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Jointness in Intelligence Organizations: Kobi Michael, David Siman-Tov, and Oren Yoeli Jointness—a concept popular in recent decades in military,
intelligence, and civilian systems—represents a change in the way
organizations function in a complex and challenging environment, which is
characterized by a networked structure, or multiple connections among various
entities. The most striking difference between cooperation and jointness is
the process of fusion, which is typical of jointness. While cooperation
preserves distinct organizational settings, authority, and areas of
responsibility, in jointness we see new organizational formats, which
represent a synergy that is greater than the sum of all the existing
capabilities. This essay focuses on jointness in intelligence. New ways of thinking
over the past years have led to the breakdown of the compartmentalizing of
intelligence organizations and have given rise to models of jointness within
intelligence organizations, military forces, and civilian entities so that
they can carry out complex missions. This essay surveys the theoretical and
practical development of the concept of jointness and presents four
archetypes of jointness, based on several Israeli and American case histories.
These case histories indicate that jointness has not always been applied
accurately. The success of jointness depends upon several essential
components that may be defined as its ecology. The most prominent is
organizational freedom, which provides the space where it is possible and,
indeed, recommended to provide autonomy to |
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Dr. Kobi Michael is a senior research
fellow at INSS. David Siman-Tov is a research fellow at INSS. Oren Yoeli is
an intern at INSS. |
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various working echelons; this
autonomy allows for flexibility and creativity even if it deviates from
familiar modes of action. Keywords: jointness, the intelligence
community, intel, learning processes The
concept ofjointness, popular in recent decades in military, intelligence, and
civilian systems, represents a change in the way organizations operate in a
complex and challenging environment. This environment is characterized by a
networked structure, that is, multiple connections among entities. Jointness
is distinguished from cooperation by the process of fusion. While cooperation
preserves distinct organizational settings, authority, and areas of
responsibility, in contrast, the process of fusion injointness creates new
organizational formats and synergy that is greater than the sum of all the
existing capabilities. Generally speaking, organizations shy away from
jointness; yet in a reality characterized by crises and competition, in which
organizations find themselves threatened and vulnerable to fail, their
inability to produce an effective response to the threats and challenges
ultimately strengthens their willingness to engage injointness. This
essay focuses onjointness in intelligence, having developed as new approaches
collapsed the boundaries and separation between intelligence organizations,
which—alongside historical rivalries over prestige and competitiveness—had
been the hallmark of their relations in the past. These new approaches have
also led to the development of models of jointness between intelligence
organizations and the military, so that they can carry out complex missions,
and also between organizations in the civilian sector. This essay addresses
the concept ofjointness and seeks to answer the following questions: What is
jointness and what led to the need for it? What are the interrelations
between the features of jointness? What are the conditions for and obstacles
to realizing jointness? How is jointness manifested in the intelligence
community, and what are the various jointness models in this world? Examining
jointness in its broader context, the essay surveys its development by the
American security establishment, its penetration of the civilian corporate
world, and its rebound effect on the military and intelligence community.
Highlighting the positions of several prominent |
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researchers
on the concept, the essay will seek to expand upon the existing theoretical
debate aboutjointness. Finally, the essay describes and analyzes various
models ofjointness in the intelligence community—specifically in contexts
requiring the use of force—especially in the United States and, in a more
limited way, in Israel, in an effort to understand if jointness in the intelligence
community is distinctive. The
Development of the Concept of Jointness The
Military The
idea ofjointness developed in the American defense establishment in the late
1970s.1 In the 1980s, the term “jointness” was coined to describe
actions, operations, and organizations in which entities belonging to two or
more branches of the armed forces took part.2 Until the 1980s, the
command structure of the US military forces was split among five branches,
each completely independent in terms of developing doctrine, manpower, and
equipment. Battles over budgets took place among the branches, often leading
to irrational financial allocations based on size of a particular branch and
also to an increase in the overall defense spending.3 If one
branch experienced a problem of resources, it would prefer to handle it by
lobbying Congress rather than by cooperating and using existing resources
already developed in a different branch.4 In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act was passed to resolve the difficulties described
above.5 The act brought sweeping changes to the command structure
of the US military by strengthening the concept ofjointness; the authority
and responsibility for force construction was transferred from the branch
commanders to thejoint chiefs of staff, and geographical commands and the
Special Forces command were established. In 1991, the first Us military
doctrine referring in a detailed and comprehensive manner tojointness was
issued, in conjunction with the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.6
The doctrine set out guidelines for the armed forces on applyingjointness in
a variety of ways in order to attain optimal effectiveness.7 The publication
and implementation of the doctrine led to the establishment of several
research centers, which developedjoint strategies, battle plans, and
training. The first war in Iraq, however, highlighted the deficiencies
ofjointness among the various forces, revealing the gaps between the written
doctrines that stressed separate activity and the interfaces that |
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required a high degree ofjointness and, as
a result, catalyzed the development of cooperative doctrines that promoted
thejointness approach.8 Several
years after the development ofjointness in the American military, the concept
