Terminology and Agents

In an age that basically lacked organized intelligence staffs or distinctly defined functions, information had to be gathered from every available source. Particularly important would have been the relatively few travelers; emigrants, although low socioeconomic status would generally have precluded access to vital information; diplomatic missions, tasked with both specific evaluative missions and general observation; merchants; and defectors from among the military and nobility. The Tso Chuan depicts a wide range of intelligence activities, the practice of which can easily be followed down through the ages and will be again 

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The first truly important character, tie,7 is composed from the classifier or radical for "words" or "speech" and a right hand component for the foliage of a tree, prompting speculation (but no historical evidence) that it first referred to someone concealed in a tree covertly listening to or observing others:

Although tie does not appear in the Ch'un Ch'iu itself, it functions both as a noun, referring to "spies," and a verb, meaning "to spy upon," in the Tso Chuan. In addition, tie also designates reconnaissance scouts inconspicuously observing the enemy, much like such ordinary terms as "observe," "watch," or even "investigate."

The first of seven usages in the Tso Chuan occurs in a passage chronicling events that occurred in 700 B.C.: "In invading Chiao, Ch'u's armies divided up to ford the P'ang River. The forces from Luo, wanting to attack, sent Po Chia to spy on them. Three times he went round their encampment, counting them." 8 Based upon this account, Po Chia obviously passed among Ch'u's forces in some sort of disguise in order to estimate their total numbers, part of the essential information needed for the process of assessing battlefield options under China's classic approach to warfare.

The next entry, for 666 B.C., sees the term being employed for a reconnaissance scout that Cheng dispatched to determine Ch'u's position after having successfully repelled their assault but remaining undecided about retreating themselves. 9 When Cheng's scout (tie) observed birds about Ch'u's encampment, in a very basic piece of military intelligence codified later, he concluded that it was empty, sufficient evidence to deduce that 

Ch'u's forces were in retreat. (The possibility that they had been deliberately feeding the birds to attract them seems not to have arisen. 10) However, the nature of his report implies he did not actually enter the enemy encampment to verify his deduction and, although presumably making his observations early in the morning--the troops having dispersed during the night--offers no confirmatory indication of the equally important absence of cookfires.

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(The records for 484 B.C. right at the end of the Spring and Autumn period similarly indicate a spy from Lu reported one night that Ch'i's forces had withdrawn following a disordered battlefield retreat at the end of the day. 11)

Records of the famous episode of approximately 635 B.C. that established Duke Wen of Chin's great credibility indicate that after he besieged the city of Yüan for three days and was visibly prepared to abandon the siege in accord with his earlier public proclamation, a spy (tie) came out and reported the city was about to fall. (Because sieges were difficult, expensive, and uncertain, employing subversives to both undermine the city's defenses and provide information about weak points in the fortifications, the defenders, and provisions was of paramount importance. This accounts for the presence of a Chin agent within Yüan.)

In the Tso Chuan the term tie also appears in Wu Tzu-hsü's diatribe (already mentioned in the section on early history) directed against granting a peace treaty to the just vanquished state of Yüeh, and again in a story related to Ch'u and Wu Tzu-hsü's difficulties. In the latter Ch'u's exiled former heir apparent, then dwelling in Cheng, foolishly agreed to assist Chin in assaulting Cheng's capital by mounting a coordinated internal response, even though he had been welcomed and well treated there. 12 In 477 B.C., needing to fix the exact date, Chin dispatched a covert agent, a tie, to Cheng, but this clandestine courier was caught in the first recorded example of Chinese counterintelligence because a staff member bitter over ill treatment had betrayed the heir apparent, resulting in the latter being secretly watched by local Cheng agents. 13 

Finally, an entry for 601 B.C. illustrates the working alliances that occurred between indigenous Chinese states and so-called barbarian steppe peoples even in antiquity. As the Tso Chuan concludes with a puzzling remark, it is worth quoting: "In the spring the White Ti and the state of Chin concluded a peace treaty, and in the summer they mounted a joint attack against Ch'in. Chin's forces captured a spy (tie) from Ch'in and executed him in Chiang's marketplace, but after six days he revived."14 (Some commentators have suggested that the ill-fated spy was a Ch'in general, an appropriate choice for a military intelligence mission. 15) Although long considered a dubious passage because of the bizarre conclusion, which no doubt stems from a corruption of the original text, it still provides important evidence of covert agents and countermeasures in the Spring and Autumn period.

Unfortunately the appearance of terms such as tie and chien in the Tso Chuan accounts for these early dates does not equate with their existence and use then because the Tso Chuan was compiled and edited

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in the Warring States period--presumably from earlier, possibly contemporary records and oral recensions--by which time the character tie had become commonplace. (Its appearance in the Ch'un Ch'iu, clearly a close chronicle of early events, would be more conclusive.) However, whatever the term, without doubt "covert agents" were employed and the concept of spying was already well developed in the Spring and Autumn period.

A second character frequently found in the Tso Chuan and even the Ch'un Ch'iu, hsien encompasses several meanings, only one of which designates secret activities and would then be pronounced chien. Visually interesting, the character is composed of a radical or signifier depicting the leaves of a traditional Chinese double door (or possibly a gate around the outside) and essentially a pictograph of a half moon between them: 

Hsien's (chien's) meaning evolved over the subsequent centuries, with a variant character that substitutes the sun for the moon assuming most of the original senses:

Both characters immediately suggest the moon or sun seen through a crack between closed double doors, resulting in meanings such as "crevice" and "the space between" and, by abstraction, "interval in time." As a verb it came to signify "to estrange," "separate," or "put space between," and thus designate the common, though covert, ac

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tivities of sowing dissension within the court, estranging rulers from their ministers, and besmirching successful generals and meritorious officials. 16 From this basic image also derives the extended usage of "peering into a crevice"--discerning the moon through the crack and otherwise learning what lies inside closed doors--and thus to spy on from without. Eventually hsien, the primary pronunciation of the character with moon, came to mean "leisure," "idleness," or "spare time," shedding the earlier meanings except in arcane language. However, perhaps in response to this shift an even more complex 

character evolved, redundantly placing the signifier for "eye" to the left of the original character: 17

Also pronounced hsien, meaning "to watch" or "spy on," it appears in the famous Mencius.

In some eighty occurrences of the original character hsien in the Tso Chuan (and virtually none in the other commentaries), only four unequivocally carry the meaning of "to spy on" or "secretly observe," two of which are particularly interesting. In the first, disaffected members among the nobility and extended royal family employed one member's cousin, a spurned concubine in the marquis of Ch'i's harem, to "spy on the marquis" with a promise of marriage if their rebellious plot should prove successful. 18 In the second case the minor state of Tun, subserviently dependent upon Ch'u for its continued existence, was compelled by the latter to clandestinely observe (chien) the nearby state of Ch'en in order to identify invasion opportunities. However, Ch'en's forces struck first by besieging Tun's capital. 19 Although the remaining two occurrences of chien are essentially matters of mounting observation, discreetly and unsuspected, the term became the common one for "spy" from the Warring States on, eventually coupled with such words as "turned," fan, and with tie to form compound words designating different types of agents from the Han dynasty onward. 20 In fact, its use became quite indiscriminate, with writers since the Sung even terming the merchant in the following episode a chien:

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Duke Mu of Ch'in mobilized his army and was about to mount a sudden strike against Cheng. Chien Shu said: "You cannot. I have heard that to mount a surprise attack, the chariots 

should not travel over a hundred kilometers or the infantry march more than thirty kilometers in order that the plans not leak out. Moreover, in this way the ardor of the mailed soldiers will not have been exhausted, the foodstuffs and provisions not yet depleted, and the people not yet weakened and sickened. All of these are done so that their ch'i [spirit] will be at its highest and their strength flourishing when they confront the enemy and thus be awesome. Now you want to traverse several thousand kilometers and even cross through the territories of several feudal lords in order to launch a surprise attack. I do not see how it can succeed. My lord should rethink this plan." Duke Mu did not heed him, so Chien Shu saw the army off in his mourning clothes and wept for them.

While marching forward, the army passed by Chou and went east. A merchant from Cheng named Hsüan Kao, pretending it was the Earl of Cheng's order, feasted Ch'in's forces with twelve cattle. Ch'in's Three Armies were then afraid and muttered among themselves: "We have traveled several thousand kilometers in order to suddenly attack an enemy, but before we reach our objective they already know it. Their preparations will certainly be complete, so we will not be able to make a surprise attack." The army turned about and returned to Ch'in. 21

This incident was subsequently cited as an example of clear thinking insofar as Hsüan Kao mounted a ruse that convincingly deceived an enemy that clearly did not have forward scouts reporting on the actual situation in Cheng.

Another character sometimes associated with the ancient period is chan, composed of the left and right components, respectively, of the radical or signifier for "prognostication" (chan) and that for "to see" (chien): 

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In at least one Tso Chuan passage it clearly means "to clandestinely observe," 22 but the definitive use appears in the famous Warring States text on the nature, practice, and psychology of the rites or normative forms of behavior, the li, known as the Li Chi, in connection with a story about Tzu Han:

When an armed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City Magistrate, Tzu Han, entered his house and wept tears of grief. An agent from Chin, having secretly observed [chan] this, reported back to the marquis of Chin: "When an armed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City Magistrate, Tzu Han, entered his house and wept tears of grief, which pleased the populace. It appears they probably cannot be attacked yet." When Confucius heard about this entire incident, he exclaimed: "Excellent, this spying upon a foreign state. The Odes state: 'Whenever the people experience mourning, he exerts every effort to assist them.' Even though this is only a minute matter for Chin, who under Heaven is capable of opposing them?"23

Diplomatic Missions

Diplomatic missions doubtlessly provided a major, comparatively reliable source of information about other states, even though important emissaries would probably have been denied extensive freedom. However, merely being present in a foreign state would immediately permit the emissaries to observe the general conditions, provide an opportunity to acquire information through conversations and bribery, and perhaps allow staff members and retainers to learn much from 

their counterparts and local servants. An early example of a deliberate evaluative mission occurred in 661 B.C.:

In the winter Chung-sun Ch'iu went from Ch'i on a mission to observe Lu's difficulties [following the ruler's assassination]. After he returned, he reported, "Unless they get rid of Ch'ing Fu [the murderer], Lu's difficulties will never end."

"How can he be eliminated?" the Duke asked.

Chung-sun replied: "Since the difficulties are unending, he will perish by himself. Can you not wait for it?"

"Can we seize Lu?" the duke inquired.

Chung-sun Ch'iu replied: "We cannot. They still firmly adhere to the rites of Chou, the very foundation of a state. I have heard

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that when a state is about to perish, only after the foundation has first been overturned will the leaves and branches follow. Since Lu has not yet abandoned the practice of the rites, it cannot yet be moved. My lord should concentrate upon bringing about tranquillity in Lu's difficulties and maintaining close relations with it. Being close to states that practice the rites, thereby reinforcing solidity, and keeping distant from the disaffected, thereby overturning confusion and chaos, are the practices of a hegemon." 24

The dialogue suggests this mission was undertaken with a view to launching a punitive expedition to either extinguish or annex the state, and the emissary's reply reflects the parameters by which he judged the government's adherence to virtuous standards of behavior. The term employed to characterize his mission merits note: hsing, a variant pronunciation of the character sheng, meaning to investigate or observe, rather than chien, the character for acting as a clandestine agent.

A second example illustrates the criteria an astute observer might employ to evaluate the conditions in a subject state. Although the following episode is probably an imaginative reconstruction dating from the Warring States period, it is firmly rooted in historical events that took place in 603 B.C. when Duke Tan Hsiang apparently undertook a mission to 

ascertain the conditions in Sung. Upon his return he made a highly negative report based upon the contiguous state of Ch'en's disregard of proper diplomatic protocol and their neglect of agriculture and public works, fundamental activities that would have to be organized and administered by the state if it was to survive. Duke Ling, whose debauched demise is retold in this section of our study as well, was another sorry example of the myopic rulers who fervently destroyed the glorious heritage entrusted to them. The detailed criteria that Duke Tan systematically applied in making his political assessment, although illuminating in themselves, subsequently functioned as a virtual textbook example:

King Ting of Chou dispatched Duke Tan Hsing on a friendly mission of inquiry to Sung. Thereafter the duke requested permission from Ch'en to cross their state in order to visit Ch'u. Mars was visible in the early morning, but the roads were impassable due to heavy vegetation. The protocol officer did not appear at the border. The Director of Works did not inspect the roads, the marshes were not diked or the rivers bridged. The work of threshing was not yet finished. The roads lacked rows of border trees, newly reclaimed lands still had brush. The master of ceremonies did not

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bring in the sacrificial meats; the attendant of guests did not provide a dwelling; the state lacked lodging places; the districts lacked way stations. The people were about to erect a pleasure tower for the Hsia clan. When Duke Tan reached the capital of Ch'en, Duke Ling, K'ung Ning, and Yi Hsing-fu had gone to the Hsia family's mansions garbed in rustic clothes, where they remained, so Duke Tan never interviewed them.

On his return to Chou the duke reported, "Unless Duke Ling of Ch'en experiences a great awakening, his state will certainly perish." The king inquired why this should be so, to which Duke Tan replied: "When chen-chiao is visible in the Heavens, the rainy season is over. When T'ien-ken is visible, water begins to dry up; when pen is seen, the season for shrubs and grass is at an end; when ssu becomes visible, frost appears; when Mars is visible, clear winds warn the people of oncoming cold. 

"According to the instructions of the former kings, when the rainy season ends, the roads should be cleared; when water dries up, the dikes are completed; when the season for trees and grass is ended, they are prepared for storage; when frost appears, winter clothes are readied. When clear winds blow, the city's inner and outer walls and its palaces are repaired. Thus the regulations of the Hsia dynasty [employed even today] state, 'In the ninth month clear the roads, in the tenth complete the bridges.' The seasonal rescripts state: 'After harvesting, winnow the wheat. When the year star is in the ying constellation, earth works are undertaken. When mars is first seen, assemble under the directors of villages.' This was the way the former kings bespread their Virtue throughout the realm without making fiscal expenditures. Now mars was visible when I was in Ch'en, but the roads were almost blocked with vegetation; the fields seem to have been abandoned; the marshes were not yet banked; and the rivers lacked pontoon bridges. They are neglecting the instructions of the former kings.

"The regulations of Chou include: 'Array rows of trees in order to mark the roads, establish way stations in order to watch the roads.' Cities had pastures in the outer suburbs, the borders had permanent lookouts. Dried marshes provided tall grass, state gardens had trees and pools in order to prepare against disaster. All the remaining land was planted in grain, and the people never hung up their hoes. The fields did not have weeds. The people's agricultural seasons were not interfered with, nor did the state seek the people's labor. There was abundance without lack, ease without exhaustion. The states were ordered, the districts disciplined. Now in the state of Ch'en the roads cannot be recognized,

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the fields are covered with grass. Their grains, although mature, remain unharvested, while the people exhaust themselves in ease and pleasure. Thus they have abandoned the laws and regulations of the former kings.

"The Royal Offices of Chou state: 'When a high-ranking envoy from an enemy state arrives, the captain of the customs barrier informs the ruler about it. The director of guests greets him 

with his credentials. An usher guides them to the capital, a high minister comes forth to inquire after them at the suburbs. The city gatekeeper clears out the gate; the clan priest takes charge of the tablets; the director of villages assigns them a residence; the director of labor prepares the way; the minister of works checks the roads; the minister of justice suppresses evildoers; the master of marshes sees to the materials; the warden gathers firewood; the master of fire supervises the heating; the master of water supervises bathing water; the chief of provisions arrays the food; the chef prepares the rice; the stable master spreads the fodder; the mechanic attends to the carriages; and the hundred officials all attend to their affairs appropriately.' The guest enters as if going home, so all the members of his party embrace loving feelings.

"If a guest from an honored state arrives, all the representatives handling these affairs are increased by one grade and marked by augmented sincerity. When it is an officer of the king, all the office heads personally take charge of the affair and the chief chancellor oversees them. When the king conducts a tour of inspection and preservation [every twelve years], the ruler personally supervises.

"Now today, although I am not talented, I am still a collateral member of the Chou royal family and in accord with regal order was crossing Ch'en as an official guest, but none of the officials came forth. This is an insult to the office of our former kings. Their edict states: 'It is the Tao of Heaven to reward the good and punish the licentious. Therefore we have established states. Those who do not follow the precepts are dissolute, those who do not complete them are arrogant and licentious. Every one should preserve their foundations in order to receive Heaven's blessings.' Now Duke Ling of Ch'en has not thought about his role in continuing their line, has abandoned his consorts and concubines, and leads his ministers to assist in licentious relations with Hsia Chi. Ch'en's royal family is of the great surname Chi. To abandon regal robes and don a southern cap to go out, isn't this simply dissolute? So they have again offended against the laws of the former kings.

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"The former kings exerted themselves to lead the people with Virtue, yet they still feared nearly committing transgressions. How can anyone who abandons their instructions and casts aside their regulations, insults their offices and contravenes their edicts, preserve their state? Dwelling amid four great states and yet lacking these four, how can Ch'en long endure?"

In the 601 B.C. year Duke Tan went to Ch'en; two years later Duke Ling was killed at the Hsia mansion; the following year the king of Ch'u exterminated Ch'en.

Agriculturally based societies such as China in the early sixth century B.C. were much subject to the vagaries of weather and climate and therefore relied for their very existence upon carefully prepared calendrical materials that included detailed instructions for initiating seasonally appropriate actions correlated with celestial phenomena. Failure to observe the admonitions and prohibitions, even without unexpected rains or drought, could result in crops damaged by frost in the spring or grains insufficiently mature for harvesting in the fall. Thus, in his report Tan Hsiang was very precise in describing Ch'en's failure to meet autumn's progressive responsibilities and therefore concluded that the government could not survive. 25

The Hsing-jen

Theoreticians writing in the T'ang observed that the first administrative official operationally responsible for undertaking intelligence activities in China was the Hsing-jen of the Chou dynasty. A title composed of the characters for hsing, meaning "to travel" or "perform some action," and jen, "man" or "human being," the post and its duties seemed to have varied from state to state and the circumstances of the moment rather than systematically evolving over time. Every state that modeled on Chou bureaucratic organization employed Hsing-jen, sometimes several, and while ranking in power and prestige below the prime minister, they still resided at the apex of power, often as functionally significant as the early specialized ministers for war and works. As with many Chinese terms, no simple English equivalent suitably translates it in all its varied usages, but their primary responsibilities seem to have 

encompassed everything from simple messenger, in which case it was not a titled position, through diplomatic courier, protocol director, secretary of state, and foreign minister.

The Chou Li (Rites of Chou), an idealized reconstruction of Chou administrative offices and practices probably composed late in the

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Warring States period, enumerates several critical responsibilities for both the Great Hsing-jen and Minor Hsing-jen:

The Ta Hsing-jen [Great Hsing-jen] administers the rites for important visitors and the formal ceremonies for major guests designed to gain the intimacy of the feudal lords. [Through his auspices], in the spring the king of Chou assembles the feudal lords at court to plan the affairs of the realm and in the autumn holds audiences to compare the achievements of the various states. In the summer he holds court to display the plans of the realm, and in winter convenes them in order to harmonize their thoughts. Seasonal assemblies are held in order to publicize the prohibitions applicable throughout the four quarters and audiences held in order to implement governmental measures throughout the realm.

From time to time [the Ta Hsing-jen] conducts friendly missions of inquiry to unite the feudal lords, at other times imperial audiences are employed to eliminate hidden evil among the feudal states. On an annual basis the Ta Hsing-jen makes inquiries among the feudal lords in order to fathom their intentions. Through him the king has sacrificial meats sent back to the feudal lords in order to invoke good fortune, deputes missions of congratulations in order to augment their happiness and missions of condolence in order to assist them during times of disaster. The Ta Hsing-jen discriminates among the edicts applicable to the feudal lords with the nine ceremonies and sets out the various ministerial ranks in order to unify the rites of the feudal states and attend to their honored guests. 

The Hsiao Hsing-jen [Minor Hsing-jen] administers the rites of tribute for the submissive states and thus attends to the emissaries from the four quarters. He orders the feudal lords to submit their offerings in the spring and contribute their labor in the autumn. The king personally receives them and treats them according to their respective tributes. Whenever the feudal lords come to submit these tributes, the Hsiao Hsing-jen meets them at the border.

If a state is in mourning, the Hsiao Hsing-jen orders the other states to contribute to its funeral expenses. If a state suffers from famine, he orders them to distribute stores of grain as aid. If a state has suffered from military engagements, he orders the other states to provide material assistance. If a state enjoys some auspicious affair, he orders them to send presents in congratulation. If a state suffers some disaster, he orders the other states to condole with them in their grief. Now these five things, their causes, prof

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its, and harm to the myriad people are all recorded in a book. The customs and ceremonies, government affairs, instructions, administrative measures, as well as adherence to and violation of instructions and prohibitions, are to make up another book. Those among the feudal lords who are contrary, perverse, brutal, chaotic, conceal hidden plots, or violate edicts are to compose one book; deaths and mourning, famines and impoverishment, another book; and health, happiness, harmony, and tranquillity, another book. Now all these five things should be discriminated by states in order to fulfill the king's mandate and thereby thoroughly know the causes and affairs throughout the realm.

Although the Chou Li elaborates a coherent vision of Chou government that was realized only in part, the Hsing-jen was clearly entrusted with supervising the major rites of state, an activity that obviously brought him into close contact with foreign dignitaries on a daily basis. Moreover, the Hsiao Hsing-jen's responsibility for not only collecting basic information about all the activities occurring in the feudal states, but also seeing that it was properly recorded (and thus provide an objective basis for analyzing affairs and making judgments) 

indicates that apart from his basic role as an observant emissary, intelligence gathering was a dedicated function. Therefore, it might be concluded that China's first official staff position with intelligence responsibilities was the Hsiao Hsing-jen, operating within the purview of the Ta Hsing-jen. 26

Records preserved in the Ch'un Ch'iu and Tso Chuan, while providing a more historically grounded portrait of Hsing-jen activities, essentially substantiate the claim that they should be considered not only China's first official covert agents, but also its first intelligence directors. However, their primary role was simply and probably originally that of a messenger, whether between states or enemies on a battlefield. 27 Accordingly, in such situations the title might be translated as "messenger" or "courier," although when deputed with full state sanctification "envoy," "emissary," or "ambassador" is more appropriate and even explicitly justified by the Tso Chuan. In fact, the Kung Yang commentary to the Ch'un Ch'iu emphasizes that one is termed a Hsing-jen only when acting on official business, not private concerns. 28 However, the three titles just mentioned imply discretionary powers within the parameters of a defined mission rather than a mere verbatim presentation of a message from a ruler or prime minister to foreign counterparts. Presumably the messenger would not only return with a reply or in the company of someone bearing a reply, but also carefully scrutinize the reactions of those receiving the message,

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note the situational context, and mark other relevant facts for subsequent analysis. In short, couriers and envoys did not simply convey messages with blind eyes and deaf ears.

Messengers were frequently employed preceding battles as part of the ancient ritual of issuing noble challenges and demands that the enemy surrender while no doubt undertaking a perceptive survey of their camp. For example, following the first day's clash at the battle of Yen-ling a messenger sent to pique Ch'u was evaluated as being fearful because his eyes kept moving, looking about apprehensively, prompting Ch'u to incorrectly deduce that Chin's forces would surreptitiously withdraw. 29 While the messenger, being in the midst of an 

enemy encampment, might naturally have been frightened, protocol should have dictated that he be returned unharmed, suggesting he was actually observing their preparations and evaluating their ability to sustain renewed combat. 30

In their role as couriers and envoys several Hsing-jen were seized and even killed, implying the existence of clandestine aspects to their official roles, whatever the ostensible reasons for their detention. A number of nonfatal examples are also recorded, states such as Chin, Ch'u, or Ch'in detaining Hsing-jen and seizing those who violated their territory without permission while crossing to a third state. 31 Commenting on the Ch'un Ch'iu entry that "Ch'u seized Cheng's Hsing-jen, Liang Hsiao," the Tso Chuan notes that Cheng had dispatched emissaries to announce a shift in allegiance from Ch'u to Chin, resulting in the envoys being detained, and adds that the Ch'un Ch'iu refers to them as Hsing-jen because they were official ambassadors. (Woeful were the prospects for bearers of such ill tidings!) After they were held for more than a year, Liang Hsiao and his companion finally persuaded Ch'u's ruler that he was only subverting Ch'u's purposes by frustrating their mission, thereby further estranging Cheng and allowing the remaining lords there a comparatively free hand. 32

In another prominent incident the Tso Chuan explains that the "men of Chin seized the Hsing-jen from Wei, Shih Mai," because Wei, under Shih's leadership, had successfully mounted an attack on Ts'ao, Chin's client state, the year before. Although smoldering hatred triggered this precipitous action, of greater interest is the Hsing-jen's qualifications. Not just a faceless bureaucrat, he was an experienced commander and therefore doubtlessly seeking military information as well as fulfilling some innocuous cover mission. 33 Furthermore, Chin also detained a Hsing-jen from Lu who had been sent to investigate a skirmish between their people and those from the minor state of Chu. 34

An unfortunate envoy from the peripheral southwestern state of Pa was seized and executed by border peoples in the minor state of Teng

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while en route there from Ch'u, eventually precipitating a battle between a Pa-Ch'u coalition force and Teng's army. 35 However, cases also arose in which Hsing-jen were the hapless victims of violence directed against them because of strife arising within their home states or some action in the greater diplomatic arena. For example, Ch'u seized and executed Ch'en's envoy even though "the guilt did not lie with the Hsing-jen." 36 A typical Ch'un Ch'iu entry for 501 B.C. that laconically states, "Ch'i seized Wei's Hsing-jen, Pei Kung-chieh, in order to invade Wei" is explicated by the Tso Chuan: "The marquis of Wei wanted to rescind his allegiance to Chin, but the great officers would not permit it. Therefore the marquis dispatched Pei Kung-chieh to Ch'i while privately advising the marquis of Ch'i to seize Pei in order to invade them. The marquis followed his suggestion and they subsequently concluded a covenant at Suo." 37 Whether the Hsing-jen unknowingly carried a written message to have himself seized is unclear but highly likely because travel between states was difficult, particularly for nonofficial travelers. Finally, the small state of Wei, having killed Wu's Hsing-jen, was terrified that powerful Wu would annihilate them and therefore plotted possible courses of action with their own Hsing-jen, thus preserving evidence of the latter's enlarged role in planning of military strategy. 38

The Ku Liang defines the Hsing-jen as one "who assists in words between states," 39 and in the simple role of courier he was expected to verbally deliver his message as dictated, without admixing his own views. In fact a court incident arose in the state of Chin when the prime minister designated Tzu Yfin to undertake a mission over another Hsing-jen, the latter having been rejected because he often changed the words of communiqués to interject his own opinions. 40 However, Hsing-jen also acted as envoys with apparently wide discretionary powers, authorized to independently persuade and negotiate with officials in foreign states, and thus became, as the Tso Chuan comments, emissaries or ambassadors entrusted with diplomatic tasks.

That states apparently assumed foreign envoys bearing the title of Hsing-jen had hidden purposes may be gleaned from an incident in the autumn of 502 B.C. when Chin detained Sung's Hsing-jen. The Tso Chuan indicates that the envoy in question, 

Yüeh Hao-li, a minister in Sung, had advised the duke not to neglect the deputation of a submissive mission of allegiance to mighty Chin and was sent himself. Venturing into the state, he was met by Chao Chien, who grandly entertained him, prompting Yüeh to give him sixty willow shields as a present, despite his own steward's protests. Arriving at the capital, he was denounced by a Chin official for giving precedence to personal affairs, neglecting official state business, and delaying the execution of

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his mission, thereby insulting two rulers, and was accordingly imprisoned. Superficially it appears he simply violated the protocol and procedures appropriate to his task, but more likely, given the internal strife that would soon sunder Chin into three independent states, he was probably suspected of providing aid to one of the factions, including weapons, whether on his own initiative or as part of a Sung effort to politically undermine Chin.

Whether at home in his native state or abroad in the fulfillment of a diplomatic mission, the Hsing-jen constantly interacted with foreign officials and therefore had numerous opportunities to clandestinely acquire information for the state. In fact, rulers routinely employed their protocol chiefs to privately query visitors on mystifying actions or behavior, thereby not only sparing everyone embarrassment, but also establishing a convenient precedent and conducive context for the secret exchange of information. For example, when an emissary from Wei did not respond to the performance of the Odes as would be expected, the Hsing-jen was instructed to personally question him. 41

In their expanded roles, Hsing-jen also performed functions equivalent to a modern foreign secretary or secretary of state. While frequently defined by traditional commentaries as essentially chief of protocol, an office mainly responsible for supervising the reception and entertainment of foreign emissaries, in many cases they were clearly charged with the task of acquiring knowledge about foreign states, knowing their affairs, planning diplomatic and military strategy, and initiating actions, as indicated by the Chou Li. The position's importance 

may be seen in three specific historical instances. First, when the Duke of Shen departed from Wu after completing his military mission, he deputed his son to act as Wu's Hsing-jen and thus control all its communications with foreign states. 42 Second, the historically famous Wu Tzu-hsü was appointed as Hsing-jen when he fled to Wu, a post he retained throughout his career "so as to plot against Ch'u." Although this vengeful plotting clearly was confined to the court, he certainly consulted on state affairs in general and may also have traveled, much as he did to Ch'i late in life, on missions he could have subverted to this purpose had Ho-lü not also been in favor of an aggressive, expansionist policy. 43 Yet until the rise of King Fu-ch'ai and machinations of the traitor Po P'i, his influence and power were unequaled as he plotted military actions with Sun-tzu.

Third, Tzu Yü, one of Confucius's most successful disciples, prominently served as Hsing-jen in Cheng, a state renowned for a government so effective that it flourished despite being surrounded by mighty neighbors. In the Analects itself Tzu Yü is noted for his ability to finalize or polish the drafts of communications with other states, the commentators frequently citing a Chou Li definition of his du

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ties--"to oversee the rites connected with communicating with other states." 44 Moreover, in an appraisal of Cheng's strength a minister from Wei singled out the state's two Hsing-jen--Tzu Yü and Kung-sun Hui--for their comprehensive knowledge of other states, prompting the Tso Chuan to comment:

Tzu Ch'an, in his administration of government, selected the capable and employed them; Feng Chien-tzu was capable of deciding major affairs; Tzu Ta-shu was handsome and refined; Kung- sun Hui was able to know about the activities of the four surrounding states, distinguish the clan and family names of the high officials, their positions, rank, and whether they were capable or not, and moreover was good at drafting orders. P'i Ch'en had planing ability that when exercised in the wilds was successful, but in the city was not. 45 

Whenever Cheng had some pending matter with the feudal lords, Tzu Ch'an inquired about the actions of the surrounding states from Tzu Yü and moreover had him draft several versions of the edicts. Then he rode out into the countryside in a carriage with P'i Ch'en to decide whether the plans would work or not, and finally informed Feng Chien-tzu to have the decision rendered. When a decision was reached, he then entrusted it to Tzu Ta-shu to have it transmitted as a response to their honored guests. For this reason they rarely encountered failure. 46

From this description Cheng Hsing-jen, while nominally protocol directors, were clearly masters of foreign information, essentially state intelligence directors as detailed in the Chou Li definition of the Hsiao Hsing-jen's duties. Tzu Yü's own fame derived from his superlative performance in executing foreign missions, handling visiting dignitaries, gathering and evaluating information, and planning state affairs, as befits a Ta Hsing-jen. 47

The Mu, or Clandestine Shepherd

A Han-shih Wai-chuan passage asserts that an official called the Mu-- a term meaning "shepherd"--should be established for the steppe and tribute regions and charged with intelligence gathering responsibilities:

The king must establish two shepherds for each of the four quarters and depute them to secretly observe distant regions and oversee their masses. Whenever people in the distant quarters suffer

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from hunger or cold without receiving clothing and food, there are criminal cases and lawsuits in which the charges are not equitably decided, or the worthy fail to be appointed to office, they should send reports back to the Son of Heaven. When their rulers come to pay homage at the court, after saluting and bringing them forward the Son of Heaven addresses them: "Alas, can it be that the instructions of our administration have not reached your domain? How can there be hungry and cold people who lack clothes and food, or criminal cases and 

lawsuits that have not been decided equitably, or worthies that remain unappointed?"

After the local ruler retires from the court, he will certainly consult with his ministers and high officials about this incident. When the people of those distant quarters hear about it, they will all acclaim: "He is truly the Son of Heaven. Although we live in a rustic corner, he sees us as if we were nearby. Although we live in darkness, he sees us clearly. How can he be deceived?" Thus the shepherds are the means by which to open the Son of Heaven's eyes to the four quarters and allow his perception to penetrate them. 48

From this description it would appear that the shepherds or overseers functioned as central government observers deployed in a conscious, ostensibly benevolent attempt to rectify the administrative shortcomings of peripheral states. However, an examination of the classic works associated with the Spring and Autumn period--the Ch'un Ch'iu and Tso Chuan--reveals only one instance that asserts Mu are to be established for China's anciently delineated nine regions, essentially echoing a statement found in the "Cannons of Yao" in the Shang Shu. 49 In all other cases the term refers to shepherds, herders, fodder overseers (serving in the quartermaster corps), or cattle managers. Furthermore, even the lengthy Chou Li, while touching on the office some dozen times, contains only three passages that suggest a centrally deputed observer's role, but none that their activities would have a secret or clandestine character. 50 First, as one of the nine aspects or factors (such as "clans," "teachers," and the "Tao") by which the king gains and controls the people, the shepherd is said to "gain people with land" (whereas a "teacher gains people through his worthiness" and the "Confucian gains people through the Tao"). 51 A second series of nine offices and aspects, such as rank and clothes, designed to rectify the states includes the establishment of Mu, understood by the commentators as "regional governors" but not necessarily so. 52 However, a third brief passage suggests they were intended to exercise some indefinite supervisory function over the

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states, especially when the king is about to make his tour of inspection, implying that they will provide the information necessary for the king's administrative judgments. 53 Yet the available material is so sparse, the references so minimal, that substantive conclusions beyond recognizing that something like the censors or independent inspectors of latter times that were turned against the state's own administrators, becoming an internal affair, were conceptually present in the Spring and Autumn era are unjustified.

Military Intelligence

Apart from information gained from diplomatic missions, spies, and defectors, the essential activities of military intelligence--observing the enemy and procuring the data necessary for evaluating threats and assessing intentions--were obviously carried out in the Spring and Autumn period and almost certainly in the Shang as well. Although structured approaches to information gathering awaited the military theorists of the Warring States and subsequent eras, basic practices were already being implemented for field armies. Moreover, events recorded in the Tso Chuan conclusively show that the individual states consciously and consistently acquired vital strategic and tactical information, enabling them to plan effectively and react adequately. A few examples are particularly telling.

In 706 B.C. the Spring and Autumn Annals laconically state that "in the summer the marquis of Ch'i and earl of Cheng went to Chi," but the Tso Chuan explains that they sought to mount a sudden attack against Chi. Much to their surprise and consternation, Chi already knew their intentions, evidence that it had been constantly gathering intelligence against its apparent friends. 54

In 684 B.C. a high official of Lu went out to observe the coalition forces of Ch'i and Sung that had encamped near Lu's capital and then returned to make this report: "Sung's army is not well ordered and can be defeated. If Sung is defeated, Ch'i will certainly return home. I suggest we launch a sudden attack." Finding his proposal rejected, he personally led an 

assault on Sung's forces and defeated them, prompting Ch'i to withdraw as predicted. 55

In 645 B.C. when Chin and Ch'in were about to engage in another of the numerous battles that would occur over the next century, Chin dispatched Han Chien to watch Ch'in's army. He advised, "Their army is fewer than ours, but their elite warriors are twice as many."56

China's first recorded active reconnaissance probe--a technique emphasized a century and a half later by the great tactician and general

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Wu Ch'i--is for 630 B.C.57 That spring a force from Chin made a limited incursion into Cheng to determine whether it could be successfully invaded or not. 58 Apparently the results inspired confidence because they besieged it in alliance with Ch'in that autumn.

Barbarian peoples of the steppe region somehow were also well informed about the northern plains states--no doubt through traders and other contacts along a very porous border, as well as diplomatic missions--and frequently exploited their knowledge by taking advantage of weakness and gaps in the contiguous states. For example, in the case just cited the Ti "spied out" (chien) Chin's preoccupation and therefore invaded its ally, Ch'i. 59 Another example arose three years later when the Ti exploited the mourning period for Chin's ruler to again make an incursion into Ch'i. 60 This was just the opposite of Wei's actions the previous year when the Jung were suffering from chaos and a Wei force successfully invaded and forced them to seek peace. Some two decades later ( 610 B.C.) a Chou force surprised and overwhelmed the Jung when they were engaged in a drinking feast, certainly not an accidental accomplishment. 61 Thus China's pattern of alternating aggressions between the central states and the steppe peoples was already well established at this early date. Moreover, alliances were formed with the so-called barbarians not only by states intent on assaulting other states, but also by factions involved in internal intrigues hoping to utilize foreign troops to 

realize their objectives, often with unexpectedly adverse consequences for all concerned. 62

Defectors

Unlike in the Warring States period that followed, few individuals traveled about in the Spring and Autumn to offer advice on political, military, or administrative matters. However, as the struggle for power among the original ruling Chou families, local powerful clans, and the ministerial families intensified with the passing of decades, the number of disaffected, displaced, and disinherited rose dramatically. Many powerful families and members of collateral lines were reduced almost to commoner status and therefore compelled to furnish the officers, administrators, and even warriors increasingly essential to managing ever more populous and prosperous states. With the internal intrigue and political infighting becoming more severe, people of every rank were forced to flee to foreign states in fear of their lives rather than simply venturing there for greater opportunities as guest ministers or experienced administrators. Others sought refuge from

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oppressive rulers or superiors who had dishonored them, hoping to exploit foreign power to exact vengeance or even annihilate their native states. Such men furnished not only a pool of ready advisers, but also a reasonably reliable source of detailed information on powerful individuals, current policies, likely supporters, troop strength, military training, types of weapons, and logistical preparedness. 63

In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods political defectors and even defeated generals were frequently placed in active command of troops, thereafter leading successful attacks against their former armies. (With the passage of centuries--and particularly during periods of dynastic turmoil--following their surrender entire units were increasingly integrated and refielded with new insignia, surprisingly going on to fight valiantly against their former comrades!) However, employing defectors always entailed an inherent threat of betrayal. At best they were simply acting for their own interests, at worst 

perhaps counterfeit traitors providing false information to the enemy's advantage, such as the case of Kung-shan Pu-niu, one of the rare examples preserved in the Tso Chuan: "The duke of Wu, being about to attack Lu on behalf of the minor state of Chu, inquired of Shu-sun Ch'e, an exile from Lu, about the feasibility. Shu-sun Ch'e replied: ' Lu has fame but no substance. If you attack it, you will certainly realize your desires.'" However, he was criticized by his countryman, Kung-shan Pu-niu, who had similarly fled from Lu to Wu. Pu- niu, outlining the moral man's ever-present concerns, sought to counter the earlier advice:

"You acted inappropriately. When a gentleman goes into exile, he doesn't venture to enemy states. However, if he happens to be in one when it is about to undertake aggressive action against his native state, if he hasn't assumed ministerial office there, he should race back and die for it. If already entrusted with administrative responsibility, he should seek obscurity. Moreover, a man does not abandon his village because of personal hatred. Now if you want to overturn your ancestral state for a minor hatred, isn't this difficult? If the duke wants to appoint you to lead the army, you should decline, for then the king will certainly employ me." Shu- sun Ch'e was much troubled by his previous actions.

When the king indeed queried Kung-shan Pu-niu, he replied: "Although Lu lacks any basis for sustaining itself, many men will certainly sacrifice themselves for it. Since the feudal lords will also strive to save it, you will be unable to achieve your ambitions there. If Chin, Ch'i, and Ch'u support it, this will amount to four enemies. Moreover, Lu is like the lips for the teeth of Ch'i and

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Chin. When the lips are lost, the teeth inevitably feel cold. As my lord certainly knows, what else can they do but rescue it?"

In the third month Wu still attacked Lu, with Pu-niu acting as their guide. He deliberately chose a path through precipitous terrain that bypassed the city of Wu-ch'eng. However, it happened that earlier some men from Wu-ch'eng with farms along Wu's border had seized a native of Cheng who had been 

macerating rushes in the river to make mats and accused him of polluting their water. Therefore, when Wu's army arrived, he willingly led it inland to attack and subjugate Wu-ch'eng. 64

Although the rich and powerful naturally commanded the attention of historians and state scribes, disaffected defectors included many ordinary people--such as the mat-maker in the foregoing incident--who acted as local guides, spies, and even subversives out of a variety of motivations.

Another oft-cited example unfolded toward the end of the Spring and Autumn period:

In autumn, Kao Fa of Ch'i led the army to attack the minor state of Chü. The prince of Chü fled to Chi-chang, so Kao Fa had Sun Shu go to attack it. Long before, the prince of Chü had killed the husband of a local woman. When she grew old, the widow had cast her lot with the city of Chi-chang. [Seeing these developments,] she plaited a rope that matched the height of the city wall and then stored it away. When Chi's forces arrived, she [secured it and] tossed the end over the wall. Someone pointed it out to Sun Shu, who had his men ascend it. When some sixty had successfully climbed up, the rope broke, but then the army beat the drums and set up a clamor while the men already on top of the city wall also began yelling. In terror the prince of Chü opened the west gate and fled. Ch'i's forces then entered the city of Chi-chang. 65

A particularly dramatic recounting of the pernicious effects of defectors appears in Sheng-tzu's persuasion directed toward Ch'u's prime minister, one designed to gain readmittance for his exiled friend Wu Chü. 66 Observing that Ch'u had been adversely impacted by defections to other states--a devastating trend much remarked upon later in Chinese history, essentially one the world's first "brain drains"--he expounded three important examples, explicating their backgrounds and severe consequences:

Wu San of the state of Ch'u and Tzu Ch'ao, Grand Counselor in the state of Ts'ai, were friends, as were their respective sons Wu

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Chü and Sheng-tzu. Wu Chü married a daughter of Prince Mou. When the duke of Shen fled and Prince Mou also departed, it was said that Wu Chü had actually escorted them away. Wu Chü therefore raced off to the state of Cheng and was about to venture on to Chin when he encountered Sheng-tzu, who was similarly bound for Chin on a diplomatic mission in the suburbs of Cheng. Spreading out some reeds, they sat upon the ground and ate together, discussing whether Wu Chü could somehow be restored to his position in Ch'u. Sheng-tzu said: "Continue your journey, I will certainly get you restored."

When Sheng-tzu reached the state of Sung, Hsiang Hsü was just calming relations between Ch'u and Chin. Sheng-tzu completed his mission to Chin and then commenced his return by first going to Ch'u. There the prime minister, Tzu Mu, speaking with him, inquired about affairs in Chin, "Among the high officials in Chin and Ch'u who are more worthy?" Sheng-tzu replied: " Chin's ministers are not equal to Ch'u's, but their high officials are more worthy, all having ministerial ability. Just like the raw materials exported from Ch'u such as wood and leather, they are from Ch'u. Thus, even though Ch'u has talent, it is Chin that benefits from their employment."

Tzu Mu asked, "Is Chin the only state without any meritorious nobles?" Sheng-tzu responded: "Although they have such nobles, they actually employ a great deal of Ch'u talent. I have heard that when administrators excel at governing a state, neither rewards nor punishments are excessive. When rewards are excessive, there is the fear they might reach the dissolute, but when punishments become excessive, there is the danger that they might affect good men. If, unfortunately, there is to be an excess, one in rewards is preferable to any in punishments. Rather than lose a good man, it is better to profit the dissolute. Without good men the state will also be lost.

"In governing the people the ancients exerted themselves to make rewards and feared imposing punishments out of their unremitting compassion for the people. Rewards were bestowed in the spring and summer, punishments imposed in autumn and winter. Accordingly, when they were about to bestow rewards, they augmented their portions so as to feast their subordinates, from which we know they rejoiced in bestowing 

rewards. When they were about to impose punishments they did not hold any banquets, and since they held no banquets they abandoned the performance of music. From this we know that they feared imposing punishments. They rose at dawn and slept late at night, administering the state from morning to evening. From this we

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know how they had compassion for the people. These three are the great constraints in the rites. Those who implement the rites will never be defeated.

"Now Ch'u suffers from numerous licentious punishments, so its high officials flee the country, die all about the four quarters, and act as strategists to the detriment of Ch'u. Since you haven't been able to remedy the situation, Ch'u is appropriately said to be incapable of employing them.

"During the turbulence caused by Tzu Yi, the Duke of Hsi fled to Chin. The men of Chin ensconced him in the rear of their martial chariots, where he acted as chief tactician. At the battle of Shao-chiao Chin was about to withdraw, but Duke Hsi said: ' Ch'u's forces lack substance and discipline and are easily shaken. If you beat all the drums in unison and press them at night, Ch'u's army will certainly withdraw.' The men of Chin followed his advice and Ch'u's army crumbled that night. Chin subsequently invaded Ts'ai; launched a surprise attack on Shen, capturing its ruler; and defeated the allied forces of Shen and Hsi at Sang-sui, capturing Shen Li before returning home. Accordingly Cheng dared not face south [toward Ch'u in allegiance] and Ch'u lost its power over the civilized central states, all due to Duke Hsi.

"When Yung-tzu's father and elder brother slandered him and neither the ruler nor high officials investigated, Yung-tzu fled to Chin. The men of Chin provided him with a metropolitan district and appointed him as a chief strategist. At the battle of P'eng- ch'en, when Chin and Ch'i encountered each other in the valley of Mi-chiao [in Sung], Chin was about to withdraw. However, Yung-tzu issued the following order to the army: 'The very young and old should return home, as well as solitary sons and the ill. When two men from a family have been 

impressed for combat, send one back. Select your best weapons and array the chariots. Feed the horses with grain and take breakfast while in your tents. After the army has deployed burn the encampment because tomorrow we shall engage in final combat.' 67 Those returning to Chin set off, and the prisoners from Ch'u were also released. During the night Ch'u's army collapsed. Chin then compelled the surrender of P'eng-ch'eng and restored it to Sung, taking Yü Shih back to Chin with them. Ch'u's loss of the Eastern Yi and the death of Tzu Hsin both resulted from Yung-tzu's efforts.

" Tzu Fan and the duke of Shen quarreled over the pernicious beauty Hsia Chi, resulting in the duke being harmed. The duke of Shen therefore fled to Chin, where the ruler assigned him the town of Hsing and made him chief of strategy. He successfully defended Chin against the Northern Ti and established diplomatic

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relations between Chin and Wu. Moreover he went on a mission to Wu, where he instructed the people how to rebel against the power of Ch'u. He taught them the martial arts related to charioteering, including driving, racing, and employing bows, as well as how to make swift invasions. Moreover, he had his son Ku Yung become Hsing-jen in Wu. Wu then attacked your subject state of Ch'ao, seized your district of Ho, conquered your city of Ts'e, and invaded your city of Chou-lai. Ch'u thus became exhausted racing about to preserve itself and continues to be troubled to this day, all because of the actions of the duke of Shen.

"During the rebellion of Jao-au royal clan, Duke Pen's son Pen Huang fled to Chin, where the ruler assigned him the city of Miao and he became a chief of planning. Early in the morning at the battle of Yen-ling Ch'u's forces pressed Chin's army and Chin was about to withdraw. However, Pen Huang, lord of Miao, advised: ' Ch'u's best regiments--those of the royal clan--compose the Center Army. If we fill in our wells, smash our cookstoves, and deploy to oppose them, and also have the forces under the Luan and Fan clans sloppily array their formations in order to lure the enemy forward, our two armies under the Chung-hang clan, in coordination with our Upper 

and New Armies, will certainly be able to vanquish the two Ch'u armies under the Mu clan. Then if we concentrate on the royal regiments from all four sides, we will certainly defeat them.' Chin's forces followed his counsel, and Ch'u's army was badly defeated. The king himself was wounded and the army exterminated. Tzu Fan died thereafter, Cheng revolted, Wu began to flourish, and Ch'u lost the allegiance of the feudal lords, all because of Pen Huang's actions."

Tzu Mu assented, "These are all true."

Sheng-tzu then said: "At present there is an even more severe case than these. Wu Chü married into the family of Tzu Mou, so when Tzu Mou was accused of perversion and fled, the ruler and high officials all said his daughter and Wu Chü had in fact escorted him away. Wu Chü was afraid and fled to Cheng, although constantly looking back and hoping for a reprieve. However, you have not made any plans in this regard, so he is now in Chin, where the ruler is about to grant him a district. If he should plot harm against Ch'u, wouldn't it be unfortunate?"

Tzu Mu, in fear, spoke to the king about restoring Wu Chü's position and increasing his rank and emoluments. Sheng-tzu then sent Wu Chü's son to meet him upon his return. 68

Two aspects in this extensive Tso Chuan account particularly merit noting. First, defectors from Ch'u found a ready refuge in Chin, its nat

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ural enemy, and in fact enjoyed not only a generous welcome, but also actual power in the state's administration and military command. Their insights apparently reversed the likely outcome of several battles, further evidence that they conveyed detailed military knowledge. (The damage incurred at the Battle of Yen-ling, mentioned in his discussion, was actually far more extensive, as will be evident from the detailed reprisal at the end of this chapter.) Second, the duke of Shen's defection, caused by complex intrigues that will be outlined subsequently, resulted in the initiation of diplomatic communications with the state of Wu and contributed to its rise as a significant power. (Even though Chin had been 

reasonably successful in its ongoing efforts to contain Ch'u, for various reasons it sought to develop a counterbalance to Ch'u's ascending might. In 584 B.C. the ruler was therefore happy to dispatch the duke of Shen--apparently at his own suggestion--with one hundred or more elite warriors and perhaps nine chariots to Wu for the express purpose of introducing the chariot and instructing them in land warfare tactics. Although his visit marked a military turning point and at least symbolically brought Wu into the realm of civilized states, Wu's growing strength clearly suggested the possibilities of such a mission. However, the direct military impact of the duke of Shen's chariot instructions was probably limited because naval and infantry forces continued to predominate.)

The duke of Shen's diplomatic mission marked two important developments: he was the first "guest adviser" to be honored in Wu, thereby initiating a practice that would later see Wu Tzu-hsü and Sun Wu entrusted with power, and his visit entangled Wu in an alliance with Chin, thereby ensuring its future enmity with Ch'u. Increasingly extensive clashes between Ch'u and Wu in fact commenced in 584 B.C. when Ch'u sought to occupy the region between them and Wu mounted a preemptive strike against Ch'u's client state of Hsü. Thereafter, over the next six decades battles occurred at least every few years as they both strove to dominate the region, with Wu emerging victorious from every significant encounter. These repeated defeats forced Ch'u to constantly reassess its military organization and methods, to rebuild and retrain its forces. As the decades passed, Wu commenced increasingly aggressive actions against Ch'u's cities, forcing them to undertake massive defensive preparations from 538 B.C. on, including the construction of city walls and other fortifications. Wu also benefited from Ch'u's brutal suppression of minority peoples and smaller states, readily exploiting their hatred and antagonism to acquire material support, local guides, and field intelligence.

The confluence of events that prompted the duke of Shen to flee Ch'u may be gleaned from several Tso Chuan narratives. Although he

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ran afoul of powerful government officials by opposing their interests and plans, the immediate cause of his departure was a conflict over one of the licentious beauties of ancient China, Hsia Chi. The duke of Shen had antagonized Tzu Chung when the latter requested two fiefs from the client states of Shen and Lé as a reward for his achievements following a siege of Sung's capital. Although the king of Ch'u consented, the duke of Shen immediately opposed it because the military taxes derived from those areas sustained the border defenses directed against the northern feudal lords now necessitated by their alliance with Ch'u. When the duke succeeded in persuading the king to rescind the grant, he invariably incurred Tzu Chung's undying enmity. 69 A more notorious cause was the duke's entanglement with Hsia Chi, reputedly a highly promiscuous widow who caused "the deaths of three husbands, a ruler, her son, the extinction of her state, and the exile of two ministers." 0 She first appears in a remarkable scene (for a Confucian classic) of wanton excess in the court of Ch'en, 71 a minor state near Ch'u whose ruler and two ministerial cohorts not only had licentious relations with her, but also visibly wore her undergarments in court and otherwise blatantly flaunted them. This prompted a conscientious but foolish minister to remonstrate with Duke Ling, the ruler, but to his misfortune the latter not only failed to reform or embrace the path of exemplary virtue, but also informed the others of his upbraiding, prompting them to request permission to kill him. The Tso Chuan merely notes that the duke did not refuse, thus ensuring the moralist's demise. 72

The next year Duke Ling was drinking at his paramour's house when he openly remarked that her son resembled one of the ministers, prompting the response that he also looked like the duke. This enraged her son, who killed the duke, but the ministers escaped and fled to Ch'u. 73 The following year the king of Ch'u invaded Ch'en, executed Hsia Chi's son for regicide, restored the two ministers, annexed Ch'en, and converted it into a district of Ch'u, although he later restored its independent status after enduring appropriate moral persuasion. 74 At the time the king himself had wanted to make Hsia Chi one of his concubines but was eventually dissuaded by the duke of Shen, who said: "You cannot. You summoned 

the other feudal lords in order to conduct campaign of rectification against the guilty. Now if you bring Hsia Chi into your palace, it will be because of avarice for her beauty. Avarice for beauty is licentiousness, and licentiousness is a great offense."75 When the king reluctantly yielded, Tzu Fan sought to possess her, prompting the duke of Shen to similarly point out that she was the most cursed of women and exclaim: "Human life is truly difficult, how can one avoid death? However, there are many beautiful

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women in the realm, so why must you have this one?" Tzu Fan naturally desisted as well, and the affair seemed at an end when the king married her off to one of his officers (who then died in battle, allowing his own son to enjoy an illicit relationship with her as well).

However, the duke of Shen had apparently become entranced by her beauty and through a complex subterfuge managed to persuade her to marry him, extricate her from exile, and join her outside Ch'u when he supposedly undertook a military mission to Ch'i. Thereafter the couple fled to Chin, where they resided quietly until the king of Ch'u died and Tzu Fan, along with Tzu Chung, slew his clan members and appropriated their lands. (Contrary to Tzu Fan's urging, the former king had declined to have the duke of Shen expelled from Chin because he had been a faithful minister to his father, compelling them to wait until a new ruler might grant them free reign to strike. 76) Although the duke of Shen had been accompanied by his immediate family, this atrocity enraged him and gave rise to his determination to annihilate Ch'u, his mission to Wu being undertaken as part of that effort.

Covert and Subversive Practices

The Spring and Autumn period witnessed the development, even perfection, of several clandestine techniques designed to adversely affect enemy states. The primary methods were employing sexual attraction--generally beautiful women, but not exclusively so--and bribery to debauch and undermine rulers and other powerful individuals. Spreading rumors to subvert capable individuals also proved astonishingly effective, 

even resulting in the extinction of several states in the Spring and Autumn and subsequent Warring States periods. Assassination became a much favored tool for eliminating enemies, including rulers, because of its low cost in comparison to lengthy military campaigns of uncertain prospects. Finally, spies were increasingly deployed to gather the vital, ever-changing information that diplomatic embassies and defectors could not provide.

Beauty and Sex

Although consorts, concubines, and other favorites initially derived their influence through sexual fascination, because of the hold they acquired over powerful men, coupled with their exclusive access, they could tempt even the most righteous into devious and pernicious acts and thus became potential partners for intrigue. Moreover, the inti

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macy and isolation of these relationships provided them with virtually unlimited opportunities to poison, stab, or otherwise dispatch their lovers in unguarded moments. Although the Tso Chuan contains only a few references to deliberate manipulation of female companions to achieve clandestine objectives, the Shih Chi and other later texts provide extensive evidence of the power that women acquired in the era, as well as that beauty and sex were frequently employed as covert weapons, establishing a precedent for activities that continue to multiply even today.

Confucius's fate when he served as minister of justice near the end of the Spring and Autumn period in the small state of Lu, supposedly the last moral bastion of the rapidly fading Chou world, has been well known in China for more than two millennia. Naturally the district he personally supervised immediately became well ordered. Not only did crimes cease, but also his moral influence induced people to respect the proper distinction of the sexes at a time when propriety was still largely future theory, awaiting the formulation of Confucian doctrine and its promulgation as the basis of public ethics. Whether events proceeded as depicted in his Shih Chi biography, much of the account having long been questioned, 

is basically irrelevant because later generations of thinkers, politicians, generals, and schoolchildren all learned the story from the Analects itself. 77 It was an unruly time, and Lu itself suffered from internal conflict as three powerful, nonroyal families contended for power. When Confucius began to achieve visible progress, the prospect of Lu achieving social order--one of the acknowledged foundations of a strong state--engendered fear in the mighty state of Ch'i:

The duke of Ch'i said: "If Confucius controls the government in Lu, its ruler will certainly become hegemon. If Lu is going to attain hegemony, since our territory is contiguous with theirs we should pay our respects first and present them with some land."

Li Tsu said: "Let me first try to impede Confucius. If I fail to obstruct him and we then sacrifice some territory, how will it be too late?"

Thereupon Li Tsu selected eighty beautiful women from among Ch'i's young ladies, all of whom were dressed in embroidered clothes and could both dance and play elegant music. He then chose thirty teams of dappled horses to convey them to the state of Lu. After arriving, Li Tsu had the female musicians and horses all arrayed outside the high gate in the city's south wall. Chi Huan-tzu went in disguise to observe them two or three times and was about to accept them when he suggested to the ruler that

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he should wander among them. The ruler went and stared at them for a whole day, neglecting government affairs. Tzu Lu said to Confucius, "Now you may leave!"78

Confucius remained hopeful and didn't depart until further incidents of governmental neglect, such as in the performance of the sacrifices, one of the two great affairs of state with war, became manifest. The Analects tersely records that the ruler remained away from the court for three days in a paragraph that countless millions memorized over the centuries: "The people of Ch'i presented female musicians and Chi Huan-tzu accepted them. For three days the ruler did not hold court and 

Confucius departed." 79 The fascination and appeal of beauty, subsequently decried by the Taoists for driving men mad, vividly clashed with Confucian puritanism. In the face of such allure even Confucius himself, despite significant accomplishments, was easily displaced, especially as Ch'i engaged in significant overkill, sending ten octets rather than just one or two, enthralling and overwhelming both Chi Huan-tzu and the duke of Lu. Later generations thus acquired an indelible image and assimilated a strong lesson on how to destroy governments and ministers through the lure of sex and beauty.

More than a century earlier an interesting incident between the peripheral state of Ch'in, just beginning to develop into a serious power, and the so-called barbarian Jung people illustrates the Chinese propensity to employ cultural weapons, including sophisticated women, to fascinate and thereby enervate those viewed as less civilized:

Having heard that Duke Mu of Ch'in was a worthy ruler, the king of the Jung nomadic peoples dispatched Yu Yé on a reconnaissance mission to Ch'in. Since his ancestors had been natives of the nearby state of Chin before fleeing into Jung territory, Yu Yé could speak Chin's language. When Duke Mu displayed his palaces and accumulated treasures to him, Yu Yé remarked, "If you had ghosts make all these, it surely exhausted their spirit; it you forced men to make them, it must have caused great suffering!"

Duke Mu, astounded by his reply, inquired: "The central states have structured their administrations on the Book of Odes, the Book of Documents, the rites and music, laws and measures, but still frequently experience turbulence. Now since the Jung and Yi peoples lack all these, what do you employ to govern? Isn't it difficult?"

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Yu Yé laughingly replied: "This is why the central states are unsettled. Ever since the era when the sagacious Yellow Emperor fashioned the rites and music, laws and measures, and personally set the example but barely attained a minor degree of order, down through the present generation rulers 

have become increasingly arrogant and licentious. Superiors exploit the awesomeness of the laws and measures in order to upbraid and control those below them, while the people, totally exhausted, view their superiors with annoyance for failing to practice benevolence and righteousness. Thus superiors and inferiors compete in detesting each other and go on to murder and slay each other. This even results in the extinction of extended families, all through concepts such as the rites and music. However, the Jung and Yi are different. Superiors encompass purity and virtue in dealing with inferiors, while inferiors embrace loyalty and good faith in the affairs of their superiors. Governing the entire state is like controlling the body. Since the people do not perceive the means of control, it truly is the administration of a Sage."

Duke Mu thereupon withdrew to query his palace secretary: "I have heard that the presence of a Sage in a neighboring state is worrisome to its enemies. Since Yu Yé is a Worthy, we may be harmed. How should we handle this?"

The palace secretary replied: "The king of the Jung dwells in a rustic, isolated place so has never heard the sounds of the central states. You might try dispatching some female musicians in order to snatch away his will. You could also make some requests of Yu Yé in order to estrange him from the Jung, and retain him rather than sending him back so that he misses the appointed time to return. The king of the Jung will find this strange and certainly begin to doubt Yu Yé. When a gulf has developed between ruler and minister, we can then imprison him. Moreover, if the Jung king loves the music, he will invariably grow lax in government matters."80

Duke Mu assented. Therefore, after returning to the interview hall, he brought their mats close together, personally handed vessels of food to Yu Yé, and proceeded to interrogate him about the Jung's terrain, as well as the army's strategic power. After his queries had been fully satisfied, he had the palace secretary dispatch two octets of female musicians to the king of the Jung. When the latter received them, he was extremely pleased and therefore failed to shift their encampment at the end of the year. 81 Thereupon Duke Mu had Yu Yé returned. After arriving, he re 

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monstrated with the king on several occasions but went unheeded. In addition, Duke Mu repeatedly had emissaries secretly press Yu Yé until he finally abandoned the Jung and surrendered to Ch'in. Duke Mu then treated him with all the courtesies due an honored guest and queried him on the best deployments for attacking the Jung. Three years later, employing Yu Yé's strategy, Duke Mu finally attacked the king of the Jung and eventually added twelve new subsidiary states in territory that stretched a thousand kilometers into the west, thereby becoming hegemon of the Western Jung. 82

Note that through their efforts to mesmerize the Jung ruler, Duke Mu acquired a "local guide," one of Sun-tzu's five types of agents, converting an enemy agent--an observer--into a defector or turned agent. Strangely, Yu Yé apparently was not perturbed about betraying the Jung's strategic secrets even after growing up among them, eventually responding to preferential treatment, despite his vaunted moral superiority. Ironically, Ch'in's employment of female musicians, viewed as the essence of Chinese culture and a symbol of its material affluence, was actually a case of a "semibarbarian" state simply wielding the enervating weapons of seductive decadence against a more robust, less artifact burdened tribal people. (From the Chinese ethnocentrist perspective, each step away from the central states led only into less civilized, more unrighteous cultures. Accordingly, the sedentary, agriculturally bound central kingdom's subsequent policies to contain the steppe peoples focused on employing the pernicious, debilitating effects of cultural weapons.)

