Evaluating by Associates

Without doubt the belief that people might be known by their associates was extremely popular in traditional China, anecdotes and stories

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illustrating its application being widely scattered throughout the literature. In its simplest form the theory holds that a person's friends, close court associates, and the acquaintances he cultivates, such as recluses and scholars, will all prove revealing. 102 Even though rulers were less often chosen than imposed, the same principles became applicable with the onset of mobility late in the Spring and Autumn period as men began to travel relatively unimpeded to offer their services to willing monarchs. (Rulers might equally be evaluated by their close officers, personal retainers, and officials deputed on foreign missions, as well as by the scholars, magicians, entertainers, and rogues they patronized. 103) Officials might further be scrutinized by observation of whom they entertained at home and with whom they lodged when abroad. 104

There was a twofold basis to the theory of association: environmental influence and the tendency of likes to mutually attract and naturally associate, whereas men of dissimilar temperament, tastes, and ideas would not. 105 Numerous 

thinkers focused upon the theory of association, it was rigorously applied, and the assertion that things, animals, and classes of the same type will naturally respond and associate with each other was frequently seen. The fundamental concept of environmental influence even prompted Confucius to emphasize the need to exercise care in choosing one's dwelling and associates because of their unperceived effects in transforming character and changing customs. 106 Mencius, Hsün-tzu, and, especially, Mo-tzu all stressed the danger of unconscious transformation and the need to consciously select environmental stimuli. Irrespective of a person's initial predisposition, prolonged association with evil inevitably resulted in the person assimilating perverse values and mimicking antisocial behavior, with even good men eventually becoming indistinguishable from their cohorts. Consequently, observing a person's associates predicts future development, as well as indicates current personality and inclinations. Confucius thus felt confident in Tzu Hsia's future because he liked to dwell with those more worthy than himself, whereas he feared for Tzu Kung, who enjoyed persuading the less worthy, thereby exposing himself to their insidious influence. 107

Sequence and Comparative Criteria

The natural sequence of perceiving others was seen as appearance, words, and, finally, actions or behavior, prompting codified steps to evaluate visitors to a state: "When a man comes from outside the state, irrespective of his route of entrance, if his external appearance and deportment are circumspect, then look into his name. When aware of his name, then check his appearance. Then verify his affairs

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in order to investigate his virtue. Observe him in externals, and then he will not have any means to put the ruler in difficulty with false virtues and the country will not be misled."108 Coherence in all aspects suggested that a man's true character had been revealed.

Rather than reliance upon isolated criteria, comparison of indications from different sets of traits was thought to ensure a more accurate evaluation. Although the development of the li 

(normative forms of behavior) marked the pinnacle of structured social behavior, providing a detailed but complex standard for fathoming men, simple discrepancies between words and clothing, clothing and position, or words and behavior would immediately signify a facade or indicate questionable elements in a person's character. Prominently learning from his experience, Confucius regretfully advised: "At first my way with men was to hear their words, and give them credit for their conduct. Now my way is to hear their words and look at their conduct. It is from Yu that I have learned to make this change."109 Furthermore, in concluding a discussion with Duke Ai, Confucius sounds much like Han Fei-tzu: "The method for choosing men is to observe their words and investigate their actions. Words are the means by which one reveals thoughts and expresses emotions. One who can perform some action can certainly discuss it. Thus first observe their words and then measure their actions. If one employs words to measure actions, then even though a person be evil, he will have no way to avoid revealing his true emotions." 110

The Chou Li, an idealized depiction of Chou administrative structure and rites probably compiled in the early Han, similarly suggested comparing verbal and nonverbal aspects in examining whether a person might be guilty of a crime. 111 The five, all clearly useful for questioning agents and interrogating others, are words (and the language chosen), appearance, the ch'i (breathing as normal or not), whether there were any places of doubt (through listening to the sound of his voice), and the eyes, as clear and bright or not. Every aspect should be investigated, and all of them should cohere if the person is both truthful and genuine. 112 In the Han dynasty, even though he accepted the necessity of judging men by their words (on the assumption that a good heart would result in good words), the famous skeptic Wang Ch'ung advanced an even more cautious view. When a man's actions correspond with his words, his family and state should then be investigated. Whether he had previously been successful or not, should all of them still be consistent, he might be considered worthy and appointed to office. 113 

The most thorough, detailed examination might be termed "contextual reference"--comparing the person's name, fame, reputation, posi-

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tion, personal history, character, background, and other manifestations with his environment. Any inappropriate aspect would immediately suggest something amiss, whether in the person's motives or fundamental character. (Again the li represent the most precisely developed and defined means for determining the contextual matrix, although common experience furnished more than adequate means and knowledge for examining ordinary people.) This idea appeared in a variety of texts and apparently formed an essential part of the fund of basic knowledge. 114

Evaluating by Desires

Another train of thought held that a man could be best understood by determining his desires, 115 a method that would immediately facilitate covert intelligence purposes by identifying potential temptations, which are the most effective means for acquiring information and recruiting subversives. Although it requires examining a person's behavior to detect them (and therefore largely represents a variant of the historical approach), evaluating by a man's desires represents a distinctive methodology that utilizes many materials for clues. Being visible in the pleasures and objectives a man pursues, the chief desires are revealed not only in terms of their type and visibility, but also in terms of the degree to which they have been brought under control, mastered as part of a man's self-discipline. 116 Thus the idea that "if you want to know men, then look at their desires" gained great credence, and even the medical writings noted that a man may be known by what he likes and dislikes. 117

Errors as Expressive of Character

Confucius was among the first to observe that in the cultivation of the moral Way, such as through the study of the classics and other matters, people may err to one-sidedness. Similarly, where emotional substance remains out of balance 

with constraint or expression, the person may have desirable virtues, yet be criticized for a visible shortcoming. Since these "errors" fall into patterns, it becomes possible to detect underlying virtues from their type and estimate a person's character. The basic premise first appeared in the Analects: "A man's transgressions are each indicative of a class. Thus by observing his transgressions the man can be known." 118 Of particular importance would be overdeveloped traits that, in moderation and properly balanced, are admirable, such as respectfulness, generosity, and sternness. (The authors of the military writings were particularly conscious

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of the potential dangers posed by such unameliorated traits, however outstanding they might ordinarily be considered, and identified them as exploitable flaws in enemy commanders, as will be seen in the military intelligence section.) Confucius in fact identified six inclinations that result in character and behavioral defects:

A love of benevolence without a similar love of study leads to the obfuscation of doltishness. A love of wisdom without a love of study results in the obfuscation of agitation. A love of sincerity (trust) without a love of study results in the obfuscation of precipitousness. A love of straightforwardness without a love of study leads to the obfuscation of bluntness. A love of courage without a love of study leads to the obfuscation of chaos. A love of resoluteness without a love of study leads to the obfuscation of unprincipled behavior. 119

Scholars immersed in orthodox Confucian studies from the late Warring States onward--increasingly the class from which government administrators originated--were thought to be particularly prone to one-sidedness if they specialized in one of the six classic texts, predisposing them to certain strengths, weaknesses, and methods in grappling with affairs. A passage in Tung Chung-shu Ch'un- ch'iu Fan-lu notes that "the Book of Odes and Book of Documents order a man's intentions; ritual and music purify his virtuous qualities; and the I Ching and Ch'un Ch'iu make his knowledge enlightened." 120. More than a century later Yang Hsiung correlated five of the classics with specific subject matter: "The I Ching excels in speaking of 

Heaven; the Book of Documents, affairs; the books of ritual, the concrete embodiment of Virtue; the Book of Odes, intention; and the Ch'un Ch'iu, the patterns of affairs."121

Tung Chung-shu similarly elaborated upon the strengths of the individual classics: "The Odes guide the intentions and are thus strong in substance. Ritual governs the constraints and is thus strong in cultivated expression. Music sings of virtue and is thus strong in transforming. The I Ching is based on Heaven and Earth and thus strong in the patterns of things. The Ch'un Ch'iu discriminates right and wrong and thus is strong in governing." However, the Li Chi, the main ritual text, identified certain weaknesses with each of the classics that could prove significant should someone be employed on a sensitive mission or in a critical position.

The Odes teach being congenial and flexible, honest and generous, but have the shortcoming of doltishness. The Book of Documents

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ments teaches extensive comprehension and a knowledge of antiquity, but a shortcoming of irrelevance. Music teaches being expansive, relaxed, and peaceful, but a shortcoming of extravagance. The I Ching teaches being pure and tranquil, refined and subtle, but a shortcoming of precipitousness. Ritual teaches being reverent and restrained, serious and respectful, but a shortcoming of being vexatious. The Ch'un Ch'iu teaches skill in discourse and disputation, but a shortcoming of being chaotic. 122

Presumably in the recruitment of candidates for subversion or intelligence work only those known not to be inclined to any single one of the classics would be preferable, for only they would have balanced personalities and the necessary self-constraint, just as Tung Chung- shu asserted.

Evaluating Under Stress

Although the assumption of constancy was widely accepted, it was also observed that stressful circumstances elicit unexpected behavior. Moreover, without strong character and 

great forbearance people eventually succumb to misery and pressure, thereby revealing character flaws likely to reappear whenever under duress. 123 Accordingly, the Confucians and others emphasized that actions witnessed under conditions of deprivation and ignominy have greater validity as indications of character. Especially important would be the attitude displayed in straitened circumstances, for although endurance was necessary, self-restraint alone might be suspect. The true moral exemplar would still manifest equanimity in hardship and tranquillity in poverty, an ideal well represented by Yen Hui, whom Confucius praised by saying: "Worthy indeed was Hui! With only a basket of cooked rice and a gourd of liquid, despite dwelling in a vulgar alley, a misery other men could not endure, his joy was unchanged. Worthy indeed was Hui!"124 Confucius himself established the basis for this perspective: "Even when I have nothing but coarse grain to eat, water to drink, and simply bend my arm for a pillow, I am still joyful. Unrighteously gained wealth and rank are like floating clouds to me."125

Mencius observed that great men frequently endure travails that stimulate and temper them, shaking them out of their comfort and ease, 126 and believed that Heaven would inflict tortuous experiences:

When Heaven is about to entrust a man with great responsibility, it will invariably first subject his mind and intentions to suffering and labor his muscles and bones. It causes his body to be hungry

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and deprives him of everything. It brings chaos to all his actions and efforts in order to stir his mind and forge his nature, increasing him in all that he is incapable of doing. Men constantly err and only thereafter change; suffer mental distress and consternation of thought and thereafter become creative. Only after things have been attested in appearance and manifested in sound are they understood. Only then is it known that life derives from worry and misfortune, death from security and pleasure. 127 

Other texts express similar ideas, concluding that a personal history of hardship valiantly endured marked strength of character.

Remarkably, riches and honor similarly entail personal temptation, especially for those who indulge long-repressed desires or manifest previously dormant traits after rapidly acquiring wealth. Moreover, suddenly having power and subordinates constitutes a radically different psychological experience, as evidenced by the truism that people tend to arrogance when they acquire power. Tzu Kung thus approved of a man who had resisted it, though Confucius required more: " Tzu Kung asked, 'What do you think about being poor yet not obsequious, rich but not arrogant?' Confucius replied, 'They are acceptable but not as good as being poor yet taking pleasure in the Tao, being rich and loving the forms of propriety.'"128 In another well- known passage, Confucius added, "People who are not benevolent cannot long endure dwelling in straitened circumstances or extreme enjoyment."129 Surprisingly, even Han Fei-tzu added some comments in his sections on Lao-tzu: "If the heart that desires profit is not eliminated, it will bring worry to the body. Thus when the Sage's clothes are adequate to ward off the cold and his food sufficient to fill his emptiness, he does not worry. The masses of men are not like this. Whether as great as one of the feudal lords or simply having more than a thousand ounces of gold, their worries over profits are not eliminated. The worry of those who do not know sufficiency never leaves them all their lives."130

Never being exposed to the temptations of power denied not only a man any opportunity to make himself famous, but also the world a chance to observe him in a stressful situation. Only in the context of highly visible situations can adequate information be generated: "If the person is honored, see who he introduces; if he is rich, see what assistance he gives to others; if he is of mean condition, see what he does not accept; if he is poor, see what he won't do. From observing these things his character can be known." 131 As summarized in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu: "When a man prospers, see who he treats as a guest. When he has high rank, see who he recommends. When he is 

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rich, see who he supports. When he is poor, see what he will not accept. When he is in a mean condition, see what he will not do." 132

Active Tests and Trials

The concept of an active test that might reveal flaws under contrived but observable conditions apparently evolved in response to the need to rapidly fathom character and suitability for employment, particularly high office and powerful military positions. Although from early times appointment to office essentially meant embarking upon a lifetime of challenges and evaluations, there was also a notion of a more specific trial, imposed for a limited time. According to the Shang Shu and popular tradition, Emperor Yao even subjected the future Sage emperor Shun to scrutiny by marrying his two daughters to him, moral character obviously being more important than talent and ability! 133 However, increasingly specific circumstances that focused upon eliciting behavior in stressful situations evolved as the Warring States period progressed. 134 For example, the Six Secret Teachings elucidates eight techniques for ascertaining the veracity of apparent characteristics:

First, question them and observe the details of their reply. Second, verbally confound and perplex them and observe how they change. Third, discuss things that you have secretly learned to observe their sincerity. Fourth, clearly and explicitly question them to observe their virtue. Fifth, appoint them to positions of financial responsibility to observe their honesty. Sixth, test them with beautiful women to observe their uprightness. Seventh, confront them with difficulties to observe their courage. Eighth, get them drunk to observe their deportment. When all eight have been fully explored, then the Worthy and unworthy can be distinguished. 135

Several other texts from the Warring States period contain variations of this same series premised upon the belief that a sequence of circumstances will provide the most illuminating data. The shortest list sought to induce three or four strong emotional states; the most lengthy and time-consuming, 

perhaps ten. However, methods for stimulating these states were never described, the formula merely asserting, "Anger him" or "Get him drunk," the most easily achieved objectives. The Huai-nan Tzu preserves a typically brief set: "Stir him with happiness and pleasure in order to observe what values he maintains. Entrust him with wealth and material goods in order to discern his benevolence. Shake him with fear in order to know his self-re

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straint. Then his emotional nature will be completely revealed."136 (This approach assumes transparency of character and further hypothesizes that people will react simply when confronted with such stimuli rather than mounting a deceptive facade.) The idea of providing a person with pleasure, rather easily achieved, obviously reflects Yao's test of Shun. 137 However, causing a person to grieve--which evidently meant placing him in or exposing him to a situation of mourning, not his own, to see if he behaves properly--could be quite difficult short of murdering his friends or someone he loves. Since no methods are ever discussed for inducing the more extreme states, perhaps only the easily achieved temptations of pleasure, profit, and feasting were commonly employed among all those systematically listed.

In many instances the stimuli were no doubt verbal, designed to catch the person in the immediacy of a response. The simplest technique consisted of lying, asserting the opposite of what was actually true or believed, to observe whether they would adhere to their own principles or merely accord with prevailing views. 138 Similarly, failing to reject an idea or subject that should evoke condemnation would be tantamount to accepting evil, implying they sanction and might commit similar acts themselves. No doubt in application the principle was symmetrical: Reacting to the good with distaste and rejection would indicate an immoral bent of character. 139

Apart from the Six Secret Teachings, the most complete sequences for actively creating contexts to elicit primary emotions are found in the Ta-Tai Li-chi and the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, both continuations of discussions on passively observing people in varying but normal circumstances. For example, the 

series found in the latter runs: "Make him happy in order to observe his preservation of principles. Give him pleasure in order to see whether he will abandon restraint. Make him angry to test his restraint. Make him afraid to see where he stands. Put him in grief to see his humaneness. Put him in hardship to see his willpower." 140 A similar sequence is found in the Ta-Tai Li-chi:

Frighten him to see whether he doesn't become afraid. Anger him and observe if he doesn't become disordered. Make him happy and observe if he doesn't become reckless. Send him beautiful women and see if he doesn't overstep proper bounds. Provide him with food and drink and see if he has constancy. Profit him and see if he can be yielding. When he dwells in grief, see if he is correct. When in poverty, see what he will not do. Give him labors to see if he doesn't disturb others. 141

Under the stimulus of intense emotions strong reactions would normally be expected; only a man of exceptional character would not re

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spond normally, would exhibit self-restraint and control. Consequently the preceding phrasing often employs the term "not" to indicate expectation, with actions contrary to normal vindicating and justifying the individual.

There were a number of other structured tests that were employed, particularly those associated with the major ceremonies of the li (rites), such as archery and the village drinking ceremony. Failure to adhere to ritual dictates would immediately indicate either ignorance or the absence of self-restraint, both serious defects.

However, the concept of testing was not confined to evaluating, though the discussion here must necessarily be limited to it. Tests were contrived to fathom motives or states of mind and inclinations, to determine character and evaluate abilities, to test the reliability of what the person proposed or claimed with regard to his actual capabilities, to evaluate the impact of military training, and to determine the effectiveness of rewards and punishments in inculcating desirable values. (Perhaps the 

most famous example of the latter is found in the Han Fei-tzu, which records that the King of Ch'u was persuaded to set his treasury afire to test the men's response. 142) There is no question that these trials were based upon a body of theory and explicitly conceptualized as tests, specifically designed to produce insights, irrespective of the subject's volitional cooperation.

Similar tests were also adroitly employed in intrigues, the basic procedure being to provoke people into becoming angry or so overwhelmed by hatred that they would recklessly blurt forth clandestine information. (Anger might also be exploited in many other ways, such as by being directed against a target, inducing a desire for revenge, or prompting precipitous action.) Incidents employing this simple mechanism are widely preserved in the literature, particularly the early historical writings and subsequent dynastic histories. A classic example appears in the Tso Chuan, where the heir apparent, suspecting he had been set aside, deliberately enraged his father's sister by insulting her, and in her pique she let the truth slip out. 143 In another common scenario the ruler is presented with a set of gifts, all identical with one clear exception, in order to discover the most favored concubine and thus predict the next monarch. 144 Given constancy of human behavior, the ruler would naturally honor his favorite with the best present, and her son would likely be invested as the heir apparent, presuming the monarch continued to be enthralled and befuddled.

Another commonly employed ruse consisted of treating a foreign emissary discourteously in the belief that his reactions would reveal not only his own character and qualifications, but also those of his ruler. The ploy's effectiveness depended upon the principles of association and likes mutually attracting: Worthy rulers will choose capable

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assistants and attract the Worthy, just as the Worthy will refuse to serve under tyrants and corrupt monarchs. The provocateur must also have a thorough knowledge of the ritual forms normatively governing political intercourse, though other aspects would also be involved and every reaction subject to 

differing contextual interpretations. For example, indirect insults might provoke only a mild defense, or no visible embarrassment might mark great self-restraint and an exemplary nature, or perhaps (in the absence of shame and moral outrage) an immoral and suspect character. The Kuan-tzu offers the following example:

Ch'u attacked Chü and Lu sent men to seek aid from Ch'i. Duke Huan was about to rescue them, but Kuan Chung said, "Do not rescue them."

The Duke asked, "Why is that?"

Kuan Chung said: "I spoke with his ambassador. Three times I insulted his ruler, but his countenance didn't change. Three times I had the officials not perform the rites to their fullest [but he didn't notice]. When we pressed his ambassador, he fought with us as if to the death. The ruler of Chü is a common fellow. Do not rescue him." Duke Huan did not aid him and Chü was lost. 145

Another popular method was to employ people according to the recommendations they received or the proposals they put forth themselves. ( Han Fei-tzu was especially noted for advancing a number of such techniques for mastering the myriad problems involved in evaluating and using men, and he is discussed separately.) Simply put, someone would be entrusted with a duty or mission and his ability evaluated by his performance and the results he achieved. For example, "when someone speaks of courage, test him in the military. If he speaks of knowledge, test him with an office. If he is tested in the military and achieves results, then appoint him; if in office and affairs are well governed, then employ him." 146 Similar examples are found throughout the literature, though being a fairly obvious method, it was not greatly written about. 147

Physiognomy

Physiognomy enjoyed wide recognition and considerable credibility for more than two thousand years in China, despite being pervaded by a somewhat mystical aura. Even in the Warring States period men became famous for their skill in evaluating character and predicting fate 

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based upon the shape and appearance of a person's face, and some were able to evaluate horses in this fashion. However, a skeptical counter- current suggested that any successful prediction of fate or future greatness simply resulted from the practitioner's innate astuteness. In fact, when questioned, one famous master revealed that in reality he never employed any techniques from this pseudoscience, but instead simply applied the principle of association to deduce future prospects. For three important classes he studied the following aspects:

Common men: whether their friends were filial, fraternal, pure, respectful, and feared the laws. Ministers of state: whether their friends were sincere, trustworthy, and actively performed the good. Rulers: whether their ministers were worthy, their assistants loyal; and whether they remonstrated with him. 148

A person with admirable associates could be expected to prosper, be promoted, or flourish, depending upon his status as a commoner, minister, or ruler, respectively. (As this particular story appears in several texts, it represents either a common train of thought or a rationalist attempt to debunk the power and influence of physiognomy.)

Hsün-tzu was among those who denied the effectiveness of this art, believing neither that character can be detected from a person's face nor that appearance is related to mind. 149 (However, he elsewhere indicates that the perfected man's expression and bearing mark him as someone who has cultivated the Way.) Remarkably, Wang Ch'ung vouched for the viability of employing bones for physiognomy because he believed an individual's fate to already be predetermined at birth, being manifest equally in his bone structure and the turbidity of his original nature. 150 He therefore concluded that methods for physiognomizing both could exist, although only knowledge about the former was common. Any predictive failure stemmed not from inherently flawed premises but from inadequate investigation, and even Confucius erred in relying upon such superficial aspects as words and appearance instead of the substantive techniques of physiognomy to evaluate men. 151 

Expressions and Postures

The theory of postures and expression was well developed in Chinese antiquity, with minutely detailed instructions specifying the appearance a person should manifest in all of life's situations and stages,

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whether socially trivial or vitally important. The fundamental psychological thrust of the li--the normative forms variously encompassing social etiquette, court behavior, rites, and rituals--was directed toward elucidating forms that should be internalized in preparation for future employment in appropriate circumstances. Although the Li Chi and Ta-Tai Li-chi preserve critical theories and detailed ritual practices, stories scattered throughout Warring States texts concretely illustrating how the li were applied in significant situations provide extensive information about form and behavior. A number of works also dissect appearance and action, expounding upon the ideals they should attain. For example, the Hsin Shu enumerates six aspects critical to any civilized man: intent, countenance, perception, speech, stance, and seated posture. 152 The six are further specified for the four primary situations of attending court, performing an ancestral sacrifice, serving in the military, and performing the rites of mourning. They thus provide an immediate contextual matrix for evaluating character, with any deviation clearly revealing character deficiencies and aberrant emotions.

The Tso Chuan contains numerous examples of judging people by their performance of the li, all founded upon this basic idea that any failure betrays character flaws. Court audiences provide ample opportunities for evaluation:

When Duke Tan Ch'eng held a formal meeting with Han Hsüan- tzu in Ch'i on behalf of the king of Chou, he looked downward and spoke slowly. Afterward Han said: "Tan-tzu will soon die. In court the positions are clearly determined, at convocations there are markers. The upper jacket has its lapels, the sash its knot. In court and at convocations one's words must be audible at all the designated positions in order 

to illuminate the principles of affairs. The speaker should look between the knot and lapels in order to regulate his own demeanor and countenance. Words are employed to issue commands, whereas the speaker's demeanor and countenance should illustrate them. Any failure in these is a flaw.

The duke is the king's chief official, yet when issuing orders on his behalf at this meeting, he did not look above the sash, nor did his words project beyond a single pace. His countenance did not regulate his demeanor and his words were not illuminating. Not being regulated is irreverent, not being illuminating is disharmonious. He lacks the means to preserve his ch'i." 153

The great ritual text known as the Li Chi (compiled in the Early Han) contains a passage explicitly defining the appropriate line of vi

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sion for court audiences. In essence, when a court official has an audience with the emperor, his vision should fall between the emperor's sash and lapels; with a state ruler (in the Warring States period), just below the face; and with an official of equal rank, directly upon his face. The text concludes by stating that "whenever the gaze alights above on the face [in an audience with a higher ranking person], it indicates arrogance; when below the sash, it marks sorrow; and if the person peers obliquely, it indicates villainy." 154 Since Duke Tan, as the king's representative, was the highest-ranking official at the meeting, these particular constraints would not apply to him, but to those speaking with him. However, he was still bound to maintain a proper posture, look out correctly, and speak clearly, all of which he failed to do, prompting Han Hsüan-tzu to correctly predict his imminent death.

Among the common deficiencies revealed through such performances are pride and arrogance, often witnessed in a person's clothing and carriage, suggesting an early death; 155 laxity and indifference, indicating inadequate study and self-discipline, a general weakness in temperament and character; 156 and deliberate disregard of the normative forms, proof of a truly perverse character and future trouble. 157 Conversely, 

expert performance attests to character, poise, and education, to men who have constrained their emotions and curbed their desires, yet allow substance its proper expression at appropriate times. 158

The rites of mourning for a deceased parent were viewed as the definitive life experience, one in which the mourner would be confronted with the strongest emotional forces marking human existence. For the filial son caught between the raging demands of his inner emotions and the constraints imposed by society, the li allowed for a cathartic expression while providing the moderation necessary to prevent the bereaved from being consumed by a grief whose extremity would popularly be regarded as a measure of true filiality. Because of the vital, highly visible role the rites of mourning would play in a person's life and the strong emotional bond expected between parents and children, any lack of emotional intensity or, even more dramatically, unusual or improper emotions would immediately signify a deviant nature and cast suspicion on the mourner's character.

Since the true filial son's grief would not be fully exhausted even during the mourning period, the depth of his emotions would be further attested by his attitude and behavior in the subsequent rites of sacrifice and remembrance. Therefore, the same emotional content, subdued, yet intense, should be visible during their preparation and performance, including the meditative stages preliminary to envisioning his deceased parents. Thus the rites of mourning and the sacrifices

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to the ancestors were viewed as providing the means to deter-mine a supposedly filial son's actual emotional state. The man of exemplary character would, by definition, necessarily and in-evitably be a filial son. He would be moved to grief; his prepara-tion would be meticulous; his performance would be filled with emotion, yet tempered by restraint; and his life would be ori-ented toward them, letting nothing else interfere with the rites of mourning. (During the rites of mourning he was rather unre-alistically expected to withdraw and isolate himself for the twenty-five-month period known as the "three years" mourn-ing.) As the Analects succinctly states: "While a man's father is 

still alive, observe his intent; when his father has died, observe his actions. If he does not change from his father's ways for three years, he may be termed 'filial.'" 159

Successfully performing the rites of mourning, as all the other rituals, requires thorough knowledge; therefore, failure in any detail may indicate inattentive study or a lack of focus. Con-demning an individual for his absent-mindedness in preparing for the ancestral sacrifice was apparently as common for inade-quate as for excessive emotional intensity. Confucius thus prophesied that Kung-suo Shih of Lu would perish within three years because he forgot the sacrificial victim. 160 (Since the rite provides the sole means for the filial to express his emotions, forgetting a critical aspect is synonymous with neglecting the rite itself and therefore symptomatic of negligence in such other matters as one's particular duties and responsibilities.) The Tso Chuan similarly contains a number of cases in which people are condemned for failing to manifest the proper grief, implying either an absence of sorrow or the presence of some competing emotion. For example, looking pleased (perhaps be-cause of the splendor of the rites or the excellence of the guests) would be a flagrant violation of propriety, an obvious cause for suspicion: "This man did not feel grief while a mourner and amid sorrow had a resplendent appearance. He is what may be termed 'a man without measure.' Rarely does a man without measure not cause misfortune." 161

Another case with dramatic consequences attests to the validity attributed to such indications: "You must kill him. He feels no sorrow and is very ambitious. He looks about fiercely and raises his feet high, so his thoughts are on something else. If you do not kill him, he will certainly harm you."162 Finally, in a third incident the mourner displays a startlingly disjointed happiness amid the most sorrowful circumstances, prompting the following analysis:

The king of Chou will die prematurely! I have heard that men invariably die from what they take pleasure in. At the present time

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the king takes pleasure in grief. If he dies because of grief, it cannot be termed "living out his span of years." In a single year the king has suffered two deaths that mandate three-year mourning periods. To feast with guests and request libation vessels at this time of mourning is the extremity of taking plea-sure in grief. Moreover, it violates the ritual prescripts, while the submission of such vessels should be to offer congratula-tions for achievements, not because of mourning. 163

Although other incidents in the Tso Chuan and other works provide similar illustrations, 164 the king of Chou's violation of the ritual prescriptions was particularly heinous because their very genesis was identified with Chou culture!

In detailing the forms of mourning, the traditional ritual works prescribe the expressive modes of behavior, including tones and times for wailing. Even though it was generally accepted that music varied from state to state and the Huai-nan Tzu even asserted that the sounds of music in pleasure and that of mourning similarly vary--implying that there is no single cor-rect manifestation of either, and therefore that the measures of grief and joy are less certain and invariable than imagined by the Confucians--the ritualists felt that the tone of the voice in wailing should manifest certain characteristics postulated as being the natural correspondents of that grief. 165 From this it can be inferred that if the sound of the voice fails to manifest real grief, the person cannot be experiencing it, whether be-cause of its simple absence or the presence of some other strong emotion. A famous incident commented upon by Han Fei-tzu and remarked upon by Wang Ch'ung illustrates the concept's application:

One morning in the state of Cheng when Tzu Ch'an went out and passed the alley where Tung Chiang lived, he heard Tung's wife weeping. He restrained his driver's hand and listened. Af-ter a while he dispatched the lictors to seize and interrogate her and subsequently charged her with having murdered her hus-band. A day later his driver questioned him, "How did you know it?" 

Tzu Ch'an replied: "Her voice was fearful. 166 When someone they love first falls ill, people are troubled; when they near death, they become fearful; and after they die, they are struck by grief. She was weeping for her dead husband, but instead of grieving, she was fearful. From this I knew there was some vil-lainy."167

Just as the li, musical performance was thought to betray the player's intentions to discerning listeners. Numerous examples are

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preserved in traditional historical sources, although invariably because of their exceptional nature. Furthermore, even though ordinary people might be aware of an emotional undercurrent in a performance or perhaps be affected by the songs chosen, generally the arcane skills of a Sage were required to fathom true intentions. (The presumption that the astute listener would be thoroughly familiar with the music or Odes needs hardly be raised. 168) Although the many questions entailed by the elaborate theories of musical performance preserved in the ritual writings are too complex to pursue in this chapter, an ex-ample from Ts'ai Yung's career well illustrates how "murderous intent" was seen:

One day when Ts'ai Yung was in Ch'en-liu, his neighbor invited him to a feast. By the time he went over, the other guests were already well flushed with wine. Among them was one who was playing the lute behind a screen, so when Ts'ai reached the gate he stopped, listened intently, then exclaimed: "Ay! How can he have invited me for pleasure but have such a murder-ous intent?"

He then turned about and departed. One of the host's runners reported it, saying, "Lord Ts'ai came to the door, then left." Be-cause Ts'ai was respected by all the people in the region, the host quickly raced after him to inquire why he had left, to which Ts'ai replied truthfully. The lute player said: "When I was plucking the strings, I saw a praying mantis approaching a chirping cicada. The cicada was about to fly away but hadn't 

yet moved, while the mantis was still rocking back and forth to-ward it. My heart jumped, fearing that the mantis would lose it. Could this be the murderous intent that was expressed in the sound?"

Ts'ai smiled broadly and said, "That certainly would be enough!"169

Possibilities and Problems in Criteria

As discussed previously, the criteria by which people commonly judged others were fairly simple: Wealth, rank, power, and other visible symbols of success were particularly felt to indi-cate talent, character, and ability. However, in addition to the inherent problems already raised, more thoughtful examina-tions, such as by Wang Ch'ung and Shen Chien, found them to be unreliable indications of character, often contingent upon capable men fortuitously encountering opportune circum-stances. 170 Conversely, people naturally tend to be jealous of the good and successful, to dislike, slander, and vilify them, causing

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them to acquire adverse reputations and be subsequently de-nied positions. 171 Moreover, highly visible leaders, scholars, and moralists are exposed to public scrutiny, their most minor transgressions being rapidly publicized, while hidden evil re-mains undetected, lying fallow among the obscure. 172 In addi-tion, should a man's ethics or temperament differ from his su-perior's, should he fail to be yielding and humbly deferential, he may readily be dismissed, criticism and differences quickly spawning antagonism. 173In accord with his penchant for anal-ysis, Wang Ch'ung offered a fairly systematic critique of the cri-teria conventionally employed for evaluating men, providing many insights of potential utility to the tasks of intelligence work. The more interesting and relevant are summarized here. 174

Men favored by the ruler may simply be obsequious rather than individuals of character and quality, chosen and retained simply because of their ability to please the ruler. 

Generosity and a reputation for practicing the li require wealth and may be part of a conscious effort to win the approbation of others.

Successful military command is not a true measure of talent or character because military achievements depend upon craft and strategy.

Being a clever speaker or writer should be a recommendation against someone rather than for him.

Vaunted purity is suspect because a true Worthy should not be totally withdrawn. Moreover, reclusive habits signify failure, rather than virtue, since all men desire wealth and power. The faultless may be men of minor virtue incapable of action.

Being selected for office or position depends upon the criteria employed, high positions often being gained through currying favor. 175

Being well liked by the people may be the product of conscious policies to please and attract them and stem from exploiting opportunities for developing a base of admirers through conge-niality.

Attracting numerous retainers and guests does not signify an admirable person because the individual may simply enjoy as-sembling people about him or actually be marked by low val-ues that attract dependents. The quality of such retainers is more important than their numbers.

Success in office may be due to winning favor with the ruler, and therefore only apparent, particularly when a man's reputa-tion is

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created by the rewards he receives. Success is also a question of timing.

Recommendations are more indicative of the person making them than the person being advanced. They also reflect expo-sure to other people and their attitudes, as receptive to new ac-quaintances or not.

Being a scholar cannot be construed as a recommendation be-cause scholars are transmitters, not active agents, and are characterized by personalities that should not be advanced. The view that officials are talented and scholars useless reflects the dichotomy between the literati and the realists, though in this case from the perspective of the people at large. The felt 

view was that scholars have limited, useless knowledge, which causes them to remain outside the bureaucracy, whereas men of real talent work within it. (The Huai-nan Tzu noted that an obvious inclination for studying a subject makes a person nei-ther knowledgeable nor a specialist, so stories to the contrary should be ignored. 176) Wang Ch'ung sees this as an error in perception, for in his view scholars are talented, whereas offi-cials by and large have concentrated in a specialized range of texts. However, officials conform to their age, whereas the scholars maintain their ideals and refuse to compromise, thereby effectively placing themselves outside the system. 177 Shen Chien similarly debunked many of the criteria of his era: Rulers suffer from prejudice and blindness and may fail to em-ploy qualified people for a variety of reasons, such as being afraid of them or fearing adverse comparisons. Furthermore, they may simply accept popular recommendations or select only those whom they find pleasing and compatible. 178

Rank reflects fate rather than talent and achievement. 179 Families do not reveal the character and personalities of indi-vidual members (contrary to common view). 180

The standards of the time are simply inaccurate. 181

Han Fei-tzu's Views

The ancients were conscious of the effects that perspective has upon values and valuing, as already noted in the introductory section on basic intelligence. By the Warring States it was also recognized that an individual's words can be evaluated only by reference to his back

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ground, character, and allegiances. Identical sentences may be interpreted in strikingly different ways, just as actions may be misunderstood and their significance seriously misconstrued. Because worldview and philosophic perspective can dramati-cally affect behavior and performance, they must be appropri-ate to administrative position. For example, in Han Fei-tzu's view the Confucians are too ethical for the realities of statecraft and their benevolence will inevitably spawn disaster when, for example, the compassionate heart that Mencius witnessed in 

King Hsüan of Ch'i proves unable to inflict the punishments necessary to ensure the state's stability. 182 Wielding power re-quires character and qualifications radically different from mere subservience; therefore candidates with unsuitable traits and tendencies must be eliminated.

Apart from personal relationships and connections, people were primarily selected for office based upon character evalua-tion, little attention being paid to the specialized requirements of individual positions. However, sections of the Han Fei-tzu ad-vance several methods for evaluating men, all of which have al-ready been discussed: projecting on the basis of past behavior and personal history; probing with detailed questions, includ-ing misleading stimuli to elicit responses that can be studied and analyzed; and testing within concrete situations. In fact, Han Fei-tzu pointedly denied the possibility of evaluating by appearance alone:

If in forging a sword only the tin employed and the blueness or yellowness of the flames were observed, even the famous black-smith Ou Chih could not be certain it would be a good sword. 183 But if it can be used to strike geese in the water or sever the heads of horses on land, even the lowliest slave would not doubt its sharpness. If in judging a horse only its mouth is opened to check the teeth and its overall form seen, even Po Lo could not be certain of the horse. But if it is harnessed to a chariot and watched as it runs to the end of a course, the lowli-est slave will not doubt its excellence. Similarly, even Confu-cius was incapable of being certain of a man simply by observ-ing his demeanor and clothing and listening to his language and words. But if he is tested with duties of government and his achievements examined, even an ordinary man will have no doubt about his stupidity or wisdom. 184

A few of Han Fei-tzu's fundamental observations bear reitera-tion. First, people can frequently be judged by their facial ex-pressions: "Kung- tzu Chiu being about to revolt, Duke Huan of Ch'i dispatched an agent to watch him. The agent reported: 'He laughs at what is not happy, and

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sees what is not to be seen. He will certainly revolt.'" 185 Ap-pearances may also be deceiving, particularly when the seem-ingly inconsequential achieve much, 186 and speech may be de-ceptive and evoke a spurious response. Naturally such misper-ceptions turn upon the perceiver's character as much as the speaker's overall image. Han Fei-tzu thus cited, and thereby exploited, Confucius's experience in this regard:

Tzu Yü had the demeanor of a perfected man, so Confucius ex-pectantly took him as a disciple. However, after a long time to-gether Confucius discovered that his behavior did not match his demeanor. Ts'ai Yü's language was elegant and cultivated, so Confucius expectantly took him as a disciple. However, after some time together he discovered his wisdom did not equal his sophistry. Therefore Confucius said: "Should I select men based on their demeanor? I erred with Tzu Yü. Should I select men by their words? I erred with Ts'ai Yü." Thus despite his wisdom, Confucius has a reputation for failing to grasp the re-ality. 187

Han Fei-tzu concludes the passage by citing two famous de-feats he attributed to employing men with verbal, rather than martial, skills, including Chao Ma-fu at Ch'ang-p'ing, already seen in the historical section.

Han Fei-tzu also emphasized that the behavior of two individu-als, or even of the same individual at different times, although apparently identical in all visible respects, often stems from dif-ferent motives; therefore, an individual's intent and motivation must be fathomed before an adequate judgment can be made. His analysis integrates two examples:

T'ien Po-ting liked men of ability and preserved his ruler; Duke Po liked men of ability and created chaos in Ching. Their re-gard for men of ability was the same, but the reason for it was different. Kung-sun Yu cut off his own feet and was honored for a hundred kilometers, whereas Chien Kou castrated himself and was regarded as a sycophant to Duke Huan. Their self-in-fliction of punishment was the same, but the reasons were dif-ferent. Hui-tzu said: "A madman ran east and his pursuers also ran east. Their going east was the same, but the reason 

they ran east was different." Therefore it is said, "One must thoroughly investigate men performing the same action."188

Since appearances may be deceiving, on the assumption that men will eventually betray their actual talents and personali-ties in the trials of

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real experience, Han Fei-tzu naturally became a strong propo-nent of testing. 189

Han Fei-tzu further noted that when the ruler's attitudes and desires are known, people will deliberately produce behavior that coheres with them. 190 Therefore, when anyone in power evaluates men for a position or mission, his own inclinations and expectations must be concealed, while a constant eye is kept on the motives and outside interests of prospective tal-ents. Negative or misleading stimuli should be exploited to dis-cern whether the individual is honest and sincere or merely seeking personal gain through deception and flattery. Han Fei-tzu thus evolved numerous techniques for comparative obser-vation, the most relevant being visible in the following quota-tion:

Compare their words to know if they are sincere, and evaluate them from different perspectives to investigate what they ad-here to. Grasp the visible in order to ferret out the unusual. Employ men in single offices so that they may concentrate and become familiar with them. Heavily charge your distant envoys so that they will be frightened. Raise past events in order to comprehend the present. Bring men near to know their inner thoughts, keep them distant to study their outer behavior. Take hold of what you are clear about to probe where you are ignorant. Be deceptive in employing men to thwart dissolute behavior. Deliberately invert words to fathom the doubtful; em-ploy contrary arguments in order to discover secret evil; estab-lish spies in order to reign in the self-reliant; shift men about in order to detect the actions of villains; speak clearly in order to induce error free behavior; be humbly accommodating in or-der to see who is outspoken and who flatters. Make announce- 

ments in order to reach those you have not seen; cause argu-ments in order to disperse cliques and parties; keep things deeply buried in your mind so that people cannot fathom your happiness and anger; leak out spurious information in order to cause people to change their thinking; categorize semblances and compare them with experience; array errors to be clear about their causes. When you learn of crimes, punish them in order to end the perpetrator's awesomeness; and secretly de-pute agents to go out from time to time to investigate whether people are sincere or not. 191

Although Han Fei-tzu felt that the ruler should be formless and inscrutable, deliberately creating artificial situations might also be exploited: "DukeChao of Han closed his fist and pretended he had lost a fingernail, and was seeking it quite urgently. His attendant thereupon

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cut off a fingernail and presented it. From this he would see he was not sincere." 192

Han Fei-tzu also disparaged relying upon constancy of behav-ior, citing many contrary examples, such as the following:

When Duke Wen of Chin fled outside his state, Chi Cheng car-ried a pot of food and followed him. However, Chi became con-fused, lost the way, and was separated from the Duke. Hungry, he wept beside the road. After awaking from his sleep, though famished he still did not dare eat. When Duke Wen returned to Chin, he mobilized his troops and attacked Yüan, conquering and seizing it. Duke Wen said "Someone who lightly endured the misery of starvation while preserving a pot of food for me will never employ Yüan to revolt." He therefore appointed Chi as prefect of Yüan.

When the high official Hun Kan heard about it, he criticized him, saying, "Isn't relying upon him not to revolt because he didn't disturb a pot of food a case of lacking methods?" Thus the enlightened ruler does not rely on others not revolting against him, but relies on it being impossible to rebel. He 

doesn't rely on someone not deceiving him, but on not being deceivable." 193

Given that Legalists such as Lord Shang characterized man as motivated by the irrepressible twin desires for life and food, Chi's loyalty would seem to have been well proved. However, Han Fei-tzu found extreme devotion that transcended the bounds of normal human behavior inherently suspicious and clearly assumed that men who violently contravene natural emotional constraints must be driven by abnormal forces and motives. Blind loyalty might be the apparent motivation, but the reality is often otherwise, as in the following classic case where Duke Huan is recorded as questioning the mortally ill Kuan Chung about a possible successor:

"What about Shu-tiao?" inquired the Duke, but Kuan Chung replied: "Not acceptable. To love one's body is universal human nature, but Shu-tiao castrated himself in order to govern the inner palace because he knew you are jealous and love women. If he doesn't love his own body, how will he love you?"

"How about Prince K'ai-feng of Wei?" inquired the Duke, but Kuan Chung replied: "Not possible. The distance between Wei and Ch'i requires less than ten days' travel, yet in order to ac-commodate you, he has not returned home to see his parents for fifteen years! This is not normal human emotion. If he lacks affec

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tion for his parents, how can he possibly feel affection toward you?"

"What about Yi-ya?" inquired the Duke, but Kuan Chung replied: "Not acceptable. He was responsible for the flavors of your dishes and because you had never eaten human flesh cooked his son's head and presented it, something you already know. To love one's son is universal human emotion, but he cooked his son in order to provide you with a savory delicacy. If he did not love his son, how can he love you?" 194 

However, Han Fei-tzu also believed that once the necessary knowledge has been obtained, subject to the usual controls of government and through such methods as "name and respon-sibility," people can then be employed. In general it becomes a question of applied psychology, of projecting behavior on the basis of past actions and testing expectations against reality.

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12 Character, Archetypes,

and Typology THE CLASSIFICATIONS UNDERLYING the collected biogra-phies in Ssu-ma Ch'ien Shih Chi probably represent the fullest, most sophisticated archetypal characterizations found in antiq-uity. Although he did not explicitly specify the traits composing the various archetypes--they are found only in their embodi-ment as concrete characters classified under certain rubrics--by a simplified factor analysis the underlying elements may

still be winnowed out and shown to be remarkably consistent, as we have already discussed in a separate study. 1 However, the development of personality types (as distinct from the so-matotypes that are found in the medical writings) apparently began with the earliest stories of the Sage rulers, for the latter served to integrate a variety of idealized elements. (Their oppo-sites, the depraved and evil rulers who persecuted the innocent and eventually lost their dynastic power to the Sage rulers, cor-respondingly arose.) With this development the concept of character types, of definite, if simplistic, combinations of char-acter traits, became reality. Evaluating men as marked by cer-tain personality clusters and tendencies then followed, al-though generally in terms of one or two emotions or desires that predominate and were therefore considered determining elements in a personality.

By the Warring States period the images of the Sage rulers of antiquity were already fully developed, the Shang Shu having described Yao as "reverent, intelligent, cultivated, thoughtful, and harmonious. He was completely respectful and capable of yielding." 2 Shun was similarly characterized in the Shang Shu. 

3 Other writings from the period repeat the story of his ordeals and virtuously portray such other legendary rulers as Yü, King Wen, and the Duke of Chou. 4 Their counter

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parts, such as the tyrannical Chieh and debauched Chou, are thoroughly vilified, their evil behavior generally being reported with enough concise particulars to clearly establish how they lost the Mandate of Heaven. 5 Although essentially products of the thrust to idealize the Chou and disparage the Shang, these figures were the simplest images found in common awareness.

The Shang Shu also contains an enigmatic passage elucidating "Nine Virtues" that, in Wang Ch'ung's view, can somehow be employed to estimate character. (Although he readily admitted the task would be difficult and never provided any actual meth-ods, Wang's recognition of the passage still imparted great im-port to it. 6) As recorded in the Shang Shu they are composed by a series of paired, often contradictory, traits that largely defy translation: "Genial, yet dignified; pliant, yet upright; substan-tial, yet reverent; impetuous, yet respectful; 7 abrupt, yet reso-lute; straightforward, yet mild; terse, yet modest; firm, yet con-strained; and strong, yet righteous." 8 In theory, someone who was marked by three of these virtues could serve as a clan or village leader; by six, a high state official; and by nine, ruler of the world.

Depending upon the perceiver's perspective, the concept of character and moral types included an immediate value judg-ment about worth, employability, and association potential. Despite all the problems and questions already raised, a man found to have embarked along the moral road would normally be a prime candidate for office and friendship, whereas the so-called common or mean fellow would be shunned. Because the emphasis continued to be on character and the moral man, on men with a sense of shame and an orientation to righteous-ness, abilities were little discussed apart from Han Fei-tzu and Liu Shao somewhat later. However, the writings of the period are replete with specific recommendations on characteristics to be sought in men and traits to be avoided. A man who mani- 

fests desirable qualities should be recommended for office and positions of trust; those displaying tendencies associated with trouble or moral deficiencies should not be retained under any circumstances. Somewhere between these two, in a sort of limbo to be evaluated by techniques as best they might, would fall men neither distinguished by prominent attributes nor marred by any glaring defect.

The value matrix for defining these concrete indications was generally a Confucian one, tempered somewhat by the require-ments of office. Confucius himself set the tone and often many of the criteria with specific pronouncements in reference to some identifiable person that thereafter became applicable al-most as a general rule. Many that do not fall into this category were prompted merely by the particular

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ized experiences of some notable individual, the essence of the situation being distilled and transmitted as abstracted remarks separately from the original context. When taken together, these concrete pronouncements on "other people" constituted a sort of collective wisdom, a compendium of specific insights. Consequently, when a person was labeled with a certain trait that had a recognizable historical identity, the associated mate-rial would probably not be far from conscious awareness and the person judged accordingly.

Although much of this material is preserved in the traditional historical writings, the philosophical and political works con-tain numerous distilled portraits, particularly those built upon trends initiated by Confucius in characterizing his various dis-ciples. 9 In summary, inimical behavioral patterns and person-ality traits include being flattering and acting obsequiously; be-ing disobedient; being disrespectful; seeking fame irrespective of the cost to one's state and to others; being greedy and cov-etous, like the evil rulers of old; being ambitious; being domi-neering; being tough or severe (especially on oneself); being sharp-tongued; seeking office under a poor ruler; liking the small and dangerous; being too puritanical and overly con-cerned with minor faults; being petty; being ashamed of not be- 

ing perfect; liking to drink, indulge in sexual pleasures, and other licentious activities; and slandering and demeaning one's own clan. Traits that would disqualify bureaucratic officials are being hard; displaying toughness (as in bravado and misdi-rected courage); being flowery, all culture or expression, with-out substance; acting arrogantly; heeding the spirits; becoming easily angered; and lacking Virtue. 10

There was also a second tendency to classify men into simple categories, such as good or evil, polite or disorderly, arrogant or humble, rich or poor, noble or common, long before the advent of the Chou dynasty and the development of expository written materials. By the end of the Spring and Autumn period Confu-cius thus elaborated upon his conception of the ideal man (chün-tzu, or "perfected man") committed to the moral path of self-cultivation, defined by the practice of such virtues as benevolence and righteousness, and the common or menial man (hsiao-jen, or "small man"), marked by the absence of a moral orientation, beset by all of life's cares, and essentially lost amid its struggle. 11 Although not as perverse as true evil-doers, their orientation and behavior were governed by simple self-interest, unencumbered by abstract concepts of Virtue that, because of their socioeconomic status, would be unreach-able, as Mencius later observed.

With the passing of centuries the conception of ethically de-fined classes or types of men expanded to include both formal categories and simple characteristics, such as the arrogant and irascible. Classifying someone according to such conceptions would naturally lead to

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certain behavioral expectations, as well as set the framework for understanding subsequent actions. Even though the details of these characterizations and composite portraits remain unimportant, the existence of this basis for projecting and in-terpreting is crucial, at least within the framework of intelli-gence activities. Some idea of their extensiveness may be gained from an explication of the five basic classes of men at-tributed to Confucius in the Hsün-tzu: 

Ordinary Man: His mouth cannot speak good words, his mind does not know modesty or to select worthy men and excellent gentlemen to entrust himself to, and so has endless worry. He does not know what aspects of behavior to focus upon, in stop-ping and acting does not know where to settle. In his daily se-lection of things he does not know what to value but follows them as if flowing along, not knowing where to return. His five emotions dictate, his mind follows and is destroyed.

Gentleman: Although incapable of fully exhausting the tech-niques of the Tao, he will certainly accord with them. Even though he is incapable of excellence and goodness in all as-pects, he will certainly dwell among them. Accordingly, in his knowledge he doesn't strive for multiplicity but concentrates upon thoroughly examining what he knows. In speech he does not strive for verbosity but concentrates upon examining what is discussed. And in his behavior he does not undertake too much but focuses on thoroughly examining the basis. Thus when his knowledge has solidified, his words convey the dis-cussion, and his actions stem from proper motives, they will be as unchangeable as human nature, fate, and one's skin. Thus riches and nobility will be inadequate to increase him, poverty and lowliness insufficient to reduce him.

Perfected Man: His words are loyal and trustworthy, but his mind does not regard this as virtuous. He embodies righteous-ness and benevolence, but his appearance does not boast of it. His thoughts and contemplations are enlightened and penetrat-ing, but his language is not contentious, so it seems he can still be reached.

The Worthy: Their actions always accord with proper standards without suffering any injury to their original basis. Their words are sufficient to be taken as a model for All under Heaven, yet are not detrimental to themselves. Even if they possessed the entire realm, they would not accumulate personal wealth; even though their generosity gave everything to the realm, they would not be troubled by poverty.

Great Sage: His wisdom penetrates the Great Tao, he responds to change without being impoverished and is discriminating 

about the nature of the myriad things. The Great Tao is the means

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to change and transform the myriad things, whereas their na-ture is the means to impose patterns on taking or leaving. For this reason his affairs are pervasively discriminated amid Heaven and Earth, clearly investigated in the sun and moon. He unifies the myriad things in the wind and rain. Mysterious and ineffable, his affairs cannot be compassed. Just like the mastery of Heaven his actions cannot be discerned, and in their ignorance the common people do not recognize his prox-imity. 12

The last three represent the ideals and were therefore moot, even so- called perfected men and Worthies rarely being seen, despite many highly visible efforts at self-cultivation and per-fection. However, the passage does provide a sense of the worldview in the late Warring States period regarding the world of men. 13

Somatotypes and Character

Among the basic correlates of the five phases are the four com-pass directions, together with a hypothetical midpoint that lies somewhere in central China. One phase or element is associ-ated with each of the points and further coupled with a large collection of regional characteristics, such as climate, humid-ity, temperature, predominant food types, and tastes. Because of environmental factors, each region developed a distinctive lifestyle and local specificities in illnesses and treatment. As a result, it was felt that discernible differences also characterized regional behavioral tendencies and personalities, as well as re-gional physiques, habits, and activities. Although little was said about employing these categories to fathom men, the experi-enced physician would be expected to recognize them and mod-ify his treatment accordingly, whereas ordinary individuals might have certain expectations based upon a person's regional origins. 

The medical writings include another series of types, some parts of which appear in other works, such as the Huai-nan Tzu and Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. The most extensive of these is a twenty-five-category somatotypology based upon a fivefold vari-ation on the five phases that provides a fairly individualized physical description of each type's outstanding characteristics, basic talents, and possible fate. However, as only the five major categories provide any personality and aptitude information, the fivefold variation within each group has been deleted from the following translation.

Wood Somatotype: They tend to have a greenish cast to their complexion; small heads, with long faces; large shoulders and

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backs; stand erect; and have small hands and feet. They are very talented but exhaust their minds and have little strength. They worry a lot and fatigue themselves in affairs.

Earth Somatotype: They tend to have a yellow cast to their complexion, round faces and large heads, well-set shoulders, large bellies, attractive thighs and legs, and small hands and feet. The upper and lower parts of their bodies are fleshy and well matched. Their movements are well anchored on the earth, but when they lift their feet, dust floats up. They are tranquil, like to profit others, don't like power and authority, and excel at attracting others.

Fire Somatotype: They tend to have a ruddy cast to their com-plexion, broad muscles, pointed faces, and small heads. They have substantial shoulders and midsections, but small hands and feet. Their movements are solid, but they sway when anx-ious. They are full of energy, regard material wealth lightly, trust little, and are frequently worried. They are perspicacious in affairs, and like to give a good appearance. However, they are anxious, have short life spans, and die violently.

Metal Somatotype: They have square faces and tend to have a white cast to their complexion. They have small heads, small shoulders, small abdomens, and small hands and feet, as if the bones were coming out of the heels, and light bones. In per- 

sonal appearance they are clean and pure. When anxious, sometimes they are quiet, sometimes violent. They are well suited to being minor functionaries.

Water Somatotype: They tend to have a dark cast to their com-plexion and rough faces. They have large heads, square jaws, small shoulders, a large abdomen, and nimble hands and feet. When they begin to move, they rock from side to side. Their lower backs are long, fully stretched out. They are neither re-spectful nor fearful, are inclined to cheat and deceive other people, and usually die violent, ignominious deaths. 14

Yin and Yang Somatotypes

A second series of somatotypes is based upon the presence of yin and yang within the individual. Depending upon the rela-tive balance of the two, there are five basic possibilities: t'ai-yin, shao-yin, t'ai-yang, shao-yang, and yin and yang balanced and in harmony. In the medical text, for each category the person-ality traits are first explicated and then followed by a discus-sion of the underlying energetics and a consideration of the im-plications these phase energetics have for charac

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ter, illness, and treatment. However, the paragraphs pertaining to physiology and treatment, being irrelevant to concerns of evaluating, have been abridged and the text rearranged for clarity.

T'ai-yin Somatotype: The man of t'ai-yin [extreme yin] is greedy and inhumane, though appearing humble and congenial. He likes to acquire but hates to expend. His mind harmonizes with others, he doesn't like to move first. He is not concerned with timeliness but follows after others. He has an abundance of yin and no yang. His skin and yang are not in harmony. His mus-cles are relaxed and his skin thick. His appearance is very dark, and he seems thoughtful, with downcast eyes. He ap-proaches deferentially and, although tall and large, is bent over, though not from being a hunchback. 

Shao-yin Somatotype: The man of shao-yin [lesser or immature yin] is somewhat greedy and has the heart of a thief. When he sees that others have lost something, it's as if he has gotten something. He likes to injure and harm others. When he sees others attaining honors, he turns round and becomes angry. His heart is full of enmity and he has no generosity. He has an abundance of yin and a small amount of yang. He has a small stomach and large lower belly. His appearance is quiet and furtive, he conceals the heart of a thief. When standing still, his attitude and behavior exude danger. When moving, he seems furtive.

T'ai-yang Somatotype: The man of t'ai-yang [excessive yang] is self-satisfied in his normal life. He likes to speak of great mat-ters but lacks ability, and his words are empty. His intentions are widely expressed. In his actions he takes no cognizance of right or wrong. In affairs he always relies upon himself alone and even when matters fail never has any regrets. He has abundant yang and no yin. His appearance is erect and impos-ing, and his body is bowed backward.

Shao-yang Somatotype: The man of shao-yang [young yang] values self-reliance in his investigations into matters. Even in a very minor post he arrogantly assumes everything he does is appropriate. He likes external activities but not internal attach-ments. He has an abundance of yang and some yin. Standing about, he likes to lift his head up, whereas in movement he sways from side to side. He frequently holds his hands behind his back.

Harmonious Somatotype: The man with yin and yang in har-mony and equilibrium is at peace and tranquil in all aspects of his life, experiencing neither the extremes of fear nor happi-ness. He flows agreeably with things and does not compete with others. He

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changes and transforms with the seasons. If honored, he is modest and yielding. Vast, he does not govern, and this is re-ferred to as the apex of governing. His yin and yang ch'i are in harmony. His appearance is one of satisfaction, flexibility, re- 

spect, happiness, friendliness, and clarity. The masses all take him to be a perfected man. 15

"The Offices of King Wen"

"The Offices of King Wen," found in the Yi Chou-shu and Ta-Tai Li- chi, texts that probably attained final form in the third cen-tury B.C., purportedly records a lecture delivered by King Wen, one of the founders of the great Chou dynasty, to the T'ai-shih on the subject of evaluating, selecting, and employing men. 16 The speaker identified as the king believes that character can be fathomed, that emotions and true personality cannot be concealed. However, while accepting this principle of the trans-parency of character, he also provides a sophisticated analysis of particular character types, their deliberate facades, and their potential in government. Throughout the lecture, which inte-grates a wealth of detail, he applies the common knowledge of the Warring States period about human tendencies, coupled with an ideal figure against whom behavior may be appraised. Not content with external evaluations, the speaker also pro-vides psychological principles for evaluating, such as consis-tency of behavior. The chapter is thus a complete and extensive analytical guidebook for the evaluation and classification of personality and ability and a vast sourcebook on character types of intrinsic value. Prior to Liu Shao Jen-wu Chih there is nothing to compare with it, and it of course merits thorough consideration and study in itself. However, within the context of "knowing men" it is introduced here as a summation and ex-pression of the general approach to evaluating rather than it-self being the focus of study (commentary to elucidate the indi-vidual sections and passages appears in the notes as appropri-ate):

King Wen said: "T'ai-shih, you must be cautious and ponder deeply, observe the affairs of the people, investigate and mea-sure their emotions and artifices, make changes in official posi-tions to see their ability to [govern] the people, and array them by their talents and skills. You must be cautious! How can you be careful about those that are not of the right ability? There are seven categories of ability; each category has nine employ- 

ments; each employment has six indications. The first is ob-serve his sincerity;

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the second is test his intentions; the third is look within; the fourth is observe his appearance; the fifth is observe his hidden aspects; the six is estimate his Virtue."

Observe His Sincerity

If he is wealthy and noble, 17 observe his performance of the li. If he is poor and in mean condition, observe whether he has Virtue and integrity. If he is heavily favored by the ruler, ob-serve whether he isn't arrogant and extravagant. If he is un-known and in straitened circumstances, observe if he isn't fear-ful.

Life Stages

If he is young, observe whether he is respectful, likes to study, and can be a proper younger brother. If he is an adult, observe whether he is incorruptible, puts his ambitions into effect, and overcomes his personal desires. If he is old, observe whether he is cautious, exerts himself where he is inadequate, and does not overstep the li.

Observe the Person in Relationships

In the relationship of father and son, observe whether the per-son is a filial son or loving father. In the relationship of elder and younger brother, observe whether the person is harmo-nious and friendly. In the relationship of ruler and minister, observe whether the minister is loyal and the ruler gracious. In his village and among his associates, observe his faithfulness and sincerity.

Observe Him in Different Contexts

Investigate him in his normal life, and observe his righteous-ness in measures. Investigate his behavior and grief in mourn-ing, and observe his sincerity and faithfulness. Investigate his 

social activities, and observe his making of friends. Investigate his making of friends, and observe whether he is responsible and incorruptible.

Actively Test the Person

Test him to observe his trustworthiness. Give him some cues to observe his wisdom. Show him hardship in order to observe his courage. Annoy him with small matters in order to see how he handles it. Immerse him in profit in order to observe whether he isn't greedy. Immerse him in pleasure to observe whether he

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doesn't become dissolute. Make him happy with things to ob-serve whether he doesn't become frivolous. Make him angry in order to observe his gravity. Make him drunk in order to ob-serve if he doesn't violate propriety. Indulge him in order to ob-serve the mainstays of his character. Keep him at a distance in order to see if he isn't disloyal. Keep him nearby in order to see if he doesn't become too familiar. Sound out his intentions in order to observe his emotions. Try his behavior in order to ob-serve his sincerity. Revisit his minor words to observe his truthfulness. Surreptitiously investigate his behavior in order to observe if it is complete.

This is what is referred to as observing his sincerity. 18

Testing Intentions

Those who daily improve: Speak with them in order to observe their intentions. Their will is robust and deep; personality broad and pliant; countenance humble without being obse-quious; they practice the li before other men, but speak after them; and display their own inadequacies.

Those who daily regress: They approach people with arrogant countenances; insult them with haughty attitudes; employ speech to compel others to deem them worthy; conceal their in-adequacies and boast of their abilities. 

The substantial: Their appearance is straightforward without being insulting; their words upright and unselfish; they don't adorn their good points, or conceal their evil ones; they don't cover over their errors.

The insubstantial: Their countenance is a facade of friendli-ness; their words are clever and artful; they gloss over their base inclinations; they exert themselves in establishing minor acts of trust, and employ reason to their own ends.

Men of equanimity and perseverance: If you make them happy or angry with external things, their countenances will not be-tray any changes; if you annoy them, their intentions will re-main unaffected; if you speak with them about great profits, their minds will not change; if you frighten them with majesty, their spirits will not be humbled.

The vulgar and artificial: If you make them happy or angry with external things, their changes will easily be known; if you an-noy them, their intentions will be ungoverned; if you display profits to them, they will be easily changed; if you frighten them with majesty, they will easily be scared.

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The thoughtful: Threaten them with external things and they will decide with alacrity; startle them with sudden affairs and they can take the full measure of them; even without studying, they can be discriminating.

Dolts: It is difficult to entrust any affairs to them or to speak with them about anything. They know things as if they could never be shaken from them; in difficulty they do not know how to proceed; they lack discrimination; and they bring about their own worries.

The pure and decisive: Confront them with matters, they will not be worried; oppose them with sudden affairs, they will not be afraid. They are resolute in establishing righteousness; ap-proached with material goods or beautiful women, they remain unaffected. 

