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Lessons Learned from the This
paper aims to analyze still unnoticed aspects of the so-called Islamic
State's cyber jihadist campaign in order to indicate its potential utility
for state-sponsored information warfare. To begin with, it tends to present
the most important features of the “Islamic Caliphate's” online campaign,
which aims to generate the “viral effect.” Moreover, the paper attempts to
provide an overview of earlier military conflicts, in which the viral effect
could be noticed. And finally, based on these considerations, it answers the
question how viral marketing methods and mechanisms can be used as viable
tools in psychological operations. Keywords: cyber jihadism, cyber
propaganda, information warfare, PSYOPS, viral effect, viral marketing Information warfare1 is
becoming an increasingly important aspect of contemporary military conflicts.2
As many recent examples have proven, the manipulation of information is
frequently critical to gaining an advantage over the enemy.3 One
method of doing this is through the use of psychological operations (PSYOPS),4
which aims to influence attitudes and the behavior of hostile populations,
counter enemy propaganda and disinformation, and establish credibility among
the people targeted. Until the end of the Cold War, Dr. Miron Lakomy is an assistant
professor at the Institute of Political Sciences and Journalism, University
of Silesia, Katowice, Poland. |
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these
goals were usually reached through various, but rather unsophisticated
methods such as loudspeakers, leaflet drops, radio programming, comic books,
posters, and TV spots and bulletins.5Anew era of information
warfare emerged at the end of the twentieth century with the worldwide
propagation of the Internet. Cyberspace, being a new domain of
multidimensional human activities, proved to have multiple unique features,
which enabled new kinds of offensive and defensive information operations.6
The most fundamental of these operations was accurately described by w.
Tecumseh Fitch: “When I consider the effect of the Internet on my thought, I
keep coming back to the same metaphor. What makes the Internet fundamentally
new is the many-to-many typology of connection it allows. Suddenly any two
Internet- equipped humans can transfer essential information, flexibly and
efficiently. We can transfer words, code, equations, music, or video anytime
to anyone, essentially for free.”7 It
is well known that the use of cyberspace for information warfare is not a new
phenomenon. Many early examples such as the US intervention in Iraq or the
Caucasus war in 2008 indicated that cyber propaganda usually rested on
adapting the means of traditional PSYOPS to the electronic environment. Instead
of leaflets and loudspeakers, they frequently utilized poorly designed spam
in the form of e-mails or website comments. Posters were transformed into
banners and messages that were posted on defaced websites and social media
sites.8 TV bulletins emerged as videos that were released via
popular hosting services such as YouTube or LiveLeak.9 Currently,
cyberspace is characterized by its massiveness (more than 3.3 billion
Internet users in 2016) and its interconnectedness, which—along with the
dominance of mobile devices—open much more unique and sophisticated
possibilities for propaganda sensu largo. This has already been
realized and utilized by the so-called Islamic State (IS); its spectacular
cyber jihadist campaign, initiated in 2014, now has the group’s major goals
echoing around the world. As Christina Schori Liang put it, “IS has brought
cyber jihad to a whole new level . . . This highly successful campaign is an
effective tool for psychological operations and for recruitment.”10
Naturally, its online activities have become the object of extensive
scientific studies. It is therefore surprising that academics have not yet
observed that in order to increase its efficiency, IS propaganda exploits
techniques and mechanisms specific to viral marketing. |
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In this context, this study has three goals.
First, this study will present the most important features of the “Islamic
Caliphate’s” online campaign, which generate the “viral effect.” Second, this
study will provide an overview of earlier military conflicts, in which the
viral effect could be spotted. Third, based on these considerations, this
study will answer how viral marketing methods and mechanisms can be used as
viable tools in psychological operations. To summarize, the paper aims to
analyze still unnoticed aspects of the IS cyber jihadist campaign in order to
indicate its potential utility for state-sponsored information warfare. To
achieve these objectives, the paper has been divided into three sections. The
first section attempts to characterize the phenomenon of the viral effect
from the perspective of its potential usability for psychological operations.
The second section presents a short overview of conflicts in which propaganda
went viral. Finally, the last part focuses on the “viral caliphate,” i.e.,
the reasons why the viral effect is so evident inIS’s cyber jihadist
activities. The
viral effect is a subject of in-depth marketing research, which has
discovered that cyberspace enables the development of the well-known
mechanism “word-of-mouth.” It can be defined as the use of influencers “to
generate peer-to-peer product recommendations or buzz.”11
Historically, word-of-mouth was strictly dependent on direct, physical
contact between peers, which limited its geographical coverage and message
proliferation rate.12 In the information revolution era,
word-of-mouth has evolved into viral marketing, which is defined by Maria
Woemdl and others as “the transmission of marketing messages through various
Internet-based channels by peers. During these transmissions, information
passes between individuals without the involvement of the original message
source, propagating like a virus would have done, infecting the hosts.”13
Viral marketing techniques therefore aim to incite the “viral effect,” which
can be broadly defined as a process of the exponential proliferation of a
message online, in which individuals “infected” by its content share it with
their peers through their electronic environment. The form of such a message
varies, starting from simple e-mails, websites, pictures (e.g., “memes”), to
games, videos, music, and documents. In principle, almost any form of
uncommon content under appropriate conditions may inspire individuals to
propagate it among their |
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friends,
associates, and family. The term “viral marketing” was coined by Steve
Jurvetson and Tim Draper to describe the dynamic expansion of Hotmail in
1996, which had advertised its services in the outgoing e-mails of its users.