Later ages were so struck by Duke Mu's story that it was incorporated in various forms in several eclectic works of the late Warring States and Han periods, as well as the writings of such political philosophers as Han Fei-tzu. 83 A version found in the Lé-shih Ch'un- ch'iu embodies some interesting developments: "When Duke Mu dispatched two octets of female musicians and a skilled chef to them, the king of the Jung was overjoyed and for this reason constantly ate and drank day and night without interruption. Among his attendants someone warned that Ch'in invaders would come, so he took up a bow 

and shot him. When the invaders indeed arrived, the ruler was sleeping drunkenly beside a wine jar, so the troops tied him up and captured him alive." 84

The acquisition of power and influence by sexually beloved consorts and concubines invariably provided a way for external forces to achieve inimical purposes once the slightest disaffection became evident or the woman's or her son's position was vitally threatened. (Al

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though stories abound throughout Chinese history of widespread human tragedy wrought by internal intrigues, they fall beyond the scope of our study, which focuses upon state-initiated covert actions rather than domestic politics.) Women also acquired power as a ruler's queen, empress, or mother, often to the detriment of state interests. A brief but telling example, much cited thereafter, appears in a Tso Chuan account of events following one of the many battles between the two powerful states of Chin and Ch'in. Chin's youthful ruler had been persuaded to attack Ch'in, despite his father's recent death--the body still lay uninterred--on the grounds that if "one releases an enemy even for a single day, the misfortune will extend for several generations." Despite his qualms, Chin's forces proved victorious, capturing three important commanders, who were brought back to the capital for execution. However, the ruler's mother--originally a princess of the enemy state of Ch'in--interceded on their behalf, craftily suggesting that "since they had caused enmity between two rulers, my father (the duke of Ch'in) would not be satiated even if he were to get hold of them and eat them. So why tarnish yourself by executing them? Why not have them returned to Ch'in and allow my father free expression of his will?"

Easily persuaded by his mother's words despite their obviousness, the duke assented and released them, to the great consternation of his chief commander, who, in scathingly rebuking him, expressed the timeless outrage of soldiers who find their sacrifices turned to naught for political reasons: "Our warriors, through brute strength, captured them on the plains of battle, yet in just a short while a woman has succeeded in releasing them. You have subverted the army's 

accomplishments and augmented the invader's enmity. We will certainly perish in no time!" Naturally the duke, realizing the enormity of his negligence, dispatched troops to recapture the three commanders, but the pursuers succeeded only in hearing a sarcastic retort as the former captives crossed the river. Rather than being executed, they were in fact warmly welcomed by the duke of Ch'in and lived to distinguish themselves in subsequent engagements with Chin. 85

Bribes

When we extrapolate from the few important instances preserved in the Tso Chuan and other writings, we see that bribes were frequently employed in the Spring and Autumn period, whether to purchase information or alter the course of events by subverting important ministers. Moreover, their number and importance increased as the strife among the states intensified coincident with the decline of the Chou

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ruling house. As the peripheral states such as Ch'u, Wu, and eventually Yéeh grew in strength, alliance building among the original northern plains states became important and could reasonably be ensured by suborning the important ministerial families through generous treatment, both openly and covertly. One of the most famous cases in Chinese history unfolded in the upstart state of Wu in conjunction with Wu Tzu-hsé's campaign to guarantee Wu's mastery of the world by completely exterminating the just vanquished state of Yéeh. However, King Fu-ch'ai was persuaded by Po P'i--the Benedict Arnold whose name became synonymous with shortsighted, traitorous greed--to grant Yéeh leniency. Wu Tzu-hsé was betrayed and martyred by Po P'i's slanders, and his dramatic life story, initially portrayed in the Shih Chi, became the stuff of storytellers and playwrights down through the ages:

About 504 B.C. the state of Wu, employing the strategies of Wu Tzu-hsé and Sun Wu, had destroyed the strong state of Ch'u to the west, overawed Ch'i and Chin to the north, and forced the people of Yéeh in the south to act submissively. Four years later Confucius was made minister in Lu, and four years after that Wu attacked Yéeh. King Kou-chien of Yéeh mounted a 

counterattack and defeated Wu at Ku-su, injuring King Ho-lé's toe, so Wu withdrew its army. Ho-lé, who had developed an infection from his wound and was near death, addressed Heir Apparent Fu-ch'ai, "Will you ever forget that Kou-chien killed your father?" Fu-ch'ai replied, "I would not dare forget it." That evening Ho-lé died. Fuch'ai was then enthroned as king, appointed Po P'i as Grand Steward, and practiced warfare and archery.

Two years later he attacked Yéeh, defeating Yéeh at Fu-chiao. Kou-chien, king of Yéeh, with his remaining five thousand troops ensconced himself on the heights of K'uai-chi, and had the high official Wen Chung dispatched with generous gifts to seek peace through Wu's Grand Steward Po P'i, offering to subordinate their state as a menial subject to Wu. King Fu-ch'ai was about to give his assent when Wu Tzu-hsé remonstrated with him: "The king of Yéeh is capable of enduring great hardship. If your majesty does not exterminate him now, you will certainly regret it later." Instead of heeding his advice, the king of Wu employed Po P'i's plans and made peace with Yéeh.

Five years later the king of Wu heard that Duke Ching of Ch'i had died and that Ch'i's great ministers were contending for favor. Since the new ruler was weak, Fu-ch'ai mobilized Wu's army to go north and attack Ch'i. Wu Tzu-hsé remonstrated: " Kou-chien

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does not have two flavors in his food. He consoles the families of the dead and inquires about the ill because he wants to employ them. If this man doesn't die, he will inevitably cause disaster for Wu. Today Wu's possessing Yéeh is like a man having an acute illness in his abdomen. If your majesty does not make Yéeh his priority but instead focuses upon Ch'i, won't it truly be an error?" The king did not listen, but instead attacked Ch'i, greatly defeating their army at Ai-ling and going on to overawe the rulers of Tsou and Lu before returning. He increasingly distanced himself from Wu Tzu-hsé's plans.

Four years later when the king of Wu was about to go north to attack Ch'i, Kou-chien, employing Tzu-kung's strategy, led his 

masses to assist Wu while greatly augmenting the treasures that he had presented to Po P'i. Having already received bribes from Yéeh on several occasions, Grand Steward P'i's love and trust for Yéeh became ever greater, and day and night he spoke on Yéeh's behalf to the King of Wu. The king trusted and employed Po P'i's plans.

Wu Tzu-hsé remonstrated: "Now Yéeh is an abdominal illness. Today you trust their specious phrases and false behavior while coveting Ch'i. If you destroy Ch'i, it will be like gaining a rocky field, of no utility. Moreover the 'Announcement of P'an Keng' said: 'If there are those who overturn, overstep, or are disrespectful to my orders, then cut off their noses, utterly exterminate them. Ensure that they will not leave behind any posterity, do not allow their seed to be moved to this city.' This is how the Shang arose. I would like your majesty to abandon Ch'i and give priority to Yéeh. If you do not, you will experience immeasurable regret."

But the king did not listen, and sent Wu Tzu-hsé to Ch'i. When Tzu-hsé was about to return to Wu, he addressed his son: "I have remonstrated with the king several times, but the king has not employed my plans. I now perceive that Wu is lost. For you to perish together with Wu would be of no advantage." Then he entrusted his son to Pao Mu of Ch'i, and returned to report to Wu.

Wu's Grand Steward Po P'i had already had disagreements with Tzu-hsé, so he slandered him: "Tzu-hsé's character is hard and brutal, of little charity, suspicious and malevolent. I fear his enmity will cause great disaster. Previously your majesty wanted to attack Ch'i, but Tzu-hsé felt it was not possible. In the end your majesty attacked it with great success. Tzu-hsé was ashamed that his strategies had not been employed, so he reacted with rancor. Now that you are again about to attack Ch'i, Tzu-hsé alone opposes and strongly remonstrates against it. He obstructs and slan

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ders those in authority and would rejoice if Wu should be defeated since his own plans would then prevail. Now your majesty is himself going forth, assembling the entire military 

force of the state in order to attack Ch'i. Because Tzu-hsé's remonstrances have not been heeded, he declines to participate and feigns illness and inability to travel. Your majesty must be prepared; for this to turn into a disaster would not be difficult.

"Moreover, I dispatched men to secretly observe him. When he was an emissary to Ch'i, he entrusted his son to the Pao clan of Ch'i. Now he is a minister who within has failed to attain his ambition and without relies on the feudal lords; who personally acted as the former king's minister for planning but now is not used. He is constantly discontented and resentful. I would like your majesty to plan for it early on."

The king of Wu said: "Not only do you speak about it, I also have doubted him." Then he had an emissary present Wu Tzu-hsé with the Shu-lé sword, saying, "You should use this to die."

Wu Tzu-hsé looked toward Heaven and sighed: "Alas! The slanderous minister Po P'i causes chaos, but the king turns around and executes me! I caused your father to become hegemon. When you had not yet been established as heir apparent and the various princes were contending for the designation, I engaged in a death struggle on your behalf with the former king. You almost were not established. When you gained the throne, you wanted to divide the state of Wu with me, but I wouldn't dare hope for it. Yet now you listen to the speeches of sycophants and thereby kill your elders."

Then he instructed his retainers: "You must plant my grave with catalpa trees in order that they may be used for coffins. And gouge out my eyes and suspend them above Wu's east gate so that I may see Yéeh's invaders enter and destroy Wu." Then he cut his throat and died. When the king of Wu heard about it, he was enraged and seized Tzu-hsé's corpse, stuffed it into a leather sack, and floated it out onto the Yangtze River. The people of Wu pitied him, so they erected a shrine above the river. Thereafter it was called "Mount Hsé."

When the king had executed Wu Tzu-hsé, he proceeded to attack Ch'i. The Pao clan of Ch'i assassinated their ruler Duke Tao and set up Yang Sheng. The king of Wu wanted to mount a punitive expedition against the brigands but was not victorious and abandoned it. Two years later he summoned the rulers of 

Lu and Wei to a meeting at T'ao-kao. The year after he convened a great meeting of the feudal lords in the north at Yellow Pool, forcing

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the Chou to come. Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, suddenly attacked, killing Wu's heir apparent and destroying his forces. When the king of Wu heard about it, he returned and had envoys arrange a truce with Yüeh with generous presents. Nine years thereafter Kou-chien went on to exterminate Wu, killing King Fu-ch'ai. He also executed the Grand Steward Po P'i because he had been disloyal to his ruler, accepted heavy bribes from external sources, and colluded with him. 86

As the section on covert programs will show, Yüeh's conquest over Wu was not accidental, but was the result of careful planning, coupled with a focused effort to implement subversive measures, such as corrupting the king's confidant into becoming their minion. Po P'i's desire to eliminate his rival (despite Wu Tzu-hsü having introduced him when he arrived in exile), coupled with his greed, made him an ideal candidate for Yüeh's subversive efforts. Circumstantial developments were then easily twisted by Po P'i to Yüeh's advantage and Wu Tzu-hsü's fate sealed.

Assassins

Assassination was dramatically employed to eliminate both rivals and enemies, ensure the continued enjoyment of power, and adversely affect other states, as well as frequently resorted to in domestic intrigues and intracourt conflicts. The Tso Chuan notes the following incident for 626 B.C.: 87 "Tzu Tseng, a member of the royal family, fled Cheng and sought refuge in Sung. He liked to gather bird feathers to make hats. When the earl of Cheng heard about this, he was angered and dispatched a robber to lure him out of Sung and kill him in the border area between Sung and Ch'en." Although the Tso Chuan rationalizes that the glaring disparity between the man's actual dress and proper convention occasioned his death, the incident vividly illustrates the readiness of rulers to employ assassins outside state borders even for trivial reasons. 88 

A second example from the Tso Chuan shows how easily palace intrigues, even among minor nobles, spawned assassination attempts:

In the beginning Shu-sun Ch'eng-tzu wanted to establish Wu-shu to succeed him, but Kung-juo Mao strongly argued against it, saying that he should not. However, Ch'eng-tzu still designated him as his heir and then died. Kung-nan had a brigand shoot arrows at Wu-shu but was unable to kill him. As Kung-nan was Master of Horse, he dispatched Kung-juo to be steward of Hou township. Af

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ter Wu-shu had been established, he ordered Hou Fan, Master of Horse in Hou, to kill Kung-juo but he failed. One of Wu-shu's grooms said: "If I wander through his court with a sword, Kung- juo will surely ask whose sword it might be. When I reply it is yours, he will certainly want to see it. I will feign awkwardness and grope for the end, and then I can kill him." He was employed as suggested. Kung-juo said, "Do you intend to treat me like the king of Wu?"89 The groom then slew him. 90

Probably the most famous episode, one romanticized in later legend and literature, was Ho-lü's employment of Chuan Chu (whose name became synonymous with assassins) to kill the king so that he could succeed him late in the sixth century B.C. The following retelling, from the Wu Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu, commences with Ho-lü's resistance to Wu Tzu-hsü's growing influence over the king, forcing Wu Tzu-hsü to adopt a long-range plan:

King Liao knew that Wu Tzu-hsü wanted to mobilize the army to attack Ch'u and gain revenge for his father's and brother's deaths. Prince Kuang [Ho-lü], who was plotting King Liao's death, feared Wu might first become favored by the king and thus somehow thwart his plan. Therefore he calumnized Wu Tzu-hsü's plan: "This attack on Ch'u is designed solely to avenge his personal grievance rather than being in Wu's interest. My lord should not employ it."

Wu Tzu-hsü realized that Prince Kuang wanted to harm King Liao, so he said to himself, "Since this Kuang has subversive 

intentions, he cannot yet be persuaded to undertake external affairs." Then he went in to see King Liao and said, "I have heard that the feudal lords do not mobilize troops and attack other states for a common person."

King Liao asked, "Why do you say this?"

Wu Tzu-hsü replied: "The feudal lords exercise despotic government; it is not their intention to rescue the distressed and thereafter mobilize the army. At present your august majesty manipulates the state and controls its awesomeness. To mobilize the army for an ordinary fellow would not be righteous. Therefore I dare not act in accord with your majesty's edict." King Liao therefore ceased preparations for the attack, and Wu Tzu-hsü retired to farm in the wilds. However, he continued to seek out courageous individuals and recommend them to Prince Kuang, hoping thereby to curry favor with him. Thus the prince gained Chuan Chu.

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Chuan Chu was a native of T'ang-yi. When Wu Tzu-hsü was fleeing from Ch'u to Wu, he happened to encounter him on the road when Chuan was about to fight with another man. When he attacked his enemy, his anger became as great as ten thousand men, so extreme it could not be withstood. However, as soon as he heard his wife's voice, he immediately returned home. Wu Tzu-hsü found this to be strange and therefore queried him about it: "How is it that, although your anger was overwhelming, as soon as you heard a woman's voice it broke? I would like to know if there is an explanation."

Chuan Chu said: "You have misclassified my behavior as simply that of a stupid fellow. How can you speak about it in such low terms? To humble oneself before a single man one must be able to stretch out over ten thousand."

Wu Tzu-hsü then examined his appearance: a blunt forehead with deep set eyes, a tiger's chest with a bear's back, fierce in coping with difficulties. Knowing that he was a courageous individual, he secretly allied himself to him, wanting to employ him later. Thus, when he chanced upon Prince Kuang's plot, Wu Tzu- hsü introduced him to the prince. After Kuang had 

admitted Chuan Chu as a retainer and treated him respectfully, he said to him, "Heaven has provided you to supplement my lost roots."

Chuan Chu replied: "When Yü-mei, the late king, died, King Liao established himself as the rightful heir. Why does your lordship want to harm him?"

Prince Kuang replied: "The previous ruler, Shou-meng, had four sons: the eldest, Chu-fan, my father; and then Yü-chi, Yü-mei, and Chi-cha. Chi-cha was morally exemplary, so when my father Chu-fan was about to die, he transmitted the throne to the next eldest of Shou-meng's sons, thinking that it would eventually devolve to Chi-cha. However, Chi-cha had been deputed on a mission to the feudal lords and was absent, unwilling to return. When Yü-mei died, the throne was vacant and Chi-cha should have been established. Otherwise, it should have been me, the eldest son of Chu-fan, so how is it that Liao came to be enthroned? My power was weak, inadequate to seize control of events. Without employing force, how may I now satisfy my ambitions? Even if I take the throne from Liao and Chi-cha returns from the east, he will not depose me."

Chuan Chu said: "Why not have some of the king's favored ministers leisurely speak about the former king's edict at the ruler's side in order to stimulate his thoughts? Arrange that he knows to whom the state will give their allegiance. Why must

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you personally prepare swordsmen and thereby damage the Virtue of the former king?"

Prince Kuang replied: " Liao has always been greedy and relies on strength. He knows the advantages of advancing but never considers withdrawing or yielding. For this reason I am seeking out similarly troubled men in order to unite our strength. I only wanted you to understand my righteousness."

Chuan Chu replied: "My lord's words have been extremely expressive. What do they imply for you, sir?" 

Prince Kuang said: "Nothing. I was speaking about the altars of state. Ordinary men cannot undertake such affairs but only await Heaven's mandate."

Chuan Chu said, "I would like to receive your mandate."

Prince Kuang replied, "The time is not yet appropriate."

Chuan Chu said: "When one wants to kill his ruler, he must first find out what he loves. What is it that the king loves?"

Kuang replied, "He loves the taste of food."

Chuan Chu asked, "What flavors does he find delicious?"

Kuang replied, "He likes barbecued fish."

Chuan Chu then departed to Lake T'ai, where he studied how to barbecue fish for three months. When he had mastered its flavor, he sat back quietly and awaited Prince Kuang's orders.

In the spring of King Liao's thirteenth year, hoping to exploit Ch'u's mourning for their king by mounting an attack, the king dispatched Princes Kai-yü and Chu-yung in command of troops to besiege Ch'u's capital, and deputed Chi-cha as an ambassador to Chin, where he might observe the reactions of the feudal lords. Ch'u then sent forth some troops that cut off Wu's armies from the rear so that they were unable to return to Wu. Prince Kuang's heart then stirred.

Wu Tzu-hsü realized that Prince Kuang perceived that the vital moment for change had arrived, so he spoke with him: "Now that the king has attacked Ch'u and the fate of your two younger brothers and their troops is uncertain, Chuan Chu's actions are urgently required. The time will not come again and cannot be lost."

Accordingly the prince saw Chuan Chu: "Presently the king's two younger brothers are attacking Ch'u while Chi-cha has not yet returned from his mission. At this time, if we do not seek it, we will not gain anything. The moment cannot be lost. Moreover, I am the former king's direct descendant."

Chuan Chu said: "KingLiao can be slain. His mother is old, his sons weak. His younger brothers have attacked Ch'u, but Ch'u 

has severed their rear. Now the state of Wu suffers from external

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difficulties while lacking stalwart ministers within. If I am not the man, who is?"

In the fourth month Prince Kuang secreted mailed warriors in ambush in a subterranean chamber, prepared a feast, and invited King Liao. Liao spoke plainly with his mother: "PrinceKuang has prepared a drinking feast for me. I do not expect any trouble, but what do you think?" His mother replied: " Kuang's temperament is hasty, and he constantly has an embarrassed, hateful countenance. You must be cautious."

King Liao then put on three layers of lamellar iron armor and had his personal bodyguards deployed along the road. All the way from the palace gate to Kuang's mansion, up the steps, and around his seat, all were the king's relatives. He had all those in attendance upon him stand, holding long spear-tipped halberds turned outward. When they were flushed with wine, Prince Kuang feigned having a foot pain and went into the subterranean chamber, where he had Chuan Chu place a dagger inside the barbecued fish and bring it in. When Chuan Chu reached King Liao he tore open the barbecued fish and pushed the dagger out. The attendants standing around the king immediately stabbed him in the chest with their halberds. Although his chest was split and shattered, Chuan Chu held the dagger firmly and stabbed King Liao, piercing through the armor and penetrating his back. With King Liao already dead the attendants slew Chuan Chu. All the officials in attendance moved about in confusion and Prince Kuang then attacked them with the mailed soldiers he had concealed in ambush, exterminating them all. The prince subsequently ascended the throne as King Ho-lü, enfeoffed Chuan Chu's son, and appointed him as a guest minister. 91

The dramatic account concludes with the usurper symbolically offering to yield the throne to Chi-cha, who of course declines it, consistent with his previous posture in being unwilling to accept it instead of his older brothers or after their deaths. (Such "virtuous declinations," while ensuring temporary fame, 

frequently caused enormous political carnage in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods.) Further implications of Prince Kuang's actions included the surrender of the two Wu commanders to Ch'u, where they were subsequently rewarded for their treachery with fiefs in Ch'u's borderlands, and the murder of the former heir apparent by the infamous Ching K'o (whose mission is reprised in the assassination section).

Even though largely a case of resolving the internal issue of succession, this episode well illustrates not only a willingness to employ assassins, but also the preparation required, the importance of ferreting

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out the victim's desires and then exploiting them. Despite the prevalence of assassination throughout Chinese history, after Ssu-ma Ch'ien's definitive Shih Chi chapter the official histories never again sanctified such behavior with a dedicated biographical section. Individual biographies and the accounts of dynastic revolutions frequently mention covert murders, but rarely with the expansive detail that characterized the Spring and Autumn and subsequent Warring States periods when their employment was commonplace, thereby establishing a predisposition, a virtual mind-set for subsequent generations.

Strong-arm and Stealth Techniques

In 681 B.C. the state of Sung offered generous bribes to Ch'en if they would return a rebel who had fled there. Accordingly, "the men of Ch'en employed a woman to inebriate the rebel with wine and then thrust him into a leather sack made from rhinoceros hide. By the time they arrived in Sung, his hands and feet were both visible. He was subsequently executed and pickled." 92 The men of Ch'en thus employed two potent weapons in combination, women and wine, to throw the man off guard and capture him, being motivated by the promised rewards, even though they certainly knew he would be executed.

As a result of the complex factional struggles over Chin's regal succession in 620 B.C., Shih Hui--a high official with significant military experience--and others were compelled to 

take refuge in nearby Ch'in. Since Ch'in and Chin frequently clashed, his presence there was viewed as troubling, particularly when he began to provide intelligence and tactical advice:

Because of its defeat at the battle of Ling-ku in 620 B.C., in the middle of winter, 615 B.C., Ch'in attacked Chin and seized Chima. Chin's forces mounted a defense with Chao Tun in command of the Central Army and Hsi Ch'üeh in command of the Upper Army. After following Ch'in's force to Ho-ch'ü, Yü P'ien, assistant commander of the Upper Army, advised: "Ch'in cannot long endure. Let's deepen our moats, solidify the fortifications, encamp, and wait them out." They followed his suggestion.

Ch'in's soldiers wanted to fight so the Earl of Ch'in asked Shih Hui, "How can we get them to fight?" He replied: " Chao Tun's recently appointed subordinate, Yü P'ien, certainly formulated this plan to exhaust our army. Chao has another staff member, an imperial relative named Ch'uan. He is spoiled and weak and lacks experience in military affairs, but loves courage, acts irrationally, and also hates it that Yü P'ien is acting as assistant commander of

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the Upper Army. If you have some light troops strike him, it will be possible." The earl of Ch'in, throwing a jade disc into the Yellow River, prayed for victory to the river spirit.

On the fourth day of the twelfth month a Ch'in army suddenly mounted a fleeting attack on Chin's Upper Army. Chao Ch'uan, who pursued them but was unable to catch up, returned and angrily said: "We sack up provisions and wear armor solely to seek out the enemy. If we do not attack the enemy when they arrive, what are we waiting for?"

The provost said, "We are waiting for the right time."

Ch'uan replied: "I do not understand such plans. I am going out alone." Then he went forth with the troops under his command. 

Huan-tzu said: "If Ch'in captures Ch'uan, it will be like getting one of our ministers. If Ch'in then returns home victorious, what shall we report to our ruler?" Then they all went forth to engage the enemy in battle, after which a mutual withdrawal occurred. 93

Although Ch'in's forces eventually retreated that night after an inconclusive engagement, clearly Shih Hui understood Chin's command structure and how their personalities might be manipulated to achieve tactical objectives. Chin's officials therefore brooded over their misfortune:

The men of Chin were troubled by Ch'in's employment of Shih Hui, so in the summer of 614 B.C. the six cabinet ministers held a meeting at Chu-fu. Chao Hsüan-tzu said: "With Shih Hui in Ch'in and Chia Chi active among the Jung, difficult days have befallen us. What can we do about it?"

Chung-hang Huan-tzu said, "Please bring Chia Chi back because he is an expert in foreign affairs and previously distinguished himself in serving the state."

Hsi Ch'eng-tzu said: " Chia Chi is rebellious and his offense was great. He is not equal to Shih Hui, who can endure mean condition and has a sense of shame, who is complaisant and not offensive. He is wise enough to be employed and innocent of any offense."

They then dispatched Shou-yü to feign revolting from Chin with his fief of Wei in order to lure Shih Hui back. Moreover, they seized Shou-yü's wife and had him escape from Chin at night. He therefore sought refuge in Ch'in, where the earl allowed him to stay. While at court he deliberately stepped on Shih Hui's foot. When the earl of Ch'in deployed the army west of the Yellow River, forces from Wei were on the eastern side. Shou-yü said,

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"Please depute two or three officials originally from the east to first advance with me."

The earl ordered Shih Hui to go but he tried to decline, saying: "The people of Chin are like tigers and wolves. If they break 

their word, I will die and my wife and children will be exterminated. This will not be to your advantage, nor will regret be of any avail."

The earl of Ch'in said, "If they break their word, I swear by the spirit of the Yellow River to return your wife and children to Chin." Shih Hui then departed. Shao Ch'ao presented him with a whip, saying: "Please do not refer to Chin as lacking any real men. It is simply that my plans are not employed."

When they had already forded the river, the men from Wei let out a roar and then returned [to Chin] with Shih Hui. The earl of Ch'in accordingly sent back his wife and children, but those [from the original party] who remained behind changed their surnames to Liu. 94

This passage shows how a plausible cover story was concocted for the recovery effort and a second ruse--the request for eastern natives, knowing that Shih Hui would certainly be among those chosen, if not the only one--employed that was open enough for the earl of Ch'in to carelessly respond as desired. However, the plan was penetrated by Shao Ch'ao, to little avail but his own subsequent execution. 95 At the time the Yellow River demarked the border between Chin and Wei, making Shih Hui's restoration a simple matter of fording the river, for once he was in Wei territory, essentially part of Chin, his exile was over. Interestingly, the Shih Chi recounts the affair somewhat differently, asserting that when Chin had Wei Shou-yü pretend to rebel, Ch'in dispatched his former countryman Shih Hui to meet him somewhere inside their borders. Wei then forcefully seized and returned him to Chin, providing a striking example of political kidnapping. 96 In either case, as a false traitor Wei Shou-yü was certainly one of history's earliest counterfeit defectors.

An example of actively exploiting an exile's predicament arose when the king's succession spawned bitter strife among Ch'i's major families in 554 B.C. and Chin exploited their chaos to effect a significant incursion. Three years later somewhat reversed circumstances saw Luan Ying, a strong contender for the throne of Chin, flee to Ch'u and then Ch'i: 

In 551 B.C. a Chin high official named Luan Ying fled to Ch'i. Duke Chuang generously rewarded him and treated him as an

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honored guest. Yen Ying and T'ien Wen-tzu objected, but the duke wouldn't listen. The next year Duke Chuang dispatched Luan Ying as an agent into the city of Ch'ü-wo in Chin to mount a subversive internal response, and had troops follow up through T'ai- hang and Meng-men. However, when Luan Ying was defeated, Ch'i's armies withdrew, seizing Chao-ke instead. 97

According to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's summary depiction, Luan Ying was a traitor cleverly exploited by Ch'i as a subversive agent to undermine his native city's defenses. However, the Tso Chuan depicts these events as distinct actions separated by several months. At the time of his expulsion Luan Ying was stigmatized as a troublemaker whom the feudal lords should deny refuge, but Duke Chuang of Ch'i apparently discerned an excellent opportunity to foster renewed chaos in Chin and perhaps even facilitate Luan Ying's seizure of the throne, thereby converting Chin from a constant threat into a useful ally. When Ch'i was about to dispatch several court women to a wedding ceremony in the fourth month, the duke therefore arranged for Luan Ying and a few key supporters to conceal themselves within the baggage train that ventured to Chin. 98 Luan subsequently attempted to mount a revolt in Ch'ü-wo, his native city, but failed and was eventually besieged at another location for several months. According to the Tso Chuan, 99 Ch'i's forces didn't begin their advance until the autumn, some months later, commencing in the state of Wei; eventually seized Chao-ke; then divided their forces and proceeded by the two routes noted in the Shih Chi, scoring minor victories and occupying some terrain. Somewhat thereafter, in the winter Luan Ying was captured and executed, concluding the dissociated series of events. However, from them it is clear that Ch'i cleverly exploited a fleeting opportunity by employing disguise and subterfuge to support an internal putsch. Moreover, several centuries later Ssu-ma Ch'ien viewed the events as interconnected, despite the Tso Chuan's clear time lapse between actions, implying a personal predisposition--or 

perhaps a Han dynasty mind-set--to perceive complex covert operations in the historical relationships between states and the frequent utilization of agents in foreign affairs. 100

Divination and Prognostication

The Spring and Autumn period witnessed the vibrant continuation of Shang dynasty divination practices, as well as the inception of casting by milfoil stalks that eventually coalesced into the now famous IChing

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Ching. Lacking adequate information from other sources, the political elite, in the quest for reliable information on the advisability of courses of action, frequently turned to prognostication by turtle shell, divination by milfoil, the examination of natural phenomena, and cognizance of other unusual events. Pre-battle divination, routinely performed to decide whether to commit troops to an engagement, accounts for roughly one-fourth of the some sixty important prognostications recorded in the Tso Chuan, excluding the martial implications of the extensive accounts it preserves. (Marriage, sacrifices, children, moving of cities, and illness are the other common categories.) Because this tradition continued throughout Chinese history in an attempt to penetrate otherwise unfathomable events--despite strong voices raised in opposition--it will be examined more extensively in the final chapter. An example from 563 B.C., when a state's fate hung in the balance, illustrates this Spring and Autumn quest for military information:

In June Ch'u and Cheng attacked Sung and besieged its capital. The marquis of Wei sent a force to rescue Sung. Tzu Chan of Cheng said: "We must attack Wei; otherwise, we will not be supporting Ch'u. We have already offended Chin [by attacking its ally of Sung], so if we then offend Ch'u, how will the state survive?"

Tzu Ssu replied, "The state is exhausted."

Tzu Chan retorted: "If we offend two great states we will certainly perish. Isn't illness preferable to death?" The other 

high officials all concurred. Therefore Huang Erh led the army forth to invade Wei because of Ch'u's commands.

Wei's ruler performed divination by turtle shell to see if they should pursue this invading force and then presented the pattern to the late ruler's mother. She then inquired about the accompanying prognosticatory verses and was advised they read: "The omen is like a mountain height, there is a force that goes forth and suffers the loss of its stalwart leader." She then interpreted, "To lose the stalwart means that it will be advantageous to defend against the invaders. You should plan for it." The forces from Wei pursued Cheng's army and captured Huang Erh at Ch'ien-ch'iu. 101

An incident somewhat more than two decades later, although evidencing strong belief in the veracity of such procedures, shows the importance of the charge and the offhand rejection of results that belie the tactical situation:

In 538 B.C. Wu attacked Ch'u. Yang Kai, prime minister of Ch'u, performed divination by turtle shell to inquire about the

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prospects, but the result was inauspicious. Tzu Yü, the Minister of War, said: "We have gained a position upstream from them, so how can it be inauspicious? Moreover, of old Ch'u's Minister of War made the charge before cracking the shell, so let me change it." He then ordered, "Even though I and my men perish, if the remainder of Ch'u's forces follow on may it be that we gain a great victory." The result was auspicious. They then engaged the enemy at Chang-an. The Minister of War died first, but the army sustained the effort and Ch'u severely defeated Wu's army, even capturing the king of Wu's command vessel. 102

The Battle of Yen-ling

The battle of Yen-ling, which occurred in 574 B.C. and was previously mentioned in Sheng-tzu's review of Ch'u's numerous defectors, epitomizes the state of intelligence activities in the Spring and Autumn period and thus merits recounting to conclude the era's discussion: 

The duke of Chin was about to attack the state of Cheng, which had shifted its allegiance to Ch'u. Fan Wen-tzu remarked: "If I had my wish, all the feudal lords would rebel, for then Chin would truly arise. If only Cheng rebels, disaster will soon befall our state."

Luan Shu replied, "In my time we cannot lose the allegiance of the feudal lords, so we must attack Cheng." Thereupon they mobilized the army. Luan Shu was in command of the Center Army and Fan Wen-tzu was his adjutant. Hsi Ch'i was in command of the Upper Army, with Hsün Yen as adjutant. Han Chüeh was in command of the Lower Army, while Hsi Chih was adjutant of the New Army. Hsün Ying was in charge of defense. Hsi Ch'ou went to Wei and then Ch'i to request forces, as did Luan Yen in Lu. Meng Hsien-tzu remarked, "They will be victorious."

After Chin's four armies had set out, Cheng learned about the Chin force and deputed an emissary to inform Ch'u, accompanied by Yao Kou-erh, a high official. King Kung of Ch'u led his forces out to rescue Cheng, with the Minister of War, Tzu Fan, in command of the Center Army; the prime minister, Tzu Chung, in command of the Army of the Left; and the deputy minister, Tzu Hsü, in command of the Army of the Right. When they passed by the former state of Shen, Tzu Fan visited Shen Shu-shih, a retired Ch'u high minister, to inquire about his thoughts on the army.

He replied: "Virtue, punishment, reverence, righteousness, the rites, and fidelity are the implements of warfare. Virtue is the

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means to bespread beneficence, punishment to rectify, reverence to secure the spirits, righteousness to establish what is advantageous, the rites to accord with the seasons, and fidelity to preserve things. When the people's livelihood is abundant Virtue is upright, when employments are advantageous affairs are constrained. Government measures meet no opposition, whatever is sought is fully supplied, and everyone knows the proper measure. Thus the Odes state, 'Establish my people, let all be included.' For this reason the 

spirits send down good fortune and the seasons are free from disaster and harm.

"The people's lives were formerly fruitful and abundant, harmoniously they heeded the government. Everyone exhausted their strength to implement the ruler's commands and would die to supplement gaps in the line of battle. From this stems virtue in battle. However, internally Ch'u now casts away its people and externally severs connections with formerly close allies. It violates its alliances and eats its words. In acting, it contravenes the seasons and labors the populace to achieve its desires. The people no longer recognize fidelity; whether they advance or retreat, they commit offenses. When the people are anxious about their movements, who will die for the state? Exert yourself fully, but I will never see you again."

Yao Kou-erh returned to Cheng before Tzu Fan, whereupon Tzu Ssu inquired about his observations. He replied: " Ch'u's forces are advancing rapidly but in passing through constricted terrain are not well ordered. When an army moves quickly it has lost its resolve; when disordered, strength of formation is sacrificed. When their resolve is lost and formations sacrificed, how will they engage in battle? I fear that they cannot be employed."

When Chin's armies crossed the Yellow River in the fifth month they heard that Ch'u's forces were about to arrive. Fan Wen-tzu, who wanted to turn back, said: "If we pretend to flee from Ch'u we can extricate ourselves from the present misfortune. We obviously cannot bring the feudal lords together, so let us leave it to those who can. If we ministers unite in serving our ruler it will be enough." Luan Shu replied, "It is not possible."

In the sixth month Chin and Ch'u encountered each other at Yen-ling. Fan Wen-tzu did not want to engage the enemy, but Hsi Chih said: "At the battle of Han Duke Hui did not deploy his regiments in good order; in the engagement at Chi, Hsien Chen failed to fulfill his mission; and the army that went to Pi under Hsün Po was unable to return, all to Chin's disgrace. You also have personally witnessed these affairs of our former rulers. Now if we avoid Ch'u, it will only increase our shame!"

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Fan Wen-tzu said: "Our former rulers fervently engaged in warfare because the Ti, Ch'u, Ch'i, and Ch'in were all strong. If Chin had not exerted all its strength, their sons and grandsons would have become weakened. Now that three powerful states have already submitted, Ch'u alone remains as an enemy. Only a Sage can be free from both internal and external worries. Since we are not Sages, if the state is externally at peace we will certainly have internal anxieties. Why not release Ch'u to provide us with an external source of fear?"

Early in the morning, on the last day of the lunar month, Ch'u deployed its forces close on Chin's encampment. Chin's officers were concerned, but Fan Wen-tzu's son raced in and said: "Fill in the wells, destroy the cookstoves, deploy our formations amid the encampment, and spread out the vertical rows. It is only a question of whether Heaven sustains us or Ch'u, so what is there to worry about?" Fan Wen-tzu seized a halberd and pursued him, shouting, "The state's preservation or destruction is a matter of Heaven. What does a kid know about it?"

Luan Shu said: " Ch'u's army is skittish, so if we solidify our fortifications and wait them out, within three days they will certainly withdraw. If we then suddenly attack their retreating forces, victory will be inevitable."

Hsi Chih countered: " Ch'u has six gaps that cannot be left unexploited. Its two ministers detest each other; the king's troops are fatigued; Cheng's formations are not well ordered; the Man tribal regiments cannot be deployed; and in deploying for combat, Ch'u has not avoided the most inauspicious lunar day. When in formation they are noisy, when uniting for deployment increasingly clamorous, every man looking behind him, no one having the will to fight. Since their veterans are not necessarily outstanding and they have offended the prohibitions of Heaven, we shall certainly conquer them."

When the king of Ch'u climbed up on a mobile observation tower in order to look out at Chin's armies, Tzu Chung had the grand counselor Po Chou-li [a defector from Chin] stand behind him. The king asked, "Why are they racing about to the left and right?" Po Chou-li replied, "They are summoning the army's officers." 

"They are all assembling in the Center Army." "They are gathering to finalize the plans."

"They are raising a tent." "It is for respectfully performing divination before the ancestral rulers."

"They are striking the tent." "They are about to issue the orders."

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"They are extremely noisy and dust is flying everywhere." "They are filling in the wells, destroying their cookstoves and assuming formation."

"After mounting their chariots, the attendants, bearing their weapons, have descended again." "It is to listen to the admonitory oath."

"Will they fight?" "I still do not know."

"After remounting the chariots, the attendants have once more descended." "This is for the battle prayer." Po Chou-li also advised the king about the duke of Chin's men.

Miao Pen-huang, a defector from Ch'u standing beside the duke of Chin, similarly advised him about the king of Ch'u's forces. The duke's attendants all said, "One of our natives, Po Chou-li, is with the king of Ch'u and their forces are too great to oppose." However, Miao Pen-huang said to the duke of Chin: "Ch'u's superior soldiers are found only in the royal clans composing the Center Army. I suggest that we divide up our elite warriors to launch a sudden attack on their armies on the left and right flanks and then our three remaining armies can concentrate upon the royal troops. Without doubt we will severely defeat them."

The duke performed divination by milfoil to ascertain the prospects. The Scribe observed: "It is auspicious. You have encountered the hexagram Fu, 'to return,' whose implications are 'a southern state will shrink, there will be a shot, the king will be hit in the eye.' When a state shrinks and its king is wounded, if this doesn't mean defeat, what would?" The duke followed the indications. 

There was a muddy stretch in front of their encampment, so all the chariots separated off to the left and right to avoid it. Pu Yi acted as the duke of Chin's driver, Luan Chen wielded the halberd on the right; P'eng Ming acted as driver for the King of Ch'u, with Pan Tang taking the position on the right. Shih Shou drove for the earl of Cheng and T'ang Kou attended on the right. Fan Wen-tzu and Luan Shu's troops advanced in parallel on either side of the duke of Chin, but the duke's chariot became mired in the mud. Luan Shu was about to convey the duke away in his own chariot when Luan Chen, the duke's attendant on the right, shouted: "Get away. When the state has entrusted you with great responsibility, how can you usurp that of others? Moreover, encroaching upon another's official duties is impudence, neglecting your own duties is negligence, and departing from your own unit is perversity. You cannot commit these three offenses." Then he raised up the duke's chariot in order to extricate it from the mire.

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The day before when Pan Tang and Yang Yu-chi had stacked breastplates on the ground to hold a shooting competition, each succeeded in shooting an arrow through seven layers of armor. Boastfully, they showed the results to the king: "Since you have two subjects so skilled as this, why worry about the coming engagement?" The king angrily retorted: "This is a disgrace to our state. Tomorrow morning your archery will be the skill that kills you."

Over in the Chin camp General Wei Ch'i dreamt that he had shot at the moon and hit it but on withdrawing became enmired himself. Having the dream interpreted, he was advised: "The sun represents the royal surname of Chi [the house of Chin], while those of different surnames [such as Ch'u] are the moon. That is certainly the king of Ch'u. You will shoot and hit him, but in withdrawing into the mire you will also die." When the battle was under way he hit the king in the eye with an arrow. The king then summoned Yang Yu-chi, gave him two arrows, and had him shoot Wei Ch'i, who was struck in the neck and fell prostrate on his quiver. Yang then took back the remaining arrow and reported the fulfillment of his mission. 

Three times Hsi Chih encountered the king of Ch'u's clan troops, and each time when he saw the king, he removed his helmet and raced away like the wind. The king dispatched the Minister of Works to inquire after him and present a bow, saying: "In the fervency of our present engagement the man wearing red gaiters and leggings is a true gentleman. But since he runs off so quickly when he sees me, I wonder if he hasn't sustained some injury?"

When Hsi Chih saw the messenger, he doffed his helmet to receive the edict and then replied: "Your external servant, following his ruler in engaging in this matter of warfare, on account of your spiritual power has for some time now worn helmet and armor. I dare not bow in acknowledgment of your command but venture to advise it causes me uneasiness, this condescension of your ruler. Because of the activities of the moment, I can only salute you." He saluted three times and then withdrew.

Han Chüeh of Chin began to pursue the earl of Cheng so his driver said: "Let us quickly follow him because his driver is constantly looking about and obviously does not have his mind on the horses. We can overtake him." Han Chüeh replied, "I cannot insult another ruler." So they ceased their pursuit.

When Hsi Chih then pursued the earl of Cheng, his attendant on the right said, "Have some reconnaissance scouts 103 cut in

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front of him and I will mount the chariot from behind and bring him off as a captive." Hsi Chih replied, "Those who harm a ruler are punished," so he too desisted.

Shih Shou, driving the earl of Cheng's chariot, said, "Only because Duke Yi of Wei would not abandon his flag was he defeated at the battle of Ying." Then he took down the earl's pennon and stuffed it in his quiver. T'ang Kou, the attendant on the right, said to Shih Shou: "You must remain by the ruler's side. Since our defeat is horrendous, at this moment I am not as important as you. You should escape with the ruler and I will remain behind." Then he died in battle. 

Ch'u's force were pressed onto constricted terrain, so Shu-shan Jan said to Yang Yu-chi, "Even though the ruler indicated otherwise, for the sake of the state you must shoot the enemy." So he shot an arrow and then shot again, and in both cases killed a soldier of Chin. Shu-shan Jan threw a man whom he had seized against a chariot, snapping the crossbar. Although Chin's troops then halted, they had already taken the king's son prisoner.

Luan Chen saw Tzu Chung's flag, so he appealed to the duke of Chin: "Ch'u's soldiers have advised me that is Tzu Chung's banner so that must be Tzu Chung. When I was formerly an emissary to Ch'u he inquired about the nature of Chin's courage. I replied, 'It is seen in masses of men well ordered.' He further asked what else, and I replied, 'In being tranquil.' This time, when our two states engaged in battle, we failed to dispatch a hsing-jen, so we cannot be said to have been well ordered. Now that the battle has commenced, I have had to eat my words, so this cannot be termed composure. Permit me to present him with some wine."

The duke of Chin consented, so he dispatched a hsing-jen with a flagon to invite Tzu Chung to drink. Advising Tzu Chung of his mission, he said: "As Luan Chen's ruler lacks capable men, he was ordered to drive and take up a spear and has not been able to attend to your troops. However, he has dispatched me bearing wine for you to drink."

Tzu Chung said: "This must be from the officer who once spoke with me in Ch'u. Do I not also recognize him?" He accepted the wine and drank it, dismissed the emissary, and then resumed beating the drums.

The battle had commenced at first light and was still raging when the stars became visible. That night Tzu Fan order Ch'u's officers to investigate the extent of the killed and wounded, supplement any deficiencies in troops and chariots, put the armor and weapons in good order, array the chariots and horses, prepare

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to eat at first light, and immediately obey all orders. Learning about this, the troops from Chin were uneasy, but Miao Penhuang circulated about, saying, "Gather the chariots together, replace missing troops, tend to the horses and prepare your weapons, improve your formations and solidify your lines, eat in your tents and intensify your prayers because tomorrow we will again engage the enemy." Moreover he released the prisoners from Ch'u.

When the king of Ch'u in turn heard about these preparations, he summoned Tzu Fan to formulate their tactics, but the latter's attendant had given him wine to drink and Tzu Fan was too drunk to see the king. The king said, "When Heaven defeats us we cannot wait here." Then he withdrew during the night. Chin's forces entered their encampment and found three days' worth of provisions. 104

This account of the battle of Yen-ling, the last of the Tso Chuan's well-known five great battles, while lengthy and evocative, actually provides virtually no information about the engagement itself beyond a few vignettes of ritual heroic acts (contrary to numerous Western scholars who have vigorously asserted that traditional Chinese values do not countenance such heroism and its writings are devoid of such accounts, unlike Greek heroic literature. The Tso Chuan narrative clearly depicts an encounter during the transitional period from chariot-centered conflict undertaken mainly by the noble class to mass- based infantry armies). The crucial tactical thrust was perceptively formulated by Miao Pen-huang, but the foundation, the possibility of mounting an effective assault rather than simply withdrawing, derived from Hsi Chih's conclusion that Ch'u's coalition was marked by dissension and fatigue, its forces too dispirited to fight effectively. However, both sides obviously employed agents and reconnaissance soldiers to gain information about the enemy prior to their confrontation and exploited extensive knowledge provided by defectors on either side. The stylized battle preparation would hardly have required a defector's explanation unless the king of Ch'u lacked battlefield experience, for Ch'u would certainly have followed similar practices. However, the value of defectors in providing key information--such as good troops being concentrated solely under the king of Ch'u--illustrates the 

main intelligence thrust at the end of the Spring and Autumn period.

The slow progression of events is also evident from this battle, for emissaries have the luxury of reaching out to allies for additional forces. Tzu Fan even managed to visit an old minister of Ch'u who

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reprised the essential foundations of military strength for him, all principles and values subsequently incorporated in Warring States military writings, but certainly grounded on Spring and Autumn experience. 105 The divination and dream accounts embedded in the narrative indicate how such information might have been interpreted and employed, as well as the fact that prophesied death would never deter military action. The deliberate release of prisoners to jangle the enemy with news of strong preparations, of resolve to fight, was a practice much discussed in later literature, but here already witnessed. (Alternatively, false information could have been scripted but would have required careful consideration of a myriad possibilities. Miao Pen- huang, knowing that Ch'u's forces were already skittish, simply wanted to augment their fears.)

Finally, amid this portrait of military intelligence as practiced at the end of the Spring and Autumn period, the ill-fated Tzu Fan merits noting because his somewhat tragic fate was frequently employed to illustrate one principle or another in later centuries. Obviously a man who loved wine, he was (at least in Han Fei-tzu's subsequent account) deceived by his own steward, who insisted a proffered beverage wasn't wine. Since it is inconceivable that he wouldn't have recognized the taste of wine, once he partook of it all self-restraint must have vanished. Thus a valiant warrior and otherwise conscientious officer was doomed to suicide in the defeat's aftermath.

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3 The Warring

States Period 

THE WARRING STATES PERIOD ( 403-221 B.C.), aptly named because of the incessant warfare that plagued China throughout its two centuries, saw the final demise of the old Chou nobility, the rise of powerful despots, unimaginable social turbulence, and the disaffection and death of millions. The major states extant at the beginning of the period--Ch'in, Ch'u, Han, Wei, Chao, Yen, Ch'i, and Yüeh--essentially battled each other into nonexistence, with Ch'in eventually emerging from its advantageous position on the western fringes to dominate all of China. As states and their entrenched nobility perished, the social structure underwent a major upheaval, creating a pool of disfranchised individuals forced to seek employment through knowledge and talent. Their availability proved opportune because the period's insecurity compelled the surviving states to implement every possible measure to strengthen themselves economically, politically, and militarily. Political desperation fostered opportunity, giving rise to professional bureaucrats, technocrats, political theorists, strategists, and philosophers, all of whom roamed about the realm seeking a receptive ear. Although some important officials and members of the nobility still defected or were exiled, their importance as intelligence sources considerably diminished in comparison with the information that might be easily elicited from professional advisers and peripatetic persuaders such as Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, proponents of the Vertical and Horizontal alliances, respectively, as well as major spies. However, prominent traitors, especially key generals, could still prove critical, often as much because they no longer served in an enemy state as for the intelligence details they might provide.

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Because the stakes had become higher and the fate of states often hung in the balance, covert practices not only were constantly employed, but also tended to be used in combination rather than singularly. Systematic subversion through bribes, disaffection through calumny, and estrangement through false accusations and rumors made up the main weapons. All three often proved surprisingly successful, no doubt being much facilitated by the emerging psychological and political analyses of court dynamics and 

human desire. Bribes invariably exploited ambition, internal discord, and the breakdown of ethical values, while palace jealousies were manipulated to doom states. Court cliques and powerful clans fought for power and influence, guaranteeing there would be no lack of easily identified potential subversives. Assassination surpassed its initial role as a final, desperate measure that spawned dire, often unexpected consequences, becoming an integral part of comprehensive approaches to covert warfare in states such as Ch'in.

In the military and political realms theoreticians began studying the lessons of human experience, formulating programs, and propounding systematic beliefs. Although military theorists naturally focused upon intelligence, spycraft, and covert operations, when pondering the nature of knowledge, historical experience, and political dynamics, many of the philosophical and political thinkers advanced fundamental insights and identified basic assumptions that quickly became essential to any analysis of intelligence practices. Great advances were witnessed in methods and procedures for evaluating men and armies, analyzing enemy behavior, assessing force levels, and targeting commanders. Moreover, Sun-tzu's classifications of terrain, while certainly reflecting knowledge accumulated over the preceding centuries and the classificatory impulse that produced regional theories embracing every aspect of flora and fauna, uniquely focused on the military impact of various characteristic features such as constricted and open areas. Since his topographical categories and their subsequent expansion will be discussed in the military intelligence section, it merely need be noted that the existence of difficult terrain--land that could slow, even entrap a force--now had to be recognized for purposes of both avoidance and exploitation. The astute commander therefore deployed reconnaissance patrols far ahead to prevent his own army from becoming entangled and plot measures to maneuver the enemy onto them, effectively creating a force multiplier, possibly even a killing ground such as seen at the famous battle of Ma-ling in the mid-fourth century. 1

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Agents and Intelligence

In accord with the rational character of Chinese military enterprises in part initiated by Sun-tzu Art of War, 2 from the Warring States onward great emphasis was placed on analyzing enemy capabilities and intentions, determining the possibilities for victory, and then effectively employing the army by first confusing and debilitating the enemy. The Chinese practice of warfare attained its definitive style by the end of the period with the cavalry's initial use in supplementing massive infantry and chariot forces, the latter increasingly displaced from their earlier pivotal role. This analytical thrust required gathering information about the enemy, as well as oneself, preliminary to undertaking critical calculations. Apparently in accord with Sun-tzu's emphasis upon spycraft as the most efficient and necessary military activity, clandestine undertakings flourished. Instead of relying upon occasional diplomatic missions supplemented by dubious defectors, states dispatched agents and constructed foreign networks, generally through bribes and coercion. Although little information has been preserved about the nature of covert intelligence practices, their extensiveness at the end of the Warring States period may be seen in an oftcited incident found in Wei Kung-tzu biography in the Shih Chi:

King Chao of Wei's youngest son, Prince Wu-chi of Wei, was the stepbrother of King An-li. When King Chao died and An-li ascended the throne, he enfeoffed his younger brother Wu-chi as Lord of Hsin-ling. About this time Fan Sui fled from Wei to Ch'in, becoming its prime minister. Because of Fan's hatred for Wei, he had Ch'in's troops surround Wei's capital of Ta-liang. They subsequently crushed Wei's army below Hua-yang and drove off Mang Mao. 3 King An-li and Prince Wu-chi agonized over these developments.

Prince Wu-chi was benevolent and respectful to men of quality. Whether they were worthies or scoundrels, he treated them all courteously and deferentially, never presuming to be arrogant on account of his wealth and rank. Accordingly, warriors for thousands of kilometers around rushed to give their allegiance, and eventually he retained three thousand men on stipend. Because the feudal lords regarded the prince as a worthy man 

and knew he had numerous retainers, for some ten years they never dared plot against or attack Wei.

One day when the prince and the king were gambling, word came from the north that signal fires marking a border invasion

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had been seen. This was understood as indicating that Chao's forces had appeared at the border and were making an incursion. Putting the game aside, the king wanted to summon his high officials to formulate their tactics. The prince stopped him, saying: "It's not an invasion. The king of Chao is merely out hunting." He then returned to the game as before.

Being troubled, the king could not concentrate on their game. After a while word again came from the border reporting that the king of Chao was merely out hunting, not mounting an invasion. The king of Wei was astonished: "How did you know this?"

The prince replied: "Among my retainers are those who can deeply penetrate the king of Chao's secrets. Whatever the king is about to do, my retainers always report it to your servant. Thus I was able to know it." Thereafter, fearing the prince's ability and sagacity, King An-li did not dare entrust him with government affairs. 4

Although Sun-tzu himself was active at the end of the Spring and Autumn period and his thoughts reflect the era's military practices, as a conceptual analysis the Art of War became influential only in the Warring States period when copies may have begun circulating and his teachings, through either his disciples or a family school, carefully studied. His characterization of spies, defined by their mode of action and objectives, has been widely acknowledged even by Western historians otherwise unfamiliar with China as history's first, and his chapter termed the earliest on spycraft. In "Employing Spies" Sun-tzu identified five categories that became the foundation for all subsequent Chinese thought upon the subject. Although they will be comprehensively discussed in 

the theoretical section on agents, they merit brief reprising here:

There are five types of spies to be employed: local spy, internal spy, turned spy or double agent, dead or expendable spy, and the living spy. When all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed "spiritual methodology." They are a ruler's treasures.

Local spies--employ people from the local district.

Internal spies--employ their people who hold government positions.

Double agents--employ the enemy's spies.

Expendable spies--employ them to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our expendable spies with false information and have them leak it to enemy agents.

Living spies--return with their reports.

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Even though Sun-tzu's definition of "double agents" or "turned agents"--fan chien--is essentially the classical Western one, in common use from the Warring States on fan chien rarely meant "doubled agent," but instead someone recruited from the other side to act as an agent in place. Simply traitors to their states, rather than foreign agents who have been compromised and enlisted, they clearly fall into Sun-tzu's category of "internal agents," people who hold government positions or are otherwise close to the ruler and centers of power.

Su Ch'in

Even though his diplomatic missions were patently overt and he achieved his greatest fame for advocating the vertical alliance--successfully balking Ch'in's predatory attacks for some fifteen years--Su Ch'in has also been regarded as one of China's most successful and notorious agents. In fact, an Art of War text from the late Warring States period recovered in recent decades appends Su Ch'in's name to those of Yi Yin and Lü Ya as China's first spies, observing that "when Yen arose, Su Ch'in was in Ch'i." His counterfeit betrayal and flight from 

the state of Yen provide a dramatic example of subterfuge at its best, for through them he created a plausible motive for seeking revenge against the king of Yen and was therefore warmly welcomed in Ch'i, Yen's bitter enemy. Moreover, Su Ch'in not only achieved great fame in premodern China, but also continues to be a giant figure today as his story is retold in novels, comic books, TV programs, and movies.

Although his experiences and persuasions are recorded in several Shih Chi biographies and Chan-kuo Ts'e chapters, their reliability has been much questioned because they have apparently become admixed with romantic stories that evolved after his death. (In authoring the Shih Chi, Ssu-ma Ch'ien felt compelled to remark that Su Ch'in's biography was nebulous at best, and he further noted that many disparate elements had coalesced around Su Ch'in's name.) However, even though the dialogues and persuasions are almost certainly later fabrications, his activities are well recorded, and lost Chan-kuo Ts'e chapters that have recently resurfaced amplify the historical picture and provide further dialogues. The main difficulty therefore lies with the dates and range of Su Ch'in's activities, tentatively resolvable into the last decade of the fourth century and first two decades of the third century B.C., his death coming a year or two before 284 B.C., when Yüeh Yi led Yen's armies in a successful invasion of Ch'i. 5

In Ssu-ma Ch'ien's narrative the critical point arrives when Su Ch'in plots to become a counterfeit exile:

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The king of Yen's mother and Su Ch'in were involved in illicit relations. Even though the king knew about it, he treated him even more generously. Su Ch'in, afraid of being executed, suggested to the king, "If I remain here, I will not be able to make Yen a significant state, but if I were in Ch'i, I could certainly accomplish this objective."6 The king concurred: "I consent to whatever you want to do."

Thereupon Su Ch'in feigned having committed an offense in Yen and fled to Ch'i where King Hsüan appointed him as a guest minister. When King Hsüan died, King Min ascended the throne. 7 Su Ch'in then persuaded King Min to make the burial 

extremely lavish in order to display his filiality and to undertake lofty palaces and large gardens to illuminate his Virtue, hoping to thereby enervate Ch'i and exhaust its resources to Yen's benefit. 8 When King Yi of Yen died, King Hui ascended the throne. Thereafter Ch'i's high officials competed with Su Ch'in for the ruler's favor and eventually had an assassin attack him. After fatally stabbing Su Ch'in, the assassin escaped. Even though the king dispatched men to catch the brigand, they failed.

Near death, Su Ch'in proposed to the king, "I am about to die, so if you have me torn apart by chariots in the marketplace as an exemplary punishment for causing turmoil in Ch'i on Yen's behalf, my assassin will certainly be caught." The king put his plan into effect and the assassin indeed came forth [to claim a reward], whereupon the king had him executed. When the people of Yen heard about Su Ch'in's violent death, they remarked, "How extreme was Ch'i's method for taking revenge on Su Ch'in." After his death Su Ch'in's actual mission completely leaked out, causing Ch'i to greatly fear and hate Yen when they learned about it.

The Grand Historian comments: " Su Ch'in and his two brothers became famous as peripatetic persuaders to the feudal lords. Their techniques emphasized shifts in authority, but after Su Ch'in was found to be a turned agent and executed, the world laughed at him and shunned the study of his methods. What people have said about Su Ch'in over the years varies greatly, even attributing to him unusual events from very different times. However, insofar as Su Ch'in rose from humble beginnings to unite the six states in a vertical alliance, his intelligence clearly surpassed that of ordinary men. Therefore I arrayed his actions and appended an introduction to his times in order that he not be tarnished solely by an evil name."9

Su Ch'in's remarkable biography raises the possibility that his reputation as a double agent for Yen was conceived solely on his deathbed

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as a final ploy to capture his assassin. However, when Ch'i employed him, they knew about his reputation among the feudal lords and his previous missions to create alliances in opposition to Ch'in, so Ch'i easily accepted his fabricated exile. Generations thereafter believed that he had truly betrayed Ch'i, just as his brother would subsequently. Moreover, the policy of exhausting a state through massive public undertakings was already part of current knowledge, having been a keystone in Wen Chung's systematic effort to undermine Wu at the end of the Spring and Autumn period.

The small but formidable state of Han essentially mimicked Su Ch'in's mid-fourth-century example by trying to generate unrest among the workers impressed for a massive, arduous canal project that it persuaded Ch'in to undertake. From antiquity, when the semi- mythical Yü exhausted himself in taming the floodwaters that perpetually inundated China, through the Spring and Autumn and into the Warring States periods, canals were undertaken on ever vaster scales, connecting rivers, lakes, and major streams. Multiuse, they immediately provided water for irrigation, as well as navigable waterways that might be negotiated by shallow draft boats either poled or pulled along from shore, thereby dramatically nurturing increased economic prosperity in the canal's vicinity. The Shih Chi therefore devotes a chapter to canals and China's ongoing struggle to control the Yellow River that coincidentally notes this covert attempt to exhaust Ch'in:

Hsi-men Pao diverted water from the Chang River to irrigate the district of Yeh and thereby enriched Wei's Ho-nei region. About this time the state of Han heard that Ch'in's ruler liked to initiate major undertakings. Therefore, in order to exhaust Ch'in and prevent them from launching an eastward attack, Han had the hydraulic specialist Cheng Kuo, in the capacity of a clandestine agent, persuade the king of Ch'in to chisel out a canal from the Ching River west of Mt. Chung westward to Hu pass, and also eastward around the northern mountains toward the Luo River, a total of some three hundred kilometers, in order to provide irrigation for the fields.