gained acceptance within the civilian and corporate spheres. Changes in
management and information technologies led to the development of important
theories and applications. The cyberspace revolution enabled businesses to
harness advanced computer applications for their needs, speed up processing
methods, cut costs, and make information and knowledge accessible to all. At
the same time, the acceleration of R&D processes and trade and
cooperation among organizations and nations contributed to the declining
status of the large business outfits, which were managed in a traditional,
hierarchical, and centralized fashion and to the increasing prestige of the
more agile and dynamic businesses, characterized by small staffs and
independent divisions that manage networks of relationships. The traditional
structure typical of organizations for most of the twentieth century
gradually made way for a flatter, more decentralized, networked and dynamic
model, stressing its many intersecting relations.9 The
most successful companies were the most cooperative ones; a growing segment
of business activity around the world is now carried out cooperatively within
an organization, as well as between organizations. Processes of manufacturing
and development in many industries (technology, marketing, biomedicine, and
more) have become increasingly complex, making a lone organization’s attempt
to handle these processes independently virtually impossible. For example,
the development of information systems at present cannot be carried out as an
independent process. Competing companies prefer to incorporate external
services in their products instead of engaging in independent development, which
would require them to meet constantly changing standards.10 Developments
in the Theory of Jointness Zvi
Lanir, who worked on developing the notion of jointness in military
organizations, defined it as “creating a new systemic capability based on the
fusion of the unique assets of the different entities and evincing a deeper
connection than coordination or cooperation.”11 Lanir classifies |
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joint
activities in a hierarchic manner according to the quality and depth of
systemic influence that they achieve within the military context. According
to Lanir, it is necessary to distinguish between the terms “coordination,”
“cooperation,” and “jointness,” where each interface characterizes a
different level of relationship between entities. Lanir defines
“coordination” as “a level of interface allowing [organizations] to attain
systemic efficiency by a standardization of process,” such as
coordination of time, location, and intensity between a pinning force and a
strike force during battle. Lanir ranks cooperation one rung above
coordination. He argues that in order to attain systemic effectiveness
(relevance), it is not enough to engage in coordinated systemic thinking.
While it allows forces to act efficiently, it does not guarantee the desired
effect vis-à-vis the enemy. Every campaign has its own unique features, and
every enemy requires unique systemic understanding. “Cooperative systemic
thinking” represents the interface of cooperation during which the rationale
of the opponent’s system is conceptualized. Lanir
places jointness above both coordination and cooperation.12 Lanir
explains that the objective ofjointness is to ensure that the systemic effectiveness
will continue even under changing circumstances; the relevance of a system
can be maintained only if the system is dynamic, and if all the echelons of
the different entities are involved in developing knowledge. The new
knowledge is created in the encounter between the different entities and
results in ongoing organizational transformation. The knowledge is created in
the “no-man’s cognitive zone,” the vacuous space outside of the domain that a
single entity can encompass cognitively and exclusively. Lanir refers to the
knowledge created in this zone as “joint systemic thinking.”13 Efron
Razi and Pinhas Yehezkeli favor the terms “inter-system cooperation” and
“cooperative activity.”14 They claim thatjointness is an
expression of a degree of organizational freedom that creates a space where
it is possible— even recommended—to deviate from familiar procedures,
regulations, and operational patterns. This freedom is crucial because in a
dynamic, rapidly changing environment, every organization must quickly
develop and acquire knowledge. Their claim is that a significant amount of
knowledge is created in the interstices between organizations as a result of
their interrelations; in order to access this knowledge and develop it,
organizations must cooperate with one another.15 Knowledge may be
created in any one of the organization’s |
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echelons;
a good flow of information enables the organization to construct processes
from the bottom-up rather than being the result of centralized planning from
the top-down. The
ideas described above currently shape the perception of jointness in both the
US military and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and constitute a central
component of their approaches. This is particularly true of the US army,
which since the early 1990s, has perceivedjointness as fundamental to its
strategy,16 while distinguishing between the concept’s dimensions
and its implementation.17 Similarly, the IDF distinguishes
betweenjointness as an action or a process resulting from an action and
jointness as a concept and as part of organizational culture.18 The
Dimensions and Stages of Jointness Jointness
is fundamentally a process of continuous learning, and has two major
dimensions: the cognitive and the organizational. Jointness takes place in
three stages: design, planning, and implementation.19 The
literature tends to distinguish between two main types of learning: causal
learning, occurring when new information leads to a change in means and
methods; and diagnostic learning, which stems from understanding the tension
between values and concepts and results in changes both in the objectives as
well as the means of attaining them. Causal learning may also be defined as
tactical learning, characterized by adapting and adjusting, whereas
diagnostic learning can also be defined as strategic learning, which at its
core is a restructured view of reality. In cognitive terms, tactical learning
can be seen as an update of existing cognitive structures, resulting in
adaptation and adjustment, and strategic learning can be perceived as a
change in cognitive structures and their expansion, leading to a change in
attitudes and beliefs.20 At the basis of the strategic learning
process is the concept of “design” as an abstract cognitive process in which
the conceptual framework is formulated. At the design stage, existing
paradigms are challenged, updated or replaced, and a new vision is formed.