The weak-willed: They are easily moved by words and cannot maintain a steadfast will. Although they mentally affirm some-thing, they are incapable of decisively putting it into practice.

The tranquil: Agreeing with them will not make them happy, grabbing them not make them angry. Deeply quiet and of few words, they are contemplative and yet humble in appearance.

Jealous slanderers: They are discriminating in language but do not put the Tao into practice. Even when a state is well or-dered, they are among the first to be in difficulty. They follow their own inclinations and are unyielding, vehement in the pur-suit of their interests.

Men of controlled intent: They are able to distinguish the minute and quiet; they measure and investigate matters, and thus can exhaust them.

Loquacious slanderers: They employ clever words, have a spe-cious appearance, display a superficial respect for others, and all take nothing to be something.

Look at the Interior

If there is sincerity within, 19 it will be manifest without. One takes what is manifest to estimate what is concealed, what is small to estimate the large, and the sounds to know the ch'i.

At the origin, ch'i gave birth to things. When things came alive, they had sound. Among sounds there are the hard and the soft, the murky and the clear, the good and the evil. They are all expressed in the sound.

If the mental ch'i is flowery and expansive, then the sound is flowing and dispersed. If the mental state is congenial and trustwor

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thy, then the sound is congenial and measured. If the mental state is vulgar and perverse, then the sound is hoarse and 

ugly. If the mental state is generous and mild, then the sound is mild and attractive.

The ch'i of trustworthiness is correct and placid. The ch'i of righteousness is always relaxed. The ch'i of knowledge is com-plete. The ch'i of courage is strong and straightforward.

Listen to his sound; determine his ch'i; examine what a person does; observe its basis; look into what they rest in; and esti-mate the future from the past, the invisible by what is mani-fest, and the large by the small.

Emotions and Their Manifestations

Man has five emotions:20 happy, angry, desirous, fearful, and anxious. When the ch'i of happiness accumulates within, even if one wishes to conceal it, the signs of happiness will certainly be manifest. When the ch'i of anger accumulates within, even if one wishes to conceal it, the signs of anger will certainly be manifest. When the ch'i of desire accumulates within, even if one wishes to conceal it, the signs of the desires will certainly be manifest. When the ch'i of fear accumulates within, even if one wishes to conceal it, the signs of fear will certainly be man-ifest. When the ch'i of worry and sorrow accumulates within, even if one wishes to conceal it, the signs of worry and sorrow will certainly be manifest. When any of these five ch'i is truly present within, they will be expressed externally. People's emo-tions cannot be concealed.

The appearance of happiness is of bubbling forth. The appear-ance of anger is aroused and insulting. The appearance of de-sire is expectation with pleasure. The appearance of fear is as if being pressed down. The appearance of worry and sorrow is ex-hausted and silent.

True wisdom will certainly have the appearance of inex-haustibility. True humaneness will certainly have the appear-ance of should-be-respected. True courage will certainly have the appearance of being difficult to frighten. True loyalty will certainly have the appearance of being approachable. True pu-rity will certainly have the appearance of being difficult to tar- 

nish. True tranquillity will certainly have the appearance of can-be-trusted.

The appearance of true substance is luminously solid and peaceful, the appearance of artifice is confused, turbulent, and vexed. Even though one wished to conceal it within, the ap-pearance will not listen. Even though one changes it, it can be known. This is referred to as observing the appearance.

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Observe What Is Concealed

The people have yin and yang aspects. 21 There are many who conceal their emotions, who adorn themselves with artifice in order to seek fame. There are those who hide in humanness and substance, in knowledge and principle, in culture and art, in purity and courage, in loyalty and filiality, and in friendship. Such cases must be investigated.

Those who hide in benevolence and worthiness: They make mi-nor gifts but expect large returns; they yield but little, yet like great projects. Their words are circumspect and taken to have substance. They feign love and it is taken to be loyalty. Their faces are congenial and appearance compassionate. They feign the constraints in order to display them to others. They act de-liberately in order to forge their names.

Those who hide in knowledge and principles: They investigate old transgressions thinking to know men. When people are successful, they are envious and deprecate their shortcomings. If their plans fall short, they feign not being willing to talk about them. If they are inadequate within, they feign having an excess. Thus they know how to move men. They follow them-selves without ever yielding. They never complete their words, and no one knows their true emotions.

Those who hide in culture and art: They move people with empty phrases, and set out things without ever coming to the end. If you ask them about something, they do not reply but feign having inexhaustible knowledge, manifesting an appear-ance of having an excess. They pretend to have realized the Tao 

but follow only themselves in employing it. If affairs turn diffi-cult, they make them seem deep.

Those who hide in purity and courage: Their words bespeak in-tegrity so that they may be taken as their character. Their arro-gance and harshness are taken as courage. Within they are afraid, without they are braggarts. They respectfully repeat their words in order to deceive others.

Those who hide in loyalty and filiality: They are fond of telling other people about how they serve their parents. They repeat-edly speak of their labors and fatigue, forcing the proper facial expressions of respectfulness and love, adorning their visible efforts, and thus they attain their fame. However, while their names are raised without, internally it is not so. They flaunt their filial reputations in order to profit. Whatever they do to publicize their names is solely for self-benefit.

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Those who hide in friendship: They employ secret means to gain fame, form cliques with others for the purpose of mutual praise, and make it clear that they know Worthies who can at-test to their character. When they associate with others who are different, it will be that the association is of greater benefit to them. Even though they are happy with someone, they will not approach them. Even if they get close to someone, in actu-ality they do not accept them or feel happiness or loyalty. How-ever, they feign satisfaction and loyalty in front of others, their appearance overcoming any lack of substance.

Estimating Virtue

When words and actions are not of the same category, end and beginning contrary to each other, yin and yang conquer in turn, and the exterior and interior do not cohere, when even their behavior manifests artificial constraints and visible virtue, it is said not to be true substance.

Those with humane hearts: Their words are extremely loyal and actions are very even. Their thoughts are free of selfish-ness. In assisting others, they do not exceed what is necessary. 

They are loyal and congenial. Although imposing, they set peo-ple at ease.

Those with expansive knowledge: Although matters change, they can control them. If something is good, they can speak of it to others. Burdened with poverty they can prosper. They ded-icate themselves to establishing the Tao and are able to attain their objectives.

The circumspect and good: They speak little but put it into ac-tion. They are respectful, frugal, and compliant. They have knowledge but do not flaunt it. They aid others but do not con-sider it to be great virtue.

The congenial and trustworthy: Minor words suddenly spoken long ago are still viable. Their private, unseen actions are di-rected solely toward their goodness, not overcoming others. Al-though others be gone, they act as if they were still present.

Men of Virtue: Although they have rank, wealth, and honor, they are respectful and frugal, and capable of assisting others. Even when their lands are large and subjects numerous, when they are stern and majestic, they still adhere to the li and are not arrogant.

Men who preserve principles: If they dwell obscurely in poverty, they are unafraid, whereas if they enjoy luxury, they do

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not go to excess. Though they labor hard, they do not change. Whether happy or angry, they do not lose their self-constraint.

The proper and upright: They are firm and upright, and do not toady to others. They are scrupulous, pure, and not violent. They stand strongly in the Tao and are not self-oriented.

The pensive: Upright and quiet, they await orders. If not sum-moned, they do not go; if not queried, do not speak. Their words do not surpass their actions, and their actions do not transgress the Tao. 

The truly filial: They serve their parents with sincere love and happily respect them. They exhaust their strength, but not merely with a respectful countenance designed to overcome others or to attain a name that they do so.

True friends: Their inclinations are in harmony, and they are united in the Tao. They share each other's worries and take re-sponsibility for their hardships. Their actions are loyal and trustworthy, they have no doubts about each other. Whether in straitened circumstances or far apart, they do not abandon each other.

Position seekers: Their attitude and words can penetrate and make people very happy. They can advance or retreat with skill, so they are very skillful with people. They can quickly be-come familiar with people, yet may easily turn against them.

Greedy, rough fellows: They ply people with food and drink in order to draw close to them, and use gifts and bribes to attract associates. They will unite with others for profit, employ name and reputation for gain, and rely on secretly exploiting material things.

The artificial and deceitful: They never decide anything sub-stantial, their words never express the matter. They minimize their own inadequacies and make plans unceasingly.

Those who lack sincere intent: Their words and behavior are al-ways changing, their manner wanton and frivolous. For them good and evil are not constant, their behavior and personality have no coherence.

The vain and boastful: They have little knowledge and cannot decide great matters. They have little ability and cannot attain great achievements. They focus on minor matters and do not know about great affairs. They are extremely changeable and very selfish.

Those skillful at achieving fame: They offer corrective remon-strance but inappropriately. They implement the Tao but do not delight in it. 

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Thus those who like to find difficulty when they encounter some matter are not constant. Those who rely on the spirits are not benevolent. Those who seek only superficial fame are not sincere. Those who put on an appearance are not showing their true emotions. Those who hide in the constraints are not equanimous. Those who are very self-centered are not right-eous. Those who exaggerate are seldom trustworthy.

T'ai-shih! Extrapolate past words in order to estimate future actions. Listen to what people say to scrutinize their past ac-tions. Observe their yang [visible aspects] in order to examine into their yin [hidden natures]. Investigate them internally in order to appraise them externally. Accordingly, those who con-ceal their emotions can be known; those who feign not having any emotions can be discerned; men of substance and sincerity who dwell in the good can be found; and the loyal, benevolent, constrained, and righteous will be seen.

Alas, you must be cautious! How can you be careful of those who are not of the right mind? How can you be careful of those who are not the right men? Men have six indications. When these six have been completely investigated, then observe the nine employments.

The Nine Employments

Imperturbable, benevolent, and thoughtful: in charge of gov-erning the state and leading the people. 22

Loving, beneficent, and principled: heads of villages and towns, govern fathers and sons.

Straightforward, industrious, truly upright: oversee govern-ment offices, evaluate officials as good or not.

Respectful, straightforward, investigate what they hear: in charge of criminal and legal cases, act as liaisons for the ruler.

Can manage affairs, upright, incorruptible: in charge of the treasury, administer income and expenditures. 

Careful in investigations, incorrupt and pure: in charge of di-viding wealth, handling goods, and making rewards.

Like to make plans and know men: govern difficult lands and be in charge of the artisans.

Sensitive and perceptive: administer the feudal lords and take care of state guests.

Firm, resolute, self-reliant in decisionmaking: be in charge of the army and patrol the border.

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In accord with their talents you should employ them. This is what is referred to as "employing ability."

When the nine employments have been investigated, then en-trust men according to the seven categories. The first states that for a state use men of noble rank. The second, for villages use the true. The third, for offices use leaders. The fourth, for students use teachers. The fifth, for clans use the clan heads. The sixth, for the families use the heads. The seventh, for teachers use Worthies. 23

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13 Intelligence Applications

MANY CHAPTERS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL writings contain passages of utility and importance to anyone entrusted with the tasks of intelligence gathering, operations, and analysis, but only Han Feitzu extensively addressed the critical issues of power and control in dedicated sections. Known in the West in recent centuries as China's Machiavelli, Han Fei-tzu not only observed and described the psychological dynamics of hierar-chically structured human interactions, but also offered meth-ods for controlling others through their inclinations and de-sires, which Li Ch'uan adopted among his techniques for inter-rogating and appraising. Before briefly studying his most fa- 

mous chapter--one cited in virtually every modern Chinese book on plans, strategies, spying, controlling, and even com-bative business practices--we should note his citation of Kuan Chung's warning about the dangers of court subversion and the common practice of "inner court officials spying out the ruler's emotions in order to inform those outside for their own benefit." 1 An example of how this might be implemented ap-pears in the following mid-fourth century B.C. incident:

Chao had an emissary seek troops from Han through the inter-cession of Shen-tzu, the prime minister, because they were about to attack Wei. Shen-tzu wanted to speak to the ruler about it but feared he would be suspected of acting in the in-terests of a foreign state. However, if he failed to communicate their request, he was afraid of offending Chao. Therefore Shen-tzu first had two of the ruler's favorites test the duke while he observed his reactions and countenance, only thereafter broaching the subject. Thus he was able to learn the ruler's in-tentions and also achieve Chao's purpose. 2

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Although Han Fei-tzu's infamous chapter of nefarious tech-niques, entitled "Eight Villains," undertakes an incisive analy-sis of the ways in which rulers may be manipulated (prepared for the latter's benefit), it was thereafter regarded as a hand-book of techniques universally applicable against powerful peo-ple irrespective of their actual rank or position. Virtually all the modern Chinese works that discuss intrigue and methods for controlling men focus upon it, even though it was much con-demned by the Confucian literati throughout the centuries whenever not simply or deliberately ignored. Although the core methods fully accord with the simplistic premises of exploiting the ruler's desire for riches, power, and sex previously wit-nessed, many other subtle and sophisticated techniques are identified. The chapter commences with Han Fei-tzu noting that "there are eight techniques that subordinates follow to achieve perverse objectives," although in most instances "sub-ordinates" or "ministers" can be understood as men in general and their targets as the rich and powerful rather than just the ruler: 

First, exploiting those who share the ruler's bed--noble con-sorts, beloved youths, favored concubines, and nymphomani-acs who can delude the ruler. Taking advantage of his mo-ments at pleasure and exploiting the time when he is drunken and satiated, they press their own desires, a technique that en-sures they will be heeded. Other men then bribe these mem-bers of the inner palace with gold and jade to have them delude the ruler. 3 Second, exploiting his attendants--actors and jesters, comedians and dwarfs, all those who are close and fa-miliar, who concur even before the ruler indicates his wishes and assent before he commands them, always anticipating his intentions. Observing his face and peering at his countenance, they precede him in realizing his intent. They advance and withdraw in unison, reacting and replying with identical lan-guage in a single chorus in order to affect the ruler's mind. Other men then provide these inner court members with gold, jade, curios, and rarities and act illegally outside it in order to transform the ruler through them.

Third, exploiting the elder generation--princes of collateral lines and those whom the ruler loves within his own family, as well as great ministers and court officials with whom the ruler eval-uates plans. When they all exhaust their strength in fully dis-cussing a topic, the ruler will invariably heed them. Other men provide these collateral family members with music and women and gather in the great ministers and court officers with words and speech. They arrange to have them propose affairs that, when

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achieved, result in higher ranks and increased compensation, and thus encourage their minds.

Fourth, nurturing misfortune--rulers take pleasure in splendid palaces, towers, and pools, and love to adorn themselves with beautiful women, dogs, and horses in order to bring joy to their hearts. These are calamities for rulers. Their subordinates ex-haust the people's strength in these beautiful palaces, towers, and pools, and redouble the taxes and impositions in order to grace them with beautiful women, dogs, and horses, thereby 

pleasuring their hearts and bringing turbulence to their minds. By following what the ruler desires, they establish their own profit in their midst.

Fifth, cultivating the people--by dispersing public funds in or-der to please the people and performing minor acts of generos-ity in order to gain the hundred surnames, bringing it about that everyone in the court, market, and villages is encouraged to praise them. They thus eclipse the ruler and achieve what they desire.

Sixth, exploiting eloquent behavior--the ruler, being insulated from conversation and isolated from discussions, is easily swayed by the eloquent speech of sophists. Other men there-fore seek out sophists among the feudal lords and nurture elo-quent speakers within their states, employing them to dispute on their behalf. They embellish their words and hold forth elo-quently, showing the ruler advantageous circumstances and frightening him with misfortune and harm. They flourish vacu-ous language and destroy the ruler.

Sixth, awesomeness and strength--rulers assume the officials and hundred surnames create their authority and strength. Those that the officials and hundred surnames regard as excel-lent the ruler does as well, those that they do not regard as good the ruler does not either. 4 Other men assemble sword-bearing retainers and nurture death-defying warriors in order to flaunt their awesomeness and make it clear that their parti-sans will profit and enemies perish. They thus frighten the offi-cials and hundred surnames and secure their personal desires.

Seventh, the Four Quarters--rulers whose states are small serve large states, whose armies are weak fear strong armies. Whatever large states want, small states must yield. Wherever strong forces are applied, weak armies must submit. Their sub-ordinates double the taxes and impositions, exhaust the trea-suries and warehouses, and empty out the state in serving these large states while also exploiting their own resulting awe-someness to control the ruler. The most extreme raise the army in order to provoke an accumulation of troops along the border and control exactions within the 

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state, while the least frequently bring in ambassadors from great states in order to shake the ruler and cause him to be fearful.

Another chapter entitled "Ten Errors" discusses tendencies commonly found among rulers that lead to their destruction and may therefore be profitably exploited, often as previously outlined, such as being obsessed with profit, indulging in mu-sic, and losing oneself in sexual pleasure. However, one section known as "The Difficulties of Persuasion" ventures even farther into the detailed psychology of affecting powerful individuals, not just through their vices and inclinations, but through the very techniques employed in speaking to them, in manipulating and cajoling them through ostensibly disinterested proposals and admonitions. Virtually all the techniques explicated in this unique chapter can be abstracted from the initial context--ex-ercising one's persuasion upon a ruler--and applied to any sit-uation where the speaker seeks some objective, whether the target holds a high rank and exercises power or not. 5 Such has been the practice and thrust of modern books oriented to business, management, plots, and schemes in China, not to mention traditional thinkers interested in subversive opera-tions and clandestine conversions.

The difficulty in persuading others doesn't lie in having the knowledge to affect them, the disputational skills to illuminate one's ideas, or the daring to venture widely and exhaust one's views. Rather, the difficulty in persuading others lies in know-ing their minds and crafting arguments that conform to them.

If they are motivated by lofty reputation but you discuss abun-dant profits, you will be seen as vulgar, treated humbly and disdainfully, and certainly cast far away. If they are motivated by abundant profits but you discuss ways to achieve a lofty reputation, you will be seen as mindless and unrealistic, and will certainly not be accepted. If they are secretly motivated by abundant profits while conspicuously claiming to be interested in achieving a lofty reputation and you discuss name and repu-tation, they will visibly accept you but actually be distant. How- 

ever, if you discuss abundant profits, they will secretly employ your words but visibly cast you aside. These must be investi-gated.

Affairs achieve success through secrecy; discussions that leak them out will fail. It is not necessary that others allow some-thing to be leaked out, for if your words touch upon some con-cealed matter, you will be endangered. If they conspicuously undertake some project while actually seeking to achieve some-thing very different, should you happen to know not only what they purport

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to be undertaking but also what they are actually doing, you will be endangered. If you devise some extraordinary plan that gains acceptance but is guessed by some perspicacious out-sider who then divulges it to the world at large, it will certainly appear that you revealed it, and you will be endangered.

If you do not yet generously enjoy someone's confidence and beneficence, yet have exhausted your profundity, should your advice be successfully employed, you will be shunned, but if it is not employed and they moreover suffer some reversal, you will be doubted and endangered.

If someone powerful shows the beginnings of misbehavior and you discourse upon ritual and righteousness in order to illumi-nate their flaws, you will be endangered. If someone powerful acquires a plan and wants to claim the resulting achievements for themselves, should they realize you know it, you will be en-dangered.

If you coerce people to either undertake or cease something that they cannot, you will be endangered.

If you speak with people about great men, they will assume you are disparaging them. If you speak with them about common men, they will assume you are currying favor. If you discuss what they love, they will assume you are trying to exploit their inclinations; if you discuss what they hate, they will assume you are testing them. 

If you are direct and sparse in your discussions, they will as-sume you are ignorant and treat you as blundering, but if you discourse eloquently in both breadth and detail, they will as-sume you are loquacious and jumbled. If you focus on the es-sentials in outlining your ideas, they will assume you are timid and inadequately express your subject, but if you contemplate them from every aspect, they will assume you are rustic but conceited. You must be aware of these difficulties. 6 The essence of persuading others lies in knowing how to magnify aspects the person boasts about and eliminate those he is ashamed of. If they feel urgently about something, you should strongly encourage it in terms of its public benefits and right-eousness. If their intentions are vile but cannot be abandoned, you should embellish the attractive aspects and hardly speak about not doing them. If they have admirable aims in mind but are incapable of actually realizing them, you should raise the negative aspects of such aims and point out the bad points, making much of not doing them.

If they want to boast of their wisdom and talents, then bring up some distinct but similar affairs and provide numerous steps so

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that they become material for their discussions with you. Then you can feign ignorance while still introducing your knowledge.

If you want your words to be accepted and preserved, you must embellish and clearly expound them while also subtly showing that they coincide with the listeners' selfish aims. If you want to expound against dangerous and harmful matters, you must conspicuously make their destructive and chastising aspects visible while also subtly showing that they entail personal harm as well.

Praise others who act similarly, acclaim as extraordinary any affairs coinciding with their plans. Identical defects should be energetically shrugged off as innocuous, common defeats dis-missed as entailing no loss. If the listeners believe themselves powerful, do not cramp them by revisiting past difficulties. If they view themselves as courageous and decisive, do not pro- 

voke them with their failures. If they regard themselves as wise strategists, do not subvert them with their defeats.

If you eliminate all antagonisms from your core ideas and rid your language of all irritants, you will be able to fully exploit your wisdom and sophistry. This is the Tao for becoming inti-mate with people, winning their confidence, and fully exhaust-ing your persuasion unquestioned.

Interestingly, Hsün-tzu ( Han Fei-tzu's own teacher) offered an appraisal of five types of ministers that, although somewhat simplistic and certainly defined against the basic values of Confucianism, broadly characterized the nature of most offi-cials and thus identified those marked by tendencies that might be exploited for covert purposes. Although certain traits are isolated, it is the general concept that is important.

Nominal Ministers: Internally they are incapable of unifying the state's populace, externally unable to keep hardship away. They do not attract the allegiance of the hundred surnames. The feudal lords do not trust them, but with artful and clever ways and obsequious speech they excel at gaining the ruler's favor.

Grasping Ministers: Above they are not loyal to the ruler, below they excel at gaining the approbation of the people. They have no concern for the public good or effecting righteousness, but form cliques and parties in order to delude the ruler. They con-centrate upon selfish planning.

Meritorious Ministers: Internally they are capable of unifying the state's populace, externally they keep hardship distant. The

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people give their allegiance to them and officials trust them. Above they are loyal to the ruler, below they love the hundred surnames untiringly.

Sagacious Ministers: Above they are able to make the ruler honored, below they can love the people. Their administrative orders transform the people, being a model followed just like a 

shadow. They respond to sudden change and master transfor-mation as sensitively as an echo responding to its sound. From categories and associations they realize ways to contend with the extraordinary, completing every affair and governing the [Heavenly] emblems. 7

Obviously the first two categories represent attractive targets for recruiting informants and subversives, preying upon their self-interest and fundamental disloyalty.

Li Ch'uan's famous T'ang dynasty military classic, the T'ai-pai Yin- ching, 8 probably composed in the latter part of the eighth century, contains two chapters that rigorously apply many of the principles already seen, as well as provide evidence that troubling issues of evaluation and fathoming had not been dis-missed from consciousness. Although not directed toward se-lecting spies, his chapter on analyzing men through their gen-eral appearance, appropriately entitled "Scrutinizing Men," illus-trates another approach to selecting and employing men, in-cluding generals and agents. Although not as extreme an ap-proach as physiognomy, which enjoyed great popularity and became more detailed with the passing of centuries, it repre-sents a shift in that direction and no doubt reflects the general approach seen in Liu Shao's Jen-wu Chih characterizations. Particularly important is Li Ch'uan's clear statement of the transparency principle-- "observing their exterior is sufficient to know their interior"--commencing the chapter:

As for men, observing their exterior is sufficient to know their interior. The seven orifices of the head are the gates and doors to the five viscera. Thus all the aspects of the head and the prominence of the forehead, nose, and chin define the face's features. The appearance of wisdom or stupidity, courage or fear is expressed by a single inch of eyes. From the indications of Heaven and markings of wealth they are separated into no-ble and ignoble, poor and rich.

Now if you want to entrust a general with command, first ob-serve his facial appearance and afterward know his mind. The method for determining an abundance of spirit: His facial ex- 

pression is grave and dignified; he is marked by integrity and energy;

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his intentions are unaffected by the pleasures of music or the allure of sex; his principles of self-cultivation are unchanged by prosperity or adversity. This is termed "an abundance of spirit."

The method for determining a corpuscular abundance: The top of the head is abundant and broad; the belly, thick; the nose, straight but rounded at the end; the mouth, square and pro-truding; the chin and forehead closing toward each other; high cheek- bones and ears; excessively corpulent; coarse bones that, however, are not visible; eyebrows and eyes bright and clear; hands and feet fresh red. When he looks down on inferi-ors, he seems tall, but compared to the great he is solitary and small. This is termed "an abundance of physique."

An abundance of heart: He conceals the evil in others and raises their good points, puts himself last and others first, does not deprecate others in order to make himself seem worthy, or endanger other men to make himself secure. He performs un-seen acts of Virtue, always preserves loyalty and sincerity, is liberal and magnanimous, unconcerned by petty morality. This is an abundance of heart.

The three portraits strongly echo the "Offices of King Wen" and perhaps reflect the concepts of Virtue found in the characteri-zations of Confucius's disciples, as well as the famous "Nine Virtues" of the Shang Shu. Although the chapter entitled "Nu-merous Methods for Probing the Mind" focuses upon evaluating and controlling men in general, 9 the passages also make up a primer on controlling spies and were subsequently quoted in this application:

In antiquity neighboring states could see each other's signal fires and hear the sounds of each other's chickens and dogs, but their footsteps never encroached upon each other's borders or the tracks of their wagons meet a thousand kilometers away. They preserved life through the Tao, tranquilized their bodies with Virtue, and the people took pleasure in their dwellings. 

Later, when the winds of degeneracy arose, purity and simplic-ity dispersed. Authority and wisdom were employed, prevarica-tion and artifice were born. Neighboring states used spies in their intercourse with each other, the Vertical and Horizontal Alliances employed forceful persuaders. The state of Hsü cleaved to benevolence and righteousness, but its altars were laid waste, the state of Lu esteemed Confucianism and Mo-hism, but their ancestral temples were destroyed. 10

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Unless you penetrate the mysterious and know the subtle, you will not be able to resist your enemies. Unless you exert your mind and trouble your thoughts, you will not be able to pene-trate the source of affairs. Unless you can always distinguish the real and false, you will not be able to achieve fame. If you are not perspicacious about talent, you will not be able to em-ploy the military. If you cannot discern loyalty and disloyalty, you will never be able to judge men. For this reason Master Kuei-ku secretly composed his chapters on verbal persuasion, instigation, and disputation to instruct the famous Warring States strategists Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, who then wandered among the six states, probed the minds of the feudal lords, and implemented his techniques.

In general, to employ the techniques of mental probing, begin by intermixing and inclusively speaking about the Tao, Virtue, benevolence, righteousness, the rites, music, loyalty, trust, the Book of Odes, the Book of Documents, the Tso Chuan, the philosophers, histories, plots and stratagems, successes and failures. Settle the subject's mind; tranquilize his intentions; spy out his emotions, what he loves and hates, likes and dis-likes. Employ his desires to attack him. Secretly ponder but outwardly express something different in order to approach him with specious words while he responds sincerely. Then compare his mind and his appearance, listen to his sounds, and investigate his words. If his speech does not cohere with them, turn about and seek out the truth. When he has truly been forced to respond, you will have fathomed his mind. Then turn again to strike at his meaning, and if query and response have no gap, if they cohere tightly, bind him closely, do not let 

him reverse anything, like Yang Yu grasping his bow or Feng Meng taking up an arrow, never missing in a hundred shots. Just as snares and traps are set to catch fish or rabbits, once the prey have been trapped, even though they bang about, they merely get hung up in the netting and none escape.

Now to probe the mind of the benevolent, you must employ sin-cerity, not wealth. To probe the heart of a courageous warrior, you must employ righteousness, not fear. To probe the mind of a wise officer, you must employ loyalty, not deceit. To probe the mind of a stupid man, you must use obscurity, not brightness. To probe the mind of a menial man, you must employ fear, not ordinary virtue. To probe the mind of the greedy, you must em-ploy bribes, not integrity.

Now when you speak with the wise, you should rely on erudi-tion because wisdom has limits, whereas erudition has none. Therefore the wise will not be able to fathom such breadth.

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When you speak with the erudite, rely upon disputation. The erudite take antiquity as their teachers, but disputation re-sponds to the present, so the erudite are unable to respond to such facileness. When you speak with the noble, rely upon po-litical power, for although the noble have high position, they are controlled through power. Even position cannot stop power.

When you speak with the wealthy, rely upon things. When the rich accumulate wealth, they can acquire treasures, but even their wealth proves inadequate to acquire great treasures.

When you speak with the poor, rely upon profits. The poor suf-fer from want and impoverishment while great profits can pro-vide abundant aid. The impoverished lack the means to provide aid of any magnitude.

When you speak with the lowly, rely upon deference because the lowly rank below other men. By deferring to them, the lowly will not be able to speak about humbleness. 

When you speak with the courageous, rely upon daring be-cause the courageous dare to be firm and resolute. Then the courageous will not be able to monopolize firmness.

When you speak with the stupid, rely upon sharpness because the stupid are simple and substantial, while sharpness is bril-liant and enlightened. Then the stupid will not be able to inves-tigate the intelligent.

These eight are all founded upon their similarity in the Tao but differ in their final expression. By employing the Tao of what people want to hear but making the end expression different, even though they listen, they will fall to understand. 11 In this fashion they are unable to fathom the shallow or deep. Thus I am able to go out where there is no chink and enter where there is no gate. I can go alone and come alone, sometimes hor-izontally, sometimes vertically. It is just like bending dry grass over--if I bend it eastward, it goes east; westward, it goes west--or like stopping up the river's current so that when the dam is broken, it flows, but when obstructed, it ceases. What worry is there that a plan will not be followed?

Now the Tao esteems controlling men, not being controlled by men. Those who control others take hold of authority, those who are controlled by others comply with their commands. The technique for controlling others is to avoid strength and attack weakness while displaying your own strength and concealing your shortcomings. Thus when animals move, they first strike with their claws and teeth; when birds move, they will invari-ably em

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ploy their beaks and talons; when insects and snakes move, they will always employ poison; and when shelled creatures move, they use their shells for protection. Since all the wild creatures employ their strengths to wrest control over other an-imals, how much more so the wise? 12

Now if people like to discuss the Tao and Virtue, you must break them with benevolence and righteousness. Those who like to speak about the ways of Confucianism and Mohism 

must be controlled with theories of the Horizontal and Vertical Alliances. Those who like to speak about laws and regulations must be suppressed with techniques and authority. You must exploit their beginnings, accord with their conclusions, destroy their teeth, and force their horns down, never letting them es-cape your control. Thereafter gradually speak about either glee-ful or depressing affairs to make them happy or trouble their hearts, causing their spirits to be unable to act as masters of their minds. Discussions focused on longevity, tranquillity, pleasure, riches, nobility, honor, glory, music, and sex are joy-ful. Death, perishing, depression, misfortune, poverty, mean condition, bitterness, insults, punishment, execution, and fines all involve words concerned with mourning. When you speak to the noble with such words of mourning, they will grieve, whereas if you speak to the lowly about gleeful affairs, they will be pleased. Take command of their minds, respond to their thoughts, sometimes auspiciously, sometimes balefully, in or-der to effect a response in their intentions. 13 Their emotions will change within, their appearance will alter without. Con-stantly observe their external manifestations in order to discern what they conceal, for this is termed "the technique for fathom-ing the hidden and probing the mind." Even though one pos-sesses the Tao of the former kings, the methods of the Sages and the Wise, without this technique even they would be inade-quate to achieve the objective of hegemony over the realm.

Although clearly reflecting both lessons and techniques derived from Han Fei-tzu's chapters, Li Ch'uan's approach might well be characterized as more aggressive, unrelenting, even brutal, assaulting the target both directly and indirectly to simultane-ously fathom and convert, to both structure and control.

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14 Political Intelligence

DURING THE SPRING AND AUTUMN and Warring States peri-ods, when a state's very existence depended upon anticipating and fathoming one's enemies, political consciousness and its derivative, intelligence, permeated every realm. This produced a 

diffuse, generally high level of common knowledge--accurate or not--about political events, terrain characteristics, and "na-tional character" that functioned as the basis for more con-crete, data-driven analyses in the immediacy of a crisis. Evi-dence for this at the end of the Spring and Autumn period may be seen in the way even Confucius suited his teachings to par-ticularized political situations:

Tzu Kung said: " DukeYeh of Ching inquired about government and you said, 'Government consists in treating those close by well and attracting the distant.'1 Duke Ai of Lu inquired about government and you said, 'Government lies in controlling your ministers.'2 Duke Ching of Ch'i asked about government and you said, 'Government lies in constraining one's expenditures.' Three rulers inquired about government and your reply differed each time. Do governments differ?"

Confucius replied: "Now Ching's territory is broad but its capi-tal narrow and the people have wills that are difficult to govern, so I said, 'Government consists in treating those close by well and attracting the distant.' Duke Ai of Lu has three ministers who internally form cliques to delude him and externally ob-struct the visits of foreign diplomats in order to occlude his en-lightenment, so I said, 'Government lies in controlling your ministers.' Duke Ching of Ch'i is extravagant in building towers and dissipates himself in parks and gardens. He is constricted by the pleasures of his five senses, and in one morning awarded a hundred chariots each to three families. Thus I said, 'Government lies in constrain

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ing one's expenditures.' Looking into what these three rulers desire, can their governments be identical!?"3

Three categories of material provide sources for studying China's traditional practices in gathering and analyzing what might be broadly defined as political information: historical works, the writings of philosophic and political thinkers, and the extant military texts. Moreover, the numerous "case stud-ies" found embedded in works such as the Tso Chuan and the 

Twenty-five Dynastic Histories are particularly valuable be-cause they provide parameters whose reliability has been at-tested, inaccurate evaluations simply never being perpetuated except when leading to horrendous defeats. However, political analyses of other states, whether examinations of actual states or merely abstract lists of strengths and weaknesses for con-ducting such evaluations, are virtually absent from the military writings. Among the massive Seven Military Classics only se-lected passages in the Three Strategies, "Honoring the Worthy" in the Six Secret Teachings, and "Evaluating the Enemy" in the Wu-tzu provide useful observations. Because the post-Han tac-tical writings focus on terrain, enemy strength, and other mili-tary issues, they are similarly silent, except for an occasional observation or two simply repeated from the classics. However, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods-- when China consisted of states much like Europe at the turn of the twentieth century--political intelligence was much valued, and undertaken ultimately for military purposes, including thwart-ing the enemy's plans, as Sun-tzu advocated.

Historical Episodes and Their Significance

One of the fundamental assumptions underpinning virtually every political evaluation in the early Chou period was that the presence of "Worthies" in any government--men of great talent and, more important, surpassing moral self-cultivation--was essentially an ironclad guarantee of the ruler's excellence and government's stability. Although this should already be appar-ent from the passages reprised in the historical sections, a se-ries of illustrations from well-known texts, often integrated within chapters attempting to adduce sufficient examples to "prove" a political or philosophical point, will further define the essential principle in its concrete variations and surprising complexity when other factors intervene. The first example, from the Shuo Yüan, describes a typical political mission un-dertaken to ascertain the viability of military attack. The actual evaluation focuses on

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government, rather than military, readiness, showing the two were regarded as inherently one prior to actual battlefield con-frontations:

Wanting to attack Chin, King Chuang [reigned 613-591 B.C.] of Ch'u dispatched Chu Yin to conduct observations there. Upon his return Chuo reported: "They cannot be attacked. Worry be-sets the ruler while the people enjoy pleasure. Moreover, they have a worthy minister, Ch'en Chü." A year later the king again dispatched Chuo to conduct similar observations and he re-turned with his conclusion: "They can be attacked. Ch'en Chü has died, there are many sycophants and toadies in the court, and the ruler loves pleasure and has abandoned the proper forms of behavior. The people below are endangered and angry at the ruler. Upper and lower are thus estranged, so if you at-tack the state, the people will rebel." King Chuang followed his advice, the result being as predicted. 4

The absence of a single Worthy apparently freed the ruler to in-dulge his latent desires, propelling the state into an easily ex-ploited catastrophic situation.

A Spring and Autumn observational mission cited in the same Shuo Yüan chapter shows how the emissary's conclusions might also be applied reflexively: 5

Duke P'ing of Chin [reigned 557-532 B.C.] dispatched Shu Hsiang on a friendly mission of inquiry to the state of Wu, where the people of Wu dragged a boat across land to meet him. On the left of it were five hundred men, on the right five hundred. They wore embroidered leopard coats and brocaded fox jackets. Shu Hsiang returned to Chin and reported this to Duke P'ing, who said: " Wu will certainly perish! Do they re-spect boats or people?"

Shu Hsiang replied: "Your majesty is presently constructing the Chih-ti tower, so how will you be able to send forth a thousand soldiers? Will you set out your bells and drums in formation? When the feudal lords hear about your majesty, they will ask, 'Does he respect towers or people?' You only differ in what you value." Thereupon the duke ceased the tower's construction. 

As previously seen, near the end of the Spring and Autumn pe-riod Confucius's presence became an important sign of moral excellence, or at least apparent revival:

Chao Chien-tzu, being about to mount a sudden attack on Wei, had Shih An go to observe them. He left in January and re-turned in June. Chien-tzu asked, "Why did it take so long?"

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Shih An replied: "Planning to gain some advantage but instead suffering harm stems from not investigating properly. Right now Chü Po-yü is prime minister and Shih Yü is assisting him. Confucius is a guest, while Tzu Kung implements orders before the ruler and is much listened to. The I Ching states, 'He dis-perses the gathered herd, primordial auspiciousness!' This dis-persing refers to the presence of Worthies, whereas the herd refers to the masses. The primordial is the beginning of good fortune. 'Dispersing the herd, primordial good fortune' means there are numerous worthy associates." Chien-tzu stayed his army and made no further movement. 6

Shu Hsiang's citation of the I Ching illustrates how the text was often employed, not to mention contorted, to buttress argu-ments, even though the original--the hexagram Huan--is not particularly auspicious. 7

Another example from late in the Spring and Autumn period of an emissary gathering information to determine whether a state might be attacked again finds the presence of a benevo-lent, exemplary official a sufficient deterrent:

Ch'u dispatched Shih Yin-ch'ih as an emissary to Sung, where the prime minister, Tzu Han, feasted him. The walls of the house south of Tzu Han's mansion stuck out precipitously and were not straight, while the water channel for the house of the left passed through his mansion. Shih Yin-ch'ih queried Tzu Han as to the reason for these oddities, who replied: "The dwelling to the south is the home of shoemakers. I was going to move them, but his father said, 'We have been earning our livelihood from shoes for three generations. If you now move us, those people in Sung who wish to buy shoes will not know 

our location and we will starve. I hope that the prime minister will be concerned that we will not eat.' This is the reason for his walls being like this. The house to the west lies on higher ter-rain than my mansion, which is lower. To have the water chan-nel pass through it is advantageous, so I did not prohibit it."

When Shih Yin-ch'ih returned to Ch'u, the king was just about to mobilize the army to attack Sung. Shih advised against it, saying: "Sung cannot yet be attacked. Their ruler is worthy, the prime minister benevolent. The Worthy can win the people, the benevolent can employ them. If Ch'u attacks, will we not fail and be laughed at by everyone?" For this reason the king aban-doned their attack on Sung and struck Cheng instead.

When Confucius heard about this incident, he said: "Cultivat-ing oneself in the upper chambers of the court and thereby

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thwarting attacks a thousand kilometers off, doesn't this refer to Tzu Han?" Sung lies amid three great states of ten thousand chariots each, but during Tzu Han's era none of them made any incursions, while the borders benefited on all four sides. He served as prime minister to Dukes P'ing, Yüan, and Ching, and to the end of his life didn't he truly maintain his benevo-lence and the constraints of moral behavior! Thus the achieve-ments of benevolence and constraint are great. 8

Other factors had to be pondered when evaluating enemy states, including their material prosperity and control of the populace. Under the old system of imperial inspections that re-portedly occurred either every five or twelve years, certain as-pects of state government and behavior were examined to de-termine whether the ruler should be censured or rewarded. This Shuo Yüan recounting, although a later idealization, re-flects the values felt to be important in the Warring States, even examining the material goods available and the songs (or Odes) of the state:

In the spring the Son of Heaven examined the planting and supplemented what was insufficient. In the fall he examined the harvests, assisting those in need. Circuits of inspection 

were made every five years, going east in the second month as far as the eastern peaks where a wooden pyre would be burnt in respect to the spirits of the mountains and rivers. He would interview the feudal lords and ask about anyone a hundred years old. He would order the Grand Tutor to have the state's Odes performed in order to observe their customs and direct that goods be brought in from the markets to discover what the people liked and disliked, to see if they were licentious and dis-solute. He ordered the performance of their rites and examined the calendar and days set for fundamental activities; unified the laws, rites, music, and regulations; and corrected the sumptuary restrictions. Anyone who failed to respect the spirits of the mountains and rivers and offer sacrifice to them was deemed irreverent and accordingly demoted. Anyone whose an-cestral temples were marked by contention was deemed unfilial and their lands were reduced. Anyone who benefited the people had their lands increased.

When he entered the borders, those who were opening unused lands, who respected the old and honored worthies, were con-gratulated and had their lands increased. However, if he en-tered their borders and found that the fields were becoming overgrown, they neglected their elderly, lost their Worthies, and arrogant and op

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pressive men were on the throne, they were fined and their lands reduced. If they failed to attend court after their ranks had been reduced, their lands were reduced again. A third time and the six armies were sent forth to rectify them. In the fifth month of an inspection year the emperor made a circuit to the south, venturing as far as the southern peaks, where he re-peated the same ceremonies as in the east. In the eighth month he traveled to the west as far as the western peaks and again repeated the same ceremonies, and in the eleventh month went to the north and performed the same ceremonies.

Tan Hsiang's mission, previously translated in the Spring and Autumn section, provides another concrete illustration of em-phasizing the vital activities of agriculture and public works, 

communal efforts essential to the state's economic and military survival, in evaluating.

The presence of Worthies was not unequivocally felt to be a valid indication of a state's strength, as the views of Han Fei-tzu and Huai Nan-tzu will show. Moreover, conflict between embarrassment at serving the unrighteous during an age of corruption and decline and compassionate impulses to aid the people and reform the government frequently perturbed the Worthy. Although many became recluses or exiles, others em-braced the view that the misdeeds and perversity of others can-not contaminate anyone who perfects himself. Thus care had to be exercised in assessing the motivations of highly visible moral paragons and determining whether they were merely "window dressing" or actually able to affect the government. A story found in the eclectic Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu indicates the val-ues an official might employ in deciding whether to undertake administrative responsibilities in a state:

Pai Kuei of Wei went to the state of Chung-shan, where the king wanted to retain him, but he forcefully declined, ascended his carriage, and went off. Then he ventured to Ch'i, where the king also wanted to retain and employ him, but he again de-clined and departed. Someone asked him why he had not re-mained in either state, to which he replied: "Both of them are about to perish. They show all five signs that I once learned in-dicate exhaustion."

"What are these five exhaustions?"

He replied: "When certainty does not exist, credibility is ex-hausted. When praise is absent, fame is exhausted. When there is no love, intimacy is exhausted. When travelers lack provisions and inhabitants lack food, resources are exhausted. When they can employ neither men nor themselves, achieve-ments are ex

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hausted. When a state has these five, without good luck they will certainly perish. Chung-shan and Ch'i are both in this sit-uation."9 

Pai Kuei apparently made these astute observations in the very last years of the fourth century B.C. Shortly thereafter Chung-shan was in fact exterminated, and little more than a decade later Yen, under Yüeh Yi's command, overran Ch'i and nearly extinguished it before Yüeh Yi was foolishly recalled (as seen in the introductory section on the history of the Warring States period).

Pai Kuei was not the only official capable of deciding that Chung- shan was about to perish:

Chin's Grand Historian, observing the state's chaos, the duke's arrogance, and his lack of virtue and righteousness, took the state's records and went to Chou. Duke Wei saw him in audi-ence and inquired, "Among the states under Heaven, who will perish first?" He replied, "Chin will perish first."

Duke Wei asked for an explanation, to which the Grand Histo-rian replied: "I did not dare speak out honestly, so I showed the duke some extraordinary phenomenal events. I said that the revolutions of the stars and planets were not correct, to which he inquired, 'Why is it so?' I showed him that affairs in the hu-man realm were mostly unrighteous, that the common people bore him great enmity, to which he asked, 'What harm is there in this?' I showed him that neighboring states were not sub-missive, that the Worthy and good were not allying themselves with the state, to which he inquired, 'What disadvantage is there in this?' Since he does not know how states are preserved or perish, your servant says Chin will perish first." After three years Chin did in fact perish. 10

Duke Wei again saw the Grand Historian in audience and in-quired, "Who will follow?""Chung-shan will be next." The duke inquired about the reason, to which he replied: "When Heaven gave birth to men, it caused them to have distinctions. Such distinctions constitute man's righteousness, the way in which men are distinguished from the animals, and why rulers and subjects, the positions of superior and inferior, were estab-lished. The custom in Chung-shan is to take day as night, while night continues day, and men and women licentiously in-termix without cessation. They are promiscuous, confused, be- 

sotted with pleasure, and enamored of singing mournful tunes, yet the ruler does not know that it is evil, that this is the style of a lost state. Therefore I say that Chung-shan will be next." After two years Chung-shan indeed perished.

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Duke Wei again interviewed the Grand Historian and asked, "Who will follow?" The Grand Historian did not reply. The duke persisted, so he finally said, "You will." Terrified, Duke Wei sought out the state's elders, ceremoniously brought in two fa-mous Worthies, and added two others to sharply remonstrate with him about his transgressions. He dispensed with thir-

ty-nine onerous laws and then informed the Grand Historian of his actions.

The latter observed: "The state will survive until the end of your life. Your subject has heard that when a state is about to flour-ish, Heaven will send worthy men and others who will sharply remonstrate, but when a state is about to perish, Heaven sends sycophants and men who bring chaos."11 After Duke Wei died, his body went uninterred for nine months. Chou then split into two. 12

Someone holding the post of Grand Historian, familiar with the state's history, as well as that of neighboring states, would pre-sumably be well qualified to discern trends inimical to survival. Although he clearly deemed the absence of worthy men para-mount, debauched extravagance, such as marked the demise of the Hsia and Shang, was viewed as a prominent, irrefutable indicator throughout Chinese history, particularly when day and night were inverted. Consequently, in accord with such foresight two ancient historians were also portrayed as aban-doning their governments in incidents that not only illustrate the important role of defectors and the sort of critical informa-tion they might convey, but also essentially justify such betray-als in terms of a greater righteousness:

Near the end of the Hsia dynasty the T'ai-shih-ling Chung Ku, settling the laws, registers, and seals of state out before him, wept because King Chieh had become extremely deluded, per- 

verse, and brutal. Therefore Chung Ku took them and fled to the state of Shang. King T'ang of Shang, elated, announced to the feudal lords: "The king of the Hsia has abandoned the Tao, is brutal and oppressive to the people, steals their fathers and brothers, shames his meritorious officials, slights good and worthy men, casts aside the righteous, and listens to syco-phants. The masses are stirred to resentment, and his minis-ters who uphold the laws have fled of their own accord to Shang!"

Centuries later, Shang Nei-shih, Hsiang-chi, saw that King Chou was becoming increasingly confused and deluded, so fled to the state of Chou with their records and canons of state. King Wu, greatly elated, said to the feudal lords: "The king of the Shang is

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very confused, and has sunk into debauchery. He keeps Chi-tzu distant but brings women and menials near. His consort Tan Yi controls the government, rewards and punishments are implemented without principle, they do not employ the method of laws, and they have executed three famous Worthies, al-though innocent of any crime. The people are very disaffected, the ministers who uphold the laws have fled to Chou."13

In both cases essential documents, such as population regis-ters and vital information about cities and towns, were fur-nished to a more righteous leader. Presumably military, as well as administrative, information was thereby acquired, although adherence to the canons of morality should have precluded the defectors acting inimically to the interests of one state. How-ever, their mere defection confirmed the premise that the de-parture of Worthies marked a doomed state.

Remarkably, despite living in an age of disorder, the literati deemphasized the martial in comparison with civil righteous-ness, and their viewpoint severely affected the analytic process, as the following episode indicates:

Wu Chi-tzu traveled to Chin and, upon entering their borders, exclaimed, "Alas, this is a brutal state!" When he entered the 

capital he exclaimed, "Ah, this is a state whose strength is ex-hausted!" When he entered the court he remarked, "This is a chaotic state!" His followers inquired, "Since you have just re-cently crossed the borders, how can you identify these charac-teristics without any doubt?"

Wu Chi-tzu replied: "When I entered the borders, I saw that the fields had become overgrown with tall weeds and were not be-ing maintained. From this I knew that the government was brutal. When I entered the capital, I observed that their new dwellings were rustic but the old ones beautiful, that the new walls were low but the old ones high, from which I knew that the strength of the people is exhausted. 14 When I stood in their court, I noticed that the ruler merely looked on without making any inquiries, while his ministers excelled at attacking each other, yet offered no remonstrance. From this I knew that the state had fallen into chaos.

The reason Ch'i is not as well ordered as Lu is that the T'ai Kung was not as worthy as Ch'in Po, the Duke of Chou's son. Three years after both of them had been enfeoffed and begun ruling their states, the T'ai Kung went to court to have an audi-ence. The Duke of Chou asked, "What do you consider impor-tant in

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governing?" He replied, "Honoring the worthy, giving priority to the distant and putting relatives second, putting righteousness first and benevolence second." These are the signs of a hege-mon, so the Duke of Chou said, "Your influence will extend down five generations." Five years after they were both enfe-offed, Ch'in Po came to the court for an audience and the Duke of Chou similarly asked what he considered the most difficult aspect of governing. Ch'in Po replied, "Being intimate with one's relatives, putting those within first and those outside second, placing benevolence first and righteousness second." These are the signs of true kingship, so the Duke of Chou said, " Lu's in-fluence will extend ten generations." Thus Lu has the trappings of kingly rule and benevolence is emphasized, but Ch'i has a hegemon's heritage, a martial administration. That Ch'i is not 

equal to Lu stems from the T'ai Kung not having been as wor-thy as Ch'in Po. 15

The impact of this deprecatory attitude toward martial values exerted a monumental, highly subversive impact on China over the millennia, causing it to underestimate the capabilities and endurance of more warlike peoples, including the Ch'in in the Warring States period and the steppe peoples throughout the imperial age.

Since the ruling clan would ultimately set the state's style and administration, its vulnerability might be determined by exam-ining the ruler's tastes and behavior:

Having destroyed Yüeh, King Fu-ch'ai of Wu was about to at-tack Ch'en. Ch'u's high officials, afraid, all said: "Previously King Ho- lü, being able to well employ his masses, badly de-feated us at Po- chü. Now we have learned that Fu-ch'ai is even more fierce."

Tzu Hsi said: "Too bad you cannot act together more often. There is nothing to fear from Wu. Previously King Ho-lü never enjoyed two flavors in his dishes, arrayed double mats in his dwelling, or chose things requiring great expenditures. When-ever the state suffered from disaster or his relatives from want, he supplied their needs. When commanding the army, he never ate until more than half the men had received hot food. What-ever he enjoyed the troops did also. For this reason the people never felt tired and knew that if they died, they would not be abandoned in the wilds. However, today King Fu-ch'ai must have towers and pools constructed wherever he stops, and con-cubines and female attendants to wait upon him in his lodg-ings. Whatever he desires during his daily travels must be com-pleted at once. Whatever amusements he wishes to pursue must be followed, so rarities and

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curios are gathered for him. King Fu-ch'ai will first defeat him-self, so how will be able to defeat us?"16 

King Ho-lü's selfless behavior when in command of the army well cohered with the ideals advanced in such subsequent mili-tary classics as the Wu-tzu, which felt that the ideal comman-der shared every hardship with his men and led by personal example rather than simply remaining aloof in remote comfort.

Veteran diplomats attained great skill in contextually discern-ing motivation, critical to avoid being blindly manipulated to another state's advantage. The Han Fei-tzu preserves numerous examples of such skill in evaluating foreign rulers:

When Ch'i attacked Sung, Sung dispatched Tsang Sun-tzu south to beg assistance from Ch'u. The king of Ch'u, greatly elated, agreed to provide it and was very encouraging. Much troubled, Tsang returned to Sung. En route his driver asked, "You gained what you sought, so why do you have a troubled countenance?"

Tsang replied: " Sung is small state and Ch'i a large one. Of-fending a large state while rescuing a small one is something that rulers worry about, yet the king of Ch'u was elated. He must want to stiffen our resolve, for if we strongly resist, Ch'i will be enervated to Ch'u's advantage." Following his return to Sung, Ch'i went on to seize five cities, but Ch'u's rescue forces never arrived. 17

Furthermore, valuable intelligence was also derived by astutely interpreting concrete observations:

King Chao of Ch'in [reigned 306-251 B.C.], in the midst of holding court, sighed and said: " Ch'u's swords are extremely sharp, but their entertainers are rustic. When swords are sharp, warriors are mostly impetuous and courageous, and when their entertainers are rustic, their thoughts are far-reach-ing. I am afraid that Ch'u is plotting against us." This is termed "thinking about misfortune during times of blessing, and not forgetting disaster during times of security," so it is appropriate that he attained the rank of hegemon. 18

Observations of the ruler, the state's conditions, and the pres-ence or absence of worthy officials and advisers thus formed 

the basis for assessing the enemy's condition and capabilities, according to early historical writings.

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Political Evaluation in the Military Writings

Information about the enemy, however acquired, remains use-less without a set of parameters or beliefs by which to interpret it. Although several philosophically distinct approaches to statecraft contended for dominance over the centuries, China's central government and administrative apparatus were largely marked by severe policies derived mainly from Legalism con-joined with an ostensibly Confucian outlook. Even though the military writers embraced similar views-- emphasizing the peo-ple's welfare, including low taxes, combined with strict organi-zation and a draconian legal edifice--they all discerned certain particulars in character evaluation, administrative overview, government effectiveness, population disaffection, and signs of chaos and deprivation that marked weaknesses in the enemy. The most detailed series is preserved in the Three Strategies, perhaps reflecting the rise and precipitous demise of the Ch'in dynasty, as well as the general heritage of the Warring States. Some are quoted from earlier works, long lost; others are ap-parently original with the author. As they are important for any understanding of the evaluative process and were well noted by later authors, a few examples may suffice to indicate their na-ture and range:

When a ruler's actions are cruelly violent, his subordinates will be hasty to implement harsh measures. When the taxes are onerous, impositions numerous, and fines and punishments endless while the people mutually injure and steal from each other, this is referred to as a "lost state."

When the secretly greedy display an external appearance of in-corruptibility; prevarication and praise can gain fame; bureau-crats steal from the state to distribute their own beneficence, causing confusion in the ranks; and people adorn themselves and feign the proper countenance in order to attain high office, this is referred to as "the beginning of thievery." 

If administrative officials form parties and cliques, each ad-vancing those with whom they are familiar; the state summons and appoints the evil and corrupt, while insulting and repress-ing the benevolent and Worthy; officials turn their backs on the state and establish their personal interests; and men of equal rank disparage each other, this is termed "the source of chaos."

When strong clans assemble the evil, people without position are honored, and there are none who are not shaken by their majesty; when these practices proliferate and are intertwined, they cultivate an image of Virtue, establishing it through public

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beneficence, and they snatch the authority belonging to those in official positions; when they insult the people below them and within the state there is clamoring and backbiting, while the ministers conceal themselves and remain silent, this is "causing chaos at the root."

Generation after generation they act treacherously, encroach-ing upon and stealing district offices. In advancing and retiring they seek only their own convenience, and they forge and dis-tort documents, thereby endangering the ruler. They are re-ferred to as "the state's treacherous ones."

When the officials are many but the people few; there is no dis-tinction between the honored and lowly; the strong and weak insult each other; and no one observes the prohibitions or ad-heres to the laws, then these effects will extend to the ruler, and the state will reap the misfortune.

When the ruler regards the good as good but doesn't advance them, while he hates the evil but doesn't dismiss them; when the Worthy are hidden and covered, while the unworthy hold positions, then the state will suffer harm.

When the branches [the ruler's relative] and leaves [the power-ful families] are strong and large, forming parties and occupy-ing positions of authority, so that the lowly and mean insult the honored, growing more powerful with the passing of time, 

while the ruler cannot bear to dismiss them, then the state will suffer defeat from it.

When deceitful ministers hold superior positions, the entire army will be clamoring and contentious. They rely on their awesomeness to grant personal favors and act in a manner that offends the masses. Advancement and dismissal lack any basis, the evil are not dismissed, and men seek gain with any appearance possible. They monopolize appointments for them-selves and in advancements and dismissals boast of their own merits. They slander and vilify those of great Virtue and make false accusations against the meritorious. Whether good or evil, all are treated the same by them. They gather and detain the affairs of government so that commands and orders are not put into effect. They create a harsh government, changing the ways of antiquity and altering what was common practice. When the ruler employs such wanton characters, he will certainly suffer disaster and calamity.

When evil men of courage praise each other, they obfuscate the ruler's wisdom. When both criticism and praise arise together, they stop up the ruler's wisdom. When each person praises those he favors, the ruler loses the loyal.

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Accordingly if the ruler investigates unusual words, he will dis-cover their beginnings. If he engages scholars and Worthies, then evil men of courage will withdraw. If the ruler appoints virtuous men of experience and age, the myriad affairs will be well managed. If he respectfully invites the recluses and hidden scholars to take positions, the officers will then fulfill their functions. If plans extend to the firewood carriers, achieve-ments will be predictable. If he does not lose the minds of the people, his Virtue will flourish. 19

Common problems identified in "Honoring the Worthy," a chap-ter of the Six Secret Teachings, equally serve as criteria for eval-uating states that are being undermined by their own, self-serving people: 

There are six thieves. First, if the ruler's subordinates build large palaces and mansions, pools and terraces, and amble about enjoying the pleasures of scenery and female musicians, it will injure the king's Virtue.

Second, when the people are not engaged in agriculture and sericulture, but instead give rein to their tempers and travel about as bravados, disdaining and transgressing the laws and prohibitions, not following the instructions of the officials, it harms the king's transforming influence.

Third, when officials form cliques and parties, obfuscating the Worthy and wise, obstructing the ruler's clarity, it injures the king's authority.

Fourth, when the knights are contrary-minded and conspicu-ously display "high moral standards," taking such behavior to be powerful expressions of their ch'i, and have private relation-ships with other feudal lords, slighting their own ruler, it in-jures the king's awesomeness.

Fifth, when subordinates disdain titles and positions, are con-temptuous of the administrators, and are ashamed to face hardship for their ruler, it injures the efforts of meritorious subordinates.

Sixth, when the strong clans encroach upon others, seizing what they want, insulting and ridiculing the poor and weak, it injures the work of the common people.

There are seven harms. First, men without knowledge or strate-gic planning ability are generously rewarded and honored with rank. Therefore the strong and courageous who regard war lightly take their chances in the field. The king must be careful not to employ them as generals.

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Second, they have reputation but lack substance. What they say is constantly shifting. They conceal the good and point out deficiencies. They view advancement and dismissal as a ques- 

tion of skill. The king should be careful not to make plans with them.

Third, they make their appearance simple, wear ugly clothes, speak about actionless action in order to seek fame, and talk about nondesire in order to gain profit. They are artificial men, and the king should be careful not to bring them near.

Fourth, they wear strange caps and belts, and their clothes are overflowing. They listen widely to the disputations of others and speak speciously about unrealistic ideas, displaying them as a sort of personal adornment. They dwell in poverty and live in tranquillity, deprecating the customs of the world. They are cunning people, and the king should be careful not to favor them.

Fifth, with slander, obsequiousness, and pandering they seek office and rank. They are courageous and daring, treating death lightly, out of their greed for salary and position. They are not concerned with major affairs, but move solely out of avarice. With lofty talk and specious discussions they please the ruler. The king should be careful not to employ them.

Sixth, they have buildings elaborately carved and inlaid. They promote artifice and flowery adornment to the injury of agricul-ture. They must be prohibited.

Seventh, they create magical formulas and weird techniques, practice sorcery and witchcraft, advance unorthodox ways, and circulate inauspicious sayings, confusing and befuddling the good people. The king must stop them.

Many of these practices appear among the criteria identified by Warring States thinkers as marks of a doomed state. The dia-bolical encouragement of extensive building projects was a hallmark of covert programs designed to subvert enemy states by exhausting their people and resources.

Political Intelligence in the Philosophical and Political Writings 

The political and philosophical writings of the Warring States period, such as the Hsün-tzu and Huai-nan Tzu, 20 preserve a few contemporary analyses of the extant states and the criteria by which they were judged. Hsün-tzu, despite his fervent belief in the efficacy of Virtue, formulated realistic measures for eval-uating the strength and weak

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ness of enemy states. Two passages particularly illuminate his criteria and conclusions:

To determine whether a state is well governed or in turmoil, vir-tuous or not, simply observing the border will immediately pro-vide evidence. Strict, frequent border patrols and very thorough customs examinations are already evidence of a state in tur-moil. After entering the border, weed-choked fields and exposed city walls are already evidence of a greedy ruler. If you observe that the nobles in court are not morally superior, the adminis-trators capable, or the ruler's trusted attendants sincere, this is already evidence of an ignorant ruler. If it is the habit of the ruler, prime minister, court officials, and lictors to precisely calculate and thoroughly investigate all expenditures or ex-changes of wealth and goods while their performance of the customary rites is lax and negligent, this is already evidence of an insulted state.

However, if the farmers take pleasure in their fields, the sol-diers are comfortable in difficulty, the hundred officials love the laws, the court esteems the customary rites, and the high min-isters consult together harmoniously, this is a well-governed state. When you observe the honored nobles in their court are morally superior, the administrators capable, and trusted at-tendants sincere, this is an enlightened ruler.

Now when it is the habit of the ruler, ministers, and hundred officials to be generous whenever there is any expenditure or exchange of wealth, but diligent and thorough in the perfor-mance of the customary rites, this is a glorious state. When there are Worthies of equal distinction and the ruler's relatives are honored first; when capabilities are comparable and old friends are first appointed to office; and among the hundred of- 

ficials the impure are all transformed to cultivate themselves, the ruthless to be ingenuous, and the crafty to be sincere, these are the accomplishments of an enlightened ruler.

There is evidence for observing whether a state is strong or weak, rich or poor. When the ruler does not esteem the cus-tomary rites; does not love the people; his measures are not be-lieved; his praise and rewards do not penetrate; or the generals are incompetent, the army will be weak.

When the ruler is enthralled with great projects or loves profits; when the high officials, artisans, and merchants are numerous; or the state lacks regulations or fixed measures, the state will be im

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poverished. When the people are poor, the ruler will be impov-erished. When the people are rich, the ruler will be wealthy.

Thus fields and rural areas are the foundation of wealth, walled enclosures and storehouses the end. Thus when the fields are going to ruin but the warehouses replete, when the common people are empty but the storehouses full, it is referred to as "a stumbling state." Anyone who attacks the foundation and ex-hausts the sources, uniting them in end pursuits, will lack a flow of wealth. When the ruler and his ministers do not recog-nize this as evil, the state's overturn and extinction will just be a matter of time. Being sustained by the state, yet lacking enough to adorn the body is termed "the height of greed," the epitome of stupid rulership. Thus they seek wealth but lose their states, seek profit but endanger their lives. In antiquity there were ten thousand states, today there are only several tens, all lost in the same way, for no other reason. 21

Hsün-tzu's surprisingly candid observations following his visit to Ch'in, a state whose style and measures were ever after vo-ciferously condemned by the Confucians, reveal much about its strengths and Hsün-tzu's own astuteness:

Ch'in's barriers and passes are solidly defended, while the over-all configuration of terrain facilitates defense. Its mountain 

forests and river valleys are spectacular and numerous profits are derived from their natural resources. This is terrain con-ducive to victory.