In the midst of its construction the king of Ch'in realized Cheng Kuo's true intentions and therefore wanted to execute him. 

However, Cheng Kuo said, "Initially I was a secret agent, but completing this canal will truly be to Ch'in's advantage!" The king of Ch'in, feeling this to be true, eventually had him complete it. When it was opened, the canal was employed to convey a flow of muddy water from the Ching River to irrigate several million acres of salt-laden land. Since the irrigation resulted in a yield of several bushels per acre, the territory within the pass was con

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verted into productive rice fields. Consequently, Ch'in never again suffered from famine and was able to grow rich and strong, subsequently uniting all the other feudal lords. They therefore named the canal after its engineer, Cheng Kuo. 10

Against a background of burgeoning economic prosperity stimulated by canal building, Cheng Kuo's advice would certainly have been plausible, his own motive apparently being to enrich himself as its director. Moreover, this was an age when foreign advisers and technical specialists were able to travel about seeking employment under the remaining feudal lords embroiled in the struggle for survival, frequently by advocating the view that economic prosperity would provide the foundation for military strength and political power. Ironically, Han's subversive efforts significantly augmented Ch'in's economic base and thereby substantially contributed to their own demise.

Military Intelligence

As the number of forces committed to the average campaign escalated dramatically and battlefield success became vital to a state's very survival, greater resources and expertise had to be allotted to military affairs. As may be seen in the historical and theoretical writings of the period, the importance of military intelligence grew correspondingly, resulting in frequent admonitions to dispatch scouts, establish roving patrols, and continuously watch the enemy. More intensive observation naturally provoked creative efforts in deception, including widely implemented practices designed to mask numbers, misdirect attention, and conceal intent. Observational catalogs evolved that correlated visible phenomena with actual activities 

and projected probable intent based upon battlefield behavior. Although largely focused upon human intelligence, attempts were also made to capture enemy communications, interpret battlefield signals, and fathom early warning systems. However, these and the critical issues of secrecy and counterintelligence are extensively discussed in Warring States military writings; therefore, their analysis is best deferred to the theoretical sections tracing the development of doctrine across periods. Here a single example of a commander named Chao She astutely deceiving enemy observers will illustrate the increased sophistication of counterreconnaissance practices in the Warring States period.

Chao She became prominent in the state of Chao as an upright official who equalized and stabilized the taxes, thereby nurturing agricultural prosperity, and also brilliantly exercised military command responsibilities:

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About 270 B.C., en route to attacking Han, Ch'in encamped at Yü- yü in Chao so the king of Chao summoned Lien P'o and asked, "Can we rescue the city of Yü-yü or not?"

Lien P'o replied: "The road is far, the passes narrow. Effecting a rescue will be difficult."

The king also summoned Yüeh Ch'eng and similarly queried him, only to receive an identical reply. He then summoned Chao She who answered: "The road is far and the passes narrow. It might be compared with two rats fighting in a cave. The more courageous general will emerge victorious."

The king therefore ordered Chao She to assume command of an army mobilized to rescue Yü-yü. When the army had ventured thirty kilometers from Han-tan, the capital, Chao She announced to his forces, "Anyone who presumes to advise upon military affairs will be put to death."

Ch'in's main army encamped west of Wu-an where the thunder of their drums and noise of their men shook the very roof tiles. Among Chao She's reconnaissance units was one soldier who admonished Chao to urgently undertake the rescue of Wu-an. Chao She immediately had him beheaded, then solidified the 

walls of his encampment and remained entrenched for twenty-eight days without advancing. Thereupon he again increased their height and augmented his fortifications. When enemy agents came from Ch'in, Chao She ensured that they were well fed and then sent them off. When these agents submitted their reports, Ch'in's commanding general was overjoyed: "After advancing only thirty kilometers they have stopped and merely increase their fortifications. Obviously Yü-yü is not Chao's objective."

However, immediately after sending off Ch'in's agents, Chao She had his troops roll up their armor and pursue them, arriving after a forced march of two days and one night. He then constructed a fortified camp but had his skilled archers stand off about fifty kilometers from Yü-yü. Just when they were completing their fortifications, Ch'in's forces learned about them and sped forth en masse.

An officer named Hsü Li requested permission to advise about military affairs, so Chao She gave permission for him to be brought in. Hsü Li said: "Ch'in never thought our army would reach here. They have rushed forth full of spirit, so you should deploy in depth in order to await them. Otherwise we will certainly be defeated."

Chao She responded, "I await your orders."

Hsü Li said, "Please proceed with my execution."

Chao She replied, "That can wait until later at Han-tan."

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Hsü Li again requested permission to offer advice and said, "Whoever occupies the heights of the mountain to the north will be victorious, whoever arrives afterward will be defeated."

Chao She agreed and dispatched ten thousand men to race there. Ch'in forces subsequently arrived and fought with them for control of the mountain but were unable to ascend it. Chao She then released his remaining forces to suddenly strike them and thus inflicted a severe defeat on Ch'in's army. Ch'in disengaged from the conflict and fled, thereafter lifting their siege of Yü-yü and retreating back to their borders. 11 

Chao She's benign treatment of enemy spies--neither capturing nor killing them--not only is surprising for the time, but also assumes they had been detected by conscious effort. Through his actions he deliberately exploited them as fan chien, agents converted (and thus "doubled," even though unconsciously) to his own purposes. Numerous commanders followed his example in later dynasties, and theoreticians discussed the importance of manipulating foreign agents from the T'ang onward. Moreover, this incident--although chosen for its tactical employment of mountains--also appears as one of the historical illustrations selected for the Sung dynasty tactical compendium know as the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies, thereby ensuring it would thereafter be known to an even wider audience than simply literati studying the ancient histories. 12

The role of the peripatetic persuaders already mentioned in disseminating military knowledge and exposing state secrets during the Warring States period merits closer scrutiny. Although they openly ventured from state to state, in the course of their travels and through discussions on statecraft and strategy with various officials and rulers, many of them--especially the more famous and those marked by noble birth, both of whom would have been well entertained by the powerful and rich--acquired a vast store of military knowledge. Depending upon their astuteness and observational skills, they might easily divulge a critical plan to another state after simply having deduced its existence. For example, the sort of force level information a ruler might obtain from peripatetic persuaders, itinerant strategists, and even mercenaries in the Warring States may be seen in the following summary developed from persuasions exercised by Chang Yi and Su Ch'in that are preserved in the Chan-kuo Ts'e. Whether their numbers were mere guesses, calculated estimates, or precise figures remains an important but unanswered question. Each state kept reasonably updated counts of their soldiers at both the central and local levels, while a general or two might always be found to carelessly discuss

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martial affairs. Alternatively, an experienced observer could certainly have estimated total strength with basic facts about 

unit size and the number of armies. Each of the stronger states could apparently field several hundred thousand troops at this time, although the composition and readiness of standing forces remain less clear. However, their force assessments for the major states extant in the mid-fourth century may be summarized as follows:

Wei--360,000 trained, mailed soldiers, plus perhaps a hundred thousand consigned to border defense; 1,000 or more chariots; 10,000 cavalry

Chao--100,000 trained, mailed troops; 1,000 chariots; 10,000 cavalry 13

Han--200,000 trained, mailed troops; 100,000 additional on border duty

Ch'in--100,000 trained, mailed troops; 14 1,000 chariots; 10,000 cavalry

Ch'i--300,000-400,000 trained, mailed troops

Ch'u--100,000 trained, mailed troops; 1,000 chariots 15

The Warring States period also witnessed the development of "national combat profiles"--summary evaluations of an enemy's character and fighting potential, coupled with tactical principles for achieving victory--by such figures as Hsün-tzu and Wu Ch'i. 16 The Wu-tzu, a book identified with the great general Wu Ch'i that reflects early Warring States thought, preserves the following analyses:

Although Ch'i's battle array is dense in number, they are not solid. That of Ch'in is dispersed, with the soldiers preferring to fight individually. Ch'u's formations have good order, but they cannot long maintain their positions. Yen's formations are adept at defense, but they are not mobile. The battle arrays of the Three Chin are well controlled, but they prove useless. 17

Now Ch'i's character is hard; their country prosperous; the ruler and ministers arrogant and extravagant and insulting to the common people. The government is expansive, but salaries are inequitable. Each formation is of two minds, with the front being heavy and the rear light. Thus while they are dense, they are not stable. The Tao for attacking them is to divide them 

into three, harrying and pursuing the left and right, coercing and following them, for then their formations can be destroyed.

Ch'in's character is strong; their land treacherous; and the government severe. Their rewards and punishments are believed in;

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the people never yield but instead are all fiery and contentious. Thus they scatter and individually engage in combat. The Tao for attacking them is to first entice them with profits, for their soldiers are greedy and will abandon their generals to pursue them. Capitalizing on their misjudgment, you can hunt down their scattered ranks, establish ambushes, take advantage of the moment, and then their generals can be captured.

Ch'u's character is weak; their lands broad; their government troubling to the people and their populace weary. Thus while they are well ordered, they do not long maintain their positions. The Tao for attacking them is to suddenly strike and cause chaos in the encampments. First snatch away their spirit, lightly advancing and then quickly retreating, tiring and laboring them, never actually joining battle with them. Then their army can be defeated.

Yen's character is sincere and straightforward. Their people are careful; they love courage and righteousness, and rarely practice deception in their plans. Thus they will defend their positions but are not mobile. The Tao for attacking them is to strike and press them; insult them and put distance between you; then race and get behind them so that their upper ranks will be doubtful and their lower ranks fearful. Be cautious about your chariots and cavalry, avoid conflict on the open road, for then their general can be captured.

The Three Chin are central countries. Their character is harmonious and their government equitable. The populace is weary from battle but experienced in arms, and they have little regard for their generals. Salaries are meager, and as their officers have no commitment to fight to the death, they are ordered but useless. The Tao for attacking them is to press their formations, and when large numbers appear, oppose 

them. When they turn back, pursue them in order to wear them out. That then is the strategic configuration of force in these countries. 18

No doubt observations such as these were common knowledge, formulated as a result of military experience, coupled with banter about the enemy. (A few such concrete observations have already been seen in the battlefield materials included in the Spring and Autumn section.) However, Wu Ch'i's assessments not only identify national traits derived from government practices, but also couple them with battlefield behavioral tendencies that, being predictable, can be exploited with appropriate tactics. Thus the practice of intelligence has already moved from simple observation to characterization and expectation, from mere reaction to analysis and exploitation. Once aug

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mented with the details of concrete tactical situations, such profiles suggest plans for manipulating the enemy, for achieving Sun-tzu's critical objectives of debilitating them and achieving complete victory.

Hsün-tzu's well-known chapter on military affairs, much cited thereafter because it vigorously asserted the fundamental importance of righteousness and benevolence over mere military expediency (befitting good Confucian tradition), also contains a surprisingly realistic appraisal of warfare. Probably written by Hsün-tzu himself nearly two centuries after the Wu-tzu, several passages characterize three of the major states still extant late in the Warring States period:

The men of Ch'i esteem skillful attacks. When such skill results in killing one of the enemy, the soldier is rewarded with eight ounces of gold from the penalties imposed on others for battlefield failure, without any regard for whether the army itself proved victorious. 19 Accordingly, when the engagement is minor and the enemy inconsequential, Ch'i can still get by with them. But if the engagement is a major one and the enemy solid, they will disperse and scatter. Just like birds in flight, their formations can be disrupted and overturned at any moment. These are the troops of a lost state, none are weaker 

than they. It is almost as if they went into the marketplace to hire day laborers to engage in battle.

Wei's martial troops are selected according to standards that require them to sustain three sets of armor, be able to draw a twelve picul crossbow, carry fifty arrows in a quiver with a halberd hung on top, and when fully armored, bearing a sword, and carrying three days rations, race a hundred kilometers within a day. 20 Soldiers who meet these standards have their families exempted from labor duty and their land and household taxes remitted. However, when their skills decline with the passage of years, the benefits cannot be rescinded. Even changing the system would not be easy to fully implement. For this reason, although Wei's territory is vast, its tax revenues are invariably low. These are the soldiers of an endangered state. 21

The men of Ch'in are sorely deprived in their ordinary lives, and the government employs them through cruelty and harshness. It brutalizes them through authority, grieves them with difficulty, tempts them with glory and rewards, and vanquishes them with corporeal punishment and fines. It ensures that the suppressed people cannot gain any benefits from the government except through combat. 22 It employs them out of their desperation, and acknowledges achievement only after they are successful in battle. Rewards compliment the degree of accomplishment. Thus someone who slays five of the enemy is placed in charge of

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five families. Therefore, among these three states their troops have long been the most numerous and strongest, and they have expanded their territory greatly through conquest. The fact that they have been victorious over the past four generations is not a question of luck, but of methods. 23

From a perspective that emphasized the virtually unopposable strength of Virtue, Hsün-tzu was still compelled to conclude: "Ch'i's skilled attacks are incapable of successfully countering Wei's martial troops, but Wei's martial troops cannot counter Ch'in's elite warriors. Ch'in's elite warriors could not have opposed the constrained and disciplined forces of the great 

hegemons Huan and Wen, while the constrained and disciplined forces of the great hegemons Huan and Wen could never have been a match for the benevolence and righteousness of Kings T'ang and Wu."

Although these two accounts were penned some two centuries apart, they furnish evidence that working profiles were commonly developed for enemy states, no doubt the product of extensive military experience buttressed by a pervasive theory of regionalism uniquely ascribing physical and behavioral traits to different parts of the country. Clearly evolving from the concrete battlefield assessments witnessed in the Spring and Autumn period, they became significantly more abstract, transcending the simple capability and intentions material furnished by defectors or through direct observation.

Finally, it should be noted that spies were not dispatched solely against other states, but were also employed in border regions. For example, for many years General Li Mu of Chao was able to thwart Hsiung-nu raiding parties through a combination of unorthodox tactics and refusing engagements, measures made possible through deploying numerous spies and thereby being well informed about the enemy's movements and intentions. No doubt information was also acquired from various trading groups, local merchants, and disaffected members of the steppe peoples. Furthermore, as in the case of Chao She, a critical portion of his biography from the Shih Chi was similarly incorporated in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies (as the historical incident in a chapter entitled "The Strong"), ensuring his experience would become a lesson for future leaders and commanders for centuries thereafter.

Covert Practices

The Warring States period witnessed an amazing escalation in the employment of covert techniques designed to aggressively affect and sub

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vert other states. Not only did bribes continue to play a significant role, but also rumors and other methods were employed in combination to ensure their success. Most of the 

recorded efforts fall into the category of estrangement techniques, measures designed to foment dissension among important ministers, cause disaffection, and effect the dismissal of highly competent officials and generals. Because the strength of fighting armies rapidly increased, professional generals assumed an increasingly pivotal role; therefore, forcing a change in commander could reverse previous defeats, even result in complete victory, so extreme were the differences in strategic and operational abilities. However, as many commanders belatedly discovered, battlefield success also spawned court jealousies and created fertile ground for planting doubts in the ruler's mind that they represented a growing threat or might defect for greater glory and rewards.

The covert practice most widely employed in the Warring States was undoubtedly bribery, the limited materials preserved from the period recording a myriad instances. Without question bribery had been frequently employed in the Spring and Autumn but reached its apex in the Warring States because it proved the simplest, yet most effective approach amid the era's dire circumstances. As an adjunct to false rumors, bribery ensured that the loyal and courageous, the meritorious and wise, would be sufficiently disparaged to suffer exile or execution. The greater a man's achievements were, the more intense was the jealousy he aroused, greatly facilitating the identification of likely candidates to corrupt and suborn.

The conception and implementation of bribery as a systematic policy also played an essential and heretofore unnoticed role in Ch'in's dramatic consolidation of power during the final century of the Warring States period. Even though bribery could not win final victory, a task left to Ch'in's formidable warriors, it paved the way by undermining the formation of the antagonistic alliances that might have withstood them, thereby isolating the states for defeat in detail, and was also employed to persuade others to adopt policies of appeasement rather than undertake military preparations that "might be construed as provocative." According to a short reference found in the Ch'in Annals, about 237 B.C. the noted strategist Wei Liao-tzu advised the king to systematically employ bribes as a basic tool for weakening the other feudal states: 

In comparison with Ch'in's vast borders, the feudal lords may be likened to rulers of provinces and districts. My only fear is that the feudal lords will form an alliance, will unite to do something unexpected. This is how Chih Po, Fu-ch'ai, and King Min perished. I suggest your Majesty not begrudge expending his wealth

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to bribe the great ministers and thereby confuse their plans. Without spending more than thirty thousand catties of gold, we can eliminate the feudal lords.

According to the Shih Chi account, the king followed his advice and also favored Wei Liao-tzu as an adviser. 24

Li Ssu, who was then wielding the government's power, apparently undertook responsibility for implementing the plan:

He secretly dispatched strategists bearing gold and jewels to offer as presents as they wandered among the feudal lords exercising their persuasions. Famous officials in the courts of the feudal lords who might be tempted by material goods were to be entangled with abundant gifts; those unwilling to collaborate were to be assassinated with sharp swords. Whenever his plan to estrange the feudal lords from their ministers proved successful, the king of Ch'in would then have his expert generals follow up with attacks. 25

Wei Liao-tzu was not the only voice advocating the aggressive use of bribes to achieve world domination. For example, slightly earlier the marquis of Ch'in suggested an ostentatious display of gifts amid sumptuous entertainments to buy off potential adversaries:

Officers from throughout the realm assembled in Chao in pursuit of the vertical alliance against Ch'in and wanted to attack it. Marquis Yin, then prime minister of Ch'in, said to the king: "My king, there is nothing to worry about. I request permission to force them to abandon their plans. The officers of the realm are assembling to attack Ch'in because they all want to be rich and honored, not because of any resentment against us. My king, observe your dogs. Some of them are lying down, others standing up; some are moving about, others staying 

still. Although they are not fighting among themselves, why is it that if you toss them a bone they will all jump up and snarl at each other? Because they have a will to fight."

Thereupon the ruler prepared to dispatch T'ang Chü, accompanied by female musicians and five thousand catties of gold, to dwell in Wu-an and drink with the members of the high assembly. There he was to inform the men of Han-tan [Chao's capital] that anyone who came to visit him would take away monetary gifts. Accordingly, those who had been plotting against Ch'in would not obtain anything from him, while those who came and re

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ceived gifts would become his brothers. Marquis Yin further instructed him, "When you calculate the achievement for Ch'in, the ruler will not inquire about the gold, for if the gold is completely exhausted, the achievements will be many." The king moreover ordered men to follow on after T'ang Chü bearing an additional five thousand catties of gold. After T'ang Chü arrived at Wu-an and distributed the gold, before he had used up three thousand, the realm's officers were all fighting among themselves. 26

Similar measures were employed to undermine the vertical alliance, the only hope the other states had to prevent Ch'in from annexing the entire known realm through piecemeal conquest of the remaining states. When the king of Ch'in asked whether he could seize the states east of the pass, Tun Jo replied:

"Han is the throat of the realm, while Wei is the stomach. If my lord will provide your servant with ten thousand pieces of gold, I will travel about listening to affairs in Han and Wei, and suborn their ministers. Then Han and Wei will become submissive to Ch'in. When Han and Wei are submissive, the conquest of the realm can be plotted."

The king of Ch'in replied, "Our state is impoverished, so I am afraid I am unable to provide it."

Tun Jo retorted: "The realm is never free of affairs. If it is not the Vertical Alliance, it will be the Horizontal Alliance. If the 

Horizontal Alliance succeeds, you will become emperor; if the Vertical Alliance is successful, the king of Ch'u will become king of the realm. If you achieve emperorship, All under Heaven will respectfully nurture Ch'in. If the king of Ch'u becomes king of the realm, even though you have ten thousand catties of gold, you will not be able to retain them."

Concurring, the king of Ch'in provided him with ten thousand catties of gold and dispatched him east to travel among the states of Han and Wei where he subsequently brought their generals and ministers under Ch'in's influence. Then Tun Jo went north to traverse Yen and Chao where he effected the death of General Li Mu. When the king of Ch'i visited Ch'in's court, the four other states had to follow, all because of Tun Jo's persuasion. 27

Tun Jo thus turns out to be a clandestine agent par excellence who goes about subverting high officials, even though the survival of their states depended upon adopting a strong united front against Ch'in. But perhaps, if allowances are to be given, a political and military mind

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set (or inexplicable miasma), such as witnessed in the early days of the German onslaught of World War II, overcame them.

Somewhat contradictorily, the extinction of Chao and death of Li Mu are also attributed to Wang Chien, the actual commanding general in the final confrontation with Chao. According to the Chan-kuo Ts'e:

When Ch'in had Wang Chien attack Chao, Chao employed Li Mu and Ssu-ma Shang to command the defense. Li Mu's forces smashed and drove back Ch'in's army several times, killing a general named Huan Yi. Wang Chien, enraged by these developments, made generous gifts of gold to Chao's favored ministers such as Kuo K'ai, employing them as "turned agents" to say that Li Mu and Ssu-ma Shang wanted to betray Chao and join Ch'in to thereby receive generous fiefs from Ch'in. 28 The king of Chao, becoming suspicious, had Chao Ts'ung and Yen Ts'ui replace his generals. Thereafter he had Li Mu executed and exiled Ssu-ma Shang. Three months later Wang 

Chien extensively destroyed Chao's army through a fervent sudden strike, slayed Chao's commanding general, and captured both the king and General Yen Tsui. Thereafter Ch'in extinguished the state of Chao. 29

The efficacy of these bribes in underpinning rumors designed to subvert Chao's commanding general is truly astounding. For a few pieces of gold Chao's ministers not only endangered the state, but also destroyed it, thus failing to learn from the well-known story of Po P'i and the state of Wu at the end of the Spring and Autumn period!

Rumors and Estrangement Techniques

The subsequent internecine strife between the two eastern states of Yen and Ch'i during the middle to late Warring States period contains an incident that well illustrates the effective use of spies to sow dissension and eliminate the capable. After pursuing a self-strengthening policy for many years, Yen finally took advantage of Ch'i's ill-advised assault on the smaller state of Sung to launch a massive attack in conjunction with several other states. Yüeh Yi, who apparently formulated Yen's political and military strategy and was the chief architect for the invasion plans, acted as commander in chief. As summarized in the various annals, the pinnacle of King Chao's rule then arrived:

In 285 B.C. the state of Yen was flourishing and rich; the officers and troops took pleasure in military discipline and regarded war lightly. Then the king commissioned Yüeh Yi as general in chief

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and planned an attack on Ch'i in unison with Ch'in, Ch'u, and the Three Chin states of Han, Wei, and Chao.

In 284 B.C. Ch'i's forces were defeated and King Min fled outside the state. Yen's army alone pursued the retreating forces to the north, penetrating the capital, Lin-tzu; seized all of Ch'i's treasures; and burned their palaces and ancestral temples. Only the cities of Liao, Chü, and Chi-mo did not surrender; all the others were subjugated by Yen within six 

months. Yüeh Yi was deputed to continue the campaign to pacify the remaining unsubmissive cities. 30

Yüeh Yi's blitzkrieg tactics accorded with Sun-tzu's emphasis upon speed, mobility, and aggressive action. However, more cautious strategists criticized his rapid penetration into Ch'i's heartland as foolhardy, 31 and advocated conservative, presumably long-term views, thus sowing exploitable seeds of acrimony and dissension. Moreover, after the first year's stunning success, the two fortified cities that remained proved both resolute and impregnable, much in contrast to many among the seventy that had quickly crumbled. Yüeh Yi's calculated reluctance to dissipate the army's strength in a horrendous urban assault naturally provided fertile ground for political intrigue and the carping voices that vilified him: 32

Three years passed, but still the cities had not submitted. Someone slandered Yüeh Yi to King Chao of Yen: "Yüeh Yi's wisdom and planning surpass other men. After he attacked Ch'i, within the space of a single breath he conquered more than seventy cities. Now only two cities have not surrendered. It isn't that his strength is unable to reduce them. The reason he hasn't attacked for three years is that he wants to avail himself on the army's awesomeness to force the people of Ch'i to submit, for then he will face south and become king. Now that the people of Ch'i have surrendered, the reason he hasn't yet initiated this plan is because his wife and children are in Yen. Moreover, in Ch'i there are many beautiful women; eventually he will also forget his wife and children. I would like your majesty to plan against it." 33

Being wise, King Chao rebuked the accuser and had him beheaded, thereby temporarily silencing such accusations. However, his son, who succeeded him shortly thereafter, not only had previously quarreled with Yüeh Yi, but was also shortsighted and inexperienced, and thus fell prey to exactly the same innuendoes deliberately reinstigated by T'ien Tan--the popularly chosen commander in the holdout of Chi-mo--through intermediaries: 34

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In 279 B.C. it happened that King Chao died and his son was established as King Hui of Yen. When the latter had been heir-apparent, he had been displeased by Yüeh Yi. Therefore, when he ascended the throne and T'ien Tan learned of it, he released a double agent in Yen to say: "In Ch'i there are only two cities that have not surrendered. This being the case, I have heard that the reason that they were not taken earlier is that Yüeh Yi and the new king of Yen have had disagreements, so Yüeh Yi wants to unite his troops and remain in Ch'i, face south, and thus become king of Ch'i. The only thing that Ch'i fears is the disaster that would be brought about if some other general were to come."

When King Hui, having already been suspicious of Yüeh Yi, gained this information from the double agent, he dispatched Ch'i Chieh to replace him as commanding general and summoned Yüeh Yi back. Yüeh Yi knew that King Hui did not have good intentions in replacing him and, fearing execution, surrendered in the west to Chao. Chao enfeoffed Yüeh Yi at Kuan-chin with the title of Lord of Wang-chu, honoring and favoring him in order to frighten Yen and Ch'i. 35

The new commander, being far less capable and overly self-confident, was soon tricked by T'ien Tan into believing that

Chi-mo was about to surrender, only to be shocked when Ch'i's remaining forces mounted a ferocious night escape spearheaded by fire-oxen. T'ien Tan eventually succeeded in recapturing all of Ch'i's lost territory, causing the remorseful King Hui to beg Yüeh Yi to return to Yen, as much out of fear of his talent being exploited against Yen as the hope that he might again prove useful. However, Yüeh Yi wisely declined, and the destruction of Yen's mighty army became one of the most famous achievements of covert action preserved in the historical annals. 36 The Shih Chi's dramatic narrative, even as abridged here, also contains evidence of T'ien Tan's ready employment of agents to spread disinformation and thus manipulate the enemy into actions that would infuriate Tan's own men:

T'ien Tan ordered that whenever they ate, the people in the city should sacrifice to their ancestors in their courtyards. The 

birds flying about then all hovered and danced over the city, descending to eat. Yen's soldiers found it to be strange.

T'ien Tan then proclaimed, "A spirit has descended to instruct me." Afterward he said to the inhabitants, "There ought to be a spiritual man here who can act as my teacher." One soldier spoke up, "Can I act as your teacher?" Then he turned around and went

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away. T'ien Tan got up and had him returned, seated him in the eastern direction, and treated him as his teacher. The soldier said, "I tricked you; I am truly without ability." T'ien Tan said, "Do not speak!" Thereupon he made him his teacher. Every time he set forth any covenants or constraints, he would invariably attribute them to this spiritual teacher.

Subsequently he publicly announced: "The only thing I fear is that Yen's army might cut off the noses of our countrymen who have fallen captive and then parade them in front of us. If they then engaged us in battle, Chi-mo would be defeated!" Yen's soldiers heard about this and acted accordingly. When the city's inhabitants saw all the prisoners who had surrendered from Ch'i with their noses cut off, they were completely enraged and mounted a solid defense, fearing only that they might be captured.

Tan also let loose double agents who said: "The only thing that Yen's soldiers fear is that you will excavate the graves outside the city and disgrace our ancestors. This would turn our hearts cold." Yen's army thoroughly excavated the mounds and graves and burned the dead. Witnessing it from atop the city walls, the people of Chi-mo all cried and wept, and wanted to rush forth to engage in battle. Thus their anger increased tenfold.

T'ien Tan knew that the officers and troops could be employed in battle, so he personally took up the bar and spade used for building walls and shared the work with the officers and troops. His wife and concubines were enrolled in the ranks of five; he dispersed food and drink in order to feast all the officers. He ordered all the armored soldiers to conceal themselves and had the old, the weak, women, and children 

mount the walls. When he dispatched an emissary to arrange terms of surrender with Yen, the army all shouted, "Long life!"

T'ien Tan also gathered up the people's gold, accumulating a thousand ounces, and had Chi-mo's rich families send it out to Yen's generals, saying, "When Chi-mo surrenders, we hope that you will not plunder the homes of our clans or make prisoners of our wives and concubines, but let us be in peace." Yen's generals were overjoyed and agreed to it. From this Yen's army was increasingly lax.

Within the city T'ien Tan herded up more than one thousand cattle and then had red silken cloth decorated with five-colored dragon veins cover them. They tied naked blades to their horns and soaked the reeds bound to their tails in fat, igniting the ends. Before this they bored several tens of holes in the walls, and at night released the cattle with five thousand stalwart soldiers fol

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lowing in the rear. When their tails grew hot the cattle became enraged and raced into Yen's army.

Being the middle of the night, Yen's forces were greatly startled. The brightness of the burning torches on the cattle tails was dazzling. Wherever Yen's soldiers looked were dragon veins; anyone with whom the cattle collided died or was wounded. Availing themselves of the confusion, Ch'i's five thousand men, with gagged mouths, suddenly attacked, accompanied by a great drumming and clamor from within the city. The old and weak all made their bronze implements resound by striking them, the tumult moved Heaven and Earth. Terrified, Yen's defeated army ran off in turbulence and confusion. Ch'i's soldiers subsequently killed Yen's general Ch'i Chieh.

Ch'i's soldiers raced after the defeated and pursued those who fled. All the cities that they passed revolted against Yen and gave their allegiance back to T'ien Tan, so his troops constantly increased. Taking advantage of his victories and exploiting Yen's daily defeats and losses, T'ien Tan finally reached the region above the Yellow River. By then more than seventy Ch'i cities had been returned. Then he went to welcome King Hsiang 

at Chü, thereafter entering Lin-tzu where he submitted to the king's rule. King Hsiang enfeoffed T'ien Tan as Lord of An-p'ing. 37

Although ruthless, T'ien Tan clearly understood what was necessary to reverse Ch'i's hopeless situation and rescue the state from oblivion. His systematic exploitation of the enemy's greed and gullibility through disinformation and feigned bribes (or rather an actual bribe for an ostensibly different purpose) disarmed the besiegers, encouraging the laxity that imminent victory often induces. In contrast, Yen's commanders apparently assumed they well understood the situation and never anticipated the possibility of unexpected change. They obviously lacked spies within the city and failed miserably in fathoming the enemy's activities, being easily misled by the birds and internal (even though termed "double") agents who provided them with prestructured data.

A second example of employing disinformation agents to effect the removal of a talented military commander and thereby achieve an overwhelming military victory with epoch-making consequences occurred less than two decades later. Once again Ch'in managed to subvert another state with but little effort, exterminating Chao's forces in a battle in which the total combatants from both sides reputedly approached the astounding figure of one million: 38

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For his great victory at Wu-an, King Hui of Chao awarded Chao She the title of Lord of Ma-fu and appointed Hui Li as a state colonel. Chao She thus assumed the same rank as Lien P'o and Lin Hsiang- ju. Four years later King Hui died and his son was enthroned as King Hsiao. In his seventh year, 259 B.C., Chao and Ch'in were engaged in a stand-off at Ch'ang-p'ing. At this time Chao She had already died and Lin Hsiang-ju was seriously ill, so King Hsiao deputed Lien P'o to command the army in an assault upon Ch'in. However, Ch'in inflicted several defeats on Chao; therefore Lien P'o had his troops assume fortified positions and disengage from further hostilities. Several times Ch'in attempted to provoke Chao into combat, but Lien P'o was unwilling to engage them. However, King Hsiao believed Ch'in's agents in Chao who said, "The only thing 

that Ch'in fears would be the appointment of Chao Kua, Chao She's son, as commanding general."39 The king thereupon designated Chao Kua to replace general Lien P'o.

Lin Hsiang-ju objected: "You are employing Kua solely because of his father's name, just like someone gluing the tuning stops but trying to play the lute. Kua only knows how to read his father's books; he doesn't have any idea how to effect battlefield segmentation and changes." Unheeding, the king formally commissioned Kua as commanding general.

From his youth Chao Kua had studied military theory and discussed military affairs and therefore felt that no one in the world could oppose him. Once when he argued tactics with his father, even his father was unable to stump him. However, when Chao She did not acclaim his son's excellence and his wife asked why, he replied: "The army is a field of death, yet Kua easily speaks about it. If our state never appoints Kua as a general, that will be the end of it; otherwise, if they insist he serve as a commander, the one responsible for destroying Chao's forces will certainly be Kua."

When Kua was about to depart to assume command, his mother submitted a letter to the king stating that he should not employ Kua as commanding general. When the king queried her as to the reason, she replied: "Formerly when I served his father, the general, those whom he personally presented food and drink and brought forward to dine were counted by tens, while his friends were numbered by the hundreds. Whatever the king or the royal house awarded him, he in turn presented to the officers and civil officials in the army. On the day he received his mandate of command, he no longer concerned himself with family affairs.

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"Now Kua has just been appointed, but when he looked east in the court, none of the officers dared look up at him. He has stored away all the gold and silks your majesty presented to him in his house and daily concerns himself with real estate transactions. How could you imagine that he is at all like his father? Father and son are of different minds. I request that you do not to dispatch him into combat." 

"Madam, cease your protestations. I have already decided," responded the king.

Kua's mother then said, "If you must employ him after all, if he fails will you exempt me from punishment?" The king agreed.

Once Chao Kua had replaced Lien P'o, he altered all the regulations and constraints, changed and dismissed the army's officers. When Pai Ch'i, Ch'in's commanding general, heard about it, he released his unorthodox troops in a feigned hasty retreat while also severing Chao's supply lines. Thereafter he cut their army into two and Chao's officers and troops became disaffected. After forty days the army was starving, so Chao Kua sent forth his elite forces and struck Ch'in himself. However, he was killed by Ch'in's archers and his army defeated, with some several hundred thousand troops subsequently surrendering. Ch'in then buried them all alive, so that Chao lost a total of some 450,000 men in these engagements. Because Chao Kua's mother had warned of Kua's inadequacy, the king remitted her punishment. 40

Not only did the battle of Ch'ang-p'ing significantly weaken Chao; the losses it sustained were also the worst ever recorded in ancient Chinese history, even allowing for significant exaggeration despite recent archaeological discoveries that tend to confirm a massive toll at this battle. The logic of their surrender is unknown, as is the king's insistence on appointing Chao Kua in the face of dire warnings. According to his own biography, Pai Ch'i apparently felt the massiveness of Chao's forces presented a great danger and therefore took the opportunity to exterminate them. Chao Kua's name thus became synonymous with "armchair general," someone marked by book learning only, while Pai was condemned ever after for his unrighteous behavior in executing surrendered prisoners. 41

Finally, although rumor spreading was one of the simplest and least traceable methods for undermining and besmirching, more sophisticated measures--such as forgeries and preprogrammed false accusations, further examples of which will be found in the covert section-- were also employed. For example, even though the following episode

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arose as the outgrowth of one official's jealousy, it illustrates how contemporary beliefs might be exploited to frame an exemplary general: 42

Tsou Chi, Lord of Ch'eng and prime minister of Ch'i, and T'ien Chi, General of the Army, were displeased with each other. Kung- sun Han addressed Tsou Chi: "Sire, why not plan an attack on Wei for the king? If we are victorious, then it will have been due to my lord's plans and you can receive the credit. If we engage in combat and are not victorious, if T'ien Chi has not advanced into battle and has not perished, you can wrangle an accusation of cowardice against him and have him executed."

Tsou Chi agreed, so he persuaded the king to have T'ien Chi attack Wei. In three engagements T'ien Chi emerged victorious three times, so Tsou Chi informed Kung-sun Han. Thereupon Kung-sun Han had a man take ten gold pieces to a diviner in the marketplace and inquire: "I am T'ien Chi's retainer. T'ien Chi engaged in battle three times and was victorious three times. His fame overawes All under Heaven. If he wants to undertake the great affair of usurping the throne, will it be equally auspicious or not?"

The diviner went out and had men detain the person who had requested the divination for T'ien Chi, and then attested to his words before the king. T'ien Chi subsequently fled. 43

It seems incredible that Tsou Chi's simple ruse might have persuaded anyone that such a brilliant and successful general would have suddenly become so profoundly stupid as to blatantly initiate such inquiries. However, several of China's dynastic founders (including the Han and T'ang) availed themselves of--or manufactured--prophecies attesting to their "extraordinary" qualities and predestination. Had T'ien Chi actually ordered this public solicitation, it might well have been a sort of trial balloon to gauge the extent of potential adherents or a nucleus for deliberately stimulating rumors that could arouse public support.

Women, Sex, and Consorts 

Perhaps because burgeoning economic prosperity afforded hedonistic practices and because debauching other states with female musicians was no longer viewed as a dramatic technique likely to have much impact, the practice seems to have largely ceased in the Warring States

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period. Naturally women continued to be employed to seduce and befuddle powerful men--and men to influence consorts and dowagers-- but in a more circumscribed manner, without notoriety. Conversely, exploiting the influence enjoyed by favored concubines and powerful consorts seems to have evolved into a common technique, despite their supposed isolation and remoteness. This is illustrated by a well- known story about a rare white fox coat that coincidentally portrays the tangled web of personal and political intrigue, as well as the perceptions and expectations, that characterized the Warring States period. Just at the start of the third century B.C. the Lord of Meng-ch'ang, a member of Ch'i's ruling house, cultivated three thousand guests and retainers of various skills, some notable, others disreputable: 44

In 299 B.C. King Min of Ch'i finally had the Lord of Meng-ch'ang return as ambassador to Ch'in where King Chao appointed him as prime minister. However, someone said to King Chao: "The Lord of Meng-ch'ang is worthy but is also a member of Ch'i's royal clan. If he now acts as prime minister in Ch'in, he will certainly put Ch'i first and Ch'in second, and then Ch'in will be imperiled." King Chao therefore had the Lord of Meng-ch'ang seized and imprisoned, planning to kill him. However, the latter had someone visit the king's favorite concubine and entreat her to get him released. The concubine said, "I would like to have your master's white fox robe."

Meng-ch'ang once had a white fox robe worth a thousand catties of gold, unlike any other in the world, that he had presented to King Chao when he entered Ch'in. Since there wasn't another one anywhere, Meng-ch'ang was worried and asked his retainers for advice, but no one could reply. Then the lowest ranking guest, someone with the ability of a sneak thief, said, "I can get the robe for you." That night, sneaking in like a dog, he entered the depths of the palace treasury and retrieved 

the robe that had been given to the king, which was in turn presented to the beloved concubine. She then spoke with King Chao on Meng-ch'ang's behalf and he was released.

He raced away but first changed his fief, name, and other aspects of his identity in order to get through the pass. They reached the barrier at Han pass in the middle of the night. Meanwhile King Chao began to regret he had released Meng-ch'ang and sought him, only to discover he had already fled. Thereupon he dispatched men to race after, capture, and bring him back. The regulations of Ch'in forbade allowing guests out of the state until the roosters crowed in the morning. Meng-ch'ang was afraid his

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pursuers would catch up, but one of the lowliest retainers was able to imitate a rooster's crowing. When he did so the roosters all crowed, so the gate was opened and they were allowed to pass through. In the time it would take to eat a meal the pursuit force arrived at the pass but were already too late because Meng-ch'ang had departed, so they returned. In the beginning when Meng- ch'ang had ranked these two men among his guests, all the others had been embarrassed. However, after they extricated him from Ch'in everyone acknowledged Meng-ch'ang's judgments. 45

Because Meng-ch'ang and his party were ridiculed in the state of Chao, while returning to Ch'i, they angrily killed hundreds of their detractors. Hardly the behavior expected of someone characterized as a "worthy," it shows the power that private forces could brutally exercise in a tenuous age of chaos. Although later periods also witnessed powerful clans whose influence waxed and waned depending upon the strength of the central government, the Warring States clearly displayed an ethos of violence and its admiration, contrary to much verbiage about China's pacific heritage and pervasive deprecation of martial values.

Lord of Hsin-ling, Prince of Wei

Prince Wu-chi's biography, the first paragraphs of which have already been cited as evidence of the extensive covert 

intelligence operations mounted in the Warring States period, comprehensively illustrates a number of covert practices employed against one man. 46 Moreover, the significant impact of the bribery and exploitation of consorts clearly visible in it provided a lesson for subsequent ages. As background, it should be noted that the state of Wei had an aged, reclusive official named Hou Sheng who served as a watchman at the Yi Gate and in turn patronized a worthy named Chu Hai, who happened to be the town butcher. The prince made extraordinary efforts to cultivate a relationship with them and was rewarded, in turn, with a reputation for enduring their eccentricity simply to achieve it, one that Hou Sheng in fact had deliberately fostered. Even though the prince was hardly alone in such efforts, his skill in recognizing men of worth, in addition to simply being deferential to all such men, stands out. His behavior well accorded with the trends of an era that emphasized the cultivation of miscellaneous talents against the possibility of future use, although ideally these efforts were not supposed to be utilitarian in character, never deliberately undertaken to exploit the "recognized" at some critical moment.

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By King An-li's twentieth year [ 257 B.C.] Ch'in forces had already destroyed Chao's armies at Ch'ang-p'ing and advanced to besiege Han-tan, Chao's capital. Prince Wu-chi's younger sister was the wife of the Lord of P'ing-yüan in Chao, so the Lord of P'ing-yüan sent several letters to the king of Wei and prince Wu-chi requesting that they dispatch a rescue force. The king of Wei deputed General Chin Pi, in command of a hundred thousand troops, to rescue Chao. 47 [Learning of this], the king of Ch'in dispatched an emissary to inform Wei that "our attack on Chao will succeed sooner or later, so if any of the feudal lords dare dispatch rescue forces, we will certainly redirect our forces to attack them first." The king of Wei fearfully sent an officer to stop Chin Pi and have the army ensconce itself at Yeh. Although termed "rescue forces," they actually assumed an indefinite posture and merely observed.

The Lord of P'ing-yüan continuously sent emissaries from Chao to Wei and deprecatingly said to the prince: "The reason I allied myself to your house through marriage was your great 

righteousness and ability to be troubled by other people's difficulties. In a few days Han-tan will have to surrender to Ch'in. If Wei's forces do not arrive in time, how will you ever be able to express your compassion for other people's difficulties? Moreover, even if you lightly abandon me to surrender to Ch'in, do you not care about your sister?"

Troubled by the situation, the prince asked the king to take action several times and also had his prominent guests and sophisticated persuaders ply the king with a myriad arguments. However, fearing Ch'in, the king would not heed them in the end. Prince Wu-chi, concluding that he would not gain his objective, calculated that he could not live and yet allow Chao to perish. Therefore he requested his retainers assist him and gathered a force of some hundred or more chariots, intent on going forth to confront Ch'in's forces and die with Chao. In departing he passed by Yi Gate where he saw Hou Sheng [the gatekeeper], and fully informed him about his intention to die before Ch'in's army. After a final salutation he prepared to depart. Hou Sheng said: "Make your best effort. I am unable to follow you."

After the prince had proceeded some kilometers he felt uneasy, thinking: "I treated Hou Sheng with the greatest respect and generosity. Everyone in the world knows this. Now I am about to die, yet Hou Sheng did not have a word to grace my departure. Do I have some shortcoming?" Thereupon he turned his chariot around and went to query him.

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Hou Sheng laughed and said: "I knew you would return! Your name has been heard throughout the realm for delighting in men of talent, yet now that there is some difficulty, have you no other recourse but to go off and confront Ch'in's army? This may be compared to throwing meat to a hungry tiger. What will it accomplish? Among your guests you treated me very well, but when you departed I did not send you off. I knew you would hate it and return." The prince bowed twice and then asked him about possible tactics.

Hou Sheng, separating them off from the others, then secretly spoke with him: "I have heard that Chin Pi's military tally is 

always kept in the king's bedroom. Now the concubine Ju, being the most favored, goes in and out of his bedroom and has the ability to steal it. I have also heard that her father was slain and for three years she harbored enmity over it. From the king on down she sought to have someone avenge her, but no one succeeded. She cried before you because of it, and you dispatched one of you retainers to cut off the murderer's head which you then respectfully presented to her. She is willing to die for you, there is nothing she would decline, but has not yet had any opportunity. If you sincerely speak a word to her, she will certainly assent. Then you can get the tiger tally necessary to seize control of Chin Pi's forces, go north to rescue Chao, and force Ch'in in the west to withdraw. This is an attack worthy of a hegemon."

The prince followed his plot and requested Ju's aid, who indeed stole the tally of authority and gave it to the prince. The prince was about to depart, but Hou Sheng said: "When a general is in the field, for the benefit of the state there are orders from the ruler that he does not accept. 48 If you match the halves of the tally, but instead of turning the army over to you Chin Pi queries the king, affairs will turn precarious. My retainer, the butcher Chu Hai, can accompany you. He is a warrior of strength. If Chin Pi obeys, it will be excellent, but if he does not, you can have Chu attack him."

Hearing this the prince cried. Hou Sheng said: "Are you afraid of death? Is this why you shed tears?"

The prince replied: " Chin Pi is a courageous old general. If I go there, I am afraid he will not obey and I will certainly have to kill him. This is why I weep. How could I fear death?" Then he went and requested that Chu Hai accompany him.

Chu Hai laughed and said: "Although I am merely a butcher in the marketplace, you have personally honored me several times.

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The reason I never expressed my thanks is that I have always felt minor rites to be useless. Now that you have some 

difficulty, this is the time when I might sacrifice my life in repayment." He therefore accompanied the prince.

Prince Wu-chi went to take leave of Hou Sheng. Hou Sheng said: "Although I am willing to follow you, I am too old. Let me give you several days' leave to travel, and on the day you reach Chin Pi's army I will face north and commit suicide in order to send you off." The prince then departed and went to Yeh where he forged the king's order to replace Chin Pi as commander. Chin Pi matched the halves of the tally but raising his hand said to the prince: "Right now I have command of some hundred thousand troops encamped here on the border. This is a great state responsibility. So how is it that you have come out here to replace me with a single chariot?"

Since Chin Pi was unwilling to obey, Chu Hai removed a forty-pound iron truncheon from his sleeve and slew him. The prince took command and then, when reviewing the army, announced: "If there are any fathers and sons present in the army, the father should return to Wei. If any brothers, the elder should return. Any solitary sons without brothers should also go back to nourish their parents." Accordingly he obtained a select force of some eighty thousand men, advanced the army, and attacked Ch'in. Ch'in lifted the siege and retreated, thereby rescuing Han-tan and preserving Chao.

As Wu-chi had forged the transfer order, he sent the army back under a subordinate commander but personally remained in Chao with a few attendants for some ten years, where he was well treated and attracted a local following. Fearing reprisals, he consistently rejected King An-li's entreaties to return--pleas prompted by unremitting Ch'in attacks that were eroding Wei's territory--until criticized by some worthies in Chao for failing to protect his own ancestral lands.

The prince returned to rescue Wei. When the king saw him they both wept. The king gave him the seals of supreme general and the prince took command of the army. In the king's thirtieth year [ 247 B.C.] the prince sent emissaries to the feudal lords who all dispatched rescue forces once they learned he had assumed command in Wei. Then in supreme command the prince led the soldiers of five states in defeating Ch'in's 

army out beyond the Yellow River and driving off Meng Ching, subsequently exploiting

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the victory to pursue Ch'in's forces back to Han pass. Ch'in withdrew within the pass and did not again venture east.

At this time the prince's awesomeness shook the realm, and retainers from the various feudal lords all submitted military texts to him which were collected under his name and commonly called The Prince of Wei's Art of War. 49 The king of Ch'in, worried about these developments, sent an agent to Wei with ten thousand catties of gold to seek out Chin Pi's former retainers and have them slander the prince before the king, saying: "The prince was in exile for ten years, yet now he is commanding general and the feudal lords all submit to him. The feudal lords have all heard of the prince of Wei but not the king of Wei. The prince also wants to take advantage of the moment to become king while the lords, fearing his might, jointly want to establish him."

Several times Ch'in sent turned agents 50 to ostensibly offer congratulations upon the prince soon becoming king. When the king heard these things every day, he could not help believing them and therefore eventually dispatched someone to replace the prince as supreme commander. The prince, knowing that he had again been maligned and cast aside, no longer attended court on the pretext of illness, instead drinking well into the night with his guests. When he revived from his inebriation he had many women brought in, and in this fashion drank and caroused night and day for four years. Eventually he died from alcoholism, and the king also died the same year.

When the king of Ch'in learned that the prince was dead, he had Meng Ching mount an attack on Wei that resulted in seizing twenty cities and establishing eastern commanderies for the first time. Thereafter Ch'in gradually gnawed away at Wei, eighteen years later [ 225 B.C.] making the king a prisoner and butchering Ta-liang.

This account of Wei's demise at the very end of the Warring States period, just three years before Ch'in finally unified the 

whole realm to establish the first imperial dynasty, contains a number of illuminating points. First of all, the king of Ch'in resorted to so-called li-chien (estrangement) techniques and, despite Wu-chi's enormous success in rescuing Wei, succeeded remarkably! (Whether this illustrates the skillful employment of estrangement methods in creating disaffection through slander and calumny or simply the stupidity of rulers is perhaps an open question. Rulers never learned from dramatic historical events such as the fatal dismissals of Lien Po and Yüeh Yi.) Second,

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the prince's assiduous cultivation of shih--gentlemen of the lowest noble rank--irrespective of their immediate worth bears noting because this was a period when men of any and every talent, including tacticians, murderers, and strong arms such as Chu Kai, might prove useful. 51 The prince received tactical advice from Hou Sheng, no doubt a student of history who knew the lessons and techniques of the past, while the earlier incident that caused the king uneasiness proved a well-constructed web of external connections.

The traditional method for controlling military power once a general had taken the field, for verifying that an order was genuine, may also be seen in this story. Tallies, usually of metal but sometimes of wood, were created in various shapes, such as a tiger, and appropriately inscribed so that the matching halves were still distinguishable. The commander retained one, the ruler another, with the authenticity of special communications being attested by the accompanying tally. (Naturally they were intended for extreme emergencies, being usable only once.) Assuming both parties properly safeguarded their respective halves, the method would prove secure. However, these precautions were easily circumvented when Wu-chi exploited the favored concubine who was already

emotionally predisposed to cooperate with him. Thus the prince easily obtained the tally and made his escape through a gate guarded by the honored confidant who had suggested the plot. Unfortunately, his various actions obliged Hou Sheng to righteously die, which he did after ensuring the prince's success. 

The term hsien appears throughout the account in several meanings, including "secretly," "agent," and "turned agent," although the latter is not synonymous with Sun-tzu's double agent. This single biography thus provides a portrait of spies infiltrating every aspect of statecraft, thereby dramatically affecting the outcome of Warring States political strife; the state of Ch'in virtually rolled up the other states, partly by aggressively subverting state governments through the stimulation of disaffection and by fomenting political wrangling among the remaining states.

Pivotal Role of Assassinations

During the Warring States period assassination continued to be actively employed by generals and rulers to swiftly resolve difficult situations, especially when confronted by disadvantageous battlefield odds. At the very end of the era Prince Tan of Yen, noting historical precedents of strong-arm measures coercing promised concessions that were subsequently honored, decided to employ an assassin

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against Ch'in to somehow forestall being vanquished by a massive Ch'in invasion force said to number several hundred thousand men. The account of the entire exploit, the longest in the Shih Chi's chapter entitled "Assassins," so struck the Chinese mind that it remained famous ever after and the name of the warrior chosen for the task, Ching K'o, became synonymous with assassins. Significantly abridged, the Shih Chi depiction follows: 52

Ching K'o was a native of Wei, although his forebears had moved to Wei from Ch'i. He loved to read books and train in sword techniques. Traveling about to exercise his persuasion on the feudal lords, he finally arrived in the state of Yen. While staying there he was fond of drinking wine with two beloved friends, a lowly butcher and the lute player Kao Chien-li, so every day the three of them drank in the marketplace. As they became inebriated, Kao would play his lute and Ching would sing in accompaniment right in the market. Sometimes after singing they would weep, just as if no one were around. 

Although Ching K'o consorted with drunkards, he was profound and loved books. No matter which of the feudal lords he visited, he invariably associated with the worthy and with the leaders of powerful families. In Yen the reclusive scholar T'ien Kuang, recognizing he was not an ordinary man, similarly treated him generously.

The tale continues with Prince Tan's escape from his ill-treatment as a hostage in Ch'in, subsequent return to Yen, and decision to slay the king of Ch'in for both personal and state reasons. Having been introduced to Ching K'o through the auspices of T'ien Kuang (who then committed suicide), the prince interviewed Ching K'o:

Prince Tan said: "At this moment the king of Ch'in is so beset by greed that his desires can never be satisfied. Unless he controls all the territory under Heaven and compels every king to become his subject, his ambitions will never be satiated. He has already taken the king of Han prisoner and integrated his territory, and has also raised and dispatched troops south to attack Ch'u in the south and encroach upon Chao in the north. General Wang Chien, in command of several hundred thousand troops, occupies Chang and Yeh, while general Li Hsin is proceeding out to T'ai-yüan and Yün-chung. Since Chao cannot withstand Ch'in, it will inevitably be annexed as a subjugated state. When it has become a subject of Ch'in, misfortune will reach Yen. Since Yen is small and weak

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and has suffered several defeats in battle, I estimate that even mobilizing the entire state would prove inadequate to oppose them. Because the other feudal lords have all submitted to Ch'in, no one will dare join us.

I foolishly calculate that if I can find the most courageous warrior in the realm to serve as ambassador to Ch'in, we might inveigle the king with some great profit. Because the king of Ch'in is greedy, circumstances could then be manipulated as desired and the king coerced at knifepoint to restore all the territory of the other feudal lords that he now occupies. It would be excellent if the results were similar to Ts'ao Mei threatening Duke Huan of Ch'i; however, failing that, he can 

still stab the king to death. 53 With their great generals exercising independent command over troops outside the state and chaos within it, the new ruler and his ministers will certainly be suspicious of each other. In the interim the feudal lords could reunite and certainly defeat Ch'in. Although this is my great desire, I do not know whom to entrust with the responsibility. Perhaps you might ponder it a little."

After a long pause Ching K'o replied, "As this is a great affair of state, while I have but little talent, I am afraid I would be unequal to the task." The prince advanced, bowed his head before him, and strongly entreated him not to refuse until Ching K'o finally succumbed. Thereupon the prince honored him with an appointment as chief counselor and assigned him a superior mansion. Every day the prince personally went to deferentially offer all the delicacies of the greatest sacrificial feast, and separately sent over unique objects, carriages, horses, and beautiful women to fulfill his every desire and ply his intentions.

Time passed without Ching taking any action, until the prince finally pressed him and he revealed the plot's key, several objects that would invariably draw the king of Ch'in's interest. It happened that a disfavored Ch'in general had sought refuge with Prince Tan in Yen, and despite Ch'in's menacing threats, the prince steadfastly refused to be cowered into returning him to certain execution. Ching therefore sought to have General Fan killed so that he might contritely present his head and a map of Yen's border region as a pretext for calling upon Ch'in. Although the prince righteously declined to have the general killed, Ching personally went and persuaded General Fan that it provided the only way to avenge himself upon the villain who had exterminated his family. Even though the account to this point portrays the prince as a man of great honor and courage, he not only arranged the purchase of an extremely sharp dagger that was then quenched with

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poison to ensure its effectiveness in case of a nonfatal blow, but he also "had it tried on men and found that if their clothes were stained by blood, they immediately died." 

Following some additional delays, in a sorrowful scene worthy of the most tragic opera, Ching K'o and a bravado named Ch'in Wu-yang set out. Arriving in Ch'in, Ching arranged, through generous bribes, to be escorted into the court to submissively present the severed head and the map that was now wrapped around the poisoned dagger, leading to this melodramatic scene:

When the king of Ch'in heard about these developments he was greatly elated and, wearing his imperial robes, ordered the fullest ceremonies of state in granting an audience in the

Hsien-yang Palace. To present the box containing General Fan's head and the map, Ching Ko and Ch'in Wu-yang respectively advanced. When they reached the dais, Ch'in Wu-yang blanched and shook with fear. As the assembled ministers thought his behavior strange, Ching K'o looked about and laughed at Wu-yang, then apologized to the king of Ch'in: "Because this uncouth fellow from the northern barbarian tribes has never before seen the Son of Heaven, he trembles with fear. I hope your august majesty will make some allowance for him so that we may fulfill our mission here."

The king of Ch'in, addressing Ching K'o, said, "Bring me the map Wu-yang is carrying." Ching K'o then took the map and formally offered it up to the king. The king opened the map and when it was fully unrolled the dagger became visible. Thereupon, seizing the king's sleeve with his left hand and grabbing the dagger with his right, Ching K'o thrust at the king. Before the blade struck his body the king had already recoiled and risen from his seat, tearing the sleeve Ching K'o had been holding.

The king tried to draw his sword, which, being long, remained stuck in the scabbard. Furthermore, because he was flustered the scabbard was hanging straight down, frustrating attempts to pull it out. Ching K'o pursued the king around a pillar on the dais. His attendants, in panic and confusion, all lost their heads. Moreover, Ch'in's regulations forbade any of those attending upon the king on the dais to wear any weapon whatsoever. Even though armed palace guards were stationed in the lower hall, unless summoned by the king they could not come forward into the upper chamber. In the urgency of the 

moment the king failed to summon these guards from below, so Ching K'o was free to pursue the king about. In his sudden panic, lacking anything else, the king struck

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him with his fists. At this moment the attending physician Hsia Wu-chü swung his medicine bag at Ching K'o, hitting him.

Meanwhile the king had been circling around a pillar, too panicked to know what to do, when his attendants shouted, "Get the sword to your back!" Doing so, he suddenly succeeded in drawing it and slashed at Ching K'o, severing his left thigh. As Ching K'o collapsed he cocked his arm and threw the dagger at the king, but missed and struck a bronze pillar instead. The king slashed Ching K'o again and again. Having suffered eight wounds and knowing he could not succeed, Ching K'o leaned back against the pillar and laughed. Sprawling out, he then cursed the king, saying: "The only reason I failed was because I wanted to extort an agreement from you to repay the heir apparent." Immediately thereafter attendants rushed forward and killed him. 54

Naturally the attempted assassination only provoked the king of Ch'in to redouble his efforts to conquer Yen. The king of Yen, in a futile attempt to forestall the inevitable, had the heir apparent executed and his head presented to Ch'in after the latter's troops had forced them from their capital. But the gesture was of little avail as he was himself captured and his state exterminated five years later in 222 B.C.

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Part Two SPYCRAFT 

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4 Fundamental Thrust

FROM ANTIQUITY CHINESE MILITARY THEORY emphasized rationality and control, calculation and planning. In the Art of War, perhaps written about the end of the Spring and Autumn period, Sun-tzu repeatedly stressed the necessity of avoiding all engagements not based upon extensive, detailed analyses of the strategic situation, tactical options, and military capabilities. 1 Detailed calculations were apparently performed in the ancestral temple in his era prior to mobilization for a campaign, with similar, more specific assessments being made by field commanders before actually engaging enemy forces. 2 Although undertaken in the ancestral temple, these calculations were not a form of divination but were based upon quantified estimates that systematically assigned numerical values to the strength of objectively examined aspects for both sides, perhaps employing a system of tally sticks. 3 In "Initial Estimations," the Art of War's first chapter, Sun-tzu itemized the critical questions, thereby concretely defining the thrust of Chinese intelligence-gathering efforts thereafter: "When comparatively evaluating a situation through estimations, seeking out its true nature, ask: Which ruler has the Tao? Which general has greater ability? Who has gained the advantages of Heaven and Earth? Whose laws and orders are 

more thoroughly implemented? Whose forces are stronger? Whose officers and troops are better trained? Whose rewards and punishments are clearer? From these I will know victory and defeat."

Sun-tzu formulated some forty mutually defined, interrelated pairs that furnished the essential intelligence parameters grounding tactical analysis for the next twenty-five hundred years. Among them the major ones are Heaven-Earth, offense-defense, advance-retreat, and the unorthodox-orthodox. The comparative state of readiness can be deduced by reflecting upon such opposites as hunger-satiety, exhausted- rested, ordered-disordered, fearful-confident, cold-warm, wet-dry, and

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lax-alert. Whenever the calculations or net assessment indicates that the enemy holds a decided advantage, the general must either avoid them, assume a defensive posture, or develop tactics that will convert superiority into weakness, such as harassing the rested until they become exhausted: 4"If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives cannot be attained, do not employ the army. Unless endangered, do not engage in warfare. The ruler cannot mobilize the army out of personal anger. The general cannot engage in battle because of personal frustration. When it is advantageous, move; when not advantageous, stop. Anger can revert to happiness, annoyance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be revived, the dead cannot be brought back to life."5

Therefore, only through analytic calculations based upon factual intelligence can the ruler decide whether to commit the state to military activities:

Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.