The design stage rests on a vision that relates to answering the question,
“What do we want to design?” It relates to making decisions and setting a
general direction that provides meaning to the process. The vision is
seemingly disconnected from the material or practical terrain, which is
limited to a fixed total of resources, |
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and
it challenges the organization to think about solutions that transcend these
limitations. Cognition
is both a stage of jointness as well as an output (such as organizational
understanding) within a wide-reaching organizational process. It is also an
outcome of cognitivejointness, in the sense ofjointness at the stage of
formulating and designing a concept, such as cognitive structuring to
interpret reality. Therefore, it would be correct to conceptualize cognition
as “cognitivejointness.” Cognitivejointness is manifested by joint interfaces
and shared thought processes among directors of organizations, who analyze
and rethink the challenges that their organizations face and also define shared
values. This encounter between organizations abuts upon the inter-
organizational space, allowing for the creation of new knowledge in the areas
outside the organizational zones of thought (the so-called “no-man’s
cognitive zones”). Cognition at the design stage occurs by means of
diagnostic-strategic learning processes and consists of challenging existing
paradigms, bringing them up to date, or replacing them. In
contrast to cognitivejointness, organizationaljointness is manifested by
shared interfaces and cooperative work among organizations. It includes
shared organizational structures, working processes, and the organizational
climate (“ecology”), which allow several organizations or frameworks to
operate in a synchronized manner and maximize their capabilities—creating a
whole that is greater than the sum of its parts—and concurrently helping to
promote shared objectives. Organizational jointness is also needed for force
building in terms of training personnel and creating organizational
infrastructures that efficiently maximize resources and capabilities as a
fixed and systematic method for confronting complex challenges.
Organizational jointness is expressed more prominently at the planning stage
within already existing paradigms that were conceptualized during the design
stage. Learning at this stage is simple rather than complex, and it consists
of incorporating new information into existing patterns of thinking. Organizational
jointness enables organizations to identify the changes needed within the
organizations themselves. These changes may lead to the establishment,
dismantling or merger of organizational structures, newjob definitions, or
new professional ways of looking at things, which may affect the work of
existing position holders, as well as defining the components needed to
create ajoint ecology. Organizationaljointness should also include |
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the
implementation stage, which is formulated during the planning stage. The
implementation stage is essential to organizational jointness as it is a real
test of the organizations in dealing with challenges. During the final stage,
the learning process is simple learning, and consists of adapting plans,
means, or organizational aspects due to an expected challenge and on the
basis of an existing paradigm or concept. Diagram
1 below describes the dimensions ofjointness (cognitive and organizational)
as they are manifested at each of the different stages (design, planning, and
implementation), while relating to the process of learning at each stage.
Cognitive jointness is realized at the design stage, whereas
organizationaljointness is required throughout all ofthe stages. |
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Diagram
1: Jointness as a Learning Process—Dimensions and Stages As
Diagram 1 demonstrates, each stage ofjointness generates processes of learning,
which allow the realization of the next stage. The final stage of
jointness—implementation—is the stage where we can expect to encounter all
the problems and challenges. During the final stage, the process of simple
learning leads to changing plans, means, or organizational aspects, while |
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13 the
process of complex learning is needed for much greater problems or Transition
from Crisis to the Relevance and Importance of the Jointness
may be framed as a process that begins with a crisis; progresses First Stage: Crisis Crises
are the factor that generate organizational processes allowing for the Second Stage: Systemic Learning After recognizing a crisis or the desire to
avoid an impending crisis, the |
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the
organization, its objectives, the impact it seeks, and the environment in
which it operates. One possible means of resolving the ongoing crisis is
through organizational jointness, although it is not the only means. In order
to promote jointness as a solution, the organizations must recognize
jointness as having the potential to provide a mutual reward that is greater than
the one produced by separate, individual actions. Third Stage: Organizational Processes
and Ecology The
success of the processes and plan of action that are based on new insights
and knowledge are affected by various conditions of the organizational and
inter-organizational ecology, including working norms, organizational
dynamics, trust among the players, and the extent of autonomy given to the
various echelons. Although the incubation processes of the organizational
ecology can begin from the bottom-up, its completion and institutionalization
must take place from the top-down. Without the support, encouragement, and
permission of the organization’s management, it is impossible to reshape an
organization’s ecology. Jointness
is feasible only when the information flows freely between and within
organizations. Therefore, the management must provide staff with the autonomy
to develop joint interfaces and allow the flow of open and free information
in the inter-organizational space. The sides participating in the joint
interface will be willing to take risks if they expect positive behavior from
the other participants; trust is a function of expectation and of the
willingness to take risk.23 In a situation in which the sides do
not have any shared history, they will have no idea what to expect of the
other party, and the starting point for their relationship will be neutral.
Such a situation requires the gradual building of trust by means of
empowering and rewarding positive behaviors. |
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There are expectations of |
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Suspiciousness |
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Full trust |
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There are
expectations of |
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There are no |
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Absolute |
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Neutrality |
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There are no
expectations of |
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Diagram
2: Trust as a Function of Expectations24 Jointness requires working norms and a
supportive environment for information sharing, relationship development, and
shared processes in which several parties divide the burden of work. The
extent of autonomy among employees operating on behalf of an organization in
a shared setting affects their awareness ofjointness; experience proves that
when employees enjoy autonomy it is easier to work together and to build a
working environment of mutual trust.25 In additionjointness
requires that organizations to some extent forgo their original identity and
create a new professional identity oriented toward the shared mission.