Entering their borders and observing their style of life and cus-toms, I found that the hundred surnames were straightfor-ward, their music neither licentious nor muddy. Their clothes were not provocative, while they deeply feared and obeyed the officials. They are like an ancient people.

The hundred capital officials were all serious and reserved, rev-erent and respectful, loyal, trustworthy, and honest. They are the officials of antiquity.

While in Ch'in I noted that when the high officials left their res-idences they went to their government offices, and when they left their government offices they returned home without un-dertaking private affairs. They neither formed cliques nor joined in parties. Properly reserved, they all were marked by penetrating wisdom and public spirit. These are the high offi-cials of ancient times.

I observed that when the court listened to the hundred affairs and rendered decisions their implementation was never de-layed,

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yet they were still and reserved as if no one were governing. This is the style of an ancient court. That they have been victo-rious for four generations is no accident but a question of their measures. This is what I saw. 22

Despite his almost enthusiastic approbation, Hsün-tzu couldn't resist commenting that since the state lacked Confucian Wor-thies, it could never aspire to true kingship!

A century later, in a chapter discussing the impact of regional characteristics in engendering various philosophic schools, the eclectic Huai-nan Tzu described several states, including Ch'in: 

Ch'i's territory backs the ocean to the east and takes the Yellow River as a defensive barrier to the north. The land is con-stricted and its agricultural fields few, but the people are very wise and clever.

Han is one of Chin's segmented states. The soil is rocky and the people treacherous, and they are pinched between two great states. Chin's old ceremonial usages have not yet been extinguished, whereas Han's new laws have already been is-sued. The orders of its former ruler have not yet been re-scinded, but those of the present rulers have already been sent down. The old and new are at odds, the former and latter mu-tually destructive. The hundred officials are rebellious and in turmoil, not knowing what to employ.

Ch'in may be characterized as having the avariciousness of a wolf. Their strength is great, they have little regard for right-eousness, and they pursue profit. They can be awed with pun-ishments but cannot be transformed through goodness. They can be motivated with rewards but cannot be threatened with names. The state backs difficult terrain and is belted by the Yellow River. Their four passes constitute a bulwark, the land is advantageous, and the configuration of terrain is conducive to defense. Their harvests and stores are extremely plentiful.

No one looking toward Ch'in from the open terrain of the north-ern plains--where cities such as Ta-liang (present-day Kaifeng) were exposed on all four sides to raiders and invaders--failed to be impressed by their inherent strategic advantages. Not only did Ch'in occupy a virtually unassailable mountainous bastion, but it also lay on the periphery of the older, "more civilized" states and thus enjoyed the isolation provided by remoteness, coupled with the twin stimuli of civilization in the east and more warlike, nomadic peoples to the west,

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just as the Chou before them when the Ch'in were considered semi- barbarians.

At the end of the Warring States period, Hsün-tzu's disciple Han Fei- tzu envisioned the ideal state as governed by a strong 

ruler buttressed by an efficient, obedient administration that acted in a realm free of distracting, inimical values. Thus his signs of incipient disorder--essentially inherent tendencies to destruction--are elaborated in paragraphs that often condemn the presence and activity of so-called scholars and Worthies, the Confucian epitome of administrative excellence:

Its scholars praise the Tao of the former kings so as to rely on righteousness and benevolence, and flourish their manners and adorn themselves with sophistry in order to cast doubt upon the regulations of the present age, causing the ruler's mind to become indecisive.

Those fond of disputation create false assumptions, rely upon artifice, and exploit external power in order to achieve their pri-vate purposes to the state's disadvantage.

Those who bear swords assemble their own bands, establish their own code of behavior, and manifest their names while transgressing the government's prohibitions.

Those who are troubled by the prospect of serving in the state's defense seek collective refuge at the gates of the powerful and expend their wealth to employ the intercession of influential men to avoid the sweaty labors of military service.

Their merchants and artisans laboriously create outlandish vessels and hoard useless resources, accumulating things to await the period when they may acquire the farmers' profits.

These five are the state's parasites. Rulers who do not eradicate these five pernicious peoples, who do not nurture resolute offi-cials, should not be surprised when their states suffer destruc-tion and their courts are reduced. 23

In a second passage Han Fei-tzu detailed additional parasites (although not so termed) that adversely affect a state, making it vulnerable to attack and collapse:

Anyone who arranges personal benefits for old friends is said not to abandon them. Anyone who distributes the state's re-sources to others is termed "a benevolent man." Anyone who 

disdains salary and esteems himself is termed "a superior man." Anyone who bends the laws in order to embrace his inti-mates is termed "a

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man of principle." Anyone who abandons official position to in-dulge in close personal relationships is called "a bravo." Anyone who departs from the world and hides away from the ruler is said to be lofty and unsullied. Anyone who is argumentative and contentious, who violates the government's orders, is said to be a resolute talent. Anyone who dispenses personal largess in order to gain the allegiance of the masses is said to have gained the people.

Those who do not abandon their friends will be corrupt as offi-cials. Where the benevolent are present, the state's resources will be diminished. Where there are perfected men, it will be difficult employ the people. Where there are men of principle, the laws and regulations will crumble. Where there are bravos, officials will be despised. Where there are lofty and unsullied men, the people will not serve the government. Where there are resolute talents, orders will not be implemented. Where there are those who gain the allegiance of the masses, the ruler will be orphaned. These eight are what the people praise but con-stitute great defeats for the ruler. If a ruler fails to investigate what is profitable and harmful to the altars of state, but in-stead employs those whom the common people praise, it will be impossible for him to avoid entangling the state in danger and ruin. 24

A third, powerful series of values inimical to the state's survival is elaborated in a chapter entitled "Deceitful Employments":

Now the ruler is concerned that those below him obey his or-ders, but the honest, upright, pure, and trustworthy who exert their minds but are cautious in speech are termed "rustic." Those who sternly uphold the laws and obey all the aspects of the regulations are termed "stupid." Those who respect the ruler and fear punishment are termed "fearful." Those who speak at appropriate times and whose actions suit the situa-tion are said to be ordinary. Those who are free from duplicity, 

do not pursue unorthodox studies, obey the lictors, and follow their instructions are said to be uncouth. Those who are diffi-cult to employ are termed "upright." Those difficult to reward are termed "pure." Those who are difficult to restrain are termed "robust." Those who do not obey orders are termed "courageous." Those who do not profit their superiors are termed "unsullied." Those who are generous, beneficent, and virtuous are termed "benevolent." Those who are important and haughty are termed "elders." Those whose personal schools at-tract many pupils are termed "teachers of disciples." Those who are tranquil, remote, and dwell quietly are termed "thinkers."

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Those who diminish others to pursue profit are termed "clever." Those who slander, vituperate, and are indecisive are termed "wise." Those who put others first and themselves second, who designate appellations and speak about loving All under Heaven, are referred to as Sages. Those who speak about the great and surpassing, things that cannot be used, whose ac-tions are contrary to the norms of society, are termed "great men." Those who despise rank and salary, who do not obey their superiors, are termed "heroes."

When the lower ranks become soaked in these beliefs, inter-nally it will make the people chaotic, externally it will prevent them from being employed by the state. The ruler ought to pro-hibit their desires and extinguish their traces, but if instead of stopping them follows and esteems them as the means to gov-ern, he merely teaches the lower ranks to bring chaos to the upper ones! 25

The idea that dissolute rulers bring disaster upon themselves existed continually from antiquity, early focusing upon the much propagandized examples of Chieh and Chou, vile despots who perpetuated day and night and, according to the Book of Documents, even had boats run on land. A premise found throughout the Confucian school, it was especially developed by Mencius, who strongly condemned licentious extravagance as the ruination of states. However, the Ch'un-ch'iu Fan-lu com-posed by Tung Chung-shu in the Former Han dynasty corre- 

lated such excesses with the phase of earth and the associated season of mid- summer, when agricultural matters should be coming to fruition:

If the ruler loves ease and dissipation; is licentious; his con-sorts and concubines exceed the normal measure; he offends his relatives; insults his brothers; deceives and ensnares the common people; creates great pleasure towers; and has the five colors scintillate throughout his court while carvings and in-lays abound in his palaces, then the people will suffer jaundice and pellagra and their tongues will be parched with pain. If the disaster extends to earth, then the five grains will not mature and there will be brutal oppressions and unlawful executions. If the disaster extends to the hairless mammals so that they will not reproduce, the people will turn rebellious and leave, Sages and Worthies will depart. 26

Other series of interest are found in the Liz-shih Ch'un-ch'iu and the Pao P'u-tzu, particularly the chapter entitled "Chün Tao."27

The Han Fei-tzu incorporates numerous historical episodes and anecdotes in proof of the author's contentions, including a mis-sion

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that apparently took place about 306 or 305 B.C. that con-cretely illustrates Han Fei-tzu's view that, rather than aiding a state, those bent on moral self-cultivation actually destroy it when the ruler succumbs to the view that such superiority will power his state:

Duke Wu-ling of Chao dispatched Li Ts'u to observe whether Chung-shan might be attacked or not. Li Ts'u returned and re-ported: " Chung-shan can be attacked. If you do not hurry, you will lag behind Ch'i and Yen."

Duke Wu-ling inquired, "Why can they be attacked?" Li Ts'u replied: "The ruler loves the recluses dwelling amid the moun-tain caves. Many times while I was there, he went out in an un-covered carriage to visit with scholars living in impoverished 

villages and humble lanes, and also treated the lowest ranking of men as his equals hundreds of times."

Duke Wu-ling said: "From what you have said, he must be a worthy ruler, so how can he be attacked?"

Li Ts'u responded: "Not so. When he treats recluses with dis-tinction and brings them to court, his military officers will be lax in their deployments. When a ruler honors scholars and humbles himself to extend positions in his court to them, the farmers will grow remiss in the fields. When warriors are un-motivated in battle, the army grows weak. When farmers be-come dilatory in their fields, the state grows impoverished. Since no impoverished state has ever fielded an army weaker than its enemies and survived, isn't it appropriate to attack it?"

Duke Wu-ling assented, mobilized his troops, and attacked Chung-shan, eventually extinguishing it. 28

Han Fei-tzu of course cited this example not only because the criteria applied to evaluate the state coheres with his own view-point, but also because the analysis proved accurate and the resulting military action had the major historical consequence of Chung-shan being defeated and annexed in 295 B.C. by Wu-ling's successor. Han Fei-tzu was not the only thinker to ac-tively decry the value of virtuous advisers and postulate dra-matically different criteria for evaluating states. For example, on the premise that only power affects customs, the Huai-nan Tzu examined the characteristics of well-governed states and chaotic states:

Most of those dwelling under Heaven are dazzled by fame and reputation, few investigate the reality behind them. For this reason recluses are honored with praise and itinerant per-suaders are distin

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guished by their sophistry. But if one investigates why they are honored and distinguished, it is for no other reason than that the ruler is not enlightened about the techniques for distin- 

guishing benefit and harm, and takes those that the masses speak about as worthy.

The well-governed state is not thus. Those who speak about af-fairs must fully adhere to the laws, and those who would im-plement them must be governed by offices. The ruler takes hold of names in order to hold them responsible for actuality. Minis-ters preserve their duties in order to attain merit. Words do not succeed in exceeding substance; actions do not overstep the regulations; all the ministers offer their services together to the ruler, like the spokes of a wheel converging; none dares to mo-nopolize the ruler's power. Affairs not falling within the regula-tions and laws but of possible benefit to the state and adminis-tration are invariably evaluated through extensive comparative procedures and secretly investigated to determine whom they will benefit. Moreover, all aspects must be questioned in order to investigate the transformations. There is no inclination to one corner, no formation of cliques over one issue, so the mid-dle is established and the movements benefit all within the seas. The ministers are all impartial and upright, none dares act perversely. The hundred offices report on their affairs, fo-cusing upon achieving the ruler's benefit. The ruler is perspica-cious and enlightened above; the officials exert their energies below; all traces of licentiousness and perversity are obliter-ated; the accomplishments of the common people daily ad-vance. For this reason the courageous fully exhaust their strength in the military.

A disordered state is not thus. Those whom the masses praise are rewarded despite lacking merit, officials are executed de-spite being innocent. The ruler is ignorant and unenlightened above, the ministers form cliques and are disloyal. Those who can speak and discourse indulge in sophistry, those who culti-vate their behavior compete in augmenting themselves. When the ruler above issues an order, they join together in opposing it; what the laws and edicts would prohibit, they violate with perversity. The wise concentrate upon artifice and prevarica-tion, the courageous focus upon fighting and conflict. The great ministers monopolize authority; lesser officials seize power; cliques and parties manipulate the ruler. Even though the state still seems to exist, the ancients would say it is already lost. 29 

In accord with its overall perspective, the Huai-nan Tzu even contains an anecdote that discovers the greatest Sage being one who is in fact advocating inaction:

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When Chü Po-yü was serving as prime minister in Wei, Tzu Kung went to see him and inquired, 30"How does one govern a state?"

He replied, "One governs by not governing."

Chao Yang, chancellor in Chin, wanted to attack Wei, so he dispatched Shih Hsia to go and observe them. Shih returned and reported: " Chü Po-yü is prime minister, so we cannot at-tack them yet. Moreover, their passes and valleys are solidly defended, so we could not overcome them."31

Thus rather than Confucian values or Han Fei-tzu's strict but activist regime, the virtue of governing through inaction (pre-sented by employing Tzu Kung as a foil) is viewed as the ideal way to ensure a strong state--virtually the military theorists' concept of not interfering or overlaboring the people carried to its final, generally considered Taoist, extreme.

In this same chapter, the Huai-nan Tzu further explicated the indications marking a lost state in an age of decline, emphasiz-ing the people's welfare:

On the day that the ruler comes to possess the riches of the realm and occupy the seat of power, he begins to exhaust the people's energies in satisfying the pleasures of his ears and eyes. His mind is focused solely upon his palaces and pleasure towers, pools and gardens, fierce animals and bears, objects of pleasure and rarities. For this reason the impoverished people do not even have winnowed husks to eat while tigers and bears enjoy fresh grass and grain. The common people lack even short coats to keep them warm, but all within the palace wear the finest silks. The ruler fervently pursues useless achieve-ments, throughout the land the common people are worn out with grief. Thus the ruler causes All under Heaven to fail to rest in their natures. 

Signs of a Doomed State

"Doomed states"--states whose pervasive internal corruption, weakness, and disorder obviated hope of revival and made them easy prey for external forces--came to virtually make up a special category within the political writings. Assessments nat-urally turned upon the parameters chosen by those viewing the situation, but with a number of surprising traits and expanded situations. Since intelligence insights usually stem from details rather than grandiose schemes and sweeping evaluations, sev-eral concrete examples merit contempla

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tion. To begin, when queried how states lose the allegiance of their people and then perish, Yen-tzu enumerated a range of inimical behaviors observed in rulers:

When the state is impoverished but the ruler likes to boast; his wisdom is meager but he likes to rely upon himself; he is es-tranged from the noble and lowly; the great ministers neglect the rites; he inclines to flatterers and sycophants while slight-ing worthy men; takes pleasure in being rude and uncouth and in manipulating the common people; the state lacks constant laws; the people lack pattern and order; he takes those skilled in sophistry as wise, those harsh to the people as loyal; he is constantly inebriated and forgets the state; loves the army and forgets the populace; is strict about punishment and execution, but slow in bestowing rewards; takes pleasure in other people's grief and finds profit in their hardship; his virtue is insufficient to embrace the people and his government inadequate to nour-ish them; rewards insufficient to stimulate them to goodness and punishments inadequate to prevent evil--this is the behav-ior of a doomed state. 32

In another purportedly Spring and Autumn conversation, Yen-tzu undertook a comparative analysis of Chü and Lu to deter-mine which would perish first:

The menial people of Chü are constantly changing but do not really transform. They are greedy and love artifice, esteem courage, and deprecate benevolence. In martial matters their 

warriors are fervent but their anger is quickly spent. For this reason the upper ranks are unable to nurture the lower and the lower ranks unable to serve the upper. When upper and lower ranks are mutually unable to receive what is appropriate, the great body of government is lost. Thus Chü will perish first.

Lu's ruler and ministers still love acting righteously, so the lower ranks are solidly settled and little heard of. For this rea-son the upper ranks are able to nurture the lower ones, and the lower ones able to serve the upper; therefore upper and lower mutually receive what is appropriate and the great body of government is preserved. Lu can yet survive for a long time, but there is also one difficulty. A state so small that a pheasant could easily fly across it, the ruler still styles himself a "duke" and ranks among the feudal lords. Lu is close to Ch'i but seeks to be intimate with Chin. To be unwilling to act submissively to nearby Ch'i while looking

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out hopefully to distant Chin is the way for insignificant Lu to extinguish itself. 33

Eventually both states perished, with Chü becoming part of Ch'i and Lu being annexed by Ch'u.

One of the fragmented texts recovered in 1971 from a Former Han dynasty tomb is a dialogue between the king of Wu--pre-sumably Holü--and Sun-tzu on the factors from which the dis-solution of Chin might be predicted:

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "When the six generals divide up and occupy Chin's territory, who will perish first? Who will be solid and successful?"

Sun-tzu said, "The Fan and Chung-hang clans will be the first to perish."

"Who will be next?"

"The Chih clan will be next."

"Who will be next?" 

"The Han and Wei will be next. The Chao have not lost their ancient laws, so the state of Chin will revert to them."

The king of Wu asked, "May I hear the explanation?"

Sun-tzu said: "Yes. The Fan and Chung-hang clans, in regulat-ing their fields, take 80 paces as the length and 160 paces as the breadth, and impose taxes of one-fifth of the produce on them. The fields under administration are narrow, the warriors attached to the fields numerous. Because they impose a tax of one-fifth, the ducal house is rich. The ducal house is rich, the attached warriors are numerous. The ruler is arrogant, the ministers extravagant. They hope for achievement and fre-quently engage in warfare. Thus I say they will perish first.

The Chih, in regulating their fields, take 90 paces as the length and 180 paces as the breadth, and impose taxes of one-fifth on them. The fields under administration are narrow, the attached warriors numerous. Because they impose a tax of one-fifth, the ducal house is rich. The ducal house is rich, the attached war-riors numerous. The ruler is arrogant, the ministers extrava-gant. They hope for achievement and frequently engage in war-fare. Thus the Chih will be next after the Fan and Chung-hang.

The Han and Wei, in regulating their fields, take 100 paces for the length and 200 paces for the breadth, and impose taxes of one- fifth on them. The lands under administration are narrow, the attached warriors are numerous. Taxing them at one-fifth, the ducal house is rich. The ruler is arrogant, the ministers ex-travagant.

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They hope for achievement and frequently engage in warfare. Thus I say Han and Wei will be next after the Chih.

The Chao, in regulating their fields, take 120 paces for the length and 240 paces for the breadth. The duke does not im-pose any taxes on them. The ducal house is poor, their at-tached warriors few. The ruler is frugal, the ministers respect-ful, and they thereby govern a rich populace. Thus I say it is a solid state. The state of Chin will revert to them." 

The king of Wu said: "Excellent. The Tao of the true king must be to generously love his people."34

The following list from the Yi Chou-shu--a Warring States com-pilation that apparently preserves some core material from the early Chou period--enumerates ten "promiscuities," or licen-tious practices, that destroy the virtues and values necessary to effectively govern and may therefore be seen as symptomatic of a state in terminal decline:

First, promiscuous government destroys a state. When actions do not accord with the seasons, the people are not preserved. Second, licentious inclinations destroy righteousness. When edicts do not accord with what is right, the people will not be in harmony.

Third, promiscuous music destroys virtue. When the Virtue of government is not pure, the people will lose their essential na-ture.

Fourth, promiscuous actions destroy the sense of shame. When shame is inadequate, the people will not yield.

Fifth, promiscuity in the inner court destroys the rites. When the rites are not unified, the people will not be cooperative. Sixth, promiscuity in colors destroys the gradations of clothing. When clothing does not accord with sumptuary regulations, the people will not be obedient.

Seventh, promiscuous writing destroys the classics. When the classics are no longer taken as the model for teaching, the peo-ple will not be humane.

Eighth, promiscuous employment of authority destroys the models of old. When the practices of old are not taken as mod-els for government offices, the people will lack laws.

Ninth, promiscuous goods destroy the performance of duties, so orders will not be recognized in the hundred offices. Tenth, promiscuous artifice destroys fundamental use. When use becomes insufficient, none of the hundred intentions will ever be achieved. 35

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In identifying these core weaknesses in the process of govern-ing and the ruler's leadership, the text clearly reflects a Confu-cian perspective, consistent with its overall advocacy of Virtue and social order rather than strict laws and punishments. 

The most extensive compilation of behavioral and governmental practices that may be viewed as foretelling collapse or at least the possibility of successfully attacking an enemy state appears in the Han Fei-tzu. However, as Han Fei-tzu himself asserts, these factors are merely predispositions and thus not certain to lead to ruin. Additional external factors, analogous to heavy rain beating on a weakened wall, are needed to precipitate an actual collapse. In other words, military strikes or covert ac-tions to subvert the state should readily prove successful. Nat-urally most of his indications are symptomatic of the ruler not being in complete command, the state not being well adminis-tered or ordered, or distracting influences and contending power centers being present rather than failures in the Confu-cian ideals of benevolence, righteousness, and the people's wel-fare.

Whenever the state is small but the ruler's clan large, the ruler's authority light but that of his ministers heavy, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler disregards the laws and prohibitions to concentrate upon strategies and plots, allows the state to go to ruin while depending upon foreign support, the state can be destroyed.

If the ministers believe in classical studies, the ruling clan members love sophistry, merchants accumulate wealth outside the state, and the ordinary people are not submissive, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler loves palaces, pleasure towers, and pools; devotes himself to amusing himself with carriages, clothes, and curiosi-ties; exhausts the people in outdoor projects; and wastes the state's resources and wealth, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler is obsessed with astrological concerns in his daily activities, enthusiastically serves the ghosts and spirits, be-lieves in divination by the turtle shell and milfoil stalks, and loves the rites of sacrifice, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler heeds advice only from men of rank rather than ver-ifying it with other sources and relies upon one man as his gate, the state can be destroyed. 

If official positions can be gained through influence and rank and salary through bribes, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler thinks slowly without accomplishing anything and is too flexible to make many decisions so that neither good nor

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evil is settled nor any standpoint established, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler is insatiably greedy and always wants to grab what-ever profits are about, he can be destroyed.

If the ruler takes pleasure in promiscuously imposing punish-ments without regard to the laws, loves sophists without con-sidering their utility, and indulges in literary flourishes without being concerned about achievements, the state can be de-stroyed.

If the ruler is shallow and easily fathomed; leaks out the state's affairs, keeping nothing secret; and is unable to preserve se-crecy but conveys the speech of various ministers to each other, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler treats remonstrators perversely and loves to van-quish them, is unconcerned with the fate of the state, and lightly trusts in himself, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler relies upon the support of allies but insults nearby states, depends upon the strong and great for rescue but in-sults the states pressing upon him, the state can be destroyed.

If foreign visitors and itinerant persuaders who have ample funds outside the state clandestinely observe the state's plans and estimations while also becoming involved in the people's affairs below, the state can be destroyed.

If the people do not trust the prime minister and subordinates do not obey their superiors, but the ruler loves them and is un-willing to dismiss them, the state can be destroyed. 

If the ruler doesn't employ outstanding native talent but in-stead seeks officers outside it, does not promote men according to their accomplishments but likes to advance and dismiss them according to their reputations, so that foreign born offi-cials eclipse the long-serving veterans, the state can be de-stroyed.

When the ruler slights his eldest son and all his offspring con-tend for influence, or the ruler dies before the appointment of an heir apparent, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler is careless but never has regrets, the state is in chaos but he sees himself doing well, and without calculating the state's resources he snubs nearby enemies, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler is not humble although the state is small, he doesn't respect the powerful even though the state's strength is minimal, and he is impolite and insulting to large neighbors, the state can be destroyed.

If after the heir apparent has already been designated, the ruler marries a woman from a powerful enemy state, the heir appar-ent will be endangered. In this situation the ministers will be trou

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bled by the changes. When they are troubled by such changes, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler, being timid and fearful, mounts only a weak de-fense; although events can be foreseen, his mind is too weak and pliant; and he knows what ought to be done, but even after making a decision still does not take action, the state can be destroyed.

If when the ruler has ventured outside the state a new one is enthroned, or before the heir apparent has returned from serv-ing as a hostage in another state a new heir apparent is desig-nated, the state will be beset by disloyalty. When a state suffers disloyalty, it can be destroyed. 

If the ruler humiliates his chief ministers yet keeps them near, punishes and mutilates common people yet perversely employs them, so that these people all harbor rancor and mull over their shame, yet he continues these practices, it will produce murderous brigands. When brigands are spawned, the state can be destroyed.

If the chief ministers are doubly powerful and their relatives are numerous and strong, if they form cliques within the court and seek foreign support without in order to compete for influence and power, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler heeds the words of his maidservants and concu-bines, employs the knowledge of his beloved companions, while both inside and outside the court there are grief and misery, yet he repeatedly acts without regard to the laws, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler is insulting to the chief ministers and discourteous to his uncles, imposes onerous labor services on the common people, and executes and exterminates the innocent, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler loves to use his knowledge to alter the laws, con-stantly manipulates public matters for his personal benefit, al-ters and changes the regulations and prohibitions, and fre-quently issues all sorts of directives, the state can be de-stroyed.

If a state lacks bastions of terrain, the exterior and interior walls are in ruins, accumulated stores are nonexistent, re-sources are few, and equipment for mounting a defense lack-ing, yet the ruler carelessly launches attacks against other states, the state can be destroyed.

If successive generations fail to achieve longevity, several rulers dying in succession, so that mere youths occupy the throne and the chief ministers monopolize power, establishing cliques with the participation of foreign guests, and they have sacri-ficed terri

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tory several times in order to sustain foreign alliances, the state can be destroyed.

If the heir apparent is honored and highly esteemed, his sup-porters being numerous and strong, and he has established personal relationships with several powerful states so that his awesomeness and power are fully complete early on, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler's intellect is narrow but heart hasty, he is impetu-ous and acts carelessly, and never ponders the consequences when he become angry, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler frequently gets angry and loves to employ the army, slights instructions in the fundamentals of agriculture and treats military attacks lightly, the state can be destroyed.

If the noble ministers are jealous of each other, the chief minis-ters overly powerful, and they all rely upon enemy states abroad while putting the common people into strictures at home in order to attack their enemies, but the ruler does not execute them, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler is unworthy but the collateral houses virtuous, the heir apparent is demeaned and his brothers feisty, the officials weak and the populace bold, the state is fierce. A fierce state can be destroyed.

If the ruler harbors anger but doesn't express it, suspends punishments and puts off executions, causing the court to se-cretly hate him and grow increasingly fearful without knowing their fate over a long time, the state can be destroyed.

If when sending the army forth on campaign, the commanding general's mandate is too sweeping or those entrusted with bor-der defenses are so honored that they can monopolize the army's authority and issue orders without recourse to the ruler, the state can be destroyed.

If the queen is involved in illicit affairs, the ruler's mother culti-vates immoral relationships, the inner palace and the court are mutually involved with each other, and proper distinctions be- 

tween the sexes no longer observed, this is termed "a state with two rulers." Such a state is doomed to perish.

If the queen is demeaned but concubines honored, the heir ap-parent lowly but the other sons esteemed, the prime minister's household lightly regarded but the inner palace functionaries honored, the inner palace and outer court contravene each other. A state whose inner palace and outer court contravene each other is doomed to perish.

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If the chief ministers are very honored while their cliques are so extensive and powerful that they can obstruct and impede the ruler's decisionmaking and exercise the authority of govern-ment, the state can be destroyed.

If functionaries from the powerful families are employed in the government but descendants of military officials are not, those who excel in benefiting their villages are promoted but old offi-cials long in government offices are dismissed, and the ruler esteems personal action but deprecates public achievement, the state can be destroyed.

If the royal house is impoverished but the ministerial families are wealthy, the families on the state's registers are poor but aliens residing there wealthy, farmers and soldiers are in straits but merchants profiting, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler perceives great profits but does not pursue them, learns about incipient misfortune but does not make prepara-tions, is lax and makes little effort in matters of battle and de-fense, but focuses upon adorning himself with benevolence and righteousness, the state can be destroyed.

If the ruler does not fulfill his filial obligations to his royal an-cestors in governing the state but only worries about pleasing his mother, thus fulfilling the filial behavior of a common man, and is unconcerned with the altars of state, instead intent on obeying his mother's commands so that women control the state and eunuchs administer its affairs, the state can be de-stroyed. 

If the ruler's speech is clever but he does not adhere to the laws, he is wise but lacks techniques for control and adminis-tration, he is multitalented but doesn't administer affairs in ac-cord with the regulations, the state can be destroyed.

If those he favors advance while old ministers withdraw, the unworthy handle affairs while the Worthy and good submerge themselves, those without merit are honored while the indus-trious suffer and are demeaned, these subordinates will bear resentment toward the ruler. When subordinates are resentful, the state can be destroyed.

When the emoluments and positions of the ruler's clan and high ministers exceed their achievements, their insignia and attire encroach upon the gradations of rank, and their palaces and allowances become excessive, but the ruler does not pro-hibit such extravagance, then the hearts of his ministers will be insatiable. When their hearts are filled with unfulfilled de-sires, the state can be destroyed.

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If the royal clan members and marriage-related families who dwell among the common people behave brutally and per-versely toward their neighbors, the state can be destroyed. 36

Steppe and Border Peoples

From the breakdown of Chou authority even prior to the Spring and Autumn period through to the end of the Warring States, China consisted of states--often European-sized countries--which of necessity had to direct intelligence-gathering activities against each other. However, with their unification under the Ch'in and subsequent imperial dynasties, the situation was dramatically transformed, the only enemies suddenly becoming internal factions, disaffected royal clan members, divisive seg-ments of the populace, and highly elusive steppe peoples. Intel-ligence efforts toward the latter require a separate study during the imperial period, but it can be noted that the gathering of information and development of profiles had already begun in the early Chou. Ch'in, Ch'u, Wu, and Yüeh had in fact been "barbarian" regions until being gradually acculturated and be- 

coming integral players in the so-called Hwa-Hsia (Chinese) cultural and political sphere formerly identified solely with the Chou ruling house and its subject states. Information about them was first gathered in the Shang and became part of every-day political dialogue during the Warring States, but contact with more remote peoples, as well as the descendants of tribes that had troubled even the earliest Sage emperors, such as the Eastern Yi, produced increasing numbers of profiles. Many of those recorded in the Shih Chi contain basic information that was gathered through diplomatic and trade missions and then subsequently expanded and altered in later dynastic histories. For example, in a lengthy Shih Chi chapter recording historical events that occurred among the "Foreign Peoples," profiles such as the following are found:

The remote ancestors of the Hsiung-nu were descendants of the Hsia known as the Ch'un-wei. Before the Sage emperors T'ang and Yü they were known as the Mountain Jung, the Hsien-yün, and the Hsün-chu and dwelled among the northern barbarians, shifting their abode in pursuit of their herding ac-tivities. The majority of their animals are horses, cattle, and sheep, but they occasionally rear camels, donkeys, mules, and three different breeds of swift horses. They move about in pur-suit of water and grass, and although having neither cities nor fortifications, nor engaging in farming, they still have allotted territories. They do not have

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writing or documents, but make agreements verbally. Male children are able to ride sheep, hold a bow, and shoot birds and rats. Young men shoot foxes and rabbits for food. Their warriors are all strong enough to pull a bow and be armored cavalrymen.

In ordinary times it is their custom to practice herding and hunting and capture animals as their occupation, but in times of military crisis they are practiced in martial arts and aggres-sive attacks, for this is their Heavenly nature. Their long-range weapons are the bow and arrow, their close weapons the knife and truncheon. When it is advantageous, they will advance; when disadvantageous, they will withdraw, never finding it 

shameful to retreat. They are solely concerned with profit, not with ceremony or righteousness. From the ruler on down they all eat the flesh of animals, make clothes from their hides, and wear fur coats. The strong eat the best, most appealing food, the old what is left over. They esteem youth and strength, dis-dain age and weakness. When a father dies, the son will marry his widows; when a brother dies, the remaining brothers his wives. In their customs they have names but no surnames or avoidance. 37

The Hsiung-nu were a focal subject in the heated discussion of Han barbarian policy marking the great debate that occurred in 81 B.C. Known as the Discussions on Salt and Iron (Yen-tieh Lun), this debate was so titled because it was ostensibly con-vened to argue the appropriateness of the state monopolies of salt and iron. The positions taken by the literati and the offi-cials, although derived from presumably common knowledge, evidence radically different perspectives and interpretations:

The High Officials said: "The Hsiung-nu lack the defenses of city walls and stoutness of moats, the use of long pointed hal-berds and strong crossbows, and accumulated stores in gra-naries and warehouses. The ruler lacks righteousness and laws, the people civility and order. Ruler and minister slight each other, upper and lower ranks have no ceremony between them. They braid willow to make frames for their dwellings and use felt for the covering. They have plain crescent bows and use bone arrowheads. Their horses do not eat grain. Internally their preparations are inadequate to be a cause for concern, ex-ternally their rites are not worth noting.

" China is the heart of All under Heaven where worthy officers gather, the rites and righteousness accumulate, and wealth and commerce are nurtured. Now if the wise plot against the stupid and the righteous attack the unrighteous, it will be like the leaves

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falling from the trees after an autumnal frost. The Ch'un Ch'iu states, ' Duke Huan simply expelled the Jung and Ti.' How much more so one who has all the strength under Heaven," 

The Literati: "The Hsiung-nu do not embellish their chariots or vessels with silver and gold, threads and lacquer. They are plainly made and concentrate upon sturdiness. Their materials lack fancy colors, their clothes the various distinctions of col-lars and sleeves. They simply concentrate upon making them complete. The men do not pursue the artifice and skill of inlay-ing and engraving, or the labor of constructing palaces and city walls. The women make no contribution to embroidery or other dissipated skills, or the work of fine silk weaving. Their affairs are simplified and utilitarian, easily finished, difficult to cause distress.

"Even though they do not have long pointed halberds or strong crossbows, they have barbarian horses and good bows. Fami-lies have allotted preparations, men their employment. If one morning there is a military crisis, they stretch their bows and mount their horses. Although they do not seem to accumulate resources, their provisions are adequate to sustain them for several tens of days. They rely upon the mountains and valleys as their fortifications and the rivers and grasslands as their granaries and storehouses. Their laws are concise but easy to understand, what is sought easily satisfied. Therefore their punishments are minimal and rarely violated. They signal with a pennant and orders are followed. They slight the customary rites but are sincere in trust, they are uncultured but astute in affairs. Although they do not have books on the rites and right-eousness, with carved bones and rolled up wooden slips, the hundred officials have a means to record their actions, superi-ors and inferior to employ each other.

When our ministers make plans for the district governments, they similarly speak about how easily affairs will be achieved, but in actuality they always turn out to be difficult. Thus Ch'in wanted to expel the Hsiung-nu but instead was ruined itself. Accordingly, military weapons are inauspicious implements and cannot be lightly employed. 38 Will it be only one dynasty that assumed the strong were weak and the existent to have perished?" 39

Even though the accuracy of their perceptions remains to be ascertained, for the most part they were observationally derived 

and no doubt reasonably reliable, especially as intelligence fail-ures might be expected more in fathoming intent and behavior than in perceiving the easily visible material aspects of no-madic civilizations.

A slightly later but still typical analysis found in the chapter on the Eastern Yi peoples in the history of the Later Han preserves intriguing

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notes on unusual weapons that should have greatly troubled any commander facing the Pa-lou in the field.

The Pa-lou dwell in the ancient state of Su-chen. Their territory lies more than a thousand kilometers northeast of Fu-yü and has its eastern border along the shores of the great sea. To the south it is contiguous with Pei-yao-chü, to the north extends out to unknown regions. The land is marked by numerous mountains and ravines. The appearance of the people is like the Fu-yü, but their languages are completely different.

They have the five grains and hemp cloth, produce garnets and good sables. They do not have rulers or elders, but each en-campment has its own great men. They live amid the mountain forests where the earth's atmosphere is extremely cold. They usually dwell in caves, valuing depth, with the largest reaching down nine ladders. They like to raise pigs and eat the meat, as well as make clothes from the hides. In the winter they smear pig fat on their skins several layers thick in order to ward off the wind and cold. In the summer they go about naked except for a loincloth front and rear.

The people are smelly, dirty, and impure, and put their out-houses in the middle of their settlements. Ever since the rise of the Han they have been subordinate to the Fu-yü. Although their numbers are few, they are mostly courageous and strong. They dwell among the mountains and ravines and so excel at shooting that they can hit a man in the eye with an arrow. Their bows are four feet long with the strength of a crossbow. Their arrows are made from Hu wood, one foot eight inches long, with bluestone arrowheads on which they spread poison. 

A man hit by such an arrow will die. They are facile in the use of boats and like to make raids and plunder, so the abutting states are afraid and worried, but their troops cannot subdue them. All the Eastern Yi peoples eat with platters and dishes, only the Pa-lou do not follow this habit. Their customs lack any fixed patterns whatsoever. 40

The Pa-lou description indicates the widespread knowledge and application of indigenous poisons in warfare, particularly among steppe peoples. (Such practices are virtually unmen-tioned in traditional Chinese warfare except in an assassina-tion context.) Although felt to be uncouth and uncivilized, the steppe peoples clearly had mastered the mobile tactics of guer-rilla warfare and were thus able to exploit the natural advan-tages of difficult terrain to thwart protagonists.

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Part Five MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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15 Field Intelligence

POLITICAL AND GENERAL ISSUES of military capability and intentions having been determined, the next concern would be acquiring focal intelligence of actual field forces embarked upon campaigns, mounting invasions, or preparing for immedi-ate battles. That reconnaissance patrols, direct observers, look-outs, and agents were employed to acquire information about the enemy and determine their position need hardly be men-tioned. Of far greater interest is the overall approach and crite-ria by which opposing forces were evaluated and the decisions 

that might be derived from processed data, such as the number of men or the commander's character. In order to exploit any weaknesses, basic information had to be developed about the enemy's physical condition, logistics, morale, officers, sec-ondary forces, deployment, defenses, and probable intentions. Chinese intelligence operations traditionally emphasized three factors: morale, configurations of terrain, and the enemy com-mander's personality and skills.

The Six Secret Teachings clearly states that "the technique for military conquest is to carefully investigate the enemy's inten-tions and quickly take advantage of them, launching a sudden attack where unexpected."1 Sun-tzu earlier defined the param-eters for such evaluative thrusts in the initial chapters of the Art of War with a series of pronouncements, many of which have already been noted in earlier sections. Because military theorists evolved a wide range of tactics to cope with the three main possibilities of being outnumbered, facing equal strength, and outnumbering the enemy, 2 determining the enemy's ac-tual strength was naturally important, although never para-mount. Sun-tzu advised: "After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it into effect with strate-gic power supplemented by field tactics that respond to exter-nal factors. As for strategic power, it is controlling the tactical imbalance of power in accord with the gains to be realized."3

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Four of Sun-tzu's seven critical factors focus upon military questions: "Which general has greater ability? Who has gained the advantages of Heaven and Earth? Whose forces are stronger? Whose officers and troops are better trained?"4 More-over, he demarked five indices of success:

There are five factors from which victory can be known: One who knows when he can fight and when he cannot fight will be victorious. One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers will be victorious. One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious. One who, fully pre-pared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious. One whose 

general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious. These five are the Tao for knowing victory. 5

Sun-tzu's pronouncements, even though premised upon cen-turies of intelligence activity, essentially initiated the system-atic effort to conceptualize military intelligence objectives, for-mat operations, and consciously exploit the material thus ac-quired.

Concept of Timeliness

The concept of timeliness appears throughout the writings of the Warring States period, nonmilitary as well as military, evi-dence that it was paramount in determining an action's feasi-bility. For example, in the Six Secret Teachings the T'ai Kung advised King Wen:

Do not dig valleys deeper to increase hills. Do not abandon the foundation to govern the branches. When the sun is at midday you should dry things. If you grasp a knife you must cut. If you hold an ax you must attack.

If at the height of the day you do not dry things in the sun, this is termed "losing the time." If you grasp a knife but do not cut anything, you will lose the moment for profits. If you hold an ax but do not attack bandits will come.

If trickling streams are not blocked, they will become great rivers. If you do not extinguish the smallest flames, what will you do about a great conflagration? If you do not eliminate the two- leaf sapling, how will you use your ax when the tree has grown? 6

Remarkably, similar thoughts are expressed in Chapters 63 and 64 of the Tao Te Ching: 7

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Plot against the difficult while it remains easy, Act against the great while it is still minute.

Difficult affairs throughout the realm invariably commence with the easy, 

Great affairs throughout the realm inevitably commence with the small.

For this reason the Sage never acts against the great and is thus able to complete greatness.

What is tranquil remains easily grasped,

What has not yet betrayed signs is easy to plot against. The brittle is easily split,

The minute is easily scattered.

Act upon them before they attain being, Control them before they become chaotic. Trees that require both arms to embrace Are born from insignificant saplings.

A nine story tower commences with a little accumulated earth, A journey of a thousand kilometers begins beneath one's feet.

The proto-Taoist Lieh-tzu, attributed to the late Warring States, also took as one of its essential themes the need to discern the proper moment because times differ and carefully planned ac-tions may suddenly become inappropriate. In the Later Han an esoteric work entitled the Pao P'u-tzu, authored by an experi-enced military commander and Taoist adept, even contains a section entitled "The Difficulties of Timing" that may be distilled as "It's not speaking that is difficult, but talking about the time that is hard."

Agriculturally based societies could not ignore the pressing need to organize and undertake timely efforts throughout the year in order to ensure that crops were planted, the basic infra-structure of dikes and roads maintained, and preparations made against natural and military disasters. In all these activi-ties one inescapable, operative principle prevailed: Acting in ac-cord with the seasons will bring prosperity; going contrary to them, only misery. This idea predominates in the late Warring States Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, a massive thematic compilation whose initial chapters include an extensive, detailed calendar of correspondences, seasonal changes, requisite actions, and symbolical undertakings. According to the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, wisdom is one of the four critical factors of military knowledge. Wisdom, in turn, is "knowing the transformations of time. If you know the transformations of time, you will know the changes of the vacuous and substantial, flourishing and de- 

cline, the measures of advancing and retreating, far and near, releasing and uniting."8 The Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu,

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Chuang-tzu, and Wu-tzu all recognize the idea of a subtle mo-ment when incipient affairs rise, termed chi in Chinese, 9 a technical concept especially applicable in military intelligence. Determining it requires the fullest knowledge possible of gen-eral trends, such as the seasons and regional disturbances, and specifics, such as the details of the enemy's plans or ac-tions. As the Yi Chou-shu states, "Employing the military lies in knowing the time."10 More aggressively framed, knowledge must be timely, acquired expeditiously, and exploited ruth-lessly, whether in diplomatic or military affairs, such as by thwarting an enemy's alliances or shattering a temporary river dam and thereby drowning a negligent enemy force in mid-crossing. 11 Thus the great strategist Sun Pin observed: "When the army sees the good but is dilatory; when the time comes but it is doubtful; when it expels perversity but is unable to dwell in the results, this is the Tao of stopping. If you imple-ment the Tao of stopping, then even Heaven and Earth will not be able to make you flourish."12

Observation and Reconnaissance

All the military theorists made extensive reconnaissance efforts incumbent upon commanders at all levels. However, the earli-est recorded incident of a ruler (synonymous with commander in chief) personally undertaking this responsibility appears in an incident dated to 717 B.C. According to the Tso Chuan, when Duke Yin of Lu was criticized by his ministers for plan-ning to "shoot fish" in the area of T'ang, he retorted that he wanted to "gain an understanding of the terrain," presumably to assess border defenses because of ongoing tensions with other states. 13 Another king in the Warring States period took even more dramatic action in an episode that coincidentally shows the effectiveness of disguise and the ability of emissaries to penetrate other states and gather information: 

After ordering his son to assume administrative control of Chao, around 298 B.C. King Hui of Chao, personally wearing the garb of the Hu nomadic people, led his warriors and offi-cials out into the northwest to invade Hu territory, intending moreover to move due south from Yün-chung and Chiu-yüan and unexpectedly attack Ch'in. Accordingly he pretended to be a Hu emissary and thus entered Ch'in.

Although the king of Ch'in didn't recognize him, he felt it strange that he appeared so powerful and noted that his atti-tude certainly was not that of a mere minister. Accordingly, the king

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had someone pursue him, but King Hui had already escaped by racing out through the pass. When they inquired and dis-covered that it was King Hui of Chao, the populace was aston-ished. King Hui succeeded in entering Ch'in because he had wanted to personally ascertain the terrain's configuration and thus observe what sort of man the king of Ch'in might be. 14

King Hui subsequently led successful military expeditions out into these territories.

Han Shih-chung ( 1089-1151), a famous Southern Sung gen-eral who futilely opposed appeasing the northern barbarian forces, was similarly motivated to undertake his own observa-tions of the enemy:

Liu Chung had occupied Mount Pai-mien with several tens of thousands of troops, the palisades around their encampments even being within sight of each other. When Han Shih-chung first arrived in the area, he wanted to quickly mount a surprise attack. However, Meng Yü, the regional Pacification Commis-sioner, would not permit it. Han Shih-chung then said: "For the military strategist advantage and disadvantage are a matter of thoroughness in planning, something that those in central gov-ernment administration would not understand! Please allow me to report back in half a month." He proceeded to erect fortifica-tions opposite all the enemy's encampments and then sat 

around playing chess and holding drinking feasts, solidly en-sconced within his walls. No one could understand it.

One evening Han Shih-chung and Su Ke rode together into the enemy's camp. When the perimeter guards challenged them, Shih- chung responded with the password he had previously secured. After looking all about their encampments, they de-parted. Elated, Shih-chung exclaimed, "This is a gift from Heaven!" That very night he had two thousand elite troops es-tablish an ambush on Mount Pai-mien and then led his gener-als in a penetrating assault upon Liu's encampments. Just when the enemy's troops were responding to the attack, Han's concealed forces raced into the central army's position where they seized the watchtowers, emplaced their own flags, and then began yelling like thunder. Looking back, the rebel troops became frightened and crumbled. Han Shih-chung then led his generals and troops in a pincer attack, severely defeated the enemy, and beheaded Liu Chung. Honan was thus pacified. 15

Not only actual commanders felt the pressing need for forward observers, security patrols, reconnaissance scouts, various agents, and

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spies, but also the theoretical writings all emphasized the em-ployment of forward scouts. Apart from Sun-tzu's initial em-phasis upon securing precise knowledge of the enemy and ter-rain through various means, including local guides, the T'ai Kung stated:

In general, when you venture deep beyond the enemy's bor-ders, you must investigate the configuration and strategic ad-vantages of the terrain and concentrate upon seeking out and improving the advantages. Rely upon mountains, forests, ravines, rivers, streams, woods, and trees to secure defense. Carefully guard passes and bridges, and moreover be certain you know the advantages of terrain conveyed by the various cities, towns, hills, and funeral mounds. In this way the army will be solidly entrenched. The enemy will not be able to sever our supply routes, or be able to occupy positions cutting across our front and rear. 

Now the rule for commanding an army is always to first dis-patch scouts far forward so that when you are two hundred kilometers from the enemy, you will already know their loca-tion. If the strategic configuration of the terrain is not advanta-geous, then use the Martial Attack chariots to form a mobile rampart and advance. Also establish two rearguard armies to the rear, the further one a hundred kilometers away, the nearer fifty kilometers away. Thus, when there is a sudden alarm or urgent situation, both front and rear will know about it, and the Three Armies will always be able to complete their deployment into a solid formation, never suffering any destruc-tion or harm. 16

Chu-ko Liang even condemned as "worm infested" any army whose reconnaissance scouts were not thorough or whose for-ward observers failed to properly maintain the various signals and fires that would indicate an enemy advance. 17

In the T'ang dynasty Li Ch'uan, following in the tradition of the Wu-tzu and Six Secret Teachings, discussed the qualifications required for field personnel, together with the commander's in-telligence responsibilities:

When someone unites the masses of six armies and commands a force of a million men but instead of having a selected front employs all his troops indiscriminately, the wisest will lack the means to implement their plans, the sophists to exercise their persuasion, the courageous to rouse their daring, and the strong to show off their robustness. This is no different from advancing alone out onto the central plains--how could anyone achieve vic

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tory in battle? Thus Sun-tzu said, "An army that lacks a se-lected front is called routed."18

Now one selects officers with rewards, and through rewards en-sures their advancing. One employs officers through punish-ment, for punishment makes them wary of retreating. In antiq- 

uity those who excelled at selecting officers posted a list of re-wards at the Central Army's gate that ran as follows:

Those who ponder deeply and develop plans and strategies, who surpass the norm, will be assigned the highest rewards and decorously called "Wise and Capable Officers."

Those who can speak fluently about Horizontal Alliances, dis-cuss the principles of the Vertical Alliance, excel at verbal re-buttals and instigating and settling disputes, and are able to alter people's natures and seize their minds, will be assigned the highest rewards and decorously called "Disputatious and Persuasive Officers."

Those who can obtain information about private discussions between rulers and ministers, the nature and circumstances of audiences and court visits, will be assigned the highest re-wards and decorously termed "Agents and Spies."

Those who know the mountains and rivers, water and grasses, way stations and lodgings, roads and lanes, direct and indirect routes, will be assigned the highest rewards and decorously called "Local Guidance Officers."

Those who fashion the five weapons, the implements for as-sault and defense, unorthodox changes, deceit and disgrace, will be assigned the highest rewards, treated generously and termed "Officers of Skill and Artifice."

Those who can pull a five-picul bow; whose arrows pierce sev-eral layers of armor; can easily wield halberds, spears, swords, and pointed halberds; can attack a rhinoceros on land and seize great turtles in water; facilely take prisoners; capture flags; and collect the enemy's drums, will be assigned the high-est rewards, well treated, and called "Fierce and Resolute Offi-cers."

Those who can quickly mount and race a horse, jump over and circumvent walls and fortifications, and enter and leave en-campments without any trace will be assigned the highest re-wards, gathered together, and termed "Energetic, Nimble Offi-cers." 

Those who can race out and back three hundred kilometers be-fore nightfall will be assigned the highest rewards, collected to-gether, and termed "Officers with Fleet Feet."

Those whose strength is great enough to lift 630 catties and carry them fifty paces will be assigned the highest rewards and

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gathered together. Those who can lift 240 catties will be as-signed the next highest reward and gathered together. They will all be termed "Officers of Great Strength."

Those well-versed in the five elements and three phases, who can speak voluminously about the Tao of Heaven, yin and yang, feign and dissemble, will be assigned the lowest rewards, preserved, and termed "Officers of Techniques and Skill."

Now in employing these ten types of officers, you must fully ex-haust their talents and entrust them according to the Tao. For planning employ Wise and Capable Officers; for discussions, employ the Disputatious and Persuasive Officers. To separate the intimate and estrange the close, employ Agents and Spies. To deeply penetrate the territory of the feudal lords, employ Lo-cal Guidance Officers. To create the five weapons, employ the Officers of Skill and Artifice. To destroy enemy fronts, capture prisoners, defend dangerous locations, and attack the strong, employ the Fierce and Resolute Officers. To confuse the stupid and muddle the moronic, employ Officers of Technique and Skill.

This is termed "the Tao for entrusting responsibility to talent," the technique for selecting officers. Those descendants of the Three Sage Emperors and Five Hegemons who realized this Tao flourished, those who lost it perished. The Tao of flourishing and perishing does not lie in the ruler's brilliance and cultural attainments, but in selecting the capable and appropriately ex-ploiting their talents. 19

The attack on "brilliance and cultural attainments" in the last sentence is but another salvo in the unremitting conflict be-tween the literati, who esteemed the power of the civil, and the 

military officials burdened with the awesome martial responsi-bility of preserving the state from external threats.

During the early years of the Southern Sung after the emperor had been forced into the south, Hua Yüeh (who was actually banished for his outspoken opposition to barbarian appease-ment similarly decried the government's deliberate laxity in in-vestigating and preparing against border incursions:

I have heard that an army having scouts and agents is like a human body having ears and eyes. When the eyes and ears are incomplete, the person is handicapped, but when scouts and agents are not established, the army itself is crippled. My deaf-ness and blindness only handicaps my four limbs, but blind-ness and deafness in the army cause incalculable handicaps. Thus when recon

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naissance officers are not strict, wise men say the army lacks ears and eyes.

Only when the army can precede others in acting can it seize their minds. Enemy provocateurs gaining undetected entrance to your encampment and troops penetrating your walls, result-ing in the unbroken battle sounds of pipes and drums, both stem from the army lacking its own scouts and agents.

Since the establishment of the present peace the court hates to hear about developments along the border; therefore, generals and commanders fail to buy agents and spies. If they improve the defenses in the absence of incidents, they are said to be provoking border clashes, whereas if they speak about deploy-ments and strategic power when incidents arise, they are said to be divulging information about military essentials.

In recent years those occupying the rank of general have all been ordinary, undistinguished officers. Among them all, from the highest imperial official on down, including the command-ing generals of our field armies, I have yet to hear of anyone able to seek out agents and spies, to gather up what has been 

missed and thus assist what is merely heard about, to employ what is termed "the method of scouts and agents."

What is vision when border patrols are not strict and stations not established; when rewards are not bestowed to sustain their hearts, or gold or silk to stimulate fortitude in the officer's spirit? Those who learn of affairs achieve no merit, those who misperceive them no punishment. Thus officers do not go out beyond the border, spies do not enter the enemy's encamp-ment. Although the opposing armies may be separated by only a river and can look across at each other as if in the same en-campment, the smoke from their fires colliding in the air above, no one knows how many troops are in the enemy's camp. Even though they hear each other's chickens and dogs at dawn and dusk, no one knows the fullness or emptiness of enemy states, the so-called names and surnames of the villain's generals, their level of skill, whether their strategic power is poised to ad-vance or not, and whether they are courageous or fearful, prob-ably regarding these as if they were matters of a different era.

When they dare to look out across at the enemy, they only learn a minute portion of the situation. Thus it is hardly sur-prising that they perish and are defeated. Only through estab-lishing watch stations, summoning and enlisting agents and spies, and establishing communications with distant outposts will our border troops be free from difficulties and gain respite. Then, should incidents

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arise, they will not be distressed. This is termed "the method of scouts and agents."20

Not only a perspicacious condemnation of the practices of his age, his admonition repeatedly went unheeded in subsequent centuries, despite the great military compendium known as the Wu-ching Tsung- yao having thoroughly discussed the qualifi-cations and active employment of reconnaissance scouts nearly two centuries earlier.

The late Ming dynasty Ping-fa Pai-yen, written during the de-pressing onslaught of the Manchus by the heroic Chieh Hsüan, 

concludes the thread of theoretical assertions on the pressing need for knowledge of the enemy:

Definition: Skillfully employing one's ears and eyes is termed "knowledge."

Original Text: The first is called penetrators, the second spies, the third observers, and the fourth villagers [local guides]. Agents who penetrate enemy territory know the enemy's plans and plots; spies [tie] know the enemy's vacuities [gaps] and strengths; observers know the enemy's movement and rest, go-ing forth or standing down; villagers know the mountains, rivers, and roads in the enemy's state. When you know the en-emy's plans, you know what to destroy. When you know the enemy's strengths and vacuities, you know where to suddenly strike. When you know the enemy's movement and rest, going forth and standing down, you know what can be exploited; when you know the mountains, rivers, and roads, you know where to move.

Explanation: If you can successfully penetrate, spy out, ob-serve, and attain local guidance, it is all because the state has worms. If this is not the case, then its generals are incapable. Or again, because the army is filled with resentment. When worms arise in the state, then more enter from outside, for this is a natural pattern. Thus if you wish to know another man's state, you must first know the state's worms. 21

Under the rubric for "advancing" Chieh stressed the impor-tance of reconnaissance scouts and various forward agents by selectively enumerating the potential dangers an advancing army might encounter:

Definition: To penetrate where one intends to go is termed "ad-vancing."

Original Text: When traversing constricted terrain, you should consider the possibility of ambushes; when fording rivers, your

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only worry is sudden inundation. When setting out at daybreak be fearful of explosive attack, when halting at night be wary of baseless disturbances. When supplies may be easily cut off, form closely connected columns, where hasty advance is diffi-cult, roll up your baggage and advance. 22 If you do not take defensive precautions over one segment, you will be lost over the distance of the advance. First sketch out the configuration of terrain in order to observe its major strategic features, then seek out some natives in order to investigate it in minute detail. Concentrate upon finding out and knowing each and every marshy wood and mountain torrent, for only thereafter can you advance the army.

Explanation: When the army moves forward, you must have maps and natives in order to prepare for careful examination. Moreover, you should have reconnaissance patrols and roving scouts on the perimeter in order to defend against the unex-pected. [When in movement,] make the army heavy with the power of formations, be selective about the forces by employing defensive generals, supplement them with a covering army, constrain them with the two wings, and continue them with a strong rearguard. Even when passing through ravines and nar-rows, you cannot proceed in disorderly fashion, even when on level ground, you cannot abandon these preparations. Be cau-tious in sustaining the effort and there will be few instances of obstruction.

Active Probing Measures

Despite the employment of spies, reconnaissance efforts, and other observational clues, a general confronted by opposing forces might still be unsure of many aspects, including the configuration of terrain, the enemy's strength and component forces, the condition of the enemy's soldiers, and the comman-der's character and abilities. Consequently, the only alternative to simply blundering forward with a haphazard plan based upon partial intelligence, perhaps buttressed by experience, would be to actively probe the enemy, to test their defenses and responses with a heavy reconnaissance patrol or light cavalry company and thereby detect weaknesses, gaps, and possible patterns of response, always assuming the enemy commander 

had not anticipated these probes and prestructured a mislead-ing response. By the end of the Spring and Autumn period ac-tive probing was apparently an essential part of military opera-tions, critical to the project of intelligence gathering. Two early military writings, the Ssu-ma Fa and

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the Wu-tzu, defined the classic method that commanders stud-ied and emulated on through the Ming:

In general, in warfare employ large and small numbers to ob-serve their tactical variations; advance and retreat to probe the solidity of their defenses. Endanger them to observe their fears. Be tranquil to observe if they become lax. Move to observe if they have doubts. Mount a surprise attack and observe their discipline.

Mount a sudden strike on their doubts. Attack their haste. Force them to constrict their deployment. Launch a sudden strike against their order. Take advantage of their failure to avoid harm. Obstruct their strategy. Seize their thoughts. Capi-talize on their fears. 23

Marquis Wu asked, "When our two armies are confronting each other but I don't know their general, if I want to fathom him, what methods are there?"

Wu-tzu replied: "Order some courageous men from the lower ranks to lead some light shock troops to test him. When the enemy respond, they should concentrate on running off instead of trying to gain some objective. Then analyze the enemy's ad-vance, whether their actions, such as sitting and standing, are in unison and their organization well preserved. Whether when they pursue your retreat they feign being unable to catch you, or when they perceive easy gain they pretend not to realize it. A commander like this may be termed 'a wise general.' Do not en-gage him in battle.

"If their troops approach yelling and screaming, their flags and pennants in confusion, while some of their units move of their own accord and others stop, some weapons held vertically, oth- 

ers horizontally--if they pursue our retreating troops as if they are afraid they won't reach us, or seeing advantage are afraid of not gaining it, this marks a stupid general. Even if his troops are numerous they can be taken."24

Sun-tzu also believed in actively probing the enemy and was equally followed by Sun Pin in this regard:

Critically analyze them to know the estimations for gain and loss. Stimulate them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping. Determine their disposition of force to know the tenable and fatal terrain. Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency. 25

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King Wei of Ch'i, inquiring about employing the military, said to Sun Pin, "If two armies confront each other, their two gener-als looking across at each other, with both of them being solid and secure so that neither side dares to move first, what should be done?"

Sun Pin replied: "Employ some light troops to test them, com-manded by some lowly but courageous officer. Focus on flee-ing, do not strive for victory. Deploy your forces in concealment in order to abruptly assault their flanks. This is termed 'the Great Attainment.'"26

General Field Assessments

The character, quality, and other aspects of an opposing force--apart from the detailed question of the commander's character and qualifications, discussed subsequently--may be deter-mined in large part from direct observation. Accordingly, begin-ning with the Spring and Autumn period perceptive thinkers isolated certain behavioral gestalts as predictive; once the en-emy was appropriately categorized, specific conclusions and potential paths of action immediately followed. Again, Sun-tzu's concise observations anchored the practice, although later elaborations expanded them greatly. Among the most interest-ing might be the following from "Maneuvering the Army": 27 

If an enemy in close proximity remains quiet, they are relying on their tactical occupation of ravines. If while far off they chal-lenge you to battle, they want you to advance because they oc-cupy easy terrain to their advantage.

If large numbers of trees move, the enemy are approaching. If there are many visible obstacles in the heavy grass, it is to make you suspicious. If the birds take flight, there is an am-bush. If the animals are afraid, enemy forces are mounting a sudden attack.

Those who stand about leaning on their weapons are hungry. If those who draw water drink first, they are thirsty. When they see potential gain but do not know whether to advance, they are tired.

Where birds congregate it is empty. If the enemy cries out at night, they are afraid. If the army is turbulent, the general lacks severity. If their flags and pennants move about, they are in chaos. If the officers are angry, they are exhausted.

If they kill their horses and eat the meat, the army lacks grain. If they hang up their cooking utensils and do not return to camp, they are an exhausted invader.

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One whose troops repeatedly congregate in small groups here and there, whispering together, has lost the masses. One who frequently grants rewards is in deep distress. One who fre-quently imposes punishments is in great difficulty. One who is at first excessively brutal and then fears the masses is the pin-nacle of stupidity.

One who has emissaries come forth with offerings wants to rest for a while.

If their troops are aroused and approach our forces, only to maintain their positions without engaging in battle or breaking off the confrontation, you must carefully investigate it. 

The great general Wu Ch'i similarly arrayed some basic obser-vations for Marquis Wu, translating circumstances and behav-ior into tactical possibilities:

Marquis Wu inquired: "From external observation of the enemy I would like to know their internal character, from studying their advance know at what point they will stop, in order to de-termine victory and defeat. May I hear about this?"

Wu Ch'i replied: "If the enemy approaches in reckless disarray, unthinking; if their flags and banners are confused and in dis-order; and if the men and horses frequently look about, then one unit can attack ten of theirs, invariably causing them to be helpless.

"If the feudal lords have not yet assembled; ruler and ministers are not yet in agreement; ditches and embankments not yet complete; prohibitions and orders not yet issued; and the Three Armies clamoring, wanting to advance but being unable to, wanting to retreat but not daring to--then you can attack with half the enemy's force, and never lose in a hundred encounters. . . .

"In general when evaluating the enemy there are eight condi-tions under which one engages in battle without performing divination.

"First, in violent winds and extreme cold they arise early and are on the march while barely awake, breaking ice to cross streams, unfearing of any hardship.

"Second, in the burning heat of midsummer they arise late and without delay press forward in haste, through hunger and thirst, concentrating on attaining far-off objectives.

"Third, the army has been out in the field for an extended pe-riod; their food supplies are exhausted; the hundred surnames are resentful and angry; and numerous baleful portents have arisen, with the superior officers being unable to quash their effects.

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"Fourth, the army's resources have already been exhausted; firewood and hay are scarce; the weather frequently cloudy and rainy; and even if they wanted to plunder for supplies, there is nowhere to go.

"Fifth, the number mobilized is not large; the terrain and water not advantageous; the men and horses both sick and worn out; and no assistance comes from their allies.

"Sixth, the road is far and the sun setting; the officers and men have labored long and are fearful. They are tired and have not eaten; having cast aside their armor, they are resting.

"Seventh, the generals are weak; the officials irresponsible; the officers and troops are not solid; the Three Armies are fre-quently frightened; and the forces lack any assistance.