It had allowed the company to grow twenty-four times larger over a one-year
period.14 In the twenty-first century, viral marketing techniques
have focused mostly on the use of short, interesting, and unconventional
videos. One of the first advertisement campaigns to do so was by the blender
manufacturer, BlendTec, which had prepared a series of online videos entitled
“Will it blend?” It presented tests of its products using unusual items, such
as expensive smartphones, wooden boards or watches. This unique approach to advertising
hit the mark, as the series went viral. BlendTec’s YouTube account quickly
became very popular (200,000 subscribers in 2009) and retail salesjumped by
700 percent.15 Since then, many companies have tried to use viral
marketing techniques; however, very few have succeeded. The Red Bull Space
Jump, Old Spice’s “I’m on a Horse,” and the LG Elevator Prank are worth
mentioning.16 The
viral effect is not only limited to professional advertisements; the same
mechanics are exploited by hobbyists and amateurs. In fact, a large part of
the “going viral” content is created purely “for fun” and not for profit,
released on social media, such as YouTube, Facebook, Reddit, Twitter,
Instagram, Tumblr or their national equivalents (e.g., VKontakte). Most
involve random, usually ridiculous, interesting, unusual, emotional or
appalling events and situations, which attract the interest of the netizens
who are ultimately responsible for their further propagation among their
peers. Others contain unusual references to mass culture.17 In
this context, it must be emphasized that the features that constitute the
viral effect could theoretically be used to increase the scope and efficiency
of psychological operations. To begin with, the viral effect ensures the fast
and exponential proliferation of messages, reaching diverse groups due to the
specificity of multilayered interactions in social media. This is impossible
with traditional PSYOP methods in cyberspace. Moreover, going viral is also
elusive and inexpensive in nature as the transmission of messages depends
strictly on the receivers, who are always important for online propaganda
during military conflicts.18 Finally, viral marketing methods,
compared to both traditional advertising and classic PSYOP techniques, can
also be seen |
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as
less interruptive and more credible, thus limiting the possible negative
effects of a propaganda campaign.19 In
order to increase the chances of the occurrence of the viral effect in
PSYOPS, a number of conditions should be considered. To start with, its
appearance is dependent on the content of the message, which needs to be
presented in an easily receivable, interesting, and unconventional form.
Humor, violence, and sexuality are usually the themes that can influence
individuals to transmit the message, as they are the easiest way to arouse
emotions.20 This feature is crucial for information warfare, as
emotion can “infect” recipients with an idea and encourage them to
disseminate it. Furthermore, although the viral effect was successfully
tested in Web 1.0, containing mostly static content (“read-only web”),21
nowadays it is strictly dependent on the sophisticated use of social
networking. Thanks to the popularity of such services as Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram or YouTube, and the interconnection (“share” function) that they
enable, the message—if interesting enough—can proliferate exponentially and
almost instantly reach audiences worldwide. Just one share on a popular
social media account may encourage thousands or even millions to click the
link.22 This is strictly connected to the broader issue of the
network topology, which obviously influences the spreading of information. As
Romualdo Pastor-Satorras and Alessandro Vespignani stressed, “the typology of
the network has a great influence in the overall behavior of epidemic
spreading. The connectivity fluctuations of the network play a major role by
strongly enhancing the infection’s incidence.”23 There is a
difference, however, in virus and information proliferation; according to
Albert-Laszlo Barabási and others, the information spreads purposefully,
whereas the virus does not, and thus, it represents a more complex behavior.24
Moreover, viral efficiency depends on the level of the information and
communications technology (ICT) development of the country/society being
targeted. Electronically underdeveloped nations are less susceptible to
online propaganda. Simultaneously, societies that are highly dependent on
electronic communication pose a more suitable target as the manipulative
message will have a bigger chance to actually “go viral,” due to the quantity
and quality of online interactions. And finally, the population being
targeted may be less keen to use the Internet in an ordinary manner during a
crisis or conflict as their interests will be drawn away from everyday online
activities. Moreover, audiences may be much more suspicious of unknown online
content. Thus, |
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the
viral effect theoretically should be more difficult to achieve. As the Arab
Spring experiences suggest,25 however, even during serious crises,
people tend to use electronic communication extensively for information
collection or coordination purposes. That is why in most situations, it
should still be possible to generate a viral effect that would resonate
throughout the targeted societies’ electronic environment. In summary, viral messages, whether for