Therefore, in addition to the advantages of being part of a networked
association when facing challenges, the new network should avoid alienating
individuals from their mother organizations, which employ them and provide
them with training, advancement, and professional identities. |
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1 |
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r |
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The
change |
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The
outcome |
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Relevance gap |
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Cognitive
jointness |
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Strategic |
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New professional |
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New knowledge |
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Jointness learning |
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Ecology -the climate allowing jointness |
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New organizational structure/ad hoc setting |
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-Organizational
jointness - |
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Processes at
the working levels |
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Jointness |
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Operation |
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Processes
at the management |
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Relevance |
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as |
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Agility (flexibility + dynamism) |
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Diagram 3: The Jointness Process—From
Crisis to Relevance |
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Jointness
in Intelligence Organizations The
development ofjointness in intelligence organizations was influenced by
similar processes taking place in the military and the business world, as
well as by technological transformations and accompanying changes in
intelligence. For example, Itai Brun, who served as the head of the research
division in Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, describes these
changes as follows: “In this day and age, the centrality of information
technology is striking ... In such a world, one can gather intelligence of a
quantity and quality impossible to gather in the past, then analyze and
process it in time constants that were equally impossible . . . The new world
is brimming over with information, leading to competition with other
information and knowledge providers and revealing weaknesses.”26 Changes
in the technological environment and intelligence challenges have transformed
the nature of intelligence work and the outputs now expected. Intelligence organizations
must now surveil disappearing targets and incriminate them, and follow
processes that lack prior planning or even a clear aim as defined by decision
makers.27 Similarly, the intelligence community is expected to
handle incidents in a shorter amount of time (for example, as a result of the
use high-trajectory weapons, which do not require any special preparation),
while the information revolution has compelled |
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intelligence
personnel to handle a much greater volume of information and knowledge than
it did in the past.28 According to a senior member of the Israeli
intelligence community speaking in a closed forum, the Israeli intelligence
community has undergone a change of consciousness. In this context, the
intelligence community has integrated several organizations together; it has
recognized that barriers between intelligence gathering and research should
be broken down and has createdjoint intelligence spheres, allowing
accessibility to every partner on a needs basis. Generating Jointness in Intelligence: Information Systems
Management Frameworks Frameworks
for managing the intelligence community help to promote jointness by means of
synchronizing the various community member organizations. These organizations
compete with one another for resources and prestige, often resulting in
duplication and redundancy that is liable to damage their potential
contribution to the community.29 An overall supervising body could
promote jointness in both the cognitive and the organizational fields. This
body could operate in a top-down process to create standards, including
working norms, and could oversee the establishment of shared, mission-driven
frameworks that would allow several parties to work together. The
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), established in response
to the commissions of inquiry in the aftermath of 9/11, manages the US
intelligence community. Until then, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had
been in charge of the intelligence community. The new body was given the
authority to formulate the intelligence policy of the United States, direct
the intelligence program and its budget, make recommendations for senior
appointments in the intelligence agencies, and establish joint intelligence
service teams. The DNI advances programs to increase jointness among the US
intelligence bodies and promotes standards to ensure synchronicity among
them. For example, the DNI promotedjointness in its “500 Day Plan:
Integration and Collaboration” from 2007. The plan’s stated objective was to
strengthen the principles of jointness within the American intelligence
community in several ways.30 The plan was written as part of
implementing the American national intelligence strategy; it
presentsjointness and system integration as key organizational objectives and
is updated every few years.31 It definesjointness as a multiplier
force that is essential to the functioning of |
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all
realms of intelligence activity (information technology, language, analysis,
assessment, and more). The plan discusses the creation of community-wide standards
for disseminating information and documents, information security, and
accessibility to sources, while it also proposes the construction of a
shared, uniform interface for extracting and working with pieces of
information. Another principle that the DNI promotes,
also mentioned in US intelligence strategy publications, is “mission-driven
intelligence workforces.”32 This principle acknowledges that the
mission should determine the structures by which the intelligence activity
should be organized, and not allow any formal distinction between areas of
expertise and organizations to foil the reorganization or the creation of an
integrative, mission-driven setting. This principle stresses the need for
deciding on community-wide missions as an organizing principle and as the
basis for joint planning and execution, while taking optimal advantage of the
resources and capabilities of each organization and reducing any obstacles
based on organizational differences. As in the United States, Israel’s
intelligence organizations also seek to promotejointness and break down
barriers. Akey step in this direction was the 2007 establishment of an
operating division in the IDF’s intelligence branch—a modern reincarnation of
the intelligence-gathering platoon—as a result of the lessons of the Second
Lebanon War. The purpose of this division is to create better lines of
communication between the various intelligence systems in the IDF’s Military
Intelligence Directorate, as well as between intelligence in general and the
various operational field echelons. The operating division is meant to serve
as a kind of operational command center for all the entities in the
intelligence branch. It was given the authority to direct the special