"Eighth, their formations are not yet settled; their encampment not yet finished; or they are traversing dangerous territory and narrow defiles, half concealed and half exposed.

"In these eight conditions attack them without any doubts.

"There are six circumstances in which, without performing div-ination, you should avoid conflict.

"First, the land is broad and vast, the people wealthy and nu-merous.

"Second, the government loves the people, the ruler's benefi-cence extends and flows to all of them.

"Third, rewards are trusted, punishments are based upon in-vestigation, and both are invariably implemented in a timely fashion.

"Fourth, people are ranked according to their military accom-plishments, they award official positions to the Worthy and em-ploy the able.

"Fifth, their forces are massive and their weapons and armor are all first rate. 

"Sixth, they have the assistance of all their neighbors and the support of a powerful state.

"In general in these situations you are not a match for the en-emy, so without doubt avoid them. This is what is meant by 'seeing possibility and advancing, knowing difficulty and with-drawing.'" 28

The immediate leap from certain conditions to the judgment that an enemy might be attacked--an assessment obviously based upon experience, upon discerning a functionally debili-tating trait--marks the Chinese theoretical approach to warfare and will again be seen in the tactical principles rigorously cor-related with certain classifications of terrain. The symmetrical provision of conditions that are conducive or

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detrimental to attack reflects the categorical methodology of paired analysis and is similarly found in many other writers, such as Sun Pin's analysis of cities that may or may not be at-tacked, essentially continuing the idea of classifying potential targets as "go/no go."

Sun Pin similarly compiled a list of critical weaknesses that might be detected in an approaching army in a chapter entitled "The General's Losses":

First, if he has lost the means for going and coming, he can be defeated.

Second, if he gathers together turbulent people and immedi-ately employs them, if he stops retreating troops and immedi-ately engages in battle with them, or if he lacks resources but acts as if he has resources, then he can be defeated.

Third, if he constantly wrangles over right and wrong and in planning affairs is argumentative and disputatious, he can be defeated.

Fourth, if his commands are not implemented, the masses not unified, he can be defeated. 

Fifth, if his subordinates are not submissive and the masses not employable, he can be defeated.

Sixth, if the people regard the army with bitterness, he can be defeated.

Seventh, if the army is "old," he can be defeated.

Eighth, if the army is thinking about home, he can be defeated.

Ninth, if the soldiers are deserting, he can be defeated.

Eleventh, if the army has been frightened several times, he can be defeated.

Twelfth, if the soldiers' route requires difficult marching and the masses suffer, he can be defeated.

Thirteenth, if the army is focusing upon ravines and strong-points and the masses are fatigued, he can be defeated.

Fourteenth, if he engages in battle but is unprepared, he can be defeated.

Fifteenth, if the sun is setting and the road is far while the masses are dispirited, he can be defeated.

Seventeenth, if the masses are afraid, he can be defeated.

Eighteenth, if commands are frequently changed and the masses are furtive, he can be defeated.

Nineteenth, if the army is disintegrating while the masses do not regard their generals and officials as capable, he can be de-feated.

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Twentieth, if they have been lucky several times and the masses are indolent, he can be defeated.

Twenty-first, if he has numerous doubts so the masses are doubtful, he can be defeated. 

Twenty-second, if he hates to hear about his excesses, he can be defeated.

Twenty-third, if he appoints the incapable, he can be defeated.

Twenty-fourth, if their ch'i [spirit] has been injured from being long exposed on campaign, he can be defeated.

Twenty-fifth, if their minds are divided at the appointed time for battle, he can be defeated.

Twenty-sixth, if he relies upon the enemy becoming dispirited, he can be defeated.

Twenty-seventh, if he focuses upon harming others and relies upon ambushes and deceit, he can be defeated.

Twenty-ninth, if he deprecates the troops and the minds of the masses are hateful, he can be defeated.

Thirtieth, if he is unable to successfully deploy his forces while the route out is constricted, he can be defeated.

Thirty-first, if in the army's forward ranks are soldiers from the rear ranks and they are not coordinated and unified with the forward deployment, he can be defeated.

Thirty-second, if in engaging in battle, he is concerned about the front and the rear is therefore empty; or concerned about the rear, the front is empty; or concerned about the left, the right is empty; or concerned about the right, the left is empty, his engaging in battle being filled with worry, he can be de-feated. 29

The Six Secret Teachings also preserves extensive material of this type, critical to assessing the prospects for victory and pre-dicting enemy behavior. The chapter entitled "Empty Fortifica-tions" opens with a general statement of the need for accurate observation before arraying some concrete clues:

A general must know the Tao of Heaven above, the advantages of Earth below, and human affairs in the middle. He should mount high and look out far in order to see the enemy's 

changes and movements. Observe their fortifications, and then you will know whether they are empty or full. Observe their of-ficers and troops, and then you will know whether they are coming or going.

Listen to see if their drums are silent, if their bells make no sound. Look to see whether there are many birds flying above the

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fortifications, if they weren't startled into flight. If there aren't any vapors overhead, you will certainly know the enemy has tricked you with dummies.

If enemy forces precipitously go off but not very far, and then return before assuming proper formation, they are using their officers and men too quickly. When they act too quickly, the forward and rear are unable to maintain good order. When they cannot maintain good order, the entire battle disposition will be in chaos. In such circumstances quickly dispatch troops to at-tack them. If you use a small number to strike a large force, they will certainly be defeated.

No doubt these simplified recommendations were based upon battlefield experience, for similar examples may be found in the historical writings from the ancient period. For example, after the battle between Chin and Ch'i recounted earlier, Ch'i's clan-destine nighttime withdrawal was deduced from three sounds: the "happy chirping" of the birds, indicating a vacant terrain; groups of horses on the move; and the presence of birds just above the fortifications. 30

Li Ch'uan, one of China's foremost military theoreticians, con-templated these issues in more abstract terms, focusing on the dynamic dichotomy of form and spirit:

When armies are mobilized they have form and spirit. Flags and pennants, weapons and armor are their visible form; wis-dom, plots, plans, and affairs are matters of spirit. Being victo-rious in battle and successful in attacks is a matter of form, but the army's employment lies with spirit. Vacuity and full- 

ness, change and transformation are accomplishments of spirit, but their achievement lies in form. Form is coarse but spirit subtle. Form without definitive characteristics cannot be mirrored, spirit free of affairs cannot be investigated. When form appears confused, external manifestations become delu-sory; when spirit is secretive and self- contained, affairs are in-ternalized. Within these shapes spirit remains unseen; within self-contained spirit, affairs avoid discernment. Accordingly, ponder the following:

Dragging firewood to raise dust gives the appearance of numer-ous troops. Reducing the number of cookstoves and extin-guishing fires give the appearance of fewness. 31 Being coura-geous but not firm, initially opposing an enemy only to quickly run off, are the shape of retreat. Posting scouts in critical loca-tions throughout the mountains and marshes gives evidence of an advance. Oiled tents and pennon-topped screens are mani-festations of strength.

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Fallen flags and silent drums, the loneliness of desolation, are the shape of weakness.

Thus it is said that an army's form may be likened to a potter pulling clay or a smith forging metal. They make squares or cir-cles, bells or sacrificial vessels. Metal and earth have no fixed nature, they acquire names through workmanship. Combat de-ployments have no inherent power, they assume their shape depending upon the enemy. "Thus the pinnacle of military de-ployment approaches the formless." When this is achieved, agents and spies will be unable to find a chink, the wisest strategists unable to plot against it. 32 [As Sun-tzu said:] "In accord with the enemy's disposition measures that achieve vic-tory are imposed on the troops, but the troops are unable to fathom them. Men all know the disposition by which we attain victory, but no one knows the configuration through which we control victory." Form that does not proceed from spirit is un-able to change and transform; spirit not based upon the enemy is unable to create wise plans. Thus water configures its form 

in accord with the terrain, the army controls its victory in ac-cord with the enemy. 33

Since an army's organization, discipline, and command are all reflected in their flags and drums, the latter immediately pro-vide clues for evaluating enemy forces and estimating the pos-sibilities for victory. For example, the Six Secret Teachings pre-serves an assessment based upon the flags and drums in com-bination with more conventional factors:

When the Three Armies are well ordered; the deployment's strategic configuration of power solid, with deep moats and high ramparts, and they also enjoy the advantage of high winds and heavy rain; the army is untroubled; the signal flags and pennants point to the front; the sound of the gongs and bells rises up and is clear; and the sound of the small and large drums clearly rises--these are indications of the armies having obtained spiritual, enlightened assistance, foretelling a great victory.

When their formations are not solid; their flags and pennants confused and entangled with each other; they go contrary to the advantages of high wind and heavy rain; their officers and troops are terrified; their war horses have been frightened and run off; their military chariots have broken axles; the sound of their gongs and bells sinks down and is murky; the sound of their drums is wet and damp--these are indications foretelling a great defeat.

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In a famous dictum Sun-tzu enjoined, "Do not intercept well-ordered flags; do not attack well-regulated formations."34

However, in contrast to feigned disorder, true confusion and chaos are an invitation to victory and a sign that even numeri-cally superior forces can be successfully attacked, as Wu Ch'i observed in two well- known passages:

If their troops approach yelling and screaming, their flags and pennants in confusion, while some of their units move of their own accord and others stop, some weapons held vertically, oth- 

ers horizontally--if they pursue our retreating troops as if they are afraid they will not reach us, or seeing advantage are afraid of not gaining it, this marks a stupid general. Even if his troops are numerous, they can be taken. . . .

If the enemy approaches in reckless disarray, unthinking; if their flags and banners are confused and in disorder; and if their men and horses frequently look about, then one unit can attack ten of theirs, invariably causing them to be helpless. 35

A retreating force presents the commander with a particularly complex dilemma because failing to exploit the victory allows an already vanquished enemy time and opportunity to regroup and perhaps counterattack, but overzealous pursuit might dis-order one's own forces, making them vulnerable to a counterat-tack or ambush. Moreover, feigned retreats designed to induce such disorder always being a possibility, they were already much pondered in such classic writings as the Ssu-ma Fa and Wu-tzu and remained a critical concern throughout China's military history. Accordingly, it fell to commanders to decipher whether they were witnessing real enemy retreats or mere lures. The Northern Sung Hu-ling Ching summarized the pa-rameters for such judgments in a chapter entitled "Pursuit of the Enemy":

When an enemy flees during an engagement, there are five sit-uations in which you can pursue them.

First, when their fighting spirit has abated.

Second, when their infantry and cavalry have scattered chaoti-cally, many of the fleeing soldiers stumble and fall, and they do not reform their units.

Third, when they run off to their native villages or race to their fortifications.

Fourth, when their supplies and mailed troops are dispersed without being reassembled.

Fifth, when their commanding general has already died. There are six situations in which you cannot pursue them.

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First, even though they are defeated, if their fighting spirit has 

not abated.

Second, if the water in old streams and irrigation channels that the enemy have already crossed over suddenly stops flowing. Third, when the ranks and formations of a defeated, fleeing en-emy are not particular disordered.

Fourth, if in fleeing, the officials and officers are not really stumbling or falling nor are their infantry and cavalry inter-mixed.

Fifth, if in fleeing, they lack an escape route while mountains and valleys lie in all directions about them. 36

Sixth, the road is exhausted and their food used up, yet their officials and officers have not scattered very much.

When the enemy can be pursued, you should urgently pursue them. When the enemy should not be pursued, you should so-lidify your walls and observe them until there is some change in the relative advantages and disadvantages. Wait to advance until the moment when raising your forces will prove advanta-geous and damage their retreat.

By the Northern Sung dynasty Hsü Tung ( 976-1018) was thus able to effectively gather numerous individual pronouncements on assessing enemy strength, organization, intentions, condi-tion, and vulnerability and integrate them into several cate-gories, prefaced by some preliminary observations, in his Hu-ling Ching. 37 Moreover, at this time the Seven Military Classics, although not yet formally collected into one integrated volume, were well known and commentaries on Sun- tzu's Art of War were flourishing. Because he had the writings of the great Li Ch'uan and employed his insights extensively, Hsü Tung's chapters may be viewed as the culmination of the tradition, as will become clear as the following selections unfold. The first, entitled "Five Vital Points," expands the concept of a vital point (chi), the subtle crux or moment when (as already discussed) incipient change can be actualized, where minimal forces can have maximum effect. The idea, although found in philosophi-cal writings such as the Chuang-tzu as well, was perhaps first fully enunciated in the Wu-tzu:

In general, warfare has four vital points: ch'i, terrain, affairs, and strength. When the masses of the Three Armies, the mil-lion soldiers of the forces, are strategically deployed in appro- 

priate formations according to varying degrees of strength by one man, this is termed the "vital point of ch'i."

When the road is narrow and the way perilous, when famous mountains present great obstacles, and if ten men defend a place a thousand cannot pass, this is termed a "vital point of earth."

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Being good at controlling clandestine operatives, with a few light troops harassing the enemy, causing them to scatter, and forcing rulers and ministers to feel mutual annoyance, higher and lower ranks to reproach each other, this is termed the "vi-tal point of affairs."

When the chariots have solid axles and secure pins, the boats well-suited rudders and oars, the officers are thoroughly famil-iar with the fighting formations, and the horses practiced in pursuit and maneuvers, this is termed the "vital point of strength." 38

Hsü Tung transformed Wu Ch'i's four vital points into five, two of which focus on intelligence operations:

Military affairs have five vital points: the first is terrain; the second, affairs; the third, strategic power; the fourth, advan-tage; and the fifth, spiritualness.

When in arraying your encampments and deploying into forma-tion, you occupy the strategic points first and thus compel the enemy to advance against the advantages conferred by your strategic power, this is termed the "vital point of terrain."

If you carefully ferret out the enemy's affairs and then exploit this knowledge to deceive the enemy by apparently acting in accord with their expectations without allowing them to realize it, this is referred to as the "vital point of affairs."

When you can excite the spirit [ch'i] of ten men so that they may be employed as if they were a hundred, and similarly a hundred as if they were a thousand, so that the awesomeness 

of your army's name and its ch'i resounds like thunder and whoever opposes you will be destroyed, this is termed the "vital point of strategic power."

When provisions and fodder have been massively accumulated, the men and horses well trained, and supply routes to the en-emy's borders are everywhere open and advantageous, this is termed the "vital point of advantage."

When the enemy successfully estimates your strength to the front but miscalculates about the rear, or proves accurate when far off but fails when you are near, while they are unable to determine the nature and direction of your actions, this is termed the "vital point of spirituality."

Anyone who employed the army in accord with these five points in reacting to their enemies never proved incapable of assault-ing cities and occupying territory. 39

Once defined, Hsü Tung's critical points may be employed to evaluate enemy forces by their coherence or deviation:

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Those who employ their officers and troops without timely con-straints can be attacked. 40 Those whose soldiers and horses miss the proper time for eating can be attacked. Those who es-tablish encampments on terrain that lacks convenient access can be attacked. Those who are noisy and clamoring when de-ploying into formation, who do not stop when constrained, can be attacked. Those whose fortified encampments lack deep springs or streams can be attacked. Those who cannot avoid moving on inauspicious days and baleful lunar phases can be attacked. Those whose generals argue over their achievements can be attacked. Those who expel their planning officers can be attacked. Those whose officials are resentful and high officers angry can be attacked. Those whose soldiers do not appropri-ately respond to challenges can be attacked.

If you are able to observe any of these ten, attack without doubt. Sun-tzu said, "Observe them to know their patterns of movement and stopping."41 This is what he meant. If you are 

unable to observe the enemy's nature and situation, yet reck-lessly engage in battle, it is termed "offering your troops to the enemy." 42

Just as Wu Ch'i listed favorable and unfavorable circum-stances for attacking an enemy, Hsü Tung enumerated ten ex-ploitable conditions and five negative situations. Those listed in "Ten Possible Attacks" focus on the enemy's beliefs, morale, or-ganization, and unity:

First, an enemy that believes in ghosts and frequently prays must be harboring doubts and fears because they are inca-pable of properly employing men.

Second, the enemy concentrates upon seasonal concordances, selecting appropriate geomantic positions, and observing cloud phenomena without concerning themselves with topographical characteristics, such as difficult or easy, or carefully examining whether they are acting in accord with or contrary to human hearts. 43

Third, when halting, the enemy is obsessed with advantages of terrain but unable to maintain proper order, ensure adherence to commands, or impose strict precautions among the troops. Fourth, the army's troops are constantly moving and shifting about whether in camp or deployed in formation. They are mostly afraid and doubtful.

Fifth, the commander's announcements lack substance, affairs are designed to profit him, the officials are annoyed, and the officers are angry.

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Sixth, the generals and officials are dissipated and dilatory. Seventh, the terrain on which they have established their en-campment lacks defensible terrain in all four directions. Eighth, the general treats his subordinates unceremoniously. Ninth, rewards and punishments have been overturned. Tenth, their generals and officers are mostly light.

However, if you want to launch a sudden attack against them, you must first have your spies [hsi jen] secretly ferret out their actual conditions in order to exploit them. Only then will your attacks invariably strike home. It would also be appropriate for your own forces to regard these ten as a warning. 44 

Corresponding to conditions susceptible to attack are five whose problematic aspects suggest the enemy are trying to de-ceive your reconnaissance agents and lure your forces into a trap:

First, when your two armies are separated by some kilometers and you observe that the enemy are tired, weak, negligent, and lazy, their commands and orders not being respected, you may therefore conclude the enemy are vulnerable to attack. How-ever, if you do not yet know the terrain's configuration or the enemy's disposition of power--whether there are stagnant ex-panses of water or treacherous marshes, the roads twist and turn back upon themselves, the heights and lowlands mutually recede into each other, or the degree of forestation and heavy vegetation--you should respond as if the enemy is deliberately manifesting weakness while concealing strength, displaying laxity while hiding good order, showing a lack of planning while concealing wisdom, and showing being far off while their core forces are nearby. When they act thus without retreating for a long time, they must be executing an unorthodox strategy. Second, when the engagement has neither been long nor have the enemy's forces sustained significant damage, yet they abandon their drums and flags to hurriedly race off, do not pursue them, for there are certainly forces concealed in am-bush.

Third, when prisoners taken by the enemy suddenly escape and return with information about the enemy's activities or we capture enemy prisoners who similarly tell us about the en-emy's activities, these are both enemy plots. Do not trust such reports.

Fourth, when the enemy's forces, exploiting their strategic power, drum the advance and press forward to assault us, en-courage your troops to maintain a solid defense and await them. Engaging in battle with soldiers exploiting their strategic power,

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whose morale is awesome and spirit exhilarated, is not advan-tageous.

Fifth, if the enemy establishes their formations without regard to being on fatal terrain while their drums and flags are well 

ordered and constrained. 45

The third item attests to the common employment of disinfor-mation through priming prisoners who are then allowed to es-cape and suddenly capturing prisoners who willingly offer in-formation, methods espoused by many of the later military the-orists.

A long-range method for assessing an enemy's strength and de-termining their basic movements was observing the dust clouds raised by their activities. Although no doubt summariz-ing common knowledge at the end of the Spring and Autumn period, Sun-tzu drew attention to its potential with the first theoretical discussion: "If dust rises high up in a sharply de-fined column, chariots are coming. If it is low and broad, the infantry is advancing. If it is dispersed in thin shafts, they are gathering firewood. If it is sparse, coming and going, they are encamping."46

Hsü Tung, being an ardent student of Sun-tzu, expanded his correlations to subsume the new force components of the cav-alry and the evolution of maneuver and unorthodox tactics over the centuries to systematically derive fundamental intelligence about the enemy. His Hu-ling Ching chapter entitled "Analyzing Dust" provides the most sophisticated and comprehensive ex-ample of this observational science.

When the enemy first approaches, if the dust rises in streams but is dispersed, they are dragging brushwood. If it rises up likes ears of grain and jumps about chaotically, chariots are coming. If the dust is thick and heavy, swirling and turbulent as it rises up, cavalry are coming. If it is low and broad, spreading and diffuse as it rises, infantry are advancing.

When the army is small and the dust is scattered and chaotic, it means the units are not closely ordered. If the troops are nu-merous but the dust clear, it means the units are well ordered and the general's commands systematic. If dust arises to the front and rear, left and right, it means they are employing their troops without any consistent method. 

When the army moves and the dust rises in streaks without dispersing, or when the army halts and the dust also stops, it is because the general's awesomeness and virtue have caused the units to be strictly ordered. If when they encamp or set out their deploy

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ments dust rises up and flies off, mount defenses against those places where it originated because enemy forces will certainly be approaching in ambush there. Observing the enemy through rising dust is thus a technique for estimating the enemy's forces and seizing victory.

Although a number of military formations--such as square, round, goose, eagle, and elongated--were frequently discussed and presumably employed by the classic writers, including Sun-tzu and Sun Pin, reconnaissance observations always tended to focus upon how the enemy exploited the configura-tion of terrain and whether the process of deploying their troops was orderly or haphazard. In "Analyzing Enemy Forma-tions" Hsü Tung moves from the simple elongated formation to two common types of terrain--tenable and mountainous:

When the enemy's deployment is somewhat elongated and marked by a thin center, from a firm position opposing their flanks our elite forces should first forcefully penetrate the en-emy's heart. When their strength wanes, increase the number of soldiers advancing against them. Wait for the enemy to initi-ate some minor movement on the flanks to rescue the center, and then withdraw your assault troops and reestablish the so-lidity of your formations. Wait until their deployments again begin to shift, then signal your flanking troops to take advan-tage of it.

If the enemy deploys well-ordered, apparently unified units on fatal terrain, their commander is worthy and the troops picked, so you cannot launch an attack against them. However, if their flags move about chaotically, the commander is stupid and in-capable of selecting advantageous terrain, causing uneasiness in their units. You can therefore press them and then launch an assault that will certainly prove victorious. 

However, if they deploy on tenable ground where it is conve-nient for the men and horses to enter and exit, their lines are strictly ordered, their flags and pennants like a picture, and their drums and gongs respond to the measures without any clamoring or shouting, their commanding general is executing preplanned tactics and excels at gaining advantages of terrain, so you cannot carelessly attack. Conversely, if they deploy on tenable ground but their orders are not strict, their formations undisciplined, and their advancing and retreating disordered, it indicates that internally the general is incapable of under-standing military administration, and externally cannot select advantageous terrain. The minds of the officers and troops will certainly not be stalwart, so

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by unleashing some troops to mount a sudden strike, you will certainly be victorious.

If the enemy deploys where there are mountains to both sides but cannot fully occupy the valley, you can attack them. Any-one who arrays his formations but is incapable of according with the strategic advantages of the terrain can be attacked. Thus among those who excel in warfare there were none who did not follow these indications to analyze the possibilities of victory and defeat.

Every encampment represented both a threat and a target of opportunity, depending upon the commander's skill in select-ing the terrain and organizing his defensive forces. Surprise was generally considered essential to any assault, but observa-tional analysis might reveal fatal weaknesses that might easily be exploited:

When the supply routes into the enemy's encampment are not convenient, it will be advantageous to mount a sustained de-fense. When the enemy has encamped on high, dry terrain but not concerned themselves with the advantages of water sup-plied from a spring, you can wait them out because the men and horses will grow thirsty after some time. If the encamp-ment benefits from springs but the terrain is wet, they can be pressed. If the configuration of terrain about their encampment 

is not conducive to entering and exiting, you can attack them. If their encampment is large and spread out while the number of troops is few, you can assault them. But if their encamp-ment has a tight perimeter with numerous troops, you cannot take them lightly. If their perimeter defenses are not uniform, attack their gaps. If the enemy's encampment has convenient access in all directions and benefits from ample water and grass, they cannot be taken lightly. This is the method for ana-lyzing enemy encampments. 47

The existence of such fundamental knowledge about enemy be-havior and principles for evaluating never guaranteed that such hard-won perceptions would be exploited. For example, in the Sung dynasty Liu K'ai's astute deductions were thoroughly frustrated:

As the emperor had just ordered a major campaign of rectifica-tion in the north, Liu K'ai's company was employed in forward-ing provisions to the army. When the imperial forces were about to reach Chuo-chou, a Khitan leader in command of ten thousand cavalry came up and engaged Mi Hsin, Liu's com-mander, in a standoff. Somewhat thereafter the Khitan leader dispatched an emissary to

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pretend to discuss terms of surrender. Liu K'ai said to Mi Hsin: "The Art of War states, 'One who requests peace without condi-tions has a plot.' They certainly have some secret plot. If you urgently attack them, we will certainly be victorious." However, Mi Hsin was doubtful and indecisive. Two days later the rebels again brought their troops up and sought to provoke an en-gagement. Observers later learned that the Khitan had, in fact, run out of arrows and been awaiting resupply from Yu-chou. 48

This passage incidentally provides evidence that military offi-cials were well versed in the Art of War but had not necessarily memorized it exactly because the closest statement to be found therein advises that "one who has emissaries come forth with offerings wants to rest for a while." 49 

However well conceived and experientially based Sun-tzu's and Wu- tzu's methods, with the passing of centuries their tactics became increasingly well known and could therefore be balked by knowledgeable commanders anticipating the enemy's ac-tions based upon the situation's parameters. Thus in the Sung dynasty--although certainly earlier in practice--Hsü Tung strongly advocated operating contrary to normal expectations, exploiting the predictable range of interpretations to achieve the surprise necessary for decisive victory, thereby frustrating the enemy's intelligence and planning cycle. "Contrary Employ-ment of Ancient Methods" takes as its basis several detailed statements found in Sun-tzu Art of War and Wu Ch'i's observa-tions in the Wu-tzu:

One who studies ancient tactics and employs the army in ac-cord with their methods is no different from someone who glues up the tuning stops and yet tries to play a zither. I have never heard of anyone being successful. The acumen of strategists lies in penetrating the subtle amid unfolding change and dis-cerning the concordant and contrary. Now whenever mobilizing the army, you must first employ spies to investigate whether the enemy's commanding general is talented or not. If instead of implementing tactics, he merely relies on courage to employ the army, you can resort to ancient methods to conquer him. However, if the commanding general excels in employing an-cient tactics, you should use tactics that contradict the ancient methods to defeat him.

Now in the army's unorthodox employment nothing is more un-orthodox than establishing ambushes. Furthermore, in the un-orthodoxy of establishing ambushes, nothing is more unortho-dox than new wisdom. However, it is not that this new wisdom fails

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to take antiquity as its teacher, but that it contravenes it. When the ancients analyzed an approaching enemy, before the fronts engaged in battle they first provoked them with some lower-ranking but courageous men to observe whether the commands conveyed by their signal flags and drums were uni-fied or disordered; whether their officers and horses were 

strong or weak; whether their deployments were distorted or correct; whether their subformations were strictly ordered or chaotic; and whether their speech was clamoring or subdued, in order to determine whether they could be victorious or not. Thus the ancient tactics state: "If their troops approach yelling and screaming, their flags and pennants in confusion, while some of their units move of their own accord and others stop, some weapons held vertically, others horizontally--if they pur-sue our retreating troops as if they are afraid they will not reach us, or seeing advantage are afraid of not gaining it, this certainly marks a general without tactics. Even if his troops are numerous they can be taken."50 Although the ancients achieved success in this way, if someone analyzes us and we apparently act in accord with such analyses, we can deploy troops in ambush to await them. Manifest some false appear-ance, wait for them to send forth their troops, and then spring your ambush to attack them.

The ancient manuals state: "Those who stand about leaning on their weapons are hungry. Those who draw water and drink first are thirsty. Those who see potential gain but do not ad-vance are tired. If the army is turbulent, the general lacks severity. Those whose flags move about are in chaos. Those whose officers are resentful are tired. If they hang up their cooking utensils and do not return to camp, they are an ex-hausted invader. One whose troops repeatedly congregate in small groups here and there, whispering together, has lost the masses, 51 Those who frequently look about have lost their unit integrity. One who has emissaries come forth with offerings wants to rest for a while." The ancients analyzed men in this fashion, but today it is different. Armies presently segment off elite, spirited warriors and officers to establish ambushes at strategic choke points, then have their tired and wounded act hungry and thirsty, or pretend they have lost their unitary or-ganization, or frequently move their flags about. They startle and perturb their troops a few times, or have their officers talk clamorously, all in order to respond as predicted by the en-emy's analysis. If they suddenly send their army forth to attack you, secretly spring your preestablished ambushes and unex-pectedly strike them. 

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[ Wu-tzu's] ancient methods state: "When the enemy has just arrived and their battle formations are not yet properly de-ployed, they can be attacked. When they have traveled a great distance and the rearguard has not yet had time to rest, they can be attacked. When they are crossing ridges or traversing ravines, half concealed, half exposed, they can be attacked. When fording rivers and only half of them have crossed, they can be attacked. On narrow and confined roads they can be at-tacked. If their flags and banners move about chaotically, they can be attacked. When their formations frequently move about, they can be attacked."52 However, in our case this isn't true. When we haven't fully deployed into our final disposition, we can establish ambushes on the four sides. When traveling a great distance without resting, we can establish ambushes in the middle. We can also establish ambushes when half hidden and half exposed on mountain ridges, in long forests, and along sandy valleys. When fording a river, even with half still not yet across, we can establish ambushes along the banks and ridges. Along narrow and confined roads we can establish ambushes both ahead and behind. When our flags chaotically move about and our formations frequently shift, we can establish am-bushes both to the fore and rear.

When a defeated enemy flees but the army dares not offer pur-suit, it is to prevent being ambushed. [ Sun-tzu's] ancient methods state: "When birds take flight, there is an ambush. If large numbers of trees move, the enemy are approaching."53 However, it's not invariably the case that there is an ambush or troops coming. Perhaps they want to create a feigned army. If we have already fled, we can order many old and weak soldiers to shake numerous trees, startle birds into flight, and create similar phenomena. The Art of War states: "One who seeks peace without setting any prior conditions is executing a strat-agem. One whose troops half advance and half retreat is entic-ing you." This also stemmed from large armies sneaking away but, fearing pursuers to the rear, establishing such techniques to cause doubt. 

When analyzing an enemy based upon their manifestations, give great thought to contravening the methods of the ancients. Make them numerous and employ them among men. Thus tac-tics are like a wagon carrying goods: The wagon's movement depends upon the wheels turning, but the direction as north, south, east, west proceeds from man. Thus it is clear that an-cient tactics cannot be taken up and employed.

Hsü Tung's chapters clearly provide a late Sung perspective on the realities of military combat in an uncertain age of warfare, and the

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chapter thus preserves a final, sophisticated approach to ex-ploiting anticipated enemy intelligence analyses. However, he uncritically ignores Sun-tzu's discussions on the formless and unorthodox, especially as encapsulated in "Strategic Military Power," which stress them as the foundation for mystifying the enemy, as well as other classical writers, such as Li Wei-kung, who extensively analyzed the inherent relationship between ex-pectation and the unorthodox. Certainly Sun-tzu never in-tended his tactical principles to be taken as definitive or single-mindedly employed, for he clearly stated: "A victorious battle strategy is not repeated, the configurations of response are in-exhaustible."54

The Role and Importance of Ch'i

In the Questions and Replies the second T'ang emperor is quoted as stating he evaluates others by using himself as a ref-erence point: "When I was about to engage in battle, I first eval-uated the enemy's mind by comparing it with my mind to de-termine who was more thoroughly prepared. Only after that could I know his situation. To evaluate the enemy's ch'i, I com-pared it with our own to determine who was more controlled. Only then could I know myself. For this reason, 'know them and know yourself' is the great essence of the military strate-gists."55 The emperor's statement briefly refers to the question of the enemy's ch'i (or spirit), the critical component in the Chi-nese psychology of warfare that was the subject of extensive 

writing and theorizing. In essence, it was vital to determine the enemy's psychological energy, manipulate the situation to ex-ploit any weakness or dissipation, and compel their forces into enervating and demoralizing activities before engaging in battle. Among intelligence objectives, it ranked paramount with troop strength and the enemy's commander and could never be ne-glected.

The first historical passage to raise the concept of ch'i in a mili-tary context is a Tso Chuan entry for a seventh century B.C. event that prompted discussion for millennia thereafter, even being adopted in the late Sung to illustrate ch'i's psychodynam-ics:

During the Spring and Autumn period, the state of Ch'i at-tacked the state of Lü. Duke Chuang, commanding Lü's forces, was about to commit the army to battle when Ts'ao Kuei re-quested permission to join him. The Duke had him ride in his chariot and went into battle at Ch'ang-shao. The duke was about to have the drums sound the advance when Ts'ao Kuei said to him, "Not yet."Ch'i sounded their drums three times then Ts'ao said, "Now." They

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beat the drums and engaged in combat, and Ch'i's army was severely defeated.

The duke inquired why Ts'ao Kuei had delayed the drums. Ts'ao replied: "Combat is a matter of courageous ch'i. A single drumming arouses the soldiers' ch'i, with a second it abates, and with a third it is exhausted. They were exhausted while we were vigorous, so we conquered them."56

The military thinkers, who well understood the difficulty of compelling men to engage in combat, identified ch'i as the psy-chophysical component whose surge made violent actions pos-sible. Sun-tzu was perhaps the first to recognize and describe the critical role of spirit and courage in battle, but the other Seven Military Classics and some of the early philosophical writings similarly pondered ways to nurture and manipulate a true combative spirit. Among the philosophers Mencius also 

gained fame for cultivating his "overflowing ch'i," although his conception differed significantly from that of the martial theo-rists. 57

The concept of ch'i--essentially the vital energy of life--is inte-gral to many fields of Chinese thought, ranging from meta-physics to medicine, science to religion. A traditional view envi-sions the character as originally representing fragrant vapors rising from steaming rice; therefore ch'i symbolizes nourish-ment in every sense. (The modern character is written with a component that means "rice.") However, the actual origins are obscure and a matter of much speculation that looks to such natural phenomena as vapors and clouds for possible images. The character itself seems to have appeared late in the Spring and Autumn, becoming frequent only in the Warring States pe-riod.

The early Ssu-ma Fa preserves a succinct analysis of the role of ch'i in soldiers: "In general, in battle one endures through strength, and gains victory through spirit. One can endure with a solid defense, but will achieve victory through being endan-gered. When the heart's foundation is solid, a new surge of ch'i will bring victory. With armor one is secure; with weapons one attains victory. When men have their minds set on victory, all they see is the enemy. When men have their minds filled with fear, all they see is their fear." 58 Men oblivious to death and committed to victory fight courageously, becoming extremely powerful in comparison to reluctant soldiers hoping to avoid wounds and death. Wu Ch'i embodied this insight with an im-age that greatly impacted the popular mind ever after: "I have heard that men have strengths and weaknesses, that their ch'i flourishes and ebbs. Now if there is a murderous villain hidden in the woods, even though a thousand men pursue him, they all look around like owls and glance

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about like wolves. Why? They are afraid that violence will erupt and harm them personally. Thus one man oblivious to life and death can frighten a thousand." 59 

The late Warring States Wei Liao-tzu transposed the image into the ordinary life experience of the populous marketplace: "If a warrior wields a sword to strike people in the marketplace, among ten thousand people there will not be anyone who doesn't avoid him. If I say it's not that only one man is coura-geous, but that the ten thousand are unlike him, what is the reason? Being committed to dying and being committed to seeking life are not comparable." 60

Sun-tzu analyzed the importance of recognizing and exploiting the enemy's ch'i state in a famous passage widely known from the Warring States on: "The ch'i of the Three Armies can be snatched away; the commanding general's mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i becomes indolent; at dusk their ch'i is exhausted. Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate ch'i." However, Sun-tzu's passage--his only direct comment upon ch'i, even though the entire Art of War may be seen as directed toward recognizing and manipulating it--was often misinterpreted as simply meaning attacks should be made only late in the day, prompting the following T'ang dy-nasty discussion on the extended meaning and implications of his analysis:

T'ang T'ai-tsung said: " Sun-tzu spoke about strategies by which the ch'i of the Three Armies may be snatched away: 'In the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i be-comes indolent; and at dusk their ch'i is exhausted. One who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted.' How is this?"

Li Ching said: "Whoever has life and a natural endowment of blood, if they die without a second thought when the drums are sounded to do battle, it is the ch'i that causes it to be so. Thus methods for employing the army require first investigating our own officers and troops, stimulating our ch'i for victory, and only then attacking the enemy. Among Wu Ch'i's four vital points, the vital point of ch'i is foremost. There is no other Tao. If you can cause your men to want to fight themselves, no one will be able to oppose their ardor. 

"What Sun-tzu meant by the ch'i being ardent in the morning is not limited to those hours alone. He used the beginning and end of the day as an analogy. In general, if the drum has been sounded three times but the enemy's ch'i has neither declined nor become

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depleted, then how can you cause it to invariably become indo-lent or exhausted? Probably those who study the text merely recite the empty words and are misled by the enemy. If one could enlighten them with the principles for snatching away the ch'i, the army could be entrusted to them." 61

The tactical discussion found in "Spirit in Warfare" from the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies provides a characterization of ch'i dynamics:

The means by which the commanding general wages warfare is his soldiers; the means by which the soldiers engage in combat is their ch'i. The means by which ch'i proves victorious is the beating of the war drums. Since the drums are capable of incit-ing the ch'i of the officers and troops, they should not be inces-santly employed. If employed too many times, the soldiers' ch'i will easily decline. Similarly, they cannot be employed when too far away from the enemy. If too far, the soldier's strength will easily be exhausted. You must estimate when the enemy will be within sixty or seventy paces and then beat the drums to signal the officers and troops to advance into combat. If the enemy's ch'i abates while yours surges, their defeat will be certain. A tactical principle from the Wei Liao-tzu states, "When their ch'i is substantial they will fight; when their ch'i has been snatched away they will run off."62

This brief analysis opens and closes by essentially splitting an observation from the Wei Liao-tzu: "Now the means by which the general fights is the people; the means by which the people fight is their ch'i. When their ch'i is substantial they will fight; when their ch'i has been snatched away they will run off."

The core insight found throughout such passages is the need to avoid stimulating the army's ch'i too early, causing it to fruit- 

lessly peak and then diminish. As Wu Ch'i said, ch'i ebbs and flourishes, and success in combat depends upon it reaching a zenith just at the moment of battle. The Chinese military writ-ings thus emphasize measures to manipulate the enemy until they become physically and emotionally exhausted, until their spirit or "will to fight" so severely diminishes that victory be-comes certain. When men are well trained, rested, properly fed, clothed, and equipped, if their spirits are roused, they will fight vigorously. However, if physical or material conditions have blunted their spirit, if there is any imbalance in the relation-ship between command and troops, or if for any reason they have lost their motivation, they will be defeated.

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Correlatively, the commanding general must avoid the enemy when their spirits are strong, such as early in the day, and ex-ploit any opportunity presented by their diminishment, attack-ing when they no longer have any inclination to fight, such as when about to return to camp. Prolonged warfare can lead only to enervation; therefore, careful planning to guarantee the swift execution of campaign strategy is paramount. Certain situa-tions--such as being thrust onto fatal terrain where a desperate battle must be fought--are conducive to eliciting the army's greatest efforts. Others are debilitating, dangerous, even fatal, and must be scrupulously avoided.

Sun Pin Military Methods also contains an important chapter on ch'i, the first part of which describes the process of attaining the requisite levels as the time for battle approaches: "When you form the army and assemble the masses, concentrate upon stimulating their ch'i. When you again decamp and reassemble the army, concentrate upon ordering the soldiers and sharpen-ing their ch'i. When you approach the border and draw near the enemy, concentrate upon honing their ch'i. When the day for battle has been set, concentrate upon making their ch'i deci-sive. When the day for battle is at hand, concentrate upon ex-panding their ch'i." 63

Given the gravity of psychologically preparing for battle, a lack of similar commitment in an enemy would immediately become 

obvious, indicated by external signs such as noted by the Wei Liao-tzu: "One who occupies ravines lacks the mind to do bat-tle. One who lightly provokes a battle lacks fullness of ch'i. One who is belligerent in battle lacks soldiers capable of victory."

In Sun-tzu's view the special case of hopeless circumstances, rather than causing the soldiers to despair, can be exploited to elicit an ultimate effort once the soldiers resign or even commit themselves to certain death. The psychological difficulty of course lies in convincing them there is no hope of survival without provoking the loss of their will to fight (as frequently happened throughout history). Although many military writers remarked upon the psychology of spirit, or ch'i, in desperate battles, Sun-tzu was probably the first to consciously articulate it as an operational principle. In the Art of War he states:

Cast them into positions from which there is nowhere to go and they will die without retreating. If there is no escape from death, the officers and soldiers will fully exhaust their strength.

When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply into en-emy territory they will cling together. When there is no alterna-tive they will fight. Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them penetrate fatal terrain and they will

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live. Only after the masses have penetrated dangerous terrain will they be able to craft victory out of defeat.

For this reason even though the soldiers are not instructed, they are prepared; without seeking it, their cooperation is ob-tained; without covenants they are close together; without or-ders being issued, they are reliable. Prohibit omens, eliminate doubt so that they will die without other thoughts. Thus it is the nature of the army to defend when encircled, to fight fer-vently when unavoidable, and to follow orders when compelled by circumstances. 64

Whenever fatal terrain is encountered or an enemy is sur-rounded, allowances must similarly be made for a possible 

resurgence in the enemy's spirit and then suddenly encounter-ing fierce opposition.

Although many of the specific traits observed in enemy armies enumerated by the various writers are obviously indications of the army's ch'i, the most comprehensive and focused chapter appears in the Six Secret Teachings. Entitled "The Army's Indi-cations," it interprets their ch'i in terms of discipline and men-tal state, translating those indications into predispositions for victory or defeat:

King Wu asked the T'ai Kung: "Before engaging in battle, I want to first know the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, to foresee indications of victory or defeat. How can this be done?"

The T'ai Kung replied: "Indications of victory or defeat will be first manifest in their spirit [ch'i]. The enlightened general will investigate them, for they will be evidenced in the men.

"Clearly observe the enemy's coming and going, advancing and withdrawing. Investigate their movements and periods at rest, whether they speak about portents, what the officers and troops report. If the Three Armies are exhilarated; the officers and troops fear the laws; respect the general's commands; re-joice with each other in destroying the enemy; boast to each other about their courage and ferocity; and praise each other for their awesomeness and martial demeanor--these are indica-tions of a strong enemy.

"If the Three Armies have been startled a number of times, the officers and troops no longer maintaining good order; they ter-rify each other with stories about the enemy's strength; they speak to each other about the disadvantages; they anxiously look about at each other, listening carefully; they talk inces-santly of ill omens, a myriad mouths confusing each other; they fear neither laws nor orders, and do not regard their gen-eral seriously--these are indications of weakness.

"When the Three Armies are well ordered; the deployment's strategic configuration of power solid, with deep moats and high 

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ramparts; and moreover they enjoy the advantages of high winds and heavy rain, while the army is untroubled the signal flags and pennants point to the front; the sound of the gongs and bells rises up and is clear; and the sound of the small and large drums clearly rises--these are indications of having ob-tained spiritual, enlightened assistance, foretelling a great vic-tory.

"When their formations are not solid; their flags and pennants confused and entangled with each other; they go contrary to the advantages of high wind and heavy rain; their officers and troops are terrified; and their ch'i broken while they are not unified; their war horses have been frightened and run off; their military chariots have broken axles; the sound of their gongs and bells sinks down and is murky; the sound of their drums is wet and damp-- these are indications foretelling a great defeat."

Commanders

As warfare evolved and campaign armies exceeded one hun-dred thousand men early in the Warring States period, field commanders assumed ever greater importance in any evalua-tive scheme. Sun-tzu early asserted that character flaws would readily doom an army to defeat: "The general is the supporting pillar of state. If his talents are all-encompassing, the state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked by fis-sures, the state will invariably grow weak." 65 Consequently, all the military writers, but especially Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, and the T'ai Kung, devoted extensive passages to enumerating the field commander's requisite characteristics--mainly focusing upon courage, wisdom, righteousness, benevolence, and credibility--and discussed such exploitable flaws as short-sightedness, ar-rogance, and a tendency to become easily angered. 66 Sun-tzu began the tradition of not just isolating flaws and correlating them with probable consequences, but also identifying tech-niques for exploiting them: "Generals have five dangerous char-acter traits. One committed to dying can be slain. One commit-ted to living can be captured. One easily angered and hasty to 

act can be insulted. One obsessed with being scrupulous and untainted can be shamed. One who loves the people can be troubled." 67

Roughly a century later Wu Ch'i amplified Sun-tzu's views in a chapter that integrated command considerations with the army's behavioral characteristics:

In general the essentials of battle are as follows: You must first attempt to divine the enemy's general and evaluate his talent. In ac

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cord with the situation exploit the strategic imbalance of power, for then you will not labor but still achieve results.

A commanding general who is stupid and trusting can be de-ceived and entrapped. One who is greedy and unconcerned about reputation can be given gifts and bribed. One who easily changes his mind and lacks real plans can be labored and dis-tressed.

If the upper ranks are wealthy and arrogant, while the lower ranks are poor and resentful, they can be separated and di-vided. If their advancing and withdrawing are often marked by doubt and the troops have no one to rely on, they can be shocked into running off. If the officers despise their command-ing general and are intent on returning home, by blocking off the easy roads and leaving the treacherous ones open, they can be attacked and captured.

If the terrain over which they advance is easy, but the road for withdrawal difficult, they can be forced to come forward. If the way to advance is difficult, but the road for retreating easy, they can be pressed and attacked.

If they encamp on low wetlands, where there is no way for the water to drain off, if heavy rain should fall several times, they can be flooded and drowned. If they make camp in a wild marsh or fields dense with a heavy tangle of grass and stalks, should violent winds frequently arise, you can burn the fields 

and destroy them. If they remain encamped for a long time, the generals and officers growing lax and lazy, the army becoming unprepared, you can sneak up and spring a surprise attack. 68

The expansive correlations embedded in a pivotal chapter of the Six Secret Teachings provide a basis for fathoming men and concocting plans:

What we refer to as the five talents are courage, wisdom, benevolence, trustworthiness, and loyalty. If he is courageous he cannot be overwhelmed. If he is wise he cannot be forced into turmoil. If he is benevolent he will love his men. If he is trustworthy he will not be deceitful. If he is loyal he will not be of two minds.

What are referred to as the ten errors are as follows: being courageous and treating death lightly; being hasty and impa-tient; being greedy and loving profit; being benevolent but un-able to inflict suffering; being wise but afraid; being trustwor-thy and liking to trust others; being scrupulous and incorrupt-ible but not loving men; being wise but indecisive; being reso-lute and self-reliant; and being fearful while liking to entrust responsibility to other men.

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One who is courageous and treats death lightly can be de-stroyed by violence. One who is hasty and impatient can be de-stroyed by persistence. One who is greedy and loves profit can be bribed. One who is benevolent but unable to inflict suffering can be worn down. One who is wise but fearful can be dis-tressed. One who is trustworthy and likes to trust others can be deceived. One who is scrupulous and incorruptible but does not love men can be insulted. One who is wise but indecisive can be suddenly attacked. One who is resolute and self-reliant can be confounded by events. One who is fearful and likes to entrust responsibility to others can be tricked. 69

The recently recovered Military Methods devotes two of its later chapters to flaws in the commander's character and in the army itself. The first list, from "The General's Defeats," origi-nally enumerated twenty defects, of which sixteen have sur- 

vived two millennia underground: "First, he is incapable but believes himself to be capable. Second, arrogance. Third, greedy for position. Fourth, greedy for wealth. Sixth, light. Sev-enth, obtuse. Eighth, has little courage. Ninth, courageous but weak. Tenth, has little credibility. Fourteenth, rarely decisive. Fifteenth, slow. Sixteenth, indolent. Seventeenth, oppressive. Eighteenth, brutal. Nineteenth, selfish. Twentieth, induces con-fusion." Sun Pin concluded by noting that "when his defects are numerous, his losses will be many."

The Northern Sung Hu-ling Ching also pointed out ways to ex-ploit discernible traits:

Before your two armies have clashed, observe the enemy's con-dition and situation, for then the general's talents and inclina-tions can be discerned. The ferocious who treat death lightly can be provoked and ambushed. The wise but slow can be pressed. Those who react rapidly but not wisely to critical events can be enticed. Those who react slowly but wisely to critical events can be resisted. The boastful can be isolated. Those who trust others can be deceived, those who do not can be estranged. The stubborn, perverse, and self-reliant can be suddenly attacked. Those who love others can be insulted. The greedy can be bribed. The rustic can be snatched. The incor-ruptible can be contaminated. The pure and aloof can be in-sulted. Those who fear ghosts and spirits can be scared. The timid who excel in using men can be deceived. When generals have any of these fifteen characteristics, attack them without doubt. 70

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The process of discerning character deficiencies was not merely passive, but included battlefield feints and probes mounted by reconnaissance forces to ferret out an enemy commander's ca-pabilities and weaknesses. Since battlefield observations fre-quently failed to provide sufficient data for evaluation, critical information about character and propensities also had to be gained through spies and defectors. 71

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16 Classifications of Terrain

THE CONCEPT OF REGIONALISM probably predates the Shang dynasty, originating whenever people first traveled be-yond the nuclear area of Chinese culture and confronted star-tling differences in terrain and vegetation. Since the population centers were scattered throughout the Yellow River valley and out onto the northern plains area, mountains would be found in many directions, while to the north and west lay the steppe, a region too dry to sustain agriculture. South across the Yangtze River existed a wetter, warmer region where rice, rather than millet or wheat, was cultivated. (Throughout subse-quent history the difference between the northern wheat-based food culture with pasta, steamed breads, and dumplings was popularly contrasted with the south, which emphasized rice.) Further distinctions were quickly noted among China's diverse regions, including barbarian and other remote areas, such as hot Szechwan, where radically different customs and impene-trable languages predominated. Even in the Spring and Au-tumn period the newly powerful states of Wu, Yüeh, and Ch'u were treated as uncivilized because of their uncouth clothing and strange practices, such as tattooing, and long after their "sinicization" were still regarded as uncultured areas where miscreants and political offenders might be banished.

With the inception of the doctrines of yin and yang and the five phases in the Warring States period--two fundamental con-cepts of Chinese protoscience used to classify and interpret phenomenal occurrences and their patterns--the five phases quickly became organizing rubrics for the cycles of seasonal ac-tivity, directions of the earth, and important regional differ-ences. Their fullest expression occurs in eclectic texts compiled around the end of the Warring States period, as

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well as the early medical writings, which correlate them with physiological aspects, visceral functions, the famous channels empirically employed for acupuncture, herbal and mineral ma- 

terials, bodily types, personalities, emotions, and even individ-ual traits, such as courage, as already seen. Concepts of re-gionalism invariably entailed political and projective implica-tions because the different states, being sited in geographically distinct regions, were expected to manifest different tempera-ments, tastes, and behavioral tendencies, such as being easily angered. Such thinking was equally reflected in Wu Ch'i's and Hsün- tzu's characterizations of the fighting tendencies of dif-ferent states already noted in the Warring States historical sec-tion. Although never specifically employed in the military writ-ings, 1 these concepts were so powerful and prevalent, consti-tuting an essential part of the literate person's worldview, that their principles and assumptions unavoidably influenced the tactical theorists and their expectations when, for example, traveling or campaigning in the west, a region associated with fall, death, and the element metal. They also influenced ac-counts of barbarian areas preserved in the historical writings, some of which were reprised in the section on political intelli-gence; others will be noted again in passages from the Wu-ch-ing Tsung-yao on regional traits and customs. 2

The earliest expression of regional theory has traditionally been attributed to the Shang Shu, which purportedly chronicles China's ancient history, although it largely consists of formal speeches on Virtue and details of government apparently deliv-ered on important political occasions. The classic asserts that the great Yü, one of China's mythical cultural heroes, delin-eated China's nine regions as part of his efforts to tame the floodwaters that previously inundated China, and characterizes them in terms of soil type, field productivity, and inhabitants such as "wild people dressed in skins." Much of this sort of in-formation, coupled with fanciful myths, commonsense observa-tions, and astute detail, eventually found its way into the Clas-sic of Mountains and Seas (Shan Hai Ching), probably compiled late in the Warring States period. Some of the information is simplistic, such as might immediately be imagined or deduced (correctly or not) about the Amazon or Australia from so-called common knowledge without actual experience. However, other passages evidence unique points derivable only from close ob-servation, even if subsequently embellished and transformed. 

A scheme found in the Shang Shu subsequently proved funda-mental to conceptualizing and organizing information into a se-ries of concentric realms centered on the king that radiate out to subsume the feudal lords, dependent states, and barbarian peoples. However, the latter

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were generally considered too remote to be fully incorporated into the administrative order and were therefore exempt from sending tribute, although still expected to acknowledge the em-peror and China's greatness as the center of the known realm. 3 From the Han dynasty on imperial Chinese dynasties simi-larly sought to structure their diplomatic relations and impose obligations of recognition on the outer barbarian areas in this way, but with all the feudal lands having been integrated into China itself, the concept lost its functional validity except in formally differentiating China from increasingly barbarous ter-rain. However, in the early Chou period the idealized concept of mounting imperial inspections to procure information and manifest the ruler's awesomeness at fixed intervals determined solely by the region's distance from the capital was at its apex. Essentially discontinued from the Spring and Autumn onward, the Chou Li still incorporated the concept into its schematized portrait of Chou rites.

Topography and Configurations of Terrain

The recognition that topography is fundamental to military tac-tics, the classification of terrain types, and the association of basic tactical principles with particular terrains may all be at-tributed to Sun-tzu. Even though a cursory examination of the Tso Chuan indicates that effective commanders had long been implementing terrain-based tactics, and certain land configura-tions, such as sinkholes, were known to present fatal obsta-cles, Sun-tzu was the first theorist to develop and systemati-cally correlate a coherent body of operational principles with particularized terrains. Thereafter one of the defining thrusts of Chinese intelligence practice and field theory was identifying discrete terrain features and formulating tactics for their ex-ploitation. In this regard the Art of War influenced all the later 

military writings, including several chapters found in the com-prehensive late Warring States Six Secret Teachings and the in-sightful Hu-ling Ching.

In the very first chapter of the Art of War Sun-tzu included ter-rain (Earth) among warfare's five major factors, providing a lim-ited definition of "Earth": "Earth encompasses far or near, diffi-cult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain." Therefore, determining who has gained the advantages of ter-rain offers a valuable indicator when calculating the probable victor in any encounter, and underpins another fundamental Chinese concept, that of shih, or strategic configuration of power. 4 Moreover, everything depends upon terrain because "terrain gives birth to measurement," leading in turn to calcu-lating the forces required to achieve victory and envisioning their

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configuration: "Terrain gives birth to measurement; measure-ment produces the estimation of forces. Estimation of forces gives rise to calculating the numbers of men. Calculating the numbers of men gives rise to weighing strength. Weighing strength gives birth to victory. Military intelligence thus con-sists not only of knowledge of the enemy, but also of the topog-raphy of the invasion route, the time of the engagement, and the physical characteristics of the battleground." 5

Although there have been reasonable suggestions that analysts in Sun-tzu's time employed some sort of tally board in the gen-eral assessment process, perhaps allotting a number of points represented by sticks or tallies to various categories, the actual method remains unknown. However, in addition to these boards and, subsequently, maps, which were extensively em-ployed beginning with the Warring States period, three-dimen-sional strategic portrayals were also made, similar to the sand tables used in military intelligence until their recent displace-ment by computer graphics. The first recorded incident, illus-trating the importance placed upon topography and the cate-gories of terrain, is preserved in the historical records dating to A.D. 32, when general Ma Yüan, frustrated by Emperor Kuang- 

wu's indecision, illustrated the enemy's bottled up positions among the surrounding hills with kernels of rice mounded ap-propriately on a table. 6

Nine terrains are frequently associated with Sun-tzu because that is the number described in a chapter with the same name. However, the Art of War actually discusses some twenty dis-tinct configurations of terrain and further identifies several deadly land formations, such as Heaven's Well. Commanders contemplating forward movement, assaults upon an en-trenched enemy, or any sort of tactical maneuvering ignored such terrains at their peril, just as they neglected the effects of simple grades, sand, wet ground, and other factors that ex-haust an army only at great cost. Accordingly, Sun-tzu not only advocated avoiding such conditions--while exploiting them whenever possible--but also insisted that "local guides," one of his five categories of agent, be employed to develop concrete knowledge of the land, as already noted.

Sun-tzu analyzed terrain configurations in three chapters: "Nine Changes,""Configurations of Terrain," and "Nine Ter-rains." Although many of his well-known nine terrains are identically described, minor variations mark the two key se-quences and several other configurations of importance. In "Configurations of Terrain" Sun-tzu begins, "The major configu-rations of terrain are accessible, suspended, stalemated, con-stricted, precipitous, and expansive," whereas in "Nine Ter-rains" he states, "There is dispersive terrain, light terrain, con-tentious terrain, traversable terrain, focal terrain, heavy ter-rain, entrapping terrain, encircled terrain, and fatal terrain."

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This suggests either that the concepts were still in flux or that the text has been corrupted and essential materials lost. How-ever, since the sequence found in "Nine Terrains" describes an army acting as an invader, the slight differences may derive from operational tactics for general combat verses those appro-priately implemented on enemy territory. 7 In any event, in "Configurations of Terrain" Sun-tzu states: "Configuration of terrain is an aid to the army. Analyzing the enemy, taking con- 

trol of victory, estimating ravines and defiles, the distant and near, is the Tao of the superior general. One who knows these and employs them in combat will certainly be victorious. One who does not know these or employ them in combat will cer-tainly be defeated." More importantly, he also asserted, "There is terrain for which one does not contend."

Sun-tzu's descriptions, being laconic indications of mere essen-tials, may be explicated by comparatively integrating all the material pertaining to any single category. Discrepancies in the suggested tactics and terms employed for a single description thus become immediately apparent, but so do the dimensions of his characterizations. Based upon the three chapters just mentioned, the major categories with their defining attributes thus produce the following characterizations, with the generally superior definitions found in "Nine Terrains" preceding material from the other two chapters:

When the feudal lords fight in their own territory it is dispersive terrain. 8 On dispersive terrain do not engage the enemy. The Tao of the invader is that when the troops have penetrated deeply, they will be unified, but where only shallowly, they will be inclined to scatter. On dispersive terrain I unify their will.

When they enter someone else's territory, but not deeply, it is light terrain. 9 On light terrain do not stop. The Tao of the in-vader is that when you have penetrated only shallowly, it is light terrain. On light terrain I have them group together.

If when we occupy it, it will be advantageous to us, whereas if they occupy it, it will be advantageous to them, it is con-tentious terrain. 10 On contentious terrain do not attack. On contentious terrain I race our rear elements forward.

If it is not advantageous for us to go forth or advantageous for the enemy to come forward, it is termed "stalemated." 11 In a stalemated configuration, even though the enemy tries to entice us with profit, we do not go forth. Withdraw our forces and de-part. If we strike them when half the enemy has come forth, it will be advantageous. 

When we can go and they can also come, it is traversable ter-rain. 12 On traversable terrain do not allow your forces to be-come

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isolated. On traversable terrain I focus on defense. If we can go forth and the enemy can also advance, it is termed "accessible." In an accessible configuration first occupy the heights and yang side, and improve the routes for transporting provisions. Then when we engage in battle it will be advantageous.

As for expansive configurations, if our strategic power is equal, it will be difficult to provoke them into combat. Engaging in combat will not be advantageous.

Land of the feudal lords surrounded on three sides such that whoever arrives first will gain the masses of All under Heaven is focal terrain. 13 On focal terrain unite and form alliances with nearby feudal lords. The Tao of the invader is that when the four sides are open to others, it is focal terrain. On focal terrain I solidify our alliances. Unite with your allies on focal terrain.

If we can go forth but it will be difficult to return, it is termed "suspended." In a suspended configuration, if they are unpre-pared, go forth and conquer them. If the enemy is prepared and we sally forth without being victorious, it will be difficult to turn back and is not advantageous.

The Tao of the invader is that when the army has left the state, crossed the enemy's border, and is on campaign, it is isolated terrain. Do not remain on isolated terrain.

When one penetrates deeply into enemy territory, bypassing numerous cities, it is heavy terrain. 14 On heavy terrain plun-der for provisions. The Tao of the invader is that when you have advanced deeply, it is heavy terrain. On heavy terrain I ensure a continuous supply of provisions.

As for precipitous configurations, 15 if we occupy them, we must hold the heights and yang sides to await the enemy. If 

the enemy occupies them first, withdraw our forces and depart. Do not follow them.

Where there are mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes, wherever the road is difficult to negoti-ate, it is entrapping terrain. 16 On entrapping terrain move through quickly. On entrapping terrain I speedily advance along the roads. Do not encamp on entrapping terrain.

As for constricted configurations, if we occupy them first, we must fully deploy throughout them in order to await the en-emy. 17 If the enemy occupies them first and fully deploys in them, do not follow them in. If they do not fully deploy in them, then follow them in.

Where the entrance is constricted, the return is circuitous, and with a small number they can strike our masses, it is encircled

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terrain. 18 On encircled terrain use strategy. The Tao of the in-vader is that when you have strongholds behind you and con-strictions before you, it is encircled terrain. On encircled ter-rain I obstruct any openings. 19 It is the nature of the army to defend when encircled. Make strategic plans for encircled ter-rain.

Where if one fights with intensity he will survive but if he does not fight with intensity he will perish, it is fatal terrain. 20 On fatal terrain engage in battle. If there is no place to go, it is fatal terrain. 21 On fatal terrain I show them that we will not live. It is the nature of the army to fight fervently when unavoidable, to follow orders when compelled by circumstances. On fatal terrain you must do battle.

Scattered throughout the Art of War, but especially in "Maneu-vering the Army," are numerous other important pronounce-ments on terrain-related issues, and crucial identifications of recurring features correlated with suggested tactics and opera-tional principles. Three of the most significant, much explored in later writings (such as the Hu- ling Ching), are fatal terrain, 

tenable terrain, and maneuvering the army across unfamiliar ground. Only a few pertain to problems posed by rivers and wa-ter obstacles, no doubt reflecting an early heritage of plains warfare. (As the scope of conflict expanded, the problems en-tailed by fording rivers, crossing wetlands, and negotiating lakes grew enormously, stimulating the development of naval forces in the southeast. Accordingly, the later military classics address these concerns more extensively.) According to Sun-tzu:

As for deploying the army and fathoming the enemy: To cross mountains follow the valleys, search out tenable ground, and occupy the heights. If the enemy holds the heights, do not climb up to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the mountains. 22

After crossing rivers, you must distance yourself from them. If the enemy is fording a river to advance, do not confront them in the water. When half their forces have crossed, it will be ad-vantageous to strike them. If you want to engage the enemy in battle, do not array your forces near the river to confront the invader, but look for tenable ground and occupy the heights. Do not confront the current's flow. 23 This is the way to deploy the army where there are rivers.

When you cross salt marshes and wetlands, concentrate on quickly getting away from them; do not remain. If you engage in battle in marshes or wetlands, you must stay in areas with marsh

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grass and keep groves of trees at your back. This is the way to deploy the army in marshes and wetlands. 24

On level plains deploy on easy terrain with the right flank posi-tioned with high ground to the rear, 25 fatal terrain to the fore, and tenable terrain to the rear. This is the way to deploy on the plains. 

These four deployments, advantageous to the army, are the means by which the Yellow Emperor conquered the four emper-ors.

Now the army likes heights and abhors low areas, esteems the sunny [yang] and disdains the shady [yin]. It nourishes life and occupies the substantial. 26 An army that avoids the hundred illnesses is said to be certain of victory.

Where there are hills and embankments you must occupy the yang side, keeping them to the right rear. This is to the army's advantage and exploits the natural assistance of the terrain.

When it rains upstream, foam appears. 27 If you want to cross over, wait until it settles.

You must quickly get away from deadly configurations of ter-rain such as precipitous gorges with mountain torrents, Heaven's Well, Heaven's Jail, Heaven's Net, Heaven's Pit, and Heaven's Fissure. 28 Do not approach them. When we keep them at a distance, the enemy is forced to approach them. When we face them, the enemy is compelled to have them at their rear.

