided not to renew its broadcasting license in November 2020 after 

observing many cases of “disinformation” and traces of “external interference.” 

The NCC had never taken such a decision since its creation in 2006.156 The Taiwan 

Supreme Administrative Court rejected the network’s appeal and CTi News ceased to 

broadcast on Taiwanese cable television (Channel 52) on December 11, 2020. It remains 

available online however.

Want Want’s example has been emulated: knowing how beneficial China Times’ pur-

chase was to Tsai, because Beijing granted him favors. Other Taiwanese tycoons have 

become involved in the media, with the sole goal of pleasing Beijing and using that 

relationship to make profits for their companies in other sectors. Taiwanese smart-

phone-maker HTC thus took control of the TVBS Media group, which runs four national 

and one international TV channels. It did so by buying a high number of shares in 2011 and 

then by becoming majority shareholder in 2015. Furthermore, the Taiwanese group Ting 

Hsin, specialized in food production (biggest producer of instant noodles in China) also 

bought one of the biggest companies of cable TV, China Network System (CNS), in 2014. 

At the time, CNS ran eleven channels.157