operational units subordinate to the Military Intelligence Directorate,
allocate intelligence-gathering resources based on changing situational
assessments, and steerjoint processes.33 The lessons of the Second
Lebanon War caused the division to formulate a new understanding of
compartmentalization, which allows faster and better assimilation of
intelligence among the fighting forces. Training is another sphere that helps
to promote jointness. For example, in the late 1970s, the IDF began a senior
intra-service intelligence course whose primary purpose was to encourage
cooperation by bringing together the senior members of the intelligence
community. In recent years, the course has been thoroughly revamped and now
focuses on creating and enabling |
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jointness,
both within the senior management and command echelons, as well as within the
professional fields.34 The technological transformations in the
cyber era have affected greatly the ecology necessary to maintainjointness
among the various intelligence services. The changes that have occurred in
management and information systems have provided the intelligence community
with new challenges and opportunities. This is manifested by new modes of interaction
and discourse among analysts and intelligence gatherers, such as the Wiki
platforms, based on the Wikipedia model—an open encyclopedia in which users
create and edit entries and contribute their expertise—or social media-based
platforms, in which a variety of parties concerned with a certain issue can
discuss and contribute their own interpretations and insights. The discourse
within the intelligence social network neutralizes any obstacles that are
related to the participants’ organizational memberships or ranks, which
usually have considerable influence in other non-networked discourses.35
In this context, American researchers have proposed the concept of a “shared
intelligence environment” that has characteristics of social media, including
virtual meetings, shared writing, and working on “living” or “dynamic”
documents (documents that are continually edited and updated), blogs, and so
forth.36 Jointness
Models in the Intelligence Community: American and Israeli Case Histories Presenting
the Typology As
shown by Diagram 4 below, jointness models in intelligence may be
characterized by two variables: the operational environment and the
conceptual core. The first variable, the operational environment, can be
described by an axis where one end represents a pure intelligence-operating
environment, and the other end represents a mixed or multi-entity operating
environment in which intelligence is only one of the players. A purely
intelligence-operating environment relies upon intelligence methodology and
concepts, while compartmentalization is limited or non-existent. In contrast,
a mixed operating environment, in which intelligence is one of many entities,
employs various methodologies and is characterized by different
organizational identities. Intelligence is then required to adapt to
different, external rules, adjust itself conceptually and operationally, and
adhere to the rules of compartmentalization. The second variable—the
conceptual core— |
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environment |
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Diagram
4: Typology of Jointness Models |
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Examples
of Jointness in Intelligence Many
examples ofjoint intelligence settings can be found within the American
intelligence community. Well covered in the research, the National Counter
Terrorism Center (NCTC) was established at the recommendation of the
Commission of Inquiry on 9/11. The commission had to deal with the need for
integrative intelligence assessments of various terrorist threats and for
research settings that would collect the various assessments of the different
entities within the American intelligence community. The NCTC represents the
understanding that terrorism is a unique battlefield that integrates the
internal and the external and that only an integrative intelligence community
can foil terrorism, unlike the divisive nature that had characterized the US
intelligence agencies until then. The
NCTC includes a large division for intelligence research, which are divided
into branches corresponding to different arenas of threat. Each branch
consists of representatives from several American espionage agencies.37
The NCTC receives the raw intelligence produced by each of the espionage
agencies, and its researchers must construct comprehensive, holistic
assessments of the various terrorist threats. A study written by a CIA
researcher,38 who had worked for the NCTC for about two years,
indicates that the NCTC’s prestige and status are not on par with the other
organizations whose representatives work with the NCTC; the inferior position
of the NCTC is the result of the organizational and political environment in
which it operates.39 Over the years, veteran espionage
organizations such as the CIA have nurtured a tradition of organizational
pride that furthers intra-organizational excellence, but makes jointness with
other external espionage agencies difficult.40 As a result,
employees from different espionage agencies that go to work with the NCTC
tend to carefully guard their original organizational identity. Lately,
the CIA has undergone comprehensive structural change, leading to the
establishment of ten geographical and topical mission centers; in each
center, representatives of all the intelligence professions (covert
operations, research, technology, and so forth) are active.41 This
change is an example of a new architecture of intelligence organizations,
given the need for an integrative approach for dealing with the current
intelligence challenges; it is not an example of inter-organization
jointness, but rather of intra- organizational jointness. |
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Fusion Centers: Jointness Between Intelligence and Government and
Civilian Sectors Fusion
centers are situation rooms that connect the activities of government and
intelligence branches and serve government authorities in various states. In
the United States, fusion centers operate in conjunction with the civil
sector and different government departments as part of the effort to prevent
terrorism, crime, and disasters.42 In the decade after 9/11, ten
fusion centers were established in the United States operating at the
regional, state, and federal levels.43 These centers are
subordinate to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and include
representatives from government agencies, the private sector, and sometimes
also the military. All centers have representatives from at least one US
intelligence agency, in addition to the legal system, the police and FBI,
local government authorities, authorities operating national infrastructures,
and the private business sector; the presence of parties from the private
sector is meant to give the fusion centers access to private company data.44
The centers receive information from a variety of sources and create
integrative situational assessments, allowing them to deter, foil, warn
about, and study different terrorist threats mostly at the state level.45
By integrating data from a broad array of intelligence, legal, and
government sources, the centers are able to make assessments and periodically
publish documents. When there is an ongoing incident, fusion centers are
responsible for supporting the operational authorities by supplying relevant
information and by connecting the various authorities.46 The
idea behind the fusion centers was to integrate the capabilities of the
various government branches, based on the understanding that confronting
terrorism and crime is possible only through an integrative effort.