When on the flanks the army encounters ravines and defiles, wetlands with reeds and tall grass, mountain forests or areas with heavy, entangled undergrowth, you must thoroughly search them because they are places where an ambush or spies would be concealed.

The later military writings, beginning with Sun Pin Military Methods and the Six Secret Teachings in the Warring States pe-riod, essentially accepted Sun-tzu's categories as definitive, but of course expanded, reoriented, and elaborated them, particu-larly emphasizing the broad but critical distinction of tenable and fatal terrains.

In the Military Methods Sun Pin, who presumably received in-tensive instruction in the family school of tactics, clearly adopted most of Sun-tzu's categories, although without the systematization of the famous nine terrains. For example, the deadly terrains he enumerates are all familiar: Heaven's Well, 

Heaven's Jail, Heaven's Net, Heaven's Fissure, and Heaven's Pit. However, he emphasizes a number of "entrapping terrains" that retard the army's progress and convert even the most spir-ited aggressors into vulnerable targets: gorges with streams, valleys, river areas, marshes, wetlands, and salt flats. More-over, as the

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scope of warfare expanded into the wetter, peripheral regions during the Warring States period, water hazards became par-ticularly troublesome, so Sun Pin advised against going con-trary to the current's flow or being caught while fording rivers. Yin and yang classifiers were applied to mountains, formations, and seasonal indicators, and five- phase categorizations simi-larly employed, generally phrased in terms of conquest rela-tionships, for such objectives as soil classification. Ground un-able to sustain life, including incinerated areas, should be avoided whatever the season or location.

More important is Sun Pin's general principle that the com-manding general must investigate the terrain, become thor-oughly familiar with it, and actively exploit the topography to emplace his troops and defeat the enemy. When the advantages of terrain are realized, the troops will naturally be inclined to fight. The enemy should be targeted on deadly ground after be-ing forced onto it, while easy terrain can be exploited only when a commander enjoys a decisive superiority in numbers or mo-bile elements. Correspondingly, constricted terrain and ravines should be fully utilized to control and vanquish the enemy. They provide the means not only for the few to attack the many, but also for the concealment of troops in ambush. With appropriate fortifications erected across the mouth, including interconnected chariots deployed with shields to fill the voids, they become strongholds not easily assaulted.

From an intelligence standpoint, conceptually the most impor-tant chapter in the Military Methods is entitled "Treasures of Terrain":

As for the Tao of terrain, yang constitutes the exterior, yin con-stitutes the interior. The direct constitutes the warp, tech- 

niques constitute the woof. When the woof and the warp have been realized, deployments will not be confused. The direct tra-verses land where vegetation thrives; techniques take advan-tage of where the foliage is half dead.

As for the field of battle, the sun is the essence, but the eight winds that arise must not be forgotten. Crossing rivers, con-fronting hills, going contrary to the current's flow, occupying killing ground, and confronting masses of trees--all these that I have just mentioned, in all five one will not be victorious.

A mountain on which one deploys on the south side is a ten-able mountain; a mountain on which one deploys on the east-ern side is a fatal mountain.

Water that flows to the east is life-sustaining water; water that flows to the north is deadly water. Water that does not flow is death.

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The conquest relationship of the five types of terrain is as fol-lows: mountains conquer high hills; high hills conquer hills; hills conquer irregular mounds; irregular mounds conquer forests and plains.

The conquest relationship of five types of grasses is as follows: profusion of hedges, thorny brambles, cane, reeds, and sedge grass.

The conquest relationship of the five soils is as follows: blue conquers yellow; yellow conquers black; black conquers red; red conquers white; white conquers blue.

Five types of terrain are conducive to defeat: gorges with streams, valleys, river areas, marshes, and salt flats.

The five killing grounds are Heaven's Well, Heaven's Jail, Heaven's Net, Heaven's Fissure, and Heaven's Pit. These five graves are killing grounds. Do not occupy them, do not remain on them. 

In the spring do not descend; in fall do not ascend. Neither the army nor any formation should attack to the front right. Estab-lish your perimeter to the right; do not establish your perimeter to the left.

This chapter clearly discusses configurations of terrain best avoided while making some general observations about the re-spective values of various physical aspects. Many of the con-crete contents are identical with those raised in Sun-tzu Art of War and may also be found scattered throughout the Seven Military Classics. Clearly every strategist and commander had to be cognizant of such dangers, as well as the principles for exploiting them, and direct efforts to discovering them appro-priately, particularly "terrains conducive to defeat" and "killing grounds." 29

The remaining paragraphs array heights, grasses, and soils in sequences based upon relative conquest power. Heights may be understood simply in terms of greater heights being strategi-cally superior to lesser ones, whereas the grasses are ranked according to their strength and ability to act as obstacles suffi-cient to impede an advancing force. However, the five soils are characterized in terms of one of the conquest cycles found within the theory of five-phase correlative thought. (Unfortu-nately, even though the sentence is perfectly intelligible, the underlying meaning and implications remain to be understood, and are the subject of extensive arguments that cannot be con-sidered here. Whether Sun Pin truly believed in their efficacy or merely included them for theoretical purposes, or whether they are simply later accretions remains to be studied. 30)

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"Offices, I" enumerates a series of thirty-one disparate pro-nouncements upon concrete tactical principles, some situation-ally derived, others related to circumstances of terrain. Among the most important for terrain-based military intelligence con-siderations are the following: 

When attacking mountain cliffs, employ Arrayed Walls. On open terrain employ a square formation. When you confront heights and deploy your forces, employ a piercing formation.

For ravines employ a circular formation. When engaged in com-bat on easy terrain, to effect a martial retreat employ your sol-diers in a rearguard action. When the enemy is bottled up in a ravine, release the mouth in order to entice them farther away.

Amid grasses and heavy vegetation use yang [visible] pennants. To create awesomeness, deploy with mountains as the right wing. When the road is thorny and heavily overgrown, use a

zig-zag advance. In ravines and gullies use intermixed ele-ments.

When circumventing mountains and forests, use segmented units in succession. Attacking state capitals and towns with water will prove effective. Descending dragons [hidden power] and deployed ambushes are the means by which to fight in the mountains.

Preventive ditches and concentrated formations are the means by which to engage [a superior enemy in battle] with a few troops. The Floating Marsh Formation and flank attacks are the means by which to fight an enemy on a confined road. [The various units] moving in turn is the means by which to pass over bridges.

Nearly half the chapters incorporated in the Six Secret Teach-ings, a far-ranging theoretical work probably compiled within a century of Sun Pin's death, if not earlier, advance concrete tac-tical solutions for problematic circumstances, all based upon knowledge of the enemy, many correlated with specific terrains. For example, "Certain Escape" commences with the following query and response:

King Wu said: "In front of us lies a large body of water, or broad moat, or deep water hole that we want to cross. However, we do not have equipment such as boats and oars. What should we do?" 

The T'ai Kung said: "Large bodies of water, broad moats, and deep water holes are usually not defended by the enemy. If they are able to defend them, their troops will certainly be few. In such situations you should use the Flying River with winches and also the Heavenly Huang to cross the army over. Our courageous,

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strong, skilled soldiers should move where we indicate, rushing into the enemy, breaking up their formations, all fighting to the death.

In "Planning for the Army" the key features of terrain encoun-tered by the invading army are deep streams, large river val-leys, ravines, and defiles, with the complication that a sudden downpour inundates the army in the midst of crossing them. 31 In contrast, rather than water the danger that must be con-fronted in "Incendiary Warfare" is conflagration, the enemy hav-ing taken advantage of windy conditions to set the dry deep grass and heavy undergrowth afire. (Even though the T'ai Kung suggests a desperate tactic, one of the main lessons of the Six Secret Teachings is the need to gain the advance knowledge that will prevent becoming entrapped on such terrain.) Moun-tainous terrain is similarly pondered, with the description found in "Crow and Cloud Formation in the Mountains" no doubt typical of territory in the arid northwest: "high mountains with large flat rock outcropping, on top of which are numerous peaks, all devoid of grass and trees." Forests and valleys com-plete the list, with material from the former being incorporated in the Wu-ching Tsung-yao passages that are translated here. 32

The concluding section of the Six Secret Teachings preserves extremely valuable material about the three component forces of chariots, cavalry, and infantry, including a chapter on their respective strengths and equivalents, essentially explicating the statement that "the infantry values knowing changes and movement; the chariots value knowing the terrain's configura-tion; the cavalry values knowing the side roads and unorthodox 

Tao." Thus "Battle Chariots" delineates ten types of terrain that are considered fatal for employing chariots:

If after advancing there is no way to withdraw, this is fatal ter-rain for chariots.

Passing beyond narrow defiles to pursue the enemy some dis-tance, this is terrain that will exhaust the chariots.

When the land in front makes advancing easy, while that to the rear is treacherous, this is terrain that will cause hardship for the chariots.

Penetrating into narrow and obstructed areas from which es-cape will be difficult, this is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.

If the land is collapsing, sinking, and marshy, with black mud sticking to everything, this is terrain that will labor the chari-ots.

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To the left is precipitous while to the right is easy, with high mounds and sharp hills. This is terrain contrary to the use of chariots.

Luxuriant grass runs through the fields, and there are deep watery channels throughout. This is terrain that thwarts the use of chariots.

When the chariots are few in number, the land easy, and one is not confronted by enemy infantry, this is terrain on which the chariots may be defeated.

To the rear are water-filled ravines and ditches, to the left deep water, and to the right steep hills. This is terrain upon which chariots are destroyed.

It has been raining day and night for more than ten days with-out stopping. The roads have collapsed so that it's not possible to advance or to escape to the rear. This is terrain that will sink the chariots. 

These ten are deadly terrain for chariots. Thus, they are the means by which the stupid general will be captured, and the wise general will be able to escape.

The chapter then proceeds to analyze what it terms "eight con-ditions of terrain conducive to victory." However, none of the eight is inherently related to configurations or conditions of ter-rain, all of them being general indications of weakness in the enemy and are therefore discussed in the section on generally evaluating enemy armies.

"Cavalry in Battle" focuses upon ten conducive and nine inimi-cal conditions for employing the cavalry. Only two of the con-ducive circumstances ponder the impact of terrain: "When the enemy, although lacking the advantages of ravines and defiles for securing their defenses, have penetrated deeply and ranged widely into distant territory, if we sever their supply lines they will certainly be hungry. When the land is level and easy and we see enemy cavalry approaching from all four sides, if we have our chariots and cavalry strike into them, they will cer-tainly become disordered." In contrast, seven of the nine inimi-cal conditions are correlated specific circumstances of terrain:

When we go forward but there is no road back, we enter but there is no way out, this is referred to as "penetrating a Heav-enly Well," "being buried in an Earthly Cave." This is fatal ter-rain for the cavalry.

When the way by which we enter is constricted but the way out is distant, their weak forces can attack our strong ones, and their

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few can attack our many, this is terrain on which the cavalry will be exterminated.

When there are great mountain torrents, deep valleys, tall lux-uriant grass, forests, and trees, these are conditions that will exhaust the cavalry. 

When there is water on the left and right, while ahead are large hills and to the rear high mountains, and the Three Armies are fighting between the bodies of water while the enemy occupies both the interior and exterior ground, this is terrain that means great difficulty for the cavalry.

When the enemy has cut off our supply lines and if we advance we will not have any route by which to return, this is trouble-some terrain for the cavalry.

When we are sinking into marshy ground while advancing and retreating must both be through quagmires, this is worrisome terrain for the cavalry.

When on the left there are deep water sluices, and on the right there are gullies and hillocks, but below the heights the ground appears level, good terrain for advancing, retreating, and entic-ing an enemy, this terrain is a pitfall for the cavalry.

The conclusion reiterates the dual nature of such conditions: "These nine constitute fatal terrain for cavalry, the means by which the enlightened general will keep the enemy far off and escape while the ignorant general will be entrapped and de-feated."

The final chapter focuses on the infantry, which by then had become massive and unwieldy, numbered in the hun-

dred-thousands. Apart from the types of terrain that must be exploited, the chapter makes the interesting and historically important assumption that infantry forces could withstand both chariots and cavalry:

When infantry engage in battle with chariots and cavalry, they must rely on hills and mounds, ravines and defiles. The long weapons and strong crossbows should occupy the fore, the short weapons and weak crossbows should occupy the rear, fir-ing and resting in turn. Even if large numbers of the enemy's chariots and cavalry should arrive, they must maintain a solid formation and fight intensely while skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen prepare against attacks from the rear. 

To be effective, the commander would of course have to know, from reconnaissance or spies, the composition of the enemy's forces and the probable component spearheading the attack, as well as the configura

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tion of the surrounding terrain, so that he might emplace his infantry appropriately.

A battle that developed during the Later Han as government forces sought to contain the Yellow Turban uprising illustrates how knowledge of topographical features might be exploited while coincidentally showing the continuity and application of classic military thought. Whereas Sun-tzu devoted a chapter to incendiary attacks and the T'ai Kung discussed defensive mea-sures, Sun Pin detailed the method and its applicability:

The tactics for incendiary warfare: If the enemy is downwind in an area abundant with dry grass where the soldiers of their Three Armies would not have anywhere to escape, then you can mount an incendiary attack. When there is a frigid fierce wind, abundant vegetation and undergrowth, and firewood and grass already piled up while their earthworks have not yet been pre-pared, in such circumstances you can mount an incendiary at-tack. Use the flames to confuse them, loose arrows like rain. Beat the drums and set up a clamor to motivate your soldiers. Assist the attack with strategic power. These are the tactics for incendiary warfare. 33

As portrayed in the Hou Han Shu, Huang-fu Sung was an as-tute student:

After Chu Chün was defeated by the [Yellow Turban forces] un-der the rebel leader Po Ts'ai, Huang-fu Sung advanced and se-cured Ch'ang-sheh. Po Ts'ai then led a large number of troops to besiege the city. Because Sung's troops were few, he sum-moned the army's officers and said: "The military Tao lies in unorthodox changes, not in numbers. It happens the brigands have built their encampment with straw, so it will be easy to launch an incendiary attack by exploiting the wind. If we set them afire at night, they will certainly be thrown into chaos. If 

we then send our soldiers forth to suddenly strike them, engag-ing them from all four sides, we can repeat T'ien Tan's achieve-ments."

That night a strong wind arose, so Sung had his soldiers as-cend the city walls with burning torches and had his elite sol-diers secretly work their way out through the siege lines to set fire to the enemy's encampment from outside with a great yell. Those on the wall responded by raising their burning torches. Sung then drummed a rapid assault into the enemy's deploy-ment. Terrified, the brigands ran off in chaos. It happened that Ts'ao Ts'ao, who had been dispatched by the emperor, arrived and united with Chu

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Chün and Huang-fu Sung to severely vanquish Po Tsar's forces, killing several tens of thousands. 34

The simple knowledge that the enemy had encamped in grassy areas and stupidly utilized the readily available straw for build-ing their shelters allowed Sung to exploit the wind and surprise in an incendiary attack that well duplicated Sun Pin's tactical advice.

Configurations of Terrain in the Hu-ling Ching

The Northern Sung Hu-ling Ching contains several important chapters that commence with Sun-tzu's concepts and defini-tions but then provide updated explications based upon two additional millennia of warfare experience. The first, "Analyzing Terrain," tackles six fundamental configurations. With Sun-tzu's original material identified for convenience, it runs:

In order to employ the six methods for terrain, one must ana-lyze their configurations and strategic advantages. The six are accessible, suspended, stalemated, constricted, precipitous, and expansive.

Accessible Terrain: [ Sun-tzu said,] "If we can go forth and the enemy can also advance, it is termed 'accessible.'" When on ac-cessible terrain it will be advantageous to occupy the heights 

and await the enemy. Open supply routes to the rear, and pre-pare defenses along the less visible roads to prevent any un-seen advances by the enemy. Then if you engage in battle, it will be advantageous. 35

Suspended Terrain: [ Sun-tzu said,] "If we can go forth but it will be difficult to return, it is termed 'suspended.'" When occu-pying suspended terrain, first carefully determine whether the enemy is unprepared; then establish ambushes to sever their supply routes; after which it will be advantageous to engage them. If the enemy is prepared and you sally forth, you will trip yourself up.

Stalemated Terrain: [ Sun-tzu said,] "If it is not advantageous for us to go forth or advantageous for the enemy to come for-ward, it is termed 'stalemated.'" When [both sides are] occupy-ing stalemated terrain, if the enemy withdraws their troops, it is to entice you. Do not attack, for it will be advantageous to wait until they launch an assault to strike them.

Constricted Terrain: A defensible position at the mouth of a mountain valley or the gorge marking the intersection between

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two steep hills is termed "constricted." 36 If you occupy con-stricted terrain first, you should set out your encampments and improve your deployments to await the enemy, precluding any worry about sudden onslaughts. When the enemy occupies such terrain first, if they fully deploy throughout it wait them out. To attack a less than full deployment it is advantageous to approach by another route.

Precipitous Terrain: Occupying heights while awaiting those below, dwelling in security while awaiting the endangered, is termed "precipitous." If you are first to occupy precipitous ter-rain, it will be advantageous to engage in battle. If the enemy occupies it first, halt your troops, retreat, and then determine what might be advantageous.

Expansive Terrain: When your fortified encampment is far from the enemy's fortifications, it is termed "expansive." If the enemy 

tries to provoke you into battle without first advancing, even if you engage them do not advance as they will certainly have es-tablished ambushes there. Similarly, if they withdraw without engaging in battle, you cannot pursue them; such pursuit would not be advantageous.

When the ancients said that advantages of terrain are the real treasures in military tactics, this is what they meant.

As already seen, Sun-tzu also posited two fundamental cate-gories-- tenable and fatal terrain--that are the focus of the fol-lowing two Huling Ching chapters. In essence, tenable terrain refers to any ground whose configuration does not doom an army occupying it to defeat, but it also encompasses areas where troops can safely find grass, firewood, and water, as Sun Pin subsequently emphasized.

Tenable terrain refers to the absence of fatal terrain to the front and rear, left and right, so that the supply routes and both ad-vancing and retreating are all unobstructed. Accordingly, tacti-cians assert that tenable terrain is advantageous.

There are six possible employments.

First, a cutoff force has deeply penetrated enemy territory.

Second, the horses are selected and the men stalwart, and they are well practiced in the strategic advantages of deployments.

Third, the general's orders are enlightened and strict.

Fourth, the forces are strong, while the enemy is weak.

Fifth, the commanding general's style emphasizes beneficence and trust, and the officials and officers all follow him.

Sixth, the officials and officers take pleasure in warfare.

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However, there are three cases in which tenable terrain cannot be employed. 

First, the officers and troops are thinking of their families.

Second, since there are no advantages in front to entice them, the officers and troops hope to withdraw.

Third, advancing will be disadvantageous and retreating advan-tageous.

Can the advantages and disadvantages of tenable terrain not be analyzed? 37

The importance of the army's ch'i, although not specifically re-ferred to by this term, is apparent in several of the circum-stances listed here. Most of them have previously been seen in one or another list of traits that can or cannot be attacked, whereas the first of the three conditions disfavoring the em-ployment of tenable terrain is clearly Sun- tzu's "dispersive ter-rain."

Paradoxically, fatal terrain--dangerous ground that virtually fates an army to extinction--can be exploited to generate a zeal-ous commitment in the men, a resolute will to fight to the death, as first discussed by Sun-tzu and much theorized about thereafter. (The choice had to be deliberately made and pre-ceded by certain acts to create the proper psychological re-sponse to avoid merely engendering defeatism and despair. Several chapters of the late Sung Hundred Unorthodox Strate-gies focus upon this process, closely following in the footsteps of the definitive Military Methods chapter entitled "Expanding Ch'i," which delineates the psychological stages for nurturing the army's ch'i or fighting morale, as discussed earlier. 38)

Fatal terrain is characterized by mountains to the rear, rivers to the front, and all the supply and escape routes cut off. Al-though fatal terrain is said to be the bane of tacticians, there are four circumstances in which it can be employed for battle.

First, when the general's beneficence and awesomeness have not yet been made manifest, the officials and officers not yet fully submissive. 

Second, the soldiers are a match for the enemy so that if you fight vigorously it will be advantageous, but being afraid to fight will prove disadvantageous. It will be necessary to force the officials and troops to fight to the death.

Third, when pressed by the enemy and the provisions and fod-der are nearly exhausted.

Fourth, the forward army has already been destroyed, but the rear army is still solid.

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There are also three circumstances in which fatal terrain should not be employed for battle.

First, the enemy is numerous while you are few.

Second, the advantages and disadvantages have not yet been estimated, while the troops have to be compelled to act strongly.

Third, indecision.

Mountains and Rivers

Warfare in China originated mostly in the northern plains area, but by the Spring and Autumn period had already engulfed most of the territory encompassed by modern China, with its wide diversity of terrains and features. Mountains and rivers, two obvious, often almost insurmountable obstacles, entailed different dangers and tactical opportunities and were thus al-ready much discussed by Sun-tzu's era, even if not extensively by Sun-tzu himself. The evolution of cavalry and mass infantry forces further increased their strategic importance, heightening the threat they posed to operational plans, no doubt prompting Hsü Tung to comment on them both:

When the power of a mountain looms close by, do not encamp for fear of ambushes at the side. When a mountain has a de-pression in the middle with forests surrounding it, do not en-camp for fear of ambushes from all four sides. Roads that me-ander through mountains cannot be recklessly traversed for 

fear of ambushes lying ahead. Quickly distance yourself from mountains that lie to your rear, and urgently post a rearguard for fear that the enemy will cut you off.

When there are mountains to the front and rear, left and right, and you are ensconced in their midst, carefully investigate all the minor roads and by-paths and guard them with troops. Moreover, whenever there are ridges and forested wilds nearby, if you occupy them to wage battle you can establish ambushes. In urgent situations you can hide in them, or when defending them, gather firewood. Someone capable of knowing the advan-tages and disadvantages of mountain forests will rarely fail to be victorious. 39

China's great rivers not only frequently defied attempts to cross them, but also inundated the land with floods in the spring and times of disorder, such as when the dikes were inadequately maintained or deliberately broken to thwart advancing ene-mies. 40 The many ordi

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nary and secondary rivers, even though less difficult to ford or cross by small boats and makeshift, often highly imaginative rafts, provided entrenched enemies with natural defenses whose flowing waters could blunt the most determined as-saults, creating killing fields for their skilled bowmen and crossbowmen. Sun-tzu and Sun Pin both discussed the haz-ards of fighting near rivers--some of which are mentioned pre-viously--and China's early history is replete with examples of thwarting enemy crossings by first damming the water up-stream, then releasing it when the enemy became exposed, as well as diverting streams to inundate enemy positions. 41

However, sometimes simple ignorance, contrary to Sun-tzu's warnings, unexpectedly resulted in self-decimating effects, as this anecdote employed by the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu indicates: "Ching wanted to launch a surprise attack against Sung, so they had scouts first chart the depth of the Yung River. Un-known to them, the river suddenly surged higher so that when they employed their charts to ford it at night, more than a 

thousand men drowned and the army was so panicked that it destroyed their own encampment." 42

Local guides, if reliable, could provide the best information, even when merely being insightful rather than informative:

Ch'i ordered General Chang-tzu to attack the state of Ching in alliance with Han and Wei. Ching ordered T'ang Mieh to as-sume command of their response. The two armies engaged in a standoff for six months without engaging in combat. Ch'i then ordered Chou Ts'ui to press Chang-tzu to urgently engage in battle. His language was extremely harsh, so Chang-tzu replied, "Kill me, remove me, exterminate my family, all these the king can do to me, but make me fight when we cannot, or make me not fight when we can, this the king cannot obtain."

Subsequently the two forces deployed opposite each other on either side of the Tz'u River. Chang-tzu ordered his men to see whether the water could be crossed, but Ching's archers shot at them, so they couldn't get near the river. Someone cutting grass along the banks informed Ch'i's scouts that "it's easy to learn the depth of the water. Wherever Ching's forces mount a strong defense will all be shallow places, whereas anywhere weakly defended will be deep." The scouts brought him to see Chang-tzu. Elated, Chang-tzu then trained his soldiers to launch a sudden night attack against any places that Ching strongly defended, and they indeed killed T'ang Mieh. Chang-tzu can be said to have truly known the basic duties of a gen-eral. 43

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This incident coincidentally illustrates the growing profession-alism of commanders in the Warring States and their adher-ence to Sun-tzu's fiat that a field commander, once on cam-paign, had to act independently in determining when and where to fight, and disregard any political interference. Rivers also offered transport opportunities and much-needed water, the very life of the army if disease vectors and poisons might be avoided. 

Whenever encamping the army, if the river's flow is clear, this is the best drinking water. When its flow is yellow and turbid with sand, this is the next best. When it flows black, this is the least acceptable drinking water. However, if the river's flow should cease, then do not drink it. If the river flows past the enemy's position upstream, do not drink it. If the river's flow occasionally has black streams in the midst, marking poison, do not drink it or death will result. If the river is filled with de-bris and refuse, do not drink it or illness will result. When there are corpses or the bodies of animals in the river, do not drink it. If there is no potable water, you should dig a well at the side of the river because the army must have water when-ever it encamps, even if only temporarily.

If your troops are about to ford a river that sometimes flows quite full and sometimes diminishes, do not cross because some sort of temporary sandbag dam has certainly been erected upstream as part of an unorthodox strategy. Where the water stops stick close to the roads along the embankment for fear of sinking into marshy terrain. When a river in the enemy's strategic area is unguarded by armored soldiers, you still should not immediately ford it, but have your light troops con-duct a reconnaissance of the nearby mountains and ravines for fear of ambushes secreted there. When you want to seize the enemy's strength, first seize their water supply. To accomplish this, nothing is better than gaining control of the river up-stream! 44

Historically, armies often lost more men to illness than to the battlefield, prompting Sun-tzu to declare: "An army that avoids the hundred illnesses is said to be certain of victory."45 Discov-ering and ensuring potable water thus being vital, Sun Pin ob-served: "If an army drinks from flowing water, it is water that will sustain life and they cannot be attacked. If an army drinks stagnant water, it is water that will result in death and they can be attacked."46

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Hsü Tung's Contrary Practices 

Since the literature on topographical configurations with corre-lated tactical principles became readily available and was care-fully studied with the passage of time, however meritorious Sun-tzu's and Wu-tzu's ancient methods, their well-known tac-tics could be balked by knowledgeable commanders. Thus in the Sung dynasty--although certainly earlier in practice--in his Hu-ling Ching Hsü Tung strongly advocated operating contrary to normal expectations, exploiting the enemy's normal range of interpretations to achieve the surprise necessary for decisive victory. His "Contrary Employment of Ancient Methods" has al-ready been reviewed earlier in this section; the incisive "Con-trary Employment of Terrain Configurations" that follows takes as its basis detailed statements found in Sun-tzu Art of War and Wu Ch'i's observations in the Wu-tzu (all identified in quo-tation marks). His assessments quickly refute conventional wisdom, probe for psychological factors, and then situationally justify the suggested tactics, thus providing an illustration of surpassing expertise in the practice of categorical analysis, the foundation of Chinese military intelligence.

The Art of War states, "On dispersive terrain do not engage the enemy." Dispersive terrain is land within your own borders. The officers and troops are concerned about their families, their thoughts are not unified, so you cannot engage in battle.

It also states, "On light terrain stop."47 When you enter the en-emy's territory but only shallowly, the thoughts of the officers and troops are not yet solidified. You cannot advance against the enemy because you need to first solidify their hearts.

"On contentious terrain do not attack." Mountain valleys and the mouths of constricted ravines where the weak can van-quish the strong constitute terrain where a small number of troops can successfully strike a large number.

"On traversable terrain do not allow your forces to become iso-lated." Since both sides can advance and retreat you cannot sever it with troops. 48

"On focal terrain unite and form alliances." As there are roads coming and going, you can form alliances with the feudal lords. 

"On heavy terrain plunder for provisions." When you have deeply penetrated into the enemy's territory, the thoughts of the officers and troops will already be solid and unified, so you can plunder for material resources.

"On encircled terrain use strategy." The officers and troops are put in difficulty by constricted terrain. When your army is too

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weak to fight but extensive delay will mean your provisions will run out and be cut off, you must employ stratagems in order to resolve the difficulty.

"On fatal terrain engage in battle." When you find yourself with high mountains in front and a large river to the rear; your sup-ply lines cut; and neither advancing nor retreating, or even un-dertaking defensive preparations, advantageous, you are on "fatal terrain."

If the topography compels you to employ these eight ancient methods for exploiting the terrain to wage battle, then do so, but if not, then act contrary to their methods. What do I mean by going contrary to them? If the enemy's masses have deeply penetrated your territory but their encampment's fortifications are incomplete, their fodder and provisions limited, and their defenses not advantageous, how can you not engage them in battle just because you are on dispersive terrain? You must constrain the men with the will to fight to the death. Make it clear that those who retreat in fear will certainly be executed, whereas those who capture enemy soldiers will be rewarded. Set standing orders among all the officers that when the battle is joined anyone who looks back should be beheaded, while anyone whose eyes are not fixed when approaching the enemy or whose own units shift about will also be beheaded. Similarly behead those with worried countenances, who stumble or fall, who look about with eyes askance, leave behind their weapons, or whose drums and gongs do not respond to the measures. Anyone who kills an enemy soldier will be generously rewarded. In this way you can utilize dispersive terrain. 

When you enter the enemy's territory only shallowly, if the ter-rain is difficult, you should occupy it and provoke battle, but if it is level, then defend it and respond to the enemy's actions. If you are concerned about the minds of the officers and troops not being unified, select difficult terrain that lacks escape in any direction, strictly order the units, severely impose disci-plinary measures, and compel every man to fight for himself. Such is the employment of light terrain.

If the enemy occupies mountain valleys and precipitous terrain first, they will constrict your power. You should respond by en-sconcing the army in a large encampment with broad deploy-ments and concentrating upon attacking their negligence. Se-cretly give an appearance of lax security, of allowing the enemy to discern your tactics, so that your plans will seem to leak out and thus make the enemy prepare to the fore. Then clandes-tinely dis

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patch elite troops, men with the courage to fight to the death, to infiltrate through by-paths to assault their supply lines and pound their rear. Along these by-paths there will certainly be numerous ravines and gullies, as well as areas with steep cliffs and precipices, so put up ladders and hang bamboo ropes to climb them. There may also be deep pools that can be crossed with large pottery jars. When you perceive the enemy being dis-rupted within, respond by sending elite troops forth from the encampment, thereby attacking them from both within and without. This is the way to employ contentious terrain.

When the roads intersect so that you can go forth but they can also come up, it will be advantageous to establish ambushes and advance into battle. Once combat commences, feign flight. Wait until more than half the pursuing enemy have passed be-fore raising the signal for an ambush and suddenly striking into them, and also turn your retreating forces about in re-sponse. This is the way to utilize traversable terrain.

If the terrain on which you are temporarily encamped is acces-sible from all four directions, you must select your closest and most courageous associates to command the infantry and cav- 

alry units entrusted with defending the four roads. Employ them in accord with the number available, so that even though there is no response from your allies, you will be able to utilize focal terrain.

Once your troops have arrived at the enemy's border, you should employ any accompanying defensive equipment to pro-vide security at appropriate times. If not, then destroy it. You must have your subordinate commanders bring in whatever re-sources and provisions they capture for the enjoyment of the soldiers, thereby also denying it to the enemy. 49 Why must you enter heavy terrain before you can begin plundering? Plun-dering materials from the enemy should not just be a utiliza-tion of heavy terrain.

Whenever a large army is about to move, you should analyze its strengths and weaknesses, observe the clouds and vapors [ch'i] about it, investigate whether the configurations of terrain are conducive or inimical, examine whether the hearts of the soldiers are willing or rebellious, and thereafter mobilize your forces. 50 The Art of War states: "Critically analyze them to know the estimations for gain and loss. Observe them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping."51 Thus in the Tao of success or failure, advantage lies in advance knowledge. Excellence means planning a victorious strategy before victory has been achieved and being cautious about losses before they have materialized.

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Take, for example, the danger of fatal terrain. If you begin plan-ning in the army, you will certainly suffer when responding to stratagems. But if you can reverse this lateness and attain ad-vance knowledge, you will definitely escape from the misfor-tunes of encircled terrain. Now lofty mountains, expansive marshes, constricted ravines, precipitous cliffs, wetlands, and minor routes that are suddenly cut off, terrains where there are no escape routes, are of the greatest benefit to wise strategists in their planning. You should unexpectedly impede invading enemies and then suddenly strike them from behind. In the past commanders such as T'ien Tan and Yang Pan employed 

blazing horses and cattle to mount unorthodox assaults that rushed into the enemy. Others awaited the dusk of night to create false insignia and then launch a penetrating assault that exploited the resulting intermixture with previously recognized enemy units. Battles such as these must be engaged with the objective of fighting to the death; otherwise, should the enemy grow stronger and your reserves never arrive, you will en-counter the difficulty Li Ling faced when all his bows were bro-ken and his arrows used up.

When the battle is most intense and the army's strength ex-hausted, when disaster looms imminently, anyone able to ex-haust their knowledge and employ stratagems that effect a myriad inexhaustible changes will never have to worry about being on fatal terrain. Sun-tzu said: "In combat value advan-tages of terrain." Yet such advantages cannot have a single use, for only in the actual moment can their employment be dis-cerned. Furthermore, the army values employing change. One who cannot employ the army with such changes will find ad-vantages of terrain to be of no benefit.

The Wu-ching Tsung-yao

Completed slightly more than two decades after Hsü Tung's death, the great Sung military encyclopedia Wu-ching Tsung-yao was compiled as a compendium of current military knowl-edge. A careful reading indicates that hardly a sentence is orig-inal with the authors, although the source of much material is not always immediately evident because, except in some ex-tremely famous cases such as the Art of War, the materials lack any attribution or identification. However, it remains a signifi-cant work because it preserves many passages other

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wise lost and reflects the method of comprehensive inclusion that maintained the currency of ancient doctrines and attested to their validity, despite Hsü Tung's previously cited views and the likely practice of astute commanders in his and later eras. The "Miscellaneous Discussion of Combat Terrains" section ("Tsa-shu Chan-ti") essentially adopts Ho Yen-hsi's commentary from the Art of War as its prefatory remarks for a systematic re- 

view of Sun-tzu's configurations of terrain, completing each en-try with relevant dialogues wherein the king of Wu apparently questions Sun-tzu about appropriate tactics. 52 (These dia-logues, drawn from the chapters on the nine configurations in the military section of the T'ung Tien compiled by Tu Yu in the eighth century A.D., were traditionally thought to comprise ma-terial preserved from the eighty-two-chapter version of the Art of War apparently still extant in the Han dynasty. However, if not a post-Han forgery, at least parts were certainly revised af-ter the Warring States period because cavalry is mentioned prominently. 53) As well as providing a contemporary record of the integrated approach of terrain analysis correlated with tac-tical implications, being an imperially sponsored project com-pleted in A.D. 1043, the Wu-ching Tsung-yao chapters assumed a disproportionately important role in the Chinese military tra-dition thereafter.

The Tao for deploying the army includes advantages of terrain. If we occupy conquest terrain first the enemy will not be able to control us, but if the enemy occupies it first we will not be able to control them. When selecting terrain for deploying the army, if you are unable to realize advantages and avoid harm, it is the same as racing a mass of a million and casting them onto fatal ground. This would not be a disaster from Heaven but the com-manding general's error. The Art of War states: "Configuration of terrain is an aid to the army. Analyzing the enemy, taking control of victory, estimating ravines and defiles, the distant and near, above and below, is the Tao of the general." In dis-cussing this Sun-tzu said: "The nine transformations of terrain, the advantages deriving from contraction and expansion, and the patterns of human emotion must be investigated. Thus it is the nature of the army to defend when encircled, to fight when unavoidable, and to follow orders when compelled. For this rea-son one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords can-not forge preparatory alliances. One who does not know the to-pography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wet-lands and marshes, cannot maneuver the army. One who does not employ local guides cannot secure advantages of terrain. One who does not know any one of

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these four or five cannot command the army of a hegemon or true king."

This apparently speaks about the advantages of the nine ter-rains. 54 If someone who does not know one of them is not an appointee for a hegemon or king, how much more so anyone ig-norant of them all? For this reason the basic method for con-trolling the army is to esteem heights and disdain low ground, for by gaining a strategic advantage through their occupation it will be easy to control others. Thus because Ch'in enjoyed the solidity of the Yao-han pass, even though the six feudal lords knocked on the pass to assault it, without Ch'in perturbing it-self at all the armies of the feudal lords were already in diffi-culty. Moreover, Ch'in's territory was not as wide as Wu's or Ch'u's or its soldiers as fierce as Yen's or Chao's, but they were able to be victorious because their terrain had ravines and so-lidity. Their strategic power might be compared with setting up a vase and their defenses thus enjoyed an advantage of a hun-dred to two. Shouldn't we focus on this? Accordingly, we have now written a section on configurations of terrain.

Dispersive Terrain

When the officers and troops rely upon it, cherishing affection for their wives and children, so that in combat they scatter and run off, it is termed "dispersive terrain." One opinion is that when the terrain lacks any constraints, allowing the officers and troops to easily scatter and desert, anyone occupying it cannot drum an advance into combat. It is also said that when the terrain remains flat far out in all four directions and lacks strategic points, the officers and troops will not be determined and so easily scatter and depart. Therefore it is called disper-sive terrain. The Art of War states: "When the feudal lords fight in their own territory, it is dispersive terrain. On dispersive ter-rain do not engage the enemy." It also states: "On dispersive terrain I unify their will." The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "On dispersive terrain the officers and troops are thinking of their families. As we cannot engage in battle with them, we must solidly defend our positions and not go forth. If the enemy at-tacks our cities and fortifications, plunders our fields, prevents us from gathering firewood, blocks our major roads, and awaits 

our emptiness and depletion to urgently attack, what should we do?"

Sun-tzu replied: "When the enemy has deeply penetrated our capital region and numerous fortified towns, their officers and

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men regard the army as their family, are focused in their inten-tions, and slight the enemy. On the contrary our troops are in their native state; they feel secure on their territory and em-brace life. Therefore in battle formation they are not firm, when they engage in battle they are not victorious. We should assem-ble the people and gather the masses; collect the foodstuffs, livestock, and cloth; defend the walled cities and prepare to de-fend the passes; and dispatch light troops to sever their supply routes. If they are not able to provoke us into battle, their pro-visions fail to arrive, and there's nothing in the countryside that they can plunder, their Three Armies will be in difficulty. If we exploit the situation to entice them, we can be successful.

"If we want to engage in battle in the countryside, we must rely upon the strategic configuration of power. Utilize ravines to es-tablish ambushes. Lacking ravines, we must conceal ourselves in the weather, darkness, dusk, and fog, going forth where they will not expect it, suddenly striking their indolent forces. Then we will achieve results."

Light Terrain

Where strongly inclined to withdraw. When you have entered enemy territory but not yet penetrated deeply so that advanc-ing and retreating are both easy, you cannot halt or rest. The general cannot frequently stir or labor the men. The Art of War states: "When you enter someone else's territory but not deeply, it is light terrain. On light terrain do not stop." And also "on light terrain I have them group together."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "Suppose we have reached light terrain and have just entered the enemy's borders. Our officers and men are thinking of turning back. It's hard to advance but easy to withdraw. We do not yet have ravines and defiles be- 

hind us and the Three Armies are fearful. The commanding general wants to advance, the officers and troops want to re-treat, so above and below are of different minds. The enemy is defending their walled cities and fortifications, putting their chariots and cavalry in good order. Some occupy positions to our fore, others strike our rear. What should we do?"

Sun-tzu replied: "When we have reached light terrain, the offi-cers and men are not yet focused because their task is entering the border, not waging battle. Do not approach their famous cities or traverse their major roads. Feign doubt, pretend con-fusion. Show them that we are about to depart. Then initially select elite cav

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alry to silently enter their territory and plunder their cattle, horses, and other domestic animals. When the Three Armies observe that they were able to advance, they will not be afraid. Divide our elite soldiers and have them secretly prepare am-bushes. Should the enemy come up, strike without hesitation; if they do not come up, then abandon the ambushes and de-part."

He also said: "Suppose the army has entered the enemy's bor-ders. The enemy solidifies his fortifications without engaging in battle. Our officers and troops are thinking of returning home, but even if we want to retreat it will also be difficult. This is re-ferred to as 'light terrain.' We should select elite cavalry to es-tablish ambushes on the strategic roads. When we withdraw, the enemy will pursue us; when they come up, quickly strike them."

Contentious Terrain

Facile, advantageous terrain such that whoever first occupies it will emerge victorious. For this reason one struggles for it. The Art of War states: "If when we occupy it, it will be advantageous to us, whereas if they occupy it, it will be advantageous to them, it is contentious terrain." And, "on contentious terrain do not attack. On contentious terrain I race our rear elements for-ward." 

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "On contentious terrain sup-pose the enemy arrives first, occupies the strategic positions, and holds the advantageous ones with selected troops and

well-trained soldiers. Some of them go forth, others assume de-fensive positions against our unorthodox tactics. What should we do?"

Sun-tzu replied: "The rule for fighting on contentious terrain is that one who yields will gain, whereas one who fights will lose. If the enemy has gained a position, be careful not to attack it. Draw him away by pretending to go off. Set up flags, beat the drums, and move swiftly toward what he loves. Drag wood to raise clouds of dust, befuddle his ears and eyes. Divide up our superior troops, secretly placing them in ambush. The enemy will certainly come forth to rescue the endangered target. What others want we will give them; what they abandon we will take. That is the Tao for fighting for land they occupy first.

"If we arrive first and the enemy uses this tactic, select fierce troops to solidly defend our position. Have our light troops pur-sue the enemy's feigned departure, splitting some off to set up ambushes in the ravines and defiles. If the enemy turns about to fight, the troops on the flanks in ambush should rise up. This is the Tao for achieving complete victory."

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Traversable Terrain

Level plains open to communication. [ Ho T'ing-hsi] says it can be employed for forming alliances but cannot be blocked off or severed. Severing it will leave crevices. 55 It is also said that when communications penetrate far out in all four directions, they cannot be severed. The Art of War states: "When we can go forth and they can also come forth, it is traversable terrain," and "on traversable terrain do not allow your forces to become isolated. On traversable terrain I focus on defense."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "If on traversable terrain where movement is easy we are about to isolate the enemy and want to ensure they cannot advance, we must order our cities along the border to improve their defensive preparations, thoroughly 

sever all open roads, and secure the blockades at the passes. Suppose we have not planned for it beforehand while the en-emy has already made such preparations. They will be able to advance, but we will not be able to go forth. If our numbers are moreover equal, what then?"

Sun-tzu replied: "Since we cannot go forth but they can come up, 56 we should split off some troops and conceal them. Our defenders should appear at ease and lax. Display incapability and the enemy will definitely arrive. Establish ambushes, con-ceal ourselves in the grass, and go forth where he doesn't ex-pect it. Then we can be successful."

Focal Terrain

Land that occupies an important intersection and controls sev-eral roads so that the masses must follow whoever first occu-pies it. Therefore by gaining it you will be secure; losing it will be endangered. The Art of War states: "Land of the feudal lords surrounded on three sides such that whoever arrives first will gain the masses of All under Heaven is focal terrain. On focal terrain unite and form alliances with nearby feudal lords. On focal terrain I solidify our alliances."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "On focal terrain one values be-ing first. If the road is far and we mobilize after the enemy, even though we race our chariots and gallop our horses, we will not be able to arrive first. What then?"

Sun-tzu replied: "Focal terrain is territory bordered by three states with roads open in the four directions. If we and the en-emy

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oppose each other while on the side there are other states, then one who would be referred to as 'first' must dispatch polite emissaries with generous gifts to make alliances with the neighboring states. Establish friendly relations with them and secure their favor. Then even though our troops arrive after the enemy, the masses will already be allied with us. 57 We will have the support of the masses, while the enemy will have lost 

its partisans. The armies of the feudal states, like the horns of an ox, thundering their drums will attack en masse. The enemy will be startled and terrified, and no one will know what they ought to do."

Heavy Terrain

When you have deeply penetrated the enemy's territory and it is difficultto supply provisions from your state, if the officers and troops do not plunder, what can they get? The Art of War states: "When one penetrates deeply into enemy territory so that it is difficult to turn back, 58 bypassing numerous cities, it is heavy terrain. On heavy terrain by plundering I ensure a continuous supply of provisions." Moreover, "the Tao of the guest [invader] is that when the troops have penetrated deeply, they will be unified and the host will not be victorious. 59 If you forage in the fertile countryside, the Three Armies will have enough to eat. If you carefully nurture them and do not overly labor them, their ch'i will be united and their strength will be at maximum. When you mobilize the army, your strategic plans must be unfathomable. Cast them into position from which there is nowhere to go and they will die without retreating. If there is no escape from death the officers and soldiers will fully exhaust their strength. When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply they will be unafraid. When there is nowhere to go they will be solid, when they penetrate deeply they will cling together. When there is no alternative, they will fight. For this reason even though the soldiers are not instructed, they are prepared; without seeking it their cooperation is obtained; without covenants they are close together; without issuing or-ders they are reliable. Prohibit omens, eliminate doubt so that they will die without other thoughts. [If our soldiers] do not have excessive wealth, it is not because they detest material goods. If they do not live long lives, it is not because they abhor longevity. On the day that the orders are issued, the tears of the soldiers who are sitting will soak their sleeves, while the tears of

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those lying down will roll down their cheeks. However, if you throw them into a hopeless situation, they will have the courage of Chuan Chu or Ts'ao Kuei."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "Suppose we have led the troops deep into heavy terrain, bypassing a great many places so that our supply routes are cut off or blocked. Suppose we want to return home but cannot get past their strategic config-uration of power. If we want to forage on the enemy's land and maintain our troops without loss, what should we do?"

Sun-tzu replied: "Whenever we occupy heavy terrain, the offi-cers and troops will readily be courageous. If the supply routes are no longer open, we must plunder to extend our provisions. Whatever grain or cloth the lower ranks obtain must all be for-warded to the top, with those who collect the most being re-warded. Then the warriors will no longer think about returning home.

"If you want to turn about and go forth, urgently make defen-sive preparations. Deepen the moats and raise the ramparts, showing the enemy our determination to remain indefinitely. The enemy will suspect we have an open route somewhere and will remove themselves from the critical roads. Then we can or-der our light chariots to sally forth silently, the dust flying up, using the cattle and horses as bait. If the enemy goes forth, beat the drums and follow them. Prior to this secretly conceal some warriors in ambush, setting the time with them so that our forces within and without can launch a coordinated attack. The enemy's defeat can then be known."

Entrapping Terrain

Terrain with little solidity so that neither fortifications nor moats can be constructed. The Art of War states: "When ma-neuvering where there are mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes, wherever the road is difficult to negotiate, it is entrapping terrain. On entrapping terrain I ad-vance along the roads." 60

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "Suppose we enter entrapping terrain--mountains, rivers, ravines, and defiles. The road is dif- 

ficult to follow, while we have been on the move for a long time and the troops are tired. The enemy lies before us and is am-bushing our rear. Their encampment occupies a position to the left while they defend against our right. Their superior chariots and skilled cavalry are pressing us on a constricted road. What then?"

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Sun-tzu replied: "First have the light chariots advance about ten kilometers so that they and the enemy are observing each other. When our main army has reached their ravines and de-files, deploy some to go to the left, others to the right, while the commanding general conducts observations in all directions. Select vacuities and seize them, then have all our forces con-verge together on the road, stopping only when tired."

Encircled Terrain

When the entrance is constricted and precipitous, the route back circuitous, and advancing and retreating disconnected, even though one has masses of troops, what use are they? However, through unorthodox tactics and changes this terrain can be followed. The Art of War states: "Where the entrance is constricted, the return is circuitous, and with a small number they can strike our masses, it is encircled terrain." Moreover, "when you have strongholds behind you and constrictions be-fore you, it is encircled terrain. On encircled terrain use strat-egy. On encircled terrain I obstruct any openings."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "Suppose we have entered en-circled terrain so that before us there is a strong enemy and to our rear precipitous and difficult ground. The enemy have sev-ered our supply lines and are taking advantage of our moving disposition. If they beat their drums and yell but do not ad-vance in order to observe our capability, what should we do?"

Sun-tzu replied: "On encircled terrain it is appropriate to block up all the openings, showing the troops that there is nowhere to go. Then they will regard the army as their family, the multi-tude will be of one mind, and the strength of the Three Armies will be united. Furthermore, steam food for several days, there- 

after not displaying any fire or smoke, thus creating the ap-pearance of decay, confusion, paucity of numbers, and weak-ness. When the enemy see this, their battle preparations will certainly be light.

"Incite our officers and troops with exhortations, arousing their anger. When you assume formation, deploy our superior troops in ambush in the ravines and defiles to the left and right. Beat the drums and go forth. If the enemy opposes us fervently, strike them, concentrating on breaking through. Fight in the front, consolidate in the rear, and set out our flanks to the left and right [in a pincer movement]."

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The king of Wu again asked: "Suppose the enemy is sur-rounded by our forces. They lie in ambush and make deep plans. They display enticements to us, they tire us with their pennants, moving all about as if in confusion. We do not know how to deal with this. What should we do?"

Sun-tzu replied: "Have a thousand men take up pennants, di-vide and block off the strategic roads. Have our light troops ad-vance and try to provoke the enemy. Deploy our battle arrays, but do not press them. Intercept them, but do not go off. This is the art of defeating stratagems."

Fatal Terrain

Is where if you fight fervently perhaps you will survive, but if you just assume a defensive posture will die. The Art of War states: "Where if one fights with intensity he will survive but if he does not fight with intensity he will perish, it is fatal terrain. On fatal terrain I show them that we will not live." Also, "on fa-tal terrain engage in battle." Cast them onto fatal terrain, "for only thereafter will they penetrate the enemy's territory, only thereafter will the host's masses be thrown into danger and our troops be able to wrest victory from defeat."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: "Suppose our army has gone out beyond the borders and our forces are arrayed in front of the enemy. The enemy's forces arrive in great number, encir- 

cling us several layers deep. We want to suddenly burst out, but all four sides are blocked. If we want to encourage our offi-cers and incite our masses of troops to have them risk their lives and crush the encirclement, how should we do it?"61

Sun-tzu replied: "Make the moats deeper and the ramparts higher, showing that we are making preparations to defend our position. Be quiet and still, without moving, to conceal our ca-pability. Announce orders to the Three Armies to feign hope-lessness. Kill the cattle and burn the supply wagons to feast our warriors. Burn all the provisions, fill in the wells, level the stoves, cut off your hair, cast aside your caps, completely elimi-nate all thoughts of life, and have no further plans. When the officers are determined to die, then have them polish their ar-mor and sharpen their blades. When their ch'i has been united and their strength as one, some should attack the two flanks with thundering hearts and yelling fervently. 62 The enemy will also become frightened, and no one will know how to withstand us. Elite troops and detached units should urgently attack their rear. This is the Tao by which to lose the road and seek life. Thus it is said that 'one who

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is in difficulty but doesn't make plans is impoverished; one who is impoverished and doesn't fight is lost.'"

The king of Wu also asked, "What if we surround the enemy?"

Sun-tzu replied: "Mountain peaks and valley confines that are difficult to traverse are referred to as the 'means to impoverish invaders.' The method for attacking them is to set our troops in ambush in dark and concealed places. Open a road for the en-emy to depart, show them a path for flight. When they are seeking life and escaping from death, they certainly won't have any will to fight. Then we can strike them and even if they are numerous, they will certainly be destroyed."

The Art of War also states: "If the enemy is on fatal terrain, the ch'i of their officers and troops will be courageous. If we want to strike them, the strategy is to seemingly accord with them and not resist. Secretly guard against their advantageous positions, 

but you must allow them an escape route. Employ elite cavalry to segment off and block the strategic roads, employ light troops to advance and entice them. Deploy but do not engage in battle, this is the way to defeat their strategy." 63

Six Configurations

Accessible Configuration

Where either side can get there first and whoever arrives first will await the enemy. The Art of War states: "If we can go forth and the enemy can also advance, it is termed 'accessible.'" When occupying accessible terrain, "first occupy the heights and yang [sunny] side. If you improve the roads for transport-ing provisions, when you engage in battle you will be victori-ous."

Suspended Configuration

If you go forth you will not be victorious, whereas returning will also be difficult. The Art of War states: "If we can go forth but it will be difficult to return, it is termed 'suspended.' If the enemy is unprepared, go forth and conquer them. If the enemy is pre-pared and we sally forth without being victorious, it will be dif-ficult to turn back and is not advantageous."

Stalemated Configuration

Stalemated configuration is broken off and constricted but si-multaneously sustains both sides. Because both sides are be-ing sustained it will not be advantageous to go forth first. The Art of War

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states: "If it is not advantageous for us to go forth or advanta-geous for the enemy to come forward, 64 it is termed 'stale-mated.' In a stalemated configuration, even though the enemy puts us in difficulty and presses us, 65 we do not go forth. Withdraw our forces and depart. If we strike them when half their forces have come forth, it will be advantageous." 

Constricted Configuration

In a constricted configuration, if the enemy defends the nar-rows first, we depart. If they do not defend them, we follow them in. The Art of War states: "As for constricted configura-tions, if we occupy them first, we must fully deploy throughout them in order to await the enemy. If the enemy occupies them first and fully deploys in them, do not follow them in. If they do not fully deploy in them, then follow them in."

Precipitous Configuration

As for precipitous configurations, you should occupy the ravines and defiles but cannot arrive after others. The Art of War states: "As for precipitous configurations, if we occupy them, we must hold the heights and yang sides to await the enemy. If the enemy occupies them first, withdraw our forces and depart. Do not follow them."

Expansive Configuration

When you engage with an equally powerful enemy so that vic-tory and defeat cannot be known. The Art of War states: "As for expansive configurations, if our strategic power is equal, it will be difficult to provoke them into combat. Engaging in combat will not be advantageous."

Miscellaneous Discussion of Combat Terrain

The Art of War states: "As for deploying the army and fathom-ing the enemy, to cross mountains follow the valleys, search out tenable ground, and occupy the heights. 66 [If the enemy holds the heights] do not climb up to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the mountains." This teaches mountain warfare.

[ The Art of War states]: "After crossing rivers, you must dis-tance yourself from them. If the guest is fording a river to ad

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vance, do not confront them in the water. When half their forces have crossed, it will be advantageous to strike them. If you want to engage the enemy in battle, do not array your forces near the river to confront the invader, but look for ten-able ground and occupy the heights. Do not confront the cur-rent's flow. This is the way to deploy the army where there are rivers."

[ The Art of War states]: "On level plains deploy the army on easy terrain with the right flank positioned with high ground to the rear, fatal terrain to the fore, and tenable terrain to the rear. This is the way to deploy on level plains."

[ The Art of War states]: "When you cross salt marshes and wet-lands, concentrate on quickly getting away from them, do not remain. If you engage in battle in marshes or wetlands, you must stay in areas with marsh grass and keep groves of trees at your back. This is the way to deploy the army in marshes and wetlands."

[ The Art of War states]: "These four regulations for the army are the means by which the Yellow Emperor conquered the four emperors."

The king of Wu asked Sun-tzu: 67"The enemy is securely hold-ing the mountains and ravines, occupying all the advantageous positions. Their provisions are also sufficient. Even though we challenge them, they do not come forth. They take advantage of cracks in our defenses to raid and plunder. What should we do?"

Sun-tzu said: "Segment and deploy our forces to defend the strategic points; exercise vigilance in preparations; do not be indolent. Deeply investigate their true situation, secretly await their laxity. Entice them with profit, prevent them from gather-ing firewood. When they have not gained anything in a long time, they will inevitably change by themselves. Wait until they leave their strongholds, seize what they love. Even though the enemy forcibly occupies precipitous passes, we will still be able to destroy them." 

Moreover, Marquis Wu of Wei asked Wu Ch'i: 68"On the left and right are high mountains, while the land is extremely narrow and confined. If when we meet the enemy we dare not attack them, yet cannot escape, what shall we do?"

Wu Ch'i replied: "This is referred to as 'valley warfare.' Even if your troops are numerous, they are useless. Summon your tal-ented officers to confront the enemy, the nimble footed and sharpest weapons to be at the forefront. Divide your chariots and array your cavalry, concealing them on all four sides sev-eral kilometers apart so that they will not show their weapons. The enemy will certainly assume a solid defensive formation, not daring

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to either advance or retreat. Thereupon display your flags and array your banners, withdraw outside the mountains, and en-camp. The enemy will invariably be frightened, and your chari-ots and cavalry should then harass them, not permitting them any rest."

"If the enemy mounts a stout defense, urgently deploy agents and spies, observe their changes and confusion, then suddenly attack them. If they contract, you can overturn them and be victorious. In general, soldiers employed in valley warfare must be skilled at establishing ambushes. Select fierce, elite troops to act as a vanguard, array strong crossbowmen [behind them], then the short weapons. Fight courageously and quickly press the battle."

Moreover, select soldiers who are light of foot; pick out by-paths; ascend the heights and make observations on the en-emy's troops below; and then engage in battle. Set up numer-ous flags and drums on the heights in order to shake them. If you suddenly encounter the enemy in a mountain gorge, then urgently beat the drums and shout, first causing them to be startled into confusion, then uniting through unorthodox changes to suddenly strike them.

If we have led troops deep into the territory of the feudal lords, where they encounter a large forest that we share with the en- 

emy in a standoff, it is termed "forest warfare." 69 Have our Three Armies divide into the assault formation. Improve the po-sitions the troops occupy, and station the archers and cross-bowmen outside, with those carrying spear-tipped halberds and shields inside. Cut down and clear away the grass and trees, and extensively broaden the passages in order to facili-tate our deployment onto the battle site. Set our pennants and flags out on high, and carefully encourage the Three Armies without letting the enemy know our true situation. Then sud-denly form our spearbearers and crossbowmen into squads of five. If the woods are not dense, cavalry can be used in sup-port. Fight when it is advantageous, halt when it is not. If we encounter woods that are dense with numerous ravines and defiles, deploy our forces in the Assault Formation in order to be thoroughly prepared both front and rear. If we fight and rest in turn, the enemy can certainly be driven off.

Another method for forest warfare is spread out the flags and pennants during the daytime, multiply the fires and drums at night, and employ short weapons. Skill will lie in unorthodox ambushes, some sprung from the front, others raised in the rear. Place strong crossbows in the middle of the left and right flanks. It will be advantageous to defend the ravines and halt.

When Han Kao-tsu initiated his sudden strike against Mao Tun, Mao Tun concealed his elite warriors and displayed only emaci

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ated and weak ones. 70 When Kao-tsu reached P'ing-ch'eng but before his infantry had fully arrived, Mao Tun released some three hundred thousand elite forces that besieged the emperor for seven days on Pai-teng Mountain. Although this is a histori-cal experience, in recent ages the unorthodox strategies of bar-barian armies have not gone beyond such measures, some-thing enlightened generals successfully fathom but stupid ones fall into.

At the same time their tactical skills differ from those of our Central State [ China]. They can ascend and descend mountain 

slopes, go in and out along mountain streams, something that China's horses cannot match. For racing along precipitous roads that wind about hills and shooting their bows, China's cavalry is not as good as theirs. In exhausting themselves in wind and rain and being untroubled despite hunger and thirst, China's soldiers are unlike them. These are skills in which bar-barian invaders excel.

But out on the easy terrain of the plains, if we employ light chariots or a surprise cavalry attack, the barbarian's masses will be easily thrown into confusion. Barbarians bows are not a match for our strong crossbows for distant, dispersed shooting, nor their weapons for our long halberds. Barbarians soldiers cannot oppose our stout armor, sharp blades, intermixed long and short weapons, crossbow guerrilla tactics, or orderly van-guard formations. Their leather shields and wooden bucklers cannot withstand the hail of arrows loosed by our skilled archers as they travel uniform paths to the target. Dismounted, fighting on the ground with swords, clashing back and forth, their infantry skills are not a match for ours. These are the skills in which China excels.

If we analyze it on this basis, barbarians excel in three skills and China five. Earlier ages calculated five barbarians were re-quired to match one Han soldier. These days, even though they have managed to learn some of our techniques, three are still required to confront one of our soldiers. This is largely because of our advantageous weapons and the fact that barbarians are skilled in cavalry methods, not infantry fighting. China's in-fantry have strong crossbows and sharp-edged axes that are sufficient to resist them, but we Chinese are not a match for them because our people are accustomed to tranquillity and lack their ability to tolerate suffering out in the frost, snow, and grassless lands of sand. Furthermore, it is their nature not to be good at attacking or to long sustain an assault. Their sole advantage lies in sudden penetrating assaults. Therefore gener-als in former generations controlled them with unorthodox measures but were unable to pursue them to fight.

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The nature of the Jung barbarians in the south is agile, cruel, hateful, and angry. They take pleasure in being thieves and brigands but cannot sustain their power. Their weapons are simply various types of spears and javelins, flying and ringed knives, and wooden crossbows. They so excel at making poi-soned arrows that anyone hit by them will scream loudly and die after a couple of nights. They take advantage of the moun-tains and obstacles of rivers and rely upon the ravines. In times of crisis they sneak away and lay ambushes, but when it is calm they plunder and forage. When moving by boat, they can cross most of the rivers, when traveling on land, they can enter all the ravines and defiles, what we cannot do. To attack them, it is advantageous to exploit level terrain and employ un-orthodox strategies, enticing their soldiers forward and then springing elite troops from concealed ambush to capture them. There are many methods for luring them in, such as releasing turned agents to go and speak about great riches, so that when we summon their ambassadors they will fall into our trap.

Now the Chinese people dwell in buildings, cook their food, and wear clothes of silk and other fine materials. However, in the north the killing cold of fall comes early, hands and feet crack, so we are unable to cross the Han River. In the southern region of licentious heat there are narrow ravines with poisons whose peaks cannot be scaled. If we defend the border there with sol-diers from the Central State, then ten men will not even be able to match one. In antiquity they thus had the various barbar-ians attack each other so that their strengths were appropri-ately matched. In this way people outside the passes were sum-moned and brought in to be employed in combat. They opened lands in order to feed them and provided generous rewards in order to stimulate them. They sought to nurture a character for warfare and accumulate skill in galloping and shooting. They minimized district expenses in order to provide for their labors. They released agents and spies with generous bribes to attract their powerful clans and chiefs and sent them to attack the north. They reaped a tenfold benefit from employing them thus. Therefore Wu Ch'i, an excellent general of antiquity, also fre-quently discussed the character of the six states. 71 

Local Customs

The peoples' customs in the outer states and five regions of our great China all have natures that cannot be changed. 72 They are hard or soft, slow or fast, have different sacrifices and ves-sels, di

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verse regulations and clothing, all appropriately. Thus in the wilds of the northern frontier regions where yin accumulates they eat meat and drink fermented milk, and their skin is dense so that they can endure the cold. But in the humid semitropical south of constant yang the people's skin is open so that they can tolerate the heat. This is their Heavenly given nature. When the famous generals of antiquity received an or-der to attack one of these states, they would invariably calcu-late the strength and weakness of their customs and capabili-ties, and always attacked shortcomings with strength. They an-alyzed what they liked and employed it to entice them, deter-mined what they hated and exploited it to attack them.

For the most part the nature of the northern Ti is similar to those of the Western Jung. Their warriors are all strong enough to pull a bow and be armored cavalrymen. In ordinary times it is their custom to practice herding and hunting and capturing animals as their occupation, but in times of military crisis they are practiced in martial assaults and make it their affair to in-vade and attack us. Their long-range weapons are the bow and arrow, close weapons the knife and short spear. When it is ad-vantageous, they advance; when disadvantageous, withdraw. They never find it shameful to retreat as long as it is profitable. 73

The method for suddenly attacking them is to hide troops in ambush along the ravines and other concealed terrain or oc-cupy thick woods with tangled vegetation. Select elite soldiers and sharp weapons, with a thousand men to a unit. Near each strategic point where you have established ambushes employ fierce but not stalwart-looking troops, and follow up with some weak troops who will pretend the situation has become unten-able. Use several hundred to a thousand men to abandon your 

visible positions. The barbarians will certainly be greedy for what they might capture, so if you wait until they are compet-ing with each other to advance to spring your ambushes and suddenly strike them, you will certainly be victorious.