profit or non-profit, amateur or professional, are unconventional in nature
and stand out amongst the plethora of Internet content, which is the key to
their popularity. They frequently transgress typical online communication
methods, therefore attracting the attention of Internet users. The viral
effect refers to appealing to the interest of the Internet users in order to
“infect” them with a concept, idea or brand, which then should be transferred
to other users through the wide spectrum of social media channels. As a
matter of fact, without the use of contemporary social media and various
interconnected applications a trend of this scale would be virtually
impossible. As a result, viral messages have emerged as a new and powerful
phenomenon in online communication. By exploiting emotions and curiosity, they
can visibly affect the way Internet users see various issues and act offline,
which, in certain circumstances, can be utilized by skillful psychological
operations. Information
Warfare Goes Viral Given
the aforementioned considerations, it should be noted that the viral effect
is nothing new in the online dimension of wars. Since the beginning of the
twenty-first century, armed conflicts have been accompanied by cyber
propaganda, mostly due to the propagation of mobile devices with cameras—
such as smartphones—and the development of Web 2.0 technologies.26
As a result of these two developments, the Internet became flooded with
pictures and movies documenting various wartime events. Naturally some of
them proved to be so uncommon that they managed to go viral to various
degrees. A few early examples occurred during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003
and the Caucasus war in 2008. The real change, however, began during the Arab
Spring, which proved the utility of social media for influencing political
attitudes and the morale of populations. Middle Eastern activists in 2011
made extensive use of Web 2.0 tools to organize themselves, promote their
political agenda, and inspire populations to revolt against authoritarian |
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regimes.27
It is therefore not surprising that the same political activists who
participated in the Arab Spring revolutions then used their rich experience
with social media to conduct propaganda during the subsequent military
conflicts. With the scope of new manipulative content released online, the
viral effect occurred in a number of interesting cases. The
Libyan civil war in 2011 between the western-backed rebels and Muammar Qaddafi’s
regime was the first case in history where social media was used to such an
extent that it influenced international public opinion. Soon after the first
battles broke out, the Internet was flooded with videos and pictures
documenting battles against the Qaddafi regime. These videos and pictures
sometimes also contained statements or manipulations aimed at gaining
external support. Their technical and substantive sides were usually
amateurish. Nonetheless, the viral effect was evident in two cases. The first
one concerned the famous “Libyan guitar hero” picture, which quickly
proliferated through the various picture-hosting services,28 and
contributed to the positive image of the Libyan rebels. Due to the
unconventionality of this photo, merging two separate themes—fusillade and
music—it was quickly noticed by the media, which also disseminated the
message to the West.29 In effect, the picture may have reached
hundreds of thousands of netizens. The
usability of the viral effect for PSYOPS was also confirmed by the death of
Muammar Qaddafi in October 2011, which was recorded from several perspectives
and released online by the rebels soon after. In just a few hours, videos
showing the brutal lynching of the former dictator proliferated across
Internet news services and social media. They were also quickly picked up by
leading TV stations such as CNN, BBC, and NBC.30 In effect, at the
time, these recordings proved to be the most popular content not only on the
Internet, but also in the global media. Dozens of copies of the lynching
posted on YouTube alone gathered millions of viewers. For instance, the
Al-Jazeera version, released online on October 20,2011 by the YouTuber user
xciter79, was viewed over six million times by 2016. The versions posted by
ABC News and Al-Arabiya each were viewed over one million times.31
The videos presenting Qaddafi’s last moments were played across the world due
to the huge viral effect they had incited. The viral effect was possible
because these recordings combined a few significant features. They were
shocking and contained purely graphic content; yet graphic content alone
would not attract people’s attention as the Internet is |
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full
of materials restricted to 18 years and over. Moreover, these recordings
presented in detail the death of a widely hated dictator, which in itself was
very unusual. Qaddafi’s death also symbolically ended the civil war in Libya,
which was closely followed by the international community. To summarize,
these factors together created the biggest and the most apparent viral effect
during a military conflict to date. This
lesson was quickly learned by the Syrian rebels, who started to post a
staggering amount of propaganda online. While the opposition to the Bashar
al-Assad regime extensively used the Web 2.0 environment to inspire national
and international support, their attempts usually failed as they frequently