Nevertheless, in the past decade the fusion centers have come under
criticism, and commissions of inquiry have been established to examine their activities.47
The criticism has focused on the low professional level of some of the
reports produced by the centers, which flooded the US intelligence community
and the DHS with information about civilian activity that had nothing to do
with terrorism.48 Another problem, which was mentioned in several
fusion center reports, has been the low level of trust among the team members
of the various fusion centers. One of the reasons for this state of affairs
is the limitation on the use of highly classified materials, which are
generally revealed only to members of the intelligence community.49 |
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Jointness
Between Intelligence and Operational Units Unlike the fusion centers, the
intelligence-operational interface concerns operational and intelligence
processes on the battlefield. This interface occurs at the stages of
intelligence gathering, processing, and analysis, as well as during the
operational mission itself. The presence of intelligence in or near the
sphere of operations connects it to the real world and assists in producing
information that is relevant to carrying out an operation and in
comprehending the intelligence gathered by the forces before and during the
fighting. The
American Case In
the US army, Joint Inter-Agencies Task Forces (JIATFs)50 have been
established in order to improve the ability of US intelligence and defense
systems to confront armed militias and terrorist cells that are embedded in
civilian surroundings. The teams are composed of representatives from several
intelligence agencies and operational and administrative units who were
present in areas where the US army operated; the idea of the JIATFs relates
both to headquarters and field settings. The working assumption in the
creation of the JIATFs is that no single agency can provide a full and
reliable assessments of armed terrorist groups and cells. One of the parties
of a JIATF must serve as mission leader, and this person is given the
authority to manage the activity. The size of the agency represented or the
scope of that agency’s contribution to the mission at hand determines who
leads the mission, based on the assumption that the size of the contribution
or the organization’s importance confers legitimacy and validity for leading
the joint team. Evidence
of successful activities of JIATFs can be found in Bosnia and Iraq
wherejointness made it possible to identify terrorist cells and foil attacks.51
An analysis of the activity of the teams in these regions demonstrates
that the joint presence of representatives from different intelligence and
army units in highly dangerous conditions far from their home bases was the
key factor that removed the psychological obstacles and generated an
atmosphere of openness and cooperation. The smaller the JIATFs were, the
greater the intimacy that was created, and this allowed for efficient working
processes and more significant outcomes. |
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The
Israeli Test Case: Confronting Palestinian Terrorism Since
the early 2000s, Israel’s military intelligence and the General Security
Service (GSS; in Hebrew, known as the Shin Bet) have stood at the forefront
of the battle against Palestinian terrorism. The crisis that Israel
experienced in facing the suicide terrorists during the Second Intifada led
to the development of highly effective intelligence and operationaljointness,
which since then has been used in routine times and war. During the long
years of confrontation with the Palestinians, Israel’s military intelligence
transformed from being charged with helping in decision making to formulating
strategy and shaping military campaigns and being a significant operational
tool,52 which focused primarily on “completing the circle,” or
retaliation as a response to terror.53 The concept that prevailed within the
Israeli intelligence community in the 1990s for regulating relations between
the Military Intelligence Directorate and the GSS was the “Magna Carta.” To a
great extent, one can view the “Magna Carta” as the reverse of thejointness
approach, because it drew clear lines of responsibility between the intelligence
services and defined spheres of activity and authority, leaving almost no
room for joint action. After a few years of fighting terrorism together, in a
period described as “years of mass arrests and targeted assassinations,” the
institutions of the intelligence community, especially the Military
Intelligence Directorate and the GSS, grew closer to one another;54
an atmosphere of trust and intimacy ensued, quite distinct from the
atmosphere of disagreement that had characterized their earlier relationship. Yuval Diskin, then deputy head of the GSS,
pioneered the concept of “joint prevention conception,” the purpose of which
was to maximize intelligence and operational capabilities in order to engage
in targeted killings. Under his leadership, the GSS did away with the
compartmentalization that had separated the organization’s geographical units
because terrorist organizations crossed geographical borders and therefore a
more comprehensive approach to the entire Palestinian system was necessary.
Diskin also promoted channels of dialogue and coordination with Unit 8200 of
the Intelligence Corps, which is responsible for collecting signals
intelligence (SIGINT), and integrated its representatives in the GSS’s
geographical control rooms so that SIGINT could be employed for operational
closure. He acted similarly with IDF operational units in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip and with the Israeli Air Force. |
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Removing the barriers that were created by
compartmentalization and creating ajoint presence in command and control
rooms not only led to an atmosphere of trust and openness, but also to a
common language that helped to develop and forge a consciousness ofjointness
in the different organizations. The joining of forces within the internal
environment of the intelligence agencies and in the external environment
between intelligence organizations and operational units made it possible to
achieve new operational goals. At a later stage, the Military Intelligence
Directorate and the GSS succeeded in developing jointness at a very high
level, based on fusing information from among all the intelligence gathering
and research agencies. The last three rounds of fighting in the Gaza Strip
(2009,2012, and 2014) were good examples of inter-organizationaljointness,
which enabled information to be shared so that a high level, large “bank of
targets” could be created.55 Another expression ofjointness
between intelligence bodies and operational-fighting units is the “canopy of
fire” project—the IDF’s version of the targeted assassination model developed
by the GSS. In the context of that project, parties in both intelligence and
the Israeli Artillery Corps or the Air Force operate in joint attack units to
foil rocket launching and anti-tank cells and to thwart the penetration of terrorists
into Israel.56 The
recent decades have witnessed significant changes in the concept of jointness
and its practical application. At the beginning of the twenty-first century,
jointness became an important tool of intelligence communities, as a result
of changes to the security environment in which they operate, the
intelligence challenges and the subsequent crises that affected them, in
addition to the technological and cultural transformations. Jointness
describes a complex, multi-dimensional interface between entities; at its
core are processes of learning at different levels, which are facilitated by
a particular organizational ecology. The understanding that many working
environments can be more relevant and effective thanks to the interface
ofjointness is not intuitive; furthermorejointness is possible only when
organizations concede some of their authority and share responsibility with
others. The challenges that the organizations faced and the crises that hit
them as a result revealed gaps in their relevance, which in turn, generated a
willingness to engage injointness. |
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This essay surveyed the theoretical and
practical development of the jointness approach, distinguished between
cognitive jointness and organizational jointness, and examined the
interrelations and connections between them and the types of learning. The
matrix created by the intersection of the axes of the two variables (the
operational environment and the conceptual core) makes it possible to
identify and define four archetypes or models ofjointness, which the essay
analyzed, using several cases studies from both the United States and Israel. Jointness is not a magical solution; it has
not proven to be the best organizational solution in every situation in which
it has been tried. Test cases also show thatjointness is not always properly
applied. Its success depends on several components, which, when viewed
together, can be referred to as the organizational ecology. The most
prominent component is organizational freedom, and creating a space in which
it is possible and even recommended to give autonomy to the various players.