However, we Chinese do not excel in mounting great, pitched, all-or-nothing battles with them out on the open plains or in the wilds. Moreover, their skill is with ordinary bows and ar-rows, whereas we ought to press them with our strong cross-bows. Thus in the Warring States period the method for combat stated: "Have some courageous but not resolute men test the invaders but then quickly depart, setting up three ambushes to await them. If the barbarians lightly advance without good or-der, if they are greedy and disharmonious, if they do not yield when victorious or rescue

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each other when in defeat, then those in front, when they see some rewards, will certainly strive to advance. When they ad-vance and then encounter an ambush, they will certainly run off quickly. Since those in the rear will not rescue them, they will be disjointed." This is already a method for testing them. 74

The barbarians are also accustomed to enticing armies. They displayed emaciated regiments in order to bring the enemy to them, so it is important to closely observe them. Thus when-ever employing the army, Han Kao-tsu valued heights and de-tested lowlands, esteemed the sunny [yang] and disdained the shady [yin]. He nurtured life and dwelled in the substantial. Life is yang, so when one nurtures oneself in yang, his ch'i will be victorious. The heights are substantial, so when Han Kao-tsu occupied the heights, the low wetlands were kept distant and the hundred illnesses did not arise. Men were settled in their employment. This was to the advantage of the army, and the assistance of the terrain. 75

The Art of War speaks of precipitous gorges with mountain tor-rents, Heaven's Well, Heaven's Jail, Heaven's Net, Heaven's Pit, and Heaven's Fissure. These six are referred to as the "six harms." When you encounter them, quickly depart, do not ap- 

proach them. What is termed "a precipitous gorge" is moun-tainous land with a deep river valley. Heaven's Well is a natural depression in which excessive water can accumulate. Heaven's Net is a mountainous gorge with a stream with the sides so narrow that it becomes land where men could be caught in a net. Heaven's Jail is where the forest is dark and overgrown, land where tangled vegetation is deep and expansive. Heaven's Pit is land where the escape road is muddy and neither men nor horses can traverse it. Heaven's Fissure is where the ter-rain is mostly watery ditches and pits, land where one sinks into watery gravel. Always have our army keep them at a dis-tance, but force the enemy to approach them. We face them, the enemy has them at their back. [Sun-tzu said]: "When an army on campaign encounters ravines and defiles, wetlands with reeds and tall grass, mountain forests or areas with heavy, entangled undergrowth, you must thoroughly search them because they are places where an ambush or spies would be concealed. Thus when the army advances, there are roads on which one does not attack, terrain for which one does not contend." He referred to these sorts of terrain. 76

Now when sending the army forth there are the distinctions of host and guest, and in employing the army there is infantry and

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cavalry. Since there are already such differences, every terrain cannot be advantageous. Thus Ch'ao Ts'uo said: 77"Where there are moats fifteen feet deep, water that will sink chariots, or grass and trees, it is terrain for infantry." Here chariots and cavalry will not even enjoy a two to one force advantage. Dirt-covered hills, interconnected rolling ridges, level plains, and broad expanses of wilderness are terrain for chariots and cav-alry. Here ten infantrymen cannot match a single cavalryman.

Where there are flattened mountaintops far apart with a river valley between them where one must look up high and can ap-proach below, this is terrain for bows and crossbows. A hun-dred close-range weapons will not match one bow. 

Where two forces are closely deployed with level terrain and shallow grass between them across which they can advance and withdraw, this is terrain for employing long halberds. Here three swords and shields will not match one halberd.

Tangled overgrowth, bamboo clumps, heavy grass, and areas where dense leaves interconnect to shade and cover everything are terrain for spears and truncheons. Here two long weapons will not match a single one of them.

Winding roads where ambushes might be set and ravines and constrictions where attacks can occur are terrain for swords and shields. Here three bows or crossbows will not match one of them.

The Art of War states: 78 "Wherever you can look out, whether across divided valleys or over rivers, you can employ bows and arrows. In heavy vegetation and dense grass you can exploit wind and fire. If to the left and right are both high mountains, then elongate your flanks and advance. If the terrain is high to the rear but low in front, use a fierce assault and advance. When traversing wetlands and marshes, put your companies in order and quickly pass through. When occupying level inland terrain, keep fatal terrain to the fore and tenable terrain to the rear. On hills or rises you must occupy the yang side and keep them to the right rear. On embankments you must occupy the yin side and keep them to the left front." In this way the com-manding general must investigate these principles and compre-hend them in his mind first.

If their men are zealous in combat and practiced in weapons but slight their general and disdain their salaries while their of-ficers have no commitment to die, they are ordered but not us-able. Focus on the tactics for this situation: If they deploy in limited force, press them; if their masses come forth, resist them; if they

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depart, pursue them in order to wear out their army, for then they can be defeated. This is termed "investigating the dis-tresses of human nature." 

Moreover, analyze the losses marking their state's administra-tion and control them in accord with their distress. Then we will gain an advantage, they will suffer a disadvantage, and we will easily act strongly. The Ssu-ma Fa states: "Men from each quarter have their own nature, character changes from region to region." 79 This speaks about the men of the four quarters. Human nature includes the hard and soft, stupid and wise, all different. "Through instruction they come to have regional habits, the customs of each state thus being different." This speaks about the military strength of the four quarters.

The west and north are conducive to soldiers and horses, the east and south have the convenience of boats and oars. The west and north are cold and miserable and lack copper and iron, whereas the east and south are hot and humid, their bows and crossbows rot away. The middle terrain [of the Cen-tral State] has the five weapons in abundance and various trees and is conducive to bows and horses, boats and oars. These are their appropriate differences. Thus "the state of Yen lacks armor, Ch'in lacks bamboo shafts for their weapons, while the Hu lack bows and chariots." This speaks about the strength of customs.

Sun-tzu said: "Evaluate comparatively through estimations and seek out their true nature. Which ruler has the Tao? Which general has greater ability?" This also means that we must first determine our relative strengths. Otherwise, anyone who doesn't know this but still employs the military will be like a blind man without direction and will be overturned in no time at all. 80

Evaluating and Targeting Cities

China early on developed densely populated administrative centers that became the focus of economic, as well as military, activities and thus prime targets whether a campaign army was simply bent upon defeating the enemy or capturing power cen-ters and annexing territory. However, as early as the Shang dy-nasty the technique of rammed-earth wall building had been perfected, resulting in the classic combination of deep moats fronting massive walls often thirty feet in height and thickness. 

In Sun-tzu's era, roughly the end of the Spring and Autumn period, siege technology was just beginning to evolve, so

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cities represented formidable targets that required a vast ex-penditure of time and effort to capture or reduce. Moreover, in-spired defenders could easily decimate any impatient attackers who chose to mount a premature assault. Even though cities were the military and economic centers of the surrounding area, they had not evolved into critical targets, and could easily be bypassed as armies moved through reasonably open coun-tryside. Accordingly, Sun-tzu decried protracted sieges and dis-couraged precipitous urban assaults by classifying them as the lowest form of warfare, rather than dogmatically asserting they should never be undertaken:

The tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when un-avoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earthworks will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot overcome his impa-tience, but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his offi-cers and troops and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from attacking fortified cities. 81

Modern Western professional military publications have fre-quently but incorrectly simplified Sun-tzu's admonitions to "Do not attack cities" or "Avoid urban warfare." However, a slightly earlier passage reconfirms that, rather than simply condemn-ing such attacks outright, Sun-tzu advocated the considered implementation of more effective tactics: "The highest realiza-tion of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities." Furthermore, tomb fragments recovered with Sun Pin Military Methods that may have been an integral part of Sun-tzu Art of War further explicate his view:

As for fortified cities that are not assaulted: We estimate that our strength is sufficient to seize it. If we seize it, it will not be of any advantage to the fore; if we gain it, we will not be able to 

protect it to the rear. If our strength equals theirs, the city cer-tainly will not be taken. If when we gain the advantage of a for-ward position the city will then surrender by itself, whereas if we do not gain such advantages the city will not cause harm to the rear--in such cases, even though the city can be assaulted, do not assault it. 82

Sun-tzu thus emphasized calculating the potential net gain and employing methods other than frontal assaults, such as drawing the en

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emy out so that they will be compelled to fight on more advan-tageous terrain.

Sun Pin's dual categorization of "male" and "female" cities in the middle of the Warring States period is generally contrasted with Sun- tzu's reluctance to assault fortified cities and inter-preted as reflecting the growth of cities as economic and strate-gic centers, as well as the evolution of effective siege techniques and weaponry, such as the catapult. 83 Unlike the Spring and Autumn era, when campaign armies could move relatively un-hindered through the sparsely populated open countryside, in the middle Warring States period they could be thwarted by the heavily fortified strongholds that had concurrently assumed much greater military and economic value. Among these cities the strategically weaker ones, which he classified as female, could be attacked, whereas the stronger, or male, ones should be avoided. (However, Sun Pin never explicitly stated that fe-male cities should invariably be attacked or designated them as more than preferred targets.) His classificatory principles in the chapter entitled "Male and Female Cities" appear to be simply topographical, although other situations similarly categorized for their attack potential (deleted here) were also intermixed. 84

A city that lies amid small marshes, lacks high mountains and notable valleys, but has moderate-sized mounds about its four quarters is a male city that cannot be attacked. 

If before a city there is a notable valley while it has a high mountain behind it, it is a male city and cannot be attacked.

If the terrain within a city is high while it falls away outside it, it is a male city and cannot be attacked.

A city with moderate-sized mounds within is a male city that cannot be attacked.

A city with a notable valley behind it that lacks high mountains to its left and right is a vacuous city and can be attacked.

A city that lies amid vast marshes and lacks notable valleys and moderate-sized mounds is a female city that can be at-tacked.

A city that lies between high mountains and lacks notable val-leys and moderate-sized mounds is a female city that can be attacked.

If there is a high mountain in front of a city and a notable val-ley behind it, while before it the ground ascends and to the rear it descends, it is a female city and can be attacked.

The Wei Liao-tzu, a military classic probably composed a cen-tury after Sun Pin's death, discussed the economic importance of city markets for sustaining the armed forces and noted that "land is the means

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for nourishing the populace; fortified cities the means for de-fending the land; and combat the means for defending the cities." Accordingly, the author advocated making cities a pri-mary objective, particularly if "the cities are large and the land narrow":

When the troops have assembled at the enemy's border and the general has arrived, the army should penetrate deeply into their territory, sever their roads, and occupy their large cities and large towns. Have the troops ascend the walls and press the enemy into endangered positions. Have the several units of men and women each press the enemy in accord with the con- 

figuration of the terrain and attack any strategic barriers. If you occupy the terrain around a city or town and sever the var-ious roads about it, follow up by attacking the city itself.

According to the Wei Liao-tzu, determining whether to besiege or assault a city is simply part of an overall strategic assess-ment, a basic intelligence operation:

Attack a country according to its changes. Display riches in or-der to observe their poverty. Display exhaustion in order to ob-serve their illness. If the ruler is immoral and the people disaf-fected, one has a basis for attack.

In general, whenever about to mobilize the army, you must first investigate the strategic balance of power both within and with-out the borders in order to calculate whether to mount a cam-paign. You must know whether the army is well prepared or suffers from inadequacies; whether there is a surplus or short-age of provisions. You must determine the routes for advancing and returning. Only thereafter can you mobilize the army to at-tack the chaotic and be certain of being able to enter their state.

If the territory is vast but the cities small, you must first oc-cupy their land. If the cities are large but the land narrow, you must first attack their cities. If the country is vast and the pop-ulace few, isolate their strategic points. If the land is confined but the people numerous, construct high mounds in order to overlook them. Do not destroy their material profits or seize the people's agricultural seasons. Be magnanimous toward their government officials, stabilize the people's occupations, and provide relief for their impoverished, for then your Virtue will be sufficient to over spread All under Heaven. 85

Other passages in the Wei Liao-tzu identify several factors that make cities vulnerable:

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When the general is light, the fortifications low, and the peo-ple's minds unstable, the masses can be attacked. If the gen-eral is weighty and the fortifications are high but the masses 

are afraid, they can be encircled. In general, whenever you en-circle someone, you must provide them with a prospect for some minor advantage, causing them to become weaker day by day. Then the defenders will be forced to reduce their rations until they have nothing to eat.

When their masses fight with each other at night, they are ter-rified. If the masses avoid their work, they have become disaf-fected. If they just wait for others to come and rescue them and when the time for battle arrives they are tense, they have all lost their will and are dispirited. Dispirit defeats an army, dis-torted plans defeat a state. 86 . . .

If the enemy's generals and armies are unable to believe in each other, the officers and troops unable to be in harmony, and there are those unaffected by punishments, we will defeat them. Before the rescue party has arrived the city will have al-ready surrendered.

If fords and bridges have not yet been constructed, strategic barriers not yet repaired, dangerous points in the city walls not yet fortified, and the iron caltrops not yet set out, then even though they have a fortified city, they do not have any defense!

If the troops from distant forts have not yet entered the city or the border guards and forces in other states yet returned, then even though they have men, they do not have any men! If the six domesticated animals have not yet been herded in, the five grains not yet harvested, the wealth and materials for use not yet collected, then even though they have resources, they do not have any resources! Now when a city is empty and void and its resources are exhausted, we should take advantage of this vacuity to attack them. 87

The Wei Liao-tzu also contains extensive passages on the na-ture of sieges and fortified defenses, including a brief analysis of the defender's psychology, that merit examining because their thorough implementation precludes an easy, even suc-cessful, assault:

In general, when the defenders go forth, if they do not occupy the outer walls of the cities or the borderlands, and when they 

retreat do not establish watchtowers and barricades for the purpose of defensive warfare, they do not excel at defense. The valiant heroes and brave stalwarts, sturdy armor and sharp weapons, powerful

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crossbows and strong arrows should all be within the outer walls, and then all the grain stored outside in the earthen cel-lars and granaries collected and the buildings outside the outer walls broken down and brought into the fortifications. This will force the attackers to expend ten or a hundred times the en-ergy, whereas the defenders will not expend half theirs. The en-emy aggressors will be harmed greatly, yet generals through the ages have not known this.

If a wall is ten thousand feet long, then ten thousand men should defend it. The moats should be deep and wide, the walls solid and thick, the soldiers and people prepared, firewood and foodstuffs provided, the crossbows stout and arrows strong, the spears and halberds well suited. This is the method for making defense solid.

If the attackers are not less than a mass of at least a hundred thousand while the defenders have an army outside that will certainly come to the rescue, it is a city that must be defended. If there is no external army to inevitably rescue them, then it isn't a city that must be defended.

Now if the walls are solid and rescue certain, then even stupid men and ignorant women will all, without exception, protect the walls, exhausting their resources and blood for them. For a city to withstand a siege for a year, the strength of the defend-ers should exceed that of the attackers, and the strength of the rescue force exceed that of the defenders.

Now if the walls are solid but rescue uncertain, then the stupid men and ignorant women, all without exception, will defend the parapets, but they will weep. This is normal human emotion. Even if you then open the grain reserves in order to relieve and pacify them, you cannot stop it. You must incite the valiant he-roes and brave stalwarts with their sturdy armor, sharp 

weapons, strong crossbows, and stout arrows to exert their strength together in the front, and the young, weak, crippled, and ill to exert their strength together in the rear. 88

Throughout the Warring States period siege warfare rapidly evolved, producing specialized techniques, machines, and sub-versive methods, making it possible to subjugate cities far more expeditiously, sometimes even in days. The Six Secret Teach-ings describes some tactics for besieging cities that emphasize the role of intelligence. For example, when confronted with a double-pronged night attack from both outside and inside the siege lines, the T'ai Kung predicated the tactical response upon thorough knowledge of the situation: "In this case you

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should divide your forces into three armies. Be careful to evalu-ate the terrain's configuration and then strategically emplace them. You must know in detail the location of the enemy's sec-ond army, as well as their large cities and secondary fortifica-tions. Leave them a passage in order to entice them to flee. Pay attention to all the preparations, not neglecting anything." 89 Another chapter elucidates an unusual technique for determin-ing a city's vulnerability based upon observations of the ch'i in its environs, which will be discussed in the final section on por-tents.

The preceding materials clearly witness a historical progression from Sun-tzu through Sun Pin to Wei Liao-tzu, from viewing assaults on cities as the lowest tactical option to emphasizing the need to defend and attack them as the highest. After the establishment of the Ch'in dynasty and the elimination of con-flict between the distinct political entities known as states, the military horizon shifted to ongoing conflict with steppe peoples interspersed with the fragmenting battles of periodic dynastic strife. Although some cities were encountered in the Han's far-ranging campaigns, the efforts to contain, even vanquish, the steppe peoples were little concerned with city assaults because of the seasonal movements and absence of permanent fortifica-tions around even their largest population centers. However, during the repeated, interminable wars that marked China's 

history from its imperial inception, the question was no longer whether to attack the cities, but how and when. Some reluc-tance is still seen in the later military writings because they continued to be under the theoretical influence of earlier con-cepts and sieges still required enormous effort, but generals would rarely bypass such valuable and powerful targets, and the techniques of siegecraft accordingly receive considerable space in the great military compendiums.

The late Sung Hundred Unorthodox Strategies contains two tac-tical lessons that reflect the parameters for evaluating cities as targets of opportunity. The first, "Slowness in Warfare," sur-prisingly advises mounting a siege preliminary to an assault despite the presence of strong fortifications: "In general, as-saulting fortified enemy cities is the lowest form of strategy, to be undertaken only when there is no alternative. However, if their walls are high and their moats deep, their people many and supplies few, while there is no prospect of external rescue and you can thoroughly entangle and take the city, then it will be advantageous. A tactical principle from the Art of War states: 'Their slowness is like the forest.'"

Two factors predispose the city to a siege and eventual assault: The large occupation force lacks sufficient supplies to with-stand a long siege and has no hope of rescue. Therefore, the siege need not be pro

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longed and as the fortifications are basically good--high walls and deep moats--once taken, will prove highly defensible. In contrast, the situation in the next chapter, "Quickness in War-fare," assumes the opposite: ample food, few men to resist, and the danger of external forces attacking from without if the siege is prolonged. Thus, in the former case the attackers can afford to wait for the besieged to grow weaker, but in the latter they must act quickly to achieve their tactical objectives: "Whenever attacking an encircled town, if the enemy's supplies are ample but their men few while they have a prospect for external aid, you must quickly assault them and then you will be victorious. A tactical principle states: 'The army values spiritual speed.'" 

Undertaking a prolonged siege, rather than mounting a swift assault, is thus judged inadvisable because the defenders have ample food supplies and strong prospects for being rescued by a formidable external force. Should the latter arrive, the attack-ers would be exposed to a crushing external assault combined with a simultaneous interior counterattack by highly motivated defenders, just as the T'ai Kung pondered previously. As the Six Secret Teachings states, "Being as swift as a flying arrow and attacking as suddenly as the release of a crossbow are the means by which to destroy brilliant plans." Clearly, numerous factors, including the spirit and resolve of the defenders, still had to be weighed whether one is considering a siege or an as-sault, or undertaking a sustained defense against siege, which is somewhat less discussed, except in the Wei Liao-tzu, and equally requires adequate information about the enemy's forces, position, and intentions.

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Part Six PROGNOSTICATION, DIVINATION,

AND NONHUMAN FACTORS

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17 Historical Practices

and Their Rejection PLASTROMANCY AND THE SHANG DYNASTY ruling house were so intertwined as to be indivisible, current knowledge of the Shang essentially being derived from the hundreds of thou-sands of turtle plastrons and ox bones used in scapulimancy, 

supplemented with other archaeological evidence. The ruler questioned the spirits on numerous topics regarding adminis-tration, sacrifices, rituals, and personal affairs, including his own health, but especially military actions and campaigns. The hope was expressed that a specific campaign, undertaken on a certain day or within a specified time period, would prove suc-cessful, and confirmation was then sought from the spirits, perhaps in a sort of normative mode rather than simple in-quiry. 1 This tradition continued into the Chou, although much deemphasized because the Chou proclaimed they had inherited the Mandate of Heaven, and from examples in the Tso Chuan the tradition may also be seen in the Spring and Autumn pe-riod, as rulers in the individual states sought to determine the auspiciousness of contemplated military actions. 2 For this purpose both the turtle and the I Ching--divination by milfoil stalks--were used, with the former being given preference for serious affairs of state, although the latter became more popu-lar with the passing of time. 3

A very early example of employing the I Ching, presumably dat-ing from the Spring and Autumn period, is preserved in the Tso Chuan entry for Duke Hsi's fifteenth year ( 645 B.C.):

The Earl of Ch'in was about to invade the state of Chin. Tu Fu, the official prognosticator, cast the milfoil stalks and pro-nounced:

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"It is auspicious. If you cross over the Yellow River, the mar-quis' chariot forces will be defeated."

When the earl interrogated him further, Tu Fu responded: "It is really very auspicious! After defeating them three times you will invariably capture Chin's ruler. The hexagram that has been cast is called 'Ku.' A verse states, 'A thousand chariots are three times repulsed; what remains to be captured after three repellings is a male fox.' This fox, found in the hexagram Ku, must be the ruler. The lower trigram symbolizes the wind, whereas the upper trigram symbolizes mountains. The time of year is now termed 'autumn.' We will drop their fruit and seize 

their material wealth. This is the way we will conquer. When their fruit has dropped and their material wealth has been lost, on what might they rely to withstand defeat?" 4

In this case Tu Fu's interpretation turned upon the idea of the wind, symbolized by the lower trigram in the I Ching hexagram (identified with Ch'in's forces), blowing destructively up over the mountain above, causing the fruit or substance of the en-emy's strength to drop and their material wealth--possibly the trees on the mountainside-- to be taken. As predicted, the sub-sequent engagement resulted in three consecutive defeats for Chin.

Another example preserved in the Shuo Yüan dating back to the Spring and Autumn period illustrates how dreams and div-ination might be employed to produce conjoined prognostica-tions. Prior to the battle of Ch'eng-p'u, Duke Wen (who ap-peared in the historical section) observed troubling celestial phenomena and experienced an odd dream that he felt pre-saged a baleful outcome, but an alternative interpretation was quickly offered:

Duke Wen addressed Chiu Fan: "When I wanted to perform div-ination by the turtle shell and heated it [to induce cracks], the fire went out. Moreover, we confront the year star while they have it at their backs. A comet [broom star] is also visible in the sky whose position is such that they hold the handle while we grasp the tail [brush]. In addition, I dreamed that I fought with the king of Ch'u, who was on top while I was beneath him. I do not want to engage in battle. What do you think?"

Chiu Fan replied: "The fire going out when you performed plas-tromantic divination indicates that Ch'u's army will be extin-guished. Confronting the year star while they back it means they will go off while we will follow them. As for them grasping the handle of the comet while we hold the tail, if they were en-gaged

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in sweeping with a broom, it would be to their advantage, but for attacking, it is to ours. As for my lord's dream about 

wrestling with the king of Ch'u with him on top and you below, you look up to Heaven while the king of Ch'u bears the respon-sibility for his offenses. Moreover, we act as leader of the al-liance with Sung and Wei while Ch'i and Ch'in also support us. We accord with the Tao of Heaven, so based just upon human endeavor, we should be victorious." 5

Separately the Shuo Yüan notes that "ominous phenomena are the way Heaven warns the son of Heaven and the feudal lords, while nightmares are the way it warns officers and officials." 6

Even in the interlude between the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods the great general Wu Ch'i assumed that divination would be performed to confirm the prospects for success, the advisability of undertaking a campaign, or even the permissibility of a specific attack. The first chapter of the Wu-tzu states:

There are four disharmonies. If there is disharmony in the state, you cannot put the army into the field. If there is dishar-mony within the army, you cannot deploy into formations. If you lack harmony within the formations, you cannot advance into battle. If you lack cohesion during the conduct of the bat-tle, you cannot score a decisive victory. For this reason when a ruler who has comprehended the Tao is about to employ his people, he will first bring them into harmony and only there-after embark on great affairs. He will not dare rely solely upon his own plans, but will certainly announce them formally in the ancestral temple, divine their prospects by the great turtle shell, and seek their confirmation in the Heavens and seasons. Only if they are all auspicious will he proceed to mobilize the army. 7

Accordingly, even when Wu Ch'i identified situations in which victory should invariably follow, he felt compelled to preface them as "not requiring divination," saying, "In general, when evaluating the enemy there are eight conditions under which one engages in battle without performing divination." Con-versely, situations too disadvantageous to contemplate required active means of avoidance: "There are six circumstances in 

which, without performing divination, you should avoid con-flict."8

Perceiving the critical moment and acting appropriately were dominant concerns among inhabitants of the late Warring States period. The I Ching, although perhaps developed in part to resolve the inter

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pretive difficulties posed by the sometimes bizarre crack pat-terns in turtle shells, provided a method for generating consis-tent phenomenal signs and a handbook for fathoming them. However, achieving true insight remained problematic, eventu-ally prompting the creation of other, more accessible works in the same genre, such as the Ling Ch'i Ching. 9 (Even though the I Ching frequently conceptualizes in terms of military im-ages, its explanations often refer to military events, and it was consulted before battles as early as the Spring and Autumn pe-riod, it apparently had no direct influence upon pre-T'ang mili-tary writings.) The employment of prognosticatory phenomena, whether in seeking to harmonize with the universal flux or fathom concrete situations, continued throughout the Warring States period. Thus the Six Secret Teachings, representative of middle Warring States thought, includes three astrologers on the command staff, holding them responsible for "the stars and calendar; observing the wind and ch'i; predicting auspicious days and times; investigating signs and phenomena; verifying disasters and abnormalities; and knowing Heaven's mind with regard to the moment for completion or abandonment." 10

At the same time the Warring States period saw increasingly common opposition to divination, omen-taking, and other prac-tices among the military writers, even as these practices appar-ently continued to flourish and evolve. Accordingly the Three Strategies, probably composed at the very end of the Warring States or slightly thereafter, characterized states that relied upon divination as likely targets for easy conquest. 11 The slightly earlier Wei Liao-tzu opens with a much- quoted passage condemning such beliefs: 

King Hui of Liang inquired of Wei Liao-tzu, "Is it true that the Yellow Emperor, through punishments and Virtue, achieved a hundred victories without a defeat?"

Wei Liao-tzu replied: "Punishment was employed to attack, Virtue was employed to preserve. This is not what is referred to as 'Heavenly Offices, auspicious hours and days, yin and yang, facing toward and turning your back to.' The Yellow Emperor's victories were a matter of human effort, that's all. Why was that?

"Now if there is a fortified city and one attacks it from the east and west but cannot take it, and attacks from the south and north but cannot take it, can it be that all four directions failed to accord with an auspicious moment that could be exploited? If you still cannot take it, it is because the walls are high, the moats deep, the weapons and implements fully prepared, the materials and grains accumulated in great quantities, and their valiant soldiers unified in their plans. If the wall is low, the moats shallow,

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and the defenses weak, then it can be taken. From this per-spective, 'moments,' 'seasons,' and 'Heavenly Offices' are not as important as human effort.

"According to the Heavenly Offices, 'Deploying troops with wa-ter to the rear is referred to as "isolated terrain." Deploying troops facing a long ridge is termed "abandoning the army."' When King Wu attacked King Chou of the Shang, he deployed his troops with the Chi River behind him, facing a mountain slope. With 22,500 men he attacked King Chou's hundreds of thousands and destroyed the Shang dynasty. Yet had not King Chou deployed in accord with the Heavenly Offices?

"The Ch'u general Kung-tzu Hsin was about to engage Ch'i in battle. At that time a comet appeared with its tail over Ch'i. Ac-cording to such beliefs, wherever the tail pointed would be vic-torious and they could not be attacked. Kung-tzu Hsin said: 'What does a comet know? Those who fight according to the comet will certainly be overturned and conquered.' On the mor- 

row he engaged Ch'i and greatly defeated them. The Yellow Em-peror said, 'Putting spirits and ghosts first is not as good as first investigating my own knowledge.' This means that the Heavenly Offices are nothing but human effort." 12

A chapter somewhat later in the text reprises the common practices of the time and reiterates the author's deprecatory view:

Generals of the present generation investigate "singular days" and "empty mornings," divine about Hsien-ch'ih, interpret "full" and "disastrous" days, accord with turtle shell augury, look for the auspicious and baleful, and observe the changes of the planets, constellations, and winds, wanting to thereby gain vic-tory and establish their success. I view this as very difficult!

Now the commanding general is not governed by Heaven above, or controlled by Earth below, or governed by men in the mid-dle. Thus weapons are evil implements. Conflict is a contrary virtue. The post of general is an office of death. Thus only when it cannot be avoided does one employ them. There is no Heaven above, no Earth below, no ruler to the rear, and no enemy in the front. The unified army of one man is like the wolf and tiger, like the wind and rain, like thunder and lightning. Shak-ing and mysterious, All under Heaven are terrified by it.

The army that would be victorious is like water. Now water is the softest and weakest of things, but whatever it collides with, such as hills and mounds, will be collapsed by it for no other rea

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son than its nature is concentrated and its attack is totally committed. Now if someone has the sharpness of the famous sword Mo Yeh, the toughness of rhinoceros hide for armor, the masses of the Three Armies, and orthodox and unorthodox methods, then under All Heaven no one can withstand him in battle.

Thus it is said that if you raise the Worthy and employ the tal-ented, even if the hour and day are not auspicious, your affairs 

will still be advantageous. If you make the laws clear and are cautious about orders, without divining with the turtle shell or milfoil you will obtain propitious results. If you honor achieve-ment and nurture effort, without praying you will obtain good fortune. It is also said that "the seasons of Heaven are not as good as advantages of Earth; the advantages of Earth are not as good as harmony among men." The Sages of antiquity stressed human effort, that's all. 13

The great T'ang general Li Ching believed that even when the Chou was mounting its final attack against the Shang, a hu-manistic orientation prevailed:

The T'ai-tsung said: "T'ien Tan entrusted their fate to the su-pernatural and destroyed Yen, whereas the T'ai Kung burned the milfoil and turtle shells yet went on to exterminate King Chou. How is it that these two affairs are contradictory?" 14

Li Ching said: "Their subtle motives were the same. One went contrary to such practices and seized the enemy, one accorded with them and implemented his plans.

"In antiquity, when the T'ai Kung was assisting King Wu, they reached Mu-yeh, where they encountered thunder and rain. The flags and drums were broken or destroyed. San Yi-sheng wanted to divine for an auspicious response before moving. This then is a case where, because of doubts and fear within the army, he felt they must rely upon divination to inquire of the spirits. But the T'ai Kung believed that rotted grass and dried up bones were not worth asking. Moreover, in the case of a subject attacking his ruler, how could there be a second chance? 15

"Now I observe that San I-sheng expressed his motives at the beginning, but the T'ai Kung attained his subsequently. Even though one was contrary to and the other in accord with div-inatory practices, their reasons were identical. When I previ-ously stated these techniques should not be abandoned, it was largely to preserve the vital point of ch'i before affairs have be-gun to mani 

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fest themselves. As for their being successful, it was a matter of human effort, that's all." 16

The Wei Liao-tzu contains an interesting passage that essen-tially comments upon this event:

When King Wu attacked King Chou, the army forded the Yellow River at Meng Chin. On the right was the king's pennant, on the left the ax of punishment, together with three hundred war-riors committed to die and thirty thousand fighting men. King Chou's formation deployed several hundred thousand men, with Fei Liao and O Lai personally leading the halberdiers and ax-bearers. Their lines stretched across a hundred kilometers. King Wu did not exhaust the warriors or people, the soldiers did not bloody their blades, but they conquered the Shang dy-nasty and executed King Chou. 17 There was nothing auspi-cious or abnormal; it was merely a case of perfecting oneself, or not perfecting oneself, in human affairs.

Even though divinatory practices persisted unabated through-out China's history, Li Ching cynically voiced the ultimate ratio-nale for visibly continuing them while maintaining an attitude of disbelief:

The T'ai-tsung asked, "Can the divination practices of yin and yang be abandoned?"

Li Ching said: "They cannot. The military is the Tao of deceit, so if we apparently put faith in yin and yang divination prac-tices, we can manipulate the greedy and stupid. They cannot be abandoned."

The T'ai-tsung said: "You once said that selecting astrologically auspicious seasons and days are not methods of enlightened generals. Ignorant generals adhere to them, so it seems appro-priate to abandon them."

Li Ching said: "KingChou perished on a day designated as chia-tzu, King Wu flourished on the same day. According to the as-trologically auspicious seasons and days, chia-tzu is the first 

day. The Shang were in chaos, the Chou were well governed. Flourishing and perishing are different in this case. Moreover, Emperor Wu of the Sung mobilized his troops on a 'going to perish day.' The army's officers all felt it to be impermissible, but the emperor said, 'I will go forth and he will perish.' Indeed, he conquered them.

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"Speaking with reference to these cases, it is clear that the practices can be abandoned. However, when T'ien Tan was sur-rounded by Yen, Tan ordered a man to impersonate a spirit. He bowed and prayed to him, and the spirit said Yen could be de-stroyed. Tan thereupon used fire-oxen to go forth and attack Yen, greatly destroying them. This is the deceitful Tao of mili-tary thinkers. The selection of astrologically auspicious seasons and days is similar to this." 18

Li Ching advocated similar measures to obscure the designa-tions for formations and thereby keep people mystified:

The T'ai-tsung said: "The four animal formations also have the notes shang, yü, wei, and chiao to symbolize them. What is the reason for this?"

Li Ching replied: "It is the Tao of deceit. By preserving them, one is able to dispense with them. If you dispense with them and do not employ them, deceitfulness will grow ever greater. The ancients obscured the names of the four formations with those of the four animals, together with the designations of Heaven, Earth, wind, and clouds, and moreover added the notes and associated phases of shang and metal, yü and water, wei and fire, chiao and wood. This was the cleverness of the an-cient military strategists. If you preserve them, deceitfulness will not increase further. If you abandon them, how can the greedy and stupid be employed?"19

From the late Warring States period when the practice of con-sulting omens was strongly condemned by the Wei Liao-tzu, de-spite a widespread fascination with anticipatory phenomena, military thought witnessed a theoretical bifurcation into con-tradictory orientations. However, even though some military 

texts (such as the Wei Liao-tzu and Questions and Replies) com-pletely eschew divinatory practices, a vast literature devoted to their methods and measures simultaneously evolved, with ma-terial from both traditions being encompassed, if not exactly in-tegrated, from Li Ch'uan's T'ang dynasty T'ai-pai Yin-ching through such Sung dynasty works as the Hu-ling Ching and

Wu-ching Tsung-yao. Even the Ping-fa Pai-yen, dating from the transition period between the Ming and Ch'ing, while empha-sizing natural phenomena, still grudgingly granted theoretical credibility to such methods under its definition of Heaven:

Definition: Being able to observe the phenomena of clouds is referred to as "Heaven."

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Original Text: When strong winds blow, be careful about whirl-winds. When the myriad stars move about, it will be rainy and wet. When clouds and fog converge from all directions, be wary of ambushes and surprise attacks. When there are violent winds and heavy rain, rumbling of thunder and lightning inter-twined, quickly prepare your strong crossbowmen and cau-tiously guard against sudden attacks by the enemy. Those who excel in employing such circumstances will never fail to exploit an opportunity, those who excel at defense will never fail to re-spond to changes. Heaven always lies with men, but only the wise are able to rely on it to seize victory. What further evi-dence does one need to seek?

Examples: Farmers recognize the signs of clearing and rain, boatmen know the direction of the wind. What need is there for them to read different books or grasp other interpretations? They gain experience through their affairs and verify their ob-servations through constant discussion. Their eyes see phe-nomena and their minds absorb them. If they can be focused, how much more so the wise who have penetrated the mysteries of yin and yang and the five phases; who synthesize the en-tirety of sounds, appearances, vapors, and flavors; who have extensive comprehension of the books on the vast night skies; who are practiced in the arts of divination, calculation, and phenomenal observation? With one look they recognize auspi-cious omens and ill portents, with one silent glance compre- 

hend misfortune and blessings, good fortune and calamity. Few are the human affairs and season of Heaven that can be simply pondered out. Therefore, one who knows Heaven becomes wise, one who knows Heaven is knowledgeable. To attain victory through relying upon Heaven is spiritual!

Examples: Tactical methods that prove victorious in the dark-ness of night are the pinnacle of subtle essence. Thus darkness and light, wind and rain depend upon Heaven; flat land and ravines, broad and constricted terrain depend upon Earth; seg-menting and reuniting, advancing and retreating depend upon men.

Prognosticatory Systems in Military Practice

Although Chinese military intelligence, no doubt largely in re-sponse to Sun-tzu's emphasis upon acquiring knowledge through human agency, was firmly grounded in human effort and realistic practices, the countercurrent of belief that envi-sioned a useful resource in various divinatory and prognostica-tory practices continued to flourish.

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Numerous methods derived from astonishingly complex theo-ries evolved by the T'ang dynasty, requiring arcane skills, intri-cate observations, and extensive knowledge. Their prevalence may be deduced from the lengthy sections devoted to them in the major military writings of the Sung dynasty: some 45 per-cent of the Hu-ling Ching's 430 pages, many of them expan-sions of material found in the T'ai-pai Yin- ching; 15 percent of the 2,340 pages in the lengthy Wu-ching Tsung- yao, an ency-clopedia of military knowledge compiled in the mid- eleventh century, just a few decades after the Hu-ling Ching; and four of the ten volumes in the massive Wu-pei Chih completed in the last decades of the Ming dynasty. (That the voluminous works on prognostication and divination outside the military tradition also contain materials with martial implications hardly needs mention.)

The military writings organize this vast material to reflect the requirements of military intelligence. Certain conditions or cir- 

cumstances therefore recur, with observations being systemati-cally interpreted by various methods formulated according to the theories and premises of the distinct systems. The topics commonly found in the T'ang and Sung military texts include selecting an appropriate day for initiating a campaign, predict-ing victory or defeat, determining the basic advisability of en-gaging an enemy, fathoming enemy commanders, determining an emissary's credibility, predicting the existence of ambushes, discerning the enemy's location, fathoming where to encamp, determining whether to assume the tactical role of a guest or host, warning of as yet unseen threats, and deciding when to dispatch spies and agents.

Several prominent systems employ various combinations of the stars, Chinese zodiac, and sequential series known as the "Ten Stems and Twelve Branches" (for Heaven and Earth, respec-tively) that, when paired in an ongoing cycle, provide the sixty designations for the days in the traditional calendrical science that still underlies contemporary lunar calendars. For example, in the Hu-ling Ching chapter on determining an auspicious day for sending the army forth, this cycle of sixty is employed to designate certain days--such as the "Nine Uglies" and "Six Im-poverishments"--falling in various lunar months on which the commencement of military activities should definitely be avoided. (Other inimical days include those when the phases of the moon are unstable--the end and beginning of the moon's cycle, a reflection of yin's activity and therefore deadly, as well as numerical combinations that presage calamity.) Unifying them all is the general principle that "on days when Heaven's ch'i is severed, you cannot send the army forth or launch an at-tack." 20 Theories based upon the five phases, yin andyang, and even the sixty-four hexagrams of the I

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Ching--abstracted from their original context and converted into time and space markers with an intrinsic hierarchical or-der and inherent, dynamic interrelationships--similarly provide the foundation for single theories and complex hybrid systems. 21 

Other celestial phenomena of importance include the type and orientation of rainbows; the direction, type, ferocity, and dura-tion of the wind; the nature and activity of innumerable stars, as well as their positions in various constellations and the zo-diac, and important conjunctions; comets, meteors, and shoot-ing stars; the sun and moon's characteristics, position, and eclipse activity; the general appearance of the sky; rain; and various seasonal activities and discordances. Finally, as will be seen in the extensive case studies that follow, the practice of watching the subtle vapors known as ch'i and their more visible manifestation, the clouds, engendered hundreds of detailed ob-servations with correlated implications, including victory and defeat.

The evolution of these complex systems invariably strikes most modern readers, including those who evince a belief in Western astrology, as astonishing, and their persistence in China's highly rational, experientially derived military literature as in-comprehensible, even if they were never as bizarre as certain Roman practices or as localized as the Delphic Oracle. Al-though it appears that this literature, being bereft of any scien-tific basis or empirical validity, was largely irrelevant to actual battlefield command from the late Warring States on, the de-gree to which such methods were recognized and employed re-mains to be studied. However, anyone who has ever been con-fronted by major events, suffered from uncertainty, or foundered in doubt over actions and their probable results can well understand the anxiety of commanders entrusted with re-sponsibility for the army's fate and the very existence of the state, as well as their quest for any indication of the correct path. Contemporary Western military literature on comman-ders employing intuitive (otherwise termed "experientially based" or "enlightened insight") aspects of decisionmaking abil-ities, despite the plethora of data and ever-increasing real-time micromanagement of the battlefield, even though couched in "rational" terms, perhaps veers not too distantly from the un-conscious recognition of battlefield factors vaguely expressible in terms of mood, context, abnormalities, or miasmic ch'i. The accumulation, classification, and codification of particularized experiences, although theoretically verifiable in subsequent 

concrete events, thus furnished another informational dimen-sion for military intelligence efforts.

Even though certainly disbelieved by military commanders in the details, visible omens were generally given credence, espe-cially by ordinary soldiers (prompting concern about defusing the impact of these

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omens and preventing their occurrence), 22 and they were cer-tainly an integral part of the mind-set and cultural heritage. Just as the most modern, rational citizens of scientific culture may be taken aback by strange phenomena or perturbed by unusual phenomena, commanders could not help musing on forthcoming events as the day broke, and they perceived colors and shapes among the clouds forming over the enemy, in the ch'i rising from their encampment, strange configurations of stars, or a halo around the moon. Although many military writ-ings still voiced caveats about the need to train, prepare, and fight well--thereby vitiating any baleful predictions--this under-current could never be eradicated.

The strength of widespread belief in the validity of predictive phenomena may be seen in two Han dynasty examples. Once the Ch'in reunified China, the government's focal military con-cern became the danger posed by the nomadic border peoples. An indication of how portents might be exploited within this re-defined orientation appears in a memorial presented by the fa-mous Han dynasty general Chao Ch'ung-kuo, who was active during Emperor Wu-ti's aggressively martial reign and success-fully specialized in border affairs: "Just now the five main stars are emerging in the east, which presages great advantages for China and great defeats for the barbarian peoples. T'ai-pai is high in the sky, so daring to lead troops deep into enemy terri-tory and engage in battle will be auspicious, but not daring to do so will be baleful. If our generals urgently strike, by relying on the advantages of Heaven to execute the unrighteous, the realm will be preserved and there will not be any future doubts." 23 He subsequently received permission to take action against the Hsien-ling and succeeded in vanquishing them. 24 

The debilitating effect of omens and portents was much warned against in the military writings, leading to psychological coun-termeasures. Conversely, when an ill omen was seen, learning of its effects upon the enemy and exploiting them could prove advantageous, as General Tung Chuo proved in the Later Han dynasty when he served as one of the commanders of some one hundred thousand infantry and cavalry dispatched to crush a barbarian force. 25 They were standing off against the enemy after an indecisive engagement in the eleventh month when "that night there was a meteor like a flame whose light stretched out a hundred feet, illuminating both camps so that the horses and donkeys all whinnied and brayed. The barbar-ians, feeling it was inauspicious, wanted to return to their stronghold of Chin-ch'eng. When Chung Chuo learned of it, he was elated. The next day he launched a coordinated attack with the other commanders that severely defeated the enemy, killing several thousand of them." 26

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Dust, Smoke, and Atmospheric Manifestations

To study, even in brief, each of the representative systems of belief would require a lengthy, complex work clearly tangential to any focus upon military intelligence activities. However, China has a unique tradition of antique origin of watching clouds, smoke, earthly vapors, dust, mist, and other atmo-spheric phenomena forming, floating, and dispersing for indica-tions about current and future events. Although often ex-plained in terms of ch'i--the vital pneuma of life (including breath) that empowers everything and was later understood as the indefinable substance that constitutes all matter--and much intertwined with ch'i prognostication from the Han dy-nasty on, the traditions were originally distinct. In fact, as we argue elsewhere in detail, there is a sort of continuum ranging from observationally based phenomena, such as the dust col-umn from a chariot advance, through indications of life in an encampment, to clouds and vapors. Even while "rationalists" were railing against divination techniques, official credence was often granted to complex ch'i practices that ranged from imperi-ally sanctioned efforts to determine the first stirrings of sea- 

sonal ch'i, and thus fine-tune the calendar, to simple musings on the battlefield. 27 Even though they may be disparaged to-day, in numerous variations they were long regarded as an in-tegral part of the arsenal for gathering information and predict-ing military events and therefore merit analysis as a case study. 28

In the Art of War Sun-tzu included field guidelines that provide evidence that tactical information was derived from dust obser-vations at least as far back as the Spring and Autumn period: "If dust rises high up in a sharply defined column, chariots are coming. If it is low and broad, the infantry is advancing. If it is dispersed in thin shafts, they are gathering firewood. If it is sparse, coming and going, they are encamping." However, in a lengthy chapter already reprised here, 29 after similarly array-ing various phenomena that might be employed to fathom the enemy, the T'ai Kung concluded with a paragraph that ven-tures into the realm of ch'i phenomena:

In general, when you attack city walls or surround towns, if the color of their ch'i is like dead ashes, the city can be slaugh-tered. If the city's ch'i drifts out to the north, the city can be conquered. If the ch'i goes out and drifts to the west, the city can be forced to surrender. If the ch'i goes out and drifts to the south, it cannot be taken. If the ch'i goes out and drifts to the east, the city cannot be attacked. If the ch'i goes out but then drifts back in, the city's

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ruler has already fled. If the ch'i goes out and overspreads our army, the soldiers will surely fall ill. If the ch'i goes out and dust rises up without any direction, the army will have to be employed for a long time. If you have attacked a walled city or surrounded a town for more than ten days without thunder or rain, you must hastily abandon it, for the city must have a source of great assistance. These are the means by which to know that you can attack and then go on to mount the attack, or that you should not attack and therefore stop. 30 

Another chapter in the Six Secret Teachings preserves an active process already grown antique by the Warring States period:

King Wu asked the T'ai Kung, "From the sound of the pitch pipes can we know the fluctuations of the Three Armies, foretell victory and defeat?"

The T'ai Kung said: "Your question is profound indeed! Now there are twelve pipes, with five major notes: kung, shang, chiao, cheng, and yü. These are the true, orthodox sounds, un-changed for over ten thousand generations.

"The spirits of the five phases are constants of the Tao. Metal, wood, water, fire, and earth, each according to their conquest relationship, can be employed to attack the enemy. In antiq-uity, during the period of the Three Sage Emperors they used the nature of vacuity and nonaction to govern the hard and strong. They did not have characters for writing; everything proceeded from the five phases. The Tao of the five phases is the naturalness of Heaven and Earth. The division into the six chia is a realization of marvelous and subtle spirit.

"Their method was, when the day had been clear and calm, without any clouds, wind, or rain, to send light cavalry out in the middle of the night to approach the enemy's fortifications. Stopping about nine hundred paces away they would all lift their pipes to their ears and then yell out to startle the enemy. There would be a very small, subtle sound that would respond in the pitch pipes.

"If the chiao note responded among the pipes, it indicated a white tiger. If the cheng note responded in the pipes, it indi-cated the Mysterious Military. If the shang note responded in the pipes, it indicated the Vermilion Bird. If the yü note re-sponded in the pipes, it indicated the Hooked Formation. If none of the five notes responded in the pipes, it was kung, sig-nifying a Green Dragon.

"These signs of the five phases are evidence to assist in the conquest, the subtle moments of success and defeat." 31

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In addition to the response generated by their probing, certain external indications aided the process:

These subtle, mysterious notes all have external indications. When the enemy has been startled into movement, listen for them. If you hear the sound of the pao drum, then it is chiao. If you see the flash of lights from a fire, then it is cheng. If you hear the sounds of bronze and iron, of spears and halberds, then it is shang. If you hear the sound of people sighing, it is yü. If all is silent, without any sound, then it is kung. These five are the signs of sound and appearance." 32

The Shih Chi, Han Shu, and Sui Shu treatises on astronomy and astrology composed from the Han through the T'ang con-tain numerous passages correlating observable phenomena with prognosticatory interpretations, including many with mili-tary implications. Not only are comets, scintillating stars, and the appearance of constellations extensively discussed, but also certain cloud formations and their movement. Some sound almost like those found in the Six Secret Teachings or even

Sun-tzu's observations on dust, except that they lack any physical or causal earthly correlate. One particularly interest-ing series associates the appearance of the ch'i with the army's component forces:

The ch'i indicating infantry forces is white; that for earthly achievements yellow. The ch'i indicating chariot forces ascends and descends, moving about and then congealing. The ch'i indi-cating cavalry forces is low and widespread, that for infantry forces concentrated. When the front is low but the rear high forces are urgently moving, when the front is square and high while the rear is angular and low the forces are withdrawing. If the ch'i is tranquil, their movement is leisurely; if the front is high and the rear low, they will turn back without halting. When two constellations of ch'i encounter each other, the forces [indicated by the] lower one will conquer those signified by the higher, those indicated by the angular will conquer those sym-bolized by the square. 33

Similar indications, including predictions about the auspi-ciousness of engaging in battle or the size of unknown forces 

yet to appear, are provided by cloud formations, especially those suggesting animals and earthly phenomena, all of which became more prevalent with the appearance of the T'ang and Sung dynasty military texts that followed. 34

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Ch'i Theory and Representative Selections

Despite philosophical interpretations and extensive theorizing, ch'i's exact nature remains elusive, conveying diverse meanings in different contexts. In its metaphysical guise, as the essential constituent of the universe and all its particulars, it may be considered the substance of objects as realized, with the li--patterns or principles--furnishing the defining form. However, more commonly it was early imaged as the vapors clearly visi-ble rising from cooking food, especially rice (and thus written with the character for rice within it), ephemerally visible before vanishing as wisps in the air. (Another common tradition envi-sioned it as the vital breath of life, visible in a man's winter breath.) In the military writings ch'i clearly refers to something at least vaguely substantial, tenuously existent, visible only to practiced eyes in the most subtle cases but to everyone in its densest concentration. Although always entailing a metaphysi-cal aspect, it included the vapors or mists rising above a lake or early morning field, those visible over an army, and the panoply of colors in an imperceptibly moisture-laden sky.

A basic statement in the T'ai-pai Yin-ching chapter entitled "Fathoming Cloud Ch'i" sets ch'i theory within the context of portent concepts while clearly indicating its dynamic relation-ship with clouds: "When Heaven and Earth mutually respond, yin and yang mutually interact, it is termed ch'i. When ch'i ac-cumulates over a long time, it becomes clouds. In all cases things attain form below and ch'i responds above. Thus it is said, 'By fathoming the ch'i, one will know affairs; by looking at the ch'i, know people.'" The late Sung dynasty Huling Ching adds: "Wherever there are more than a hundred men, the ch'i of victory or defeat will be concretely visible. Those who accord with it will flourish, those who contravene it will perish. Heaven and Earth do not speak, so auspiciousness and balefulness 

must be fathomed through symbols. Unusual ch'i invariably entails disaster and change." 35 As the representative selec-tions will show, unusual ch'i might range from the extremely simple with direct consequences-- such as a reddish diffusion in the sky presaging great bloodshed--to the most intricate and complex, including dragons playing and headless dead men.

Cloud Ch'i Above Cities

A chapter entitled "Cloud Ch'i Above Cities" in the Hu-ling Ching continues Sun Pin's effort to characterize cities as susceptible to attack or not, echoing the T'ai Kung's early ch'i indices: 36

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Whether you want to advance your army and attack a city or the enemy is coming forth to besiege you, you should investi-gate the auspiciousness and balefulness of the clouds and ch'i. If the ch'i above a city or encampment is like men in squads of five and ten with folded hands and bowed heads, their army is willing to surrender. If the cloud ch'i is yellow above and white below, it is termed "excellent ch'i." Any army that it approaches wants to negotiate peace.

If the ch'i within a city is like a white flag, you cannot seize it. If yellow clouds approach a city, it will have cause for celebration. If green color ch'i is like a cow's head butting a man, the people within the city cannot be slain. If the ch'i in the city emerges from the eastern quarter and its color is yellow, it indicates Heaven's Ax and the city cannot be attacked. Anyone who at-tacks it will suffer great misfortune.

If the ch'i above a city is like fiery smoke that divides and bub-bles up, it signifies that they want to sally forth and fight. Their ch'i cannot be attacked. If multiple colors emerge one by one and are unconstrained, you cannot slay them. If red or black ch'i shaped like a pestle extends out from inside the city, the troops within it will suddenly sally forth and it presages a great victory.

If the cloud ch'i above a city divides to form the appearance of two spikes of fire, you cannot attack. If it mistily surrounds a 

city but doesn't enter, troops outside will not succeed in enter-ing.

Whenever attacking a city or strongpoint, if variegated ch'i goes in and out of your army, it is ch'i that foretells victory. Carefully prepare for it.

If when attacking a city red ch'i hovers over it and yellow ch'i surrounds it on all four sides, the commanding general will die and the city will surrender. If the ch'i above a city is red like fly-ing birds, by urgently striking, you can immediately destroy it. If the ch'i goes out of the city, the populace wants to sneak out and disperse and lacks the will to fight. Quickly attack them.

If the ch'i is like dead ashes and overspreads the city and strong- points, the officers and troops are ill and the city can be slaughtered.

If there is not any cloud ch'i above the city, there is dissension among the officers and troops. If the red ch'i above a city is like a mass of men with their heads facing down, below there will be many dead and wounded. If white ch'i surrounds a city and enters it, by urgently attacking, you can seize it. If the white ch'i gleams like a long sword more than a hundred staffs long that rises up above the enemy and stretches over the city, any-one who attacks

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will suffer disaster. The city cannot be slain, but within eighty-one days you can effect a subversive response.

If black clouds with yellow fringes rise up high, stretching out and solidifying in front of their formation, arrayed as if kneeling or crouching, linked together like men in groups of three and five, with heads bowed and hands folded above the encamp-ment or deployment, they will certainly surrender. If the cloud ch'i is like chickens, pheasants, or running rabbits, brigands will come to attack your forces, so you must urgently prepare.

If three or five streamers of cloud ch'i stretch across to form a deployment with stripes like tigers, any army it approaches will 

certainly seize fortifications and kill generals, so if you see it, you must attack them. If the clouds are like dragons moving over the city, there will be a great flood.

Now the ch'i for victory or defeat above a city are such. If it in-dicates victory for the enemy, you cannot attack, but if defeat for them, you should attack. When victory lies over you, then it will be advantageous to send forth the army and advance to at-tack. When defeat is indicated over you, you should solidify your walls, clear the fields, and strictly defend them. All cloud ch'i manifests the mind of Heaven and Earth, so how can you not be cautious?

Evaluating Generals

One of the chief concerns of military intelligence was learning the identity and characteristics of opposing generals so that flaws might be exploited and tactics conceived. Therefore virtu-ally all the military texts that contain prognosticatory material devote often lengthy sections to generals' ch'i indications. Al-though the information thus gleaned--primarily whether the general is fierce or timid, ruthless or stupid--is limited, it might still be acted upon to save the army from an unexpected defeat. The two selections that follow indicate the detailed historical progression from Li Ch'uan's T'ang dynasty T'ai-pai Yin-ching to the Sung dynasty Hu-ling Ching and Wu-ching Tsung- yao.

"Ch'i of Fierce Generals" (T'ai-pai Yin-ching)

A fierce general's ch'i is like a dragon or tiger in the mood for killing. When a fierce general is about to move, his ch'i will first be manifest. If this sort of ch'i is seen without any general tak-ing action, it presages brutal forces arising.

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A fierce general's ch'i is like smoke and fog, fulminating up like the light from a fire illuminating the night. A fierce general's lo-cation will have reddish white ch'i surrounding it. A fierce gen-eral's ch'i is like a mountain forest, like woods of bamboo. Its appearance is like a purple canopy or a gate tower with black 

above and red below, or like a pennant, a taut bow, or dust soaring high with a sharp head and wide base.

When two armies oppose each other, if the ch'i above the en-emy's encampment is like a granary or pure white so that the sun is seen even more clearly, these are all the ch'i of a fierce general who cannot be suddenly attacked.

If the ch'i above the enemy's encampment is yellow white and glistening, the general has awesome virtue and cannot be at-tacked. If the ch'i is greenish white and high, the general is very courageous. If before a great battle it is white and low to the front but green and high to the rear, the general is afraid but the officers courageous. If it's voluminous to the front but pauce to the rear, the lieutenant generals are afraid and unen-lightened.

If the ch'i above the enemy is black with red in the middle and lies to the front, the general is perspicacious and ruthless and cannot be withstood.

If the ch'i above the enemy is green and widely dispersed, the general is afraid. However, if the ch'i above the enemy's army gradually assumes a form like a mountain in the clouds, the general has secret plots and cannot be attacked. If this hap-pens above your army, by quickly attacking, you will gain a great victory.

If the ch'i above the enemy's army is like great snake moving toward a person, it is the ch'i of a fierce general and cannot be opposed. If it occurs above your army, by quickly engaging in battle you will achieve a great victory.

"Cloud Ch'i of Generals" (Hu-ling Ching)

Whether an enemy's commanding general is worthy or stupid can be learned through cloud ch'i prognostication. 37 Now if the clouds above an army are green with some red and interiors of yellow white and do not disperse from morning to night, the ruler is weak, the ministers strong, and the commanding gen-eral arrogant and dissipated. Their rules and commands are overturned, so you should urgently attack them. 

If the clouds above the army are confused and muddy, the ruler and generals are unenlightened and the good and Worthy do not associate with them.

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If the ch'i above the army is like a scaly dragon, the command-ing general's spirit is dissipated and turbulent, so they can be suddenly attacked.

If green clouds emerge after sunset in the west to spiral up to Heaven and it doesn't rain for ten days, the commanding gen-eral will lose his position after being strong for three years. But if green clouds change to red, it presages a great defeat.

If the green ch'i above the army gradually turns black, the com-manding general will die.

If the clouds are yellow white and glistening, the general has awesome virtue.

If the ch'i above the army, just like clouds, changes to form the shape of mountains, the general has profound knowledge.

If the outside of the clouds is black but inside red, lying toward the front of the army, or when two armies are opposing each other the clouds are like state granaries or the red ch'i is like a mountain, in all three cases the general is ferocious, perspica-cious, strong, and courageous.

If the clouds above the army connect with Heaven, the general is wise.

If the clouds are like dragons or tigers in the mood for killing, or like fire and smoke swirling, or like firelight scintillating and changing, or like the trees in a forest or lofty heights, or like dust low in the sky with a large head, or purplish black shaped like a gate tower, or like purple powder floating down, or like a dragon roaming about a black mist, or like the sun and moon with red ch'i arising and surrounding them, or shaped like a door with the upper part black and bottom part red, or like a black flag, or shaped like a bow, or wiggling about like scaly 

dragons and snakes--these thirteen are the ch'i of a fierce gen-eral.

If the cloud ch'i is green and widely dispersed, the general is timid and weak. Or if the front is large and rear small, the gen-eral is not enlightened. Or if it is black edged with white ch'i, the general is afraid and lacks plans. In this case you can trick him into movement, delude him with affairs, make him fearful with awesomeness, or press him with strength and be deci-sively victorious.

"Cloud Ch'i Prognostication" (Wu-ching Tsung-yao)

Ch'i Symbolism for Generals: If the general's ch'i extends up to Heaven, it indicates a fierce general of many strategies. The ch'i of a fierce general is like a dragon. If two armies deploy oppo-site

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each other, if his ch'i appears above, the general is fierce and sharp. If it is like a tiger in the mood for killing, it indicates a fierce general about to move. If there is redness amid the tiger ch'i, it signifies brutal forces arising. Auspiciousness and bale-fulness are determined by the sun and stars. Moreover, a fierce general's ch'i has the appearance of fire and smoke, mountain forests and woods of bamboo, or purplish black, or black above and red below. Or like a black flag, or a tautbow or crossbow. Or like dust with the head sharp and the base large, ensconced over the encampment, fortifications, or army. These are all the ch'i of a fierce general.

If the ch'i above an army is like round and square granaries, in-creasingly clear in the daylight, this is the ch'i of a fierce gen-eral who cannot be attacked.

If the ch'i above the army is yellow white and turns to become misty, the general has superlative plans and cannot be at-tacked.

If the ch'i is greenish white and high, the general is courageous. 

If during a great battle you observe that the ch'i to the front is white but green and high to the rear, the general is weak but the officers strong, but if the front is large and rear small, the general is afraid.

If the enemy's ch'i is black above and red below and lies to the front, the general is perspicacious and ruthless and cannot be opposed.

When the ch'i is clear and widely dispersed, the general is timid and weak.

If the ch'i slowly appears over the army and gradually changes like clouds to form an appearance like mountains, the general has profound plans and cannot be attacked. If this happens above your army, if you fully engage in battle, you will gain a great victory.

If the ch'i above the enemy is like a giant snake facing a man, the fierce general's ch'i cannot be withstood. However, if it is above our army, engaging in battle will certainly prove victori-ous.

If red ch'i above the army connects with Heaven, there must be a worthy general in its midst.

Victory and Defeat

Fathoming enemy generals represents but one aspect of ob-serving and evaluating the portents associated with an oppos-ing army to determine the prospects for victory and defeat. Ex-tensive materials were formulated on precisely this focal topic, which, if at all accurate,

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would obviate the need for much intelligence gathering, analy-sis, and assessment! The two chapters translated here from the Hu-ling Ching well represent the intricate observations and complex assessments found in this tradition.

"Cloud Ch'i of Victorious Armies" 

When occupying an encampment or deploying into formation, if purplish ch'i emanates above your army, it is an omen of great fortuitousness. On that day there will be a celebration.

If the ch'i above your army appears as if overflowing a dike with the front being red and the rear white, it is the ch'i of victory, so it will be advantageous to advance the army and mount a sud-den attack. But if it is over the enemy, they will be victorious.

If the ch'i over an army condenses to form stationary clouds in the midst of the sky, solid and unchanging, it is called "firm ch'i." If it is above the enemy, then do not attack.

If the cloud ch'i over your army forms into a low squatting shape, it is termed "Heaven's Majesty." It would be appropriate to employ picked troops to form a solid front and gradually ad-vance into combat.

If the cloud ch'i above the army is like a fancy canopy that moves first or cloud ch'i that is red above but black below ap-proaches the army, they are comparatively stronger. However, in the end you can destroy the strong. The small will be able to suddenly strike the large, winning great victories in major en-gagements and small victories in minor ones.

If the cloud ch'i is like a black man among red clouds, it is re-ferred to as "victorious ch'i." If the ch'i is like young boys in groups of five and ten, red in the middle, and lies to the fore, it is the ch'i of a strong army.

If the cloud ch'i is like mountainside forests or white ch'i di-vided and glistening like multiple stories edged with red in the sky, or the cloud ch'i is scintillating like the glow of a fire or surging up like fire and smoke on a mountain, or if the cloud ch'i is like twin mountain peaks jumbled like smoking grass, these are all signs of [the army] having obtained Heaven's strategic power.

If the cloud ch'i congeals white, then displays five colors, or cloud ch'i forms groups of five and ten like red birds squatting in black ch'i, or the ch'i is like black smoke, or the cloud ch'i is like a horse with its head high and tail hanging down, or the 

cloud ch'i is like a man wielding an ax toward the enemy, or the cloud ch'i is like two groups in training, in these ten cases the ch'i indicates a

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strong army. 38 If it hovers over the enemy, you should avoid them; if over your army, wherever it indicates you will be victo-rious.