released videos and pictures presenting their own terrorist activities or war
crimes.32 This ignorance was manifested by a video of rebel
commander Abu Sakkar mutilating the corpse of a Syrian soldier and eating his
flesh. In theory, as he later explained in an interview with the BBC, he did
this to terrify his enemies.33 In reality, the video actually went
viral due to its unparalleled savagery. Its effects, however, were completely
the opposite of what they had wanted as it deepened the West’s distrust of
the “moderate” rebels. The
viral effect also was apparent in the information warfare during the recent
Ukrainian conflict. Although official Russian propaganda focused mostly on
traditional media, such as TV stations, radio, and newspapers, Maria
Snegovaya noted that hackers, bots, and trolls played an important role in
promoting Russian propaganda in the online environment.34 ProRussian
propagandists released online manipulative videos and edited pictures
throughout social media, such as VKontakte,35 aimed at spreading
fear among Ukrainian society, intimidating western nations, disrupting their
perception of events, and promoting the Kremlin’s agenda. Among the plethora
of Russian propaganda online, the viral effect strengthened its reach in two
evident cases. The first concerned a picture of an alleged Ukrainian soldier
incorrectly loading the ammunition of an RPG-7. It was edited by pro-Russian
propagandists36 and released online to ridicule the war effort of
Ukraine. The picture was posted on sites such as reddit.com and epicfail.com
where they were viewed and shared by thousands of Internet users.37
The second case was proof that pro-Russian propaganda also had major
shortcomings. One of the “documents” released by the Russian-speaking media
in cyberspace depicted the mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs in Donetsk.38
In principle, |
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its aim was to damage the morale of
Ukrainian society; instead, it incited a limited viral effect as it quickly
proliferated throughout western Internet news services and social media,
becoming a symbol of the brutality and war crimes committed by pro-Kremlin
rebels.39 The
Case of the “Viral Caliphate” All
of these examples prove three points. Firstly, the viral effect in certain
circumstances can accompany psychological operations. Secondly, manipulative
content may go viral without any specific intention, as a side effect of
ordinary online propaganda activities. Thirdly, the propagandists do not
always have any awareness of these mechanisms. In
this context, the viral effect has been used intentionally to increase the
efficiency and reach of the most advanced cyber jihadist propaganda campaign
ever conducted.40 The case of the Islamic State proves that this
terrorist organization has modified traditional cyber jihadist methods to
increase the chances of a viral effect occurrence. The responsibility for
adapting this approach rests with the dedicated PSYOP cells of the Islamic
State—al-Hayat Media Center—which was created in 2014. It is composed of
highly skilled professionals, such as computer graphics artists, former
musicians,41 cinematographers, editors, and manipulation experts.
Despite the fact that little is known about the personnel of this group,
their sophisticated and technologically impeccable multimedia products
manifest their talents and knowledge. It is known that al-Hayat Media Center
has two major goals. First, it attempts to win the general support of Muslim
societies around the world, with special emphasis on the Middle East and
Europe. This vector is evident in various ways, such as in the recruitment
videos inciting audiences tojoin their ranks or to engage in terrorist
activities in the West.42 Second, it seeks to intimidate and
confuse western societies. This vector is usually based on graphic releases
presenting barbarous atrocities committed by IS members. However, as Gabi
Siboni, Daniel Cohen, and Tai Koren argue, the widely publicized beheadings
can also be considered part of IS’s strategy targeting Muslim populations.
They argue that “it is a source of attraction for potential recruits by
appealing to senses of basic Islamic morality within the framework of a
return to the fundamentals of early Islam.”43 To
reach these objectives, the Islamic State’s propaganda machine planned its
actions in cyberspace in ways of maximizing the chances of generating |
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the
viral effect. Several arguments support this statement. First of all, IS’s
propaganda campaign is based on extensive and highly sophisticated use of
social media.44 In 2014 the number of accounts on Twitter alone
that shared IS propaganda ranged from 46,000 to more than 70,000. On average,
Twitter accounts supporting the Islamic State had about 1,000 followers each.45
The Islamic State also utilizes Other social networks, as well as peer-
to-peer applications (Telegram and Surespot) and content-sharing services
(JustPaste.it andArchive.org).46 Moreover, they extensively use
various videosharing services, starting from the most popular ones like
YouTube, to the more controversial LiveLeak and the Canadian shock site
BestGore.com.47 Hence, the scope and the variety of cyber jihadist
activities in social media is unprecedented. This is also a key condition in
generating the viral effect as social media has many entry points for the
Islamic State’s propaganda, thus allowing the swift transmission of messages. Secondly,
the technical side of the Islamic State’s releases is virtually flawless.