If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his 

favor? If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent. 6

Sun-tzu's thoughts, an expression of his belief that warfare is the greatest affair of state, were echoed by virtually all the military writers thereafter, although frequently to little avail as rulers in the Warring States period and thereafter still insisted upon initiating campaigns without careful analysis, frequently in the face of insurmountable odds. A chapter entitled "Temple Victory" in the T'ai-pai Yin-Ching, the noted T'ang dynasty esoteric military text attributed to Li Ch'uan, essentially reformulates Sun-tzu's analytic thrust with a metaphysical vision:

Heaven esteems preserving the full and adhering to the patterns of yin and yang and the four seasons. Earth esteems stabilizing the precarious and observing the individuality of life and what is appropriate to ordinary land. Men esteem constraint in affairs, the harmonization of yin and yang, and the publication of seasonal edicts. When affairs come they respond to them, when things

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come they know them. All under Heaven fully express their loyalty and good faith and follow the government's orders. Thus it is said that "when the Tao of Heaven is free of disasters, you cannot come before them; when the Tao of Earth lacks calamities, you cannot take the lead; when human affairs have not suffered any losses, you cannot attack first." 7

When the four seasons encroach upon each other; deluge and drought increase and recede; there is thunder in winter and frost in summer; and flying insects devour the fields, these are disasters of Heaven. When mountains collapse and rivers block up; when the fields do not produce harvests; water does not sink down to irrigate the land; the five grains remain unplanted; and the eight cereals do not mature, these are calamities of Earth. Heavy taxes and onerous government, high towers and deep pools; labor forces excessively mobilized; drunkenness, orgies, and licentiousness; loyal officials estranged and sycophants favored; soldiers exhausted and the army spent through prolonged employment, these are losses of 

the human realm. 8 Heavenly disasters are discerned above, calamities of Earth are observed below, and human loss witnessed all about.

Armies not modeled on Heaven should not act; those not patterned on Earth should not move; expeditions and attacks not in harmony with men should not be completed. Heaven must sanction the time, Earth make its resources available, and men define the plans. When the enemy is quiet observe their yang aspects [visible behavior], when they move investigate their yin [silent, hidden] side. 9 First observe their traces, thereafter know the enemy's mind.

What is termed a victorious army is victorious first and then seeks to engage in battle, whereas a defeated army first engages in battle and then seeks victory. 10 Thus Sun-tzu said: "Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor. If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his favor? Observing it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent."11

The idea of calculation, of accurately determining the possibilities of victory through thorough planning, naturally found expression in

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numerous writings apart from the military tradition. For example, the Shuo Yüan (a first-century B.C. syncretic text) states: "In undertaking an affair, the sage king invariably plans it carefully, scrutinizes it cautiously within the scope of his plans, and then confirms it through divination by the turtle and milfoil. The ordinary people dwelling in thatched huts are all concerned with his plans, those engaged in menial labors all exhaust their minds in the task. Thus the king may undertake ten thousand affairs, yet no factor will be left out or any plans fall."12 The method of course requires balancing the tendencies 

of the moment with cognizance of their opposite: "Now whenever the wise undertake affairs, if they are full, they ponder excess; if peaceful, they contemplate danger; and if contorted, they consider the straight. For this reason in a hundred affairs they never sink into difficulty." 13 Another section reiterates: "Plans that precede affairs flourish, affairs that precede plans perish." 14

Necessity for Intelligence and Agents

Because of the analytical nature of their approach to warfighting, virtually all the Chinese military writers addressed the need for an intelligence service to ferret out vital information unavailable from open sources and simple observation. For example, the Ssu-ma Fa, parts of which may predate Sun-tzu Art of War, states: "In general, to wage war: employ spies against the distant; observe the near; act in accord with the seasons; take advantage of the enemy's resources; esteem good faith; abhor the doubtful."15 The great general Wu Ch'i subsequently identified four vital points of warfare--ch'i (spirit), terrain, affairs, and strength--defining "affairs" in terms of successfully employing agents: "Being good at controlling clandestine operatives; with a few light troops harassing the enemy, causing them to scatter; and forcing rulers and ministers to feel mutual annoyance, higher and lower ranks to reproach each other, this is termed the vital point of affairs." 16 Clearly such agents did not just passively gather information, but also actively engaged in sowing dissension and undermining administrations.

Sun-tzu, widely known even in the West as the progenitor of spycraft, 17 advanced a strong economic argument for deploying agents in the first paragraphs of his famous chapter "Employing Spies":

When you send forth an army of a hundred thousand on a campaign, marching them out a thousand kilometers, the expenditures of the common people and the contributions of the feudal

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house will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Those inconvenienced and troubled both within and without the border, who are exhausted on the road or unable to pursue their agricultural work, will be seven hundred thousand families.

Armies remain locked in a standoff for years to fight for victory on a single day, yet generals begrudge bestowing ranks and emoluments of one hundred pieces of gold and therefore do not know the enemy's situation. This is the ultimate inhumanity. Such a person is not a general for the people, an assistant for a ruler, or the arbiter of victory.

Enlightened rulers and sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invariably attain great achievements. This is the essence of the military, what the Three Armies rely on to move.

Sun-tzu firmly believed that the successful management of warfare depended upon acquiring full knowledge of the enemy, for only upon such a basis can plans be formulated:

The prosecution of military affairs lies in according with and learning in detail the enemy's intentions. If one then focuses his strength toward the enemy, strikes a thousand kilometers away, and kills their general, it is termed "being skillful and capable in completing military affairs."

For this reason one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot forge preparatory alliances. One who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot maneuver the army. One who does not employ local guides will not secure advantages of terrain. One who does not know one of these four or five cannot command the army of a hegemon or a true king. 18

Within the context of the vast commitments and expenditures required by warfare, Sun-tzu believed that wasting material and lives would be both stupid and inhumane because the ultimate intent of warfare should be to preserve one's own people while rapidly vanquishing the enemy. Thus, failing to gather any information that might facilitate victory could only be considered inhumane. However, for the past thousand years 

moral purists in China have condemned the book for its breaches of sincerity, righteousness, and trust, just as the first Westerners who eventually translated the text into French and later into English. (Remarkably, these early nonmilitary Western readers, being particularly appalled by the boldness of Sun-tzu's asser

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tions, condemned the Art of War from a doctrinaire Christian perspective as a heathen work somehow typical of an inferior race, irrespective of their own covert traditions and practices.)

Details, such as the identity of key personnel and the assignment of responsibilities that might be exploited through contacts, hostages, and extortion, should not be neglected: "In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to attack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants. You must have our spies search out and learn them all." 19

When fully assembled, this information would furnish the means to "know the enemy," one-half of Sun-tzu's famous equation for victory:

If I know our troops can attack, but do not know the enemy cannot be attacked, it is only halfway to victory. If I know the enemy can be attacked, but do not realize our troops cannot attack, it is only halfway to victory.

Knowing that the enemy can be attacked, and knowing that our army can effect the attack, but not knowing the terrain is not suitable for combat, is only halfway to victory. Thus one who truly knows the army will never be deluded when he moves, never be impoverished when initiating an action.

Thus it is said if you know them and know yourself, your victory will not be imperiled. If you know Heaven and know Earth, your victory can be complete. 20

Throughout the Kuan-tzu, an eclectic work traditionally attributed to the great Spring and Autumn governmental adviser Kuan Chung but largely composed during the middle to 

late Warring States period, "foreknowledge" is constantly emphasized:

Being ignorant about estimations and calculations but yet wanting to undertake military affairs is like wanting to cross over a dangerous river without a boat or oars. 21 . . .

When plans are not determined within the state but troops are dispatched across the borders, this is warfare that will prove self- defeating, attacks that will be self-destructive. Therefore, if one deploys the army but is unable to engage in combat, surrounds enemies but is unable to assault them, gains territory but is unable incorporate it--any one of these three can produce defeat. Therefore one who is not knowledgeable about the enemy's government cannot make plans against them. One who is not knowledgeable about the enemy's true situation cannot constrain them with

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agreements. One who is not knowledgeable about the enemy's generals cannot mobilize the army first; one who is not knowledgeable about the enemy's officers cannot deploy the army against them. 22

Sun Pin, a brilliant descendant of Sun-tzu whose Military Methods was recently rediscovered after being lost for two thousand years, similarly emphasized the importance of knowledge gained through spy activities:

There are five aspects to constantly being victorious. One who obtains the ruler's sole authority will be victorious. One who knows the Tao will be victorious. One who gains the masses will be victorious. One whose left and right are in harmony will be victorious. One who analyzes the enemy and estimates the terrain will be victorious.

There are five aspects to constantly not being victorious. A general who is hampered by the ruler will not be victorious. One who does not know the Tao will not be victorious. A perverse general will not be victorious. One who does not use spies will not be victorious. One who does not gain the masses will not be victorious. 23 

The Huai-nan Tzu's military discussion defined "tactical wisdom" in terms of clandestine intelligence gathering coupled with tactical command skills: "One who excels in employing secret agents [chien tie], investigating actions, and fathoming thought, establishing the obscure and setting ambushes, hiding and concealing his shape, and going forth where unexpected so that the enemy's troops never can succeed in defensive preparations is said to know the tactical balance of power."

The most successful military commander and thinker in the T'ang dynasty, which saw a sudden proliferation of military writings, was undoubtedly the great general Li Ching. Apart from the Questions and Replies, his views are preserved in a synthetic work reconstructed from scattered fragments entitled Li Wei-kung Ping-fa. Several lengthy passages are directed to the nature and importance of spy work, and the entire book stresses the importance of acquiring knowledge:

Now there are affairs which appear similar but whose strategic power differs, and those whose strategic power is identical but appearances differ. By according with the situation you can be completely successful with one movement, but if you strike when the

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situation is not conducive, your movements will certainly be defeated.

The measures for achieving decisive victory lie in investigating the opposing general's talent and abilities; analyzing the enemy's strengths and weaknesses; determining the configuration and strategic advantages of terrain; observing the advantages of the appropriate moment; and first being victorious, only thereafter engaging in combat and defending positions without losing them. This is termed the Tao for certain victory. 24

The Sung dynasty Unorthodox Strategies summarized the thirteenth-century view in similar terms: "Whenever planning to conduct a major military expedition, you should first employ spies to determine the enemy's troop strength, emptiness or 

fullness, and movement and rest, and only thereafter mobilize the army. Great achievements can then be attained and you will always be victorious in combat. The Art of War states, 'There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.'"25

In the Ming, about the mid- sixteenth century, an unknown author strongly asserted:

Now any general who, assuming the mantle of authority over the Three Armies and controlling the fate of ten thousand men, confronts fierce enemies or pursues them into the wilds to engage in a standoff but does not know the enemy's situation is a blockhead. When two forces struggle to control each other, anyone who does not undertake spycraft techniques is a wild animal.

For this reason attacking other states through their ruler is more intelligent than attacking them yourself. Plotting against people through their ministers is more intelligent than plotting against them yourselves. Dispersing alliances and bringing allies together in conflict are more intelligent than engaging them in combat yourself.

It may be compared with the case of a tiger who eats men. Anyone who goes to pull its teeth ends up being eaten. Anyone who trusts it by feeding it meat also ends up being eaten. Whoever pursues it wielding halberds also ends up being eaten. Whoever attacks the tiger with stones are also all eaten. Therefore, you should have other people pull its teeth, not pull its teeth yourself; entrust other men to feed it with meat, not rely upon doing it yourself; have other men pursue the tiger with a halberd, not pursue it yourself. Conceal yourself when attacking a tiger with stones, and have other men confront its anger. In this fashion you

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attack others through their ruler, plot against men through their ministers, disperse their alliances, and instigate conflict among them. But without agents, how can you investigate their true nature, without spies how can you employ these techniques? 26 

Moreover, since the enemy also seeks information, he concluded that any failure to undertake similar actions is senseless at best:

Whenever two armies stand off against each other, it is not just we who plot against the enemy, but also the enemy who plots against us. To fail to gain accurate information about the enemy's situation but recklessly engage in battle is senseless. How can you then employ subtle changes to wrest victory? Now as for the enemy's situation, there are those aspects that can be learned through observation, and those that cannot be learned through observation. There are many methods, inexhaustible changes in such matters! 27

Stress on Human Agency

Sun-tzu, among the first to decry the widespread, traditional reliance upon spirits and prognostication, insisted upon confining intelligence efforts to the human realm: "The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge. Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men, for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation." 28

This well-known passage has frequently been cited by Western historians unfamiliar with the vast corpus of Chinese military writings to conclude that Chinese intelligence theory was not only founded upon, but also strictly limited to human effort, in contradistinction to other lands and superstitious practices. 29 However, even though virtually all the tactical works stress human effort and deny the value of divination in fathoming the outcome of campaigns and battles, the prognosticatory tradition that originated in the Shang dynasty not only continued to flourish, but also vigorously evolved to encompass the interpretation of such diverse phenomena as sounds, clouds, weather, phases of the moon, natural omens, and the numerology of dates, producing numerous volumes devoted to arcane practices.

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Commanders exhorted their men to ignore meteors, birds flying backward, and the sudden appearance of dense black clouds, but rulers and generals might still resort to nonhuman agencies in an attempt to predict favorable courses of action amid the confusion of military confrontations, as will be discussed in the final section on divination, prognostication, and countertrends.

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5 Nature and

Theory of Agents

SUN-TZU'S BRIEF CHAPTER " Employing Spies, " being fundamental to all subsequent military thought about covert agents and their activities, merits presentation in itself before we dissect it and note a few historical commentaries and explications. The initial paragraphs presenting his justification for employing spies having just been cited, only the remaining two-thirds, which immediately analyze the types of agents, need be arrayed:

There are five types of spies to be employed: local spies, internal spies, turned spies [double agents], dead [expendable] spies, and living spies. When all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed "spiritual methodology." They are a ruler's treasures.

Local spies--employ people from the local district.

Internal spies--employ their people who hold government positions.

Double agents--employ the enemy's spies.

Expendable spies--are employed to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our [expendable] spies [with false information] and have them leak it to enemy agents.

Living spies--return with their reports.

Thus of all the Three Armies' affairs no relationship is closer than with spies; no rewards are more generous than those 

given to spies; no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies.

Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the sub

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stance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.

If before the mission has begun it has already been exposed, the spy and those he informed should all be put to death.

In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to attack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants. You must have our spies search out and learn them all.

You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be obtained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them you can recruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the enemy. Through knowledge gained from them our living spies can be employed as times require.

The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowledge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore, you must be generous to double agents.

In antiquity, when the Yin [Shang] arose, they had Yi Chih [Yi Yin] in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, they had Lü Ya [the T'ai Kung] in the Yin. Thus enlightened rulers and sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invariably attain great achievements. This is the essence of the military, what the Three Armies rely on to move.

In his penultimate chapter Sun-tzu thus delineated the characteristics and functions of five categories of spies that founded all future theorizing. Even though the categories were 

gradually expanded over the years, essentially being subdivided, refined, and redefined until numbering some thirty-two in the Ming dynasty, the basic types remained unchanged. Even though Sun-tzu's definitions are generally clear, it should be noted that "local spies" refers not just to agents recruited in specific areas, but may also include anyone who temporarily resides outside their native habitant, such as emigrants, experienced travelers, and peripatetic "persuaders" who readily provide information about other states as an integral part of their persuasive efforts. Thus, as discussed in the section on early history, China's first spies--Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung--did not actually engage in clandestine spy work

within a foreign state (a function performed by internal spies or living spies), but were essentially defectors. In this role, essentially in exile, they provided valuable general information about gov

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ernment officials and local configurations of terrain, thereby meriting the designation of "local spies" or "local guides."

Living spies were often talented individuals of exceptional perspicacity who could be dispatched to foreign states, sometimes in diplomatic guise, to observe and then report back. They normally comprised the greatest number of agents so as to provide the state with multiple means for acquiring data.

Double agents were spies dispatched by the enemy who had been detected and subsequently either converted to the state's cause or bribed. ( Sun-tzu's definition eventually evolved to include enemy agents who were being unconsciously manipulated. Although such manipulation certainly was not unique to China, most traditions would not term such individuals "double agents" or "turned agents" given the absence of any volitional component. However, throughout Chinese history the process of converting or turning them to one's own use was the defining factor, not whether they were knowledgeable or participants.) Sun-tzu highly esteemed true double agents because they might provide extensive, detailed information about the enemy's internal situation: 

You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be obtained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them you can recruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the enemy. Through knowledge gained from them our living spies can be employed as times require.

The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowledge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore, you must be generous to double agents.

The prolific Li Ching also pondered the nature of spycraft at the start of the T'ang dynasty, concluding:

Can victory in warfare be sought in Heaven or Earth, or must it be accomplished through men? When we examine the ways the ancients historically employed spies, we find that their subtle techniques were not singular. Some spied on rulers, the ruler's close associates, capable officials, assistants, close neighbors, associates, and allies. Tzu Kung, Shih Liao, Ch'en, Chen, Su Ch'in, Chang Yi, Fan Sui, and others all relied upon these techniques to achieve results.

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There are five categories in the Tao of spycraft: Those who rely on local connections to submerge themselves, observe and investigate, and then report on everything they have learned. Those who take advantage of the enemy's closely trusted people to deliberately leak false information for transmission to them. Those who rely upon their emissaries to twist affairs about and then return. Those worthy and talented individuals who are dispatched to discover the enemy's inclinations and vacuities and return to discuss them. And those who are accused of fabricated offenses so that they might subtly leak out false reports and specious plans, who then perish because of their reports to the enemy. Now these five categories of spies all must be kept hidden and secret. Treat them generously with rewards and keep them more than secret, for then they can be employed. 1 

Obviously Li Ching's categories are closely based upon Sun-tzu, although with slight twists, such as the nature of so-called local spies or connections--Sun-tzu's local guides; trusted personnel--internal spies; emissaries--turned or double agents; selected worthies and talents--living spies; and entangled in offenses--dead agents.

The Ch'ang-tuan Ching's military section, dating from roughly the first quarter of the eighth century, also discusses Sun-tzu's five agents in a chapter that heavily quotes "Employing Spies" but illustrates the categories with interesting historical examples:

The Chou Li states, "The one who circulates among the feudal states and reports back on their spies is a 'turned agent.'"2 The T'ai Kung said, "When an agent snares words flying about, they can be accumulated to compose a company of troops." From this we know that the Tao for employing agents is not a momentary affair. Thus there are five types of agents: local spies, internal spies, double agents, living spies, and expendable spies. These five types of agents all originated together, no one knows their Tao.

Local spies--employ people from the local district.

Internal spies--employ their people who hold government positions.

Double agents--employ the enemy's agents.

Living spies--return with their reports.

Expendable spies--reemployed to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our [expendable] spies [with false information] and have them leak to enemy agents.

In the Han dynasty when Pan Chao, Protector for the Western regions, was first appointed as chief of the regional generals, he

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mobilized all the infantry and cavalry from the areas under his control--some twenty-five thousand--to attack the minor border state of Sha-ch'e. Sha-ch'e sought aid from the state of Kuei-tzu. The king of Kuei-tzu dispatched his General of the Left to 

mobilize troops from the states of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t'ou, assembling some fifty thousand men to assist him. Pan Chao then summoned his subordinate commanders and the kings of Yü-t'ien and Su-leh and informed them: "Our troops are too few to be a match for the enemy, so it would be best to separate and disperse. The troops from Yü-t'ien should go east from here, I will return west. When you hear the sound of the drums in the middle of the night, have your troops set out." They all concurred. Thereafter he secretly arranged to have some captured prisoners escape and report his words to the king of Kuei-tzu. Overjoyed, the king had his General of the Left, in command of ten thousand cavalry, set off to intercept Pan Chao at the western border and the king of Wen-su, in command of eight thousand cavalry, intercept Yü- t'ien's forces at the eastern border. However, after conspicuously assigning their missions, Pan Chao secretly ordered his colonels, in command of picked troops and elite warriors, to race to Sha-ch'e encampment at the first cock's crow, whereupon they assaulted and overcame them. Although the defenders were terrified into running off, Chao's troops still killed some five thousand Hu tribesmen and eventually forced Sha-ch'e to surrender.

Furthermore, there is the case of Keng Yen conducting a punitive expedition against Chang Pu. 3 When Chang Pu, who had rebelled against the Han, heard about their approach, he had general Fei Yi deploy at Li-hsia and separately ordered troops to encamp at Chu-a. In addition, he established a line of several dozen fortified camps between T'ai-shan and Chung-ch'eng in preparation for Keng Yen.

Keng Yen crossed the Yellow River and advanced to attack Chu-a first. When seizing it, he deliberately left one corner of the encirclement open in order to allow some of their troops to flee back to their base at Chung-ch'eng. When the men there

heard that Chu-a had already collapsed, they were terrified and fled, leaving behind a deserted shell. General Fei Yi split up his forces and dispatched his younger brother Fei Kan to defend Chü-li. When Keng Yen advanced, he first threatened Chü-li, loudly ordering the troops to cut down numerous trees to fill in the moat and build hillocks and thereby force its surrender within days. When Fe Yi learned that Keng Yen was about to 

assault Chü-li, he laid plans to go and rescue the city. Keng Yen then ordered every

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one to repair their assault equipment, visibly planning to employ all their strength to assault Chü-li's fortifications in three days. However, he secretly left an opening in the siege so that a few soldiers from the city might escape, race back to Fei Yi, and report the time of Keng Yen's attack.

On the appointed day Fei Yi himself came forth to rescue Chü-li. Keng Yen happily addressed his staff generals: "The reason I had our assault equipment repaired was to entice Fei Yi to come here. His arrival is exactly what I wanted." Then, after splitting off three thousand men to maintain the effort at Chü-li, he personally led his elite units in ascending the surrounding hills and ridges. Thus, they were able to exploit the heights when engaging Fei Yi in battle and managed to severely defeat his army, killing Fei Yi himself. These are examples of employing local spies.

During the Chin dynasty Luo Shang, regional governor for Yi-chou, dispatched Wei Po to assault Li Hsiung, who held the city of P'i. After several pitched battles Li Hsiung summoned P'u T'ai, a native of Wu-tu; whipped him until he bled; and then had him falsely report to Luo Shang that he wanted to mount a treacherous response within the city, and would mark its initiation by setting a fire. Trusting him, Luo Shang sent forth all his elite soldiers and also dispatched Wei Po and other officers to follow to P'u T'ai's directions. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung had already dispatched Li Huan to establish an ambush along Luo Shang's route of approach. Pu T'ai then set some long ladders out against the walls and started a fire. When Wei Po saw the fire arise, his troops all competed with each other to climb their rungs. Pu T'ai also hauled up several hundred soldiers with ropes and killed them all. Li Hsiung then released the troops both from within the city and held in ambush outside to suddenly mount a two-pronged attack on the enemy. Striking from within and without, they extensively destroyed Luo Shang's army. Such is the power of employing internal agents. 

Duke Wu of the state of Cheng wanted to attack the nomadic Hu peoples, so he first had his son take a Hu woman as his wife and then queried his ministers, saying: "I want to employ our army, whom might we attack?" Kuan Ch'i-ssu, a high official, replied, "The Hu can be attacked." Duke Wu angrily slew him, exclaiming: "The Hu are a brother state. How can you say we should attack them?" When the Hu heard about it, their ruler assumed Cheng regarded them as relatives and thus made no preparations against them. Cheng then launched a sudden attack that seized them all. This is the power of employing a dead agent.

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Through bribery Ch'en P'ing released double agents amid Ch'u's army and caused Fan Tseng's estrangement when Hsiang Yü, the king of Ch'u, doubted his loyalty. This is the power of employing double agents.

Thus we know that among the intimates of the Three Armies, none are closer than spies; no rewards are more generous than given to spies; no affairs more secret than those pertaining to spies. Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies. Unless he is secret and subtle, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. 4 This is the essence of the Three Armies, emphasized only by the wise and perspicacious. 5

Although the chapter is organized around what might be termed "orthodox" definitions of agent categories, the actual terminology and examples are hardly what one would expect from Sun-tzu's definitions or the commentaries that coalesced around the Art of War. Perhaps this reflects the ignorance of an amateur writing on military matters; perhaps he had simply developed different conceptions of covert intelligence gathering. For example, the "local spies" found in his example are simply besieged soldiers who were tricked into becoming false prophets, disseminating pre-scripted information that would prompt desired enemy action. Some theorists would in fact term them "double" or "turned" agents because they were enemy personnel converted to one's own use, even though not originally spies. (In fact, the term "turned" agent in most of the historical works simply refers to such "others" being 

consciously employed to further covert causes, whether subversive or mere intelligence gathering.) Similarly, identifying P'u T'ai as an "internal agent" is rather skewed because he was clearly a counterfeit traitor or double agent who only appeared to be an internal agent from Luo Shang's perspective in the sense of already being present in Li Hsiung's camp and capable of undertaking a subversive, internal response coordinated with an external assault. ( P'u T'ai's feigned betrayal of course also excludes him from the traditional definition of a turned or double agent--even though he would be so described today--not having been tempted from his original loyalties and assignment.) Kuan Ch'i-ssu in no way merits the designation of "expendable agent" because he was simply a sacrificial lamb, an essential part of a disinformation ploy to allay Hu suspicions. A foil for the duke's stratagem, he was never employed to spread disinformation or act in any covert capacity beyond the state's borders. However, the reference to Ch'en P'ing's double agents follows the more colloquial approach of the historical writings, for they may have actually been

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double agents, but more likely were just agents sent in to spread disinformation, or perhaps local officials or staff members bribed to create suspicion, and thus merely internal agents. Of all the theoretical writings based upon Sun-tzu "Employing Spies," this chapter diverges the most radically.

Li Ch'uan, writing in his T'ai-pai Yin-ching perhaps a half century later, however, reverted to the old term of hsing-jen, which by this time had evolved with the language and lost the early connotations associated with the Chou dynasty official previously examined, coming to mean simply "traveler." He commences his chapter entitled "Hsing-jen," which might be translated "Roving Agents," in Sun-tzu's mode, condemning ignorance and any appeal to otherworldly sources, then proceeds to examine what he considers the two fundamental types of agents:

If the ruler selects a day to ascend the altar and appoint a commanding general; has the weapons and armor put into good order; the troops venture forth to destroy the enemy's state, defeat the enemy's army, kill the enemy's general, and 

take their people prisoner; transports provisions out ten thousand kilometers; and penetrates the enemy's borders, yet does not know the enemy's true situation, this is the commanding general's error.

The enemy's true situation cannot be discerned among the stars and constellations, or sought from ghosts and spirits, or acquired through divination or prognostication, but can be sought among men. 6 In antiquity when the Shang arose Yi Yin was a cook in the Hsia; when the Chou arose, the T'ai Kung was a fisherman in the Shang; when the Ch'in established imperial rule, Li Ssu was a hunter in Shantung; when Han Kao-tsu ventured forth Han Hsin was an exiled soldier from Ch'u; and Ts'ao Ts'ao found Hsün Huo, Yüan Shao's cast-off minister. Ssu-ma T'an became emperor of Chin because Chia Ch'ung had been entrusted with government in Wei, while Wei itself arose because Ts'ui Hao had made Chin his home. Thus through employing such men these seven rulers became emperor over All under Heaven.

Now whenever worthy men flee a state, it must be because sycophantic ministers control the ruler's authority. The true measure of things is then lost, the ruler's assistants form cliques, men of little merit monopolize power, and scoundrels usurp the authority of state. For example, Ya Yi promiscuously served King Chieh of the Hsia, Chung Hou immersed Chou of the Shang in licentiousness, and Yu Chan befuddled the second emperor of

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Ch'in with his music. When its three benevolent advisers departed, the Shang became a wasteland; when the two elders gave their allegiance to Chou it became glorious. When Wu Tzu-hsü died, the state of Wu was lost. Fan Li lived and Yüeh became hegemon. Wu Yang entered the border and Ch'in was delighted; general Yüeh Yi departed and Yen was terrified.

When a general succeeds in securing the enemy's people, entrusts them with responsibility, and ferrets out the enemy's true situation, what worry will remain that he might not be victorious? Thus it is said that if you gather in their stalwarts the enemy's state will be overturned; if you snare their valiants 

the enemy's state will be empty. Truly, through stones from other mountains you can polish your own jade.

Now there are two employments for roving agents [hsing-jen]. First, we can capitalize upon the men dispatched by the enemy to observe our defects by offering them higher ranks and making their salaries more generous. Thereafter, investigate their words and compare them with actuality. If they prove accurate, you can then employ them; if specious, you can execute them. Employ them as "local guides."

Second, have our roving agents observe the enemy's ruler and ministers, attendants, and officials, noting who is worthy, who stupid. Among the ruler's intimates, those both inside and outside the palace, who is covetous, who incorruptible. Among his attendants and diplomatic personnel, who are perfected men, who menial men. Once we have acquired this knowledge, we can proceed to achieve our purpose.

Among those serving in the Three Armies, none are more important than spies. Among secrets within the Three Armies, none more secret than spies. When plots involving such spies have not yet been set into motion, anyone who leaks them, as well as those they inform, should all be executed. On the day when a plot is initiated, destroy the drafts, burn the copies, silence their mouths, and do not allow internal plans to leak out. Be just like a blackbird invisibly entering the heavy forest or a fish diving into the deepest pool without any trace. Remember that, despite his surpassing visual acuity, when Li Lou bent his head he couldn't discern the shape of things, and despite his acute hearing, when Shih Kuang tilted his ear downward he couldn't hear a sound. Subtle! Subtle, just like a swirl of fine dust arising. How can a drunken and sated general who must contend with force, yet lightly engages in battle, manage to discern the affairs of spies?

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Li Ch'uan's "roving agents" would thus perform most of the functions of Sun-tzu's five categories, with an emphasis upon converting enemy spies into turned agents and using one's agents to gain a detailed knowledge of the enemy's staff and 

personalities preliminary to unspecified, but no doubt dramatic, actions.

By the late Ming the list of chien, normally understood as human agents, was expanded by an innovative military thinker, Chieh Hsüan, who regarded the employment of various techniques and the utilization of inanimate objects equally as "agents." Although this poses some problems for facile translation--requiring something like "agency through" or "clandestine action through"--his concept is clear and the range of activities comprehensive, amounting to some sixteen categories, prefaced and concluded with incisive remarks about employing covert agents under the definition for agent (chien) in the Ping-fa Pai-yen:

Definition: Those who enter among the enemy and implement unorthodox measures are termed "agents."

Original Text: Agents strike fear in the enemy's general staff, slay the enemy's beloved generals, and cause chaos in the enemy's estimates and strategies. The methods for employing agents include living, dead [expendable], written, civil, rumors, prophecy, songs, bribes, things, rank, the enemy, villagers [local guides], friends, women, goodwill, and awe.

Explanation: Spies [tie] who are dispatched and then return are living agents.

Those who enter enemy territory but do not return are dead [expendable] agents. 7

Creating forged letters is clandestine written action.

Holding discussions that stupefy the enemy is clandestine civil action.

Sullying and contaminating the enemy's generals are clandestine action by rumor.

Creating prophetic verses that circulate among the people is clandestine action by prophecy.

Songs, such as used against Ch'u, to disperse the troops are clandestine action through song. 

Using ten thousand ounces of gold to make bribes is clandestine action through bribery.

Sometimes seizing things, sometimes granting gifts, are clandestine action through things.

To promise rank and position is clandestine bribery through rank.

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Allowing the enemy's agents to return and report is clandestine action though enemy agents.

To form connections with subordinates and partisan cliques with hamlets is clandestine action through local agents.

To influence people through their friends is clandestine action through friends.

Bribes that penetrate the women's quarters constitute clandestine action through women.

Exploiting personal friendship is clandestine action through goodwill.

Inflicting bodily harm to implement plans is clandestine action through awesomeness.

It is not that implementing clandestine activities is difficult, but employing men that is difficult. Therefore employing agents is more difficult than employing the army.

The author concludes with twelve examples and then notes: "Living and dead are the general names for agents. Employing them through benevolence or fear is subtle. Now enumerating the above twelve types of agents, distinguishing them as living or dead, and then completing the categorization by indicating whether they were employed through benevolence or fear are too complex to harmonize. Thus Sun-tzu Art of War established a single chapter to distinguish the five types of agents." Although somewhat cryptic, his categories may easily be subsumed under Sun-tzu's five rubrics, many of them being local guides simply coupled with a more explicit listing of the means employed to entice or coerce cooperation among the enemy's people and thereby secure useful agents. 

Shih Tzu-mei's Lectures on "Employing Spies"

In the middle of the Southern Sung dynasty Shih Tzu-mei penned a series of commentaries to the Seven Military Classics so extensive as to merit the title of lectures. Much studied and reprinted in both Japan and China over the centuries, they were the first work to treat the Seven Military Classics as canonical, remaining especially significant today because they show the continuity of military thought from Sun- tzu's Art of War through Li Ch'uan T'ang dynasty T'ai-pai Yin-Ching and into his own work in the early thirteenth century. Moreover, several passages commenting on Sun-tzu's "Employing Spies" incorporate extensive, though unacknowledged, material from Li Ch'uan's chapter on roving agents. His views also embrace differing opinions

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from the Ten Commentaries edition of Sun-tzu Art of War, as well as Li Ching's thoughts from Questions and Replies, sometimes citing the speakers, at other times merely co-opting their phrases and sentences. (The more important ones will be indicated with attributions in parentheses.) Although lengthy, because the interpretations and details are significant, the entire lecture on "Employing Spies" from his Sun-tzu Chiang-yi merits translating. Fortunately the lectures are mostly self-explanatory, so little additional commentary is required. Of particular interest are the examples interwoven among the explications, almost invariably from the ancient period. ( Sun-tzu's original text, upon which he comments, appears in italic type.)

Employing Spies

T'ien Tan unleashed turned agents in Yen and Yen was indeed defeated. Ch'in had spies speak in Chao and Chao indeed surrendered. Spies being of such great use, Sun-tzu has a chapter called "Employing Spies."

Sun-tzu: "When you send forth an army of a hundred thousand on a campaign, marching them out a thousand kilometers, the expenditures of the common people and the contributions of the 

feudal house will be one thousand catties of gold per day. Those inconvenienced and troubled both within and without the border, who are exhausted on the road or unable to pursue their agricultural work, will be seven hundred thousand families.

Armies remain locked in a standoff for years to fight for victory on a single day, yet generals begrudge bestowing ranks and emoluments of one hundred pieces of gold and therefore do not know the enemy's situation. This is the ultimate inhumanity. Such a person is not a general for the people, an assistant for a ruler, or the arbiter of victory."

Mobilizing an army of a hundred thousand means the ultimate mass. Going forth a thousand kilometers means the farthest distance. When the ultimate mass was employed in a military campaign that took them the farthest distance possible and they calculated the transfer of supplies, what was expended and not recovered, what the royal family contributed above and the expenses of the common people below, each day they used a thousand catties of gold. Thus those bearing weapons were troublesomely employed in military service outside the state's borders, while grasses and grains were also onerously moved about within it. Along the roads delays could not be avoided.

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The number of farmers who could not pursue their occupations amounted to seven hundred thousand families because in the ancient well-field system nine families farmed an equal number of plots, with the middle plot being the duke's share. If someone among the eight families personally farming these plots was impressed into the army, the remaining seven had to supply his clothes and food. Therefore, when a hundred thousand troops were mobilized, seven hundred thousand families were unable to concentrate upon their own affairs. 8 How can the immensely disruptive effect be fully described?

With the daily expenses of the army being so great, if the commanding general wanted to find a way to certain victory but begrudged expenditures for rank and salary or a hundred catties of gold to seek out the enemy's true situation, how could he achieve victory? Moreover, the ruler easily acquires things, but the enemy's true situation is especially difficult to 

know. If easily acquired things such as money and gold can be employed to gain elusive information, how can anyone be parsimonious and not give them in exchange?

Furthermore, maintaining a defensive posture for several years is extremely long, while victory or defeat may be decided on a single momentous day, so being incapable of employing agents to spy upon the enemy's situation would be the greatest inhumanity! Someone like this cannot be a general for men, an assistant for the ruler, or the master of victory. Accordingly, the T'ai-pai Yin-ching states: "The ruler selects a day to mount the dais and appoint the commanding general, they put the armor and weapons in order, and when all the troops are mounted they go forth to destroy other people's states and defeat their armies. They kill the enemy's generals and take their men prisoner. They transport provisions out ten thousand kilometers and traverse the enemy's terrain, but if they do not know the enemy's situation, it is not the ruler's error but the general's offense." If this is true, how can spies not be used!

Ch'en P'ing advised Han Kao-tsu that if he was willing to sacrifice several tens of thousands of catties of gold, he could send forth turned agents [fan chien] to estrange Ch'u's ruler from his ministers and cause doubts in his mind. Without any further questions Han Kao-tsu therefore gave forty thousand catties to Ch'en P'ing to freely employ as he might, and in the end he destroyed Ch'u through this method. Mencius said, "Those who work for wealth will not be benevolent."9 The Rescripts state,

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"When the general is not benevolent, the Three Armies will not be attached to him."10

Sun-tzu: "The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge. Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men, for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation." 

The T'ai-pai Yin-ching states, "The enemy's situation cannot be sought for among the stars and constellations, or among ghosts and spirits, not through divination by turtle shell or milfoil stalks, but should be sought through men." Someone who knows this understands how the enlightened rulers and sagacious generals of old controlled their victories. Not one of them failed to base their efforts upon gaining knowledge of the enemy through human agents. Assuredly, if you do not know the enemy's situation, you will lack the means to realize great achievements. Similarly, if you are unable to use men, you will have no way to know the enemy's situation. If vital information about the enemy cannot be obtained, it will be difficult to determine the path to victory. Through relying upon men we can know the enemy's situation, so by employing spies we can fully know the enemy's advantageous and disadvantageous procedures and the appropriateness of their coming and going. This is why enlightened rulers and wise generals esteemed advance knowledge.

Now foreknowledge can be sought from ghosts and spirits, but the way of ghosts and spirits lacks form and shadow. Relying on men whose actions are submerged in the vacuous and nonexistent is hardly trustworthy. If we seek it in linked phenomena, the border for phenomenal associations lies in what has already passed. Since we cannot seek the future in the past, it is difficult to give it credence either. 11

Some take affairs to be simply a matter of officers, with "officers" being understood as the worthy officials and Confucians who wear round hats and walk in square shoes. They are fully conversant about the Tao of the three realms of Heaven, Earth, and Man. Now if our foreknowledge is adequate to illuminate things, why imagize it with officers, a method inferior to the theory of phenomenal associations?

If we seek it through administrative order, although the traces and forms may be beautiful, they also cannot be believed. Then

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why not seek knowledge among men? Through employing agents we can know the enemy's advantages and disadvantages, movements and stopping, interior and exterior, 

vacuities and substantialities. Then since everything about the enemy will be known, why should we resort to ghosts and spirits? Therefore Li Ching said: "Why seek to gain military victory in Heaven and Earth? Victory lies in men completing their missions." Thus one who has advance knowledge knows the subtle and shadows, knows preservation and extinction. Someone who is enlightened about things that have not yet materialized, who knows the minuscule and makes decisions, employing them before things have rushed forward and sunk, can thus arise in an instant, the interstice of a thread.

Sun-tzu: "There are five types of spies to be employed: local spies, internal spies, turned spies [double agents], dead [expendable] spies, and living spies. When all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed 'spiritual methodology.' They are a ruler's treasures."

Those who put on armor, grasp sharp weapons, and are first to break through the enemy's lines and mount their walls are men who dare to fight. Those who know the Tiger Secret Teaching and Leopard Strategy, who have mastered many methods and quick responses, excel at strategy. Those who understand riverboats and land wagons, the employment of cows and horses, excel at logistics. Those who precisely investigate the auspiciousness of natural phenomena and divine the implications of the wind's direction are diviners and prognosticators. We employ the courage of those who dare to fight, the wisdom of those who excel at planning, the labor of those who satisfy logistical needs, and the calculations of those who divine and prognosticate. As for those who spy out the enemy's closely held secrets, who ferret out their internal and external affairs, how can they not be treated as resources for spying?

Now spy activities are not singular. There are "local spies, internal spies, turned spies [double agents], dead [expendable] spies, and living spies. When all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed 'spiritual methodology.' They are a ruler's treasures." Methodology is also technique. Rulers must regard these five as valuable treasures. The subtlety of those who excel in spy work cannot be fathomed. Rulers also must esteem those who excel at employing the vital 

points. When the employment of these five types of spies attains the point that "no one

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knows their Tao" it becomes spiritlike. This is even more mysterious than being unfathomable in employing the vital points. Are not the ruler's treasure to be valued?

Sun-tzu: "Local spies--employ people from the local district. Internal spies--employ their people who hold government positions. Double agents--employ the enemy's spies. Expendable spies--are employed to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our [expendable] spies [with false information] and have them leak it to enemy agents. Living spies--return with their reports."

Local Spies--"By relying on the enemy's local people one learns the enemy's internal and external affairs, his vacuities and substantialities. If you manage to employ them, you can also have them act as reconnaissance scouts." This is Tu Yu's opinion. Chang Chao also comments: "Employing the enemy's people refers to thoughtfully and ceremoniously treating them well in order to recruit them. Just like the T'ang getting male prisoners in order to attack Kao-li [ Korea] or Wei Hsiao-k'uan enticing the men of Ch'i with gold coins and learning about their activities. Just so.

Internal Spies--"Rely on those among the enemy who have lost their government positions, such as the sons and grandsons of those who suffered corporeal punishment and families who have been fined. Rely on fissures in order to successfully recruit them." Thus says Tu Yu. Chang Chao comments: "Among the enemy's officials there will be those who resent having been dismissed for some offense, favorites and concubines no longer loved, those who are not employed, and those who lack conviction and love profits. All of them can be secretly lured in and forced to inform us about the enemy's secret affairs." This is like Chin using Miao Pen-huang and Ch'u employing Po Chü-li. 12

Turned or Double Agents--"Double agents are those dispatched to spy on us whom we detect, generously bribe, and make 

serious promises to so that they are turned around and employed as our spies." So says Tu Yu. Chang Chao comments: "When the enemy has spies come here and we uncover them, pretend to let some false affairs leak out, causing them to know about them in order to mislead the enemy. Thus Sun-tzu speaks about 'turned agents.' Men such as Chao She serving Ch'in as a spy and Ch'en P'ing using Ch'u's spies."13 Truly.

Dead or Expendable Agents--"Undertake feigned and false affairs outside the state and leak them about. Inform our agents about something and dispatch them into the enemy's midst so that they

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will divulge it when captured. When the enemy, believing their accounts, follows up but our actions differ, the spy will be executed." So says Tu Yu. Men such as Li Shih-ch'i in Ch'i and T'ang Chien among the Turks. But Chang Chao states: "Expendable agents transmit disinformation outside the state. Have our spies learn of something and transmit it to the enemy's agents. When their spies hear of it they will report back to the enemy." This should be understood as creating some sort of secret affair that is leaked to our spies. Our spies in turn see that it is leaked to the enemy's agents so that the enemy will learn of this feigned affair. When it proves to be a ruse, the enemy's spies will be executed!

Living Spies--"Living spies mean selecting your own worthy, talented, wise, and clever people, men who can access the enemy's intimates and nobility, investigate their actions, learn their affairs and calculations, and discover what they are doing. When they know the substance of such affairs they return and report, which is why they are termed 'living spies.'" So says Tu Yu. Chang Chao similarly notes: "Men who are wise but appear simple, whose deepest thoughts are hard to discern, who can come and go between our state and the enemy's, can act as spies. For example, when Chin attacked Yüan but Yüan would not yet surrender and the Duke of Chin ordered the siege abandoned, a spy came out to report that Yüan was about to surrender. He was a living spy." 

Li Ch'uan Yin-ching has a chapter entitled "Roving Agents." The roving agent is Sun-tzu's spy. The Yin-ching states: "Now there are three employments for roving agents. 14 First, we can capitalize upon men dispatched by the enemy to observe our defects by bribing them and making them reveal their missions. Second, we can exploit refugees who lost their government posts or committed offenses and fled to our state by offering them high ranks and making their salaries generous. Thereafter, investigate their words and compare them with actuality. If they prove accurate, you can then employ them; if specious, you can execute them. Employ them as local guides. Third, have our roving agents observe the enemy's ruler and ministers, attendants, and officials, noting who is worthy, who stupid. Among the ruler's intimates, those both inside and outside the palace, who is covetous, who incorruptible. Among his attendants and diplomatic personnel, who are perfected men, who menial men. Once we have acquired this knowledge, we can proceed to achieve our purposes."

If we take the Yin-ching's three roving agents and compare them with Sun-tzu's five agents, although the additional ones are

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special, the way in which they all learn the enemy's affairs are one.

Sun-tzu: "Thus of all the Three Armies' affairs no relationship is closer than with spies; no rewards are more generous than those given to spies; no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies."

The methods for employing the military include the urgent and dilatory, light and heavy, hidden and visible. The urgent cannot be treated as dilatory, the heavy as light, or the hidden as visible. The urgency of spy work lies in weightiness and secrecy. Moreover, officers for supply, prognosticators, and strategists are all intimates of the ruler, but none are closer than spies. Those in the army who are first to ascend walls or penetrate enemy formations are rewarded, those who assault cities and force towns to surrender are enfeoffed, and those 

who seize battle flags from the enemy and kill their generals are also rewarded. All of them are rewarded generously, but none more so than spies. The Tao lies in what cannot be seen, affairs in what cannot be heard, victory in what cannot be known. In all these cases one wants secrecy, but nothing is more secret than spies. No one is more intimate than spies, for this is how the ruler treasures them. None are treated more generously than spies, for the ruler does not begrudge rank, salary, or a hundred ounces of gold. Spies are the most secret. This is why anyone who leaks out affairs before they are implemented are executed.

Sun-tzu: "Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies."

One who is not fully prepared in the Tao of spycraft is not qualified to control spies. One who does not keep their vital points secret is not qualified to know the true nature of spycraft. In spy work the most difficult aspect is knowing how to employ agents. The sagacity and wisdom of someone about to employ agents must surpass other men. When missions are assigned, agents must be governed with benevolence and righteousness. However, since human minds are difficult to fathom, without subtlety and mysteriousness of spirit how can anyone interpret the substance of their efforts?

Someone with sagacious wisdom can know men, so he can run spies. A righteous and benevolent controller can motivate men, so he can employ spies. Those who penetrate the subtle mysteries

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can exhaust their patterns, so they can grasp the subtlety of spy reports. Those who employ spies must plan before events begin to break in the enemy's state so that agents can be present when they actually unfold. Han Kao-tsu can be said to have penetrated the Tao for entrusting spies and known the vital points of spy work. He knew that Ch'in's generals could be corrupted and that Hsiang Yü could be estranged from his 

generals. Thus he employed agents with sagacious wisdom. He gave Ch'en P'ing a thousand catties of gold and used Shih-ch'i to subvert Ch'i. This was employing them with benevolence and righteousness. If Han Kao-tsu had not been so perspicacious, how could he have known the actual outcome? Although appearing similar these three cases are distinct, without spies they could not have been implemented.

Employing spies in this fashion is subtle, most subtle! There is no place men who cannot be fathomed are not employed. In the Yin-ching, the chapter on hsing-jen states: "Be just like a black-bird invisibly entering the heavy forest or a fish diving into the deepest pool without any trace. Remember that, despite his surpassing visual acuity, when Li Lou bent his head he couldn't discern the shape of things, and despite his acute hearing, when Shih Kuang tilted his ear downward, he couldn't hear a sound. Subtle! Subtle, just like a swirl of fine dust arising. How can a drunken and sated general who must contend with force, yet lightly engages in battle, manage to discern the affairs of spies?"

Sun-tzu: "If before the mission has begun it has already been exposed, the spy and those he informed should all be put to death."

There are no affairs more secret than spying. For spies you want secrecy, so apart from exceptional cases you cannot let anyone among the enemy know about them, nor can you let your own officers and troops know about them. If you do not let anyone among your own people know about them except in rare instances, then even your attendants and assistants cannot be allowed to learn of operations. Once they are no longer secret, such affairs will be widely disclosed. When affairs are disclosed and widely known, the plan will have to be abandoned. According to military law how should this be treated? It merits death.

Therefore, before spy work has been initiated, anyone who knows about the mission will have certainly learned it from our own spies. Thus the spy and all who were informed should be executed. In his Hsing-jen chapter Li Ch'uan said: "Among those serving in the Three Armies, none are more important than spies. 

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Among secrets within the Three Armies, none more secret than spies. When plots involving such spies have not yet been set into motion, anyone who leaks them, as well as those they inform, should all be executed. On the day when a plot is initiated, destroy the drafts, burn the copies, silence their mouths, and do not allow internal plans to leak out." Li Ch'uan's words all derive from Sun-tzu.

Sun-tzu: "In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to attack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants. You must have our spies search out and learn them all."

Whenever there are special objectives that you want to accomplish, you must have detailed knowledge to undertake them, for then every aspect will be successful. If you initiate missions without adequate knowledge, whatever is done will merely be a reckless attempt. Moreover, in military enterprises with their thousand changes and ten thousand appearances, spies are employed to go back and forth between the armies because ignorance will immediately result in failure. This is even truer in spy work!

Thus whenever there is an army you want to attack, and certainly a city you want to assault, or men you want to assassinate, from the defensive general on down to the door guards, you want to know all their names. "Defensive generals" are responsible for defending the army. "Assistants" means the subordinate generals. "Staff" conduct guests to interviews. "Door guards" guard the gates. "Attendants" guard the lodges. You want to gain knowledge of all their names. Once you know them, as soon as a need arises you can exploit them to achieve your mission. Tu Yu asserts: "'You must know them in advance' means that you have previously become intimate with them and call on them when some urgent affair arises. Then you won't be stopped and you will know the enemy's affairs."

In Chang Chao Art of War his methods for selecting officers include one for gaining information about gatekeepers and protocol directors so you can cause them to be spies. If you 

know these two you can acquire the names of the defensive generals, staff, gatekeepers, and lodging attendants. Thereafter, you must let your own spies know them. In Duke Hsüan's fifteenth year the king of Ch'u surrounded Sung. Hua Yüan of Sung entered Ch'u's encampment one night and sat beside Tzu Fan's bed, where Tzu Fan spoke with him. Hua Yüan managed to penetrate Ch'u's camp through advance knowledge. Tu Yu thus explains it as "according

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to the Art of War, employ people from the local district. You must then know the names of the defensive generals, assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants and entice them with profits." Hua Yüan used this technique and was thus able to pass through.

Sun-tzu: "You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be obtained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them you can recruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the enemy. Through knowledge gained from them our living spies can be employed as times require. The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowledge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore, you must be generous to double agents."

Chang Chao says: "We employ agents to spy on others, and other men also employ agents to spy on us. It is vitally necessary to preserve deep secrecy and not leak out the crux of affairs. For this reason when the enemy has agents spy on us, we must strive to learn of their coming and turn them around to our own use." Probably it is normal human emotion that if we satisfy their desires, they will do what we want. If we coerce them with their anxieties, they will not know that we are using them. When an agent who comes to spy on us can be turned around and employed, it is as a double agent.

If we are to recruit him to work for us and spy on them, we must have techniques. Accordingly, lure him with profits or lead and release him. In order to entice him through his desires 

you cannot begrudge rank, salary, or the hundred gold coins that will satisfy his desires. To lead and release him, let him see our encampment's fortifications and actions in order to coerce him with anxiety. Open and lead him with affairs, and then release him to report back just as Chao She sent back Ch'in's spies after profiting them. Although Ch'u had a vast force, it displayed only a small army. These are the ways to lead and release others, that turned agents can be made to work for us.

Moreover, through turned agents you will learn about the enemy's affairs. "Thus local agents and internal agents can be recruited and employed. The expendable spy can spread his falsehoods and misinform the enemy." Since the living spy can be made to return and report at a predetermined time, sooner or later you will gain information. Missions for these five types of agents should certainly be known to commanding generals. Since the

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way they will know it is through double agents, double agents must be treated generously. Tu Yu says: "The double agent is the foundation of the five agents and the crux of spycraft." This is like saying: "Double agents are like the people's lives, the officers of the martial chariots, the martial cavalrymen, to all of whom one must be generous. Among men spies are the substance that cannot be slighted, among rulers the Tao that one does not dare disdain."

Sun-tzu: "In antiquity, when the Yin [Shang] arose, they had Yi Chih [ Yi Yin] in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, they had Lü Ya [the T'ai Kung] in the Shang."

There are those who say that Sun-tzu's meaning is not that the T'ai Kung acted as a spy in the Shang and Chou. They claim that Sun-tzu's idea was that order gives birth to superior men, disorder to menial men. When the Shang was just arising, Yi Yin was still in the Hsia, so initially he was not one of the Shang's old ministers. The Hsia was unable to employ him, but the Shang used him, which is how they flourished. When the Chou first flourished, the T'ai Kung was still in the Shang, so initially he was not an old Chou minister either. The Shang was 

unable to use him, but the Chou employed him, which is how the Chou arose. King T'ang and King Wu were raised by benevolence and righteousness, Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung were assistants for kings. If these kings had their resources act as spies in order to achieve success, would later ages have praised them?

But if we investigate Sun-tzu's words to seek out his meaning, we find the two being discussed in the chapter entitled "Employing Spies," so they must have been acting as agents. That is certain. Now what the world terms "agents" certainly includes those who spied on their rulers, ministers, relatives, worthies, assistants, neighbors, and friends--not a one wasn't a spy. But if we go back to the original, ancient meaning for spies, it still would not be exhausted, for an agent knows the enemy's affairs. Sun-tzu earlier said that "advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men." To know the enemy's situation the ancients employed spies. If one only wants to know the enemy's situation, then Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung in the Hsia and Shang would certainly have had deep knowledge. So how does gaining intelligence this way differ from employing spies? [As the Yin-ching states]: "Probably when the Shang arose Yi Yin was a cook in the Hsia. When the Chou arose the T'ai Kung was a fisherman in Chou. When Ch'in assumed emperorship, Li Ssu

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was a hunter in Shantung. When Liu Pang became king of the Han, Han Hsin was merely an officer in Ch'u's army. When Ts'ao Ts'ao became hegemon, Hsün Huo was Yüan Shao's cast off minister. Ssu-ma T'an became emperor of Chin because Chia Ch'ung had been entrusted with government in Wei while Wei itself arose because Ts'ui Hao had made Chin his home." From this perspective Yi Yin in the Hsia and T'ai Kung in the Shang, even though not employed as spies, well knew the enemy's situation and thus performed the mission of early spies. So how could Sun-tzu not have spoken of their employment as spies!

Sun-tzu: "Thus enlightened rulers and sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invariably attain great 

achievements. This is the essence of the military, what the Three Armies rely on to move."

[ Li Ching said:] "Water can float a boat, but it can also overturn the boat. Some use spies to be successful; others, relying on spies, are overturned and defeated." Truly. Yet Sun-tzu's thirteen chapters end with "Employing Spies" not because he slighted espionage but probably because he emphasized it. [ Li Ching said:] "If one braids his hair and serves the ruler, maintains a proper countenance in court, is loyal and pure, trustworthy and completely sincere, even if someone were to excel in spy work, how could he be employed [to sow discord]?" But take the case of Ya-fu's estrangement in Ch'u. Wasn't he loyal? Wasn't he trustworthy? Yet through a single ploy mounted by Han agents he was unable to preserve himself, so how can it be said that spies are not worth employing! If you employ a spy but he proves incapable of being successful, it is not the spy's fault but yours because you didn't get the right man.

No doubt one must have surpassing ability to perform extraordinary tasks and thus realize greater achievements than ordinary men. Superior wisdom surpasses ordinary capability. Spying transcends human affairs. Spies must successfully undertake actions beyond the capability of other men. How can their achievements be compared with merely assaulting a city, occupying terrain, capturing an enemy's flag, or killing a general? Their greatness is incalculable, beyond words. At the least spies with superior wisdom must be like Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung, who established the Shang and created the Chou, amazing achievements!

The military's ultimate essence lies in spies. They are what the Three Armies rely upon to move and be employed, and without them cannot. Why? Spies can learn the enemy's vacuities and substantialities, their activities, and their internal and external af

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fairs. Only after they have been successful can their desires be satisfied. The masses of the Three Armies rely on them to move. Formerly Li Su got Li Yu and took Wu Yüan-chi prisoner. 

15 Kuang Pi got Kao Hui and destroyed Ssu-ming. Wasn't this relying on them and thereafter moving?

Expendable and Double Agents

The two categories of expendable and double or turned agents occasioned the most conceptual difficulty throughout Chinese history and therefore the most verbiage. Sun-tzu's original concept of expendable or "dead" agents--spies deliberately employed on missions likely to result in their deaths--became somewhat less precise over the centuries, eventually coming to encompass any agent who died in the performance of his mission. However, it also stimulated extensive discussions not just on the apparent righteousness of such actions, but also upon the applicability of the term. Although the question of whether the agent knew he was being sacrificed never arose--it was assumed that to be effective, he would not, although there were exceptions--the issue of intention was less clear. Some unfortunate individuals, such as Li Sheng and T'ang Chien, the two most famous expendable agents in Chinese history, were simply unfortunate victims of evolving circumstances, never having been dispatched on missions intended to threaten their lives. Li Sheng eventually knew Han Hsin's ruthless actions had fated him to death, but T'ang Chien never expected the consequences of Li Ching's aggressive exploitation of an otherwise unattainable opportunity. (No doubt enemy agents who had been deliberately deceived with false information and specious plans were equally surprised to find they were about to be executed for failure or collusion with the enemy.)

Without question the Spring and Autumn period already witnessed the conversion of enemy agents and diplomats, and the term "turned agent" is often employed in later commentaries discussing what should be simply "living spies." Surprisingly, the Tso Chuan even records a botched attempt to bribe and coerce a courier into betraying his mission and thus becoming a double agent. As his story includes many intriguing aspects, it provides an excellent example of early thought on missions and principles:

Under siege by Ch'u forces, Sung dispatched Yüeh Ying-ch'i to the state of Chin to advise the extremity of their position and 

request their aid. The duke of Chin wanted to rescue them, but Po-tsung

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advised against it: "The ancients had a saying, 'However long the whip, it will not reach the horse's belly.' Heaven is presently supporting Ch'u, so it is impossible for us to engage them in battle. Even with Chin's might, how can we contravene Heaven? Let us await the outcome." The duke therefore desisted in his plan and instead sent Chieh Yang on a mission to Sung to prevail upon them not to surrender by saying that "Chin, mobilizing all its forces, will shortly arrive."

En route to Sung's besieged capital Chieh Yang was captured in Cheng and forwarded to Ch'u's encampment outside the city. The prince of Ch'u, generously providing him with bribes, sought to have him reverse the contents of his message to Sung. At first he refused, but after three such entreaties consented. Ascending to the top of a mobile siege tower, he shouted out his original message to the people of Sung's capital, thereby fulfilling his mission. The prince of Ch'u, about to have him executed, sent a messenger to say: "Why did you make a promise and then violate it? It isn't I who lacks trustworthiness, but you that abandoned it. Hasten off to your punishment."

Chieh Yang replied however: "I have heard that righteousness consists in the ruler being able to administer orders and fidelity in a minister being able to execute commands. When faithfulness sustains righteousness in the implementation of such orders it is advantageous. When plans do not lose their advantage and thereby preserve the altars of state, this is a ruler for the people. Righteousness does not allow for two acts of faith, or faith for two commands. When your lordship bribed me, he failed to understand the essence of command. If I am willing to die without regret, how can I be bribed? The only reason I consented was to complete my mission. To die in the completion of his mission is a minister's joy. My ruler has a faithful minister, one who has gained his objective. Even if I die, what more could I seek?" The prince released him to return to Chin. 16 

The background to this incident oozes diplomatic intrigue and power diplomacy. Briefly, Ch'u invaded Sung in the ninth month of the preceding year ( 595 B.C.) after their provocateur--an official emissary ostensibly on a friendly

mission to Ch'i--was captured while blatantly traversing Sung's territory without permission. This offense, which coincidentally illuminates the nature of state sovereignty and control in the Spring and Autumn period, compelled Sung to either boldly assert its independence by executing the agent or cower as a mere minion before mighty Ch'u, whose strength was expanding ex

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ponentially. Prompted by courage, righteousness, and the prospects of doom in either case, they chose to assert their independence and executed the emissary, who had, in fact, gone forth fully cognizant that it was designed to trigger exactly this response and was therefore in Sun- tzu's subsequent definition a "dead agent." However, in dispatching him, the ruler had promised to invade Sung to exact a horrendous revenge, thus showing that the entire sequence was pre-scripted, consisting of a stimulus, primary response, and secondary response or exploitative action designed to fabricate an excuse for Ch'u to subjugate the smaller, contiguous state of Sung and thereby at least nominally adhere to the ethical standards of the period.

Such sophisticated duplicity was hardly confined to Ch'u alone in the Spring and Autumn period, as Chin's actions in this very episode vividly illustrate. Although Chin never intended to undertake the military rescue of Sung, the duke still dispatched a messenger to encourage them to fervently resist their enemies, no doubt to thereby entangle Ch'u in a protracted conflict that would drain their resources, diminish their military capabilities, produce numerous casualties, and blunt their expanding influence into the northern plains. (He was perhaps oblivious to the possibility that Ch'u might enjoy much enhanced power once they conquered Sung and turned it into a client state.) The duke was too easily persuaded to desist in his plans to relieve Sung, and the historical records confirm no action was even attempted, the siege of Sung being resolved 

instead by the bold action of one man who crept into the chancellor's tent in the middle of their encampment one night and at knifepoint exacted a promise of release that Ch'u's ruler felt compelled to honor. Since Chieh Yang's original message was false, ironically Ch'u's coercion would have made it truthful, vividly illustrating the complexities of intrigue in this turbulent period.

When the fate of the Chinese empire following Ch'in's collapse was still uncertain, Liu Chi (Liu Pang), the eventual founder of the Han dynasty subsequently honored as Han Kao-tsu, benefited extensively from the clandestine work of Li Sheng, a headstrong Confucian remarkably capable of adapting himself to the momentary flux to realize great achievements. The circumstances that led to his tortured death suggest he was deliberately and unnecessarily sacrificed as a simple expedient by the ruthless Han Hsin, but his previous service, whereby he was prepared to subvert a city's defenses in conjunction with an externally mounted assault, and his subsequent reputation as a dead agent imply unrecorded dimensions to the story. His Shih Chih biography preserves the essentials:

Li Sheng, whose personal name was Yi-chi, was a native of the town of Kao-yang in the district of Ch'en-liu. He loved to study,

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but because his family was impoverished to the point of despair and he lacked any other means of livelihood, Li Sheng served as one of the lictors overseeing the village gates. Even then none of the Worthies or powerful men in the district dared employ him, while everyone termed him a foolish student.