If the cloud ch'i is yellow white, thick, moist, and heavy, or if the cloud ch'i moves and expands like three pieces of black silk with the front large and rear narrow, or when the army moves on campaign in its midst there are clouds like gamecocks, red and white succeeding each other amid the ch'i, or above the de-ployment there is five-colored ch'i that connects with Heaven or in the soaring cloud ch'i there is a man dressed in black in a red cloud, or if yellow ch'i traverses the sky, these five indicate troops responding to Heaven's will. Attacking them would be very inauspicious.

If the ch'i above the army is like a snake raising its head toward the enemy, or if red and yellow ch'i shields the sky, or the cloud ch'i is like the sun and moon with red ch'i surrounding them, or the cloud ch'i is like the glow of the sun's halo, or the ch'i gath-ers and congeals without dispersing, or red clouds like dragons and variegated colors luxuriously striking Heaven, or clouds swirling about to form patterns, shaped like phoenixes, or cloud ch'i moist and glittering like a city gate secreted amid white clouds, or clouds that internally divide into red and yel-low, these nine are the victorious ch'i of a strong army, also said to the ch'i of a king's army. When cloud ch'i like this accu-mulates above your army, go forth and mount a sudden attack on the enemy. But if it assembles above the enemy, then abso-lutely do not make any wanton moves. Moreover, if it hovers above your army while the ch'i over the enemy's army is nor-mal, it presages victory.

Cloud Ch'i of Defeated Armies 

If the ch'i above an army is like dead ashes, a horse's liver, bent cover, herd of sheep, frightened deer, or black ch'i like a man's hands, 39 they are all indications of defeat.

If black ch'i like a crumbling mountain follows an army, the army will be defeated and the general will die. If it follows you, you should avoid conflict.

If cloud ch'i of white and yellow intermixed appears several nights in succession, a surprise attack will scatter the enemy's army and throw them into confusion. Suddenly striking will prove auspicious.

If the ch'i over the army is low, they will be defeated in every encounter. If it emanates from the east, then there will be pro-found disaster. If the cloud ch'i has five colors but has not set-tled

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in the north, east, south, or west, the army will be defeated. If red ch'i gloriously flares up to Heaven, the commanding general will die and the troops will crumble in disorder.

If there is black ch'i like cows and horses gradually emerging from the fog in the form of an army, it is called the "Heavenly Dog." It will feed on blood below, so you must encamp far off to avoid it.

If cloud ch'i overspreads the road, obfuscating the daylight with darkness, it is an omen of imminent defeat. There isn't time for food to cook; quickly avoid it.

If the cloud ch'i is green or in pieces like a shattered tile, any army it approaches will be defeated. If the cloud ch'i is red or white like a person's head, or someone crawling on the ground with his head down, any army it approaches will be defeated and the blood will flow for a hundred kilometers. If it ap-proaches us and we want to propitiate it, moving far away to another location would be auspicious. If you stimulate the spirit of the men to soar up, you can attain good fortune. 

If the cloud ch'i is like a river breaking through an embank-ment, it is an omen of the officers and squads breaking down.

If after the enemy general has secreted troops to make a sud-den attack against us, the cloud ch'i at night extends out like a rope hanging down, whichever army it approaches will be de-feated.

If in the middle of the night the cloud ch'i is dense and black, there are numerous secret plots. Both bluish white and green-ish black are omens of reversal and calamity. Black clouds like rotating wagon wheels entering the army mean that low-rank-ing people are plotting against you. You should urgently inves-tigate and prepare against them. Wherever the cloud ch'i is shaped like a dog, there will be great bloodshed below.

If the cloud ch'i is black with yellow above, the officers and troops are afraid and there are internal plots of rebellion. Black clouds like pennants streaming amid the ch'i, or red ch'i like blood or birds flying amid black ch'i are all omens of defeat.

Black [cloud ch'i] intermixed and shattered like a bunch of pigs or a herd of cows and horses or like a flock of frightened birds are all omens of defeat.

If the cloud ch'i is like floating dust, dispersing everywhere, the officers and troops are planning a revolt. If it is red like the fierce flames of a fire rising up to illuminate Heaven, it indi-cates a great defeat and bloodshed. If red clouds are like peo-ple, in groups of two and three, some walking, some sitting, brutal forces will soon arrive.

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If the cloud ch'i is like the smoke from fresh grass burning, any army it approaches will suffer a great defeat. If in the middle of the night the cloud ch'i is dense and black, there are many se-cret plots. If the color is bluish white or greenish black, it presages rebellion.

If the ch'i is like the smoke from fresh grass burning, any army it approaches, even though their front be courageous, will see 

the rear withdraw of their own accord. If you can wait a month or year to suddenly attack, you can be victorious.

If red cloud ch'i is very full or like a suspended cover, the army will fall into turbulence by itself. If red clouds are forming an eyebrow-like formation with increasingly large sharp ends, there will be a great battle and much bloodshed. Whoever moves first will be defeated.

When the cloud ch'i is like suspended clothes, it is the omen of defeat.

If the cloud ch'i is like a turning front, it is an omen of defeat.

If both armies have deployed and the enemy's soldiers com-pletely lack any ch'i, by suddenly striking, you can destroy them.

If both armies have deployed against each other and the ch'i over the enemy reaches up to Heaven as if in a formation, this is termed "a transverse sea of ch'i." If you forcefully attack, you can destroy them.

If the two armies are deployed against each other and you see that above their army there is a man illuminated by fire, this means they have lost the mind of the commanding general. If you attack, they will be defeated.

If the cloud ch'i is like a flock of birds chaotically flying about, it is an omen of defeat. If the cloud ch'i is fuzzy like a tiger's tail hanging down over the army, the army wants to surrender. Otherwise, some villains intend to mount a response for the en-emy.

If the two armies are deployed within ten kilometers, if you see the ch'i above their army is both white and high while to the rear are green clouds, it is an omen of imminent defeat. You should quickly beat the advance and strike them.

If the cloud ch'i is greenish black, it is an omen of defeat. 

If the cloud ch'i is like a row of walking cows, a drum chariot, a group of snakes chaotically proceeding, or blacks clouds like a man leading a cow, all these are omens of defeat.

If the clouds are like a ruined house, the army will be defeated and the general will die.

If among gray clouds there are deep black clouds glinting in the west like stars, this is termed "the ch'i of a defeated army." The army will suffer a great disaster.

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Now whenever a commander moves troops, Heaven will inform men about forthcoming defeat and victory with ch'i. However, anyone who enjoys victorious ch'i cannot simply rely on it, but should order the army and rectify its essence, ponder their plans, make their orders strict, and rectify their rewards and punishments. Then they will accord with Heaven and Earth's blessings. Anyone who relies on correct victorious ch'i without ordering the army's administration, who is dissipated and lazy will be defeated. In this way they can convert victory into de-feat. Similarly, how can anyone who encounters the ch'i of de-feat invariably be defeated? By strictly enforcing their instruc-tions, cautiously employing their wisdom in making plans, up-braiding themselves, accepting that the guilt lies with them, and reverently according with Heaven's missive, they can change defeat into victory. Shouldn't a commanding general who has not received any indication of defeat or victory estab-lish policies to cultivate his virtue?

The admonitions in the final paragraph, although often found in passages warning generals who hold a clear strategic superi-ority not to become lax, are unusual within prognosticatory sections and bear noting as evidence that false confidence was to be allayed.

Ch'i and Counterintelligence

Prognosticatory theory also had applications in the realm of counterintelligence, guidelines being formulated for employing a complex star system to evaluate the credibility of emissaries 

and the existence of secret plots. 40 The T'ai-pai Yin-ching also contains a brief chapter that focuses on ch'i phenomena warn-ing of subversive activities: 41

If the ch'i is white and in a clump of lines, coming forth, moving to and fro, appearing like a deployment, men from other states will be coming to hatch plots against you. 42 You should not hastily respond, but observe where they go, follow, attack them, and gain the advantage.

If black ch'i like a screen emerges from the encampment, black above and yellow below, the enemy will come as if to seek battle but not sincerely. The truth will be the opposite of what they say. For the next seven days you must be alert. Being prepared would be auspicious.

If black ch'i approaches your army like a chariot wheel turning, the enemy is plotting to stir up chaos and conspiring with mi-nor ministers from your state, so you should investigate it.

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If black ch'i comes on like someone leading an animal or a de-ployment whose front is strong, there are secret plots.

If the sky is sunk in darkness without any rain so that during the day the sun is not visible or the stars or moon at night for more than three days, there is a secret plot. The commanding general should take precautions against his attendants.

If it is gray for ten days in succession, turbulent winds arise from all four quarters, and it wants to rain but doesn't, it is called "Nebulous." It means a minister is plotting against the ruler.

If the sky is so deeply yin [dark] that the sun and moon have no light and clouds shield them but it does not rain, both the ruler and ministers have secret plots, but if two armies are op-posite each other, both have secret plots. If it is clear in the daytime but dark at night, ministers are plotting against the ruler; if it is gray in the daytime but clear at night, the ruler is plotting against his ministers. 

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Notes

Insofar as this is a work intended for general readers, as well as sinologists, an abbreviated form of reference for Chinese source materials has been employed throughout the notes, cit-ing by chapter name rather than page number in any particu-lar edition. In addition to being common Chinese practice, we believe it is justified by the ready availability of modern paper-backs and popular editions of most of the ancient writings cited and translated in The Tao of Spycraft. The modern proliferation of variant versions clearly obviates the traditional practice of referring to the great classic collections found only in a few li-braries or particular editions, except in the case of rare books or more specialized annotated texts such as Ch'en Ch'i-yu Han Fei-tzu. Through the use of chapter or similar names, readers with various modern typeset editions-- for whom chüan and page references would be frustratingly useless--can easily lo-cate the relevant passages within the short chapters.

References to the various volumes in the Seven Military Clas-sics (whose chapter titles are provided in English) are to our translation published by Westview Press ( 1993). Titles apart from the Wu-tzu and Wei Liao-tzu are abbreviated as follows:

Art of War Sun-tzu's Art of War

Ssu-ma Fa The Methods of the Ssu-ma

Questions and Questions and Replies between T'ang T'ai-Replies                        and Li Wei-kung

Three Strategies Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung

Teachings T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings

The single-volume Art of War with expanded discussion and historical analysis available from Westview Press ( 1994) may also be consulted for more extensive contextual material as in-dicated. Finally, references to Sun Pin Military Methods are to our translation published by Westview ( 1995). 

Chapter 1 1.

Certain principles and historical cases rapidly became canoni-cal, almost defining the mind-set, and continue to be immedi-ately brought to mind whenever the subject is raised. For ex-ample, see "Ho wei 'yung Chien'? T'a tsai chün-shih-shang yu ho tso-yung?" in Chung-kuo Ku-tai Chün-shih San-pai-t'i ( Shang-hai: Ku-chi Ch'u-pan-she, 1989), pp. 447-449.

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2.

Wu was taught by the duke of Shen, an exile from Ch'u via Chin, as discussed in the Spring and Autumn historical section that follows.

3.

For convenience, the Tso Chuan quote has been provided in in-terpretive summary.

4.

"T'u-fan, Shang," ChiuT'ang-shu. 5.

"Hsüan Yüan Liu-wang," Han Shu. Note the emphasis upon ge-ographical knowledge.

6.

Duke Ai, 1st year ( 494 B.C.). The critical sentence and most of the story also appear in the traditional commentary to the Bamboo Annals; the main entry states that Ju-ai attacked and killed Chiao, the man who had slain Shao- k'ang's father ( Chu-shu chi-nien pu-cheng, 1:12b). Other popular accounts suggest that he also dispatched his eldest son to two small foreign states that, based upon their reports, he subsequently attacked and exterminated. The account being some fifteen hundred years after the event, its validity remains highly questionable. 7.

"Employing Spies," Art of War. 8.

A discussion of terms appears in the Spring and Autumn sec-tion that follows.

9.

"Shen-ta Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 10. 

For this he is frequently compared with the Duke of Chou, who acted as regent to King Wu's son until relinquishing power when the latter had sufficiently matured.

11.

Similarly, the claim was made--only to be vehemently re-pressed--that the Duke of Chou had also usurped the throne rather than simply serving as regent by proxy.

12.

For example, Huai-nan Tzu, chaps. 1, 9, 11, 13, 19, 20; Han Fei-tzu, chaps., 14, 17, 18, 19, 36, 37, 44, 50; Pao P'u-tzu, chaps. 7, 8, 22; Yen-t'ieh Lun, chaps. 2 (acts as a cook), 7, 11, 14, 18, 20, 51; Kuei Ku-tzu, chap. 6.

13.

"T'ai-tsu Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu. Mencius, VIB6, also notes that Yi Yin went to T'ang and Chieh five times each.

14.

Mencius, VA7. 15.

"Wu Tu." 16.

"Liu Yeh," Jen-wu Chih. 17.

"Jang Wang," Chuang-tzu. A translation may be found in Bur-ton Watson , The Complete Works of Chuang-tzu ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 320.

18.

The T'ai Kung biography is found in the Shih Chi chapter reprising the history of the state of Ch'i, to which he was ap-pointed first king by the victorious Chou dynasty. An extensive discussion of his possible role, incorporating a translation of his biography, may be found in our translation of the Six Secret Teachings in the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China or the introduction to the Shambhala edition of the Six Secret Teach-ings.

19.

The Six Secret Teachings, a remarkable work of strategy and tactics dating from the middle to late Warring States period, is the most comprehensive of the so-called Seven Military Classics collected and made canonical in the Sung dynasty. Although the Six Secret Teachings never enjoyed the respect accorded Sun-tzu Art of War by nonmilitary thinkers in China and 

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also suffered disparagement by effete bureaucrats who found it unthinkable that one of China's greatest figures was apparently a political realist, as well as a military sage, real commanders and those interested in preserving the state amid the turmoil that repeatedly engulfed it over the centuries valued the Six Se-cret Teachings greatly and profitably employed its teachings. The most extensive of the classic writings, it explores numer-ous fundamental topics from an essentially humanistic, Taois-tically oriented perspective while also providing a compendium of useful, frequently unorthodox tactics for concrete applica-tion. Interspersed among its pages may be found many of man's most pressing concerns, including social organization, development of Virtue, creation of a productive society, and the role of the military. Throughout, the essential vision is one of maneuver warfare--battlefield encounters designed to minimize losses while still retaining the martial spirit and capability to prevail in perhaps history's most turbulent era, the Warring States.

20.

This battle is extensively discussed in introductory material to our translations of the Six Secret Teachings.

21.

This was an approach similarly exploited by the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s.

22.

"Feng-mou chieh." Commentators date these reports as either one or eight years prior to the victorious attack on the Shang. See, for example, Huang Huai-hsin, ed., Yi Chou-shu Hui-chiao Chi-chu ( Shanghai: Shanghai Ku-chi, 1995), pp. 313-314.

23.

"Shen-ta-lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. The passage goes on to de-scribe King Wu's sincerity in upholding the date he swore with the feudal lords and also informing a neglected minister of Yin. 24.

The employment of women, the fundamental response in antiq-uity, should be particularly noted.

25.

And largely found in the compilation Kuo-yü, fabricated then but attributed to the Spring and Autumn period. 

26.

See Analects, V:4a. 27.

Analects, XIX:22. 28.

Analects, I:10. The wording is slightly different. Note how infor-mation can be garnered through congeniality and inquisitive-ness, a point not lost on later thinkers.

29.

Analects, I:15. The sequence of the items is, however, reversed. 30.

The numbers of chariots are anachronistic. 31.

This is a rather surprising comment given that all the historical records portray him as oblivious to any threat from the king of Yüeh. (Their conflict is discussed in several other contexts in the remainder of our study.)

32.

Po P'i, as will be seen later, was actually under Yüeh's control. 33.

Yüeh was especially known for its swords, so such a gift would have been quite special.

34.

The lengthy, dramatic conflict between Wu and Yüeh is dis-cussed in detail in the historical introduction to our translation of the Art of War.

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Chapter 2 1.

See, for example, Duke Ting, 12th year; and Duke Ai, 7th year, Tso Chuan.

2.

Karlgren, GSR 8121. 3.

See, for example, Duke Min, 1st year; and Duke Hsi, 19th and 24th years.

4.

GSR 553h. 5. 

GSR 158i. 6.

Neither of them is so employed in the Tso Chuan, but k'uei does appear in this meaning in the Kung Yang Chuan.

7.

GSR 633j, given as meaning "to spy." The locus classicus is the Tso Chuan.

8.

Duke Huan, 12th year. 9.

Duke Chuang, 28th year. 10.

In contrast, T'ien Tan deliberately attracted birds to imply spiri-tual powers in the famous tactics witnessed at the siege of Chi-mo, where he engineered a breakout by loosing fire-oxen, a bat-tle discussed in detail in our forthcoming History of Warfare in China: The Ancient Period.

11.

Duke Ai, 11th year. However, he may have been a reconnais-sance scout.

12.

He did this because he undoubtedly expected to be enfeoffed in Chin and perhaps to develop a base from which he could re-take the throne of Ch'u. His actions coincidentally illustrate the major role defectors and exiles played in the ancient period.

13.

Duke Ai, 16th year. 14.

Duke Hsüan, 8th year. 15.

See Yang Po-chün, Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan Chu ( Peking: Chung-hua Shu-cha, 1981), 2:696.

16.

The covert agents who undertook such tasks and the technique as well were classified as li chien, "estrangement agents." (See the theory section for a full discussion and numerous exam-ples.) Even as late as the Ming-Ch'ing transition, in his brief work Ping Mou Wei Hsi emphasized the estrangement role of hsien (chien) and the covert agent nature of tie.

17.

GSR 191h. 

18.

Duke Chuang, 8th year. Note that this is a case of employing disaffected women who attained their positions through sexual attraction to gain illicit ends. Numerous such cases will be cited here and in the section on covert operations.

19.

Duke Hsiang, 4th year. 20.

See, for example, Duke Ch'eng, 18th year; and Duke Hsiang, 25th year.

21.

"Tao-ying Hsün," Huai-nan-tzu. The original Tso Chuan account for Duke Hsi's 33rd year ( 627 B.C.) is comparatively terse; later versions found embedded in various Han dynasty works expand the story and exploit it to illustrate philosophical or po-litical points, thereby giving the historical events renewed cur-rency and import.

22.

Duke Ch'eng, 17th year. 23.

"T'an Kung, Hsia," Li Chi. 24.

Duke Min, 1st year, Tso Chuan.

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25.

One ancient Chinese calendar has been preserved in the Lü-shih Ch'un- ch'iu and Li Chi; contemporary almanacs still con-tain extensive information based upon the twenty-four sea-sonal periods and lunar data. Tan's series of celestial observa-tions essentially corresponds to a three-month progression through the fall.

26.

The Chou Li enumerates several other officials who probably performed intelligence-gathering duties because of their exten-sive contacts with foreign officials, although at somewhat less prestigious levels. For example, the Ssu- yi, who was in charge of foreign contacts; the Hsing-fu, a sort of a junior Hsing-jen who served as an aide to the Hsing-jen and seems to have been stuck with all the miserable jobs; the Hsing-hsü, who handled foreign ambassadors from the barbarian states and oversaw 

communications between their envoys and the Chou king; and the Chang-k'o, who was entrusted with "handling guests" but seems to have supervised the meal service.

An article analyzing a wide variety of official Ch'in seals presently preserved in a regional collection includes one for a Ch'in-hsing, the Hsing-jen's title when his position was renamed late in the Ch'in. (Although the title was again revised during the Han, it is no longer of interest because China's political ter-rain had vastly altered.) Other posts of note with likely informa-tion- gathering responsibility represented by these seals in-clude the tien-song, a lesser official in charge of relations with submissive barbarian peoples, and various messengers respon-sible for communications. (See Chou Shao-lu, Lu Tung-chih , and T'ang Yi, "Ch'in-tai feng-ni te chung-ta fa-hsien," K'ao-ku Wen-wu 1 [ 1997]:37ff.)

27.

Numerous examples of this mundane usage occur throughout the period. See, for example, Duke Hsüan, 12th year, in a mili-tary context; Duke Ch'eng, 13th year; Duke Hsiang, 8th, 21st, and 24th years; and Duke Chao, 18th year.

28.

Duke Wen, 14th year. This is confirmed by a discussion in the Kuo-yü ( "Chou-yü, Chung") for King Chien's 8th year ( 577 B.C.) as to whether to accord an envoy from Lu the full cere-monies dictated for a Hsing-jen since his mission seemed less than official in conception.

29.

The Tso Chuan's account of the battle of Yen-ling, including this incident, appears as the conclusion to this section on the Spring and Autumn period, and will also be extensively dis-cussed in our forthcoming History of Warfare in China: The An-cient Period.

30.

A similar case with a contrary outcome arose in Duke Wen's 12th year when an officer from Ch'in taunted Chin's army. Since he spoke incoherently and his eyes darted all about, it was correctly concluded that Ch'in would withdraw during the night.

31. 

For example, see Duke Chao, 23rd year, when Chin seized the Hsing-jen from Lu, resulting in complex political ramifications. 32.

The episode began late in Duke Hsiang's 11th year and con-cluded early in his 13th year.

33.

Duke Hsiang, 18th year. The Ku Liang notes his seizure was due to enmity toward his superiors.

34.

Duke Chao, 23rd year.

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35.

Duke Huan, 9th year. 36.

Duke Chao, 8th year. 37.

Duke Ting, 7th year. (This makes Pei one of history's first "dead agents.")

38.

Duke Ai, 12th year. 39.

Duke Hsiang, 11th year. 40.

Duke Hsiang, 26th year. The Hsing-jen was sometimes in-structed to deliver verbatim messages, as well as written mis-sives. (See also Duke Chao, 6th year.)

41.

Duke Wen, 4th year. For a similar case, see Duke Hsiang, 4th year.

42.

Duke Ch'eng, 7th year; noted again under Duke Hsing, 26th year.

43.

Duke Ting, 4th year. (Further discussion of Wu Tzu-hsü's his-torical role will be found in the sections on assassins and coor-dinated covert programs. His full biography will be found in the introduction to our translation of Sun- tzu's classic Art of War.) 44. 

Analects, XIV:8. (This ability even resulted in his name being cited in connection with the definition of Hsing-jen in several dictionaries.)

45.

This enigmatic statement is understood by all the commenta-tors and essentially confirmed by what follows in the passage. It of course suggests he insisted upon holding serious discus-sions of military policy in total secrecy, out in the wilds, away from prying eyes and well-stretched ears.

46.

Duke Hsiang, 31st year. 47.

See also Duke Chao, 1st year; and Duke Hsiang, 29th year, when he served as an envoy to a funeral. An anecdote in the Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu ( "Nei- p'ien Tsa-hsia") shows the king of Wu testing Yen-tzu, who was visiting in his capacity as Ch'i Hs-

ing-jen, by having him inappropriately summoned to an audi-ence with the "Son of Heaven." The ruse failed because he struck a baffled pose until after the third summons, when he expressed astonishment at having somehow lost his way and wandered into the court of an emperor rather than a king. 48.

Han-shih wai-chuan, chüan6. A nearly identical passage is found in the opening paragraphs of the Shuo Yfian.

49.

Duke Hsüan, 3rd year, Tso Chuan. 50.

Several occurrences refer to shepherding; others employ the term as a verb, one case of which is understood as meaning "to investigate" (speaking about an official responsible for "stem-ming brutality." See "Ch'iu-kuan Ssu- kuan").

51.

"T'ien-kuan Chung-tsai," Chou-li. 52.

"Ch'un-kuan Tzung-po," Chou-li. 53.

"Hsia-kuan Ssu-ma-hsia," Chou-li. 54.

Duke Huan, 5th year. 55.

Duke Chuang, 10th year. 

56.

Duke Hsi, 15th year. Note the emphasis already being placed on elite fighters and psychological factors.

57.

Wu Ch'i contributions to intelligence theory will be discussed in the theory section, and are reprised in full in our translation of the Seven Military Classics of Ancient China.

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58.

Duke Hsi, 30th year. 59.

Ibid. The term chien here clearly means "to spy" (despite ten-dencies of translators to understand it as "to exploit") because the redundant clause that follows reiterates the fact of the at-tack.

60.

Duke Hsi, 33rd year. 61.

Duke Wen, 17th year. 62.

See, for example, Duke Hsüan, 13th year, wherein Hsien Ku invited the Red Ti to invade Chin, further compounding Chin's problems of internecine strife among their powerful families. (Such factionally prompted alliances contributed greatly to China's turmoil in the centuries following the Han's collapse.) 63.

The first noted betrayal of a state's military plans is recorded for 658 B.C. when "an officer of Ch'i, for the first time, leaked the army's plans at Tuo-yü" (Duke Hsi, 2nd year, Tso Chuan). 64.

Duke Ai, 8th year. The mat-maker clearly falls within Sun-tzu's concept of "local guides."

65.

Duke Chao, 19th year, Tso Chuan. 66.

Although this persuasion evidences Warring States characteris-tics, it may have some factual basis and certainly coheres with what would have been required in the circumstances.

67. 

This is exactly the sort of instruction that Sun-tzu identified with fighting on fatal terrain, eliciting the ultimate effort from the troops. (See, for example, "Nine Terrains," Art of War. Sev-eral examples are also found in the Unorthodox Strategies.) 68.

Duke Hsiang, 26th year, Tso Chuan. 69.

Duke Ch'eng, 7th year. 70.

Duke Chao, 28th year. 71.

This is, of course, the same state of Ch'en as in Tan Hsiang's earlier observations, and in fact it is Duke Ling who is mur-dered and Ch'en extinguished.

72.

Duke Hsüan, 9th year. 73.

Ibid. 74.

Duke Hsüan, 11th year. 75.

Duke Ch'eng, 2nd year. It would also make it seem that he had mounted the attack merely to satisfy his own lusts.

76.

Duke Ch'eng, 7th year. 77.

The event would appear to be a fabrication of the Warring States period, projected back to around 498 B.C., but it is re-ported in numerous sources thereafter.

78.

"Kong-tzu Shih-chia," Shih Chi. 79.

Analects, XVIII:4. (Rulers and powerful nobles enjoyed sexual liaisons with such musicians and kept astounding numbers of favorites and serving girls, in addition to a formal wife and offi-cially recognized concubines of various rank.)

80.

These two techniques are found in the T'ai Kung's "Civil Offen-sive," a chapter from the Six Secret Teachings that is abstracted and discussed in the theoretical section.

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81.

Commentators to Han Fei-tzu's chapter entitled "Ten Errors" point out that the king failed to shift their encampment as sea-sonally appropriate, resulting in half their horses and cattle perishing.

82.

"Ch'in Pen-chi," Shih Chi. 83.

See "Ten Errors." It also appears in Han-shih Wai-chuan, chüan 9; and "Fan-chih," Shuo Yüan.

84.

"Kui-chih-lun." 85.

Hsi Kung, 33rd year, Tso Chuan. 86.

"Wu Tzu-hsü Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 87.

Hsi Kung, 24th year, Tso Chuan. 88.

Also note Duke Ting, 5th year, Tso Chuan, when the king has a man assassinate Tzu Ch'ao in Ch'u.

89.

He had been killed by a boatman, a prisoner from Yüeh, when he inspected the boats ( Duke Hsiang, 29th year).

90.

Duke Ting, 10th year. 91.

"Wang Liao shih Kung-tzu Kuang." 92.

Duke Chuang, 12th year, Tso Chuan. 93.

Duke Wen, 12th year. 94.

Duke Wen, 13th year, Tso Chuan. 95.

See Yang Po-chün's comments based on recently recovered Ma-wang-tui slips, Ch'un-ch'iu Tso-chuan Chu, 2:595-596.

96.

"Chin Shih-chia," Shih Chi. (The episode is also noted in "Chou Penchi." Shih Hui also appears as Sui Hui, for unknown rea-sons.) 

97.

"Ch'i T'ai Kung Shih-chia," Shih Chi. 98.

Although the text doesn't specify, they may have been dis-guised as women. This would not be completely abnormal, for other instances of men disguising themselves as women to ei-ther gain surreptitious access to the women's apartments for li-centious reasons or to carry out murderous acts are recorded. 99.

See the records for Duke Hsiang, 23rd year, for the military events; and the 22nd year for his arrival in Ch'i and the out-rage his presence evoked, as seen in the Shih Chi account. 100.

Additional examples of stealthy methods will be found in the last part of the third section, on covert activities.

101.

Duke Hsiang, 10th year, Tso Chuan. 102.

Duke Chao, 4th year, Tso Chuan. 103.

The term employed is tie, normally "spy" but here "reconnais-sance troops."

104.

Duke Ch'eng, 16th year, Tso Chuan. 105.

Insofar as the Tso Chuan apparently reflects a Warring States perspective, these essential formulations may well be anachro-nistic projections.

Chapter 3 1.

The Battle of Ma-ling is extensively analyzed in the historical introduction to our translation of Sun Pin Military Methods.

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2.

The actual impact of Sun-tzu's writings and thought remains to be determined, turning upon the pivotal question of the avail-ability of his writings and whether his disciples actively dissem-inated his teachings or if the teachings remained a family 

school of tactics down through his famous descendant, the great Ch'i tactician Sun Pin, in the mid-fourth century.

3.

As many commentators have pointed out, these two events ac-tually occurred a decade before Fan Sui went to Ch'in in 265 B.C.

4.

"Wei Kung-tzu Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 5.

See Yang K'uan, Chan-kuo Shih, rev. ed. ( Shanghai: Jen-min Ch'u-pan- she, 1979), pp. 342-343. In two pages of dense notes Yang provides an extensive discussion of the thorny problem of Su Ch'in's dates and the resulting confusion with his two brothers, concluding that he was active during King Min's reign in Ch'i, roughly 300 to 284 B.C., being an honored minister in Ch'i near the end of his reign.

6.

This is summarized in "Yen Chao-kung Shih-chia," Shih Chi, as well: " Su Ch'in had illicit relations with the king's mother and, fearing execution, persuaded the king to employ him in Ch'i as a 'turned agent' with the intention of plunging Ch'i into chaos." This was certainly a case of a true "double agent."

7.

Takigawa Kametaro, Shiki Kaichū Kōshō ( Taipei: I-wen Yin-shu-kuan, 1972), p. 884, doubts that he lived into King Min's reign, implying he actually died while Yi was still on throne in Yen, perhaps having been discovered after only two years in Ch'i. However, as already noted, Yang K'uan, based on recently discovered tomb materials, concludes the records support the traditional account ( Chan-kuo Shih, p. 343).

8.

This was an ambitious aspect of the era's covert programs, such as previously advocated by Wen Chung at the end of the Spring and Autumn period against Wu and seen again in Han's attempt to exhaust Ch'in in canal building, found subse-quently. ( Wen Chung's covert program, purportedly preserved in the Han dynasty Wu Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu, is fully translated in the section on systematic covert programs.)

9.

"Su Ch'in Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 10. 

"The Treatise on the Yellow River and Canals." A translation of the complete treatise may be found in Burton Watson, Records of the Grand Historian of China ( New York: Columbia Univer-sity Press, 1961), 2:70-78.

11.

"Lien P'o Lin Hsiang-ju Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 12.

The incident, which appears in chapter 35, "Mountains," is fully translated in our Unorthodox Strategies.

13.

The identification of cavalry at this early date bears noting. Al-though cavalry apparently originated in Chao, the actual date is uncertain.

14.

This is perhaps a serious underestimate, certainly increasing rapidly.

15.

Throughout, the figures for chariots seem far too low since sev-eral states supposedly possessed ten thousand chariots early in the Warring States period, and battlefield commitments of several thousand per state are noted in major battles. However, these figures are taken verbatim from the Chan-kuo Ts'e.

16.

Theories of regional character evolved during the period as well, often organized around concepts of the five phases, associating the north with cold,

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harshness, and endurance. Hsün-tzu, a late Warring States Confucian philosopher who believed man to be innately selfish and conflict to be inherent to society, addressed both military and civil problems from a more realistic viewpoint than the ear-lier Confucians and exerted considerable influence on subse-quent governmental thought and over pivotal figures.

17.

The Three Chin are Han, Wei, and Chao. 18.

"Evaluating the Enemy." 19.

The system of battlefield rewards and punishments thus em-phasized individual performance to the detriment of the army's 

performance as a whole. This encouraged warriors, rather than soldiers, men who fought individually with a view to their own profit largely unconcerned with the overall progress of the bat-tle.

20.

These tests were singular, not simultaneous, with the last be-ing directed toward mobility and endurance under load. They no doubt reflect Wei's heritage, for tests of this type were strongly advocated by the famous general Wu Ch'i, who suc-cessfully commanded the western region in Wei, frequently de-feating Ch'in, for many years early in the fourth century B.C. Appropriate criteria and the importance of selected troops are discussed in the first two chapters of the Wu-tzu.

21.

Among the recently recovered tomb texts, a fragment entitled "The King of Wu's Questions" (translated in the intelligence sec-tion) apparently preserves Sun-tzu's analysis of the tax struc-ture of the various clan lands in Chin (which had not yet split asunder) and their associated martial prospects. At that time he estimated the taxes as one-fifth of a family's income.

22.

This of course follows Lord Shang's draconian conception. 23.

Hsün-tzu's grudging acknowledgment of Chin's remarkable success, despite their perverse methods, will be further dis-cussed in the sections on political and military intelligence. 24.

See the introduction to the Wei Liao-tzu in the Seven Military Classics, p. 23].

25.

"Li Ssu Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. The king referred to in the pas-sage is the eventual unifier of all China, the first emperor of the Ch'in dynasty, Ch'in Shih-huang.

26.

"Chin-yü, 3," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 27.

"Chin-yü, 4," Chan-kuo Ts'e. Note that Li Mu's spies, already mentioned, failed to protect him from covert enemies.

28. 

The turned agents are really traitors who act as agents for an enemy state, Sun-tzu's "internal agents" rather than double agents.

29.

"Chao-yü," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 30.

"Yen Chao-kung Shih-chia," Shih Chi. 31.

This criticism is reminiscent of those leveled at Patton and any-one else who outstripped their lines of support in World War II and throughout history. Although current terminology would view the issue as one of "synchronization," the crux is seizing penetration opportunities versus the danger of becoming iso-lated and enveloped.

32.

His reluctance well accords with Sun-tzu's famous admonition to avoid urban assaults whenever possible.

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33.

"Chou-chi, 4," Tzu-chih T'ung-chien. 34.

T'ien Tan also proved highly capable in manipulating Yen into provoking his own warriors, raising their ch'i, determination, and resolve.

35.

"Yüeh Yi Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 36.

This battle, its recorded sources, and the political circum-stances surrounding it are fully discussed in our forthcoming History of Warfare in China: The Ancient Period.

37.

"T'ien Tan Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 38.

Figures from this period are difficult to accurately evaluate. Al-though traditional sources seem to be filled with exaggerations, they may be less inaccurate than thought. Certainly both sides fielded several hundred thousand men, and the number of men from Chao slaughtered at Ch'ang-p'ing is reported as 450,000 or 485,000 in various sources. Recent archaeological evidence indicates that a great battle was fought there, and states of the 

period were certainly capable of mobilizing a very high percent-age of their male population, particularly when threatened with extinction. (This battle is extensively discussed in our forth-coming History of Warfare in China: The Ancient Period.)

39.

Pai Ch'i's biography in the Shih Chi notes that " Ch'in's prime minister, the marquis of Ying, moreover dispatched men to dis-tribute a thousand catties of gold around Chao to have 'turned agents' spread the rumor that the only thing Ch'in feared was that Chao She would become commander."

40.

"Lien P'o Lin Hsiang-ju Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 41.

A similar account of these events with additional details of the battles themselves, told from Ch'in's point of view, appears in the combined biographies of Pai Ch'i and Wang Chien, chüan 73 of the Shih Chi. (Also see Shih Chi, chüan 79, the biography of Fan Chu.)

42.

A second example of exploiting the era's belief in divination, perhaps prompted by knowledge of this incident, appears in the covert section.

43.

"Ch'i-yü, 1," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 44.

Equally important with singular talent and remarkable charac-ter was dedication, the focused effort that resulted in particu-larized expertise and became the foundation for the martial arts practices that proliferated in later centuries. Astute leaders proved their ability to "know men" through recognizing and ex-ploiting such individuals.

45.

"Meng-ch'ang Chün Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 46.

"Wei Kung-tzu Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 47.

This is a very odd name indeed, meaning "one who despises Chin" or a "rustic of Chin."

48.

This is a famous phrase attributed to Sun-tzu, but widely found. 

49.

Although listed in the Han Shu bibliography, the work is now lost.

50.

Here the term is fan chien, possibly "doubled spies" but more likely just "agents."

51.

This was an essential aspect of the traditional practice of "knowing men" that will be discussed in the section on evaluat-ing men.

52.

"Ts'u K'o," Shih Chi. A complete translation may be found in Burton Watson , Records of the Grand Historian, Qin Dynasty ( New York: Columbia

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University Press, 1993), pp. 167-178; and the Chan-kuo Ts'e version ( "Yen, 3") in J. I. Crump, Chan-kuo Ts'e ( London: Ox-ford University Press, 1970), pp. 553-561.

53.

Ts'ao Mei's coercion of an agreement from Duke Huan is reprised in the covert section.

54.

Although the prince's intention had been to extort an agree-ment, Ching Ko's actions were too precipitous for anything but assassination--contrary to his dying claims--as many commen-tators have subsequently noted.

Chapter 4 1.

Debate rages over whether the Art of War was actually com-posed by Sun- tzu at the end of the sixth century B.C., written by his disciples shortly after his death, or compiled from oral teachings somewhere about the end of the fifth century B.C. (For a brief discussion, see the introduction to our Art of War.) 2.

Recourse to the ancestral temple for councils of war had the additional value of entrusting the decision to the ancestral spir-its, essentially receiving their sanctification and psychologically shifting the responsibility to them in the event of failure.

3. 

See D. C. Lau, "Some Notes on the Sun Tzu," BSOAS 28

( 1965):331-332. A highly simplified example of employing chopsticks to visibly count off advantages and disadvantages, no doubt in the same mode, appears in Li Sheng's analysis of the strategic situation for Liu Pang during the last years of the struggle to establish the Han ( "Chang, Ch'en, Wang, Chou Chuan," Han Shu).

4.

According to Michael Handel, "Intelligence in Historical Per-spective," in Go Spy the Land, ed. Keith Nielson and B. J.C. McKercher (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 179-180, Sun-tzu was "the first to explicitly discuss the role of what is today termed net assessment."

5.

"Incendiary Attacks," Art of War. 6.

"Initial Estimations," Art of War. The famous Huai-nan Tzu mili-tary chapter reiterates the temple calculation theme several centuries later.

7.

A paraphrase from "Opening Instructions" in the Six Secret Teachings that discusses the appropriate time for the Chou to revolt against the hated Shang: "If there are no ill omens in the Tao of Heaven, you cannot initiate the movement to revolt. If there are no misfortunes in the Tao of Man, your planning can-not precede them."

8.

The choice of "symptoms" reflects the military theorists' (as well as Mencius's and other later Confucians') concern with benevo-lent government, economic prosperity, and programs that do not impoverish or exhaust the people. For example, see "Affairs of State," Six Secret Teachings.

9.

Again this echoes "Opening Instructions" from the Six Secret Teachings: "You must look at the Shang king's yang aspects [his government], and moreover his yin side [personal deport-ment], and only then will you know his mind. You must look at his external activities, and moreover his internal ones, and only then will you know his thoughts."

10.

"Initial Estimations," Art of War. 

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11.

"Military Disposition," Art of War. 12.

"Ch'üan-mou," Shuo Yüan. Note that the term translated as "factors" is ch'ou ( Matthews 1323), which fundamentally means "to calculate," as well as a "tally," such as employed for making these net assessments.

13.

"Ch'üan-mou," Shuo Yüan. 14.

"T'an-ts'ung," Shuo Yüan. 15.

"Determining Rank," Ssu-ma Fa. 16.

"The Tao of the General," Wu-tzu. In "Responding to Change" Wu Ch'i also states, "If the enemy has fortified their defenses in order to solidify their troops, quickly dispatch spies in order to observe their plans."

17.

He is even cited in the Encyclopedia Britannica. The question of the Art of War's composition date and whether the chapter on spycraft was an integral part of the original text of course af-fects the assignment of priorities. Even though the chapter is consistent with his theoretical conceptions and emphasis, three questions arise. First, when was the Art of War actually composed-- at the end of the sixth century B.C., by Sun-tzu himself, prior to assuming his famous (if questioned) role in Wu, or by his disciples or later members of his school, perhaps at the end of the fifth century B.C.? Second, was chapter 13 on spies part of the original text, or was it appended later in the Warring States? Third, is it by the same author as the other chapters? In terms of context, all the types of spies Sun-tzu discusses existed in the Spring and Autumn period--even ex-pendable ones--but their real proliferation came in the Warring States, possibly in small part the result of Sun-tzu's conceptu-alizations. Even though too tangential to undertake here, the problem clearly merits further research.

18.

"Nine Terrains." 

19.

"Employing Spies." 20.

"Configurations of Terrain." 21.

"Seven Standards." 22.

Ibid. In the Three Kingdoms period Chu-ko Liang similarly stated, "Those who excel at combat invariably first investigate the enemy's situation and thereafter make their plans" ( "Chi Shih," Chu-ko Chung-wu-hou Wen- chi).

23.

"Ping-lüeh-hsün." 24.

Li Wei-kung Ping-fa. 25.

"Spies in Warfare." 26.

"Spies," T'ou-pi Fu-t'an, chüan 5. 27.

"The Enemy's Situation," T'ou-pi Fu-t'an, chüan 5. 28.

"Employing Spies." 29.

See, for example, Handel, "Intelligence in Historical Perspective," pp. 180ff.

Chapter 5 1.

Li Wei-kung Ping-fa. 2.

This is not the case in the Chou Li. Tie is not used there either, so it is probably an error for mou, "to plot" or "to plan."

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3.

This occurred in A.D. 29, during the Later Han dynasty. (See "Compulsion," Unorthodox Strategies, for a more detailed ver-sion.)

4. 

These are almost exactly Sun-tzu's words throughout, except for the elision of one clause.

5.

"Five Agents." 6.

We are emending t'ien to jen, as the former is clearly erroneous here.

7.

This differs from Sun-tzu's concept because the agents are not deliberately sacrificed.

8.

Tu Mu's commentary. 9.

Mencius, IIIA3, quoting Yang Hu in a somewhat distorted con-text!

10.

"The Unorthodox Army," Six Secret Teachings. 11.

Note that credence is basically accorded these methods; the problem lies in their opacity and difficulty, not premises or the-ory.

12.

This occurred at the battle of Yen-ling, already reprised in the Spring and Autumn section.

13.

So he claims really double agents, rather than just internal agents, spreading disinformation.

14.

The extant texts of the T'ai-pai Yin-ching, translated separately, contain only two types of roving agents. Whether the Yin-ching has suffered condensation ( Shih Tzu-mei had a copy with three types) or is simply misquoted, dividing the two into three, is unknown.

15.

This incident provides the historical illustration for "Snow," Un-orthodox Strategies.

16.

Duke Hsüan, 15th year, Tso Chuan. 17.

The next section, to the end of the paragraph, is supplemented from "Huai-yin-hou Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi, chüan 92. 

18.

"Li Sheng, Lu Chia Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi, chüan 97. For another translation, see Burton Watson, "The Biographies of Li Yi-chi and Lu Chia," in Records of the Historian ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1:269-274. Li Sheng's death marks the dramatic conclusion to the episode and thus imprints it upon historical memory. However, this did not prevent others from questioning his demise thereafter.

19.

"Tung Chou," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 20.

"Shu-shu 13," San-kuo-chih, chüan 43. 21.

"Chou-yü," Chan-kuo Ts'e.

Chapter 6 1.

Questions and Replies, Book II. The boat analogy also appears in a parallel passage in Li Ching Li Wei-kung Ping-fa, and Li Ching's conclusions are paraphrased in the anonymous Ming Dynasty, "Spies," Ts'ao-lu Ching-lüeh.

2.

"Spies," T'ou-pi Fu-t'an, chüan 5. 3.

Never specifically mentioned in this context, but fundamental to the military writings, was the belief that warfare, being the greatest affair of state, could not be undertaken for emotional reasons. Therefore, the evaluation of acquired material should not be prejudiced by optimism, emotional tendencies, or per-sonal desires.

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4.

"Middle Strategy," Three Strategies. The conclusion should also be noted.

5.

"Controlling the Army," Chu-ko Chung-wu-hou Wen-chi. 6.

"Chien-tie." 7. 

"Hsiao K'uang." In the T'ang dynasty a rebel commander em-ployed a puppet show that he dispatched in advance into un-conquered areas to ferret out the people's inclinations and fathom the local political situation ( Chiu T'ang-shu, chüan 177).

8.

"Spies." Even the initial chapter of the Six Secret Teachings em-phasizes the need for material incentives with an analogy of bait and fishing.

9.

"Employing Spies." 10.

Li Wei-kung Ping-fa. The passage echoes some of the T'ai Kung's methods in "Civil Offensive," Six Secret Teachings, dis-cussed in the section on systematic programs.

11.

Li Wei-kung Ping-fa. 12.

"Local Guides," T'ai-pai Yin-ching. 13.

Hou (observer), a character not often seen, although more com-mon in the military writings, is certainly deputed by the king to make clandestine observations.

14.

In traditional China the number three seems to have been al-most magical in attesting to the veracity of an event, as will be discussed in the section on basic intelligence.

15.

"Ch'i-yü, 1," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 16.

The character for control originally meant "to drive a chariot." 17.

For "exhaust themselves" some editions have "love men." 18.

"Jen Yung," Hu-ling Ching. 19.

Such "bravos" were often identified with outlaw bands, espe-cially during times of turmoil and hardship.

20.

"Hao-chieh wei Chien." 21. 

The echoes are chilling. 22.

The Hu-ling Ching is found as a separate text and preserved in the Wu- pei Chih. There are some problems with textual varia-tion and corruption for this chapter, much of which reflects the T'ai Kung's "Civil Offensive."

23.

The word is fan chien, which by this time simply designates "spy."

Chapter 7 1.

"The Army's Strategic Power." 2.

"Vacuity and Substance," Art of War. 3.

"Nine Terrains," Art of War. 4.

"Vacuity and Substance," Art of War. 5.

"Military Discussions," Wei Liao-tzu. 6.

"Superior Strategy," Three Strategies. 7.

"Ping-lüeh-hsün." 8.

Examples of fathoming men from afar based upon their ap-pearance and demeanor will be found in the section on evaluat-ing men.

9.

Compare the terms employed in "King's Wings," Six Secret Teachings.

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10.

"Chen Chien" 11.

"T'an Ts'ung." In "Chiang T'i," Ch'ang-tuan Ching, it states: "When the general's plans leak out, the army will lack strategic power; when internal affairs can be spied out from outside, the resulting disaster will be uncontrollable." 

12.

"Tactical Balance of Power in Warfare." 13.

"Nine Terrains," Art of War. 14.

"The Source of Offices," Wei Liao-tzu. 15.

The traditional function of "feathers and wings," according to the late Warring States Six Secret Teachings, was "to flourish the name and fame of the army, shake distant lands with its image, and move all within the four borders in order to weaken the enemy's spirit" ("The King's Wings").

16.

"Orders for Segmenting and Blocking Off Terrain," Wei Liao-tzu. In "Army Orders, II" forward reconnaissance forces are also en-trusted with a mandate to control the terrain and prevent any-one from moving in or through the area of forward advance. 17.

"Wang Lou." Similar pronouncements are found in the roughly contemporaneous Wu-ching Tsung-yao, such as in "Chih-hou T'ing-wang."

18.

"Yu Yi." Similar methods are found in "T'an Ma" and "Hsing Feng," Wu-ching Tsung-yao.

19.

See, for example, "Severed Routes." 20.

The Wu-ching Tsung-yao chapter entitled "Ch'uan-hsin Pei" dis-cusses such methods as splitting coins and other objects in half, as well as multiple use tallies.

21.

"Secret Tallies." 22.

Ibid. The severe penalty for discussing them, even within the camp, should be noted.

23. Ibid. 24.

David Kahn, The Codebreakers, rev. ed. ( New York: Scribner, 1996), pp. 73-74. Remarkably, Kahn also notes the existence of 

this Wu-ching Tsung-yao section, but questions whether it or similar systems were much employed.

25.

The construction, staffing, and employment of beacons to re-port border incursions and similar events with fires, smoke, and other visible signals are described in "Feng Huo," Wu-ching Tsung-yao.

25.

Although the Western military tradition is hardly bereft of the theory and practice of deception, in recent centuries it seems to have not only been disdained but also vociferously rejected with the coincident condemnation of the "morally deficient" Chinese approach to warfare. However, closer examination re-veals the systematic employment of deception from Greek and Roman times right through the twentieth century, particularly by Britain and Russia in the last world war. (For an insightful overview of Western practices, see James F. Dunnigan and Al-fred A. Nofi, Victory and Deceit [ New York: William Morrow, 1995]; for Russian methods, see David Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War [ London: Frank Cass, 1989].)

27.

"Li, Lu, Chu, Liu, Shu, Sun Chuan," Han Shu, chüan 43. 28.

Perhaps these were straw dummies, perhaps just nonfighters from the baggage train.

29.

Duke Hsiang, 18th year.

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30.

The battle of Ma-ling and the earlier battle at Kuei-ling are ana-lyzed in detail in the historical introduction to our translation of Sun Pin Military Methods.

31.

31.For further discussion, see "The Weak," Unorthodox Strate-gies. (The battle of Ma-ling is discussed in the chapter entitled "Knowledge," as well as in the introduction to our translation of the Military Methods.)

32.

"Offices, I," Military Methods. 

33.

See, for example, the Six Secret Teachings chapters "Divided Valleys," "Forest Warfare," and "Crow and Cloud Formations in the Mountains."

34.

"The Cavalry in Battle." Book I of the Questions and Replies dis-cusses the tactical utility of interchanging the uniforms of bar-barian and Chinese troops.

35.

"Movement and Rest." 36.

"Planning for the Army." 37.

"Preparation of Strategic Power." 38.

"Initial Estimations," Art of War. 39.

"The Tao of the Military," Six Secret Teachings. 40.

A famous quote from "Initial Estimations," Art of War. 41.

This echoes "Vacuity and Substance," Art of War. 42.

"Initial Estimations," Art of War. 43.

"Nine Changes," Art of War. 44.

"Nine Terrains," Art of War. 45.

Sun-tzu's objectives in "Military Combat." 46.

"Great Appendix," Yi Ching. 47.

"Submerged Plans." 48.

The word here is chan, meaning through reconnaissance scouts, clan- destinely.

49.

"Strategic Military Power," Art of War. 50. 

This statement is not found in the present Six Secret Teachings but certainly echoes Sun-tzu sentiments in "Military Disposi-tion," Art of War.

51.

"Strategic Military Power," Art of War. 52.

This is no doubt a quote from "The Unorthodox Army," Six Se-cret Teachings. However, the original differs in having "divide" rather than "extend."

53.

"Submerged Changes." 54.

This basically echoes Sun-tzu's concept of compelling others, not being compelled by them.

55.

"Tsa-shih," Hsin Hsü. 56.

"Wei-yiü, 4," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 57.

Li Wei-kung Ping-fa, chüan 1. 58.

"Yüeh Fei," Sung Shih, chüan 365. 59.

"Han Shih-chung," Sung Shih, chüan 364. 60.

"Tzung Tse, Chao Ting," Sung Shih.

8 1.

"Chin-yü, 2."

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2.

These are all tactics that clearly reflect Taoist thought. (For a discussion, see the introduction to our translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)

3.

"Chi Chien-tie Shuo," Teng-t'an Pi-chiu. 4.

"Inferior Strategy," Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung. 5. 

"Wu Tzu-hsü Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. The complete biography, to-gether with an analysis of the political and military conflicts be-tween Wu and Ch'u, may be found in the introduction to our single-volume Art of War.

6.

This somewhat fictionalized account of the dramatic conflict between the two states of Wu and Yüeh was probably written in the first century A.D. Even though the reliability of its dia-logues is very questionable, the author may well have had ac-cess to oral transmission and records no longer extant and was thoroughly knowledgeable about the area.

7.

This standard series of techniques for evaluating men will be discussed in the section on knowing men.

8.

For example, during the reign of Duke Wen, Chin provided aid to Ch'in.

9.

T'ai-pai Yin-ching. 10.

The definition remains problematic, particularly as it runs con-trary to the idea of "darkness" or "obfuscation" that might be expected from "covering the enemy's enlightenment," and there may well be difficulties with the text that fortunately do not de-tract from the concept's importance as explicated.

11.

The character ying (Morohashi 4462), rarely used, is defined as the "sound of animals." Note that the "Original Text" for this entry has been lost.

12.

This, of course, echoes his various definitions seen in the sec-tion on deception.

Chapter 9 1.

The chapter has been translated by Burton Watson and is in-cluded in his compendium Records of the Historian ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). However, traditional elitist prejudices apparently prevented later writers from emulating it in the so-called official dynastic histories.

2. 

For a discussion of the psychological impact of the Chinese practice termed "knowing men," see our earlier work by the same name or the forthcoming revision.

3.

Jujubes, for example, were a much-favored medium for admin-istering poisons ( "Yu Hui," Shih-shuo Hsin-yü).

4.

"Ho-lü Nei-chuan," Wu-Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu, chüan 4, abridged, leaving out his confrontation with a stalwart who had battled a river spirit over the death of his horses.

5.

The prevalence of admiration for martial values in the common culture will be discussed at length in our forthcoming History of Warfare in China. Essentially, most of China's historical records, such as the official dynastic histories, were composed by literati deeply imbued with a "civic" orientation that stressed nonviolence, the reign of Virtue over power. This has led to nu

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merous assertions that China lacked a martial tradition, that the civil controlled the martial, and that the people disdained strongmen, bravados, fighters, and similar miscreants. How-ever, China's history is one of almost incessant warfare, and when the civil dominated the martial, it often undermined any hope of survival. Popular culture clearly diverged from the literati's value scheme, flocking to such individuals as the yu-hsia and openly applauding the strong. Thus, although virtue is much spoken about and expected to carry the ruler to tran-quil governance of the realm, even the court itself seethed with intrigue and recourse was easily had to murder and assassina-tion without any moral compunction whatsoever. Those who would boldly throw away their lives and all that men value to revenge a wrong or save the state were heroes, whatever ac-tions they might endure or take. (The Shih Chi's chapter on the yu-hsia [chüan 124] has been translated by Burton Watson as "The Biographies of the Wandering Knights," in Records of the Grand Historian of China [New York: Columbia University Press, 1961], vol. 2, whereas the yu-hsia have been studied by James Liu, The Chinese Knight-Errant [ Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967].)

6. 

"Ch'üan Mou." 7.

Even though actually falling in the interval between the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, Chih Po's Greek-like tale of hubris is also recounted at length in the Chan-kuo Ts'e and may be found in J. I. Crump's translation by the same title ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). Portions relating to his demise will also be found in the section on evaluating men.

8.

In the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu version a friend makes this inquiry. 9.

"Shih-chün-lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. The event also receives mention in three other chapters; the sequence differs greatly from that found in the Shih Chi chapter on assassins.

10.

"K'ai Ch'un," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 11.

"Shu Hsü," Lun Heng. 12.

This shows that they expected spies to be about even in the Han itself, especially in the regions near the border, and make reports.

13.

"Fu Ch'ang, Cheng Kan, Ch'en Tuan," Han Shu. 14.

"Han Chang-ju Lieh-chuan." Another account is found in the chapter on the Hsiung-nu. The Hsiung-nu chapter in the Shih Chi portrays the sequence as evolving more gradually, with Nieh first acting as a trader, under the emperor's instructions, then enticing them with the betrayal of Ma-yi. Moreover, the emperor apparently instigates the plan, no suggestion being recorded of it originating with Nieh. The commandant simply betrays the Han plot when about to be slain of his own accord, rather than as the result of forcible questioning. Of course, the Shan-yü seized him to learn exactly why circumstances seemed so suspicious and thus obtained his own "native guide," even if by coercion. For further information, see Watson translations of these two chapters in Records of the Historian, "Han Ch'ang-ju" and "The Account of the Hsiung-nu."

15. 

"Kuo Tu, Kong Chang, Lian Wang, Su Yang, Chia Lu." 16.

"Yen-yü, 1," Chan-kuo Ts'e.

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17.

This is found in Confucius's biography in the Shih Chi and twice in the Analects, IX:18, XV:13. (Chapter 15 being a late chapter, the sentence was clearly viewed as important.)

18.

Even the pedant Mencius saw sex as innate, as seen from the opening paragraphs of Book V.

19.

Shih Ching, Mao 1. 20.

See, especially, Mao 143, describing male longing. 21.

"Wen-cho-chieh." 22.

"Wen-ch'uan-chich." 23.

"Shih-chi-chieh." 24.

"Ta Ming-wu." 25.

"K'o-Yin-chieh." 26.

"Tsa Yen," Shuo Yüan. (In a fabricated chapter of the Kung-tzu Chia-yü entitled "Li Yün," Confucius even speaks fluently and at length [in contrast to his "discussions" in the Analects and even the Li Chi] about the seven emotions [which include the desires] as innate.)

27.

"Kuei Te," Shuo Yüan. 28.

"Ching Shen," Shuo Yüan. The tastes and desires are coupled with "slander and flattery" in their ability to confuse the up-right mind.

29. Ibid. 30. 

Hsin Hsü, chüan 1. A man's commitment to the world was even thought to be confirmed by his continuing interest in women. Therefore, in the Three Kingdoms period Ssu-ma Yü once noted that Hsieh An, a famous recluse, would probably reappear be-cause he constantly had a courtesan with him and couldn't avoid being troubled by the world's anxieties ( "Shih Chien," Shih-shuo Hsin-yü).

31.

"Chung-Hsia-chi," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 32.

"Chung-Ch'un-chi," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 33.

"Chung-Hsia-chi," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. Hsün-tzu framed the principle of external stimuli stimulating the desires that is no doubt being followed in this passage. The psychology of self-control gave rise to the theory of the li, the rites and cere-monies governing social life that, when internalized, become the forms and possibility for a sort of transcendent freedom. (For an extensive discussion, see Ralph Sawyer, Psycho-emo-tional Conceptualization and Expression in the Li Chi [ Taipei: Kaofeng, 1978].)

34.

"Pen-ching-shun." 35.

"T'ai-tsu-shun." 36.

"Ching-shen-shun." The "king of Hu" refers to the Jung ruler Duke Mu subverted, already recounted in the historical sec-tion.

37.

"Wai-p'ien, Chiu-ch'eng," Pao P'u-tzu. According to Han Fei-tzu, even the great Lao Tan adopted a similar practice: "Lao Tan was the epitome of purity and vacuity. Yet he would not dare gaze at what he desired in order to prevent his mind from be-coming perturbed."

38. Ibid. 39.

"Pien Wen," Pao P'u-tzu. 40. 

The character yao is difficult to translate here, but can mean "beauty," as well as "strange."

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41.

This characterization includes men as well. 42.

The term he employs is ch'u, "to rear," just like domesticated animals!

43.

Duke Hsiang, 21st year, Tso Chuan. Wang Chung's version is nearly identical.

44.

"Chien Chieh-shih Ch'en," Han Fei-tzu. 45.

"Chao-yü, 4," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 46.

"Ch'in-yü, 1," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 47.

Chiu T'ang-shu, chüan 161. 48.

"Han-yü, 3," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 49.

"Chien-chieh Sha-chün." The episodic story of Duke Wen's trials and wandering before he finally ascended Chin's throne even includes his stepmother's attempt to frame him for trying to poison his father to ensure her own son's succession. A very dramatic story, it readily became the stuff of romantic legends and provided a lesson for later generations seeking instant so-lutions for difficult situations.

50.

"Ch'u Shih-chia," Shih Chi. (The dates cited are much disputed and are included merely to provide a chronological sense of the events.)

51.

"Hsiung-nu Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi, chüan 110. (The chapter has been translated in full by Watson, "The Account of the Hsi-

ung-nu.") A similar but slightly longer entry appears in Ch'en P'ing's biography in the Shih Chi, chüan 56. Some commen-taries to the Han Shu suggest that Ch'en P'ing had pictures painted of these idealized women to create a stronger impres- 

sion. ( Ch'en P'ing was the famous strategist who estranged Fan Tseng from Hsiang Yü with unfounded rumors of duplicity and is remembered as the progenitor of other ruses and decep-tions.) The background to this incident has already been re-counted in the section on concealment and deception.

52.

Huan Tan's discussion is noted by Dubs in a footnote to the Kao-tsu entry. See Homer H. Dubs, trans., The History of the Former Han Dynasty ( Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1938), p. 117. 53.

Hsin Lun. 54.

Chu-ko Liang even recommended it as the policy of choice against the Eastern Yi, a barbarian people he characterized as "having few rites and little righteousness" and being suscepti-ble to estrangement techniques based upon bribery preliminary "to enticing them with Virtue and attacking them with power"

( "Tung Yi," Chu-ko Chung-wu-hou Wen-chi). 55.

"Tung Chou," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 56.

The term employed is "turned agent," but again they are simply agents, traitors who have turned against their own state.

57.

"T'ien-ching Chung-wan Shih-chia," Shih Chi. 58.

"Ho-lü Nei-chuan, 4," Wu-Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu. 59.

"Chou-yü," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 60.

"ch'i-yü, 1," Chan-kuo Ts'e. 61.

"L'ien P'o Lin Hsiang-ju Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. Fan chien is again the term, but he was merely a traitor, contrary to Sun-tzu's definition.

62.

Although termed "double" or "turned agents," they were proba-bly just agents in the Han's employ.

63.

"Ch'en Yung-hsiang Shih-chia," Shih Chi. -569- 

64.

"Hou Chün-chi, Chang Liang, Hsüeh Wan-ch'e," Chiu T'ang-shu. 65.

This is an ironic request because his contemplated actions would violate all the forms and proprieties of a minister serving at a formal convocation.

66.

Duke Chuang, 13th year, Ku-liang Ch-uan. 67.

Duke Hsüan, 15th year, Tso Chuan. 68.

"Tao-ying Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu.

Chapter 10 1.

"Shao-ming Wu-chieh." To evaluate men and behavior, consis-tency of course must be assumed.

2.

"Fei Hsiang," Hsün-tzu. 3.

"Chung-tung Chi." 4.

"Ching Hua." 5."

Jen Yi Fa," Ch'un-ch'iu Fan-lu. 6.

"Tsun Hsien," Shuo Yüan. 7.

"Ch'i Shih," Lun Heng. 8.

"Shuo Fu." 9.

"Miu-ch'eng Hsün." 10.

"Chuo Ts'ai," Pao P'u-tzu. 11.

See, for example, "Tao Ying Hsün." 12.

"Cheng Li," Shuo Yüan. Naturally the Sage is capable of know-ing himself; otherwise he wouldn't be a Sage. However, most rulers fell far beneath the ideal. As Han Fei-tzu stated in his 

commentary upon Lao-tzu ("Yü Lao"), "The difficulty of knowing does not lie in seeing other men but in seeing oneself."

13.

"Chih Wu," Shuo Yüan. The concept of the virtuous being able to invariably triumph without combat, strongly identified with Mencius, plagued China's military preparedness for millennia and obstructed efforts to resist and subdue external, more war-like steppe peoples such as the Mongols and Manchus there-after.

14.

"Chieh-pi," Hsün-tzu. As the Ping-fa Pai-yen states in its defini-tion of emptiness: "When the mind has no errors to obstruct it, it is termed 'emptiness.'" However, the definition is more tacti-cally than psychologically oriented, focusing on deluding the enemy through their preconceptions. Thus it states, "When the enemy has extensive plans and we are able to balk them, their wisdom will fall."

15.

"Chieh Pi," Hsün-tzu. The Huai-nan Tzu defined technique as "when you see the foundation and know the ends, observe indi-cations of going and see the return, grasp one and respond to the myriad, take hold of the essential and control the details, this is called 'technique'" ("Jen-hsien Hsün),

16.