Their technical level is sometimes even compared to Hollywood movies.48
Production and postproduction equipment and methods used by the al-Hayat
Media Center, including videography, editing, computer graphics, sounds
effects, and photography are of the highest quality. This was highlighted by
Charlie Winter who argued that, “undeniably, the production effort behind Although
the Disbelievers Dislike It was formidable. It is clear that the content
of the video was carefully considered and the individual (or individuals) who
directed it were obvious perfectionists ... the equipment that IS attempted
to keep out from shooting—the cameras, in particular—demonstrates the
professionalism of the operation.”49 This is where the uniqueness
factor comes in. The technical quality of IS propaganda distinguishes itself
from other cyber jihadist productions. There is no comparison between the
crude releases of al-Qaeda, al-Shabab or Boko Haram, for example, and the
high definition Hollywood-style movies with multilingual translation produced
by the Islamic State. Moreover, such productions match the ordinary
communication habits of the western audiences. Therefore, both of these
issues naturally increase the chances of the viral effect. In
comparison to the majority of cyber jihadist releases, IS frequently adopts
unconventional forms of propaganda, which also draw the attention of western
citizens. Messages produced by the al-Hayat Media Center frequently refer to
cyber or mass culture canons. For instance, one of the |
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videos
exploited a very popular gaming brand.50 Other examples include
the so-called #mujatweets on Twitter,51 extensive use of memes,
and the American-stylized nasheed music videos. These references
frequently are combined with barbarous savagery, such as decapitations or
corpse mutilations, which aim to generate extreme emotions. The distinct
contrast between properly introduced cyber culture cliches and horrible atrocities
is unique among cyber jihadist propaganda. In effect, such a convergence
especially seduces youth, more efficiently than the previously dull
statements that were released, for example, by Osama bin Laden. Thanks to
evident references to mass and cyber culture, targeted audiences can more
easily understand and embrace the message, thus enabling the viral mechanism.
In summary, terrorist organizations had never before released graphic images
and videos, as well as propaganda music in a way that was specifically for
the western entertainment sector. This feature naturally attracts the
attention of netizens, which is a crucial condition for inciting the viral
effect. The
Islamic State combined the trendiest methods of online communication— social
media and the most popular apps—with technological advancement, crude
savagery, and manipulative sophistication on an unprecedented scale.52
This is the key to their great propaganda “success,” symbolized by the scale
and proliferation of a series of videos presenting decapitations of western
citizens (e.g., James Foley, Steve Sotloff, David Haines, and Alan Henning).
These beheadings, published from August 2014 onwards, went viral on a global
scale shortly after their initial online release. Afew features contributed
to their viral effect: the aforementioned technical flawlessness; the sheer
brutality they presented; and the sophisticated manipulative content, evident
in the statements by the prisoners and by “Jihadi John.” Finally, they all
exploited the same video-sharing services, including YouTube, LiveLeak,
BestGore, and other social media, which ensured their instant proliferation
on the Internet. Basically, they combined the uniqueness factor with
professional propagation via multiple social media entry points. In
effect, these beheading videos have become the most successful pieces of
viral terrorist propaganda in history. Several arguments support this
statement. First, it is difficult to assess exactly how many people have
viewed or heard about these videos,53 but tens of millions is the
lowest possible estimate. This is due to the fact that there were two
interconnected proliferation vectors for this campaign. They have gone viral
through social |
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media
and video-sharing services. Although administrators frequently deleted the
original releases, edited or intact copies proliferated instantly over the
web, supposedly due to the activities of unaffiliated netizens. YouTube alone
still contains dozens of Islamic State’s censored decapitation recordings
viewed by millions of Internet users. The two most popular copies of James
Foley’s execution, which were published on YouTube, were viewed almost four
million times by May 2016. Its full version posted on LiveLeak has been
viewed more than one million times.54 Journalists
also quickly spotted these videos. As a result, leading global media, both
offline (via TV news) and online (through official YouTube accounts and
dedicated websites) released censored and shortened recordings with
commentary in hundreds or even thousands of copies. Many also prepared their
own reports on the executions, which frequently contained excerpts of the
manipulative statements included in the original videos. This trend was
visible just after the first release of James Foley’s execution when all the
offline and online global media outlets were full of its screenshots, edited
recordings, and detailed descriptions. A google video search of the words
“James Foley” has about 322,000 hits, frequently related to his execution. It
should be emphasized that both these vectors were self-perpetuating. While
the media reports increased the curiosity among netizens in the original
videos, the popularity of the unedited versions escalated viewers’ interest
in successive media reports; thus the media unwittingly contributed to the
success of the Islamic State’s PSYOP. Thanks to them, audiences could know
what the Islamic State wanted to tell them, even if they did not see the
original recordings. Furthermore,
the viral aspect of the IS beheadings is manifested by the popularity of this
theme among the blogosphere pundits and amateurs, creating a multitude of
content referring to IS atrocities. These include various analyses,
commentaries, and even parodies. The scope of this trend is exemplified by the
popularity of the YouTube movie, “ISIS Bloopers,” a pastiche of the famous
executions prepared by Israeli comedians. Between February 2015 and May 2016,
it was viewed more than 5.2 million times.55 The abundance of
amateur-made content referring to IS decapitations proves that this
“epidemic” factor has really worked. If it had not worked, Internet users
would not devote their time and resources to preparing their own materials
that mention these events. |
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It must be stressed that the exposure of
millions of western citizens to the unusual IS decapitations, which went
viral online and offline and were strengthened by alarming reports from the
Middle East and by terrorist attacks in Europe, have contributed to the
increasing fear of the Islamic State, especially in the West. The success of
the Islamic State’s propaganda is evident in the statistics of the Pew
Research Center, which indicate that western societies perceive the Islamic
State as the top global security threat.56 The
activities of the “viral caliphate” pose a serious threat to international
security, including, among others, an increased risk of micro terrorism, as
well as a deepening fear and confusion among western nations. Therefore, the
information security policies of the NATO/EU states aim to quickly suppress
this feature of the Islamic State’s cyber strategy. Paradoxically,
the Islamic State’s success also allows several conclusions to be drawn about
the usability of the viral effect in psychological operations. Firstly, there
is no certainty that a message designed to go viral in PSYOP will ever do so.