When stalwarts such as Ch'en Sheng and Hsiang Liang initiated their revolts against the Ch'in dynasty, many of their generals came through Kao-yang en route to targeted areas. Li Sheng learned that these generals were all obsessed with trifles, loved detailed ceremony, and were too self-reliant to pay attention to portentous words, so he buried himself away. Subsequently he heard that troops under Kao-tsu's command had occupied Ch'en- liu's border and that one of their cavalrymen chanced to be a man of his own village. Han Kao-tsu had frequently queried him about the village's worthy and 

powerful men, so that when this officer returned to Kao-yang, Li Sheng intercepted him and said: "I have heard that, although Han Kao-tsu arrogantly disparages other people, he has conceived numerous far-reaching strategies. I would truly like to throw in with him but lack anyone to advance me. When you have an audience with Kao-tsu, say to him that 'in my village there is one Li Sheng, more than sixty years old and some six feet tall, whom everyone terms a foolish student. However, he asserts he is not foolish.'"

The cavalry officer said: " Kao-tsu does not like Confucians. Every time someone wearing a Confucian hat comes in, Kao-tsu grabs the hat off his head and urinates in it. When he speaks with people, he always swears loudly. He has never allowed any Confucian to expound on anything." Li Sheng said, "Merely tell him what I have said!"

The cavalry officer casually spoke to Kao-tsu just as Li Sheng had directed. When Kao-tsu reached Kao-yang's official hostel, he had men summon Li Sheng. When Li Sheng arrived and went into the hostel for his interview, Kao-tsu was just lounging on the bed, where two women were washing his feet. After entering, Li Sheng simply bowed low rather than formally prostrating himself and then asked: "Do you, sir, want to aid Ch'in in attacking the feudal lords? Or do you want to lead the feudal lords in destroying Ch'in?"

Kao-tsu cursed him: "Confucian dolt! Because All under Heaven have long endured the misery inflicted by Ch'in, the feudal lords are leading each other forth to attack it. How can you ask if I want to aid Ch'in in attacking the feudal lords?"

Li Sheng said, "If you are truly assembling followers to forge a righteous army that will execute perverse Ch'in, you should not

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interview your elders while lounging about!" Thereupon Kao-tsu ended the foot washing, arose, arrayed his clothes properly, and apologetically invited Li to take a seat of honor on the mat. Li Sheng then discussed the horizontal and vertical alliances that had developed during the Warring States period. Pleased, 

Kao-tsu presented something to eat to Li Sheng and then inquired, "How should I proceed?"

Li Sheng replied: "You have hastily assembled an untrained mass and gathered the remnants of chaotic forces, somewhat less than ten thousand men, yet want to advance directly into mighty Ch'in. This is termed 'tempting the tiger's jaws'! Now Ch'en-liu is the realm's focal location, situated on terrain that is open in all directions and traversable everywhere. Moreover, the city has accumulated large stores of grain. I am on good terms with the district magistrate and would like to be deputed to bring about its submission. If they prove unwilling to listen, you can then mobilize your army for an attack, while I will effect a response from within."

Accordingly Kao-tsu dispatched Li Sheng to proceed first and had his troops follow. They subsequently subjugated Ch'en-liu, so Kao-tsu granted Li Sheng the title of Lord of Kuang-yeh. Li Sheng then recommended his brother, Li Shang, to Kao-tsu, who entrusted him with command of several thousand men. Thereafter Li Shang accompanied Kao-tsu on his campaign to seize the southwest, while Li Sheng served as an adviser and was frequently deputed as an emissary to the feudal lords.

In the third year of the Han dynasty, autumn, Hsiang Yü attacked Kao-tsu's forces and seized Jung-yang, compelling the Han forces to escape to Pao-kung and Luo-yang. Hsiang Yü, king of Ch'u, on learning that Han Hsin had vanquished Chao and P'eng Yüeh had mounted several rebellions in Liang, divided his armies to rescue both Chao and Liang. Han Hsin was on the verge of attacking Ch'i in the east when Kao-tsu repeatedly encountered difficulty around Jung-yang and Ch'eng-kao. Kao-tsu therefore calculated that he should sacrifice the territory east of Ch'eng-kao and encamp in the Pao-kung and Luo-yang regions in order to resist Ch'u's forces under Hsiang Yü. Li Sheng then said: "I have heard it said that one who knows the Heaven of Heaven can achieve kingship, but one who does not know the Heaven of Heaven cannot achieve kingship. A true king takes the people as Heaven, but the people take food as Heaven. Now the realm has long been forwarding and transporting goods to the great storehouses at Ao- shan, and I have heard that extremely substantial amounts 

of grain are stored there. When Hsiang Yü captured Jung-yang, in

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stead of stoutly defending the granary at Ao-shan he took his forces to the east, deputing some former convicts to guard Ch'eng-kao. In this way Heaven has provided resources for you. Now I dare to believe it will be a great error if we withdraw, thereby snatching opportunity away from ourselves, when Hsiang Yü may be so easily taken.

"Moreover, two valiant stalwarts cannot both be established. You and Hsiang Yü have long been locked in an indecisive standoff, so the common people are vexed into movement and all within the four seas rocked and jangled. Farmers have abandoned their hoes and women their shuttles, while the hearts of All under Heaven remain unsettled. I suggest you urgently resume advancing your army to seize and appropriate Jung-yang. Then, by relying upon the grain stored at Ao-shan, securing the defiles of Ch'eng-hao, blocking the road to the T'ai-hang mountains, occupying the pass at Fei-hu, and defending the Yellow River ford at Pai-ma, you may show the feudal lords that you have effectively taken control of the realm's strategic dispositions. All under Heaven will then know where to give their allegiance.

"Now that Yen and Chao have already been pacified, only Ch'i has not submitted. T'ien Kuang presently occupies several hundred miles of Ch'i's old territory, and T'ien Hsien, in command of some two hundred thousand troops, is ensconced at Li-ch'eng. The mighty T'ien clan, backed by the sea and relying upon the obstacles posed by the Yellow and Chi Rivers, are encroaching upon Ch'u in the south. Their populace is highly changeable and crafty. Even if you dispatch an army several hundred thousand men strong, it will be months or years before they can be destroyed. I suggest you entrust me with the task of persuading the king of Ch'i to join you and thus become your eastern hedge."

"Excellent," Kao-tsu responded and then, in accord with his plan, retook the granary at Ao-shan, thereafter dispatching Li Sheng to exercise his persuasion upon the king of Ch'i. 

"Does your majesty know to whom All under Heaven will give their allegiance?" Li Sheng asked of the king of Ch'i.

"No," replied the king.

"If your majesty were to know to whom All under Heaven will give their allegiance, you would be able to preserve your kingdom of Ch'i; if you do not know to whom All under Heaven will give their allegiance, you will be unable to retain your kingdom of Ch'i," said Li Sheng.

The king inquired, "To whom will All under Heaven give their allegiance?"

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"To Han."

"Sir, how do you say that?"

Li Sheng replied: "Formerly, when Kao-tsu, king of Han, and Hsiang Yü, king of Ch'u, united their forces and ventured west to attack Ch'in, they agreed that whoever penetrated Hsien-yang first would become king. Kao-tsu advanced into Hsien-yang first, but Hsiang Yü abrogated the agreement by enfeoffing him as king of the Han area instead of Ch'in. Thereafter, when Kao-tsu heard that Hsiang Yü had shifted the Righteous Emperor out of Ch'u and then had him slain, he mobilized troops from Shu and Han to strike the three kings of Ch'in [set up by Hsiang Yü from the remnants of the Ch'in forces], went out through the pass, and gathered the soldiers of the realm to punish Hsiang Yü for his treatment of the Righteous Emperor and to reestablish the descendants of the feudal lords. Whenever he forced the submission of a city he enfeoffed a general, and whenever they gained material goods he divided them among his officers. Because he shared all the profits with All under Heaven, the powerful, valiant, worthy, and talented all take pleasure in being employed by him. Soldiers from the feudal lords are thus arriving from all directions, while boatload after boatload of grain is being shipped down from Shu and Han.

" Hsiang Yü now has a reputation for contravening agreements and the responsibility for slaying the Righteous Emperor. He 

never takes note of other people's achievements or forgets their offenses. When they prove victorious in battle the troops receive no rewards, when they capture a city no one is enfeoffed. Except for the members of his family, no one is entrusted with any responsibility. Whenever he has seals of authority carved for anyone, he holds them until the corners have been worn off, unable to award them. Whenever they assault a city and gain material goods he just accumulates them, unable to part with them as rewards. All under Heaven rebel against him, the worthy and talented revile him, and no one is willing to serve under him. That all the warriors of the realm will give their allegiance to Han Kao- tsu can be anticipated.

"Now Kao-tsu has exploited Shu and Han, pacified the three Ch'in, ventured beyond the Hsi-ho area, and gathered the soldiers from Shang-tang; proceeded down through Ching-ching and executed the Lord of Ch'eng-an; destroyed Northern Wei and occupied thirty-two cities. These are the soldiers of the legendary Ch'ih Yu, objectives accomplished through Heaven's beneficence rather than the strength of men. Since Kao-tsu has already availed himself of the grain supplies at Ao-shan, secured the ravines in

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Ch'eng-hao, blocked the lower heights of the T'ai-hang mountains, defended the ford at Pai-ma, and occupied the pass at Fei- hu, the last to submit will be the first to suffer destruction. If your majesty quickly becomes among the first to submit to Kao-tsu, you will be able to preserve and retain Ch'i's altars, but if you do not submit to Kao-tsu, you will shortly be endangered and perish."

T'ien Kuang felt this to be true so he accepted Li Sheng's suggestions and desisted military preparations for the defense of Li- ch'eng, indulging himself in wine every day thereafter with Li Sheng. 17 Meanwhile, after suddenly retaking control of Han Hsin's forces, Kao-tsu appointed Han Hsin as chancellor and deputed him to attack Ch'i with idle troops from Chao. Han Hsin therefore led his new army to the east, but before he had forded the Yellow River at P'ing-yüan, he learned that Li Sheng had already persuaded Ch'i to submit and so wanted to 

stop his advance. K'uai T'ung, a sophist from Fan-yang, advised Han Hsin thus: "My general received an imperial summons to suddenly strike Ch'i, but Han Kao-tsu also secretly deputed an emissary to effect Ch'i's surrender. Has my general received an imperial edict to halt? So how can you not continue your campaign? Moreover, Li Sheng, a single officer, by bowing from his carriage and moving his three inches of tongue, has wrought the submission of more than seventy Ch'i cities, while my general, in command of seventy thousand troops, required more than a year to subjugate Chao's fifty plus cities. Is what you required several years to achieve, on the contrary, to be less than the success of a doltish Confucian?"

Han Hsin, feeling this to be true, therefore followed his original plan, forded the Yellow River, and suddenly struck Ch'i. T'ien Kuang, king of Ch'i, being informed about the arrival of Han troops, assumed Li Sheng had betrayed him and therefore said to him: "If you are able to stop this Han army, I will spare you; otherwise, I am going to boil you!" Li Sheng replied: "Undertaking momentous affairs is not a matter of fastidious circumspection, overflowing Virtue not a matter of courteous yielding. Your elder will never change his words just for you!"

The king of Ch'i then had Li Sheng boiled alive before leading his soldiers off to the east, where he was eventually defeated by Han Hsin. 18

Li Sheng was thus a victim of Han Hsin's ambition coupled with Kao- tsu's probable duplicity or lack of confidence in Li's ability to successfully persuade the king of Ch'i to join them as an ally.

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Another, somewhat earlier illustrative episode from the Warring States period finds a hapless courier being deliberately sacrificed (in accord with Sun-tzu's definition) to subvert an informant residing in another state. This dramatic measure--literally setting up the courier for detection--was apparently resorted to in the expectation that rumors alone would prove inadequate to implicate the defector: 

Ch'ang T'o fled to East Chou from West Chou and then fully informed them about West Chou's internal affairs. East Chou was elated, but West Chou was greatly angered. Feng Tan said to the ruler, "If my lord will provide me with thirty catties of gold, I can have him killed."

Feng Tan then deputed an agent to take the gold and a secret letter to Chang T'o that instructed him: "You are advised that if the affair can be achieved, you must exert yourself to complete it; if it cannot be achieved, you should immediately flee back to West Chou. If the affair is prolonged and leaks out, it will cause your death."

Shortly thereafter he dispatched an emissary to inform East Chou's border guards, "Tonight an evildoer will enter your state." The guards caught the agent and forwarded him to the ruler, who immediately had Ch'ang T'o executed. 19

Despite being unqualified for any sort of covert activities and never having been dispatched on a clandestine mission, either with or without his conscious knowledge, T'ang Chien became the second famous "expendable agent" of Chinese history. The outlines of the episode that occurred just after the founding of the T'ang dynasty are found in the T'ang histories and the lengthy biography of General Li Ching, the probable author and chief spokesperson in the seventh Military Classic, the Questions and Replies. However, the story's importance may be seen from its employment as the illustration for Chapter 59 of the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies, "Advancing," whose tactical principle states: "Whenever engaging an enemy in battle, if you truly know that the enemy has a weakness that can be exploited to yield victory, you should quickly advance your army and pound it, for then you will always be victorious. A tactical principle states: 'Advance when you see it is possible.'" The story itself unfolds as follows:

During the T'ang dynasty, when Li Ching was serving as commander in chief for the Ting-hsiang Circuit campaign army, he suddenly attacked and destroyed the Turks. Chieh-li, khan of the tribe, raced back to the protection of Mount T'ieh and dispatched

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an ambassador to the T'ang court to acknowledge his offense and request that his state be allowed to submit in allegiance to the T'ang. The emperor dispatched Li Ching to accept their surrender.

Although the khan had visibly requested the privilege of visiting the imperial court, he still harbored doubts. Li Ching guessed his intentions. At this time the emperor summoned the Director of Rites, T'ang Chien, and dispatched him and others to officially condole with and placate the khan. Li Ching said to Chang Kung- chin, the Military Commissioner attached to his command: "With the arrival of imperial ambassadors, the Turks will certainly feel quite secure. If we were to have ten thousand cavalrymen, each carrying three days' rations, proceed via the Pai Road, we could suddenly attack them and certainly gain our objectives."

Chang Kung-chin said: "The emperor has already assented to their surrender. And what about the men who have gone out there?" Li Ching said: "The opportunity cannot be lost. This is the way Han Hsin destroyed Ch'i during the founding reign of the Han dynasty. As for men of T'ang Chien's advanced age, what is there to regret?" He supervised the soldiers in an urgent advance. When they had proceeded as far as Mount Yin, they encountered more than a thousand of the khan's perimeter defense troops, all of whom surrendered and joined Li's army.

When the khan received the T'ang's ambassadors he was greatly elated and neglected the army's supervision. Li Ching's vanguard took advantage of a heavy fog to advance within seven miles of the khan's command center before the khan first became aware of them. Before the Turkish formations could be deployed, Li Ching released his troops in an assault that resulted in killing more than ten thousand enemy soldiers. They also took more than a hundred thousand men and women prisoner, captured the khan's son Ku- luo-shih, and killed Princess Yi-ch'eng. The khan fled but was subsequently captured by Chang Pao-hsiang, the commander in chief of the Ta-t'ung Circuit campaign army, and sent back to the emperor. The T'ang thus enlarged its territory from Mount Yin north to the Gobi Desert. 

T'ang Chien's fame was further enhanced among military readers when Emperor T'ai-tsung questioned his most successful and loyal general about his intentions and motives in so readily sacrificing the Director of Rites. As recorded in the Questions and Replies:

The T'ai-tsung said: "Formerly when T'ang Chien was an emissary to the T'u-chüeh [Turks], you availed yourself of the situa

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tion to attack and defeat them. People say you used T'ang Chien as an expendable spy. Up until now I have had doubts about this. What about it?"

Li Ching bowed twice and said: "T'ang Chien and I equally served your Majesty. I anticipated that T'ang Chien's proposals would certainly not be able to persuade them to quietly submit. Therefore I took the opportunity to follow up with our army and attack them. In order to eliminate a great danger I did not concern myself with a minor righteousness. Although people refer to T'ang Chien as an expendable spy, it was not my intention.

Li Ching's ruthlessness in consolidating the T'ang position prompted officials and the literati in his own age and thereafter to severely condemn him. However, from the perspective of many years of warfare and persistent external threats to the fledgling T'ang dynasty, he obviously calculated that sacrificing T'ang would be insignificant compared to the men and resources otherwise certain to be lost. That T'ang Chien became known as an "expendable spy" is one history's ironies because he was the epitome of the literati, well versed in ceremony and protocol, merely a symbolic choice to accept the khan's surrender on the emperor's behalf. Being a civil official rather than a military officer, his mission was initiated without covert intentions, becoming subversive only when opportunely and astutely exploited by Li Ching, who viewed him simply as an expendable diplomat.

Sun-tzu's definition of double or turned agents was premised upon them having originally been dispatched by an enemy 

state and subsequently turned around, whereas the contemporary Western idea of a double agent requires a conscious, if not always willing, choice. The Chinese concept came to entail the manipulation and exploitation of enemy personnel whether they had been active clandestine agents or not, whether they were consciously recruited or not. However, classic double agents continued to exist, as may be seen in this example from the Three Kingdoms period:

Tung Feng, de facto ruler of Su-ch'i city, together with his younger brother Wei-ch'ü, revolted after having previously surrendered to the government, so Chang Ni, the regional governor, executed him. However, as Tung's wife was the daughter of the king of the nearby mountainous state of Mao-niu, Chang Ni concocted a way to pardon her. Meanwhile Wei-ch'ü escaped across the western frontier.

Wei-ch'ü was hard, fierce, astute, and cruel, so all his subordinates were terrified of him. He deputed two of his close confi

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dants to get information about Chang Ni on the pretext of wanting to surrender. However, Chang realized their true objectives, and by granting generous rewards converted them to double agents, thereafter planning with them how to assassinate Wei- ch'ü. When this was accomplished Wei-ch'ü's band all felt secure. 20

Peripatetic persuaders sometimes seem to have consciously acted as double agents, even freelance triple agents, as the following example shows:

Eastern Chou wanted to plant its fields with rice, but Western Chou had blocked the river's flow. Eastern Chou found this disastrous, but Su-tzu asked the ruler, "May I be sent as an emissary to force them to provide the water?"

The ruler assented, so Su-tzu went to see Western Chou's ruler, to whom he said: "Your majesty's plan is in error. By cutting off the water you are enriching Eastern Chou because the people are now all planting wheat. If you want to harm them, nothing would be better than now letting the water flow 

and thereby distressing their plantings. Once you allow the river to flow through, Eastern Chou will certainly plant rice again. When they have sown the rice, you can again cut off their water. In this way you can force their populace to look toward you with raised heads, eager to receive your orders."

The ruler of Western Chou consented and subsequently let the river flow through. Su-tzu thus received payment from two states. 21

Other Agents

Apart from the various categories of secret agent directly employed by states and armies to individually operate against their enemies, military staffs included a number of officers with designated intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert operations functions. Although they are rarely indicated in the extensive bureaucratic listings found in the twenty-five dynastic histories, their presence may be discerned in occasional military notes on command responsibilities and staffing. Fortunately a chapter entitled "The King's Wings" in the Six Secret Teachings, a product of the middle to late Warring States period, in detailing perhaps the earliest formal general staff in history stipulates

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many positions that clearly entail vital intelligence, psychological, and covert warfare responsibilities:

Chief of Planning, one: in charge of advising about secret plans for responding to sudden events; investigating Heaven so as to eliminate sudden change; exercising general supervision over all planning; and protecting and preserving the lives of the people.

Planning Officers, five: responsible for planning security and danger; anticipating the unforeseen; discussing performance and ability; making clear rewards and punishments; appointing officers; deciding the doubtful; and determining what is advisable and what is not.

Topographers, three: in charge of the army's disposition and strategic configuration of power when moving and stopped; 

information on strategic advantages and disadvantages; precipitous and easy passages, both near and far; and water and dry land, mountains and defiles, so as not to lose advantages of terrain.

Strategists, nine: responsible for discussing divergent views; analyzing the probable success or failure of various operations; selecting the weapons and training men in their use; and identifying those who violate the ordinances.

Secret Signals Officers, three: responsible for the pennants and drums, for clearly signaling to the eyes and cars; creating deceptive signs and seals; issuing false designations and orders; and stealthily and hastily moving back and forth, going in and out like spirits.

Officers of Authority, three: responsible for implementing the unorthodox and deceptive; establishing the different and the unusual, things that people do not recognize; and putting into effect inexhaustible transformations.

Ears and Eyes, seven: responsible for going about everywhere, listening to what people are saying; seeing the changes; and observing the officers in all four directions, and the army's true situation.

Feathers and Wings, four: responsible for flourishing the name and fame of the army; shaking distant lands with its image; and moving all within the four borders in order to weaken the enemy's spirit.

Roving Officers, eight: responsible for spying upon the enemy's licentiousness and observing their changes; manipulating their emotions; and observing the enemy's thoughts in order to act as spies.

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Officers of Techniques, two: responsible for spreading slander and falsehoods and for calling upon ghosts and spirits in order to confuse the minds of the enemy's populace.

The large number of central staff devoted to deception, disinformation, observation, and similar functions out of a total 

of seventy-two clearly indicates the importance assigned to their functions in effecting victory.

"Selecting Officers," the second chapter in the military section of the Ch'ang-tuan Ching--a synthetic work written by Chao Jui in the T'ang dynasty that essentially interweaves selected passages from the classic writings on different topics, forming them into an extended discussion interspersed with the author's unifying comments--similarly enumerates the key staff members of any military command. The following obviously exercised military intelligence and spying functions:

Now whenever the king commands the army, he must carefully select courageous men and wise officers of all ranks, assign them duties in accord with their abilities, each based upon their individual strengths, to be his thighs [personal advisers] and wings [staff] in order to compete his awesome spirituality. Only thereafter will the myriad affairs be complete.

These include a chief of staff, five strategists, three astronomers, three topographers, nine tacticians, four quartermasters, four public relations officers, three signals officers for the drums and flags, four engineering officers, three tactical officers for unorthodox measures, seven ears and eyes [roving security agents], five claws and teeth [morale officers], four wings [psyops officers], eight roving officers [recon officers], two invocators [to call upon ghosts and spirits], two accountants, and two physicians.

The chapter continues with a discussion largely in the vein of Wu Ch'i's Wu-tzu: Select men of unusual motivation or physical skills, including those skilled in disputation and clever in speech, for grouping into cohesive units. Unmentioned in these two chapters but otherwise specified were the large numbers of scouts and reconnaissance patrols (discussed in the following section on Military Intelligence) that would be employed to observe the enemy and penetrate their camps whenever possible, responsible for secretly gathering information about disposition, conditions, plans, and tactics.

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6 Operations and Control

WHILE MILITARY WRITERS ALL AGREED that spies were an integral part of intelligence gathering efforts, astute voices warned against relying upon them too extensively. The T'ang general Li Ching was particularly cautious, but in the conclusion to a passage previously cited about T'ang Chien, he expressed confidence that spies could not successfully penetrate a well-ordered court and estrange the ruler from truly loyal and capable ministers:

According to Sun-tzu, employing spies is an inferior measure. I once prepared a discussion of this subject and at the end stated: "Water can float a boat, but it can also overturn the boat. Some use spies to be successful; others, relying on spies, are overturned and defeated."

If one braids his hair and serves the ruler, maintains a proper countenance in court, is loyal and pure, trustworthy and completely sincere, even if someone excels at spying, how can he be employed to sow discord? 1

Whereas Li Ching was somewhat oblivious to the impact of spy activities directed against court ministers and ruler, the Ming dynasty T'ou-pi Fu-t'an observed: "Now some spies simply watch the way the winds blow and transmit falsehoods, while others will be subject to enemy persecution and divulge your affairs to the enemy. These are intimately related to being overturned and defeated. Thus agents can be employed but cannot be exclusively relied upon. Employing them is wisdom; relying upon them is stupidity."2

Apart from discussing the types of spies and the importance of double agents, Sun-tzu's chapter identified two other critical points: controlling agents requires talent and character, while interpreting the data acquired demands wisdom and perspicacity: 3 "Unless someone

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has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is 

subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle!"

Although personal integrity, righteousness, Virtue, and wisdom are considered prerequisites for understanding the spy and the data he retrieves, they are also essential to motivating men to the cause. Thus, for example, the Three Strategies states:

The Army's Strategic Power states: "One does not employ righteous officers with material wealth alone. Thus the righteous will not die for the malevolent. The wise will not make plans on behalf of an obtuse ruler."

The ruler cannot be without Virtue, for if he lacks Virtue his ministers will rebel. He cannot be without awesomeness, for if he lacks awesomeness he will lose his authority. A minister cannot be without virtue, for if he lacks virtue he has nothing with which to serve his ruler. He cannot be without awesomeness, for if he lacks awesomeness the state will be weak. If he is too awesome he himself will be overturned.

If your state's Virtue and strategic power are the same as those of the enemy, so that neither state has the means to overcome the other, then you must win the minds of the valiant, share likes and dislikes with the common people, and only thereafter attack the enemy in accord with changes in the balance of power. Thus without stratagems you have no means to resolve suspicions and settle doubts. Without rumor and the unorthodox you have no means to destroy evildoers and stop invaders. Without secret plans you have no means to be successful. 4

Even though Chinese history provided many examples of brutal rulers and perverse states, such as Ch'in in the final stages of its conquest, successfully employing clandestine agents to disrupt their enemies and wrest a telling advantage, the military theorists generally persisted in their belief that righteous causes and moral leadership must underlie intelligence efforts. The famous but ill-fated Chu-ko Liang thus stated:

One who doesn't know the advantages of the nine configurations of terrain does not know the Tao for the nine 

changes. The yin and yang of Heaven, the configuration and names of Earth, the close associates of men--one who knows these three will dwell in their achievement. One who knows their officers knows the en

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emy; one who does not know their officers does not know the enemy. One who does not know the enemy will invariably be imperiled in every engagement. Thus for targets the army will suddenly strike, one must certainly know the ruler's attendants, the mind of the officers and troops. In the Tao for employing the five types of secret agents, they are what the army treats as most intimate, what the general is most generous to. Without Sagely wisdom one cannot employ them; unless one is a righteous worthy, one cannot dispatch them on missions. When the five categories of agents realize their appropriate nature, the populace of the state can be employed and the state can be long preserved. 5

A chapter in the anonymous late Ming dynasty Ts'ao-lu Ching-lüeh further expanded the fundamental principles of spycraft with important insights regarding the management of agents and comparative evaluation of their material:

The Military Rescripts states: "The means by which enlightened rulers and worthy generals initiated actions, conquered others, and achieved success that surpassed the ordinary was advance knowledge." Advance knowledge of the enemy's true situation can be derived only from materials obtained by agents, so how can intelligence work be slighted?

Sun-tzu spoke in detail about the Tao for employing spies, what he referred to as "without subtlety and mystery being unable to realize the substantial employment of spies," so that especially in scrutinizing the essence, you must explicate the meaning. When the five types of agents are employed, you must invariably assemble all the data and probe for similarities. Thus for any single affair you cannot but multiply the number of agents employed in order to observe whether their words actually cohere or not, for only then will you begin to attain the truth. 

When the five types of spies are kept ignorant about each other, and when your living spies, unaware of each other, also gather their information about various matters and forward it, each reporting what they have heard, you can begin to compare their commonalities and evaluate differences, ferreting out the true and false. Why is this? As soon as agents become aware of each other, they inevitably compare their findings and make them consistent, skillfully employing their craftiness, in turn deceiving you with their reports. Thus your agents should not be unified; only you should know who they are.

You should question them in detail and observe their sincerity, evaluating the data in accord with appropriate parameters in order

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to discern the most subtle points, thus being as vaporous as illusion, as secretive as ghostly spirits. Then, even though the enemy excel at bolting their doors, will they be able to conceal their true situation? By not proceeding in this manner, some employed spies to achieve success, but others relied on enemy spies to overturn their enemies, so how can agents be relied upon? As for managing them with benevolence and righteousness and stimulating them with heavy rewards, these hardly require mention. 6

To facilitate gathering information and targeting individuals and objectives, preliminary steps to secure fundamental data--such as employing the eighty "travelers" described in the Kuan-tzu--should be undertaken: "Kuan Chung dispatched eighty warriors to wander about the four corners of the realm offering adornments, amusements, and delights for sale to the feudal lords in order to discern what the upper and lower ranks liked and valued and thereby select the dissolute and chaotic as priority targets for attack." 7

As late as the mid- sixteenth century the T'ou-pi Fu-t'an pointed out:

If you want to learn the enemy's true situation through spies, you must first gain an understanding of their fundamentals--such as the price of goods, their customs and inclinations, 

their causes of happiness and anger--and fathom who among the upper and lower ranks are in harmony, who marked by acrimony. Only thereafter, in accord with slight openings, can you spy upon the ruler's close associates; through sycophants, estrange the loyal; through profits, control the disputatious; and through doubt, contrive dismissals. Cause their words to be deceptive, sow confusion in their actions and stopping, estrange the intimate, and disperse their alliances, all through the subtle work of employing agents.

Therefore, successfully mounting covert operations in enemy states requires first acquiring some knowledge of their situation. If you want to gain knowledge of the enemy's situation, you must not begrudge the expense of a thousand pieces of gold. To be parsimonious about a thousand pieces of gold and lose agents is to be defeated. To expend a thousand pieces and thereby learn the enemy's situation is to be victorious. This is the subtle crux of victory and defeat, it must be investigated! 8

The importance of allocating adequate funds to acquire information, reiterated in the last paragraph, deserves note. Because of the risks undertaken by secret agents and the need for courage, determination, and self-control, all the military writers who pondered their em

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ployment emphasized two aspects: secrecy and generous rewards. As will be discussed in the section on counterintelligence, secrecy is paramount for any state that seeks to prevent the enemy from fathoming its plans and operations. However, the measures to be implemented with regard to running spy operations must be even more extreme. Thus Sun-tzu stated: "Of all the Three Armies' affairs no relationship is closer than with spies, no rewards are more generous than those given to spies, no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies. If before the mission has begun, it has already been exposed, the spy and those he informed should all be put to death."9 Later, the Wu-pei Chih-yao asserted: "In employing the military, nothing is more important than using spies. The methods for employing spies are not 

singular, but the main point is to prevent people from fathoming them, the subtle essence is secrecy."

Sun-tzu was also the first to assert that spies could neither be recruited nor retained without strong material incentives, and he was followed by many others thereafter. Although the financial requirements for agents were frequently spoken of in isolation, the military sphere equally required courage and incentives, just as positions in the central government. Accordingly, both the military and philosophical writings developed a complex psychology of rewards and punishments during the Warring States period that fully explored the power of incentives to motivate and manipulate men. A chapter entitled "Administrative Distinctions" in the Kuan-tzu observes:

The ruler does not begrudge gold and material wealth to the acute of hearing and sharp of eye. Thus a minor campaign occurring within one thousand kilometers is known about. The construction of substantial walls and the gathering of ten people will be espied within five days. A major campaign [by the feudal states] anywhere under Heaven will be known about within five days because the ruler disperses gold and material wealth in order to employ those who have acute hearing and sharp eyes. Thus one who excels at employing the military may lack ditches and ramparts because he has ears and eyes.

The value of clandestine information in reducing the state's military expenditures deserves note.

As for targeting individuals and manipulating agents, including enemy spies, Li Ching advised:

If the enemy has spoiled favorites who are entrusted with confidential affairs, we should dispatch spies to bring them marvelous

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curiosities, to debauch them with their desires, to accord with and entice them. If the enemy has important officials who have been deprived of power or whose ambitions are unsatisfied, we can inveigle them with generous profits to prevaricate against those close to the ruler, to pluck their true situation and learn it. If the enemy has those close to the ruler or attendants who 

are frequently boastful, who like to dispute about the advantages and disadvantages of things, we should have our spies pretend to warmly embrace them, to honor and praise them, and then generously provide them with marvelous gifts in order to ferret out their spies and convert them.

If the enemy dispatches emissaries with requests to us, we should detain their emissaries and have people constantly accompany them. They should act courteously and attend them congenially morning and night, taking good care of them, while we double and redouble their bribes and provide gifts that suit their tastes, constantly observing their countenances and words and investigating them. But early in the day and late at night we should see that they are always alone with our chosen attendants, and also dispatch men with acute hearing to conceal themselves in the double walls and listen to their leisure talk. When we have delayed their mission, they will fear being doubted and reprimanded by their governments, and will certainly discuss their true affairs among themselves. When we know their plans, we can dispatch them and use them for our purposes. 10

Through such efforts double agents can easily be recruited, for they will have been forced into untenable positions in which their survival depends upon cooperating with the enemy rather than continuing to loyally serve their own state.

Although double agents have inordinate value, their employment entails the dilemma of reliability, ensuring they are neither false double agents nor expendable agents planted to spread disinformation by feigning a new loyalty. As the preceding passages already indicate, one method would be to compare the double agent's reports with those from other sources, increasing the credibility accorded them only after their veracity has been attested over time. Li Ching offered some suggestions for grappling with this problem and handling agents previously detained by the enemy who perhaps provided them with critical information or were seduced into their employment:

You should not heed the words of any agent who was captured by the enemy but later returned. However, if you do manage to re 

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ceive true information through him, you can reverse your course and employ it. When you uncover an enemy agent, if you want to extinguish all trace of him, kill or imprison him. If you want to employ him as a double agent, treat him generously and then release him. This is the method for achieving certain victory, the essence of the military. 11

In Li Ch'uan's estimation even so-called local guides--essentially defectors employed in an extended role--pose reliability problems and therefore require extensive measures to secure their loyalty and confirm the validity of their information:

Although deer naturally enter forests, one who does not employ local guides will find it difficult to realize advantages of terrain. Now employing local guides doesn't necessarily mean natives. Anyone familiar with the difficult and easy ground among the mountains and rivers, or with the enemy's vacuities and substantialities, can be entrusted with the task. Reward them generously to gain their willing allegiance, but be prepared to strictly guard against deception. Bestow offices and ranks upon them, enrich them with wealth and goods, and thereby cause them to have things they cherish. Match them with wives and children, and thereby cause them to have people they embrace. Thereafter, investigate their speech, examine their countenances, turn their words upside down, and if they are consistent throughout, from beginning to end, they can be employed. 12

Li Ch'uan's policy was essentially a method of vetting spies rather than simply employing local guides on a temporary basis as the army advanced. His advice to ensure loyalty through nurturing both desires and ties of localized affection was unique among the military writers, as were his methods for querying and probing (which will be seen in the section on evaluating men). Clearly any men subject to such insightful handling were destined for future employment as spies and double agents.

Historically, many rulers fell victim to the machinations of trusted confidants who became enemy agents, often dismissing 

truly loyal and meritorious ministers at their behest. However, at least one ruler proved capable of fathoming false reports and employing generals, unlike numerous Spring and Autumn and Warring States failures, illustrating the knowledge necessary to successfully interpret events. His perspicacity in assessing agent reports was even cited by later generations:

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Having gained permission to pass through the states of Han and Wei, a Ch'in army advanced to attack the state of Ch'i. King Wei of Ch'i had Chang-tzu assume command of the counterattack. After confronting Ch'in's army, both sides stood down and encamped. Meanwhile emissaries were dispatched back and forth a number of times. Then Chang-tzu changed their battle pennons and unit insignia [to match Ch'in's] in order to have his soldiers intermix with Ch'in's forces. An observer came back to the court and informed the king that Chang-tzu had gone over to Ch'in with all his troops. 13 King Wei made no reaction.

After the passage of some time another observer came and reported that Chang-tzu had surrendered with all his troops to Ch'in. The king made no reaction. After this happened a third time the chamberlain asked: "Using the same language, three different men have informed you that Chang-tzu has been defeated. Why have you not dispatched a general to suddenly attack him?"14

The king replied, "Since it is clear that he has not rebelled against me, why should I attack him?" After a while another report advised that Ch'i's forces had gained a great victory, Ch'in's army having been severely defeated. The king of Ch'in subsequently confessed his offense against Ch'i and bowed in acknowledgment as a barbarian subject. An attendant inquired how King Wei knew Chang-tzu had not deserted. He replied: " Chang-tzu's mother was unfaithful to his father, so his father killed and buried her beneath the stables. When I commissioned Chang-tzu as commanding general, I encouraged him by saying, 'If you return with all your forces, you will certainly be formidable enough to rebury her as the mother of the commanding general.' He replied: 'It is not that I am unable to rebury her. However, while still my father's wife, 

my mother proved unfaithful. Without instructing me otherwise he died. To formally rebury my mother would be to deceive my deceased father. Therefore I have not dared to undertake it.' How would a son who is unwilling to deceive his deceased father betray his living ruler while acting in the capacity of a high official?"15

Because King Wei understood Chang-tzu's character and believed in consistency of behavior--something that Han Fei-tzu subsequently proved could be highly misleading--he was able to correctly assess the incoming reports. Naturally he overlooked the possibility that fidelity to a ruler might not weigh so heavily as duty to a deceased father, even though this was an age when ministers and generals frequently betrayed their monarchs.

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Identifying and Recruiting Agents

By any functional definition of morality the army is inherently an evil enterprise because it requires people to perform perverse, violent, and inhumane acts. This implies that either psychopaths must be coerced into directed action or good men somehow be motivated to abandon social and personal constraints to do what they would otherwise abhor and deem evil. Spy work naturally falls into this category, with some of the most successful spies even being comfortable in the least desirable circumstances, situations where so-called negative talents are best exploited. However, in general reliable spies can be found only among honorable, intelligent men and women, who must be persuaded to undertake what the Chinese literati always condemned as deceitful and dishonorable. The only solution thus resides in motivation and control, as Chieh Hsüan indicated in his meditations on the term "control" in the Ping-fa Pai-yen: 16

Definition: To employ the greedy and deceitful is termed "control."

Original Text: The military is not a good affair. The talents that are advantageous are exactly those that can harm it. The martial must kill, the courageous must hate, the wise must be 

deceitful, and strategists must exercise forbearance. The military cannot cast aside the martial, courageous, wise, or strategists, so it cannot abandon hatred, killing, deceit, and forbearance. Thus if those who excel in control employ these capabilities but eliminate the evil aspects, harvest the profits but impede the harms, then everything under Heaven will become a resource for the military. Enemies can be summoned, invaders pacified, brigands used, and the distant employed. It all lies in control, that's all.

Explanation: If one simply gains their allegiance through material incentives but lacks deep plans and farsighted thoughts to control them, then the warriors of the Three Armies will either be arrogant or lax. Thus there are five ways to control them: First, Virtue, the armies of Emperors Yü and Yi. Second, public spirit, the armies of Kings T'ang and Wu. Third, righteousness, the armies of the hegemons Dukes Huan and Wen. Fourth, administration, the armies of Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu. Fifth, authority, the armies of Ssu-ma Yi and Ts'ao Ts'ao. Although their employment differs, they are still unified in being able to manipulate human talent.

Moreover, there is control in the realm of the formless. The first is termed ch'i: When the ruler's ch'i is overflowing, the men

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dare not have any rebellious intentions. Second, strategic power: When the army's strategic power is flourishing, the warriors dare not have any traitorous thoughts. These are matters of control found in a commander's complete achievement, not what just deep planning and foresighted thoughts are able to attain. Thus when the general's ch'i is not flourishing, he need not take command. When the army's strategic power is not flourishing, it need not be sent forth on campaign.

Even though Chieh Hsüan's general solution for the martial dilemma was control, his thoughts represent the final development of the tradition and perhaps an unfounded optimism. Somewhat earlier, much in the tradition of the Wu-tzu and the retainers found among powerful Warring States nobles, in the Sung dynasty Hsü Tung advocated recruiting 

men of every conceivable talent and employing them in accord with their skills, however despicable. Moreover, he made the remarkable point--astounding within the context of China's entrenched bureaucratic government and values of his era--that the normal method of selection and appointment, emphasizing the civil skills of language, literature, study, and disputation, automatically excluded men with martial talent and the courage to undertake and complete dangerous military missions:

In selecting men the present age focuses upon extensive learning and ignores specialized skills. This is not a good method. In contrast, the military finds it advantageous to employ men according to their strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, those good at comforting others are not employed in the urgency of combat for fear that they will exhaust themselves but lack courage. 17 Those who excel in defense are not employed in mounting assaults for fear that they will be slow and not fierce. The crafty should not be employed in decisionmaking for fear that they will be indecisive. The recklessly courageous should not be employed in planning against the enemy for fear that they will regard them too lightly.

Employ the truly cruel in combat, the decisively courageous in assaults, and the profoundly resolute and stubborn-natured in occupying the passes and ravines. The petty-minded but greedy should not be employed in guarding stores and supplies. You can adopt the words of the wise and the adroitly decisive. The agile should be employed to entice a response from the enemy. The firm and strong-willed should be employed in the front. The fluent and loquacious should be employed to work as spies. Those good at filching things like rats and snatching things like dogs

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should be dispatched to steal the enemy's signals and investigate the enemy. Those who speak foully and curse a lot should be employed to slander, deprecate, and undermine the enemy. Those with unorthodox talents and unique knowledge should be employed to discuss future events. Those who have profound knowledge and are broad-minded should be 

employed to settle the masses. Those marked by surpassing strength and great power should be employed to open the way and cut through dense growth. Those who excel at erecting fortifications suitable to the terrain should be employed to measure trees and construct palisades.

Employ the timid and fearful in forwarding equipment. Employ the old and weak in preparing cookfires and wells. Those familiar with mountains and streams, who can select the advantages of high and low, streams and springs, should be employed to carefully investigate the terrain's configuration. Those who speak about portents and fabricate sayings, who excel at elucidating the mind of Heavenly ghosts and spirits, at invoking the mandate of Heaven, should be employed to raise a ruckus to delude the masses and thus move the enemy's hearts. Those who excel at selecting strategic configurations of terrain, the easy and difficult, who know both the major roads and minor bypaths for coming and going, should be employed to establish supply routes.

Those who use unorthodox language and loquacious discourse, who can inflate the vacuous and amplify greatness, should be employed to shake and flourish the army's awesomeness and virtue. Those whose ears and eyes are perceptive and sensitive, who can clandestinely investigate the enemy's true situation, should be employed to watch for villainy and artifice. The talented who are good at writing should be placed in charge of the documents and dispatches. Those knowledgeable about the sun, moon, five planets, blessings, and calamities should be made officers for calendrical matters. Those who excel at interpreting the auspiciousness and inauspiciousness of the winds and clouds should be made atmospheric officers. Those who understand the intricacies of portentous date calculation should be appointed officers in charge of selecting appropriate days for action. Those versed in prognostication by tortoise and milfoil should be made officers for divination. Even though these last four classes of officers all derive their prognostications from experience and embody predictions through yin and yang, they should be kept from confusing each other. Esteem any predictions in which they all concur. 

There should also be at least twenty medical personnel, appropriately increased in accord with the army's numerical strength.

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The number of veterinarians should be similarly calculated. When the commanding general weighs those with penetrating talents, he need determine only whether they can be employed in consultations or not. Thus, although there are both good and evil among the masses in our army, no one will ever be discarded. Since there will thus be no disaffection, when the army moves, it will achieve its objectives. 18

Although relatively few personnel are entrusted with intelligence and covert operations, they clearly must have particularized skills that enable them to succeed in their missions.

Premised upon historical justifications, the Ts'ui-wei Pei-cheng Lu of the succeeding dynasty continued this thrust by encouraging a dynamic approach to ferreting out the unique talents necessary for spies and military professionals in a chapter entitled "Selecting Officers":

I once read in the thirteenth and last chapter of Sun-tzu's book that the wisest should be spies. "When the Shang arose, Yi Chih was in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, Lü Ya was in the Shang." Now the kings of the Shang and Chou assuredly were granted the Mandate of Heaven, for otherwise how could Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung have brought about the rise and fall of these states? Thus in the method for employing spies do not be troubled that bravos have not arrived, but the departure of bravos is sufficient cause for worry. Do not regard heroes failing to give their allegiance a matter of urgency for the army, but their departure to be a grave concern in the matter of close assistants. Even though the Hsia had not yet perished, once Yi Yin departed it succumbed. Even though the Chou had not yet arisen, when the T'ai Kung went there it flourished. Thus we know that the retention and departure of heroes and bravos determine the good or ill fortune of the empire and countries. Our present urgency must be upon this, and not on that. 

Now famous mountains and great rivers are where superlative talents gather, while steep precipices and lofty mountain peaks are where the spirits descend. When the penultimate day arrives, somewhere in the mundane world there will certainly be eminent talents and outstanding fellows. However, their dreams have not yet taken form, nor have diviners yet discerned them, for they dwell among the poor and lowly, amid the common culture of the villages and lanes, or are hidden among the farmers, merchants, husbandry men, physicians, and prognosticators. Can you net them in through the examination system? They do not excel at the Confucian compositions needed to pass. Can you entice them

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with profits and salary? They do not follow the official routes to eminence. May they be found among the staff in military camps? They were not born amid fortifications and formations. The farmers of San-ch'eng T'ung-po, the wood merchants who gather firewood in Luo-yüan, the lofty recluses of Liu-an's distant peaks, the merchants of Yang-chien, and all others of this sort harbor dreams of outstanding accomplishments, but can they work together, will they be given a chance?

It is not that they do not want to be employed in the world, to exhaust their hard-won abilities, but that the upper ranks have no method for summoning them, while the lower ranks lack steps by which they can advance. Within the court there are no techniques for searching them out, while outside there are no doors by which they might enter. This is why the court must widely bring men in without being deterred by the distance. The Secretariat must exert itself in listening and gathering, not being put off by the earliness or lateness of the day. Circuit supervisors in the prefectures and districts must concentrate upon recommendations, neglecting neither the insignificant nor the lowly.

There are eight doors: First, "officeholders," referring to those buried in the lowest ranks, unable to shake themselves free. Second, "those without offices," normally found in rustic circumstances who are unable to advance themselves. Third, "later generations," the sons and grandsons of generals unable to distinguish themselves. Fourth, "bravos," leaders from 

around the rivers and lakes, the outstanding among the mountains. 19 Fifth, "tears from offenses," those who once offended the laws [in some minor way] and seek to escape from the criminal registry. Sixth, "criminals," whose talents and spirit surpass other men's, who carelessly offend the laws entailing corporal punishment. Seventh, "staff officers," who plot and plan and have long been buried in the regiments. Eighth, "minor clerks," who are hidden among the clerking staff and cannot become known.

The author goes on to detail the methods that might be employed to search out potentially useful men among the various corners of the ever shrinking Sung empire, such as listening to recommendations from among the various groups themselves, then testing candidates with appropriate positions to see if they can actually perform.

A second chapter somewhat later in the text, entitled "Bravos Make Spies,"20 continues his theme by focusing upon recruiting courageous men for spy work. After opening with an identical passage about Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung, Hua Yüeh presses the argument for concentrat

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ing upon such men with further examples, no doubt because he was frustrated by the entrenched, appeasement-oriented literati currently monopolizing power.

Probably the retention or loss of the Mandate of Heaven is related to whether a state's heroes depart or remain. If you can bring in their heroes, enemy states will become impoverished by themselves. Only when the Ch'in dynasty truly lacked men could its adversaries begin to plan against it. Five times Yi Yin went to King T'ang, five times he went to King Chieh, and so acted as a minister to establish the state. Han Hsin was employed by the Han rather than Hsiang Yü, and Kao-tsu thus gained All under Heaven. Fen Juo-shui was not awarded a post by the Southern T'ang but by our Sung, enabling Emperor Yi to gain all of Chiangnan. Probably when officers with heroic qualities are brought into the court or employed in the field, they can become loyal ministers and righteous warriors. But if they are left to the wilds, abandoned to the mountain forests, 

then they may become rebellious subjects and brigands. When we get them, we can realize the achievements of emperors and kings, while if the enemy gets them, they are capable of supplying effective, perverse plans.

In antiquity, sages and worthies concentrated upon seizing the minds of heroes; otherwise, assistants supplied by Heaven turned to become tools for others. Even though the Hsia had not yet perished, once Yi Yin departed it succumbed. Even though the Chou had not yet arisen, when the T'ai Kung went there it flourished. Isn't this frightening? From now on it would be appropriate to order two or three high-ranking ministers to circulate widely, to bring your generals into the Secretariat, and perspicaciously to issue invitations to gather the talented in, thereby keeping them from being banished to grassy wilds or neglected in suburban fields. When you select outstanding men, do not shy away from granting them strategic power or hesitate to assign them minor duties. Then you will see eminent men from Hsiang-huai, the bravos from among the rivers and lakes, the superlative swordsmen of Ch'u, the fishermen of the misty waves, rumors accumulating like the fog, and the courage of men banded together--all will be sought out and prepared for our selection. This is what is referred to as bravos becoming spies.

By the Southern Sung the T'ai Kung had again fallen from the lofty position accorded him by the T'ang, when he was honored as the martial patron, while an enervated Confucianism mouthed by an effete,

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self-serving literati largely dominated the court's political discussions and bureaucratic methods and objectives. The need for spies to penetrate the north, already lost to the Mongols, as well as the empire's fringe areas, was apparent, yet largely ignored in favor of ordinary reports forwarded by local and circulating government officials who had little incentive to identify trouble, to contravene the prevailing political climate. 21 One solution would have been to recruit more dynamic personnel for the government in general, and spies in particular, for whom many difficulties would loom. Although individual military commanders reportedly employed spies and 

reconnaissance personnel during this distressed period, there seems to have been no systematic effort to gather critical intelligence.

Finally, in the context of talent and agents the late Ming dynasty Ping-fa Pai-yen enjoys the distinction of being the only military text to advocate the recruitment and employment of women in clandestine operations. (Although the early historical writings are replete with examples of women in every covert role imaginable, there was no theorizing about their talents and suitable missions, no doubt because of traditional Confucian prejudices.) In this regard Chieh Hsüan's definition for women is illuminating:

Definition: Those who are able to act as intimate agents are termed "women."

Original Text: The great generals of antiquity sometimes relied on the pliancy of women. In civil matters they were employed to give pleasure to the enemy and amuse invaders, in the martial realm they were used to wage war and drive wagons. To realize opportunities, respond to tactical changes, overcome difficulty, and extricate forces from danger, they are always advantageous.

Explanation: Many of the ancient strategists relied upon female pliancy, even though it was not something that great generals were inclined to esteem. However, when commanding generals employed people it was like a physician prescribing medicine. Medicinal potions blend every sort of ingredient--animal, mineral and vegetable--nothing necessary ever being neglected. Since male villains and bravados are accepted in the army, how much more so should those who can penetrate deep secrets, search out hidden ambushes, or act skillfully as secret agents? How can you not concentrate on collecting and nurturing them in order to prepare against some unexpected need to dispatch them as part of your strategy? Furthermore, segmenting off the enemy's Army of the Right in order to buttress your own army's strategic power and relying on internal assistance in order to establish a meritori

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ous name are what an intelligent, exceptional woman can accomplish. However, despite searching, few ancient examples are visible and discussing them in the context of history is blasphemous. Although I have explained the meaning and provided some examples below, speaking about such agents potentially harms them.

Examples: Wen Chung and Fan Li [in the state of Yüeh] secretly plotted and by introducing Hsi Shih and Cheng Tan turned the state of Wu into a fish pond. Marquis Ying employed an unorthodox scheme to steal the military tally of authority [through the ruler's favorite concubine] and thereby relieved the siege of Chao. Meng Ch'ang-chün presented a fur robe; Chang Yi offered bribes; Li K'o had his son intermarry with the Jung barbarians and thereby obtained experience in crossbow use that allowed the Han to extinguish the Jung. They all gained their power through female agents. Even if great generals do no rely upon them to stupefy their enemies, they must still be cautious and emphasize internal defenses against them.

China's covert practices, from ancient times through this very moment, have systematically employed and aggressively exploited women, as well as frequently adopted apparently feminine-oriented (passive) policies. However, apart from their role in debauching rivals and enemies, with the exception of this strong statement, their role in gathering information received only minimal, often grudging, recognition in the military texts. No doubt this reflects the literati's prejudice against military measures in general and clandestine practices in specific, as well as extreme embarrassment at the thought of employing women in such despicable endeavors, even though they were frequently married off for precisely such purposes and court intrigues often turned upon their effectiveness.

Operational Methods and Agent Control

With the flourishing of military thought in the T'ang dynasty and subsequent efforts in the Sung to compile the military classics and create integrated compendiums of tactical teachings, strategists began to address the question of how spies might be employed rather than simply categorizing and 

describing them. Although many martial writings contain materials on their functions within a military context (which will be seen in the chapters on military intelligence and topography that follow), only Hsü Tung seems to have pondered their nonmilitary utilization in two chapters of his Hu-ling Ching, "Employing Spies"

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and "Deceiving the Enemy." Commencing with his reflections on the Hsing-jen of the Chou dynasty, "Employing Spies" proceeds to delineate eight methods for employing covert agents. 22 Although the first two apply exclusively to military situations., several reflect fully developed counterintelligence practices that convert enemy agents to useful assets, whether knowingly or not, while the remainder are designed to acquire essential knowledge by subverting enemy officials:

The official described in the ancient Rites of Chou who traveled about the feudal states and reported back to the king on their plans was actually a spy. 23 Thus Sages have always valued the Tao of spycraft. If you would utilize the army to determine victory, you must also employ agents. If you use agents to fathom internal affairs, you must be secretive. Apart from the very wisest, who can attain this?

In general, a spy's activities depend upon the situation. There are eight basic techniques.

First, when your troops are locked in a standoff with the enemy at the border, pretend to be tired, in difficulty, and fearful. Clandestinely leak out word that you will generously provide gifts to the enemy's favorites so as to attain what you seek there. Next, dispatch emissaries with jade, silk, boys and girls, carriages, superlative horses, and subtle adornments to apparently seek a reconciliation. When you observe the enemy becoming arrogant and insulting, secretly select and dispatch elite troops by several routes, having them press their advance both early and late in order to exploit the enemy's laxity and negligence.

Second, when you capture enemy prisoners, leak false plans to them and secretly allow them to escape, thereby causing the 

enemy to trust in their validity. Since your actions will differ, you will thus be employing the enemy's soldiers as your agents.

Third, when enemy agents come to spy on you, pretend not to realize it, instead allowing them to acquire information about a fake plan. Thereafter unexpectedly attack their forces, thereby turning their agents around so that they speak as if they were your own.

Fourth, when enemy agents come, bribe them generously to compel them to betray their missions, thereby spying on the enemy while converting their agents into your own.

Fifth, when engaged in battle with the enemy, feign a minor defeat and urgently withdraw the army into a deep fortress, displaying a terrified countenance. Then select men whose speech is rustic and blunt, of little knowledge or thought, to act as emissaries

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to the enemy. Have them magnify and exaggerate your army's flourishing strength, causing the enemy to know that they are agents. They will certainly conclude that you are afraid since you have sent agents to speak boldly and spy upon them. After they have departed, mobilize your unorthodox troops to follow on with a surprise attack. This is employing visible agents as spies.

Sixth, when there are favorites in the enemy's court, have your confidants ply their families with gold and jewels so that they might clandestinely learn the enemy's secret affairs. This is employing court favorites as agents.

Seventh, to subvert the enemy's strategists, secretly bribe the ruler's confidants with gold and gifts to have them slander them in the court. Then appropriately respond to the slanders from outside the state, causing the ruler and his strategists to grow mutually suspicious, instigating them to ruin and harm each other. This is using slanderers as agents.

Eighth, seek out those that the enemy trusts with their affairs, copiously satisfy their desires, and then secretly ferret out 

information about the enemy's movements and rest, words and speech. This is employing local people as agents.

Accordingly, we know that agents are the critical essence of the military theorists. But without sagacious wisdom and moral worth, one cannot employ agents. Thus the Tao for employing agents lies in the subtle, secretive, clandestine, and submerged, all of which have long been stressed by the best generals.

The next chapter, "Deceiving the Enemy," continues Sun-tzu's thought on the critical importance of deceiving the enemy, a thrust that Hsü Tung envisioned as fundamental, as well as the reason for counterintelligence efforts. It expounds two techniques designed to spread disinformation through converting enemy personnel and victimizing false defectors:

Warfare is the Tao of deception. Even Heaven and Earth, ghosts and spirits cannot fathom the myriad changes of condensing and expanding. Thus there are two methods for deceiving the enemy.

When an enemy emissary comes to you, privately treat him as if he were a powerful minister, generously plying him with treasures and showing him great gifts. Converting his doubts with such manifest sincerity is the technique for tying up emissaries. When you have thus convinced him to believe you, when he has no further doubts, you can then delude him by apparently leaking state secrets. Contrary to the enemy's original intent, you will se

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cretly entangle their estimations, yet they will never doubt their veracity. Then, in accord with the information thus passed on to the enemy's ruler, to encourage an internal response show that you are mobilizing troops at the time and place designated. But when the moment arrives, act unexpectedly, employing your elite troops to pound their vacuities and press them from outside. This is the first technique.

Select a courageous and daring officer as an attendant, then suddenly pretend to be angry and have him beaten with a bamboo whip until blood is visible. Afterward, secretly let him 

sneak away to the enemy. In addition, imprison his wife and children so that when he hears about it he will be angry and certainly transmit any secret affairs he formerly heard to the enemy, speaking about your attack at a certain place and time. You should then act as foretold at the right moment, but then secretly send forth elite troops to strike where unexpected. This is the second technique. These are both examples of employing the unorthodox to conquer, the essential Tao of the military. You can never be too knowledgeable about them!

The second case again shows how rulers might ruthlessly exploit their officers and revisits the question of volition and consciousness in the definition of "expendable agents" because Hsü Tung never implies any knowledge or willingness on the hapless victim's part, unlike Yao Li, King Ho-lü's second assassin, who may have been the inspiration for this method. According to Sun-tzu's terminology anyone so manipulated would certainly qualify as a "dead agent," someone provided with false information deliberately sacrificed in the ongoing effort to deceive the enemy, to gain a critical battlefield advantage through misdirection and false expectation. However, the first case is not simply a classic "turned agent"--someone who consciously chooses to work for the enemy--but rather a diplomat who becomes mesmerized by riches and profits, who is manipulated into readily believing whatever he apparently manages to learn, as well as might be told. This sort of conversion thus coheres with the broader definition that allows for duping enemy agents, for simply employing enemy agents without any shift in their allegiance or loyalties.

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7 Secrecy and

Countermeasures

CLIMATES IN WHICH SPIES PROLIFERATE naturally stimulate countermeasures to thwart their efforts. China proved no exception, with the military writers constantly warning of the urgent necessity for secrecy. Some states made it a matter of government policy. Astute generals required virtual silence, formlessness, and strict control in their encampments and 

when out on campaign to conceal their plans, strength, and preparations, as well as prevent dishonest practices, profiteering, and desertion. For example, within the context of strategic planning and tactical execution, the Six Secret Teachings advises:

Strategic power is exercised in accord with the enemy's movements. Changes stem from the confrontation between the two armies. Unorthodox and orthodox tactics are produced from the inexhaustible resources of the mind. Thus the greatest affairs are not discussed and the employment of troops is not spoken about. Moreover, words that discuss ultimate affairs are not worth listening to. The employment of troops is not so definitive as to be visible. They go suddenly, they come suddenly. Only someone who can exercise sole control, without being governed by other men, is a military weapon.

If your plans are heard about, the enemy will make counter-plans. If you are perceived, they will plot against you. If you are known, they will put you in difficulty. If you are fathomed, they will endanger you.

In military affairs nothing is more important than certain victory. In employing the army nothing is more important than ob

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scurity and silence. In movement nothing is more important than the unexpected. In planning nothing is more important than not being knowable. 1

Sun-tzu, a prominent advocate of secrecy, advised making the army formless to preclude the enemy from fathoming intentions. An ignorant enemy being compelled to spread their defenses, vulnerable points are immediately created:

The pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is formless then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans against it. 2 . . .

It is essential for a general to be tranquil and obscure, upright and self-disciplined, and able to stupefy the eyes and ears of the officers and troops, keeping them ignorant. He alters his 

management of affairs and changes his strategies to keep other people from recognizing them. He shifts his position and traverses indirect routes to keep other people from being able to anticipate him. 3 . . .

Thus if I determine the enemy's disposition of forces while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate my forces while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with our many, those whom we engage in battle will be severely constrained.

The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we will engage will be few. Thus if they prepare to defend the front, to the rear there will be few men. If they defend the rear, in the front there will be few. If they prepare to defend the left flank, then on the right there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the right flank, then on the left there will be few men. If there is no position left undefended, then there will not be any place with more than a few. The few are the ones who prepare against others; the many are the ones who make others prepare against them. 4

The later military classics echoed his concern, often in almost transcendent terms:

Control of the army is as secretive as the depths of Earth, as dark and obscure as the heights of Heaven, and is given birth from the

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nonexistent. Therefore it must be opened. The great is not frivolous, the small is not vast. 5

The Military Pronouncements states: "For the general's plans one wants secrecy." When the general's plans are secret, treacherous impulses are thwarted. If the general's plans leak out, the army will not be able to effect a strategic disposition of 

power. If external agents spy out internal affairs, the disaster that will befall the army cannot be controlled. 6

Even the military chapter of the Former Han, markedly Taoist Huai-nan Tzu espoused formlessness as the best defense against being fathomed:

Among the spiritual nothing is more honored than Heaven, among strategic power nothing more conducive than earth, among movements nothing more urgent than time, and among employments nothing more advantageous than man. Now these four are the trunk and branches of the army, but they must rely upon the Tao before they can be implemented and attain unified employment.