"Ssu-hsün Lun," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 17.

"Cheng Ming," Hsün-tzu. 18.

"Hsien-shih Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. -570-

19.

"Shu-chen Hsün." 20.

"Yu-shih Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. The ax story is also found in "Shuo Fu," Lieh-tzu.

21.

"Hsiu-wu Hsün." This text is also found in "Hsien-shih Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu.

22. 

This is no doubt based upon chapter 12 of the Tao Te Ching, which states that input from the senses overwhelms the sen-sory organs.

23.

"Shu-jell Hsün." 24.

"Yüan Tao Hsün." 25.

"Shu-chen-hsün." 26.

"Pa Ching," Han Fei-tzu. 27.

"Tsa Shih, 2," Hsin Hsü. 28.

Ibid. 29.

"Shen-hsing Lun," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 30.

"Kuei-chih Lun," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. ( Sung's story is much dis-cussed in the literature, and the historical section has already recounted other aspects of it.)

31.

"Nei-p'ien wen-hsia." Interestingly, Yen-tzu found that when the ruler was too severe, he would equally not hear any criticism or ill news ("Nei-p'ien Chien-hsia").

32.

"Ch'i-ssu Hsün." 33.

"Planning for the State." 34.

"P'ing-yüan Chün, Yü Ch'ing Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 35.

"Shuo-shan Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu. The question of evaluating men is discussed separately.

36.

"Shen-hsing Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. A similar point is made in the Huai-nan Tzu in a passage that employs the identical im-ages of jade and another famous sword, noting that only an ex-pert can distinguish them ("Fanlun Hsün").

37. Ibid. 

38.

"Ssu-hsün-lun," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. The colors no doubt refer to the copper and tin employed in alloying bronze.

39.

"Ch'üan Mou," Shuo Yüan. An almost identical, probably origi-nal, version appears in "Ssu-hsün-lun," the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. King Chuang was one of the five hegemons; the attack took place in 597 B.C.

40.

"Ch'i-ssu Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu. (The lute incident has been par-tially reconstructed from an earlier passage.)

41.

"The Army's Strategic Power," Six Secret Teachings. See also "Doubt and Timeliness," Art of the Warrior.

42.

"Controlling the Army," Wu-tzu. The Yi Chou-shu ("Wu-chi Chieh") also observes that "one who assumes power but is doubtful will never escape disaster."

43.

"Yi Ping." 44.

A more extreme expression deduces that the eyes and ears sim-ply cannot be relied upon, although not in the same sense as in some eras of the Western philosophical tradition. (See, for ex-ample, "Shen-fen Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu.) This is also the thrust of Taoist transcendent knowledge.

-571-

45.

"Yüan Tao Hsün. 46.

"T'ai-tsu Hsün." 47.

"Ch'u Chuang Wang," Ch'un-Ch'iu Fan-lu. 48.

Analects, XII: 11. 49.

"Hsien-shih Lan." 50. 

"Chieh Pi," Hsün-tzu. The Pao P'u-tzu notes that people who es-pouse different views, who follow their own paths, are mis-trusted and doubted by others ("Wei Chih").

51.

"Miao-ch'eng Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu. 52.

"Chieh Pi," Hsün-tzu. 53.

"Tao Yi," Pao P'u-tzu. 54.

"Kuang P'i," Pao P'u-tzu. 55.

"Jen-hsien Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu. 56.

"Yu-shih Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 57.

"Ssu-shun Lun." This certainly echoes a fundamental Tao Te Ching insight (chap. 71), although commentators also see it as referring to Confucius's pronouncement on knowing ( Analects, II:17). The passage ends by noting that great wisdom and little wisdom are distinct, a concept probably derived from Chuang-tzu.

Chapter 11 1.

"Fu En," Shuo Yüan. 2.

The tradition of knowing men, although pronounced and dra-matic, has occasioned little scholarly interest apart from Eric Henry, "The Motif of Recognition in Early China," Harvard Jour-nal of Asiatic Studies 47, no. 1 ( 1987):5-30; and our early work, Knowing Men ( Taipei; Kaofeng, 1979), in revision for reissue.

3.

"Kao-yao Mo," Shang Shu. The "Doctrine of the Mean" similarly notes the ruler must "know men."

4.

Analects, XII:22. 5.

Analects, I:16. 6. 

Analects, XV:7. 7.

This text is available in John Shryock classic translation, The Study, of Human Abilities ( New Haven: American Oriental Soci-ety, 1937).

8.

The "Wen-wang Kuan" is translated later in this chapter.A chapter in the Later Han Pao P'u-tzu entitled "Hang-p'in" also enumerates dozens of character types, with a brief phrase de-scribing their dominant traits.

9.

Analects, XIII:2. Note that in a dialogue with Duke Ai ( "Ssu Tai," Ta-Tai Li-chi) Confucius suggested observing the people at large, for the Worthy will clearly stand out, just as a tiger in the depths. In later texts Confucius is also quoted as advising Duke Ai against employing three types of men: the close-mouthed, the strong, and the sharp-tongued ( "Ai Kung," Hsün-tzu; and "Tsun Hsien," Shuo Yüan), or the strong, the flatterer, and the loquacious ( Han-shih Wai-chuan, chüan 4).

-572-

10.

"Wen Shen," Fa-yen. 11.

Analects, V:5, V:8, V:19, XIV:1. 12.

See, for example, "Shen-ying Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, where Confucius speaks about men who have the skill to "know words."

13.

"Jen Shin," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu; "Wei Chiang-chün Wen-tzu," Ta-Tai Li-chi.

14.

"Tsa Yen," Shen Chien. Also note "Shih Fan," Feng-su T'ung-yi. 15.

"Wen Chien." Another interesting example is found in "Yü Ho," the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu.

16.

"Pen Hsing," Lun Heng. 17. 

"Kuan Piao," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. In this regard the Sage is envi-sioned as capable of fathoming a person's actual intent rather than simply watching his activities.

18.

"Kuan Piao," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 19.

Analects, XI:20. 20.

"Wu-ti Te," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü. 21.

"Selecting Generals," Six Secret Teachings. 22.

"Lei Hai," Lun Heng. Wang Ch'ung observed that the evil can still create a reputation for goodness.

23.

"Chün Ch'en." The object of such forbearance was probably the conquered Hsia people, but the saying is frequently cited out of context.

24.

"Fan Lun." 25.

"Tsa Shih, 5," Hsin Hsü. 26.

Chüan 4. This text is also found in Hsün-tzu ( "Chün Tao"), which is probably the original source.

27.

"Ting Chüeh" ("Determining Rank"), Ssu-ma Fa. 28.

Analects, II:10. 29.

"Jen Hsien." A man who shows sympathy for a horse would be expected to be benevolent.

30.

"Jen Hsien," Huai-nan Tzu. 31.

Ibid. 32.

Mencius, IVA15. (The last line deliberately repeats Confucius's earlier assertion.) Note that the Ling-shu ( "Shih Ch'uan") also states that the eye expresses courage.

33. 

"Wu-hsing Chih," Han Shu, cited by the author as coming from Shih Chi, but probably originally from "Chou-yü, Hsia," Kuo-yü. 34.

Han Fei-tzu even cites the case of a prince so intent on plotting a revolution to gain revenge for his father's death that he didn't realize his chin was leaning on the point of his staff and bleed-ing from being punctured ("Yü Lao").

35.

Han-shih Wai-chuan, chüan 4. 36.

"Chieh-ching Wei-lun," Su-wen. 37.

"Pen Ts'ang," Ling-shu. 38.

"Hsi Tz'u," I Ching. 39.

"Ching Lun." 40.

The episode is found in the records for both Chao and Wei in the Chan- kuo Ts'e, as well as in various forms in the Shih Chi (historical houses of Han, Chao, and Wei), the Huai-nan Tzu

( "Chien Hsün"), Shuo Yüan ( "Ch'üanMou") -573-

Mou"), and other parts of the Han Fei-tzu ( "Shuo Lin, Shang" and "Nan San"). It ranks among the most famous Warring States stories, well known through the centuries.

41.

"Shih Kuo." 42.

This is an ironic comment because of the ignominious death he later suffered, having ignored Kuan Chung's dying words on se-lecting a successor.

43.

"Shen-ying Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 44.

"Ching Yü," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. (The passage of course entails vestiges of the mystic tone of the "knower," the man who can know without visible signs and actual behavior.

45.

"Shuo Shan." 

46.

"Tsun Hsien," Shuo Yüan. 47.

This is, in part, a pun on the construction of the Chinese char-acter for Chü, which consists of two mouths stacked one over the other underneath the signifier for grass.

48.

"Shao Wen," Kuan-tzu. This is also found in "Chih Shih," Lun Heng; "Chung Yen," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu; "Ch'üan Mou," Shuo Yüan; and Han-shih Wai-chuan, chüan 4.

49.

"Miu Ch'eng." This reflects the common view that sounds and tones express underlying emotion, even if unintentionally, and have a significant effect on the listener. Therefore even the songs of a state allow it to be evaluated for a sort of national temper and character.

50.

Analects, II:8 (also note II:7). 51.

"Fei Shih-erh-tzu," Hsün-tzu. 52.

"Fei Hsiang," Hsün-tzu. 53.

Ibid. His train of thought was also incorporated by the Han-shih Wai- chuan.

54.

"Hsien Chi," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. Sun-tzu, more than two cen-turies earlier, had expressed the similar sentiment that one must know the enemy and oneself.

55.

Mencius, IA7. The king confesses he did not understand his own motives in sparing an ox from being sacrificed. (Legge's classic translation unjustifiably introduces the phrase "by re-flection.") Tung Chung-shu also cites this verse as an example of the principle of association, concluding that "exhaustively looking at a person's exterior one can see the interior" ( "Yü Pei," Ch'un-Ch'iu Fan-lu).

56.

"Fei Kung, Chung," Mo-tzu. 57. 

Mencius, IA7. The Ho Kuan-tzu, in introducing the set of stan-dard criteria employed for evaluating men in varying circum-stances, also speaks of "measuring men."

58.

"Chih Tu." The idea is advanced here and in one or two other texts (such as "Tsun Hsien," Shuo Yüan) that men such as the T'ai Kung and Yi Yin must be recognized in their situations and then appropriately employed based upon an estimation of their abilities if the ruler is to attain ultimate status as a hegemon. 59.

Wang Ch'ung ponders it as the basis for asserting behavior can be fathomed, citing the "Offices of King Wen" (translated at the end of this section). See "Ta Ning," Lun Heng.

-574-

60.

Mencius, VIIA44. 61.

Analects, XVII:26. (This is the traditionally sanctioned under-standing of the sentence, but it might be translated as "Some-one who still displays evil at forty years of age will end by being so.")

62.

Analects, I:2. 63.

"Kuan Piao," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. Also note "Tao Ying," the Huai-nan Tzu.

64.

Chung-lun, A:9a; Analects, II:10. 65.

"Shu Chieh," Lun Heng. 66.

See, for example, "Tsa Shih, 5," Hsin Hsü. 67.

"Chu Shu," Huai-nan Tzu. 68.

Analects, XV:27. 69.

"Advancing the Worthy." 70.

Analects, XIII:24. 

71.

Mencius, IB7. 72.

"Ssu Tai." 73.

"Tsa Shih, 1." 74.

A9b, B19b-21b. 75.

"Ch'ien T'an" and "Chung Kuei," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien. 76.

"Ch'a Ch'uan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 77.

"Tzu Lu Ch'u-chien" and "Wu-ti Te," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü. Also note "Wu-ti Te," Ta-Tai Li-chi; and "Tsa Shih, 4," Hsin Hsü. 78.

Mencius, VIIA36. 79.

"Ai Kung," Hsün-tzu. 80.

"Lu-yü, Hsia," Kuo-yü. 81.

"Lu-yü, Hsia," Kuo-yü. 82.

"Ai-kung Wen Wu-yi," Ta-Tai Li-chi. 83.

"Ch'iung Ming," Shang Shu. 84.

Analects, I:3. 85.

Mencius, VIIB12. 86.

Mencius, VIIB37. (This essentially combines two passages from the Analects, XVII: 13 and XVII: 18.)

87.

Analects, VI:16. 88.

"Ai-kung Wen Cheng," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü. (Compare "Hsiao Chih," Fa Yen.)

89. 

"Shuo Lin." (This is contrary to later Confucian attitudes, which condemned any successful person serving in a de-bauched state.)

90. Ibid. 91.

"Lun Fei." 92.

Mencius, IIA2. 93.

"Fei Hsiang," Hsün-tzu. Also note "Li Yi," Yen-t'ieh Lun, which likens raising men to selecting a horse by its hair.

94.

"Chou-yü, Shang," Kuo-yü. 95.

Analects, XI:20. 96.

Analects, XIV:5. 97.

Analects, I:3, XVII:17. 98.

Analects, V:9; "Tzu Lu Ch'u-chien" and "Wu-ti Te," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü; Analects, XI:2.

-575-

99.

Analects, XV:22. 100.

"Jui Liang-fu," Yi Chou-shu. 101.

"Wu-ti Te," Ta-Tai Li-chi; "Nei-ch'u-shuo Shang, Ch'i-shu," Han Fei- tzu (through listening the wise and stupid cannot be distin-guished); and "Jui Liang-fu," Yi Chou-shu.

102.

"Wu Pen," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu; "Ta Lüch" and "Hsing Eh," Hsün-tzu; "Feng Shih" and "Tsa Yen," Shuo Yüan; "T'ai-tsu Hsün," Huai-nan Tzu; and "Shih Kuo," Han Fei-tzu.

103.

"Hsing Eh," Hsün-tzu. 104. 

Mencius, VA8; "Chih Kung," Shuo Yüan; and "Ta Lun," Yen-t'ieh Lun.

105.

"Cheng Ming," Hsün-tzu; T'ai-hsüan Ching (Ch'ü tetragram); and "Yü Pei" and the important "T'ung-lei Hsiang-tung," Ch'un-Ch'iu Fan-lu.

106.

This thought pervades the K'ung-tzu Chia-yü, a work that pre-sumably preserves the Master's teachings. (Note that in the Shuo Yüan [ "Tsa Yen"] Confucius observes that someone enter-ing a strongly smelling environment quickly becomes accus-tomed to the odors and no longer notices them.)

107.

"Liu Pen," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü. 108.

"Wen Ti," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü. The Han-shih Wai-chuan (chüan 2) similarly notes the sequence by which people see and evaluate the powerful: from far to near, appearance, voice, and then ac-tual behavior.

109. Analects, V:9. 110.

"Tsun Hsien, " Shuo Yüan. 111.

"Ch'iu-kuan Shih-k'ou," Chou Li. 112.

Note that the Ta-Tui Li-chi ( "Ts'eng-tzu Li-shih") and Tseng-tzu Chia- yü ( "Li-shih") compare words and eyes.

113.

"Ting Hsien," Lun Heng. (Compare "Ch'ien T'an," "Chung Kuei," "Shih Kung," and "Chiao Chi," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien.)

114.

See, for example, "Ching Ya," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu; and "Fei Shih-erh- tzu," Hsün-tzu.

115.

See, for example, "Chu Shu," Huai-nan Tzu; and "Tzu Lu Ch'u-chien," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü.

116.

"Miu Ch'eng," Huai-nan Tzu. 117.

"Shih Ch'uan," Ling Shu. 

118.

Analects, IV:7. Also note "Kuo Yü," Feng-su T'ung-yi. 119.

Analects, XVII:8. The term "obfuscation" was later employed by Hsün-tzu in a similar manner in his famous chapter "Explain-ing Obfuscations." In an interesting Hsün-tzu passage Confu-cius is quoted as discussing some counterbalances to unstruc-tured substance that turn the individual into a virtual paragon: "One who is artful but loves measure will certainly constrain himself; who is courageous and loves to unite with others will be victorious; who is wise but loves modesty will be come a Worthy" ("Chung-ni").

120.

"Yü Pei," Ch'un-Ch'iu Fan-lu. 121.

"Kua Chien," Fa-yen. 122.

"Ching Chieh," Li Chi. 123.

See, for example, "Ta Ning," Lun Heng. 124.

Analects, VI:9. Also note I:15. 125.

Analects, VII:15.

-576-

126.

Mencius, VIB15. 127.

Mencius, VIB15. Also note VIIA18. 128.

Analects, I:15. 129.

Analects, IV:2. Mencius of course concurred, and the Confu-cian school adopted it as a fundamental belief.

130.

"Chieh Lao," Han Fei-tzu. 131.

"Ch'en Shu," Shuo Yüan. 132. 

"Lun Jen," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. Such series are extremely com-mon. See, for example, "Ting Hsien," Lun Heng; Ho Kuan-tzu; "Fan Lun," Huai- nan Tzu; and Han-shih Wai-chuan (chüan 3) where Li K'o's criteria for evaluating men run: "When at rest see whom they are intimate with; when rich, see whom they as-sociate with; when successful, see whom they recommend; when impoverished, see what they will not do; when lowly, see what they will not take. These five are sufficient to observe men."

133.

"Yao Tien," Shang Shu. The story is widely found, such as in Mencius, and Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu ( "Yu Tu").

134.

The concept of a test or probationary period is found through-out War- ring States texts, including, for example, "Ching-kung Wen Te-hsien chih Tao," Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu; "Ssu Tai," Ta-Tai Li-chi; "Wu-yi Chieh," K'ung- tzu Chia-yü; and "Yao Tien," Shang Shu.

135.

"Selecting Generals." 136.

"Fan Lun," Huai-nan Tzu. 137.

For another example, see "Ch'au Shih," Ta-Tai Li-chi. 138.

"Pa Ching," Han Fei-tzu. 139.

"Tseng-tzu Li-shih," Ta-Tai Li-chi; and "Li Shih," Tseng-tzu Chia-yü.

140.

"Lun Jen," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 141.

"Tseng-tzu Li-shih," Ta-Tai Li-chi. This text is also found in "Li Shih," Tseng-tzu Chia-yü. Another series designed to determine ability appears in Hsün-tzu's chapter "Chün Tao."

142.

"Nei-ch'u-shuo Shang, Ch'i-shu," Han Fei-tzu. 143.

Duke Wen, 1st year, Tso Chuan. 144. 

See, for example, "Ch'i, 3" and Ch'u, 4," Chan-kuo Ts'e; and "Wai- ch'u-shuo, Yu-shang," Han Fei-tzu.

145.

"Shuo Wen." Yen-tzu's thwarting of such a test is discussed in the political intelligence section, and another interesting exam-ple is seen in Shen Sheng's response, "Chin-yü, 1," Kuo-yü. 146.

"Ming-fa Chieh," Kuan-tzu. 147.

See, for example, Duke Ch'eng, 17th year, Tso Chuan; "Wu-yi Chieh," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü; "Ch'au Shih," Ta-Tai Li-chi; and "Ch'u Hsia," Yen-t'ieh Lun.

148.

"Kuei Tang," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. This incident is also found in such other texts as Han-shih Wai-chuan, chüan 9; Duke Hsi, 23rd year, Tso Chuan; and "Tsa Shih, 5," Hsin Hsü.

149.

"Fei Shih-erh-tzu," Hsün-tzu. 150.

"Ku Hsiang," Lun Heng. A similar idea is found in "Hsiang Lieh," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien.

151.

"Ku Hsiang," Lun Heng.

-577-

152.

"Jung Ching," Hsin Shu. 153.

Duke Chao, 11th year, Tso Chuan. 154.

"Ch'ü Li, Hsia," Li Chi. 155.

Duke Hsiang, 28th year, Tso Chuan; Duke Hsi, 31st year; Duke Wen, 9th year; Duke Wen, 15th year; and Duke Ch'eng, 13th year.

156.

Duke Hsi, 12th year, Tso Chuan. 157.

Tso Chuan. 158.

Duke Wen, 18th year, Tso Chuan; and Duke Hsi, 27th year. 

159.

Analects, I:11. 160.

"Hao Sheng," K'ung-tzu Chia-yü. Also in "Ch'üan Mou," Shuo Yüan.

161.

Duke Hsiang, 31st year, Tso Chuan. 162.

Duke Hsiang, 30th year, Tso Chuan. 163.

Duke Chao, 15th year, Tso Chuan. (For another example, see Duke Hsiang, 31st year.)

164.

See Duke Hsiang, 19th year, Tso Chuan, where the absence of grief indicates he has lost his foundation; and Duke Chao, 11th year, where the mourner lacks sorrow, steps high, and looks fierce.

165.

"Hsin Wu," Huai-nan Tzu. 166.

The Lun Heng has "her voice was unmoved." 167.

"Nan San," Han Fei-tzu; and "Fei Han," Lun Heng. 168.

A striking example of evaluating intent by the Odes appears in Duke Hsiang, 16th year, Tso Chuan.

169.

A prominent official of many skills, including mathematics, as-tronomy, and music, during Wang Mang's reign and the first years of the Later Han dynasty, he enjoys a biography in the Hou Han Shu ( "Ts'ai Yung Lieh-chuan").

170.

See, for example, "Ming Lu," Lun Heng; and "Chih Shih," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu.

171.

"Ting Hsien" and "Lei Hai," Lun Heng; "Hsien Nan,"Ch'ien-fu Lun- chien. (Purity itself seems to spawn antagonism.)

172.

"Lei Hai," Lun Heng; and Analects, XIX:21. 173.

"Lei Hai," Lun Heng. 

174.

Abstracted from "Ting Hsien," Lun Heng. 175.

Note also "Lun Jung" and "Ch'ien T'an," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien. An additional complication, raised by Wang Ch'ung (in "Liang Chih"), is that two men performing the same job do not imply equal talent. For example, Confucius and an ordinary man might both hold the same administrative position.

176.

"Shuo Shan." 177.

"Ch'eng Ts'ai" and "Shu Chieh," Lun Heng. 178.

"Hsien Nan," "Ch'ien T'an," and "Chung Kuei," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien.

179.

"Pen Cheng," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien. 180.

"Lun Jung," Ch'ien-tu Lun-chien. 181.

Ibid. 182.

"Nei-ch'u-shuo Shang, Ch'i-shu," Han Fei-tzu. (The famous Men-cian passage appears in IA7.)

183.

There were actually many tests and indications for forging China's superlative swords, some of them preserved in the work on technology known as the T'ien-kung K'ai-wu.

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184.

"Hsien Hsüeh," Han Fei-tzu. 185.

"Shuo Lin, Hsia." Han Fei-tzu. (This is another example of em-ploying spies to watch political enemies.)

186.

"Wai-ch'u Shuo, Tso-hsia," Han Fei-tzu. 187.

"Hsien Hsüeh," Han Fei-tzu. The examples are drawn from the Analects.

188. 

"Shuo Lin, Shang," Han Fei-tzu. 189.

"Nei-ch'u-shuo Shang, Ch'i-shu" and "Pa Shuo," Han Fei-tzu. 190.

"Wen Pien," Han Fei-tzu. Han Fei-tzu was particularly known for his analysis of penchants and inclinations, and suggested methods for exploiting them, which will be discussed at the end of the section.

191.

"Pa Ching," Han Fei-tzu. Many of these techniques are also found in Han dynasty texts such as the Ch'un-Ch'iu Fan-lu ( "Li Yüan-shan") and later adopted by Li Ch'uan in his T'ai-pai Yin-ching and perhaps derive from the mysterious figure known as Kuei Ku-tzu, whose apocryphal book advances methods for con-founding and probing other people. Unfortunately, space does not permit an examination of Kuei Ku-tzu's abstruse tech-niques, though they are incorporated by dozens of modern pop-ular Chinese works.

Several of the clauses are a matter of considerable disagree-ment, as the extensive commentaries in Ch'en Ch'i-yu, Han Fei-tzu Chi-shih ( Taipei: Shih- chieh Shu-chü, 1972), 2:1017-1025, indicate.

192.

"Nei-ch'u-shuo, Shang: Ch'i Shu," Han Fei-tzu. A similar ploy precedes it.

193.

"Wai-ch'u-shuo, Tso-hsia," Han Fei-tzu. 194.

"Shih Kuo," Han Fei-tzu. As is well known, Duke Huan failed to heed his advice and died ignominiously, despite his great stature and power, not long thereafter, a victim of their treach-ery.

Chapter 12 1.

Knowing Men ( Taipei: Kaofeng, 1979). 2.

"Yao Tien," Shang Shu. 3.

Ibid. 

4.

See, for example, "Ch'i Shu," Huai-nan Tzu; "San-tai Kai Chih-wen," Ch'ien-fu Lun-chien; and Han-shih Wai-chuan, chüan 7. 5.

"Ta Yü Mo," Shang Shu; and "Shen-ta Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 6.

"Ta Ning," Lun Heng. 7.

This phrase is normally translated, despite an apparently dif-ferent meaning, as "aptness for government combined with rev-erence," which is based upon somehow contorting the charac-ter luan (signifying chaos, turbulence, disorder in its primary meaning) to mean "to govern" or "put in order."

8.

"Kao-yao Mo." Some of the pairs are, based upon normal read-ings, inherently contradictory, leading to imaginative explana-tions and alternative readings. ( James Legge classic transla-tion of the Shu Ching [ 1865], as well as Bernhard Karlgren, The Book of Documents, BMFEA 22 [ 1950]:8, may be con-sulted for traditional renderings.)

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9.

His characterizations are apparently preserved in Kung-tzu Chia-yü; Ts'eng-tzu Chia-yü; and Ta-Tai Li-chi.

10.

Extensive discussion of the disciples' characterizations will be found in Knowing Men.

11.

The dozens of passages defining their respective attributes in the Analects and their subsequent elaboration by Mencius and especially Hsün- tzu may easily be consulted for specifics.

12.

"Ai Kung," Hsün-tzu. Being found in a late Warring States work, the passage has only nominal connections with Confucius. (There is another passage attributed to Confucius in the Han-shih Wai-chuan in which he essentially berates the five classes of "gentlemen" found in his time who abuse their position and privileges rather than pursue self-cultivation and the Way [chüan 2].)

13. 

The Shuo Yüan arrays two sets of six ideal and pernicious min-isters in "Ch'en Shu." Although largely stereotypes, certain characteristics and practices are distinguishable.

14.

"Yin-yang Erh-shih-wu Jen," Ling Shu. 15.

"Tung. T'ien," Ling Shu. 16.

There are some important discrepancies in the two versions, in-cluding whether King Wen instructs the T'ai-shih (synonymous with the T'ai Kung, as in the Six Secret Teachings), or it is the Duke of Chou instructing King Wen (highly unlikely). The translation that follows is based upon the somewhat more ex-pansive "Wen-Wang Kuan-jen" chapter in the Ta-Tai Li-chi, emended slightly where characters seem obviously incorrect from the "Kuan-jen" version preserved in the Yi Chou-shu. Be-cause of the extensive use of adjectives, often puzzling, to char-acterize various types of individuals, extensive recourse was also made to the notes found in two contemporary editions: Kao Ming, Ta-Tai Li-chi chin-chu chin-yi ( Taipei: Shang-wu Shu-chü, 1975); and Li Hsüeh-ch'in , Yi-Chou-shu hui-chiao chi-chu ( Shanghai: Shanghai Ku-chi ch'u- pan-she, 1994).

17.

The basis for the criteria that follow is human tendencies prevalent in less than ideal circumstances. The noble and wealthy usually become arrogant and ignore the li, the poor tend to be forced into illegal actions, the favored become haughty and exploit their positions, and the unknown, who have failed to realize their ambitions, generally become anx-ious. Maintaining proper behavior under such stressful situa-tions provides a strong indication of character and virtue.

18.

This concludes the first section of material that emphasizes in-ternal and external coherence and the discernment of true emotions and commitments within a variety of contexts. The last part of this section provides techniques and suggestions for actively probing and testing a person to discover his hidden aspects. Even though King Wen had faith in the principle of transparency, he provided methods for actively setting up stim-uli to elicit reactions that might then be judged for internal co-herence, as well as appraised against external standards. The 

tests include providing major temptations based upon man's powerful, often overwhelming desires for wealth and beauty, situations such as rejection and favor in which undesirable emotional reactions might appear, and false clues or sugges-tions.

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19.

This brief section is essentially an explicit assertion of the transparency of character followed by a set of illustrative exam-ples correlating the sound of the voice with internal mental states on the premise that through them the person's psycho-logical state may be fathomed. (Throughout the term ch'i, basi-cally synonymous with psychic energy and spirit, is employed in a quasi- technical sense.)

20.

This section begins with a strong assertion of essential trans-parency based on the assumption that affective states will in-variably be visible in the individual's manners, appearance, and physique and therefore that internal states can be fath-omed and people evaluated.

21.

King Wen begins by pointing out that people attempt to conceal their emotions and true personalities, and he goes on to indi-cate some character types and the ploys they use to con-sciously manipulate their images in order to gain fame as a particularly virtuous type of person while masking their true nature.

22.

The king enumerates nine employments, following which the text repeats them, correlated with appropriate official duties. (The redundancy has been eliminated.)

23.

The section closes with the king charging his officials to consci-entiously perform their duties and warning that "bringing con-fusion to the laws" and other failures would be punished with-out pardon. In comparison with the six indications, and to a lesser extent, the nine employments, the seven categories con-sist of titles and only the broadest indication of positions. Per-haps much material has been lost, or perhaps King Wen never expanded upon this classification. Equally likely, the emphasis 

naturally fell upon evaluating personality and talent, and therefore the six indications are extensive and detailed.

Chapter 13 1.

"Wai-ch'u-shuo Yu-shang," Han Fei-tzu. Some commentators take "outside" as referring to foreign states, which is certainly true in other passages and contexts, but is less likely here as they profit from such information from the outer officials and powerful families.

2.

"Nei-ch'u-shuo, Shang," Han Fei-tzu. 3.

This is, of course, the old idea of consorts, previously seen, but codified.

4.

This is a practice strongly warned against by many writers from Mencius through the T'ai Kung, as already seen in the section on judging by fame, reputation, and approbation. 5.

The translation adopts a more general rubric for the "target," even though the original intent was specifically rulers in the Warring States period.

6.

Another chapter entitled "Difficulty in Words" ( "Nan Yen") dis-cusses how various types of presentation, phrasing, and choice of topics lead to misperceiving the speaker's intent, attain-ments, and character.

7.

"Ch'en Tao," Hsün-tzu, slightly abridged and rearranged for convenience.

8.

The T'ai-pai in the title refers to Venus, the "star" designated by metal in the five-phase system--metal (as in weapons) of course being associated with

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the west, fall, oncoming cold, and death. The yin (of yin and yang) is understood as referring to the arts of darkness--death and killing--but is also said to mean "hidden," resulting in the translation of Hidden Classic. 

9.

"Shu yu t'an-hsin." 10.

This first chapter essentially reprises the fall from natural har-mony theory identified with Taoism that clearly influenced some of the military writings as well.

11.

Essentially lead them on by similarity of view or approach, but then--to their surprise--confound them.

12.

This passage is somewhat puzzling insofar as Master Kuei-ku ( Kuei-ku Tzu) and much military thought stressed deceit and misdirection, especially initially concealing strength. Of course

there was always a conceptual strain that emphasized the psy-chological impact of awesomeness.

13.

Some texts have "delude" rather than "respond." Response is preferable, as translated.

Chapter 14 1.

Also found in Analects, XIII: 16. 2.

Also found in "Chung-shu" and "Ai-kung Wen," Li Chi. 3.

"Cheng Li," Shuo Yüan. 4.

"Feng Shih." 5.

Ibid. 6.

"Shih Chün," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. Also found in "Feng Shih," Shuo Yüan, with slight changes suggesting the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu version is original.

7.

Rather problematically, the passage would require the I Ching to have been in existence at this time.

8.

"Serving the Ruler," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 9. 

"Shih Lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. Also found in "Ch'üan Mou," Shuo Yüan.

10.

Chin was rent asunder by its ministerial families, rather than destroyed, in 434 B.C.

11.

Hsün-tzu made a similar observation but emphasized the act of changing itself, coming to appreciate Worthies, noting that when a state is about to rise, it will invariably esteem teachers and learning, and thus laws and measures will be preserved, but when it is about to perish, the opposite will be true ( "Ta-lüeh," Hsün-tzu).

12.

"Ch'üan Mou," Sh-uo Yüan. 13.

"Hsien-shih-lan," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 14.

Of course, from another perspective it might be argued that dissipation and excess characterized the earlier period, frugal-ity and security the later, which is why intelligence analysis re-mains an art rather than a science.

15. "Cheng Li." 16.

"Ch'üan Mou," Shuo Yüan. The original is found in Duke Ai, 1st year, Tso Chuan.

17.

"Shuo-lin, Shang."

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18.

"Chih Wu," Shuo Yüan. 19.

A similar range of criteria may be derived from the lengthy Kuan-tzu chapter entitled "Eight Observations," which analyzes the strengths and style of a state.

20.

Later writers, such as Chu Hsi, were uninterested in the topic, perhaps because they confronted a very different political world.

21. 

"Fu Kuo." 22.

"Chiang Kuo". 23.

" Wu Ku." 24.

"Pa Shuo," Han Fei-tzu. 25.

"Kuei Shih." 26.

"Wu-hsing Shun-ni". 27.

"Li-su-lan." For a translation of "Chün Tao," see Jay Sailey, The Master Who Embraces Simplicity ( San Francisco: Chinese Ma-terials Center, 1978), esp. pp. 57-60.

28.

"Wai-ch'u-shuo, Tso-shang." 29.

"Chu-shu Hsün." 30.

This is the same Tzu Kung already encountered in the intro-ductory historical material.

31.

"Chu-shu-hsün." 32.

"Nei-p'ien Wen-shang," Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu. 33.

Ibid. 34.

This entire dialogue has been previously translated in our Art of War, which may be consulted for appropriate notes.

35.

"Ta Wu-k'ai," Yi Chou-shu. An interesting list of ten practices, aptly called Ten Defeats, is found in "Feng-pao-chieh." Another section of the Yi Chou-shu also notes that when a ruler loves wealth and treasure, it facilitates the acquisition of power by the perverse, and that one immersed in pleasure will lose his power to his ministers ("Shih-chi Chieh").

36.

"Precursors to Extinction," Han Fei-tzu. 37. 

"Hsiung-nu Lieh-chuan," Shih Chi. 38.

This sentence, a quote from the Tao Te Ching, is frequently found in military and political writings discussing--usually op-posing--military action.

39.

"Lun Kung," Yen-t'ieh Lun. 40.

"Tung Yi Lieh-chuan," Hou Han Shu.

Chapter 15 1.

"The Tao of the Military," Six Secret Teachings. 2.

These have been extensively analyzed in our various books, in-cluding Unorthodox Strategies and Complete Art of War.

3.

"Initial Estimations," Art of War. 4.

Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6.

"Preserving the State's Territory." 7.

For a discussion, see the introduction to our translation The Six Secret Teachings on the Way of Strategy ( Boston: Shamb-hala, 1997).

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8.

"Chüeh Sheng." 9.

GSR 547C. 10.

"Wang-p'ei Chieh." 11.

See, for example, "Shih-jung Lun," part 4, "Jen-ti," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. The concept will be reexamined later in this section in conjunction with the Hu-ling Ching.

12. 

"The Army's Losses," Military Methods. 13.

Duke Yin, 5th year. Some commentators suggest that this was only an excuse to go fishing, but later military writers see it as foresighted "walking of the terrain."

14

"Chao Shih-chia," Shih Chi. 15.

"Han Shih-chung," Sung Shu. 16.

"Severed Routes." In other chapters he also emphasizes the need to know the enemy's location at all times (chap. 45) and constantly observe them (chap. 44).

17.

"The Army's Worms," Chu-ko Liang Wu-hou Wen-chi. 18.

"Configurations of Terrain," but the intent is different. 19.

"Selecting Officers," T'ai-pai Yin-ching. 20.

"Scouts and Agents," Ts'ui-wei Pei-cheng Lu. 21.

The very first example the author cites is that of the infamous Po P'i.

22.

Reading "roll up" in concord with Sun-tzu, rather than "slowly" found in an alternate text, since slowness may be fatal on con-stricted terrain.

23.

"Employing Masses," Ssu-ma Fa. 24.

"The Tao of the General," Wu-tzu. 25.

"Vacuity and Substance," Art of War. Book II of the T'ang dy-nasty Questions and Replies refers to Sun-tzu's approach, pro-viding evidence of the tradition's continuity.

26.

"The Questions of King Wei," Military Methods. (This is essen-tially Wu Ch'i's method.)

27. 

Many of Sun-tzu's basic observations are cited and integrated into the military writings through the Ch'ing dynasty, including Chu-ko Liang's collected works.

28.

"Evaluating the Enemy (Liao Ti)," Wu-tzu. His observations are fully incorporated in the Wu-ching Tsung-yao chapter "Ch'a Ti-hsing."

29.

The 10th, 16th, and 20th items have been lost. 30.

Duke Hsiang, 18th year, Tso Chuan. 31.

The same things were done at Sun Pin's famous victory at Ma-ling.

32.

This closely paraphrases Sun-tzu but is not exact. (This whole final paragraph elaborates a section of Sun-tzu "Vacuity and Substance," including the exact sentences that follow.)

33.

"Ping-hsing," T'ai-pai Yin-ching. The last paragraph is almost identical with the concluding section of "Vacuity and Sub-stance," substituting "flow" for "form."

34.

"Military Combat." 35.

"Evaluating the Enemy." A similar passage appears in the "Tao of the General," and is quoted in "Liao Ti-chiang," Wu-ching Tsung-yao.

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36.

Because they are on "fatal terrain," they would seem to have no alternative to standing and fighting. However, the author might equally be pointing out the danger of such forces exploiting the advantages of constricted terrain, entrapping and slaying any enemy troops that pursue them in.

37.

The Wu-ching Tsung-yao, compiled slightly later, also contains a lengthy section that provides historical illustrations for many of the conditions and situations. (See Hou-chi, chüan 11.)

38. 

"The Tao of the General." 39.

"Wu Chi," Hu-ling Ching. (Also see "Ping Chi.") 40.

Sun-tzu mentioned constraints, but Wu-tzu explicated them in "Controlling the Army."

41.

The original, in "Vacuity and Substance," has "stimulate them" rather than "observe them," thus an active probe rather than mere passive observation.

42.

"Observing the Enemy." 43.

Note that he isn't condemning these practices, just their em-phasis to the exclusion of fundamental, human-focused mea-sures.

44.

"Shih K'o-chi," Hu-ling Ching, slightly rearranged for clarity. 45.

"Five Conditions That Should Not Be Attacked," Hu-ling Ching. 46.

"Maneuvering the Army." This will be further discussed in the final section on omens.

47.

"Analyzing Enemy Encampments." 48.

"Wen Yüan, 2," Sung Shih, chüan 440. 49.

"Maneuvering the Army." 50.

"The Tao of the General," Wu-tzu. Hsü Tung's remarks about various phenomena all derive from this chapter and the previ-ous one entitled "Evaluating the Enemy."

51.

All the examples to this point are from Sun-tzu's chapter enti-tled "Maneuvering the Army"; "The Army's Indications," Six Se-cret Teachings, is similar.

52.

These observations are taken mainly from "Evaluating the En-emy," Wu-tzu.

53. 

"Maneuvering the Army." 54.

"Vacuity and Substance." 55.

Questions and Replies, Book III. The Mencius also remarks upon a similar procedure in a well-known passage in the first chapter.

56.

"Spirit in Warfare," Hundred Unorthodox Strategies. Written in the Warring States period, the Tso Chuan entry may simply re-flect Warring States conceptions projected backward.

57.

Mencius, IIA2. The definitions, dimensions, and dynamics of ch'i are quite complex, entailing both metaphysical and psycho-logical aspects. This extremely important concept still lacks a serious monograph in English, although it is touched upon in a number of places in Joseph Needham multi- volume Science and Civilisation in China; and a few monographs have appeared in Japanese and Chinese.

58.

"Strict Positions." 59.

"Stimulating the Officers."

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60.

"Discussion of Regulations." There is, of course, a distinction between being oblivious to life and death and being committed to dying in the fight.

61.

Questions and Replies, Book III. Nominally attributed to Li Ching, the text's actual relationship to the T'ang period is somewhat murky.

62.

"Spirit in Warfare," Hundred Unorthodox Strategies. 63.

"Expanding Ch'i." 64.

"Nine Terrains." Several chapters in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies discuss the question of "fatal terrain" and eliciting the ultimate effort from the troops. 

65.

"Planning Offensives," Art of War. 66.

For example, in "Initial Estimations" Sun-tzu states, "The gen-eral encompasses wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness."

67.

"Nine Changes," Art of War. 68.

"The Tao of the General," Wu-tzu. Most of the observations on generals are incorporated in the Wu-ching Tsung-yao section entitled "Liao Ti-chiang."

69.

"A Discussion of Generals." Although similar materials are found throughout the military writings, the formulations in the Six Secret Teachings remain the most detailed and comprehen-sive.

70.

"Observing the Enemy," Hu-ling Ching. 71.

A number of military writings identify similar strengths and weaknesses in commanders, such as Chu-ko Chung-wen-hou Wen-chi ( "Ch'ing Shih"), as well as the military sections of the Ch'ang-tuan Ching ( "Chiang Ti"). More general assessments of position-correlated strengths and weaknesses are delineated by two sections of the Jen-wu Chih, "San Tu" and "Ts'ai Li."

Chapter 16 1.

The exception is in prognostication texts. Sun-tzu employs the five colors, tastes, and sounds in an analogy in "Strategic Mili-tary Power" but without any reference to the five phases. Sun Pin apparently exploits their inherent conquest relationships in the enigmatic chapter entitled "Treasures of Terrain," but again without explicitly mentioning the concept.

2.

The topic, as many others, clearly requires a dedicated volume or two. To date the best and practically only coverage remains Joseph Needham explorations, with charts, in volume 2 of Sci-ence and Civilisation in China, History of Scientific Thought

( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). 

3.

See Shang Shu, the Books of Yao and Shun. 4.

For a discussion of shih, see the introduction to our Art of War translation. Originally it probably entailed the concept of posi-tional advantage coupled with power to signify the strategic ad-vantage enjoyed by an army, but eventually it came to desig-nate strategic power in general. However, shih is not something that might be observed in itself, but instead resolves in, and is evidenced by, its components--position, configuration of ter-rain, number of troops, discipline, spirit, and so forth, all key indicators enumerated by these observational check lists.

5.

"Military Disposition," Art of War. -586-

6.

See Li Kang, "Chung-kuo ku-dai-shih shei shou chuang-yung sha-p'an ts'o ping-lai fen-hsi ti-ch'ing te," in Chung-kuo Ku-dai Chün-shih San-pai-t'i ( Shanghai: Shanghai Ku-chi, 1987), p. 43. The incident is preserved in Ma Yüan's biography in the Hou Han Shu.

7.

This explanation, perhaps plausible, was advanced by the mod-ern military historian General Wei Ju-lin. See his Sun-tzu Chin-chu Chin-yi ( Taipei: Shang-wu Yin-shu-kuan, 1972), pp. 222-224.

8.

The commentators generally understand dispersive as referring to the tendency of the men while fighting in their native states to be thinking of their homes and families and inclined to re-turn. Consequently, they are neither unified nor aroused to a fighting spirit, contrary to Western conceptions that men will fight most vigorously in defense of their immediate homes.

9.

Apparently the soldiers still do not regard the enterprise too se-riously and continue to think about home and family. Because it remains relatively easy to withdraw but dangerous to forge ahead, it is termed "light" terrain.

10. 

This is ground for which one contends, therefore "contentious" terrain.

11.

"Stalemated" describes the tactical situation, although the ex-act character is chih, "branch" or "to support." Both sides are supported, so they are in a stalemate. Many commentators suggest a lengthy standoff.

12.

This is also termed "accessible terrain." The army's movement is unhampered.

13.

Presumably this is territory in which major roads intersect and is accessible to great powers on various sides. (The characters literally mean "terrain where highways intersect"; therefore, narrowly defined it would be land that is accessible from sev-eral directions over prepared roads.) Its occupation is the key to controlling vast territory.

14.

This term contrasts with "light terrain," the severity of their sit-uation now being apparent to the soldiers. Their minds are uni-fied, their courage united.

15.

"Precipitous" invokes the image of steep mountain gorges or ravines, "ravines" being the translation in other contexts. It is difficult terrain to traverse; therefore, occupying the heights is paramount.

16.

"Entrapping terrain" is traditionally understood as low-lying ground, perhaps surrounded by hills or mountains, and char-acterized by bodies of water such as marshes or swamps. It is thought to be land that can be inundated, by heavy rains or by the breaking of restraining banks (as was done in China in World War II), and consequently involves heavy slogging for the chariots and men. However, there is considerable disagreement as to its defining characteristics.

17.

"Constricted" configurations are generally described as exten-sive mountain valleys. Others also identify them with river or lake crossings.

18. 

The term for "encircled" is normally translated as "besieged" in other contexts. The emphasis here is on the necessity to pass through a narrow opening or along a narrow passage that con-strains the flow of men and materials and thereby makes them vulnerable to even a small force.

19.

In the original Wu-ching Ch'i-shu edition Liu Yin explains this as meaning that the general closes off any openings deliber-ately offered by the enemy to lure his forces out of their encir-clement. Leaving such an opening was a

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common way to keep the defenders from mounting a last-ditch, pitched defense. (Both the Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu discuss this technique.)

20.

Sun-tzu consistently advocates exploiting the "ground of death" because when troops are deployed on it, the situation forces them to fight valiantly. Most commentators think it would be terrain with solid obstacles to the front--such as mountains--and water to the rear, preventing a withdrawal.

21.

The tomb text differs somewhat: "If you have strongholds be-hind you and the enemy before you, it is fatal terrain. If there is no place to go, it is exhausted terrain."

22.

The Six Secret Teachings analyzes the tactics for mountain war-fare in a number of places and focuses on them in such chap-ters as the "Crow and Cloud Formations in the Mountains." The other military classics also discuss such terrain considera-tions, but are less focused.

23.

This is understood as meaning that armies should not assume positions downstream from an enemy because of the potential danger of being inundated by suddenly released floodwaters or felled by drinking water drawn from a poisoned river.

24.

The problems posed by wetlands and marshy terrain (also termed "entrapping" terrain) must have been well known to ev-ery military commander, and they are duly noted in virtually all the military writings, including Sun Pin's Military Methods. For 

example, see "Responding to Change," Wu-tzu; and "Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes" and "Battle Chariots," Six Se-cret Teachings.

25.

Presumably, this is terrain that is easy for chariots to negotiate and for supply wagons to cross.

26.

Life-supporting terrain is obviously ground that has sunlight, grass for the animals, brush and trees for firewood, and, espe-cially, potable water.

27.

Chu Chün points out that observing the presence of bubbles or foam on the river, which indicates rain upstream, exemplifies Sun-tzu's approach to analyzing and fathoming the enemy and battlefield situations. From the bubbles one can deduce that it has rained and can anticipate a surge in the river's flow and level. Such a surge could prove disastrous for an army en-camped too close to the shore or caught suddenly in mid-stream. See his Sun-tzu Ping-fa Shih-yi ( Peking: Hai-ch'ao

Ch'u-pan-she, 1990), p. 137. 28.

Heaven's Well is so named because it is a significant depres-sion, such as a valley, surrounded on four sides by hills or mountains. It is dangerous because the runoff of rainwater from unexpected storms can inundate the lowlands. Heaven's Jail is a valley with steep hills or mountains on three sides. Forces that carelessly enter it can easily be bottled up, unable to ascend the sides to escape. Heaven's Net refers to any area of extensive, dense growth-- including heavy forests or dense vegetation (such as junglelike growth of underbrush and vines) that will obstruct the passage of vehicles or entangle men. Heaven's Pit refers to an area characterized by soft, probably muddy terrain, perhaps marked by wetlands, that will mire both men and vehicles. Heaven's Fissure refers to terrain that suggests a fissure in the earth. Therefore, it en

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compasses long, narrow passages constrained by hills or forests from which an enemy might advantageously dominate the passage.

29. 

In "Eight Formations" he clearly states: "On both difficult and easy terrain you must know the tenable and fatal ground. Oc-cupy tenable ground and attack the enemy on fatal ground." Ravines ranked paramount among the terrain that cause diffi-culty ( "The Questions of King Wei").

30.

Extensive discussion of all these questions together with sen-tence notes will be found in our translation of the Military Methods.

31.

Being confronted by a wide river is also pondered in "Crow and Cloud Formation in the Marshes."

32.

In "Divided Valleys" the enemy is encountered in the midst of a steep valley, with movement being constrained by a river to the right and mountains to the left.

33.

"Ten Deployments," Military Methods. 34.

"Huang-fu Sung, Chu Chün Lieh-chuan." 35.

His description is almost exactly the same as Sun-tzu's, with the addition of preparing defenses on less visible roads to pre-vent an unseen advance by the enemy. (It might also mean "preventing spies from obtaining access.")

36.

This is clearly not Sun-tzu's definition, but is somewhat more dramatic.

37.

"Tenable Terrain." See, for example, "Treasures of Terrain," Mil-itary Methods.

38.

"Fatal Terrain, " Hu-ling Ching. 39.

"Analyzing Mountains," Hu-ling Ching. 40.

The difficulty in crossing rivers and the degree of exhaustion that would result may be seen in Sun Pin's assessment that "an army that is encamping after being on the march without avoiding notable rivers, whose ch'i has been harmed and deter- 

mination weakened, can be attacked" ( "Male and Female Cities," Military Methods).

41.

For an example, see the historical illustration to "Rivers," Un-orthodox Strategies.

42.

"Shen-ta-lan." 43.

"Ssu-hsun-lun," Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu. 44.

"Analyzing Rivers," Hu-ling Ching. 45.

"Maneuvering the Army," Art of War. 46.

"Male and Female Cities," Military Methods. 47.

This clearly contradicts the extant Art of War, which states, "On light terrain do not stop." Since the sentence clearly appears thus from the Seven Military Classics editions onward, and no doubt earlier as evidenced by the first commentaries (which much of his passage also draws upon), his reversal is highly puzzling. However, all the editions consulted write it thus.

48.

This is exactly Tu Yu's commentary. Hsü quotes the commen-taries very extensively here, intermixing them with the original Art of War text.

49.

This is in accord with Sun-tzu's dictum in "Military Combat." 50.

Although said about the enemy's forces, it is equally applicable to one's own in line with the principle of knowing the enemy and knowing yourself.

51.

"Vacuity and Substance." The original has "stimulate them" for "observe them."

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52.

The text always has Wu-tzu as the speaker rather than the king of Wu, but the two were not contemporaries. Unless 

viewed as a deliberately fictional dialogue, the king of Wu should be understood as the actual speaker.

53.

They also appear as part of Ho Yen-hsi's commentary in the Ten Commentaries edition of the Art of War. Unfortunately, Ho is otherwise unknown, although he probably lived around the end of the T'ang and certainly before the eleventh century. One line of thought sees these dialogues as having been passed down by Ts'ao Ts'ao, the first commentator on the Art of War, who is much reviled for radically editing the extant Han dy-nasty text to produce the present thirteen-chapter version. De-spite historical references to Sun-tzu having presented a thir-teen-chapter book to the king of Wu, the tradition of an eighty-two-chapter version--based upon a Han dynasty bibliographic entry-- continues until today, where new claims of having re-covered it are being made. (The entire T'ung Tien section is translated in our Art of War.)

54.

Note that he uses terrains and configurations separately. 55.

This is a different interpretation from those that emphasize not allowing troops to become broken off, isolated.

56.

Supplementing "not," which has been lost. 57.

The T'ung Tien has the following additional sentences: "With picked soldiers and well-trained troops they will block off the advantageous positions and occupy them. They will sustain our military affairs and make our provisions substantial. Order our chariots and cavalry to go in and out with an attitude of re-spectful anticipation."

58.

This phrase is found in the Art of War. 59.

The last clause does not appear in the Art of War. 60.

The idea of "speedily" has been lost. 61.

Situations such as this are the subject of several chapters in the Six Secret Teachings.

62. 

The T'ung Tien has "thundering the drums." 63.

The text is corrupt but also differs from Ho's original commen-tary and the T'ung Tien, which runs: "Sever their supply routes. If you are afraid that they have unorthodox troops concealed that have not been observed, have our bowmen and crossbow-men guard against their positions."

64.

Restoring "not," which has dropped out. 65.

"Tries to entice us with profit" has dropped out. 66.

This entire section is largely from Sun-tzu chapter entitled "Ma-neuvering the Army."

67.

T'ung Tien, chüan 159. 68.

"Responding to Change," Wu-tzu. 69.

This paragraph is essentially a condensation of "Forest War-fare," Six Secret Teachings.

70.

This is discussed in the section on counterintelligence. 71.

The section concludes by quoting in full Wu Ch'i's characteriza-tion of the spirit and martial practices of the various states al-ready reprised in the historical section on the Warring States. (Many of the sentences describing the barbarians in this pas-sage are taken verbatim from chüan 49 of the Han Shu, which has already been provided in translation.)

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72.

"Our Great China" was literally the Central State or Kingdom as it came to be popularly translated, but "China" for conve-nience.

73.

This description of their warriors to this point all comes, with only slight variations, from the Shih Chi antique chapter on the Hsiung-nu already quoted in the political intelligence section. 74. 

This paragraph incorrectly attributes the method to the War-ring States period when in fact this is the tactical advice offered for confronting the Jung in one of the first battles in the Tso Chuan, recorded for Duke Yin's 9th year, 713 B.C., right at the beginning of the Spring and Autumn period. Wu Ch'i later adopted this method, but it became famous in itself, even con-tributing a well-known dictionary entry for "three ambushes" (san fu).

75.

This is essentially a paraphrase of Sun-tzu "Maneuvering the Army."

76.

The author apparently treats most of the paragraphs as quotes from Sun- tzu ( "Maneuvering the Army"), as all but the last one essentially are, and then appends his comment. However, it is a loose construction at best. (Also note how the compilation moves from subject to subject simply on the turn of a keyword.) 77.

His observations are found in a memorial preserved in the Han Shu, thus showing the wide variety of sources employed by the text. (He actually cites some military writings similar to the Six Secret Teachings.)

78.

The first four sentences are not in the Art of War as such, but the later ones are derived from it.

79.

This and the following quotation are from "Strict Positions." 80.

Despite being such a significant undertaking, the compendium lacks the flow and well-integrated (or thought out) quality of Tu Yu T'ung Tien, from which it borrows extensively. Often a pas-tiche of rather disjointed sentences that betray the compilers' (predominately scholars rather than military men?) cut-and-paste mentality, it frequently revises or misquotes original works and suffers from numerous miscopied and missing char-acters. The translation emends or supplements where neces-sary from the original texts when identifiable, any significant changes being indicated in the notes.

81.

"Planning Offensives," Art of War. Incredible motivation was of course required to elicit such performances from the men. Even 

the late Sung Hundred Unorthodox Strategies cites this situa-tion as exemplifying the need for rewards in a chapter entitled "Rewards in Warfare": "In general, if despite high walls, deep moats, and a hail of stones and arrows the officers and troops are to compete with each other to ascend the walls, or when the naked blades first clash they are to contend with each other in rushing forth, they must be enticed with heavy re-wards. Then every enemy will be conquered. A tactical principle from the Three Strategies states: 'Beneath heavy rewards there will certainly be courageous fellows.'"

82.

In "Nine Changes" the traditional text simply asserts, "There are fortified cities that are not assaulted." The tomb fragments include this, as well as the passage translated here.

83.

For a comprehensive discussion of the evolving tactics and technology of sieges and countersieges, see Robin D. S. Yates, "Early Poliorcetics: The Mohists to the Sung,"

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hists to the Sung," in Joseph Needleman, Science and Civilisa-tion in China ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5:6:30.

84.

A discussion of the theory behind these classifications may be found in our translation of the Military Methods.

85.

"Military Instructions, II." 86.

Ibid. 87.

"Tactical Balance of Power in Attacks." 88.

"Tactical Balance of Power in Defense." 89.

"Occupying Enemy Territory."

Chapter 17 1.

These were originally thought to be simple queries about whether an act would be auspicious, but the current view is 

that the ruler believed he could influence the state of affairs. See, for example, David N. Keightley, Sources of Shang History ( Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 33; and Paul Serruys, "Studies in the Language of the Shang Oracle Inscriptions," T'oung Pao 40, nos. 1-3 ( 1974):25-28.

2.

The Shuo Yüan preserves an interesting example of a leader be-ing forewarned of a military attack through plastromancy. In this incident Hsien Chen, who had distinguished himself at the battle of Ch'eng-p'u, for his own purposes persuaded Duke Hsiang of Chin to attack Ch'in, but the latter became aware of Chin's approaching army through routine divination, which co-incidentally indicated it would be auspicious to attack the in-vaders, a tactic that was successfully executed ("Ching Shen"). 3.

For an overview, see Michael Loewe, "Divination by Shells, Bones, and Stalks," in Divination, Mythology, and Monarchy in Han China ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The Shang Shu discusses the relative importance of the types of divination for state purposes, giving slight preference to the turtle over the newer milfoil, but even greater import to the opinions of men. It also notes that there are other basic forms of verification for courses of activity that largely relate to proper seasonable activity, with extremes being omens of inimical courses. (See "Hung Fan" and "Ta Yü Mo.")

4.

For a discussion of the I Ching's role in the Tso Chuan, see Kid-der Smith, "Zhouyi Interpretation from Accounts in the Zuochuan," HJAS 49, no. 2 ( 1989):421-463.

5.

"Ch'üan Mou," Shuo Yüan. 6.

"Ching Shen." Dreams were another important source of infor-mation about the future--worthy of a chapter in themselves--but had to be interpreted before being of any value. Remark-ably, divination by the I Ching was often employed to provide critical clues necessary for complete insight.

7.

"Planning for the State," Wu-tzu. 8.

"Evaluating the Enemy," Wu-tzu. 

9.

Although clearly intended for individual use, the Ling Ch'i Ching contains a number of military images and prognostica-tions. (For further discus

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sion, see the introductory material to our translation [Boston: Shambhala, 1995].)

10.

"The King's Wings," Six Secret Teachings. Extensive material on interpreting the significance of comets, scintillating stars, the varying appearance of stars and constellations, and other ob-servable phenomena are preserved in a number of military works and in the treatises on astronomy in the early histories. 11.

"Middle Strategy." A similar view appears in the Hu-ling Ching. (The Three Strategies also states, "Prohibit mediums and shamans from divining about the army's good or bad fortune on behalf of the officials and officers.")

12.

"Heavenly Offices." 13.

"Martial Plans," Wei Liao-tzu. 14.

T'ien Tan, whose was previously mentioned in conjunction with Yüeh Yi, is discussed in our forthcoming History of Warfare in China: The Ancient Period.

15.

The T'ai Kung's biography in the Shih Chi relates his effort to stiffen the troops when the omens for attacking the Shang proved inauspicious and heavy wind and rain, both ill portents, arose at the critical moment. To justify his disregard for such overwhelmingly baleful signs, he claimed that the overthrow of the ruling house could hardly produce favorable indications. This may be understood as referring to the moment of action, rather than the enterprise in general, because in "Opening In-structions" he stresses that revolutionary activity cannot be undertaken on personal responsibility alone: "If there are no ill omens in the Tao of Heaven, you cannot initiate the movement to revolt. If there are no misfortunes in the Tao of Man, your planning cannot precede them. You must first see Heavenly 

signs and moreover witness human misfortune; only thereafter can you make plans." His emphasis upon relieving the suffer-ing of the people, the sole justification in the view of Confu-cians such as Mencius and most of the military writers, stands forth clearly.

16.

Questions and Replies, Book III. 17.

These comments essentially embody the "Virtue triumphant" approach to warfare, which dogmatically asserted that the an-cient Sages always conquered through Virtue, without blood-shed, despite evidence to the contrary. Mencius was a chief proponent of this view, and its inclusion in the Wei Liao- tzu, a harsh military work, is both remarkable and puzzling.

18.

Questions and Replies, Book III. 19.

Ibid., Book II. 20.

"Ch'u-chün Jih," Hu-ling Ching. 21.

Over the centuries several well-known arrangements for the sixty-four hexagrams evolved that, once codified, permitted their employment in both abstract and concrete ways.

22.

Eliminating doubt among the troops and defusing inimical in-fluences that might undermine their spirit and confidence, such as unexplained portents and omens, were paramount concerns for military commanders and thus the subject of nu-merous passages and injunctions throughout the military writ-ings.

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23.

"Chao Ch'ung-kuo, Hsin Ch'ing-chi," Han Shu. 24.

Chao's tactics are reprised as the historical illustration for chapter 92 of the Unorthodox Strategies.

25.

"Tung Chuo Lieh-chuan," Hou Han Shu. 26. 

Individuals, as well as armies, also profited from intelligence gleaned from knowledge and skill in these practices. At the end of the Former Han Jen Wen-kung, a noted practitioner of eso-teric methods, escaped the violence spawned in Wang Mang's era by foretelling its arising and moving into the hills with his family ("Fang-shih Lieh-chuan"). Perhaps not coincidentally, he earlier had served as a spy along the provincial borders to se-cretly investigate the strategic situation.

27.

For a discussion of the practice of determining seasonal pro-gressions by watching for a ch'i response amid the ashes of ap-propriate pitch pipes, see Huang Yi-long and Chang Chih-ch'eng, "The Evolution and Decline of the Ancient Practice of Watching for the Ethers," Chinese Science no. 13 ( 1996):82-106.

28.

Derke Bodde broached the subject in 1959 with his article "The Chinese Cosmic Magic Known as Watching for the Ethers," reprinted in Essays on Chinese Civilization (Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, 1981), pp. 351-372. A.S.P. Hulsewe added further information two decades later with "Watching the Vapours: An Ancient Chinese Technique of Prognostication," Nachrichten 125 ( 1979):40-49. Recently Michael Loewe ex-panded the discussion with a series of interesting articles on it and other aspects of divination-- such as "the oracles of the clouds and winds"--conveniently gathered in Divination, Mythology, and Monarchy in Han China ( Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 1994). Unfortunately, even though all three provide examples of military cases from the general litera-ture, especially the dynastic histories, little use has been made of the military literature itself. Two articles in Chinese also pro-vide useful discussions: Ho Kuan-hu, "Hsien-Ch'in Liang- Han Chan-hou Yün-ch'i chih Chu-tso Shu-lüch," Chung-kuo-shih Yen-chiu I ( 1988):133-139; and Ch'en P'an, "Ying-ch'ao Tun-huang Hsieh-pen Chan-yün- ch'i-shu Ts'an-chüan Chieh-t'i," BIHP 50, no. 1 ( March 1979):1-27.

29.

See the section entitled "General Field Assessments." 30.

"The Army's Indications." 31. 

"The Five Notes." 32.

Ibid. 33.

"The Book of Heavenly Offices," Shih Chi. Hulsewe discusses this passage and others, and provides examples of actual mili-tary incidents employing them, in "Watching the Vapours." 34.

In Divination, Mythology, and Monarchy, Loewe provides some examples of military prognostication from cloud formations based upon recently recovered texts and also incidents of wind interpretation in a military context.

35.

"Yün Ch'i T'ung-lun" (General Discussion of Cloud Ch'i]. 36.

Distinctions in the text among clouds, ch'i, and cloud ch'i--whatever their essence and phenomenal correlates--are main-tained in the translation.

37.

"Chiang-chün Yün-ch'i."

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38.

There are not exactly ten, just as thirteen earlier was puzzling. Perhaps it is a character error for six, or perhaps material has been lost.

39.

Some texts say a headless dead man. 40.

"Shih Lai Hsü-shih Chan," Wu-ching Tsung-yao. 41.

"Yin-mou Ch'i" (Ch'i of Secret Plots). 42.

This might also be understood as "emissaries from other states coming to make plans with you," but the conclusion--assassi-nating them--would be inappropriate to Li Ch'uan's moral ori-entation.

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