The tapestry of human relations on various levels in the Internet is too
dynamic and elusive to exploit it successfully every time. Designing actions
that will meet the constantly changing features of online communication,
including varying trends and moods of netizens, is highly problematic. As
David Meerman Scott states, “nothing is guaranteed to go viral.”57
From thousands of IS messages released online in the form of videos, music,
statements, banners, and memes, only a few actually have gone “epidemic.” Secondly,
the case of the “viral caliphate” shows how important it is to conduct proper
cyber reconnaissance. Adapting a message to the targeted group’s “cyber
cultural” background as well as to the level of ICT development increases the
chances of the viral effect. Thirdly, PSYOP intending to exploit this effect should
use multiple “vectors of attack,” both in terms of content and technology.
One message posted online has little chance of going viral. A hundred
messages in various forms may sometimes make a difference, as the probability
of attracting the audience’s attention will increase. This is understood by
the al-Hayat Media Center, which has flooded the Internet with its
propaganda. Moreover, these messages should be proliferated throughout a wide
range of channels: websites, social media networks, and |
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other
online services, including those that are the most popular among the targeted
population. Fourthly,
viral campaign should both precede and coincide with political and military
events, which was evident in the aforementioned executions, in which “Jihadi
John” referred to President Obama’s statements. Anticipation may minimize the
chances of the messages being recognized as hostile propaganda by the
targeted populations. At the same time, messages should strictly refer to the
most important events for PSYOP. Such a solution may strengthen operational
efficiency as it draws attention to messages that are up-to-date and
controversial or unusual. This was also done in the infamous execution
videos. Fifthly, the case of the “viral caliphate” proves that the message
inciting the viral effect should be in compact form and be easily accessible,
meaning that it must not require any logins, passwords, web browser add-ons
or plug-ins. This is due to the fact that users usually are not keen to log
in or install new software in order to familiarize themselves with even the
most interesting online content. Moreover, content should be simply named, in
a way that will increase the chances of finding it through social media or
search engines. In the Web 2.0 environment this also heavily depends on the
use of proper hashtags (#), such as IS’s #mujatweets. And
finally, the content of the message should be as intriguing, unconventional,
and unique as possible. This does not mean that PSYOP should just copy
classic viral marketing techniques frequently based on sexual themes.
Instead, humor and violence presented in a unique and unconventional
form—both used by the Islamic State—may be the right way to go. Humor may be
more elastic, and, if used properly, can spark various reactions from the
audiences, both positive and negative. For instance, al- Hayat Media Center
frequently mocked the American military effort in the Middle East, using
humor as a tool. Violence also may have a different role as it may shock and
intimidate recipients; this was carried out perfectly in many of the
execution videos posted online by the Islamic State. In
conclusion, the case of the “Islamic Caliphate” and the aforementioned
military conflicts suggest that the viral effect can be efficiently exploited
by psychological operations in cyberspace. Although it is a highly uncertain
tool, with enough deliberation, it is possible to increase the chances of its
occurrence and gain outstanding benefits for its creators, as proven by the
case of the infamous IS executions. |
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Cyber, Intelligence, and
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Kofman, and Matthew Rojansky, “A
Closer look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War,’” Kennan Cable, no. 7 (2015). 9
Cori
E. Dauber, YouTube War: Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone
and Photoshop on Every Computer (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). 10
Christina
Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State
Propaganda,” GSCP Policy Paper, no. 2 (2015), p. 2. 11
MindComet
Corporation, Viral marketing: Understanding the Concepts and Benefits of
Viral Marketing, The Relationship Agency White Paper (2008), p. 3, http://cmginteractive.com/uploads/viral_marketing.pdf. 13
Maria
Woerndl, Savvas Papagiannidis, Michael Bourlakis, and Feng Li, “Internet-
induced Marketing Techniques: Critical Factors in Viral Marketing Campaigns,”
International Journal of Business Science and Applied Management 3,
no. 1 (2008), p. 34. 14
Victoria
Fairbank, “A study into the Effectiveness of Viral Marketing over the
Internet,” (University of Gloucestershire, 2008), pp. 12-13, http://ct-files.