Now advantages of Earth overcome seasons of Heaven; skillful attacks overcome advantages of Earth; strategic power conquers men. Those who rely on Heaven can be confused, who rely on Earth can be constrained, who rely on time can be pressed, and who rely on men can be deluded. Now benevolence, courage, trust, and purity are attractive human attributes, but the courageous can be enticed, the benevolent can be seized, the trusting can be deceived, and the pure are easily plotted against. If the army's commander displays any one of these attributes, he will be captured. From this perspective it is clear that armies control victory through the patterns of the Tao, not through relying upon the talents of worthies. Only those without form cannot be ensnared. For this reason the Sage conceals himself in the originless so that his emotions cannot be perceived. He moves in the formless so that his deployments cannot be fathomed. Without tactics or appearance, he acts appropriately. Without name or shape, he changes and creates an image. Even among those with acute vision, who can spy out his nature? 7

The late Ming dynasty Ping-fa Pai-yen even offered an operational definition of secrecy, examining the implications for personal behavior and demeanor:

Definition: Not to speak about anything to inappropriate persons is termed "secrecy."

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Original Text: The affairs of one person are not leaked to a second person; what is to be implemented tomorrow is not leaked to anyone today. Carrying this to the minutest extreme, be careful not to leave even the space of a hair. When secrecy in meetings needs to be preserved, be wary about betraying the information in speech. When secrecy needs to be preserved in speech, be wary about betraying it in your demeanor. 8 When secrecy needs to be preserved in your demeanor, be wary about betraying it in your spirit and emotions. When secrecy needs to be preserved in your spirit and emotions, be wary about betraying it in your dreams and sleep. When you undertake an action, conceal the beginning; when you employ someone, gag his mouth. However, when something can be spoken about, you need not guard against being the first to reveal it so as to show other people that they are trusted. When such sincerity is extended over time, what is not secret will provide the means to establish the secrecy of what is.

Explanation: One who fills the role of general has a stomach and belly [chief of staff], thighs [assistants], cars and eyes [intelligence agents], claws and teeth [elite warriors, enforcers], hands and feet [messengers], and blood and pulse [various officers]. 9 They are all parts of a single body. If I am secretive about all aspects of my single body, how does it differ from being secretive about myself? But among my officers and men there are those who understand affairs and those who do not; those who are circumspect in speech and those who are not; those with scintillating wisdom, those without it; those who compete for achievement, those who do not. If I fail to carefully select them and warily take precautions, others will gain control over my men and some may then turn and impede our affairs. How will this differ from divulging something myself? Thus one technique for secrecy is to keep secret what ought to be secret, but not that which need not be secret.

Example: One who acts as a general cannot dwell by himself when the army halts or move alone when on the march. Plans cannot come from him alone, actions cannot be undertaken solely by him. By being cautious about one's associates, it can be managed. To conduct secret affairs, first seek out reliable persons. 

The Yi Chou-shu wisely advised against employing the loquacious because they may inadvertently leak plans, commenting that "disaster and good fortune lie in what is preserved in secrecy." However, the Han dynasty Shuo Yüan summarized much verbiage on security issues by simply saying, "If you do not want people to hear about some

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thing, nothing is better than not speaking of it,"10 and added that "plans that leak out will lack achievement."11 Accordingly, the Six Secret Teachings warned: "Those who are unguarded in their discussions can be clandestinely listened to." 12

Apart from generally emphasizing secrecy in all activities, three concrete steps were widely implemented: strict constraints on movement, the employment of secret means of communication, and deceptive measures. Prior to embarking on a campaign and whenever the army was out in the field, airtight security had to be implemented, completely prohibiting the passage of unauthorized personnel and thwarting any attempts by the enemy to infiltrate spies among the troops disguised in appropriate uniforms. Sun-tzu stated, "On the day the government mobilizes the army, close the passes, destroy all tallies, and do not allow their emissaries to pass through."13 Wei Liao-tzu added, "When itinerant persuaders and spies have no means to gain entrance, this is the technique for rectifying discussions."14 Since it is evident from the historical writings that spies still frequently gained access to military encampments and acquired vital information, the imposition of strict security measures became necessary. The Ping-fa Pai-yen encapsulated these concerns under the rubric of "caution":

Definition: Being careful in every aspect is termed "caution."

Original Text: There isn't a single moment when the army's employment is not dangerous; therefore, you need to be cautious at all times. Enter the army [to assume command] as if there were spies all about; when crossing the border, be as strict as when approaching battle. Whenever you obtain or seize something, make certain no harm is entailed; when you encounter natural obstacles of terrain, you must search about for villains. When emissaries approach from the enemy, ponder 

their plans, when you go forth, make calculations. Being cautious in advancing the army is the pinnacle of the Tao.

Explanation: When the ancients deployed their formations, they always consulted the Heavenly mansions and eight trigrams, so extreme was their caution. Thus they illuminated and reacted to everything about them. When the ancients advanced the army, they invariably had close, trusted associates act as their eyes and ears and burly relatives for their bodyguards. Moreover, they had wise and courageous men who were adept at handling the masses act as their "feathers and wings," so extensive was their caution. 15

Within the army racing about on horses was prohibited, as was wild shouting and horseplay. Preventing them from wandering

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about was the height of caution. They quieted their voices and breath and undertook investigations in accord with affairs. Through investigations they realized the doubtful, through doubt they achieved preparation. Through preparation they could be employed, which is the height of caution. They made their concerns and contemplations numerous.

The establishment of laws gives birth to caution; sufficiency in material resources gives birth to caution; severity in commands gives birth to caution; numerous doubts give birth to caution. Thus caution depends upon laws, relies upon materials, is completed through commands, and arises from doubt.

Example: Caution, this one word, truly is the first essential in controlling the army and confronting the enemy. None of the great ministers or generals of antiquity ever violated it. Those who hope to imitate the achievements of antiquity's famous generals must first learn to emulate their caution.

The many Ch'in dynasty camp regulations apparently preserved in the Wei Liao-tzu underscore the strictness of the army's methods:

The Central, Left, Right, Forward, and Rear Armies all have their segmented terrain, each surrounded on all four sides by 

temporary walls, with no passage or communication among them permitted.

The general has his segmented terrain, the regimental commander has his segmented terrain, and the company commander has his segmented terrain. They should all construct ditches and sluices, and make the orders blocking communications explicit, so that it is impossible for someone who is not a member of the company of a hundred to pass through. If someone who is not a member of the company of a hundred enters, the commander should execute him. If he fails to execute him, he will share the offense with him.

Along the roads crisscrossing the encampment set up administrative posts every 120 paces. Measure the men and the terrain. The road posts should be within sight of each other. Prohibit crossing over the roads and clear them. If a soldier does not have a tally or token issued by a general or other commanding officer, he cannot pass through. Wood gatherers, fodder seekers, and animal herders all form and move in squads of five. If they are not moving in squads of five, they cannot cross through. If an officer does not have a token, if the soldiers are not in squads of five, the guards at the crossing gates should execute them. If anyone oversteps the demarcation lines, execute him. Thus if within the army no one contravenes orders or violates the prohibitions, then without there will not be any that are not caught. 16

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The Sung Hu-ling Ching advised two measures for camp security. First, observation towers should be erected some hundred paces outside the camp to watch for enemy activity and signal with flags to indicate the presence and direction of enemy movement. (They should also report force size, type, activity, and speed. 17) Second, roving security patrols should be established from among the "courageous soldiers knowledgeable about the mountains, rivers, springs, and wells." Each patrol's movements should be confined to a designated area well outside the camp, and they must undertake responsibility for "seizing living spies dispatched by the enemy." To preclude the loss of vital information during interrogation should they be captured by enemy 

reconnaissance patrols, they were kept ignorant about their own troop dispositions and defensive measures. 18

Whenever a campaign army penetrated enemy territory, these issues became even more acute, particularly if the area was unfamiliar and reconnaissance efforts less than effective. A primary concern would be anticipating and defending against sudden attacks masked by the terrain's configuration. "Defending Against the Enemy," another Hu-ling Ching chapter, expanded the tactics advanced by the Six Secret Teachings when a force was besieged or surrounded, 19 as well as the operational principles found in the Ssu-ma Fa and Military Methods governing deep penetration of enemy territory:

Whenever you have penetrated deep within the enemy's borders, if all is silent and you do not encounter a solitary person, in order to defend against ambushes you should not carelessly move about. You should carefully investigate the cloud formations in all four directions, feed the horses, encourage your warriors, have them assume a crouching defensive position, and wait. As soon as night falls you should deploy strong, courageous warriors as defensive forces all around outside the camp. You should also establish ambush forces with powerful crossbows and facile shields and array numerous drum sites. Beating the drums will signal a sudden perimeter assault.

If the enemy attacks the defensive forces, then the main camp should send forth light troops to support them. If they assault the main camp, then the defensive forces should attack them from all four sides while your main forces maintain a solid deployment, awaiting any changes that might arise. If the enemy retreats, you should pursue but not press them. The main camp can also follow on and advance further inland.

Naturally the use of scouts and reconnaissance forces (discussed subsequently) should never be neglected.

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Communications 

Communications being vital to the army's organization and mission, the Ping-fa Pai-yen pondered its nature and implications under the term "communications":

Definition: To transmit information where desired is termed "communication."

Original Text: When an army maneuvers without any method of communication, its segmented forces will not be able to recombine; its distant units will be unable to respond. Allowing forces to be obstructed and cut off is the Tao of defeat. However, if your communications are not secret, on the contrary they will become part of the enemy's calculations. Thus there are such things as the special golden signal banners, swift post horses, arrows symbolizing authority, and signal fires and smoke in order to report extremely urgent matters.

When two armies meet, you should establish clandestine watchwords. When a thousand kilometers apart, you should employ a simple letter, use unformed words, invisible writing, and even nonpaper strips. The messenger will not know about them, and if someone else obtains them there will not be any visible trace. It is spiritual, spiritual! If you are cut off by the enemy, your line of march severed far off where no one can reach, then you must communicate through subtle techniques.

Explanation: Communicating information is the army's most essential activity. However, every army's orders are different, so the main point is keeping the enemy from becoming aware of them while informing your own army. Although communication is the most secret activity, there are only three essentials: terseness, convenience, and astuteness. You should employ selected officers who are close confidants, who are courageous and daring, and specially train those who have agility and speed, whose minds are strong and bodies robust, several hundred or more, to be employed in going back and forth to ensure communications. Select these couriers and make their rewards generous. Be cautious about their missions, be diligent in their employment, for then your communications will be timely and responses rapid, with few failures. 

Examples: Communication is a great achievement. The magnitude of its employment is seen in the signal mounds, its skill in the extremes of carrier pigeons.

Clearly by the end of the late Ming numerous methods of transport were available, including post horses, as were ingenious techniques

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such as invisible ink that are unfortunately little discussed in the military compendiums and can only be guessed at.

Generally speaking, secrecy might be achieved through verbal communications memorized and carried by messengers; codes, which seem not to have been much used in pre-Ch'ing China, although substitution charts or one-use pads could certainly have been created; prearranged secret systems of tallies or markers; various types of hidden messages, whether physically disguised or embedded in innocuous texts; and fragmented written communications. Verbal communications entrusted to reliable individuals were no doubt the most common, but also most readily compromised should the messenger be captured, killed, or simply bribed for his information. Since various types of symbolic tallies split in half were employed to signify power and confirm the authenticity of written communications--forged letters and documents having a long, effective history in China--it was a simple step to create more systematic sets that might unequivocally convey predetermined information. 20 Although simplistic and therefore limited in data capacity, something like the array described in the Six Secret Teachings may have been employed in the Warring States and thereafter:

The ruler and his generals have a system of secret tallies, altogether consisting of eight grades: for signifying a great victory over the enemy, one foot long; for destroying the enemy's army and killing their general, nine inches long; for forcing the surrender of the enemy's walls and capturing the town, eight inches long; for driving the enemy back and reporting deep penetration, seven inches long; for alerting the masses to prepare for stalwart defensive measures, six inches long; for requesting supplies and additional soldiers, five inches long; for signifying the army's defeat and the general's death, 

four inches long; for signifying the loss of all advantages and the army's surrender, three inches long. 21

The T'ai Kung's measures for preserving the secrecy and validity of these tallies merit note: "Detain all those who bring in and present tallies, and if the information from the tally should leak out, execute all those who heard and told about it. These eight tallies, which only the ruler and general should secretly know, provide a technique for covert communication that will not allow outsiders to know the true situation. Accordingly even though the enemy have the wisdom of a sage, no one will comprehend their significance." 22 He also advocated the use of fragmented missives to convey more extensive information in relative security:

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Whenever you have secret affairs and major considerations, letters should be employed rather than tallies. The ruler sends a letter to the general, the general uses a letter to query the ruler. The letters are composed in one unit, then divided. They are sent out in three parts, with only one person knowing the contents. "Divided" means it is separated into three parts. "Sent out in three parts, with only one person knowing" means there are three messengers, each carrying one part, and when the three are compared together, only then does one know the contents. This is referred to as a "secret letter." Even if the enemy have the wisdom of a Sage, they will not be able to recognize the contents. 23

Of course the T'ai Kung assumed that only one of the messengers might be captured--which would of course render the other two parts useless even to the intended receiver--and that every nefarious measure would be employed to conceal the letter or the message itself, as mentioned in the introductory section.

In a section entitled "Tzu Yen" ("Verification Through Characters") the Wu-ching Tsung-yao cited an old method that essentially expanded the T'ai Kung's limited, length-based tallies: 

According to the old methods, whenever some affair needed to be transmitted through documents that were passed back and forth, it was necessary to guard against leaks. If confidants were employed to transmit the information, not only did it labor them, but it was also necessary to take precautions against human emotions changing and rebelling. To issue orders or constrain the army there were forty items, each to be secretly designated by a single character. These were for requesting bows, arrows, swords, armor, spears and pennants, pots and screens, horses, clothes and grants, foodstuffs and provisions, grass and fodder, carts and oxen, boats, equipment for mounting sieges and defending against them, increasing the number of troops, shifting the encampment, advancing the army, withdrawing the army, and assuming a solid defensive position.

Also to report that the enemy had not yet been seen, had been seen arriving, that the enemy is numerous, few, an equal match, increasing their forces, shifting their encampment, advancing their army, withdrawing their army, or maintaining a solid defense. And to report having besieged the enemy's fortifications, lifted a siege against the enemy, being besieged by the enemy, the enemy lifting their siege, not being victorious in battle, winning a great victory, gaining a minor victory, the general and officers sur

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rendering, the general and officers rebelling, the officers and troops falling ill, the regional commander being ill, and a significant conquest over the enemy.

All of them would be sequentially correlated with the individual characters of an old-style, forty-character poem selected because it was free of duplications. When the commanding general received his order to go forth and mount an attack or siege, he and his subordinate generals would each have a copy. When there was something to report or a reply to send, the appropriate character would be sought out in an ordinary letter or document and marked [with a solid circle]. When the report was acknowledged or the request granted, the same character would then be written or similarly found in a text and marked. 

If it was not granted, then it would be marked with an open circle. This kept the masses from understanding.

Essentially a one-time pad with a pre-scripted content, it represented one approach to encoding information. Assuming the forty items were strictly apportioned in standard sequence, the two parties would merely need to know the poem and silently recite it to themselves to determine the appropriate character. A simple variant, undiscussed here, would be to scramble the forty items before assigning them to a poem, thereby preventing anyone from guessing the contents even if they discovered the character and happened to know the poem. The transmission could be further concealed by burying the character at a predetermined position, thereby obviating any need to mark and thus draw attention to it. Fixed phrases or allusions could similarly be embodied within ordinary communications at specified count positions or appended to innocuous documents, such as a scenic scroll covered with poems. However, as David Kahn insightfully points out in his monumental work, until numeric codes (such as the nineteenth-century telegraphic code) were assigned to the individual characters, the nature of the writing system largely precluded ciphers. 24 Character substitution charts could of course be constructed--and no doubt were on a limited basis, especially for private, rather than official, use--but would invariably require cumbersome character substitution. Book codes would equally have been possible, indicating characters through page, line, and position numbers, but there doesn't seem to be any evidence for their use in either the historical writings or military texts.

Ordinary communications might also be couched in obscure language, written at length on paper, or conveyed by messenger unobtrusively, but the most critical form--the issuance and conveyance of

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battlefield commands to troops deployed in the field and the heat of battle--required the exact opposite: visibility and clarity. From antiquity China's forces were expertly directed by signal flags, drums, and gongs, and therefore early in the Spring and Autumn period had already long been capable of segmented 

and articulated action. Thus generals commanded rather than led, and were in fact expected to maintain control of the drums that signaled the type and speed of movement and the battle pennants that designated direction and the units that should respond to a command. To counteract the din of battle, writers from Sun-tzu on emphasized the need to multiply the drums and ensure they sounded in unison, compelling every soldier to respond. However, as their volume and clarity increased, the enemy's ability to hear and learn such commands equally benefited. A chapter entitled "Countering Leaks" in the Southern Sung Ts'ui-wei Pei-cheng Lu provides an overview of the problem and its solution:

I have heard that when we maintain security while the enemy leaks information, victory will always be ours. Conversely, when the enemy is secretive while we leak, victory will always be theirs. In recent years our border administration has truly been lax in this regard, and some nomadic peoples have completely adopted our army's flags and pennants, resulting in our own forces often being defeated through misperceiving nomadic units for our own. Moreover, some of these barbarian peoples are thoroughly familiar with our military organization, and our armies are constantly betraying themselves because their structure is not secret. Thus the methods for countering leaks should probably be discussed.

Now there are four methods for countering leaks. First, "summoning by signals." This refers to previously employing a green flag to direct generals and commanders, but now using green flags to summon officers and troops. Whereas formerly a white flag was employed to summon the commander in chief, now a white flag will be used to summon the divisional commanders.

Second, "flags and pennants." This refers to previously using green to signal the left flank, white the right flank, and now exchanging green and white to keep the enemy from learning the designations of my left and right armies. Whereas previously green was employed for the straight and black for the curved, now exchange the black and green to keep the enemy from knowing whether our strategic power will be deployed in straight or curved formations. 

Third, "gongs and drums." Whereas the army formerly advanced to the sound of the drums and retreated to the gongs, on

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the contrary when the drums are now heard, it will halt. Where formerly it halted at the sound of the gongs, it will now advance to the gongs.

Fourth, "beacon fires." Whereas one torch previously signified enemy invaders and two torches a request for help, on the contrary one torch will now signal a request for help. Previously, whereas no smoke indicated the absence of incidents and smoke a warning, now on the contrary the presence of smoke will signify the absence of incidents. These are the ways to counter leaks. 25

Whether these countermeasures would deceive the enemy or one's own troops more thoroughly may well have been problematic.

Concealment and Deception

Although the practice of deception was already prevalent in the Spring and Autumn period, to counter the increasingly effective and focused reconnaissance efforts found on Warring States battlefields and thereafter, military theorists strongly advocated its employment and commanders increasingly resorted to a wide variety of ruses, feints, and deceits. (The practice of deception is, of course, a hallmark of Chinese military thought, stemming in part from Sun-tzu's famous dictum that "warfare is the art of deception." However, to reduce Chinese warfare simply to an exercise in deception, as some uninformed Western writers have suggested, is absurd. 26) A number of clever techniques became commonplace, stimulating a correspondingly increasing sophistication in observation methods and analysis to penetrate them. Moreover, because observers were restricted by the powers of the human eye and the vantage points they might secure, the deployment of spies also soared in the belief that plans clandestinely obtained would prove far more accurate than deductions derived from 

observations of partially obscured, not to mention aggressively deceitful, armies.

Given the difficulty of accurate observation, the first measure employed was concealment, whether through hiding a portion of the forces in another location, in ravines, inside tents, beneath clouds of dust or smoke, or even within deployments themselves. Its effective application may be seen in the events preliminary to Emperor Kaotsu's famous encirclement by Hsiung-nu forces (whose resolution is more fully examined in the section on consorts):

When King Han Hsin revolted in the seventh year of the Former Han dynasty, Emperor Kao-tsu personally led the army forth to

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strike him. Reaching Ching-yang, Kao-tsu learned that Han Hsin was planning to attack his army in alliance with the Hsiung-nu. Enraged, the emperor dispatched emissaries to the Hsiung-nu. However, the Hsiung-nu concealed their stalwart warriors and stout horses and cattle so that all the emissaries saw were the old and weak, as well as emaciated livestock. Ten emissaries in a row came back to report that the Hsiung-nu would be easy to attack.

The emperor then had Liu Ching again go as ambassador to the Hsiung-nu, but when he returned he reported: "When two countries are about to engage in battle, they ought to diligently display their strengths [to overawe the enemy]. However, when I went out there, I saw nothing but emaciated livestock and the weak and old. This is certainly an example of wanting to display weakness while concealing troops in ambush in order to fight for advantage. I humbly believe that the Hsiung-nu cannot be attacked." At this time the emperor's forces, more than three hundred thousand strong, had already crossed through Chü-chu and the soldiers were advancing. The emperor angrily cursed Ching, saying, "Son of the despicable Ch'i, you got your position through your tongue, yet you now wantonly use it to impede our army!" He then had him tied up and left at Kuang-wu and proceeded out. 

When they reached P'ing-cheng, the Hsiung-nu indeed sent forth the unorthodox troops that surrounded the emperor at Paiteng, and he only succeeded in escaping seven days later. When Emperor Kao-tsu reached Kuang-wu he pardoned Ching, saying: "I failed to heed your words and thus suffered the difficulty at P'ing- ch'eng. I previously sent out ten emissaries, all of whom had concluded they could be attacked." He then enfeoffed him with two thousand households as a lord within the pass and changed his title to Chien-hsin. 27

In the ongoing confrontation between the Central Kingdom and the peripheral border peoples, just as in the earliest days of the Chou dynasty's decline, intelligence missions were largely carried out by official emissaries rather than indigenous spies. However, since the nature of these missions was transparent, measures to mislead and frustrate them could easily be mounted. For the highly mobile nomadic and seminomadic peoples it would have been a simple matter to divert their best warriors and livestock to less visible areas when apprised of an emissary's approach, particularly as diplomatic missions would have been burdened with extensive paraphernalia of office and probably relied on slow oxen to pull their supply wagons.

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An early example of observational countermeasures dating to 555 B.C. embedded in a Tso Chuan account of a confrontation between Ch'i and Chin turns upon the opposite principle of manifesting apparent strength:

The marquis of Ch'i ascended Mount Wu in order to observe Chin's army in the distance. However, Chin had ordered its commanders to establish outposts throughout the difficult terrain in the hills and marshes and even deploy regimental flags in areas where they would not emplace troops. Moreover, they had their chariots manned by real warriors on the left but dummies on the right, 28 set up large flags at the front of the chariot forces, and had other chariots, dragging brush, follow on. When the marquis of Ch'i saw this, he was afraid of their numerousness, abandoned the field, and returned to Ch'i. 29

Another part of the same account, at first innocuous looking, when viewed in the context of Chin's actions indicates that the 

marquis of Ch'i was psychologically set up, primed to see or accept reports of great enemy strength. One of Chin's commanders deliberately provided his counterpart with the frightening news that the Chin coalition had granted Lu and Chü, each capable of fielding a thousand chariots, permission to join the effort and freely invade Ch'i. This fact was "sincerely" conveyed on the battlefield as if from one concerned officer to another, and therefore immediately advised to the marquis, who trembled at the prospect since the battle was already going poorly. (The marquis' lack of courage may have already been known to Chin, being much remarked by Ch'i's own forces, perhaps suggesting the possibility of literally frightening him off the battlefield.) This psychological preparation no doubt facilitated the execution of an extensive but still inherently simple deception that detailed observation by reconnaissance troops might otherwise have prevented. The clarity of the episode's lesson also prompted its selection as the historical example for the chapter entitled "Daylight" in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies, abstracting and identifying it as an important lesson for later generations. The tactical principle illustrated there states: "Whenever engaging an enemy in battle during daylight, you must set out numerous flags and pennants to cause uncertainty about your forces. When you prevent the enemy from determining your troop strength, you will be victorious. A tactical principle from the Art of War states: 'In daylight battles make the flags and pennants numerous.'"

The story of Sun Pin's exploitation of P'ang Chüan's arrogance at the battle of Ma-ling some three centuries later provides another ex

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ample of a simple but effective deception. 30 With P'ang's massive force in pursuit, Sun Pin created a facade of fear and desertion by hastily retreating while also dramatically reducing the number of cookfires every night. Since P'ang equated the number of fires with a corresponding troop presence, he concluded that Sun Pin's forces were rapidly dwindling and had little will to fight, making them easy prey. Thus P'ang was lured into rushing forward without adequate heavy forces and 

quickly massacred at a preestablished killing ground. From this China learned the trick of masking troop strength by manipulating the number of fires, making them more numerous to suggest larger armies and thereby deter attacks, or reducing them to lure the enemy forward. 31 Similarly, flags and pennons being essential for identifying and controlling the troops, as well as evidence of their degree of order or confusion (as discussed in the military intelligence section on evaluating enemy forces), Sun Pin himself advised that "spreading out the pennants and making the flags conspicuous are the means by which to cause doubt in the enemy" and "amid grasses and heavy vegetation one should employ visible pennants." 32 Naturally these techniques worked because signal flags and command pennants had to be positioned to be clearly visible at all times on every terrain. 33

As a general tactical principle several writers advised multiplying the number of flags and drums or increasing their spacing when attacking an enemy to confuse the enemy's targeting and balk any estimates based upon them. For example, the Six Secret Teachings advises: "Change our flags and pennants several times and also change our uniforms. Then their army can be conquered. 34 Multiply the number of flags and pennants, and increase the number of gongs and drums. 35 In the daytime set up five colored pennants and flags. At night set out ten thousand fire-cloud torches, beat the thunder drums, strike the war drums and bells, and blow the sharp-sounding whistles." 36 Although primarily for communications purposes, Sun Pin himself stated: "In the daytime making the flags numerous and at night making the drums many are the way to send them off to battle. Rectifying the ranks and systematizing the pennants is the way to bind the formations together."37

Although innovative, effective, and amenable to categorization along general lines, the actual techniques employed to deceive enemies throughout China's military history are too numerous to consider here and must therefore be left for another book. However, a few examples, particularly those that became historically important through their inclusion in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies and the military writings, coupled with a 

brief overview of the methods indicated in the theoretical classics, are merited. As with many con

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cepts, Sun-tzu apparently enunciated the first tactics designed to exploit the impetus to deception: "Although you are capable, display incapability. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby."38

In the massive work known as the Six Secret Teachings numerous suggestions for deceptively manipulating the enemy are interspersed throughout the sixty detailed chapters. For example, to resolve a difficult tactical situation, the T'ai Kung advised:

Make an outward display of confusion while actually being well ordered. Show an appearance of hunger while actually being well fed. Keep your sharp weapons within and show only dull and poor weapons outside. Have some troops come together, others split up; some assemble, others scatter. Make secret plans, keep your intentions secret. Raise the height of fortifications and conceal your elite troops. If the officers are silent, not making any sounds, the enemy will not know our preparations. Then if you want to take his western flank, attack the eastern one. 39

The themes of secrecy and deception continued to be developed after the classical military writings. For example, Li Ch'uan's T'ang dynasty T'ai-pai Yin-ching integrates feints and deception with secrecy in an abstract, unified approach:

Those who excelled at employing the army could not have established themselves without trust and righteousness, achieved victory without yin and yang, realized advantages without the unorthodox and orthodox, or engaged in battle without deceit and subterfuge. Plans are concealed in the mind, but affairs are visible in external traces. One whose thoughts and visible expression are identical will be defeated, one whose thoughts and visible expression differ will be victorious. 

Warfare is the Tao of deception. When capable, display incapability. When about to employ the army, feign that you are not. 40 When your mind is filled with great plans, display only minor concerns. When your mind is planning to seize something, feign being about to give something away. Obscure the real, cast suspicion upon the doubtful. When the real and doubtful are not distinguishable, strength and weakness will be indeterminable. Be profound like the Mysterious Origin free of all images, be an abyss like the unfathomable depths of the sea. When you attain this, yin and yang can no longer be employed to calculate your intentions,

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ghosts and spirits will be unable to know them, techniques and measures will be unable to impoverish them, and methods of divination will be unable to fathom them, so how much more so mere enemy generals!

Now those who excelled in warfare achieved their victories in the clash of armies. The historical records are inadequate to attest to their plans, the form of their victories too insubstantial to be observed. 41 Those who can discuss tactics but not implement them harm a state, while those who can implement them but are unable to discuss them can be employed by the state. Thus it is said, "The highest plans are not spoken about, great military affairs are not discussed." It is subtle and mysterious!

Thus outstanding generals are able to penetrate the patterns of Heaven and Earth and fully prepare against the nature of the myriad things. They profit the greedy, thereby nurturing their desires, and are deferential to the strong, making them arrogant and boastful. 42 They estrange the intimate, causing them to become mutually disaffected. Men with insatiable desires will lack uprightness, the arrogant and boastful will neglect their defenses, and disaffected strategists will depart. King Wen of the Chou made generous gifts to the Shang and the Shang king was subsequently slain. King Kou-chien of Yüeh humbled himself before the state of Wu and King Fu-ch'ai of Wu was later exterminated. Han Kao-tsu became estranged from the kingdom of Ch'u, and Hsiang Yü, king of Ch'u, 

perished. Thus one subjugates the feudal lords with words and labors the feudal lords with plans. 43

Those who excel in commanding the army attack what the enemy loves so that they must respond, and strike their vacuities so that the enemy must react. 44 They multiply their methods to coerce the enemy into dividing and create suspicious facades to force the enemy to prepare. When the enemy's response fails to be successful, they are compelled to divide their forces and defend their cities. If they are thus unable to unite their soldiers, we will be rested while they are labored; they will be few, while we are many. Now attacking the tired with the rested accords with martial principles; attacking the rested with the tired contravenes martial principles. Attacking the few with the many is the Tao for military victory; attacking the many with the few is the Tao for military defeat. Attacking the few with the many and assaulting the tired with the rested is the way to attain complete victory.

Now debilitating the enemy's spirit, seizing the general's mind, 45 exhausting the strength of their troops, and severing thousand kilometer supply routes do not lie in martial force but in the strategic power of deployments coupled with wise officers calcu

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lating the tactical imbalance of power. It is weak and soft! Roll it up, it won't fill the space of a sleeve. It is deep and secretive! Stretch it out, it will surpass the seas. A five-inch bolt can control the opening and closing of a door, a square inch of heart can change success to defeat. Thoroughly knowing all the aspects of the myriad things and thus never being imperiled, flexibly completing the myriad things without omitting any, according with Heaven and trusting men, 46 investigating the beginning and knowing the end, what worry is there that one's plans will not be followed? 47

The first part of this lengthy passage thus opens with an assertion on the importance of being unfathomable, but the discussion then proceeds to link critical material from Sun-tzu in an integrated discussion that well illustrates how these concepts flow from one to another. 

The Hu-ling Ching, composed during the Northern Sung period, advanced and expanded Sun-tzu's initial concept of misdirecting the enemy's perceptions in a chapter entitled "Far and Near" that equally evidences a thorough understanding of Li Ch'uan T'ai-pai Yin-ching. The text explicates six tactical actions that exploit misdirections in the enemy's focus, including a nighttime river crossing made with bamboo rafts launched from upstream when the river's depth and current preclude direct fording and assault operations. Although largely an adaptation of the techniques for deceit found in Sun-tzu's thematic chapter "Initial Estimations," key passages merit scrutiny:

Warfare is the Tao of deception. Deception can make the empty appear full, the distant appear near, and the near appear distant. Thus there are six methods for employing the deception of the far and near. First, those who excel at attacking the enemy cause them to be alert to the front and then assault their rear, speak of the east then strike the west. They go forth where the enemy will not race, and race where the enemy does not expect. They lure them with profits, causing the settled to move, the rested to labor, and the sated to become hungry. They observe where they are unprepared and suddenly exploit it. 48

These six all display objectives being nearby but gain victory far off. Such are the strategies of the unorthodox and orthodox. Suntzu said: "Armies engage in battle with the orthodox and gain victory through the unorthodox."49 This is what he meant.

Another chapter in the Hu-ling Ching entitled "Five Differences," although ostensibly focusing upon differences in command style, explicates several deceptive techniques for countering a more powerful

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enemy by exploiting their very superiority and consequent expectations, playing off normal perceptions and the "wisdom" of the common view:

The T'ai Kung said: "One whose wisdom is the same as the masses is not a commander for the army, one whose skill is the 

same as the masses is not an artisan for the state. No movement is more spiritual than being unexpected, no victory greater than being unrecognized."50 Sun-tzu said, "The strategic power of those who excel in warfare is sharply focused and their constraints are precise."51 "Leading" means to be different from the ordinary. For this reason those whose excel at employing the military act distinctively in five circumstances: The first is constrained terrain; the second, lightness; the third, danger; the fourth, stupidity; and the fifth, fear.

Exhausted roads and deep valleys, fatal and severed terrain, ruined fortifications and moats, places normally raced through, are ordinarily taken by the masses as constricted and to be avoided. However, on the contrary you should make your deployments internally solid while externally manifesting an appearance of disorder in order to entice the enemy. Internally you should be strict with your troops while externally appearing afraid in order to make the enemy arrogant. Then when they fail to recognize the true situation, oppress them with changes, assault them with troops. This is the Tao for utilizing constricted terrain.

When they are numerous but you are few, your strength is ruined and supplies exhausted, and the power for victory lies with them, you should swear a blood oath with the warriors, strictly order generous rewards, and advance and retreat as if certain to die. Also select a small number of soldiers to suddenly mount a fierce defense against them. The enemy, being more numerous, will assume you are light, but lightness has its employment. Passing through exhausted terrain on which the gate to life has been shut will convert lightness into decisiveness. This is the Tao for employing lightness.

When a strong enemy mounts such a fervent attack that your soldiers are trembling, the masses will assume you are endangered, but you should not become agitated or chaotic. When you employ perilous conditions, your orders must be strict, your preparations thorough. Encourage the officers and troops with thoughts about the Will of Heaven; externally close off your appearance; internally grasp the vital moment to covertly employ 

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unorthodox tactics in sending your troops forth. This is the Tao for employing danger.

When the enemy employs agents to spy upon you, pretend you do not realize it and receive them. When the enemy sends spies into your encampment, pretend you are unprepared, but establish ambushes to await their forces. The enemy will assume that you are stupid, but employing the method of apparent stupidity is, on the contrary, wise. This is the Tao for employing stupidity.

When you see the enemy's army approaching, retreat and concentrate behind defensive walls. When you see the enemy's emissaries approaching, speak deferentially and act dispirited, as if you hope to be reconciled with them. The masses will assume you are afraid. When utilizing fear you should withdraw and contract, establish ambushes, and then attack, employing unorthodox tactics to penetrate them. Act as if you want to be reconciled, move them with profits, and make them arrogant through your humility. This is the Tao for employing fear.

These five are contrary to the methods of the masses. When the masses assume you are constricted, employ their advantages. When they assume you are light, employ lightness to be decisive. When they assume you are endangered, utilize their [sense of] security. When they assume you are stupid, employ their wisdom. When they assume you are afraid, employ their courage. Thus the T'ai Kung said, "One who cannot extend and move [his troops about] cannot be spoken with about the unorthodox."52 This is what he meant.

The inclusion of measures to thwart spies, treated as just one of many responses, provides further evidence that military forces were constantly employing agents to penetrate enemy encampments, no doubt in disguise either as merchants and other vendors or as members of the army itself. (A number of similar methods for exploiting enemy expectations arising from configurations of terrain, including examples from the Hu-ling Ching, will also be found in the section on military intelligence.) 

The Northern Sung Ts'ui-wei Pei-cheng Lu advanced a method to deceive enemy spies by exploiting the reputation of armies and commanders:

I have heard that when a general is famous throughout the realm, shift the general, not the army. When an army is famous throughout the realm, shift the army, not the general. If a capable general

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whom the Three Armies heavily rely upon goes out one day to another encampment, enemy forces will secretly observe it and invariably exploit the rear. If elite troops that normally shake enemy states into submission one day go forth to some other area, enemy forces will certainly spy out this fissure and exploit it. Thus the army's secret method for shifting its generals is to not have the soldiers follow so as to make both armies heavy. Similarly, when you shift the army, the general does not accompany them so as to make them both complete.

On the day the troops set out, discard the mats and cookstoves so that neither the fires nor bedding leaves a trace. At first light set out and travel at night so that the dust will not arise. On the day when the general sets out, do not remove his official insignia from camp in order to stupefy the enemy's army, or lower the command pennants in order to keep our troops calm. Thus the general can be shifted without the army worrying about having lost their general, while the army may be shifted without the general being concerned about the loss of his army. These are termed "submerged changes." 53

Again the techniques presuppose the presence of enemy agents in the encampment or their access to rumors and gossip.

By the late Ming period military contemplation of certain subjects such as the unorthodox and orthodox, secrecy, formlessness, and strategic power had become highly rarefied and abstract, no doubt in part because of the influence of such philosophical developments as Taoism, Buddhism, and Neoconfucianism over the nearly two thousand years since these subjects were first articulated by Sun-tzu. Conceptually important, their degree of realization in actual operations 

remains problematic, although there certainly was a general cognizance of the essential principles and a recognition of the need to be as deceitful and unfathomable as possible without creating impossibly complex plans and totally confusing one's own forces. The Ping-fa Pai-yen, a late Ming text composed by a loyalist leader and eventual recluse, ponders much of the corpus of Chinese military theory in the light of field practices and historical records. To provide an overview of what certainly must be considered the theoretical apex of the genre, several relevant definitions are translated here, while others will be found in the theoretical section on intelligence evaluation.

The technique of "according with" the enemy's expectations and desires requires first determining what they believe and want, then apparently conforming to them until the situation can be exploited:

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Definition: When the enemy wants to take something and you yield it, it is termed "according with."

Original Text: In general, when going contrary to something merely solidifies it, it is better to accord with it in order to lead them to flaws. If the enemy wants to advance, be completely flexible and display weakness in order to induce an advance. If the enemy wants to withdraw, disperse and open an escape route for their retreat. If the enemy is relying upon a strong front, establish your own front lines far off, solidly assuming a defensive posture in order to observe their arrogance. If the enemy relies upon their awesomeness, be emptily respectful but substantially plan while awaiting their laxness. Draw them forward and cover them, release and capture them. Exploit their arrogance, capitalize on their laxity.

Explanation: Whenever you encounter a strong enemy, unless you have extensive wisdom and great courage, it is not possible to oppose them headlong and sever their forces. It is better to assume a solid defensive stance and refuse battle, waiting for their ch'i to decline. Deepen your moats and heighten your fortifications; conceal your sharp front and hide your arrows; endure taunts and curses without moving; accept insults without declining. Temporarily accord with the enemy's 

intentions, do not engage them in battle. Once some change develops, exploit any cracks and arise without waiting an instant. Then you can conquer the great with the small, the strong with the weak.

"According with" the enemy's assessment is but one technique in the panoply of misperception. Every commander should consistently mount efforts to mislead the enemy into making errors of judgment and undertake whatever actions might directly produce "misperceptions."

Definition: Causing the enemy's plans to be erroneous is referred to as "misperception."

Original Text: The essence of conquering an enemy is not only using your strength to control them, but also employing techniques that mislead them. Perhaps you will use your own methods to mislead them, perhaps exploit their misperceptions to impede them. Cause them to misperceive their basis of support, advantages, stupidity, and wisdom, and also misperceive ongoing changes. Provoke them with emptiness [feints], seize them with substantiality. If they are knowledgeable, cause them to be mis

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led; when they are misled, you can be enlightened. Thus one who excels in military affairs misleads others and is not misled by others. 54

Explanation: Misleading them with their own misperceptions accords with the natural tendencies of the situation. Misleading them in the absence of misperception is contrary to the tendencies of the situation. Even when the enemy doesn't have a perceptible crack that can be exploited, there are still techniques. For example, display weakness in order to mislead them about what they can rely on, manifest fear in order to mislead them about the advantages they enjoy. Show disorder in order to mislead their stupidity, manifest stupidity in order to obfuscate their wisdom. Show them you do not dare act in order to interfere with their tactical changes. When they nominally provoke you, act startled, when they employ substantial forces to seize terrain, display a sudden response. 

In all cases act as if your generals are incompetent and the army incapable. These are the methods of inner court officials, the Tao of pliancy.

Alternatively, destroy their solidity and thereby interfere with what they rely upon. Seize their riches in order to impede their realization of advantages. Employ the extremes of skill and artifice to mislead them in their stupidity, deepen your plans in order to obscure their wisdom. Employ intertwined attack and defense in order to confuse their tactical changes. When they nominally provoke you, exercise caution in the middle, when they employ substantial forces to seize terrain, occupy the strongpoints. In all these situations act as if neither your generals nor army can be matched by the enemy. This was the military strategy of the Yellow Emperor, the Tao of firmness.

The Tao of the Yellow Emperor, the Tao of Lao-tzu--sometimes being a dragon, others a snake--anyone who excels in employing the army must employ such methods.

Although the term "misperception" is active, conveying the sense of inducing a misperception or erroneous evaluation, it also includes the idea of actively impeding, misleading, or obstructing, so no single English word suffices to translate it, including "obfuscate," which has many appropriate connotations.

In defining a word best translated as "displays" (although "extensions" or "screens," depending upon the type and context, would also be possible), the Ping-fa Pai-yen similarly provides evidence that the technique of doubtful flags and screens was still practiced in the late Ming and ancient texts still assiduously studied, but now on more

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abstract level, implemented through actual deployments rather than just flags themselves:

Definition: The establishment of multiple doubtful deployments is termed "displays."

Original Text: Ostentatiously flaunting one's capabilities to shake an enemy is an ordinary method; only when the 

substance is lacking does the term "display" apply. Thus only when something has not yet been realized should you trust to displays, only when insufficient do you thereby become full. Displays may be undertaken to cause doubt in the enemy. When you amplify your awesomeness to snatch away the enemy's morale and then employ unorthodox tactics to achieve victory, this is a case of empty fame attaining substantial employment, the skilled Tao of dwelling in weakness.

Explanation: When an army lacks substance but displays a facade, it is termed a "display." The method is to amplify what should be extended. When you blatantly flourish the army's actual awesomeness, it is termed a "substantial display." When you purely set out feigned deployments to incite doubt, it is termed a "vacuous display." Even so, substantial displays require rearguard actions to prevent the enemy from fervently and courageously mounting a sudden attack. Vacuous displays value concealed ambushes to prevent the enemy from leading you into a fierce engagement. Thus some displays result in victory by exploiting the enemy's fear, others their ignorance. When you have no alternative but to employ them, any victory achieved will be a matter of luck, not of normal methods. Those who excel in this method extend themselves externally but are constrained internally.

The concept essentially exploits Sun Pin's idea of confusing an enemy by setting out specious displays, especially when one is weak: "Set out artifice in order to cause doubt." The most spectacular example among those that Chieh Hsüan provides is Chao Yün blatantly opening his camp to make a vastly superior enemy afraid to attack since a fatal ambush had no doubt been prepared.

The foregoing measures, when abstractly extrapolated, may be theorized in terms of "shadows," a more all-encompassing, multidimensional form of "displays":

Definition: Being skilled in setting out doubtful formations is termed "shadows."

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Original Text: In antiquity, when those who excelled in employing the military intended to do something, they would do something else in order to implement their actual intentions. This is an excellent method for destroying enemy armies, capturing generals, and forcing the submission of cities. When they did not intend to do something, they did it, thereby causing doubt in the enemy that they intended to do it. This similarly is a subtle way to destroy enemy armies, capture generals, and force the submission of cities. Thus doing something is shadowy, doing it without any intention to do it manifests shadows within shadows. Just as when two mirrors are hung opposite each other, profound and more profound!

Explanation: Men have straightforward principles, but military strategy does not. The sincere and trusting will not be able to comprehend a slippery enemy commander. Thus there are techniques for real and feigned assaults, methods for vacuous and substantial defenses. For battle there are unorthodox and orthodox tactics, including giving when you want to take, and taking when you want to give. When you want to capture something, you liberate it, when you want to liberate something, you capture it. Sometimes one acts contrary to this principle and actually seizes or gives, captures or liberates, all of which are termed "shadows within shadows." Thus shadows have shadows within them, but shadows also have reality within them. Within the real there are shadows, within the real there is reality. Thus reality and shadow complete each other, ever attaining the inexhaustible.

Examples: Chu-ko Liang wanted to seize Hsi-ch'uan but first blocked Sun Ch'üan's advancing to attack. T'ang T'ai-tsung was capable of pacifying the Turks, but he first humbly sought to make peace. Duke Wen of Chin wanted to engage in battle, but he first feigned a retreat at Ch'eng-p'u. Ch'in's army wanted to retreat, so it sought to engage the enemy in battle. In all these cases stretching out was taken as contracting and contracting as stretching out. How can the mind of the strategist be real and substantial like other men?

Although highly abstract and esoteric, battlefield practices of this sort represent the pinnacle of deception and the ultimate challenge to the mysteries of evaluation. Even though the 

conception appears more complex than Sun-tzu's feigned appearances, it essentially resolves into faking (but also sometimes actually performing) the opposite of an intended action to mislead the enemy, to cause misperceptions and thereby achieve one's real purpose. However, the language mirrors Li

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Ching's discussion on the unorthodox and orthodox, as well as Sun- tzu's original passages on that topic, in Book I of the Questions and Replies. Moreover, it can be similarly conceptualized and phrased in terms of yin, the dark, passive polarity in the dynamic pairing of light and darkness, sun and moon, day and night:

Definition: Wisdom that cannot be perceived is termed "yin" [dark, obscure].

Original Text: When you employ yang [visible, overt measures] but others still are unable to fathom them, then yang is yin [dark, covert]. When you employ yin measures and others are even less able to fathom them, then yin measures are yin. Thus sometimes one borrows yang to implement yin, sometimes revolves yin to complete yang, neither of which differs from simply employing unorthodox measures and seizing subtle opportunities, using ambushes and sudden strikes.

Explanation: The myriad military tactics of antiquity can all be exhausted by a single word, yin. The talents of antique generals may similarly be encompassed by the single word yin. The wisest military calculations, if leaked out, will fail to achieve anything, whereas if preserved in secrecy, they will be effective. Allowing plans to become prominent invites misfortune, concealing them preserves the army intact. However, unorthodox and dangerous compounds and fiercely poisonous medicines such as bitter aconite or ta-huang are solely for striking diseases themselves. Thus if a disease's root is shallow but powerful medications are inappropriately employed to purge it, the life force may be harmed and original essence congealed to the detriment of the patient. Yang must be ameliorated with yin; through surpassing skill in yin achievements will be complete. Yin must be perversely contrary 

to yang; then, by reverting to yang, the Tao will be upright [orthodox].

After citing the Yin-fu Ching in the comments to his examples for "yin," the author concludes: "Without yin, how can the unorthodox aspects of calculations be successful? Without yin how can they be secret? The eye is a natural thief, the mind a natural robber." Although the language is enigmatic, the chapter simply focuses upon the ongoing battle between secrecy and perception, the contrast between things that, having form, are detectable and the invisible, which, being indiscernible, thwarts intelligence efforts. The chapter's insights depend upon the dynamic polar tension characterizing the opposition of yin and yang that underlies all phenomena in the traditional Chi

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nese view and no doubt reflects Taoism's close interrelationship with Chinese military theory over the centuries.

Counterintelligence

The classic historical writings of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods preserve several accounts of early counterintelligence efforts mounted to thwart political and military observers seeking to assess the prospects for a successful military invasion. To thwart these enemy agents, whether clandestine or politically accredited, the visit had to be anticipated--no doubt reported by one's own spies--and the parameters by which a judgment would be rendered well understood. Generally speaking, until the middle of the Warring States period when disparate views began to arise, observers looked for a virtuous ruler, capable assistants, morally superior advisers, and economic prosperity among the people. A famous Spring and Autumn incident involved Yen-tzu, an astute Ch'i statesman around whom many disparate stories eventually coalesced in the Warring States period to make up the lengthy book attributed to him, the Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu. (Reputedly a compilation of his remonstrances and advice, much of the material appears tenuous at best.) However, in the following episode his quick response su ccessfully frustrated the enemy's attempt to insult them and 

thereby probe their moral excellence and administrative order. Although the original version appears in the Tso Chuan (and appears in several later compilations such as the Hsin Hsü, Han-shih Wai-chuan, and Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu itself), a later version incorporated in the Sung dynasty Hundred Unorthodox Strategies is translated here because it provides evidence of the continuing importance of antique materials in the late Sung and subsequent centuries for military students who pondered the Unorthodox Strategies as a tactical handbook:

During the Spring and Autumn period Duke P'ing of Chin wanted to attack the state of Ch'i, so he dispatched Fan Chao to observe Ch'i's government. At a feast in his honor Duke Ching of Ch'i presented him with a cup of wine, but Fan Chao asked to drink from the ruler's goblet. The duke ordered that his cup be brought to his guest. Fan Chao had already drunk from it when Yen Tzu seized the goblet and exchanged it for another cup. Later Fan Chao, pretending to be drunk, unhappily rose to dance. He asked the Music Master: "Can you perform the music of Ch'eng-chou

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for me? I want to dance to it." The Music Master said, "Your ignorant servant is not familiar with it."

When Fan Chao went out Duke Ching said: " Chin is a great state. He came to observe our government. Now that you have angered this great state's emissary, what will we do?" Yen Tzu said, "I observed that Fan Chao was not ignorant of the proper forms of court behavior but sought to embarrass our state, so I did not comply." The Music Master said: "The music of Ch'eng-chou is the music of the Son of Heaven. Only the ruler of men can dance to it. Now Fan Chao, although a subject, wanted to dance to the music of the Son of Heaven. Therefore I did not perform it."

Fan Chao returned to Chin and reported to Duke Ping: "Ch'i cannot yet be attacked. I tried to insult their ruler, but Yen Tzu realized it. I wanted to act contrary to their forms of court behavior, but the Music Master perceived it." Confucius subsequently said, "The saying 'to shatter an enemy a 

thousand miles off without going beyond the banquet hall' refers to Yen Tzu.

The tactical principle illustrated by this incident in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies derives from Sun-tzu Art of War: "If you attack the enemy just after they have formulated their strategy, it will ruin their plans and force them to submit. The Art of War states: 'The highest realization of warfare is to attack plans.'"

Even Ch'u, although regarded by the original Chou states as semi- barbaric, was similarly able to deter a planned Chin attack by thwarting its probe through an unexpected display of surpassing talent:

Ch'in wanted to attack Ch'u, so it dispatched an emissary to observe Ch'u's valuable treasures. Learning of his coming, the king of Ch'u summoned his prime minister Tzu Hsi and inquired: " Ch'in wants to inspect our valuable treasures. We have the famous Ho-shih jade and Sui-hou's pearl. Can we show them these?"Tzu His replied, "I do not know."

The king then summoned Chao Hsi-hsü and asked him the same thing. He replied: "They want to observe our state's attainments and losses and make plans against them. The state's valued treasures are its worthy ministers. Pearls and jewels are merely things for amusement, not the treasures that a state really esteems." The king then deputed Chao to prepare their response.

Chao Hsi-hsü deployed three hundred elite soldiers within the western gate. On the eastern side he constructed one mound, on the south four, and one in the west. When Ch'in's emissary ar

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rived Chao said, "Honored guest, please assume a position in the east." He had prime minister Tzu Hsi stand in the south with Tzu Fang behind him, Tzu Kao in turn behind him, and Ssu-ma Tzu Fan behind him. Chao himself stood on the mound in the west and then called out: "Our guest wants to observe Ch'u's valued treasures. However, what Ch'u treasures is its worthy officials. 

"To bring order to the people and ensure that the storehouses and granaries are full and settle the people in their positions are prime minister Tzu Hsi's responsibilities. To present appropriate offerings, undertake embassies to the feudal lords, mitigate difficulties of friction, bring states together in harmony, and keep us free from the worry of military affairs are Tzu Fang's responsibilities. To defend the borders and be careful about their definition so that we neither encroach on others nor other states encroach on us are Tzu Kao's responsibilities. To organize the armies and array the troops in order to oppose strong enemies, to take up the drumsticks and stir our million men to action so that they will all rush into boiling water or fire, stomp on naked blades, and die a thousand deaths without troubling about the difficulties of one's life, are Ssu-ma Tzu Fan's responsibilities. To embrace the bequeathed instructions of the hegemons and take hold of the winds of order and disorder, I am here. It only remains for your great state to observe us."

So frightened that he could not reply, the ambassador from Ch'in bowed and departed. He then returned to Ch'in and reported, " Ch'u has many worthy ministers so we cannot yet plot against them." Subsequently they did not attack. As the Book of Odes states, "With his splendid array of officers King Wen enjoyed tranquillity." This is what it means. 55

A brief anecdote involving Chang Yi, the famous proponent of the so-called horizontal alliance that would submissively unite all the states under Ch'in, reveals he apparently had his own sources of information and was therefore able to counteract his opponents even though active in another state: " Chou Tsui was a partisan of Ch'i, while Ti Ch'iang advocated an alliance with Ch'u. Both of them wanted to harm Chang Yi's standing in Wei. Chang Yi heard about it and managed to have one of his people placed as a staff member to the king's protocol director to secretly observe audiences with the king, so they did not dare harm Chang Yi."56

As the military and political situation became more complex and intense in the Warring States period, the sort of highly visible observational missions undertaken by equally high-profile diplomats yielded 

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to low-profile and totally clandestine efforts. Despite the most stringent measures to preserve secrecy, enemy agents often succeeded in penetrating them to gather information, bribe disaffected and greedy officials, or sow discord. They, and those already emplaced by the enemy, had to be detected and either eliminated or converted to one's own use, whether knowingly or not. As already examined, Sun-tzu discussed the need to recruit converted spies, valuing turned agents as the basis for all other efforts to penetrate the enemy, but with the benefit of another thousand years of experience General Li Ching of the T'ang dynasty provided perhaps the most succinct characterization of the situation's dynamics:

Now while we employ agents to spy on other people, other people also use agents to spy on us. Our spies go forth secretly, theirs come forth secretly. The operative principle is that one must simply investigate reports with respect to possible motives and evaluate them comparatively, for then they will not be lost.

If the enemy dispatches men to discover our vacuities and strengths, investigate our movement and rest, observe and learn our affairs and plans, and implement covert activities, we should feign being unaware of it, allowing them to continue, generously profiting them, and treating them well. House them and feast them, subtly inform them of false information and speak speciously of unreal affairs, both former and subsequent. What I need then will be what the enemy loses. Relying upon their spies, we will turn about and spy upon them.

If they assume our vacuities are substantial and our substantialities vacuous, we can then take advantage of their exhaustion and seize their will. Now water can float a boat, but it can also overturn it. Although some use spies to be successful, others relying on them are overturned and defeated. 57

At the end of the passage Li Ching pointedly raises the ultimate question in shadow work--how to ensure an agent's reliability-- 

one already discussed, along with measures to evaluate and validate the content of reports, in the section on agent control.

Several military writers addressed the general question of how to evaluate men and motives, and in particular how to detect enemy agents and traitors from their behavior. The Northern Sung Hu-ling Ching includes a chapter entitled "Recognizing Villains" devoted to such evidence, together with responsive measures designed to gain control of the situation and in turn secretly exploit the opportunities thus presented:

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When an emissary comes from the enemy whose eyes constantly move about, countenance frequently changes, and words are dissolute, he is an assassin.

When an enemy who is not yet distressed requests peace talks, it is a plot.

An enemy that speaks deferentially and presents generous gifts is trying to make you arrogant.

When they do not cease their plundering even though urgently dispatching emissaries, they are insulting you.

Those who provide generous gifts to your attendants want to ferret out your secret plans.

When their emissaries speak fluently, are skilled in disputation, and want to resolve tensions between your two states, they are about to mount a surprise attack when you are unprepared.

One whose emissaries speak brusquely and belligerently wants to deceive you.

When you encounter any of these seven forms of behavior in an enemy emissary, you should minutely investigate in order to seize and coerce them. Turn their plots against those who would plot against you. Feign arrogance toward those who would make you arrogant. Deal brusquely with those who insult you. Display false plans to those who seek to ferret out your plans. Respond by suddenly attacking those who hope to attack when you are unprepared. Execute those with desires. 

You cannot detain their emissaries for long because if they remain long, they will know your smallest affairs, in which case it would be better to kill them. For these reasons knowing the techniques of these seven villains is one of the foundations of military art and must therefore be investigated.

In conjunction with the methods for detecting and converting enemy agents to one's own use already presented in the theoretical sections on agents and turned agents, from the preceding passages it is clear that the military writers, and therefore military commanders, were compelled to actively ponder the problem of spies and undertake vigilant countermeasures.

A passage from the biography of the famous Sung general Yüeh Fei depicts the exploitation of a captured spy exactly as specified in the theoretical writings. At the time Yüeh Fei was pursuing the rebel leader Ts'ao Ch'eng, who was retreating before him in command of some one hundred thousand troops:

When Yüeh Fei advanced into Ho-chou they captured one of Ts'ao Ch'eng's spies and tied him up outside Yüeh Fei's tent. When

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Yüeh came out from his tent the quartermaster advised: "Our provisions are exhausted, what should we do?" Yüeh Fei boldly replied, "We will temporarily return to Ch'a-ling." After that he looked at the spy as if he were very discouraged and walked heavily back into his tent. Thereafter he secretly ordered that the spy be allowed to escape.

The spy returned to Ts'ao Ch'eng's camp and reported these events. Greatly elated, Ts'ao Ch'eng decided to initiate his pursuit the next day. However, Yüeh Fei meanwhile ordered his officers and troops to eat early the next morning while still in their tents, after which they secretly raced out around the mountain and arrived before daybreak at T'ai-p'ing-ch'ang, where they destroyed Ts'ao's outlying camps. Ts'ao's forces then resisted by occupying the ravines, but Yüeh led his troop in a sudden, unexpected thrust that severely shattered the enemy. 58 

Han Shih-chung, another skilled Southern Sung general honored with a lengthy biography in the History of the Sung, also proved adept at manipulating the enemy's sources of information:

After having suffered a defeat, Li Heng's rebel army and Chin forces, in anticipation of uniting, proceeded by separate routes to mount an invasion of Sung-controlled territory. By his own hand the Sung emperor ordered Han Shih-chung, then serving as Pacification Commissioner for the area east of the Yangtze River, to cautiously defend his position while making plans to advance and seize the enemy. As the edict's language was bleak and earnest, when he received his instructions Shih-chung was moved to tears and exclaimed, "How can I live when the ruler's worries are so great?" Then he had the army cross the river from their fortified encampment and also ordered Major General Chieh Yüan to defend Kao-yu and await Chin's infantry forces. Meanwhile, he personally led his cavalry forces to temporarily occupy Ta-yi in order to confront the enemy's cavalry. Once there, they cut down the trees to erect palisades and sever the return route.

It happened that Wang Liang-ch'en, a Sung emissary just being dispatched by the Sung emperor to the Chin, was present, so Han Shih-chung had his refectories withdrawn on the pretext that he had received an imperial order to shift camp and defend the estuary. Wang Liang-ch'en then raced off on his mission. When Shih- chung calculated that Wang Liang-ch'en had crossed over the border, he jumped on his horse and ordered the army to "follow where his whip pointed." Thereupon he led the army to reposition at Ta-yi, configuring them into five deployments. He also es

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tablished ambushes at more than twenty other places, ordering them to arise in a sudden attack when they heard the sound of the drums.

After Wang Liang-ch'en arrived at the Chin encampment the latter inquired about the actions of the Sung armies, to which he replied in detail about all that he had seen. When Che-erh-pei- chin, the Chin commander in chief, heard that Han Shih- 

chung had withdrawn, he was greatly elated and led his troops to the mouth of the river, about five kilometers from Ta-yi. Moreover, he dispatched a secondary force composed of valiant cavalry under the command of General T'a-pei-yeh to bypass Han Shih- chung's five deployments on the east. Shih-chung then ordered the drums sounded and the troops in concealment raised their flags on all four sides of the enemy. Their flags were soon intermixed with those of the Chin troops as the latter were thrown into confusion, allowing Han's soldiers to successively advance. With their backs to the heights, Han's soldiers wielded long-handled axes that struck the enemy's chests above and chopped at the horses' legs below. In full armor the enemy's cavalrymen fell heavily into the mud. Han Shih-chung then signaled his strong cavalry to trample them from all four sides so that men and horses alike perished. Subsequently they captured T'a-pei-yeh and some two hundred others. 59

Prisoners

One of the major sources of information has always been prisoners captured either preliminary to battle, often as a result of conscious effort, or incidental to the course of conflict. Although there are numerous problems associated with such potential sources, including deliberate fabrication, self-delusion, and simply inaccurate information derived from a limited perspective, through the techniques advised in the theoretical writings, perhaps buttressed by a general awareness of the principles of evaluating men and motives found in Han Fei-tzu, the Six Secret Teachings, Jen-wu Chih, and similar texts, coupled with duplication, cross-checking, and an occasional defector, vital information could be elicited. The following example of Tzung Tse, a prominent general who lived at the end of the Sung and start of the Southern Sung (A.D. 1060-1128), effectively employing moral persuasion to sway a prisoner into revealing essential details is but one of many successful cases preserved in China's voluminous historical writings:

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Wang Ts'e, originally a Liao chieftain, had been actively serving as a Chin general in the upper part of the Yellow River. When Tzung Tse's forces captured him, Tzung untied his bonds, had him seated in the upper part of the hall, and addressed him: "The Khitan and the Sung were originally brother states. Now you have truly insulted my ruler and moreover abandoned your allegiance to your own state. It would be proper to plan together to wipe away this shame." Wang Tse, moved to tears, was willing to die to achieve this end. Tzung then interrogated him about the enemy's vacuities and strengths and obtained complete, detailed information. Thereafter he decided on a plan for a major mobilization that resulted in the Chin forces being defeated and compelled to withdraw from the area. 60

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Part Three COVERT ACTIVITIES

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8 Systematic Programs and

Psychological Warfare

BY THE EARLIEST RECORDED LITERATURE it had become apparent that military measures constituted expensive solutions to problems of state and that other alternatives might prove more efficacious. Particularly as military exercises designed, in part, to confirm each clan member's position and 

role became less important than the mobilization of citizen populaces and the fielding of mass infantry armies, less disruptive solutions were much to be desired. Although unrecorded, clandestine activities such as bribery, estrangement, and deception no doubt began simply and early. By the Spring and Autumn period typical objectives for the frequently mounted covert operations included sowing dissension, causing misperception, assassinating key personnel, ruining public confidence, and mounting other political measures to subvert enemy governments and undermine their ability to wage war. As theorists began to ponder the nature and implication of such efforts, they naturally envisioned coordinated programs designed to weaken and even topple their enemies, to achieve Sun-tzu's ideal objective of conquering the enemy complete.