This autonomy allows for flexibility and creativity, even if it means
straying from familiar working methods. Furthermore, trust among the players
is very important for the success of the interfaces. Jointness among various
members of a single intelligence community, and, in particularjointness
between intelligence agencies and external parties, is possible mainly in
situations in which intelligence personnel are able to develop expectations
of positive behavior from their partners and reduce their concerns about
negative behavior. This builds trust, which increases players’ willingness to
take chances, including revealing themselves and sharing with each other. The
notion of an overarching body (such as the DNI in the United States) that
facilitates and generates jointness and can influence the organizational
ecology has emerged as important, at least in the context of the American intelligence
community. A director of such a body can encourage the creation of a
conducive climate forjointness, as well as promote awareness and the values
needed for engaging in shared work. The ultimate manifestation of
intelligencejointness is in the multi-arena setting that incorporates
intelligence gathering and research bodies. This model represents aspects of
both cognitive and organizational jointness, from processes of thinking and
learning in its making to the way in which it is realized. In these cases,
jointness indicates an understanding that the format of traditional
intelligence work that is split among various disciplines needs to be changed
to mission- or arena-driven intelligence production. |
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In conclusion,jointness is a response to
some of the key issues that the intelligence communities are currently
confronting; adopting the concept of jointness would enable them to provide a
better solution to these challenges. At the same time, it is not a panacea
that obviates the need for traditional concepts and organizational
structures. Realizing jointness in places and contexts where it is needed
also requires shared force construction, such as personnel, communications
infrastructures, and more, all which form a critical foundation for attaining
this objective. 1 The
first seeds ofjointness can be traced to Soviet military thought on the art
of the campaign. For more on this topic, see Shimon Naveh, The Art of the
Campaign: The Making of Military Excellence (Tel Aviv: Ministry ofDefense
Publications and Maarakhot, 2001) (Hebrew). 2 US
Department ofDefense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC, amended through
September 17,2006), p. 132. 3 An
example is the US naval strategy, “Ship Maritime strategy 600,” which
involved warships and aroused the ire of the heads of the other branches when
it was presented. See Don M. Snider, “The US Military in Transition to
Jointness Surmounting Old Notions oflnterservice Rivalry,” Airpower
Journal 10, no. 3 (Fall 1996), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/fall96/
snider.html. 5 The
text of the act is available at “Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986,” US Code
Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/
awcgate/congress/title_10.htm; for more on the act, see “Goldwater-Nichols
Act,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldwater%E2%80%93Nichols_Act. 6 Joint
Chiefs of stair, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Joint
Publication 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, November
11, 1991), http:// hdl.handle.net/2027/uiug.30112001695292. 7 The
doctrine was shaped hierarchically in a top-down manner, unlike the navy
doctrine, which was formulated by the different fleets in a bottom-up
fashion. For more, see Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G.
Shackelford, Defense Organization: The Needfor Change: Staff Report to the
Committee on Armed Services (Washington DC: US Government Printing
Office, 1985), http://babel.
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015011556266;view=lup;seq=l. 8
Snider, “The US Military in Transition.” 9 Efron
Razi and Pinhas Yehezkeli, Public Management at a Crossroads: From
Selfishness to Cooperation (n.p.: Center for strategy and Policy study,
National Security College, IDF, May 2007), p. 31 (Hebrew). |
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10 This
approach to developing an application is called service-oriented architecture
(SOA). See “Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Specialized Messaging
Patterns,” Adobe, 2005, http://xml.coverpages.org/SOA-Adobe20050221.pdf. 11 Zvi
Lanir, “Why We Need the Concept of Jointness” Maarakhot, no. 401 (June
2005), p. 20 (Hebrew). 12 For
more on the distinction between coordination, cooperation, andjointness, see
thejointness chart at https://doalogue.co.il/wiki/. 13
Lanir, “Why We Need the Concept of Jointness,” p. 25. 14 Razi
and Yehezkeli, Public Management at a Crossroads: From Selfishness to
Cooperation, p. 59. 16 US
Department ofDefense defines “Jointness of the Joint Force” as follows:
“Jointness implies cross-service combination wherein the capability of
thejoint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its
parts (the capability ofindividual components).” It defines “Joint Operation
Planning” as providing “a common basis for discussion, understanding, and
change for thejoint force, its subordinate and higher headquarters, thejoint
planning and execution community, and the national leadership.” See United
States Department of Defense, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: United States Department
ofDefense, March 2013), pp. xii, ix, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jpl.pdf. 17 US
Department ofDefense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms,ựp. 11, 13-14. 18 Doctrine
Department, Safety and Training Commands, “Lexicon (2006),” in Systemic
Planning (IDF, Operations Division, Doctrine Training), (Hebrew). 19 For
more on the distinction between forming and planning in the system’sjargon,
see Yotam Hacohen, “Forming the Campaign,” Doalogue, (Hebrew), https://
doalogue.co.il/wiki/nraran OTS. 20 Kobi
Michael, “The Failure ofLearning in the Test ofMatching Statesmanship to
Militarism in the War on Terrorism in the Middle East,” POLITIKA—The
Israeli Journal of Political Science and International Relations25
(2015): 6 (Hebrew). 21 Gabriella
Heichal, Decision Making in a Crisis (Tel Aviv: Maarakhot, 1992), pp.