glos.ac.uk/mwd/modules/co333/showcase/MU303_08_FairbankV.pdf,; Steve
Jurvetson and Tim Draper, “Viral Marketing: Viral Marketing Phenomenon
Explained,”DFJ, January 1, 1997, http://dfj.com/news/article_26.shtml. 15
Christian
Briggs, “BlendTec Will It Blend? Viral Video Case study,” SocialLens, January
2009, http://www.socialens.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/20090127_ case_blendtec 1 l.pdf. 16
Laura
Crimmons, “Top Viral Marketing Campaigns of All Time,” Branded3, December
2,2014, https://www.branded3.com/blog/the-top-10-viral-marketing-
campaigns-of-all-time/. 17
This
kind of viral content sometimes contributes to the global cyber culture. One
of the greatest examples of this trend concerns a set of popular comic-style
meme pictures, which went viral several years ago, influencing communication
habits in social media worldwide. One can mention “Neil deGrasse Tyson
reaction,” “forever alone,” “trollface” or “Yao Ming face.” See “Neil
deGrasse Tyson reaction,” Knowyourmeme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/neil-degrasse-
tyson-reaction; “Forever
alone,” Knowyourmeme, http://knowyourmeme.com/ memes/forever-alone; “Trollface /
Coolface / Problem?” Knowyourmeme, http://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/trollface-coolface-problem, “Yao Ming Face,”
Knowyourmeme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/yao-ming-face-bitch-please. 18 Woerndl and others,
“Internet-Induced Marketing Techniques,” pp. 35-36. 19 MindComet Corporation, Viral
marketing, p. 4. 20
Petya
Eckler and Shelly Rodgers, “Viral Marketing on the Internet,” in Wiley
International Encyclopedia of Marketing, eds. JagdishN. Sheth and Naresh
K. Malhotra (New York: Wiley, 2010), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.1002/9781444316568.wiem04009/pdf. |
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21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 |
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63 For more about Web 1.0, see
SarehAghaei, Mohammad Ali Nematbakhsh, and Hadi
Khosravi Farsani, “Evolution of the World Wide Web: From Web 1.0 to Web E 4.0,”
International Journal of Web & Semantic Technology 3, no. 1
(2012): 1-10. 27 This
mechanism is simple; source accounts share the message among followers, I and
then their followers can transmit the message further to their followers, and
so — forth. E Romualdo
Pastor-Satorras and Alessandro Vespignani, “Epidemics and Immunization in Scale-Free Networks,” in Handbook
of Graphs and Networks: From
the Genome to the Internet eds. s. Bornholdt and H.G. Schuster (Wiley- Ệ VCH, Berlin, 2002), p. 19, http://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/0205260.pdf. Albert-Laszlo Barabási, Dashun Wang, Zhen
Wen, Hanghang Tong, Ching-Yung Lin,
and Chaoming Song, “Information Spreading in Context,” in Proceedings of 3 the
20th International Conference on World Wide Web (Hyderabad: 20H), p. 2,
http://www.barabasilab.eom/pubs/CCNR-ALB_Publications/20ll02-l0_WWW- n> Spreading/20H02-l0_WWW-Spreading.pdf. o See
Miroslaw Lakomy, “Arab Spring and New Media,” in The Arab Spring, ed. Jp Beata
Przybylska-Maszner (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Naukowe WNPiD UAM, .£ 20ll). See Dauber, YouTube War', Pew
Research Center, Social Networking Popular Across Globe: Arab Publics Most
Likely to Express Political Views Online, Global Attitudes Project, (December 12, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/20l2/l2/l2/
social-networking-popular-across-globe/. See, for example, Mikael Eriksson
and others, Social Media and ICT during the Arab Spring, no. FOI-R—3702—SE (Swedish Defence
Research Agency July 2013); Lakomy, “Arab Spring and New Media.” “Man plays a guitar in the middle of
a shootout in Libya,” Imgur, http://imgur. com/r/HumanPorn/pyMmP. See Uri Friedman, “Libya’s Fighting
Guitar Heroes,” Atlantic, October 12, 20H, http://www.thewire.com/global/20ll/l0/libyas-fighting-guitar-heroes/43584/; “The story behind the Libyan guitar
hero photo,” Channel 4, http://www.channel4.