Sun-tzu's famous chapter on spies only touched upon the employment of double agents to spread disinformation, but a Warring States work entitled the Six Secret Teachings contains two explosive chapters on clandestine operations that were much condemned thereafter for their inhumanity and perverse approach to warfare, one held to be inconsistent with antiquity's great Sages. The first, entitled "Civil Offensive," although presumably providing measures for undermining the power of the dominant Shang, elucidates many techniques of universal validity:

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There are twelve measures for civil offensives. First, accord with what he likes in order to accommodate his wishes. He will eventually grow arrogant and invariably mount some perverse affair. If you can appear to follow along, you will certainly be able to eliminate him.

Second, become familiar with those he loves in order to fragment his awesomeness. When men have two different inclinations, their loyalty invariably declines. When his court no longer has any loyal ministers, the state altars will inevitably be endangered.

Third, covertly bribe his assistants, fostering a deep relationship with them. Although they will bodily stand in his 

court, their emotions will be directed outside it. The state will certainly suffer harm.

Fourth, assist him in his licentiousness and indulgence in music in order to dissipate his will. Make him generous gifts of pearls and jade, and ply him with beautiful women. Speak deferentially, listen respectfully, follow his commands, and accord with him in everything. He will never imagine you might be in conflict with him. Our treacherous measures will then be settled.

Fifth, treat his loyal officials very generously, but reduce the gifts you provide to the ruler. Delay his emissaries, do not listen to their missions. When he eventually dispatches other men, treat them with sincerity; embrace and trust them. The ruler will then again feel you are in harmony with him. If you manage to treat his formerly loyal officials very generously, his state can then be plotted against.

Sixth, make secret alliances with his favored ministers, but visibly keep his less favored outside officials at a distance. His talented people will then be under external influence while enemy states encroach upon his territory. Few states in such a situation have survived.

Seventh, if you want to bind his heart to you, you must offer generous presents. To gather in his assistants, loyal associates, and loved ones, you must secretly show them the gains they can realize by colluding with you. Have them slight their work, and then their preparations will be futile.

Eighth, gift him with great treasures and make plans with him. When the plans are successful and profit him, he will have faith in you because of the profits. This is what is termed "being closely embraced." The result of being closely embraced is that he will inevitably be used by us. When someone rules a state but is externally controlled, his territory will inevitably be defeated.

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Ninth, honor him with praise. Do nothing that will cause him personal discomfort. Display the proper respect accruing to a great power, and your obedience will certainly be trusted. 

Magnify his honor, being the first to gloriously praise him, humbly embellishing him as a Sage. Then his state will suffer great loss!

Tenth, be submissive so that he will trust you and you will thereby learn about his true situation. Accept his ideas and respond to his affairs as if you were twins. Once you have learned everything, subtly gather in his power. Thus when the ultimate day arrives, it will seem as if Heaven itself destroyed him.

Eleventh, block up his access by means of the Tao. Among subordinates there is no one who does not value rank and wealth or hate danger and misfortune. Secretly express great respect toward them, and gradually bestow valuable gifts in order to gather in the more outstanding talents. Accumulate your own resources until they become very substantial, but manifest an external appearance of shortage. Covertly bring in wise knights, and entrust them with planning great strategy. Attract courageous knights and augment their spirit. Even when they are sufficiently rich and honored, continue to increase them. When your faction has been fully established, you will have attained the objective referred to as "blocking his access." If someone has a state but his access is blocked, how can he be considered as having the state?

Twelfth, support his dissolute officials in order to confuse him. Introduce beautiful women and licentious sounds in order to befuddle him. Send him outstanding dogs and horses in order to tire him. From time to time allow him great power in order to entice him to greater arrogance. Then investigate Heaven's signs, and plot with the world against him.

When these twelve measures are fully employed, they will become a military weapon. Thus when, as it is said, one "looks at Heaven above and investigates Earth below" and the proper signs are already visible, attack him.

An example of implementing something like the fifth measure appears in the Chan-kuo Ts'e:

The king of Ch'in said to Kan Mao: "The emissaries that Ch'u has dispatched to us are mostly robust persuaders. When we 

argue, I have frequently found myself confounded. What should I do?"

Kan Mao replied: "Your majesty need not be concerned. When effective emissaries come, you should ignore them, but when timid and weak emissaries come, you should listen to their ad

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vice. Then these timid, weak officials will be employed in Ch'u, while the strong will be neglected. Through this method you will control Ch'u." 1

The second Six Secret Teachings chapter, entitled "Three Doubts," expounds the preferred method for undermining enemy rulers, concretely focused in terms of the hated Shang:

King Wu inquired of the T'ai Kung: "I want to attain our aim of overthrowing the Shang, but I have three doubts. I am afraid that our strength will be inadequate to attack the strong, estrange his close supporters within the court, and disperse his people. What should I do?"

The T'ai Kung replied: "Accord with the situation, be very cautious in making plans, and employ your material resources. Now in order to attack the strong, you must nurture them to make them even stronger, and increase them to make them even more extensive. What is too strong will certainly break, what is too extended must have deficiencies. Attack the strong through his strength. 2 Cause the estrangement of his favored officials by using his favorites, and disperse his people by means of the people.

Now in the Tao of planning, thoroughness and secrecy are treasured. You should become involved with him in numerous affairs and ply him with temptations of profit. Conflict will then surely arise.

If you want to cause his close supporters to become estranged from him, you must do it by using what they love, making gifts to those he favors, giving them what they want. Tempt them with what they find profitable, thereby making them ambitious. Those who covet profits will be extremely happy at the prospects, and their remaining doubts will be ended. 

Now without doubt the Tao for attacking is to first obfuscate the king's clarity and then attack his strength, destroying his greatness and eliminating the misfortune of the people. Debauch him with beautiful women, entice him with profit. Nurture him with flavors, and provide him with the company of female musicians. Then after you have caused his subordinates to become estranged from him, you must cause the people to grow distant from him while never letting him know your plans. Appear to support him, and draw him into your trap. Don't let him become aware of what is happening, for only then can your plan be successful.

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The fourth paragraph of "Civil Offensive" and the last paragraph just cited clearly advocate one of China's favored measures for weakening opponents, whether enemy states or barbarian kingdoms: Entice the ruler and his key advisers with the allure of beauty, and debauch them with scents, music, and sexual delights. Although remarkably obvious and simplistic, it repeatedly proved successful throughout Chinese history (and continues to be widely employed today), particularly among self-indulgent rulers whose arrogance inclined them to neglect the people's welfare and the state's administration, and is therefore accorded a separate chapter later in this section.

The importance of the two Six Secret Teachings' chapters to the enterprise of spycraft may be seen in the glowing evaluation of Wang Ming-lo, an experienced high-level Ming dynasty commander who viewed them and Sun-tzu's chapter on "Employing Spies" as the very foundation of spycraft:

All the writings in the "Civil Offensive" chapter of the Martial T'ao within the Six Secret Teachings are concerned with concealed plots and secret plans for subjugating enemy forces without engaging in combat. The military esteems the Tao of deception and relies on profits to attain a tactical imbalance of power. Thus the T'ai Kung, who with righteous and benevolent counsel assisted the Chou in realizing the strategic affair of emperorship, put forth the unorthodox and employed agents, actions that might be termed "not shunning anything." I really am amazed that the authors of such secret teachings and 

strategies managed to be transmitted down with the Six Confucian Classics for more than a thousand years, being preserved like the tortoise and milfoil of the arts of divination. Sun-tzu's discussion of the five types of agents does not exceed the essentials found in twelve paragraphs. Thus agents cannot be abandoned.

Alas, without sagacity one cannot employ spies; without benevolence and righteousness, cannot use them; without subtlety, cannot distill their substance. It is therefore truly hard to speak about spycraft. However, through the employment of spies certain historical rulers exceeded the ordinary, and their fame has thus been inexhaustibly perpetuated. They truly followed the T'ai Kung's and Sun-tzu's bequeathed words.

In summary, when one's wisdom is all-encompassing and the moment for glory arrives, the subtle response cannot be entangled, intentions cannot be fathomed, or measures taken from ghosts and spirits. Subtle, truly subtle! It is truly difficult to speak

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about agents. Thus it is said, spiritualness and enlightenment lie with men! 3

The other military classics, while failing to emphasize covert actions to this extent, generally advised undertaking a wide range of measures to undermine the enemy, including spreading rumors and manipulating officials. In fact, the Three Strategies, which evinces a world vision of Sagely rule, states: "Without stratagems you have no means to resolve suspicions and settle doubts. Without rumor and the unorthodox you have no means to destroy evildoers and stop invaders."4

King Kou-chien and the State of Yüeh

Po P'i's corruption (already recounted) just at the end of the Spring and Autumn period dramatically illustrates the fearful impact a single influential adviser in the pay of a foreign state might achieve, especially when manipulating a headstrong, youthful ruler. 5 However, his employment constituted only one aspect, however critical, of an extensive program to debilitate 

the state of Wu and destroy its ruler, King Fu-ch'ai. The outlines of this famous systematic effort, the process by which it was conceived, and the steps taken to implement it are recounted in a Wu Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu chapter entitled "Kou-chien's Secret Strategy." Although the Wu Yüeh Ch'un-ch'iu is a semihistorical work at best, these nine techniques were assiduously studied (and much decried) for nearly two thousand years and therefore merit careful scrutiny. 6 The death struggle between Wu and Yüeh stimulated Wen Chung to formulate a diabolical program:

In the second month of his tenth year Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, pondered deeply and thought extensively about the insults he had suffered as a result of Wu's invasion, and how he had yet received Heaven's blessings and been restored to Yüeh. His numerous ministers and preceptors had each proposed plans, their words were harmonious and their intentions united. Kou-chien respectfully followed their advice and the state was already rich.

On the other hand he had not heard any of his friends speak about death-defying action and thought that perhaps his high officials loved their persons and were unwilling to sacrifice their lives. Kou-chien ascended Chien Tower and looked out to see whether his ministers seemed troubled or not. The prime minister Fan Li and the high officials such as Wen Chung and Kou Ju

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were all sternly seated in rows. Even though they harbored worries and troubles, none appeared on their countenances. Kou- chien then struck the bell to summon a war council and made a covenant with his ministers: "I have been insulted and shamed. Above I have been embarrassed before the king of Chou, below ashamed before the rulers of Chin and Ch'u. Fortunately, through your plans, I managed to return to our state. I have implemented governmental measures, enriched the people, and nurtured officers, but for five years have not heard from any official willing to risk death or any minister who wants to wipe away our enmity. What do I have to do to achieve this?" 

All the assembled officials remained silent, none dared reply. Kou-chien looked toward Heaven and sighed: "I have heard that when a ruler is troubled his ministers are disgraced, and when a ruler is disgraced his ministers die. I have personally experienced the misery of being a prisoner, suffered the shame of being incarcerated and broken. I am unable to support myself alone, but must have worthy advisers and entrust power to the benevolent, for only thereafter can we calculate the possibilities for attacking Wu. How is it that ministers and high officials bearing heavy responsibilities are so easily seen but so difficult to employ?"

Chi Yen, a lowly young official seated well in the back, raised his hand, jumped off his mat, and advanced: "Your majesty's words are erroneous. It is not that high officials are easy to see but difficult to employ, but that your majesty is incapable of employing them."

When Kou-chien asked what he meant, Chi Yen replied: "Now official position, riches, money, gold, and rewards are what your majesty disdains. Taking up sharp weapons, treading on naked blades, risking one's life, and flaunting death are what officials value greatly. Now your majesty would exchange the wealth that he disdains for undertaking responsibilities that the officials find heavy. Isn't this perilous?"

Thereupon the king fell silent. With a displeased look and embarrassed countenance he dismissed his assembled officials and had Chi Yen advance in order to ask him, "What are the methods for gaining the hearts of my officials?"

Chi Yen replied: "When the ruler respects benevolence and righteousness, this is the door to control. Officials and the people are the roots of rulership. For opening the door and solidifying the roots nothing surpasses rectifying yourself. The Tao for rectifying yourself is to be cautious about those about you. Associates are the means by which a ruler flourishes or declines. I would like

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your majesty to wisely select his associates so as to obtain only the worthy. In antiquity the T'ai Kung remonstrated nine times, 

then fled, eventually suffering from hunger along the Pang-hsi River. The Western Duke [ King Wen] employed him and thereby became king of the realm. Kuan Chung was a prisoner from a lost state and had a reputation for avarice. Duke Huan of Ch'i obtained him and became hegemon. Thus the Tso Chuan says that /one who loses officials will perish, and one who gains officials will flourish.' I would like your majesty to carefully examine your associates. Why should you be concerned about your ministers not being employed?"

The king complained: "I employ the worthy and give responsibility to the capable, assigning them each different affairs. I empty my mind of high expectations, hoping to hear about strategies for gaining revenge. At present they all conceal their sounds and hide their forms so that I have not heard any such discussions. Where does my fault lie?"

Chi Yen replied: "Selecting the worthy and successfully employing officials have their individual stages. Dispatch them far off with difficult affairs in order to verify their sincerity, internally advise them of hidden affairs in order to know their trustworthiness. Discuss affairs with them in order to observe their wisdom, get them drunk in order to detect their disorder. Appoint them as emissaries in order to investigate their abilities, display different countenances in order to discern their attitude. 7 Establish them according to their various virtues. Officers will then fully employ their abilities and men exhaust their wisdom. When you know that their wisdom is fully actualized, what worries will my ruler have about his ministers?"

Kou-chien said, "My strategists have exerted a substantial effort, and my men have exhausted their wisdom, but not all the officers have advanced beneficial proposals."

Chi Yen said: " Fan Li is enlightened and understands internal affairs, while Wen Chung is far-sighted and perceives externals. I suggest you invite Wen Chung for a serious discussion because the techniques for attaining kingship and hegemony lie with him."

The king of Yüeh, having invited Wen Chung to an audience, queried him: "Previously, through your advice I escaped from 

impoverishment and danger. If I would now have you put forth unconstrained calculations for washing away my long-standing enmity, what actions should I undertake?"

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Wen Chung said: "I have heard that high-flying birds perish from beautiful food, while the fish found in deep pools yet die from fragrant bait. Now if you want to attack the state of Wu, you must first seek out what they love and participate in what they like, for only then will you be able you achieve it."

Kou-chien said, "How can we determine what people want, even their desires, and control them so that they will perish as a result?"

Wen Chung said: "If you want to repay insults, avenge enmity, destroy the state of Wu, and exterminate your enemies, there are nine techniques. Your majesty should investigate them."

The king of Yüeh replied: "I have been insulted and burdened with worry. Within the court I have been embarrassed before my ministers, outside the state I have been shamed before the feudal lords. My mind is confused and deluded, my spirit empty and vacant. Even though there might be nine such techniques, how could I know about them?"

Wen Chung said: "As for these nine techniques, T'ang of the Shang and Wen of the Chou employed them to become kings, Duke Huan and Duke Mu to become hegemons. With them, attacking cities and seizing towns are as easy as removing one's sandals. I would like you to scrutinize them.

"First, revere Heaven and serve ghosts in order to seek their blessings.

"Second, make generous presents and monetary gifts to the ruler and numerous presents and bribes to please his ministers.

"Third, make the five grains expensive in order to empty their state, take advantage of what the ruler desires in order to weary his people. 

"Fourth, present the ruler with beautiful women in order to befuddle his mind and confuse his plans.

"Fifth, send the ruler skilled artisans and excellent materials to stimulate him to undertake palaces and mansions and thereby exhaust their wealth.

"Sixth, dispatch sycophantic ministers, causing the ruler to become easily attacked.

"Seventh, stiffen those ministers who dare to remonstrate, forcing them to commit suicide.

"Eighth, enrich your country and prepare the implements of war.

"Ninth, discipline your soldiers in order to exploit the ruler's perversity.

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"Now your majesty should close his mouth and not transmit these nine to anyone. If you preserve them in spirituality, seizing All under Heaven would not prove difficult, so how much less so the state of Wu!"

"Excellent," said the king and then proceeded to implement the first technique. He established the eastern suburb in order to sacrifice to yang, calling it the August Duke of the East. He established the western suburb in order to sacrifice to yin, calling it the Queen Mother of the West. He sacrificed to the hills and mountains at K'uai-chi and the rivers and marshes at Chiang-chou. After he had served the ghosts and spirits for a year, the state no longer suffered from disasters. The king of Yüeh exclaimed, "How wondrous your techniques. I would like you to discuss the next one."

Wen Chung said: "The king of Wu loves to erect palaces and mansions and employs his workers without respite. Your majesty should select some sacred materials from our famous mountains and present them to the king."

Kou-chien then had more than three thousand woodworkers venture into the mountains to fell trees. After more than a year the unfortunate officers of this army thought about returning 

home. Everyone harbored rancorous, expectant hearts and went about singing the dirge of the "Tree Guest." One night Heaven gave birth to a pair of sacred trees, each twenty spans around and four hundred feet tall, the yang of catalpa, the yin of pien-yu. The woodworkers then began estimating and calculating, establishing the dimensions with the compass and cord, adjusting the roundness, planing and sanding. They divided the wood into red and green, decorated it with paint, embellished it with white jade disks, engraved and inlaid it with gold, and painted it with images of dragons and snakes.

While the decorations and colors where still new and scintillating, the king had Wen Chung present them all to Fu-ch'ai, king of Wu, saying: "Your servant Kou-chien, dwelling near the East Sea where these materials originate, entrusted me to humbly present them to your majesty. Through your lictors I dared to query your attendants. Based upon your majesty's strength, I dare say they will make somewhat more than a small palace. Therefore, respectfully bowing twice, I present them."

Fu-ch'ai was elated, but Wu Tzu-hsü objected: "Your majesty, do not accept them! In antiquity Chieh erected the Spirit Tower and Chou undertook the Deer Tower. Yin and yang were no longer in harmony, cold and warmth became unseasonal, and the five

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grains did not ripen. Heaven sent forth calamity, the people were vacuous, and the state changed, these two kings thereby invoking their own extinction. If your august majesty accepts them, you will certainly be exterminated by the king of Yüeh."

Instead of listening, Fu-ch'ai accepted the materials and erected a tower at Ku-su. It took three years to assemble the materials and five to complete it. From its heights one could see some seventy miles. Men died on the roads, the sound of wailing and crying was unbroken in the lanes and alleys. The people were exhausted and the officials embittered, men had nothing by which to live.

The king of Yüeh said, "This second technique is excellent!" 

In his eleventh year the king thought deeply and pondered extensively, wishing only to attack Wu, so he sent for Chi Yen and queried him: "I want to attack Wu but fear we may not be able to destroy it. I would have mobilized the army earlier but wanted to question you about it."

Chi Yen replied: "To mobilize the army and raise troops you must first cultivate the five grains, accumulate silver and gold, fill the storehouses and warehouses, and hone your mailed troops. Now these four require that you first investigate the ch'i of Heaven and Earth, make your sources yin and yang, and become enlightened about solitariness and vacuity. When you have attained a penetrating understanding of survival and extinction, you will be able to analyze the enemy."

Kou-chien said, "Where is the essence of Heaven and Earth, survival and extinction?"

Chi Yen replied: "Through the ch'i of Heaven and Earth things live and die, through their sources in yin and yang they are noble or base. One who is enlightened about the solitary and vacuous knows when they will intersect. One who has fathomed survival and extinction can discriminate the true and false."

Kou-chien said, "What do you mean by death and life, the true and false?"

Chi Yen replied: "In the spring one plants the eight grains, in summer nourishes their growth, in autumn harvests their maturity, in winter stores them away. Now when it is the Heavenly season for birth and one doesn't exert oneself in planting, this is one death. In summer, when things grow, if there are no sprouts, this is a second death. In autumn, when things mature, if there is no accumulation, this is the third death. In winter, when one stores away, if there has been no harvest, this is a fourth death. Even if one possessed the Virtue of Yao or Shun, what could he do?

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"Now the seasons of Heaven include birth and striving, aging and completion. When one infrequently contravenes them and their ch'i is responsive, when the numbers never lack or are 

lost, this is the pattern for the first stage of life. Be attentive, carefully investigate, and cautiously remove the weeds among the sprouts. When the weeds are removed and the sprouts flourish, this is the second stage to life. Making preparations in advance so that when events arise one can manage them, no one will evade their taxes, or the people lose their grain, is the third stage to life. When the granaries have already been sealed shut, the old grain replaced by the new, the ruler is at pleasure and the ministers are happy while men and women are faithful, this is the fourth stage to life. As for yin and yang, the harvest from years designated by t'ai yin can be retained for three years. The noble and inferior will be manifest thereby. Now 'solitary' and 'vacuous' refer to the gate of Heaven and door to Earth. Survival and extinction are the ruler's Tao and Power."

Kou-chien said, "How is it that, despite your youth, you are so knowledgeable about things?"

Chi Yen replied, "Whether an official is talented or not is unaffected by age or youth."

The king of Yüeh said, "Your logic is excellent!" Then, looking up, he observed the constellations of Heaven and investigated the astrological configurations, structuring the images of the four seasons to accord with them. Based upon vacuity above he established eight granaries. Following yin he stored, observing yang he sold grain. After fully implementing this plan for three years the harvest had improved fivefold. Yüeh was glorious and rich. Kou- chien sighed, "This is the basis for hegemony" and thus proclaimed the excellence of Chi Yen's plan.

In his twelfth year Kou-chien addressed Wen Chung: "I have heard that the king of Wu is licentious, loves beauty to the point of confusion, and drinks so heavily that he neglects the management of state affairs. Can we lay some plot to exploit this?"

Wen Chung said: "We can destroy him. Now the king of Wu is licentious and loves beauty, while his chancellor Po P'i flatters him in order to gain control over his heart. If we present beautiful women through Po P'i's intercession, the king will 

certainly accept them. Your majesty need only select two beautiful women and forward them."

Kou-chien, approving, had his prime minister obtain two women named Hsi Shih and Cheng Tan from Chu-luo-shan and Yü-hsin. He had them adorned with the finest silks, taught man

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ners and bearing, and educated at T'u-ch'eng. After they had been in the capital for three years and their education was complete, he had Fan Li, the prime minister, present them to the king of Wu, saying: "The king of Yüeh, Kou-chien, dares to present these two women. Yüeh is a miserable state and in its present difficulties does not presume to retain them. Therefore the king has ordered your servant Fan Li to present them to your august majesty. I hope he will overlook their rusticity and unattractiveness but accept them for some menial task." The king of Wu, elated, responded, "The fact that Kou-chien has presented these two women is proof of his loyalty to Wu."

Wu Tzu-hsü remonstrated with him: "Your majesty cannot accept them. I have heard that the five colors cause men's eyes to go blind; the five notes, their ears to go deaf. In antiquity Chieh regarded T'ang lightly and was exterminated; Chou thought little of King Wen and perished. If you accept them, your majesty will certainly suffer from calamity.

"I have heard that the king of Yüeh never rolls up the court records but pores over them until the middle of the night. Moreover, he has gathered several tens of thousands of warriors willing to fight to the death. If this man doesn't die first, he will certainly achieve what he desires. The king of Yüeh bears himself with sincerity and practices benevolence. He listens to remonstrance and advances the worthy. If this man doesn't die, he will certainly become famous. The king of Yüeh wears a fur robe in the summer and endures linen in the winter. If this man doesn't die, he will certainly avenge his enmity. I have heard that worthy officials are a state's treasure, beautiful women a state's misfortune. The Hsia perished through Mei Hsi, the Shang through Ta Chi, and the Chou through Pao Ssu." Unwilling to listen, the king of Wu accepted 

the women. This prompted Kou-chien to exclaim, "How excellent this third technique!"

In his thirteenth year Kou-chien addressed Wen Chung: "All the techniques I have learned from you, the plans you have made, have proven to be appropriate and auspicious. If I want you to again plot against Wu, what would you advise?"

Wen Chung replied: "Your majesty has himself said that Yüeh is minuscule and rustic, our annual harvests not plentiful. I would have your majesty ask them to sell us some grain in order to attain your ambition. If Heaven is about to abandon Wu, their king will certainly assent." The king of Yüeh then dispatched Wen Chung as an emissary to Wu, where he sought an audience with the king through the intercession of Po P'i. He then formally

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proclaimed: "The state of Yüeh humbles itself before you. The elements of water and heat are out of balance, so the annual harvest has been sparse. The people suffer from hunger and want, the roads are constantly filled with the famished and starving. I would like to request your august majesty to provide us with provisions to be repaid to your great granaries in the coming year. Our only wish is that your august majesty will rescue us from our dire impoverishment.

Fu-ch'ai said: "The king of Yüeh is trustworthy, sincerely preserves the Tao, and is free of disloyal intentions. In their impoverishment he has turned and informed us of his distress. How can I begrudge the expense or be parsimonious with our treasures, snatching away his hopes?"

Wu Tzu-hsü remonstrated: "You cannot! If Wu doesn't have Yüeh, Yüeh will certainly gain control of Wu! When good fortune departs, evil will come. You will nurture invaders who will destroy our state. Granting their request will not bring them closer; not granting it will not cause disaster. Moreover, Yüeh's sagacious minister Fan Li is courageous and excels at plotting. He has certainly disguised their aggressive intentions in order to spy on us and secretly observe us. Kou-chien has dispatched emissaries to request provisions not because their 

state is poor and the people suffering, but to enter our state and spy on our internal affairs."

Fu-ch'ai said: "I insulted Kou-chien and forced him to submit. I possess his masses. I embraced his altars of state in order to shame him and Kou-chien's spirit submitted. Moreover, he served as a carriage driver and stable hand, something all the feudal lords already know. Now that I have restored him to his state, resurrected his ancestral temple, and revived the altars of state, how would he dare think of turning against me?"

Wu Tzu-hsü said: "I have heard that when a poverty-stricken officer does not find it difficult to repress his inclinations and humble himself before others, he will later have an intimidating appearance. We have now learned that Kou-chien suffers from famine and his people are enduring hardship and destitution. Therefore you can exploit this situation to destroy them. If you do not today employ the Tao of Heaven and accord with the patterns of Earth, but instead ship them provisions, you will solidify your fate. This is like a fox playing among chickens! When the fox humbles himself and the chickens trust him, the fox will gain his ambition and the chickens will certainly die. How can you not be cautious?"

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Fu-ch'ai said: "If I provide grain to Kou-chien's state when it suffers from difficulty, this is beneficence flowing out and righteousness accruing. The virtuousness of this course is manifest, so what is there to worry about?"

Wu Tzu-hsü said: "I have heard that a wolf cub still has a wild heart and that great enemies cannot be brought close. Tigers cannot be trusted with edibles or snakes left to fulfill their desires. Today your majesty is about to reduce your state's wealth in order to nourish unsurpassed enmity, to abandon the words of loyal ministers and accord with the wishes of the enemy. I will certainly witness Yüeh destroy Wu, swine and deer amble about the tower at Ku-su, and brambles and thorns fill the palace. I hope your majesty will take a lesson from the affair of King Wu attacking King Chou." 

Po P'i, chancellor of Wu, replied from the side: " KingWu was not a true subject of King Chou. He led the feudal lords in an attack against his ruler. Even though he was victorious over the Shang, is he termed 'righteous'?"

Wu Tzu-hsü replied, " KingWu thereby established his fame!"

Chancellor Po P'i then remarked, "I cannot abide a subject exterminating his ruler."

Wu Tzu-hsü said: "One who steals a state is enfeoffed as a feudal lord, one who steals gold is executed. If you would now deprive King Wu of his principles, how would his actions have illuminated virtue in others?"

Chancellor Po P'i retorted: " Tzu-hsü is a subject who only wants to oppose what your majesty wants, to frustrate your majesty's intentions in order to distinguish himself. How is it that your majesty has not recognized his excessiveness?"

Wu Tzu-hsü replied: " ChancellorP'i gratifies your desires in order to ingratiate himself. He previously worked to release Kou- chien from his imprisonment and persuaded you to accept the presentation of two women. He has externally colluded with enemy states and internally deluded his ruler. Your majesty should investigate it, not let yourself be insulted by coteries of menials. You should be like someone bathing an infant--even though they cry, no one listens. Such are the chancellor's words."

The king of Wu said: " ChancellorP'i is someone who never fails to listen to my words. This isn't the way of a loyal, faithful minister but similar to that of sycophants and flatterers."

Chancellor P'i replied: "I have heard that when a neighboring state suffers from distress, one races aid to them from a thousand

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miles away, for this is the way of a true king. To enfeoff the descendants of a lost state is to continue the achievements of the five hegemons in supporting the remnants of extinction." 

King Fu-ch'ai then provided Yüeh with ten thousand bushels of grain and asserted: "In providing this grain to Yüeh, I have acted contrary to the advice of my ministers. After the next full harvest return it to me."

Wen Chung said: "I undertake responsibility for bringing it to Yüeh. We will certainly repay Wu's provisions from the next abundant harvest." When he returned to Yüeh, all the ministers wished him long life and congratulated him. Yüeh then apportioned the grain as a reward to its ministers and the people. The next year Kou-chien had the best grains selected to repay Wu, but secretly had them heated before dispatching them to Wu. They repaid every bushel and moreover had Wen Chung accompany it back to Fu-ch'ai. When Fu-ch'ai saw the size of the grain, he sighed and remarked to Chancellor P'i: "Yüeh is a fertile land, its grains are excellent. We should retain these for planting." Wu subsequently planted the grain from Yüeh, but as the seeds had been killed, it didn't germinate. Wu therefore suffered from a serious famine.

Despite his loyal service over the critical years of struggle with Wu, Wen Chung ironically suffered the fate of all those who served headstrong rulers, being executed when he refused to plan further military actions and otherwise offended Kou-chien. (His end had been foretold by Fan Li, who realized that one could share hardship with Kou-chien, but not success.) The vituperativeness of Kou-chien's final dismissal, while probably fictional, is striking: "We have already employed three of the nine measures contained in your secret plans and strategies for overturning and seizing enemy states to destroy powerful Wu. What I want is for you to employ the remaining six on behalf of my predecessor in the nether world to plot against Wu's former ruler."

Even though this dramatic narrative ventures into the mythical and improbable, it clearly depicts the fundamental intention of sowing dissension and gaining control of Fu-ch'ai essentially through measures such as advocated in the Six Secret Teachings. Moreover, it portrays Yüeh's ruthless approach to debilitating and impoverishing the state of Wu itself, not just the ruler and his court, through what might be termed "indirect biological warfare." Unlike earlier in the Spring and 

Autumn period when states felt compelled to aid their neighbors during times of famine despite considerable tension and enmity between them, 8 Wen Chung conceived and enacted a two-step program

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to empty Wu's grain reserves and then destroy their next crop, a plot vociferously condemned as heinous and dastardly for two thousand years thereafter, even though it is only hinted at in the more reliable histories. (Others dismiss it simply as the stratagem of a semicivilized peripheral state, as might be expected from men not yet fully versed in righteousness.) Irrespective of the moral dimensions, this program, or at least some of its steps, perhaps paved the way for Yüeh to aggressively exploit King Fu-ch'ai's grandiose schemes and misperceptions and swiftly obliterate the state of Wu itself. This unimaginable reversal of fortunes thus became the basis of history and legend, narrative and romance, creating an indelible impression upon subsequent generations that subversive programs systematically implemented could achieve remarkable results.

Later Contemplations

Wen Chung's program and other materials from the early period prompted the following meditation from Li Ch'uan in the T'ang dynasty in a chapter entitled "Techniques for Secret Plots."

Among the ancients, those who excelled in employing the military invariably emphasized authority over the realm and investigated the thoughts of the feudal lords. One who is not fastidious about the weightiness of tactical power will not know the relative imbalance of the light and heavy, the strong and weak. One who is not particular about probing emotions will not know hidden evils or the transformations of movement and rest. For heaviness nothing is more important than being thoroughly knowledgeable; for probing nothing is more difficult than raising everything. In affairs nothing is more difficult than invariably being successful. A true Sage can undertake these three. 

Therefore, military techniques that achieve a hundred victories in a hundred battles are not the height of excellence. Rather, subjugating the enemy's forces without engaging in combat is the pinnacle of excellence. The pinnacle employs plots and plans; the next highest, human affairs; and the lowest undertakes warfare by attacking. Those who employ plots and plans mystify and confuse the enemy's ruler, secretly influence his slanderous ministers to affect his affairs, muddle him with sorcerers and soothsayers, and cause him to respect ghosts and serve spirits. They cause him to indulge in colors and embroidery while cheapening the value he places on grains and foodstuffs, thereby emptying out his gra

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naries and warehouses. They send him beautiful women to unsettle his mind and dispatch skilled carpenters to inveigle him into constructing palaces, rooms, and high towers in order to exhaust the state's wealth and dissipate their strength in labor, thus changing the ruler's nature and inducing licentious practices.

When he has become extravagant, brutal, arrogant, and dissipated, his worthy ministers will bite their tongues, unwilling to provide correctives or support. When he grants overflowing rewards and perverts the punishments, determining them solely by his own happiness or anger, the orders of government will not be implemented. When he believes in divination and looks for ghosts; contravenes the loyal but advances sycophants; publicly holds private audiences but lacks wise men in government; provides positions to those he loves and rank to those without merit; rewards people without achievement but pardons crimes because he is happy and perverts the laws to execute people when he is angry, then although there are laws, the ruler is merely indulging his inclinations and orders are not implemented. When he believes in divination by turtle shell and milfoil casting; when sorcerers and soothsayers, sycophants and slanderers, the strange and skillful, are favored and prevalent within his gates; and whatever he considers correct is actually incorrect, what he terms "incorrect" all correct, a chasm separates the ruler and his ministers. 

When you block off the ruler's access to external information and debauch him with licentiousness, attack him with the lure of profits, pleasure him with music, nurture his tastes, and cause him to regard the deceitful as the trustworthy, the trustworthy as deceitful, the loyal as rebellious, and the rebellious as loyal, then those who offer loyal remonstrance will perish while sycophants will be rewarded. When he exiles worthy men to the wilds, retains menial men in official positions, issues urgent orders, and imposes brutal punishments, the people will not sustain his mandate to rule. This is termed "overthrowing the ruler through secret plots without fighting." When the destruction of his state has thus been achieved, if you follow up with troops, the ruler can be captured, his state subjugated, his cities seized, and his masses scattered. Thus King T'ang of the Shang employed this method and King Chieh of the Hsia was deposed; the Chou used it and the last Shang king was killed; Yüeh employed it and the state of Wu was extinguished; Ch'u adopted it and Ch'en and Ts'ai were raised; Lu's three ministerial families followed it and Lu was weakened; Han and Wei employed it and the Eastern Chou cracked.

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Even the Confucians say, "One whose forces are large and strong will certainly be victorious; one whose forces are few and weak will certainly perish." For this reason while the ruler of a small state has no hope of becoming hegemon, there is little indication that the king of one capable of fielding ten thousand chariots will be destroyed. However, in antiquity the Hsia was broad, the Shang but narrow, yet the Shang prevailed; later the Shang was great and the Chou small, yet the Chou overthrew them; and finally Yüeh was weak and Wu strong, but Yüeh exterminated them. Thus the strategy for wresting victory without fighting is actually the technique of secretly overturning them, the Tao of night implementation. The Sage is enlightened about the teachings of the martial and civil. He alone sees them clearly, he alone take pleasure in them. 9

Li Ch'uan thus argued enthusiastically for the importance and necessity of covert actions, justifying them in part as having been historically employed even by the great sages, despite the 

literati's adamant belief in the dogma of their hegemony having been achieved solely through benevolence and righteousness. Unfortunately his views in the second half of the eighth century were ignored by all but the military writers, who took them very seriously indeed.

Causing consternation in the enemy, the basic thrust of covert programs, is again evident in a chapter entitled "Putting the Enemy in Difficulty" from the Sung dynasty Hu-ling Ching that shows theoretical continuity with earlier writings and the timeless applicability of the approach:

When the enemy has planning officers, employ spies to estrange them. When the enemy has accumulated stores, employ covert agents [hsi jen] to burn them. Whatever the enemy has planted, cut it down when it ripens. If the enemy has people, forcefully make them prisoners. Secretly bribe the king's favorites to have them send him beautiful women to delude his thoughts, and present excellent dogs and superlative horses in order to incite his mind. Use numerous methods to give him pleasure, and wait until they are suffering consternation without and delusion within, for then he will be remiss in state affairs. Thereafter you can mobilize the army to attack and be successful without laboring. One who excels at employing the military always plots how to put the enemy in difficulty. When the enemy is in difficulty, you will be at ease. When forces at ease strike those in difficulty, what enemy will not be conquered?

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Late in the Ming dynasty Chieh Hsüan also contemplated the nature of subversive programs designed to undermine and psychologically impact the enemy, providing two key analyses in his Ping-fa Pai- yen. The first defines the character mu, which, while translated here as "focus," originally depicted an eye and thus had the primary meaning of "eye" or "eyes." However, in his conception the term obviously entails an extended meaning that on the one hand designates the linchpin of action or center of perception and strategy, on the other perhaps functionally approaches the modern concept of "center of gravity." 10 

Definition: To cover and obfuscate the enemy's enlightenment is termed "focus."

Original Text: What the enemy invariably relies upon for their movement is termed their "focus." You must first observe the location of the enemy's focus and then seize what they rely upon. If the enemy takes their strategists as their focus, concentrate upon expelling them. If they take their enlightened generals as their focus, concentrate upon eliminating them. If they take their intimate, trusted ministers as their focus, you can estrange them. If they take fame and righteousness as their focus, you can destroy them. Extract their roots; strike their strategic points; defeat their secret plans; alienate their reliable allies; strip away their basis; destroy their customary profits. When men have a focus, they are enlightened; in conflict, when they have eyes, they live. Isn't cutting off their lives and destroying their enlightenment the essence of controlling the enemy?

Explanation: Eliminating the enemy's focus is not so easily planned. Until a tree is rotten insects will not live in it. Until the strands snap a rope will not break. If an enemy ruler is free of doubts while his generals are wise, how will rumors succeed in defaming them, how will slanderous agents be able to harm them?

If there is no alternative, eliminating their wise generals has to be the first technique. The wise rely upon the courageous to deploy the army for battle. If there are no warriors capable of penetrating formations and forming an assault front, the wise will find it difficult to implement their plans by themselves. If you can estrange them through covert agents, employ clandestine calculations to beguile them, and multiply the plots and battle plans designed to slay them, you will blunt the sharp edge of their army's front. When the vanes are removed from an arrow, even though

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the shaft and tip remain it is difficult for the arrow to penetrate deeply. Similarly, even the wisest have little recourse in such circumstances. Thus it may be said that eliminating a state is not as good as eliminating the army's focus. 

Less enigmatically, Chieh Hsüan's definition of "noise" directs the strategist's attention to implementing psychologically effective measures to confuse the enemy's analytic skills, coincidentally pointing out the importance of the unrighteous and despised in such work:

Definition: Misleading and confusing the enemy's hearing is termed "noise" [obfuscation]. 11

Explanation: A state beset by treacherous individuals is lost, but when they plague the enemy it is advantageous. In our state Po P'i and Ch'in Hui are brigands, but in the enemy's they are treasures. Rely upon them to confuse the ruler's intelligence, stir up the will of the masses, destroy human relations, and throw the rules and regulations into chaos. When they do not attain their ambitions they grumble uselessly, but if we assist them in gaining their ambitions they will push out everyone who differs with them. Their discourses and discussions are sufficient to confuse and befuddle the worthy and wise, to shake and startle the ordinary and stupid. They can cause the entire populace of a state to be overturned and confused, bereft of any means to serve the ruler. Eventually even the most upright Sages, Worthies, and scholars, as well as the greatest stalwarts and wisest strategists, will abandon their positions and never speak again. Is not such a situation to our state's advantage?

Thus it is better for the enemy to delude themselves rather than for us to delude them. You should especially value the ruler's trusted confidants for nurturing such self-delusion. "Noise" thus has the meaning of deluding someone with the shimmering and sparkling. Reflexively, rulers and ministers should focus upon achieving administrative excellence in order to strengthen the state and preserve uprightness in order to eliminate the disorderly. 12

Examples: Female musicians and stylish horses were employed by Ch'i to obfuscate K'ang-tzu. Po P'i, Hsi Shih, and Cheng Tan were employed by Yüeh to obfuscate Fu-ch'ai. How can all the cases in which noise caused harm ever be counted? Still, those who come from the enemy are easy to detect, those born within a state hard to prevent. 

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The thrust of such covert action is to occlude the enemy with a dazzling array of misinformation, distraction, and vices. Therefore the analogy is drawn with noise--the buzzing of insects--that overwhelms the senses and precludes critical focusing, no doubt reflecting many concepts and measures originally formulated in the much excoriated chapter entitled "Civil Offensive" in the Six Secret Teachings.

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9 Assassination and Other Techniques

TRADITIONAL CHINA SAW NOT ONLY the widespread practice of assassination, but also its lionization in "The Assassins," a Shih Chi chapter depicting five famous assassins. 1 In each case the person was motivated to strike on behalf of someone who had visibly recognized and honored him despite ignominious position, a reaction the cynical will recognize as assiduously cultivated. 2 However, assassins were employed not only in personal vendettas, but also in epoch-making events. For example, the king known as Ho-lü (who presided over Wu's apex and employed the great Sun-tzu just at the end of the Spring and Autumn period) acceded to the throne through the murderous act of Chuan Chu, already related in the historical section on the Spring and Autumn period. Ching K'o's unsuccessful attempt, late in the Warring States period, to stab the king of Ch'in with a dagger originally concealed in a map case represents another state-initiated operation. This readiness to employ covert agents and the determination displayed by the assassins were remembered and emulated throughout Chinese history in both internal intrigues and against external enemies.

Assassination attempts generally relied upon poison and simple strong-arm techniques such as stabbing or multiple attackers. States generally employed swift violence, perhaps for its dramatic decisiveness, while palace intrigues that frequently, but not exclusively, involved women and questions of imperial succession saw a variety of poisons being mixed 

into strongly flavored foods, such as mushrooms and dates, or hot beverages provided to unsuspecting victims. 3 Poisons being readily available and herbal knowledge commonplace, thwarting such attempts proved difficult. The dynastic histories thus record

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hundreds of murders, as well as the deaths of numerous food tasters and hapless dogs, all poisoned in the quest for survival. More artistic approaches forced the innocent to commit suicide by constructing elaborate plots and mounting false accusations that exploited the perverse dynamics of court jealousy and hatred, the ruler's insecurity, and ongoing tension between the royal family and court ministers. Many of these remarkable tales are intrinsically fascinating, but as they recount clandestine actions undertaken for internal rather than external objectives, they fall outside the scope of our study.

As reprised in the Spring and Autumn historical section, King Ho-lü found regicide a surprisingly simple, effective method for attaining the throne. Therefore, when he wished to eliminate the residual threat posed by the late ruler's valiant son, he again turned to assassination and his confidant Wu Tzu-hsü in a sorrowful tale that was much remarked thereafter:

Two years after he had killed King Liao, King Ho-lü became troubled that Ch'ing-chi, the king's son, being in a nearby state might unite the feudal lords in an attack upon him. Therefore he spoke with Wu Tzu-hsü: "Formerly you treated me generously by recommending the assassin Chuan Chu. Now that I have learned that prince Ch'ing-chi is plotting with the feudal lords, my food lacks taste and I am unable to sleep peacefully. I would like to entrust this to you."

Wu Tzu-hsü replied: "I was evil and disloyal in planning the death of King Liao with you in my own rooms. I am afraid that eliminating his son will not accord with Heaven's intentions."

Ho-lü retorted: "Anciently, when King Wu of the Chou conducted a campaign of rectification against King Chou of the Shang and thereafter killed Wu Keng, the Chou populace did 

not display a resentful appearance. Therefore why should Heaven care this time?"

Wu Tzu-hsü replied: "If by thus serving your majesty we unify Wu, what will there be to fear? One man that I have treated well is delicate, but I would like him to participate in these plans."

The king said: "The enemy that worries me has the strength of ten thousand men. How can a delicate man make such plans."

Wu Tzu-hsü replied, "He plans affairs like a delicate man but has the strength of ten thousand men."

"Who is he?" the king inquired.

Wu Tzu-hsü replied: "His surname is Yao and given name is Li. I previously witnessed his courage."

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The king said, "I would like to give a feast for him." Wu Tzu-hsü then went to see Yao Li and said, "The king of Wu has heard of your lofty righteousness and fervently hopes to meet you." So he accompanied Wu Tzu-hsü to see the king. The king asked, "What can you do?"

Yao Li replied: "I am a man from a state a thousand kilometers east of here. I am thin, small, and weak. When I go against the wind I am knocked flat, when the wind is at my back I am pushed down. But if your majesty commands me, how would I dare not exhaust my strength?"

The king of Wu wondered to himself how Wu Tzu-hsü could have introduced this man. After a long silence Yao Li advanced and said: "Your majesty is concerned about Ch'ing-chi. I can kill him."

The king replied: "All the world has heard about Ch'ing-chi's courage. Not one among ten thousand can oppose the strength of his muscles and bones. He can pursue racing animals and his hands snatch flying birds. His bones leap and his flesh soars, his elbows and knees can cover a hundred kilometers. I once chased after him along the Yangtze River but my chariot horses could not catch up to him. I shot at him but he invisibly 

caught the arrows so that none ever hit their mark. Your strength cannot match his."

Yao Li said, "If your majesty desires it, I can kill him."

The king said, " Ch'ing-chi is perceptive and wise, and even though he is a refugee among the feudal lords, he does not rank below anyone."

Yao Li said: "Your servant has heard that one who rests in the pleasures of his wife and child without fully exerting himself in the service of his ruler's righteous cause is not loyal. Someone who embraces the love of his family without eliminating his ruler's problems is not righteous. I suggest that I flee on the pretense of having committed a criminal offense. I would like your majesty to exterminate my wife and children and chop off my right hand. Ch'ing-chi will then certainly believe me."

The king assented. Yao Li then fled on a pretext of having committed a criminal offense and the king of Wu seized his wife and children, executed them, and then burned their bodies in the marketplace. Yao Li fled out among the feudal lords, where he become known throughout the realm for his protestations of having been wrongfully punished. Eventually he went to Wei, where he sought an audience with Ch'ing-chi, to whom he said: "Ho-lü is com

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pletely unprincipled, as your majesty knows. Now he has extinguished my family and burned their bodies in the marketplace. Innocent of any offense, I have been punished. However, I know all the details of Wu's affairs and with your courage King Ho-lü can be captured. Why not go east with me to Wu?"

Since Ch'ing-chi trusted his plans, three months later they proceeded to Wu with selected troops. When they crossed over the Yangtze, Yao Li's strength being small, he sat upwind. Just in the middle of the river, hooking his cap on a spear and then relying upon the power of the wind, he stabbed Ch'ing-chi with it. Ch'ing-chi turned around, grabbed him, dashed his head into the water three times, then held it down on his knee and 

gaspingly said, "You are the most courageous man in the empire to dare stab me."

His attendants all wanted to kill him but Ch'ing-chi stopped them, saying: "He is one of the realm's courageous officers. How can two such courageous men be slain on a single day?" Thereupon he admonished his attendants to have him returned to Wu in order to be an example of loyalty. Thereupon Ch'ing-chi died.

When Yao Li had crossed over the river to the embankment, stricken with grief he did not stir. The others said, "Sir, why do you not depart?"

Yao Li replied: "Sacrificing my wife and children in order to serve my ruler is not benevolent. Slaying a former ruler's son on behalf of a new lord is not righteous. Overvaluing my death and being unconcerned about righteousness, thereby coveting life and abandoning morality, is not righteous. Marked by these three evils, how might I face the officers of the realm if I remain in the world?"

Having finished his words, he threw himself into the river but Ch'ing-chi's attendants pulled him out before he drowned. Yao Li said, "Do you think I don't want to die?"

They replied, "Sir, do not die in order to await your rewards of rank and salary." However, Yao Li chopped off his hand and feet, fell on his sword, and died. 4

Even though this must be regarded as a semihistorical account with fabricated dialogue, it depicts the terrible resolve with which assassins historically approached their tasks and was subsequently witnessed in Chinese warrior behavior and among the samurai and ninja in Japan. The yu-hsia ("wandering knights") of the late Warring States and

thereafter--resolute, often arrogant individuals of no formal rank or status--

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exemplified the Chinese fascination with the spirit of martial independence, the refusal to be cowered or flinch in the face of power or insult. Although clearly admired by Ssu-ma Ch'ien 

(who penned a chapter to memorialize the best of them) and much of the ordinary populace (who willingly shielded them from authorities and flocked to their protection), they were increasingly condemned as Confucian values and the literati's antimartial viewpoint dominated officialdom. Although basically just asocial, the yu-hsia and anyone else who would manifest an independent spirit buttressed by martial expertise (in contrast to the simple ideal of a reclusive scholar or Taoist inebriate) were branded as antisocial and therefore criminals to be extirpated. However, evidence from the popular culture provides indications that the common people continued to admire individual strength, decisiveness, and martial virtues, despite their heavy deprecation in the orthodox writings, memorials to the throne, policy debates, and similar records. 5

The Shuo Yüan describes another attempt to end Confucius's dangerous influence as a worthy administrator in the state of Lu. Although it is probably apocryphal, since the Tso Chuan does not confirm any aspects of it, nor are the quotations found in any other writing, it had obviously became part of common historical lore by the Han dynasty:

Duke Chien of Chao said: " Chin has Tse Ming and Tu Ch'ou, while Lu has Confucius. If I kill these three men, I can then plot how to seize the realm." He then summoned Tse Ming and Tu Ch'ou, entrusted them with high government positions, and subsequently had them killed. Thereafter he had an emissary go and invite Confucius to come from Lu. En route, when Confucius reached the Yellow River, he approached the water and gazed out at it: "How majestic the water, vast and overflowing. That I will not cross over is fate!"

Tzu Lu hastened forward and inquired, "May I dare ask what you mean?"

Confucius replied: "Now Tse Ming and Tu Ch'ou were Chin's great Worthies. Duke Chien of Chao, having not yet realized his ambition over the realm, consulted with them, then killed them both and personally implemented their policies. I have heard that when unborn infants are murdered and young forests burned down, unicorns do not appear; when marshes are drained to catch fish, dragons will not appear; when nests are overturned and eggs destroyed, phoenix will not soar. I have 

heard that the true gentlemen regards those who harm his kind seriously."6

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Through his subterfuge the duke not only deprived Chin of two Worthies, but also acquired vital administrative information. However, by prematurely killing them to ensure they could not be similarly employed by anyone else, he carelessly alerted Confucius to the danger and thus scared him off.

Another compelling depiction of the painful extremes willingly endured by those determined to exact righteous vengeance is found in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's chapter on assassins. However, concise versions of Yü Jang's dramatic story, often with the sequence of events altered, are embedded in such eclectic texts as the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu and Shuo Yüan. In "Repaying Kindness" the Shuo Yüan's narrative unfolds as follows:

Chih Po perished when he fought with the ruler of Chao, the viscount of Hsiang, below Chin-yang. 7 One of Chih Po's ministers, Yü Jang, was so angered by it that his vital energies even affected the viscount's heart. Therefore he blistered his body with lacquer to change his appearance, and swallowed charcoal to alter the sound of his voice. When the viscount of Hsiang was about to go out, Yü Jang feigned being a dead man lying beneath a bridge. However, the viscount's carriage horses, being startled, refused to advance while he also felt his heart stir. When he had his guards look below the bridge they caught Yü Jang. Because he valued Yü's righteousness, he did not have him killed.

Another time, pretending to be a thief by wearing the red jacket of punishment, he entered the palace as a workman to repair the walls. The viscount's heart stirred, so he said, "It must be Yü Jang." After having him seized, he asked: "You initially served the lord of Chung-hang, but when Chih Po slew him, instead of dying for your lord you went on to serve Chih Po. Yet after I killed Chih Po, you lacquered your body to form boils and swallowed charcoal to make yourself hoarse, wanting to kill me. Why is it different from the former case?"8 

Yü Jang replied: "The lord of Chung-hang treated me as one of the ordinary masses, so I served him in a similar fashion. Chih Po treated me as a minister of his court, so I also continued my employment as a court minister."

The viscount of Hsiang remarked: "Is this not righteousness? You are a resolute officer!" Then he put Yü Jang in his carriage house and abstained from drinking for three days in order to honor him. Knowing the viscount's thoughts, Yü Jang committed suicide.

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The Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu account further illuminates the evolution of his disguise: "Wanting to kill Chao's viscount of Hsiang, Yü Jang shaved his head and eyebrows, mutilated himself as if he had suffered corporal punishment in order to change his appearance, and pretended to be a beggar. In this disguise he went to beg food from his wife, who said, 'Your appearance is not at all like my husband's, so how is it that your voice is so similar?' So then he swallowed charcoal in order to change his sound." 9

Even the virtuous state of Chou, the final remnant of the glorious Chou dynasty, not only split apart, but also the halves actually became enmired in costly intrigues against each other and resorted to assassination: "During the Warring States period King Wu of Western Chou had an agent assassinate Ling K'uei, a minister in Eastern Chou. Lying down prostrate, Ling ordered his son to immediately weep and cry out, 'Who has stabbed my father?' Hearing this, the assassin believed he was dead and fled. Later, the king of Western Chou, learning that Ling was still alive, assumed the agent had been unfaithful and heavily punished him." 10

Wang Ch'ung, a Han official, commentator, and professional skeptic active in the first century A.D., analyzed a story current in his time that attributed Ch'in Shih-huang's lingering death to an assassin's blow. Essentially a continuation of Prince Tan's saga (which hastened the extinction of Chao as retold in the Warring States section), the agent was none other than the musician Kao Chien-li, the drinking companion who had played at Ching K'o's ill-fated departure for Ch'in. After some 

years in hiding as a common servant, he finally betrayed his skill and again became well known:

Traditional works state that Tan, Yen's heir apparent, had the assassin Ching K'o stab the king of Ch'in, but he failed to accomplish his objective and was executed. Somewhat thereafter Kao Chien-li also went to have an audience with the king to perform on the lute. The king of Ch'in was elated but knowing that Kao was formerly a guest of the heir apparent, had him blindfolded before playing his lute. However, prior to coming to court Kao had made his lute heavier by placing lead inside it. Unable to restrain himself during the performance, the king crept forward on his knees. Kao then struck him in the forehead with the lute, seriously wounding the king, who died three months later.

Now to say that Kao Chien-li struck the king with his lute is factual, but to claim that he fell ill and died three months later because he was thus struck is specious because the king in question

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was the first emperor of Ch'in, Ch'in Shih-huang. It is clear that Yen's heir apparent had Ching K'o attack the first emperor in the latter's twentieth year of rule, but Ch'in Shih-huang killed him. In his twenty-first year the emperor had General Wang Chien attack Yen and bring back the heir apparentis head. In his twenty- fifth year he again attacked Yen and captured the king. Some unknown years thereafter Kao Chien-li struck the emperor with his lute but wasn't accurate and was executed. In his thirty-seventh year the emperor roamed about the realm, visiting various places, before he fell ill and died. He was said to die after another illness, as well as three months after the lute blow, and to have died in different places. However, the common transmission has largely misstated the facts. 11

Wang Ch'ung's analysis, an example of his critical spirit, also provides evidence of the currency of such stories and the ongoing appreciation of loyalty and devotion. 

Although distinct states no longer existed as separate entities to struggle for control of the realm, the political employment of assassins did not cease with the dawn of imperial China because rebel bands, dynastic challengers, and nomadic steppe peoples--against whom every measure, including extravagant bribery, largely failed--plagued the empire. Thus when several of its emissaries to the steppe peoples were slain, the Han readily accepted Fu Chieh-tzu's offer to arrange the impossible assassination of the rebellious leaders:

Chieh-tzu and the officers and troops accompanying him all prepared gold and silks and conspicuously let it be known that they were intended as gifts for foreign states. 12 When they reached Lou- lan the king did not want to see him, so Chieh-tzu withdrew and made a show of departing, but when he reached the western border of their territory instructed the translator to say: "The Han ambassador, bringing gold and embroidered silks, is traveling about to present gifts to the various states. If your majesty does not come to receive them, I will send them out to the western states." He displayed the gold for the translator to see, who then returned and reported it to the king.

Because he coveted Han goods, the king went to see the ambassador. While Chieh-tzu and the king sat together and drank, Chieh-tzu again displayed the items. They continued drinking until both were drunk, at which time Chieh-tzu informed the king that the emperor had instructed him to personally reward him. The king got up and followed Chieh-tzu into the tent, where two

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stalwart officers stabbed him from behind while they spoke together privately. Because their blades penetrated the king's chest, he died immediately. All his nobles and attendants scattered and fled.

Chieh-tzu then proclaimed: "The king committed an offense against the Han, so the emperor dispatched me to come, execute him, and establish the former heir apparent, who has been a political hostage in the Han. Han troops will shortly 

arrive, do not dare move. If you move, we will extinguish your state."13

For his extraordinary efforts Chieh-tzu was enfeoffed as lord of Yi- yang, and his chief assistants were awarded palace guard positions.

A startling example of Han perfidy appears in the Shih Chi when Emperor Wu, the Martial Emperor, who was frequently inclined to pursue aggressive solutions to the ongoing conflict with the steppe peoples, agreed to violate the terms of friendly relations in order to mount an essentially preemptive strike against the Hsiung-nu:

In 135 B.C., at the beginning of Emperor Wu's reign, the Hsiung- nu came to request the ratification of peaceful relations, a matter upon which the emperor requested opinions. The Imperial Messenger Wang Hui, a native of Yen who had frequently served as a border official and was well experienced in barbarian affairs, expressed the following opinion: "Even if the Han concludes a treaty of friendship with the Hsiung-nu, before many years pass they will certainly abrogate the agreement. Rather than consenting it would be better to mobilize troops and suddenly attack them."

Han An-kuo replied: "It is not advantageous for an army to engage in battle a thousand kilometers away. The Hsiung-nu presently ride swift steppe horses and embody the hearts of wild animals. They move their forces about and attack as suddenly as crows, so it would be difficult to wrest control over them. Even if we were to acquire their territory it would be inadequate to broaden the Han, even if we wrest control over their masses they would be insufficient to augment our power. Since remote antiquity they have not been considered civilized men. If our forces struggle with them for profit some several thousand kilometers away, the men and horses will be exhausted, and the bastards will completely seize control over the exhausted remnants. Moreover, at the end of its flight a bolt from even the strongest crossbow is unable to pierce thin gauze. When dying down, even the most brutal wind lacks the power to float goose down. This is not because they were not initially fierce but because their strength de 

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clines at the end of their range. Suddenly attacking the Hsiung-nu would not be beneficial. It would be better to conclude an alliance of friendship." Most of the ministers who expressed an opinion accorded with Han An-kuo, so the emperor sanctioned the proposed treaty of friendship.

The next year Nieh Weng-yi, a rich merchant from the city of Ma-yi in Yen-men commandery, submitted a memorial through the auspices of Wang Hui that stated: "The Hsiung-nu initially suggested the establishment of friendly relations. We have now attained a state of friendship and trust along the border so we can manipulate them with the prospect of profits." Accordingly the emperor secretly had Nieh Weng-yi, acting as a Han agent, flee into Hsiung-nu territory, where he tempted the Shan-yü, "I can slay all the high officials in Ma-yi and force the city's surrender, whereupon you may obtain all its goods and riches." The Shan-yü liked the prospects, trusted Nieh, and assented, assuming all was as it seemed.

Nieh then returned to Ma-yi, feigned the murder of the major officials by having some criminals executed, and suspended their heads from the outer walls to show the Shan-yü's observers that he had acted faithfully. He then informed them, "Ma-yi's important officials have all been slain, so you should quickly come down." The Shan-yü then pierced the border barriers and entered Yen-men through Wu-chou, crossing with more than a hundred thousand cavalry.

At this moment the Han forces lying in ambush in the valleys around Ma-yi amounted to more than three hundred thousand soldiers, including cavalrymen, chariots, and logistical support. Li Kuang was general of the elite cavalry; Kung Sun-ho, general of the fleet chariots; Wang Hui, general for the encampments; Li Hsi, general of the quartermaster corps; and Han An-kuo, general of the protective army. The other generals were all subordinate to Han's command. They agreed that as soon as the Shan-yü entered Ma-yi, they would release their own forces. Wang Hui, Li Hsi, and Li Kuang were dispatched as a secondary force to move through Tai-chu and launch a sudden assault on the baggage train. 

After the Shan-yü had entered Han territory through the Long Wall at Wu-chou crossing, his forces began pillaging the land, even though still more than a hundred kilometers from Ma-yi. However, he felt it strange that, even though they encountered many herds in the fields, they did not see any people. They therefore attacked a signal tower, captured the commandant for Wu- chou, and interrogated him at knifepoint. The commandant then

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admitted, "Several hundred thousand Han troops lie in ambush below Ma-yi." Looking about at his staff the Shan-yü exclaimed, "We were almost sold out by the Han!" Then he led his troops in withdrawing. After crossing back over the border he said, "It was the workings of Heaven that we captured this commandant," so he titled him "Heavenly King."