75-79 (Hebrew). 22 Kobi
Michael, “Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli
Experience,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32no. 5 (2009): 687-713. 23 Roy
J. Lewicki, Daniel J. McAllister, and Robert J. Bies, “Trust and Distrust:
New Relationships and Realities,” Academy of Management Review 23, no.
3 (July 1998): 438—458. 24 This
model was presented by Daniel Bar-Tai at a research workshop held at the Tami
Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University. 25 Jeanne
Hull, “‘We’re All Smarter than Anyone ofUs’: The Role of Inter-Agency
Organizations in Combating Armed Groups,” Journal of International and
Public Affairs (2008): 37-38. |
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26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 |
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Itai
Brun, Intelligence Research: Clarifying Reality in an Era of Change
(n.p.: For
more on the challenge in surveilling a disappearing enemy, see ibid, p. 93.
On Ibid,
p. 12. Bridget
Rose Nolan, “Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States United
States, Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence, 500 Day Plan, United
States, Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence, The National See,
for example, United States, Office of the Director of the National Amir
Rapaport, “Upheaval in Intelligence,” Israeldefense, March 6, 2014 Shai
Shabtai and Omri Gefen, Promoting Jointness in the Intelligence Community David
Siman-Tov and Ofer G., “Intelligence 2.0: A New Approach to Intelligence These
include the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Federal Nolan,
“Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Ibid,
p. 70. |
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41
Tom Ashbrook, “Reforming the American Intelligence
System,” On Point Radio Show, March 11,2015, http://onpoint.wbur.org/2015/03/ll/cia-reform-john-
brennan-senate-spies-national-security. 42
Gudrun Persson, Fusion Centers—Lessons Learned—A
Study of Coordination Functions for Intelligence and Security Services
(Swedish National Defense College,2013). 43
The list of fusion centers active in the United
States may be found at the official website of the DHS, at Fusion Center
Locations and Contact Information, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information. 44
Torin Monahan, “The Murky World ofFusion Centers,” Criminal
Justice Matters 75,no. 1 (2009): 20-21,http://publicsurveillance.com/papers/FC-CJM.pdf. 45
US Department ofHomeland Security, US Department of
Justice, Fusion Process, Technical
Assistance Program and Services, Considerations for Fusion Center and
Emergency Operations Center Coordination Comprehensive Preparedness, Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide (CPG) 502 (May 2010), p. 9, https:// www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-3917/cpg_502_
comprehensive_preparedness_guide_considerations_for_fusion_center____ eoc_ coordination_2010.pdf. 46
Chuck Dodson, “Use of Technology in Intelligence
Fusion Centers,” An Oracle White Paper, April 2007, p. 5, http://www.oracle.com/us/industries/046140.pdf. 47
For the report of a federal commission of inquiry to
examine the activity of the fusion centers, see US Senate, The Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, “Investigative Report Criticizes
Counterterrorism Reporting, Waste at state & Local Intelligence Fusion
Centers,” Press Release, October 3,2012, http://www.hsgac.
senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/investigative-report-criticizes-
counterterrorism-reporting-waste-at-state-and-local-intelligence-fusion-centers. 48
For an essay describing the damage to privacy
generated by the fusion centers, see Robert O’Harrow, “DHS ‘Fusion Centers’
Portrayed as Pools of Ineptitude and Civil Liberties Intrusions,” Washington
Post, October 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/dhs-fusion-centers-portrayed-as-
pools-of-ineptitude-and-civil-liberties-intrusions/2012/10/02/10014440-0cbl-
Ile2-bdla-b868e65d57eb_story.html. 49
Persson, Fusion Centers—Lessons Learned, p.
12. 50
Hull, “We’re All Smarter than Anyone ofUs.” 52
Lt. Col. A., “The Place for Intelligence in the
Clausewitz Lnangie,” Maarakhot, no. 409-410 (December2006): 77-81
(Hebrew). 53
Amir Oren, “The master of interpretations or the
servant of operations,” Haaretz, June 24, 2005 (Hebrew). 55
In reference to Operation Cast Lead, see Yossi
Melman, “The wonders of fusion,” Haaretz, August 1, 2008 (Hebrew). 56
Amir Bohbot, “Intel gathering officer: The story of a
targeted assassination,” Walla, December 28, 2012, http://news.walla.co.il/item/2601434
(Hebrew). |
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