com/news/the-story-behind-the-libyan-guitar-hero-photo; Lee Moran, “Now
that’s a real guitar hero: Libyan soldier strums away as battle for Sirte
rages around him,” Daily Mail, October ll, 20H, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2047889/Libyan-soldier-strums-guitar-battle-Sirte-rages-him.html. See Moni Basu and Matt Smith,
“Gadhafi killed in crossfire after capture, Libyan PM says,” CNN, October 21,
20H, http://edition.cnn.com/20ll/l0/20/world/ africa/libya-war; “Libya’s Col
Muammar Gaddafi killed, says NTC,” BBC News, October 20, 20H, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-l5389550; “Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi killed in
hometown battle,” NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.
com/id/4497l257/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/libyas-moammar-gadhafi-
killed-hometown-battle/#.VyJ7k-SbSUk. “Gaddafi death,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/results7search_ |
|
query=gaddafi+death. |
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Cyber, Intelligence, and
Security | Volume 1 | No. 1 | January 2017 |
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32
“Syria,”
YouTube, accessed April 9, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/
results?sp=CAM%253D&search_query=syria&page=l&nohtml5=False. 33
Paul
Wood, “Face-to-face with Abu Sakkar, Syria’s ‘heart-eating cannibal,’” BBC
News, July 5, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-23190533. 34
Maria
Snegovaya, Putin s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of
Russia s Hybrid Warfare (Institute for the study of War, September 2015),
pp. 13-14, http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20
Putin%27s%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20
Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdf. 35
Myroslav
Shkandrij, “How Russian Propaganda Works Through Social Media,” Myroslav
Shkandrij’s Blog, May 9, 2014, http://www.ukrainianwinnipeg.ca/
russian-propaganda-works-social-media/. 36 Original photo at Imgur, http://i.imgur.com/BuiPsTj.jpg. 37
“It’s
Gonna be a Short War,” Epic Fail, December 31,2015, http://www.epicfail.
com/2015/12/31/its-gonna-be-a-short-war/; Reddit, https://www.reddit.eom/r/pies/
comments/3kh4o3/sorry_captain_i_am_of_still_learnings_how_to/. 38
See
“UAF storm Donetsk Airport and Get their Assess Handed to them by NAF. FULL
VERSION [Warning: Graphic],” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=3TZ9Q18HKlQ. 39
See
“Ukraine rebels launch grisly propaganda war,” France24, http://observers.
france24.com/en/20150128-ukraine-rebels-launch-grisly-propaganda-war. 40
See
Christina Schori Liang, “Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic
State Propaganda,” GSCP Policy Paper, no. 2 (2015); Adam Hoffman and
Yoram Schweitzer, “Cyber Jihad in the Service of the Islamic state (ISIS),” Strategic
Assessment 18, no. 1 (2015): 71-81; Erin Marie Saltman and Charlie
Winter, Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism (London:
Quilliam Foundation, 2014); Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, “Paradigmatic Shift in
Jihadism in Cyberspace: The Emerging Role ofUnaffiliated Sympathizers in
Islamic State’s Social Media strategy,” Journal of Terrorism Research
7, no. 1 (2016): 36-51, http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1183. 41
See
Hayley Cole, “German rapper turned extremist behind Islamic state beheading
videos and uses music to recruit young jihadis,” Mirror, November 9,
2014, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/deso-dogg-german-rapper-
turned-4597188. 42
For
more on the topic, see Gabi Siboni, Daniel Cohen, and Tai Koren, “The Islamic
State’s strategy in Cyberspace,” Military and Strategic Affairs 7, no.
1 (2015): 127-144; Charlie Winter, Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’
(London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015). 43 Siboni, Cohen, and Koren, “The
Islamic State’s strategy in Cyberspace,” p. 137. 44
Charles
Lister, “Profiling the Islamic state,” Brookings Doha Center Analysis
Paper, no. 13 (2014), p. 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2014/12/en_web_lister.pdf;
Veilleux-Lepage, “Paradigmatic Shift in Jihadism in Cyberspace.” |
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45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 |
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J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan,
“The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Brendan I. Koerner, “Why ISIS Is
Winning the Social Media War,” Wired (April Miron Lakomy, Cyberprzestrzehjako
nowy wymiar rywalizacji i wspolpracy Michael s. Schmidt, “Islamic state Issues Video Challenge to Obama,” New York Times, September 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/world/ Claire Davis and Charlie Winter, Detailed
Analysis of Islamic State Propaganda Michelle Malka Grossman, “Watch:
Islamic State’s terror video game,” Jerusalem Mujatweets, https://twitter.com/hashtag/mujatweets. Miron Lakomy, “Internet w
dzialalnosci tzw. Panstwa Islamskiego: nowajakosc Some of censored versions have been
viewed on YouTube more than one million “James Foley,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/results?q=james+fole “ISIS Bloopers,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/ Jill Carle, Climate Change Seen
as Top Global Threat (Pew Research Center, July David Meerman Scott, The New Rules of Viral Marketing: How
word-of-mouse 9884be8e803282182b2.1472783930977.1472783930977.1472783930977.1&__ |
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