When word of the Shan-yü's retreat reached the Han forces they set out in pursuit, but upon reaching the border realized they could not catch them and therefore abandoned the effort. When Wang Hui learned that the Hsiung-nu were not going to engage the main Han forces in battle, he calculated that by mounting a fast cavalry pursuit to attack their baggage train they would certainly confront elite troops and be defeated, and accordingly concluded it would be best to have his troops stand down. Thus none of the Han generals achieved anything. 14

A well-orchestrated effort that exploited greed and desire to entice the enemy into essentially a mass assassination, it failed because of gaps in the detailed execution rather than any profound reconnaissance efforts by the Hsiung-nu. Obviously such machinations little enhanced Han-steppe relationships.

The tragic saga of Wu Tzu-hsü, who fled to Wu and became a strategic adviser in his quest to punish the king of Ch'u for killing his father and brother (already reprised in the Spring and Autumn historical section), inspired others to emulate him. One minor official who consciously mimicked him and the acts of the other historical assassins was Su Pu-wei, who lived during the Later Han dynasty. His father died after being imprisoned and brutally interrogated by a political enemy in retaliation for having previously uncovered and reported the 

latter's corruption. Not satisfied with his death, the hateful Li Hao then even mutilated Su Ch'ien's corpse to exact further revenge. According to the Hou Han Shu:

Wearing mourning garb, Su Pu-wei returned to his native village and sacrificed to his father but did not bury him. Looking up to Heaven, he sighed and exclaimed, "Is it only Wu Tzu-hsü who can be a man?" Then he hid his mother away in the mountains of Wu- tu, changed his name, and employed all the family's resources to gather skilled swordsmen. Thereafter he attacked Li Hao between two hills but failed to overcome him.

It happened that Li Hao was transferred to become Minister of Agriculture and the seasonal storehouse for fodder was located in the right capital district below the northern temple wall. Together

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with his brothers, Su Pu-wei burrowed into the grass to hide, coming out at night to dig a tunnel into Li's residence and sneaking back to sleep by day. They continued in this fashion for a month when they reached Li's sleeping quarters from the side and came out under his bed. It happened that Li Hao was in the privy, so they killed his wife and young son, left a letter, and departed.

Li Hao, startled and terrified, thereafter set thorns out about his rooms and floored up the earthen ground with wooden planks. He also changed his sleeping room nine times every night so that even the members of his family did not know his location. Every time he went out, he carried a sword and pointed halberd and surrounded himself with stalwart guards.

Su Pu-wei knew that Li Hao was prepared so he raced day and night until reaching Li's native district, where he exhumed the body of Li Hao's father, severed the head, and then offered it in sacrifice at his own father's burial, subsequently displaying it on a pole in the marketplace with a sign that read, "The head of Li Hao's father."

Li Hao concealed the episode, not daring to speak of it, and retired from his position to return to his native village, where 

he personally closed the coffin and covered the grave. After a year of unsuccessfully trying to catch Su Pu-wei his rage so overwhelmed him that he fell ill, choked, and died. 15

The bizarre exhumation of Li's father's head, a great shame and sacrilege according to traditional Chinese conceptions of rites and propriety, echoes the actions taken by Wu Tzu-hsü when, despite having led Wu to conquer Ch'u, he was unable to directly avenge his father's and brother's deaths at the hands of Ch'u's king. More than five hundred years after his death Wu Tzu-hsü's actions not only were legendary, but also continued to encourage the wronged and oppressed.

In attempting to persuade Yen to give its allegiance to Ch'in, Chang Yi, the famous spokesman for the Horizontal Alliance, unfolded a story of assassination to cast doubt upon Chao's trustworthiness and sincerity:

Among all the states with whom you are closely allied, none is like Chao. Formerly the king of Chao, wanting to annex the minor state of Tai, arranged for his elder sister to marry the king of Tai. Later, when he was to convene with him at the frontier pass at Kou-chu, the king of Chao commanded his craftsmen to cast a bronze wine ladle with an extended handle that could be used to attack someone. Then, just before he went in to drink with the

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king of Tai, he secretly instructed his cook that when they were flushed from drink and absorbed in pleasure, he should bring in more warm wine but then suddenly swing the ladle around to strike the king of Tai. Accordingly, when they were flushed with wine and had more brought in, the cook advanced with the wine, then swung the ladle about, striking the king in the head so forcefully that his brains covered the ground. When the king of Chao's sister heard about it, she slashed herself with a hairpin pulled from her hair. Thus even today everyone has heard about Hairpin Mountain. 16

This story, apparently true, illustrates not only the careful planning involved in state-oriented assassinations, but also a unique method. Being famous, it furnishes another example of 

material subsumed in the mind-set of the period and readily recalled thereafter.

Beauty and Sex

Prompted by an incident in the state of Wei, Confucius exclaimed, "I have never seen anyone who loves virtue as much as he loves beauty!"17 This famous remark well expresses the strength of sexual appeal and its almost unopposable efficacy in the service of covert operations. Moreover, since "sex" is another fundamental meaning of the character se, translated here in accord with the traditional (although not necessarily correct) understanding of "female beauty," sexual connotations are invariably present whenever the character is encountered in discussions focused upon morality and behavior. Confucius may well have meant "sex" rather than the more idealized, morally acceptable "beauty." 18

The Book of Odes, one of the fundamental Confucian classics even though essentially a collection of romantic songs and folk elegies from the early Chou period, opens with a portrait of romantic longing:

K'uan k'uan resound the ospreys, Ensconced on the river mound. Slender and refined, the alluring girl, The prince desires her for a mate.

Of variegated length floats the mallow, Carried left and right by the current. Slender and refined, the alluring girl, Awake and asleep he sought her.

He sought her without success,

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Awake and asleep his thoughts dwelled on her, Long his pondering, interminable his contemplating, Tossing and turning, bent and unsettled.19

Other poems in this work ostensibly praising Virtue and the idealized relationships of ministers and rulers echo these themes from both the male and female perspectives. 20 Early on the poets and singers were obviously conscious of the power 

wielded by desire and its more romanticized counterpart of love, which made it possible to exploit natural attractiveness to manipulate men and occasionally women.

An Yi Chou-shu passage traditionally attributed to King Wen, the great Chou cultural king, sketches the dynamics of human desire. In admonishing the future King Wu, the actual conqueror of the Shang dynasty, King Wen stated: "When people are born they have likes and dislikes. When they gain what they like to some degree, they are happy; when they obtain what they like in large measure, they are joyful. When they encounter what they dislike to some degree, they become worried; when they are subjected to what they dislike, they feel grief."21 Although common sense would dictate this to be so, even the most transparent of principles eventually requires elucidation for it to function as a basis for conscious decisionmaking, such as in manipulating people for covert objectives.

Furthermore, throughout the Yi Chou-shu (Lost Books of the Chou) there is a unifying thread, a recognition that women, being the most powerful objects of desire, represent both danger and the means for destroying worrisome enemies. Accordingly, King Wen instructed King Wu not to become arrogant, extravagant, or licentious, 22 while the text separately notes that "beautiful women destroy a state" and that "when the ruler monopolizes pleasure, authority passes to the ministers."23 This being true, it advocates "bending rulers with licentious music and bribing them with beautiful women," 24 measures much employed in the Spring and Autumn period. Thus King Wu's violent treatment of the Shang king's two concubines (who had already hung themselves) immediately following the bloody conquest by shooting their corpses with three arrows each, striking them with a sword, and then beheading them with an executioner's ax may be understood as symbolically exorcising the power of sexual desire. 25

While sometimes according desires recognition in the classics and derivative works, such as the Yi Chou-shu and Li Chi, the Confucians consistently decried the disruptive power and influence of the desires. Moreover, virtually every other school 

of thought from Taoism through Legalism pondered the nature and dynamics of desire, gener

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ally focusing upon its impact on man's emotional and spiritual life. Although their analyses and conceptions merit several hundred pages, a few pronouncements from the disparate perspectives will indicate the importance attached to the emotional drives whose existence underlay the very possibility of China's two major covert practices--subversion through sexual attraction, discussed in this section, and corruption coupled with estrangement techniques, analyzed in the next.

The Tao Te Ching, the definitive Taoist classic traditionally attributed to the semimythical Lao Tan, warns against perturbations induced by the desires with such dire assertions as found in Chapter 12:

The five colors cause human eyes to be blind, The five notes cause human ears to be deaf,

The five tastes cause human mouths to be numb.

The fairly eclectic Shuo Yüan preserves a number of pronouncements from different speakers--some no doubt genuine, others certainly spurious--that indicate what might be termed "the common understanding" and therefore what military and political officials would have taken as fundamental operating assumptions at the end of the Warring States period. For example, Yen-tzu is quoted as saying that "he heard that desire can reverse normality and change nature" and Confucius as observing that "when the average man's emotions follow his desires he is defeated."26 With desire being so powerful, "it is human nature that everyone wants to excel in virtue, but they are unable to act virtuously because profit defeats them. 27 The tastes and desires cause behavior to fail, they are horses that pursue disaster. 28 Nothing is more poisonous to wisdom than wine; nothing detains affairs more than music; nothing destroys purity more than beauty (sex)." 29 However, Liu Hsiang, compiler of the Shuo Yüan, allowed that, even though dynasties perished because of women, they also rose in part because of them. 30 

It was generally accepted that the desires and emotions are innate: "That which first gives birth to man is Heaven, men have nothing to do with it. Heaven causes men to have desires, men cannot keep them from coming. Heaven causes men to have hatreds, men cannot avoid them. Desire and hatred are what is received from Heaven, man cannot have anything to do with it, cannot change them, cannot alter them." 31 And even more ominously, "Heaven gives birth to men and causes them to have greed and desire." 32 In the prevalent view disorder stemmed from external stimuli that drove men to perverse acts in seeking their unbridled fulfillment:

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When man is born his body is solid and quiet, only when he responds to outside stimuli does he have wisdom. Something brings it about. When he follows them without reverting, when he is controlled by inexhaustible tastes and desires, he will certainly lose his Heavenly component. Moreover, when his tastes and desires are inexhaustible he will invariably have a greedy, uncouth, perverse, rebellious, turbulent mind, and perform licentious, lax, promiscuous, and deceitful actions. 33

Certainly this constitutes a radically different view from that of the Taoists who emphasized the natural life force and suppleness of a child at birth!

Certain observations dominate the extensive passages found in the Huai-nan Tzu that ponder the desires from an essentially Taoist perspective:

Now music, beauty, the five flavors, valuable and unusual goods from distant states, and rare and unique items are sufficient to change the mind and alter the will. The number of things that can perturb the spirit and stir the blood and ch'i cannot be counted. 34 People have a nature that loves sex so there is the great ceremony of marriage. 35 In general, what caused rulers to lose their states, cast away the altars of state, perish at the hands of other men, and become laughingstocks of the realm has always and invariably been desire.

Following the final assertion, the text cites five cases in which desire destructively overwhelmed the powerful, including the 

"king of the Hu who dissipated himself in the pleasure of female musicians and lost his great lands." 36 Pao P'u-tzu, a Later Han period Taoist adept, as well as administrator and military commander, counseled self-restraint:

What the eyes love should not be followed. What the ear takes pleasure in should not be accorded with. What the nose likes should not be trusted. What the mouth enjoys should not be followed. What the mind desires should not be unleashed. Thus what will confuse the eye will certainly be soft feminine deportment and refined elegance. What will delude the ear will certainly be beautiful notes and dissipated sounds. What will confuse the nose will certainly be wondrous fragrances. What will confuse the mouth will certainly be rare foods and delicacies. What will de

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lude the mind will certainly be power, profit, achievement, and fame. 37

However, in this same chapter--contrary to normal Taoist inclinations--he expounded upon the dangers of imbibing alcohol, condemning it not only for confusing men, but also for harming them physically and psychologically. (Perhaps the only treatise of its kind, it constitutes an early psychological examination of the effects of alcohol.) Although he adduced several notable figures who destroyed themselves through drunkenness to illustrate his thesis, he uniquely conceded it was not simply the licentious pursuit of beauty that ruined history's despots, but the effects of alcohol that compromised their judgment:

Now what caused Chieh of the Hsia dynasty, Chou of the Shang, Hsin Ling and Emperor Hui of the Han to dissipate themselves with the licentious sounds of lost states and submerge themselves into a sexual morass sufficient to overturn an entire city stems from alcohol occluding their natures and drunkenness achieving its power. Accordingly, they allowed their emotions to go to extremes and forgot the techniques of cultivating one's person and appearance. 38 

As he elsewhere states, "Human emotion universally loves a rouged face, voluptuous appearance, light bones, and a soft body."39

In the Han dynasty Wang Ch'ung, whose fondness for explicating the unusual and debunking the dubious in the Lun Hing will be seen shortly, apparently derived an odd theory from a Tso Chuan passage. In essence, he asserted that "the exotic gives birth to the beautiful and delightful. 40 Therefore beautiful people are, 41 for the most part, pernicious and evil." He symmetrically concluded that the reverse also holds true: "The strange and unusual always proceed from a love of beauty. In everyone's life poison and harm derive from loving beauty." He thus felt that "loving women brings joy to the heart, but it is difficult to maintain beautiful women. 42 Love of beauty will delude the mind."

Although the original Tso Chuan story probably evidences jealousy more than fear, it still embodies an antibeauty viewpoint that is remarkable in having been voiced by a woman:

Shu Hsiang's mother, being jealous of an extremely beautiful concubine, excluded her from her husband's bed. When her sons advised against this, she retorted: "The deep mountains and great

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marshes truly give birth to dragons and serpents. As she is beautiful, I am afraid that she will give birth to a dragon or serpent that will bring misfortune upon you. Our clan is weak, while the state is filled with many favorites. If some perverse individual intervenes, won't it be difficult for you? How would I otherwise begrudge this meeting?" She then arranged for the concubine to visit the duke, resulting in the birth of Shu Hu. Shu Hu proved both handsome and courageous and was thus much favored by Luan Huai-tzu, resulting in their clan being plunged into trouble. 43

When these fears proved prophetic, Shu Hsiang was implicated and imprisoned. However, after Shu Hu was killed, Hsiang managed to gain his own release and thus escaped capital 

punishment. Han Fei-tzu cited a famous case much like the infamous example of Duke Ling of Ch'en to illustrate the power of sex and the consequences of dissipation:

Ts'ui Chü of the state of Ch'i had a beautiful wife with whom Duke Chuang, the ruler, had illicit relations. Therefore the duke frequently went to the Ts'ui family mansion. One day, while en route, one of Ts'ui Chü's retainers led the family forces in an attack on him. The duke managed to reach the interior rooms and offered to divide the state with Ts'ui Chü, but he would not accept. Duke Chuang then raced out and tried to leap over the north wall of the compound but was shot in the thigh by an arrow and fell back. Ts'ui Chü's retainers hacked away at the duke with their halberds until they killed him and then established his younger brother, Duke Ching, as ruler. 44

Even before Han Fei-tzu's analyses of court dynamics and temptations, a Chan-kuo Ts'e persuasion summarized the threats posed by favorites and consorts:

What are referred to as Sang-yung are favorites, close attendants, concubines, and beloved youths. They are all capable of exploiting the king's drunkenness and befuddlement to seek what they want. When they succeed in gaining what they want within the palace, outside the great ministers will bend the laws in the court for them. Thus while the sun and moon scintillate outside the palace, the real brigands are present within. People cautiously prepare against those they detest, but misfortune lies in what they love. 45

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Such influences--both male and female--were historically well known, often cited, and therefore frequently suggested. For example, in the initial part of a Chan-kuo Ts'e persuasion directed to the king of Ch'in, T'ien Hsin cited a couple of successful examples:

Your servant is afraid that you will be like the lord of Kuo. Once Duke Hsien of Chin wanted to attack Kuo but was troubled by the presence of Chou Chih-chiao in Kuo. Hsün Hsi accordingly advised, "The Book of Chou states that beautiful women can destroy a tongue so dispatch some female 

musicians to bring chaos to their government." Chou Chih-ch'iao's remonstrances were then ignored, so when he departed, Chin invaded Kuo and reduced it.

Thereafter the duke wanted to attack the state of Yü but was similarly troubled by the presence of Kung Chih-ch'i. Hsün Hsi again advised, "The Book of Chou states that handsome men can destroy the old so send the ruler a handsome young man who has been instructed to revile Kung Chih-ch'i." Kung Chih-ch'i continued to remonstrate but was ignored so he too soon departed. Thereupon Chin attacked Yü and subsequently seized all of it."46

However, with martial heroes this ploy did not always succeed, as a T'ang dynasty incident shows:

Han Hung hated Kuang Yen's forceful fighting so he secretly plotted, connived, and was willing to implement every sort of plan against him. Subsequently he scoured the city of Ta-liang until he obtained a beautiful woman, whom he had taught such arts as singing, dancing, and playing musical instruments. Then he had her adorned with jewelry and jade and dressed in the most expensive clothes, expending several hundred million in all. Thereafter he deputed an emissary to escort her to Kuang Yen, hoping that as soon as he saw her he would be stupefied with joy and neglect the affairs of military administration. The emissary therefore forwarded a letter in advance to the fortifications that Kuang Yen was erecting to say: "I have been ordered by my gracious lord, who, respecting your patriotism and becoming concerned that you have long been exposed to the brutalities of military life, wants to send you a courtesan in order to soothe your thoughts during the work of pacification. I respectfully await your orders."

Kuang Yen replied, "As today dusk has nearly fallen, I will accept her tomorrow."

The next morning Kuang Yen held a great feast for his warriors and when the three armies were all assembled had the emissary

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bring the courtesan in. When she entered, her movement and beauty surpassed all mortals, astonishing the whole assembly. From his seat in the upper hall Kuang Yen addressed the emissary: "Your gracious lord felt pity for my having been away from home so long. Parting with this beautiful courtesan who has just been presented to me would be truly ungracious, yet I have received great beneficence from the state and have sworn not to live under the same sun and moon as these brigands. I have caused several tens of thousands of fighting troops to turn their backs on their wives and families and brave naked blades. How could I find pleasure in a beautiful woman?" As he finished speaking tears caught in his throat, while the soldiers assembled below were all moved to weeping.

Kuang Yen generously rewarded the emissary with rolls of silk, respectfully led the woman off the platform, and addressed the emissary: "Please thank your gracious lord profusely. My heart is loyally fixed upon serving the state until I die." From this time onward the soldier's spirits were greatly stimulated. 47

Consorts and Concubines

Consorts have historically played an important role throughout Chinese history, whether as active military commanders in the Shang dynasty or more subtly from behind the scenes in the rarefied and constrained atmosphere pervading later dynasties. Apart from simply debauching the ruler or plunging the court into murderous intrigue over issues of power, succession, and displacement, they also wielded influence through proffering advice or dissuading their husbands from contemplated courses of action. Moreover, because they were constantly exposed to the state's most secret affairs, their knowledge was frequently sought by agents trying to learn a ruler's plans and their influence courted in attempts to affect policy. An interesting anecdote in the Chan-kuo Ts'e illuminates the potential threat:

Ch'in was a great state and Han only a minor one. Although Han viewed Ch'in with enmity, it manifested an appearance of intimacy. However, they calculated that without additional gold their situation would become hopeless, so they wanted to sell their beautiful palace women. The price was exorbitant so none 

of the other feudal lords could afford them. Ch'in was willing to purchase them for three thousand catties of gold, which Han could,

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in turn, employ to serve Ch'in. Contrary to their expectations, Ch'in would of course eventually gain both the women and the gold and the women would inform the king of Ch'in that Han was seriously estranged. From this perspective Han would lose their beautiful palace women and their gold while their estrangement from Ch'in would immediately become increasingly clear. Therefore one of the king's guests remonstrated with him: "It would be better to cease your licentiousness and employ the gold to serve Ch'in. In this way your gold will certainly be adequate and your estrangement from Ch'i will not become apparent. Those who excel at plots do not reveal their internal activities."48

During the period of ascendancy when consorts and concubines held a ruler enthralled, they often enjoyed such surpassing credibility that they could easily achieve perverse aims. The following incident, included by Han Fei-tzu in his catalog of dangers besetting rulers, although not an example of a state-mounted covert operation, illustrates the means by which such objectives might be achieved. By adopting it for his discussion of palace dynamics, Han Fei-tzu converted the episode into a lesson for future generations:

The younger brother of King Chuang of Ch'u, known as the Lord of Ch'un-shen, had a beloved consort named Yü. Yü wanted him to abandon his formal wife, by whom he had had a son named Chia, so she wounded herself and then, weeping, showed the wound to Ch'un-shen: "I am extremely blessed to have become your consort. However, accommodating your wife is not the way to serve you, and accommodating you is not the way to serve your wife. It is not that I am disrespectful, but my strength is inadequate to serve two rulers. Since circumstances do not permit accommodating everyone, rather than perish at your wife's hands, I would rather die before my lord. After I have died, if you should again favor anyone among your attendants, I hope your majesty will certainly investigate the 

circumstances and not be laughed at by the people." Because he trusted her deceitful words, he abandoned his formal wife.

Thereafter Yü wanted to have Chia killed and her own son designated heir apparent. Therefore she ripped her clothes through to her underclothes and then showed them to the ruler, weeping: "I have long been favored by my lord, as Chia must know. Yet today he wanted to rape me, but I fought with him until even my clothes were torn. There is no more unfilial act than this!" Enraged, the lord of Ch'un-shen killed his son. Thus his wife was

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cast aside because of Yü's deceit and their son was killed. From this we can see that even a father's love for his son can be destroyed. 49

Among the famous statesmen of the middle Warring States period were Chang Yi, Ch'in's prime minister, and Su Ch'in, a peripatetic persuader who served Yen's interests but also wandered among the feudal lords in Yen's behalf, as already seen in the Warring States section. Chang Yi, whose career as Ch'in's minister began the same year King Huai of Ch'u ascended the throne ( 328 B.C.), is noted as the progenitor of the so-called Horizontal Alliance--uniting the states in servitude to Ch'in, each motivated by self-interest and survival--and Su Ch'in as the proponent of the Vertical

Alliance, which would have preserved all the powerful states by uniting them in opposition to Ch'in in the west. (In fact, according to one dating scheme Su Ch'in succeeded in establishing the Vertical Alliance with King Huai of Ch'u as the coalition head in 318 B.C.) The political machinations of the period and Chang Yi's skills are well portrayed in the following lengthy excerpt from Ch'u's history in the Shih Chi, which dramatically concludes with Chang Yi relying upon a consort's influence to save his life:

In 313 B.C. King Hui of Ch'in wanted to attack Ch'i, but Ch'i, and Ch'u were united in a troublesome strategic alliance. The king therefore announced Chang Yi's dismissal as prime minister and then dispatched him on a mission south to see King Huai of Ch'u, where he said: "No one pleases our lowly 

village king more than your majesty, while my fondest wish would be to personally serve as a menial bathroom attendant to your majesty. Moreover, our rustic king detests the king of Ch'i more than anyone, and even I hate him the most. But now that your majesty has concluded a great pact of harmony with him, my miserable king is unable to serve you and I, likewise, unable to act as your insignificant attendant.

"However, if your majesty were to close the passes to Ch'i and sever relations with them, you could have an emissary accompany me west and receive back the six hundred kilometers of territory in Shang-yü previously forfeited to Ch'in. Ch'i would accordingly be weakened. By weakening Ch'i to the north, garnering Ch'in's approbation for virtue in the west, and personally gaining the riches of Shang-yü, you will attain a threefold profit from a single act."

King Huai, greatly pleased, entrusted the seals of a state minister to Chang Yi, feasted him for days on end, and announced to his

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court, "I will regain the territory of Shang-yü." His ministers all congratulated him, but Ch'en Chen alone mourned his decision. When the king inquired as to the reason, Ch'en replied: " Ch'in treats your majesty respectfully because you have Ch'i's friendship. Now if you sever relations before this land has been received, it will isolate Ch'u. How will Ch'in then regard your solitary state? Moreover, if they first provide the territory and we then sever relations with Ch'i, Ch'in's plan will not work. If you sever relations first and then accost Ch'in for failing to yield the land, you will have been tricked by Chang Yi. If you are tricked by Chang Yi, your majesty will certainly be annoyed. If you become annoyed, you will definitely incur misfortune at Ch'in's hands while having severed relations with Ch'i in the north. When you have aroused Ch'in's displeasure and severed relations with Ch'i, troops from both countries will certainly descend upon us. Therefore I mourn your decision." Instead of heeding his words, King Huai dispatched a general westward to accept the territory. 

When Chang Yi returned to Ch'in, he feigned a drunken fall from his carriage and did not appear in court for three months because of the resulting injury. Consequently, Ch'u could not obtain the promised land. King Huai of Ch'u said, "Does Chang Yi think that my actions in breaking relations with Ch'i have been too meager?" Accordingly he dispatched a courageous officer northward to insult the king of Ch'i. Greatly angered, the king of Ch'i broke the emissary's tally in half and reestablished cordial relations with Ch'in. Chang Yi then appeared in Ch'in's court and addressed Ch'u's general, "Why haven't you accepted the land some six kilometers from north to south?"

The general replied, "I was entrusted with a mission to receive six hundred kilometers of terrain; I heard nothing about six kilometers." He hastily returned to Ch'u to report on these developments. King Huai, greatly angered, wanted to mobilize the army and attack Ch'in.

Ch'en Chen again objected: "Attacking Ch'in is hardly a plan. It would be better to bribe them with an important city and join them in attacking Ch'i. Then we shall recoup from Ch'i what we have lost to Ch'in and the state can be preserved. Now that your majesty has already broken relations with Ch'i and would accost Ch'in for tricking you, we will simply bring Ch'i and Ch'in together and summon the realm's forces down upon us. The state will certainly suffer serious harm."

Instead of heeding his advice, King Huai severed all relations with Ch'in and dispatched an army westward to attack them.

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Ch'in responded by similarly sending forth troops to strike them. In the spring of the king's seventeenth year [ 312 B.C.] their armies collided at Tan-yang, where Ch'u was severely defeated, incurred 180,000 casualties, and suffered the capture of its commanding general and some seventy other high-ranking officers. Ch'in thereafter seized the commandery of Han-chung.

The king of Ch'u was so enraged that he mobilized all his troops to strike Ch'in again and subsequently engaged their 

forces in battle at Lan-t'ien, where his armies were badly defeated. When Han and Wei heard about Ch'u's difficulties, they struck south in an attack that penetrated as far as the city of Teng. When informed of their invasion, King Huai withdrew the army back to the state.

In King Huai's eighteenth year [ 311 B.C.] Ch'in sent an emissary to reestablish close relations with Ch'u, offering to give back half of Han-chung to make peace. The king of Ch'u said, "I would rather have Chang Yi than land." When Chang Yi heard this he asked leave to go to Ch'u. King Hui said to him: " Ch'u desperately wants to take revenge on you. How will you manage?"

Chang Yi replied: "I am close to the king's attendant, Chin Shang, who in turn has access to Teng Hsiu, the king's favorite consort. King Huai will heed whatever she says. Moreover, my former embassy set up the disavowed agreement to cede Shang-yü and caused the great hatred of the resulting battles between Ch'in and Ch'u. Unless I personally apologize to the king, King Huai will never forget his enmity. Furthermore, as long as your majesty lives Ch'u would never dare seize me. However, if it is to Ch'in's advantage, I am willing to be slain."

Chang Yi then ventured to Ch'u as an official emissary. However, King Huai not only refused to see him, but also imprisoned him, intending to kill him. Chang Yi managed to bribe Chin Shang, who spoke to the king on his behalf: "If you hold Chang Yi, the king of Ch'in will certainly be angry. When the realm then sees that Ch'u lacks Ch'in's support, they will inevitably slight your majesty."

Moreover he advised the king's consort, Teng Hsiu: "Although the king of Ch'in loves Chang Yi very much, our majesty wants to kill him. King Hui is about to offer six districts from the commandery of Shang-yung as a bribe to spare him, as well as beautiful women to serve as the king's concubines, accompanied by excellent singing girls from his own palace. Our king covets land, while the women from Ch'in will certainly be valued, so you will inevitably be neglected. Why not go in and speak with the king?"

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Teng Hsiu eventually spoke with the king on Chang Yi's behalf and obtained his release. Thereafter the king treated him well, and Chang Yi in turn advised the king to revolt against the Vertical Alliance directed against Ch'in and join in an alliance of friendship with Ch'in itself. 50

Exploiting insecurity and jealousy in a powerful ruler's consorts apparently occurred frequently. The Han Shu contains a cryptic entry in the basic annals of Han Kao-tsu, the Han dynasty's founding emperor, for his seventh year: " Han Kao-tsu went to P'ing-ch'eng, where he was surrounded by the Hsiung-nu for seven days but, through employing Ch'en P'ing's secret plan, managed to escape."51 Huan T'an's discussion of Han Kao-tsu's release from the Hsiung-nu siege in his Hsin Lun provides evidence that the incident was widely noted in Han literature and served as an example for later generations. 52 Remarkably, he expressed the sort of moral disdain found among the Confucians and literati throughout Chinese history, and his rather deprecatory explanation later became embedded in scholarly commentaries on the episode's Shih Chi and Han Shu entries:

Someone said: " Ch'en P'ing succeeded in extricating Han Kao-tsu from the siege of P'ing-ch'eng, but the records state the affair was secret so subsequent generations have not succeeded in learning about it. Was it successful because of subtle techniques and transcendent skill and accordingly concealed and hidden without being passed down? Can you, through weighing the factors, penetrate the nature of this affair or not?"

Huan replied "On the contrary, his plan was skimpy, lowly, stupid, and odious; therefore it was concealed and not leaked out. When Han Kao-tsu had been besieged for seven days, Ch'en P'ing went and persuaded Yen-shih, the Shan-yü's consort, to release him. She in turn spoke with the Shan-yü, who sent out Kao-tsu. Accordingly we can deduce the substance of his persuasion. Ch'en P'ing certainly told her that the Han has such surpassingly beautiful women that no one in the world is capable of describing their appearance. Under the difficulty of his present extremity the emperor had already dispatched an emissary to race back, seek out, and obtain 

them because he wanted to present them to the Shan- yü. Were the Shan-yü to gaze upon these women, he would certainly favor them greatly and love them. When he thus became enamored, Yen-shih would be increasingly estranged from the Shan-yü. Therefore it would be better, before they arrive, to effect the emperor's departure. Once released, he would not forward the

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women. Yen-shih, a woman marked by an extremely jealous nature, would have certainly detested the prospect of being neglected and wanted to eliminate the possibility. This sort of persuasion is uncouth but effective. When he managed to successfully employ it, Ch'en P'ing wanted to make it seem mysterious and extraordinary, so they concealed it rather than let it leak out."53

The chapter on the Hsiung-nu in the Shih Chi also records the event, essentially stating that Emperor Kao-tsu, personally leading a large force to repel a major Hsiung-nu incursion, stupidly blundered out into the steppe in the middle of winter. Consequently, when the Hsiung-nu lured him further forward with a feigned retreat, he and his 320,000 men were surrounded by some 400,000 of the enemy at P'ing- ch'eng. Reportedly one-third of his troops suffered from frostbite, and the situation turned desperate because they received no food for seven days. Accordingly, the emperor is said to have dispatched presents to the Shan-yü's consort, thereby convincing her to speak on his behalf. Because the Shan-yü's newly converted Han ally, the great general Han Hsin, had not appeared as agreed--causing the Shan-yü to suspect

treachery--he arranged for the emperor and his surviving forces to depart, thus giving the event a rather different cast.

Bribes and Estrangement Techniques

Bribery being the simplest method for affecting another state's political and military activities, dependent solely upon identifying people in a position to influence the ruler or commander, it was much resorted to throughout Chinese history. 54 Several illustrations in the historical section have already indicated its widespread practice even in the Spring 

and Autumn period, one that proliferated to decimating effect in the Warring States period. Furthermore, during the latter strife-torn era men came to be recognized as essentially creatures of desire, driven to satisfy their needs for food and warmth, stimulated to extreme measures in their quest for profits, as already described in the section on women, sex, and consorts. Therefore every covert program extensively employed bribery as a fundamental method, whether to buy information, influence events, or acquire agents. Even diviners and prognosticators became involved, as this minor incident from the Warring States period illustrates:

The state of Chao seized some territory in Chou where the sacrificial rites were conducted. Deeply troubled, the ruler informed Cheng Ch'ao about it. Cheng responded: "My lord, do not be trou

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bled. Your servant requests the allocation of thirty gold pieces to regain them." The ruler gave them to Cheng, who in turn presented them to Chao's Chief Prognosticator while informing him about the problem of Chou's sacred territory. Somewhat later, when the king of Chao fell ill, he had the Prognosticator divine about his illness. The Grand Prognosticator reprimanded him, " Chou's sacrificial lands are causing this calamity." The king of Chao then returned the lands to Chou. 55

A second, remarkable example depicts the almost unimaginable consequences realized by Ch'in's plan to vanquish their enemies through a combination of covert action and awesome military force. While self-explanatory, the critical role that King Chien's mother played in Ch'i's government merits note:

King Chien's mother, a woman of great moral character, solicitously served the state of Ch'in and kept faith with the feudal lords. Moreover, although Ch'in unremittingly assaulted the five states of Han, Chao, Wei, Yen, and Ch'u, embroiling them in a struggle to save themselves, King Chien managed to rule for some forty years without ever suffering an invasion because Ch'i was an eastern state situated along the seacoast. When King Chien's mother died, Hou Sheng was appointed as 

prime minister of Ch'i. Hou not only accepted large payments to act as Ch'in's agent, but also dispatched numerous important guests to Ch'in who were then generously plied with gold. Upon their return to Ch'i they acted as "turned agents" who persuaded the king to abandon the Vertical Alliance [formed by the feudal states to contain Ch'in] and instead politically submit to Ch'in. 56 Furthermore, they successfully advised against preparing the equipment necessary for aggressive warfare or assisting the other five states in a concerted attack on Ch'in.

In consequence, Ch'in succeeded in successively extinguishing the five states. When they had all perished, Ch'in's armies finally entered Lin-tzu, Ch'i's capital, whose populace dared not resist. King Chien subsequently surrendered without fighting and was later transferred to the city of Kung. The state of Ch'i was extinguished [in 221 B.C.] and its territory became merely another Ch'in commandery. The people of Ch'i therefore hated King Chien for not having early on united in a Vertical Alliance with the other states to attack Ch'in, and for listening to the perverse advice of his ministers and honored guests that destroyed the state, and even created songs condemning him. King Chien's employment of foreigners was certainly injudicious. 57

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Bribes were employed not only to subvert other governments, but also to facilitate the execution of estrangement techniques, confirm rumors, cast suspicion, and raise doubts about targeted individuals. This systematic employment of covert agents--identified as turned spies, but not necessarily so--to spread disinformation and create suspicion about effective commanders, as in Wu Tzu-hsü's demise and Yüeh Yi's removal, frequently recurred in the Warring States and subsequent dynasties. Because it was a favored method of both individuals and states, many episodes became well known, thereafter furnishing both examples and a growing knowledge of techniques, comprising a veritable pool of covert wisdom.

The Spring and Autumn historical section includes the story of Confucius being deliberately undermined through the besotting of the ruler with sexual beauty. However, another version of 

Confucius's departure from Lu suggests that machinations formulated by the famous Yen-tzu--generally regarded as a paragon of Virtue and consummate statesman--played upon the Sage's natural sense of moral superiority, thus directly targeting him rather than the ruler. According to the account found in the Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu:

Confucius was serving as a minister in Lu. Duke Ching, troubled by it, said to Yen-tzu: "The presence of a Sage in a neighboring state causes worry for its enemies. What about Confucius serving as minister in Lu?"

Yen-tzu replied: "My lord, do not be concerned. Lu's ruler is weak, while Confucius is a Sage. You should secretly treat Confucius generously, implying that you will establish him as a minister in Ch'i. Confucius will strongly remonstrate in Lu but not be heeded, and will inevitably become arrogant toward Lu and venture to Ch'i, but then you should not admit him. When he is cut off from Lu and lacks succor in Ch'i, he will be in difficult straits.

After a year Confucius left Lu and went to Ch'i but Duke Ching would not admit him to his court, so he found himself in difficulty between the minor states of Ch'en and Ts'ai.

Commentators have long pointed out that this account is a simple fabrication since Yen-tzu had already died when the events purportedly occurred. However, a product of the early Warring States period, the Yen-tzu Ch'un-ch'iu was widely read and generally accorded great respect in later centuries, while the two protagonists were among the most famous men in antiquity, so an important, if specious, lesson was thus established.

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Forcing a change in commanders through rumors and disinformation, as in the case of Yüeh Yi, often proved surprisingly easy:

In his fourth year King Ho-lü learned that Ch'u had obtained the Chan-lu sword and became enraged. Subsequently he dispatched Sun-tzu, Wu Tzu-hsü, and Pai Ch'i to attack Ch'u. Wu Tzu-hsü secretly disseminated talk in Ch'u, quoting him as 

saying, "If Ch'u employs Tzu Ch'i as commanding general, I will surely capture and execute him, whereas if Tzu Ch'ang controls the army I will certainly depart." Ch'u's ruler heard about it and therefore employed Tzu Ch'ang, retiring Tzu Ch'i. Wu's forces then attacked and seized two towns from Ch'u. 58

At other times a few simple acts could create suspicious circumstances, playing upon the ever-present doubts of disloyalty in the ruler's mind, and achieve the removal of a prominent enemy:

Ch'u's army had advanced into Chou's southern mountains and their commanding general Wu Te was about to expiate Ch'u's pent-up anger upon Chou. Someone said to the ruler of Chou: "Why not have the heir apparent, in command of the army, formally welcome Wu Te at the border while you yourself greet him in the suburbs? Make All under Heaven know that you greatly esteem Wu Te, and ensure that it leaks back to Ch'u that a sacrificial vessel that you presented to Wu Te has a certain name. The king of Ch'u will inevitably importune him for it, but when Wu Te does not produce it he will certainly be found guilty of an offense."59

Another Warring States example is furnished by Tsou Chi's successful calumniation of the great strategist T'ien Chi, the statesman who had been responsible for bringing Sun Pin back to Ch'i and played a critical command role in the crucial Warring States battle of Kuei-ling in the mid-fourth century B.C. Although this is an example of internal intrigue, it merits retelling because of its historical prominence and the way Tsou Chi exploited the general credence given to prognostication and omens:

Tsou Chi, Lord of Ch'eng and prime minister of Ch'i, and T'ien Chi, general of the Army, reviled each other. Kung-sun Han addressed Tsou Chi: "Sire, why not plan an attack on Wei for the king? If we are victorious, it will have been due to my lord's plans and you can receive the credit. If we engage in combat and are not

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victorious, if T'ien Chi has not advanced into battle and perished you can wrangle an accusation of cowardice against him and have him executed."

Tsou Chi agreed, so he persuaded the king to have T'ien Chi attack Wei. In three engagements T'ien Chi emerged victorious three times, so Tsou Chi informed Kung-sun Han. Thereupon Kung-sun Han had a man take ten gold pieces to a diviner in the marketplace and inquire: "I am T'ien Chi's retainer. T'ien Chi engaged in battle three times and was victorious three times. His fame overawes All under Heaven. If he wants to undertake the great affair of usurping the throne, will it be equally auspicious or not?"

The diviner went out and had men detain the person who had requested the divination and then attested to his words before the king. T'ien Chi subsequently fled. 60

It seems incredible that Tsou Chi's simple ruse might have persuaded anyone that a brilliant, successful general such as T'ien Chi would be so profoundly stupid as to openly make such inquiries. However, several of China's rulers and dynastic founders availed themselves of (or manufactured) prophecies attesting to their "extraordinary" qualities and predestination. Had T'ien Chi actually ordered this inquiry, it might well be understood as a sort of trial balloon, an effort to deliberately stimulate useful rumors, arouse public support, or gauge the extent of potential adherents.

Ch'in's extinction of Chao at the end of the Warring States period was similarly facilitated by bribes employed to cause the dismissal of capable field generals and the substitution of inferior ones. Remarkably, their effort succeeded despite the well-known devastating effects achieved by similar ploys in earlier centuries.

In the seventh year of King Ch'ien's reign in Chao, [ 229 B.C.], the state of Ch'in had Wang Chien attack the state of Chao. Chao sent Li Mu, Lord of Wu-an, and Ssu-ma Shang to resist them. Ch'in then generously bribed Kuo K'ai, the king's favorite minister, to act as their agent and say that Li Mu and Ssu-ma Shang wanted to revolt. The king of Chao then employed Chao Ts'ung and the Ch'i general Yen Chü to replace Li Mu. 

However, Li Mu refused to accept his edict, so the king clandestinely dispatched men to capture and execute him and dismiss Ssu-ma Shang. Three months later Wang Chien launched a surprise attack against Chao's forces and inflicted a severe defeat, killing Chao Ts'ung

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and taking both the king and Yen Chü prisoner. Thereafter he extinguished the state of Chao. 61

Simply through providing a bribe, Ch'in's juggernaut achieved the unimaginable extinction and annexation of Chao, the linchpin of the northern plains states and last obstacle between itself and Ch'i.

Undoubtedly the most famous, literally epoch-making, example of successfully undermining an important commander occurred during the widespread strife that followed the overthrow of the Ch'in and preceded the founding of the Han dynasty. Shortly after Ch'en P'ing had taken refuge with Liu Pang--the eventual founder of the Han dynasty--and assumed a minor command role, they were cut off by Hsiang Yü's army in the city of Jung-yang. Liu Pang attempted to conclude a peace treaty with his powerful rival Hsiang Yü, even offering to cede considerable territory in exchange, but Hsiang Yü naturally refused, setting the stage for the following meeting between Liu Pang and Ch'en P'ing:

Liu Pang said to Ch'en P'ing: "The whole world is so confused and turbulent, will it ever be settled?"

Ch'en P'ing said: "Hsiang Yü, king of Ch'u, is respectful and loves men, so the incorruptible, constrained, and well-mannered warriors have all given their allegiance to him. But when it comes to doling out rewards for achievement, granting rank and fiefs, he is parsimonious, so they become disaffected. Now you, great king, are haughty and rude, so the incorruptible and constrained do not come. But you, great king, are also generous in enfeoffing men and granting rank, so the unscrupulous, covetous, and shameless give their allegiance to the Han. If you could truly eliminate such shortcomings and garner these strengths, the realm might be 

settled just like waving a pennant. But my king loves to insult people, so remains unable to gather incorruptible warriors.

"I observe that there is some prospect for throwing Hsiang Yü's camp into confusion. He has only a few highly favored confidants--men like Fan Tseng, Chung Li-mei, Lung Chieh, and Chou Yin-chih. If only you were capable of sacrificing some forty or fifty thousand pieces of gold to employ double agents, we might cause the king and his ministers to become mutually estranged and doubtful. Moreover, Hsiang Yü is plagued by doubt and suspicion and easily believes slanderers, so they will certainly begin killing each other. If you then mobilize your forces and attack, Ch'u's destruction will be inevitable."

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As Liu Pang felt this to be true, he provided Ch'en P'ing with forty thousand pieces of gold to dispose of as he wished, never inquiring how. Ch'en P'ing then used most of the gold to loose double agents among Ch'u's forces, 62 spreading talk that Ch'u's generals, such as Chung Li-mei, having achieved great success but not been granted any fiefs or kingships, were inclined to unite with the Han forces, destroy Hsiang Yü, divide his land, and become kings. As expected, Hsiang Yü began to distrust his generals.

When Hsiang Yü had already become doubtful, he dispatched an emissary to Liu Pang. Liu Pang appeared to be preparing a great feast and the best meats had already been brought in when, seeing the emissaries and pretending to be surprised, he exclaimed, "I thought that Fan Tseng had deputed you, but you are Hsiang Yü's emissary," so he had the feast removed and vulgar, common food brought in for Ch'u's ambassador. When the ambassador returned to Ch'u and reported everything to Hsiang Yü, the king became very suspicious of Fan Tseng.

Fan Tseng wanted to urgently assault and subjugate the city of Jung-yang, but Hsing Yü didn't trust him and was unwilling to listen to his strategy. When Fan Tseng heard of Hsiang Yü's doubt he was enraged: "The great affair of emperorship is largely settled! Let my lord finish it himself. I just want my old bones to return home." While en route home, before he had reached P'eng, he was hit in the back with a poison arrow and 

died. That night Ch'en P'ing then sent two thousand women and children forth from Jung-yang's east gate, and when Ch'u's forces attacked them, Ch'en P'ing and the king fled into the night through the west gate. 63

Liu Pang was subsequently able to regroup his forces and eventually succeeded in disposing of Hsiang Yü to found the Han dynasty, becoming its first emperor, while the incident thereafter became not only a famous example of the importance and effective employment of clandestine agents in estrangement operations, but also the gist of novels, stories, and romances.

Long after the demise of the Han, the brilliant strategist and spy master Wei Hsiao-kuan mounted a complex ploy that again exploited the power of rumor and prophetic verse and thus illustrates how men came to be condemned because they were mentioned in rumors or sayings. Not only preserved in the standard histories, the incident is also incorporated as the historical illustration for the chapter entitled "Spies" in the Unorthodox Strategies.

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In the sixth century, during the Northern and Southern Dynasties period, General Wei Hsiao-kuan of the Northern Chou succeeded in defending and protecting the area about Yü-pi through his virtuous actions. Hsiao-kuan excelled in pacifying and governing the people and was able to gain their willing allegiance. All the spies he dispatched into Northern Ch'i fully exhausted their abilities. Hsiao-kuan also bribed many Northern Ch'i citizens with gold for information and reports, and thus knew all about Ch'i's actions and court affairs.

Ch'i's minister Hu Lü-kuang, whose style name was Ming Yüeh [Bright Moon], was worthy and courageous. Hsiao-kuan was deeply troubled about him. Northern Chou's chief of military planning Ch'ü Yen, who was thoroughly versed in milfoil divination, advised Hsiao-kuan, "Next year Ch'i's court will certainly be marked by mutual killing." Thereupon Hsiao-kuan ordered Ch'ü Yen to fabricate a prophetic verse that said, "A 'hundred pints' will fly up to Heaven, a 'bright moon' will shine 

on Ch'ang- an." At that time a "hundred pints" was equal to a "hu," Hu Lü- kuang's surname. Additional verses read, "The high mountain, unpushed, will crumble of itself, the hu tree, unsupported, will become established by itself." Hsiao-kuan then ordered several spies to memorize these lines and spread them about Ch'i's capital.

When Tsu Hsiao-cheng, who had recently clashed with Hu Lü-kuang, heard them, he further embellished the lines, and Hu Lü- kuang, known as "Bright Moon," was eventually executed because of it. When Emperor Wu of the Northern Chou learned about Lü-kuang's death, he declared a general amnesty, fully mobilized the army, and subsequently exterminated the Northern Ch'i.

The verses illustrate the nature of Chinese wordplay. In the Northern Chou era a "hu" was a large measure for corn and grain equal to "one hundred pints," but was also Hu Lü-kuang's surname, so the "one hundred pints" was immediately understood as referring to him. The "bright moon" of the first couplet, simply being his style name, reinforced the identification. The second couplet turns upon the emperor's surname being "kao," translated as "high" in "high mountain," implying that the emperor would perish by himself, while the second half asserts that the "hu" tree--a tree name formed by adding a "wood" signifier to the Chinese character identical with Hu Lü- kuang's surname and similarly pronounced--would gain its position

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even without external support. Naturally the emperor assumed the worst and reacted precipitously, as desired. General Wei Hsiao-kuan thus achieved a lasting historical reputation for his skill in employing secret agents, essentially confirming Sun-tzu's view that "unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports."

Finally, during the T'ang dynasty when Liu Shih-jang was about to be appointed as commander in chief for Kuang-chou, he unfortunately was called upon to advise the emperor on 

basic tactics for containing the Turkish border threat, providing an opinion that ultimately resulted in his death:

Liu replied to the emperor's inquiry: "The southern incursions mounted by the Turks essentially take the road to Ma-yi as their main objective. According to my calculations you should place a wise, courageous general at Kuo-ch'eng, and abundantly supply him with gold and silk. Generously reward anyone who comes to surrender. Furthermore, you should frequently dispatch unorthodox troops to plunder their encampments outside the city and cut down all the standing crops, thereby destroying their livelihood. Within a year they will have nothing to eat and Ma-yi will not even enter into their plans."

Because the emperor didn't have anyone he could entrust with this task, he ordered Liu Shih-chang to race out to oversee the implementation of his plan. Meanwhile, the Turks, fearing his formidable reputation, released double agents to claim that Shih-jang and the khan had been secretly plotting together and were about to mount a revolt. Without investigating, Emperor Kao-tsu had him executed and his family name stricken from the registers. At the beginning of the next reign period a surrendered Turk informed the court that Liu Shih-jang never had any intent to rebel, so his wife and son were restored. 64

Stealthy Methods

A variety of stealthy methods, such as employed by the "dog thief" already seen in the biography of Hsin-ling Chün, and strong-arm ploys such as the kidnapping of Shih Hui, were commonly employed to achieve clandestine objectives. An early case ( 680 B.C.), much referred

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to in subsequent military writings, that clearly became part of the common lore about antiquity saw the first hegemon, Duke Huan of Ch'i, opt to keep faith with a coerced agreement rather than abrogate it, as was clearly his prerogative:

When Duke Chuang was about to meet with Duke Huan, Ts'ao Mei advanced and inquired, "What are your thoughts?" Duke Chuang replied, "It would be better if I were to die." Ts'ao Mei 

replied, "Then please uphold the role of a ruler while I ask leave to act as a minister."65 Duke Chuang assented, whereupon they went to meet with Duke Huan.

Duke Chuang ascended the dais with Ts'ao Mei following close behind, sword in hand. Kuan Chung came forward and asked, "What do you seek?"

Ts'ao Mei replied: "Our walls are ruined and our border pressured. Will you plan for it?"

Kuan Chung said, "If so, then what do you want?"

Ts'ao Mei replied, "We would like (the return of) the land on the sunny side of the Wen River."

Kuan Chung said to Duke Huan, "You should allow it." When Duke Huan assented, Ts'ao Mei requested a formal covenant, so Duke Huan descended and swore an oath with them. After the oath Ts'ao Mei threw down his sword and departed. A covenant so coerced could be contravened, but Duke Huan did not deceive him [by doing so]. Ts'ao Mei could also have been regarded as an enemy, but Duke Huan bore him no resentment. Duke Huan's good faith was manifest throughout the realm, commencing from this covenant at K'o. 66

This episode, reminiscent of Duke Wen of Chin keeping faith by withdrawing the siege of Yüan after three days, no doubt struck the imagination of later listeners because of its improbable nature. Obviously Ts'ao Mei's singular determination, although perhaps formidable, could have been quashed by Kuan Chung or armed attendants who must have been near the dais. Moreover, unlike in the incidents that follow, Ts'ao Mei never directly threatened Duke Huan with harm, perhaps an ameliorating aspect that granted the incident a degree of respectability.

Another famous case arose during the Spring and Autumn period when Ch'u reversed its decision to abandon a lengthy siege of Sung's capital that had been instigated by Sung's execution of a Ch'u emissary. The latter had deliberately violated the state's sovereignty by passing through Sung without proper permission, knowing full well it

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would result in his death (perhaps making him the first "expendable agent") and provoke Ch'u's vengeance. Sung's 

situation thus became desperate, forcing them to dispatch Hua Yüan to extort an agreement from Tzu Fan, Ch'u's commander, in an incident that became extremely famous thereafter:

The people of Sung, being afraid, had Hua Yüan penetrate Ch'u's encampment one night and sit upon Tzu Fan's bed. Rousing him, he said: "My ruler commanded me to report our extremity. In our city the people exchange their children and eat them, then break the bones for faggots. Yet we will not assent to any covenant forced upon us, even though our state be extinguished. However, if you withdraw your forces thirty kilometers, we will obey your orders."

Terrified, Tzu Fan swore an oath with him and subsequently informed the king of Ch'u, with the result that they withdrew the thirty kilometers. With Hua Yüan serving as a hostage, Sung and Ch'u then concluded a peace treaty that stated Sung would not deceive Ch'u or Ch'u harm Sung. 67

A similar incident that perhaps indicates as much about lax security measures (despite the many admonitions in the military writings and presumably stringent lock-down procedures) as the thief's skills, Ch'u exploited the same technique:

General Tzu Fa of Ch'u loved to seek out men distinguished by specialized skills. One man in Ch'u who excelled in thievery came to see him and said to his attendants: "I heard that my lord is seeking men skilled in the Tao. I am a thief and would like to offer my skill as one of your followers."

When Tzu Fa heard this, without belting his robe or taking the time to put on his cap, he went out and greeted him with all the proper courtesies. His attendants all remonstrated with him: "A thief is one of the brigands of the realm. Why did you extend such courtesies to him?" He replied, "This isn't something that you would understand."

Not long after this Ch'i mobilized its forces and attacked Ch'u. In command of the army, Tzu Fa went out to resist them but was forced to retreat three times. Ch'u's Worthies and high officials all exhausted their strategies and fully employed their sincerity, but Ch'i's forces grew increasingly stronger. At that 

moment the market thief came in and respectfully requested that as he had some

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minor skill, it ought to be put to use. Tzu Fa agreed and sent him off without asking what he meant.

That night the thief cut down the curtain of Ch'i's commanding general and brought it back to Tzu Fa. The next day Tzu Fa had him return it, saying, "One of our troops, out to gather firewood, found your curtain, which I am returning so that you may conduct your affairs."

The next day the thief went again to steal a pillow that Tzu Fa similarly had returned. The day after the thief went a third time to steal his hairpin, and Tzu Fa once again had it returned. When Ch'i's troops heard about it, they were afraid. Ch'i's commanding general said to his staff, "If we don't leave today, I am afraid the lord of Ch'u will steal my head." Then he faced the army about and left. 68

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Part Four THEORIES OF EVALUATING AND INTELLIGENCE

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10 Basic Theory and Issues

FROM THE WARRING STATES PERIOD onward China almost religiously looked to the past for the wisdom necessary to achieve ideal government and behavioral patterns to emulate and avoid. Certain texts, such as the Ch'un Ch'iu (due to its presumed editing by Confucius), gradually became canonical, but others, including the Tso Chuan, Chan-kuo Ts'e, and finally the Shih Chi, quickly exceeded it in utility. Efforts were frequently made to deny them to nonofficial readers and all "barbarians" because of their perceived potential as subversive handbooks, the very reason many "perverse and devious" readers found them valuable and interesting. Whether viewed as preserving ideal patterns to consciously emulate or evil techniques to actualize, they irreversibly became fundamental to China's political culture, with their incidents and anecdotes eventually permeating the general consciousness.

However, strong disagreement marked Warring States and subsequent debates over the fundamental issues of whether human behavior is consistent and the past germane. The Confucians vehemently affirmed continuity and relevance as essential points of doctrine, but the Legalists and an admixture of iconoclasts vociferously argued that overwhelming changes made the past irrelevant. Such divergence in essential assumptions directly impacts intelligence activities because predictive evaluations cannot avoid being based upon past patterns. Even the Yi Chou-shu states: "The Tao for mounting an attack is to invariably obtain advantages of terrain, accord with the season of Heaven, observe the situation in the present, and examine it with respect to antiquity."1 Political officials, due to their educational background, were more concerned with this debate over "earlier" versus "later" kings in the service of the state, but to the extent that military thinkers mastered general material and were not just specialists in

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military matters, they certainly recognized the question and its implications. 

By the late Warring States period Confucius's reputation as a transmitter, rather than an innovator, was well established, while the view that antiquity furnished models for study and emulation came to dominate. For example, in arguing against the view that antiquity and his age somehow differed, Hsün-tzu stated:

The Sage measures things by the things themselves. Thus he evaluates men by men, emotions by emotions, categories of things by their categories, achievement with theory, and observes everything with the Tao. Antiquity and the present are one, their categories do not contravene each other. Even though the time may have been long, they have the same patterns. Thus he can incline to the perverse and twisted and not be deluded, observe intermixed things and not be confused, for he measures them accordingly. 2

The late Warring States Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu defined wisdom in terms of a continuity with antiquity: "Wisdom is the means by which one compares the past, views what is far off, and sees what is nearby. The present is to antiquity as antiquity is to later ages. The present is to later ages as the present is to antiquity. Thus if one thoroughly knows the present he can know the past, if he knows the past he can know later ages. Antiquity and the present, earlier and later, are one. Thus the Sage knows a thousand years ahead, a thousand years back."3

Tung Chung-shu's influential late second century B.C. treatise, the Ch'un-ch'iu Fan-lu, extolled the importance of the Ch'un Ch'iu, the chronicles of the Spring and Autumn period, as the paradigm model of the past:

The ancients had a saying, "If you do not know what is coming, look at what has passed." Now the way the Ch'un Ch'iu provides a basis for study is that it takes the past as its Tao and makes the future clear. Moreover, its language embodies the signs of Heaven, and teaches what is difficult to know. For someone incapable of investigating it, it is silent, as if without substance, but for someone able to investigate it, it is all comprehensive. 4 . . .

To observe the movement of things and first become aware of their sprouts, to terminate future chaos, blockage, and harm at 

the time when they have not yet taken form, this is the intent of the Ch'un Ch'iu. 5

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In his thematic compilation titled the Shuo Yüan, the famous Liu Hsiang similarly wrote: "A clear mirror is the means to illuminate form, the flow of the past the means to know the present. Now if one knows that evil is the means by which antiquity came to be imperiled and extinguished but doesn't seek out the traces by which they were secure and flourished, then it is no different from running away and seeking to catch someone in front of you."6 In the Han dynasty Wang Ch'ung claimed that, even though vessels might differ over time, "human nature and behavior are not different. People are not different, nor their desires or inclinations."7 Thereafter, this was the view commonly embraced.

Although dissenters remained, even a few of the so-called Taoist writings inclined to the view that knowledge can be derived from antiquity and the future predicted from the past. For example, the Liehtzu asserts that "the Sage, by looking at what has gone out, knows what is coming back, by observing what has gone before, knows what will come. This is the pattern of his foreknowledge."8 The Huai-nan Tzu echoed it with the view that the Sage investigates what has gone before in order to know future disposition and development. 9 Meanwhile the vociferous countertrends prominent in the late Warring States virtually disappeared after the early Han as their chief proponents--LordShang and Han Fei-tzu--were reviled for the influence of their theories in creating and theoretically sustaining the odious Ch'in dynasty and opposing the Confucian views embraced by the literati. However, the Pao P'u-tzu, an esoteric Taoist tract, still observed: "In love and hate, likes and dislikes, antiquity and the present are not uniform. Times change, customs alter." 10

In broadest terms the next most pressing question was whether there would ever be a need for active intelligence gathering when ancient books and records already provided a complete repository of knowledge and the Sage (and by implication the Virtuous ruler, who in theory had no enemies) could know everything without making any external effort. Within the 

context of a constant tension between those who sought to know and those who presumed to know, the premise of knowing without effort assumed two forms corresponding to the Confucian and Taoist perspectives, although later formulations saw Lao-tzu's original pronouncements adopted by the eclectic writers and officials to justify Confucian views. Both inimically influenced China's attitude toward military preparedness and intelligence over the centuries, often fatally frustrating externally directed efforts against the steppe peoples. In brief, the Confucians felt that all knowledge could be derived from perfect understanding of oneself, whereas the Taoists found that more extensive efforts simply produced lesser

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returns, reflecting a quietest viewpoint. Their defining passage, parts of which frequently appear in the Huai-nan Tzu, 11 including excerpts that will be cited here, recur as Chapter 47 of the received Tao Te Ching:

Without going out the door he knows All under Heaven, Without peering out the lattice work sees the Tao of Heaven. As one goes out further knowledge grows less.

Thus the Sage knows without traveling, Names things without seeing them, And achieves without acting.

The Confucian perspective derives from the image of the Sage rulers of antiquity governing the realm without venturing beyond their courts, expressed in passages such as this one attributed to Confucius: "When you love people then people will love you, but when you hate people then they will hate you. What you know from yourself is the same as what you know from men. What is meant by not venturing beyond the confines of single room and yet knowing all under Heaven just refers to knowing yourself."12 Naturally the petty-minded stressed the literal interpretation of not venturing to gather information, but there was also a sense that, in the large, major affairs of conflict could be foretold without divination:

King Wu of the Chou was about to attack King Chou of the Shang, so he summoned the T'ai Kung and inquired, "If I want 

to know whether we will be victorious before engaging the enemy in battle, know whether it is auspicious without performing divination, whether we can employ men from other states, is there a Tao?"

The T'ai Kung replied: "There is a Tao. If your majesty gains the allegiance of the people and plans against the unrighteous, you can know that you will be victorious without fighting. If you attack the unworthy with the worthy, then without divining you will know that it is auspicious. When others injure their populaces while we profit them, even though they are not our people we can gain and employ them."13

Prejudices, Inclinations, and Interference

Late Warring States and Han writers analyzed and extensively commented upon the actual process of perceiving, understanding, interpreting, and finally deriving knowledge from experience. Their efforts

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resulted in their insights and historical incidents becoming amalgamated into the amorphous but coherent body of common wisdom seen throughout the eclectic writings, materials certainly known to the military thinkers as well, even though never explicitly incorporated into their texts. The philosopher Hsün-tzu pondered many of these critical issues in a unique chapter entitled "Untangling Obfuscations" that scrutinizes perception and its relationship to understanding, identifying internal disturbances that adversely affect the process itself and thereby induce false impressions and conclusions. In a passage focusing on the critical issue of doubt Hsün-tzu stated:

Whenever making observations, if there are any doubts, the mind will not be settled and external things will not be clear. When thoughts lack clarity, it will not be possible to determine the correct and incorrect. Proceeding in such confusion and murkiness, a person takes a supine rock to be a crouching tiger and standing trees to be people behind him because murkiness has obscured his clarity. When a drunk crosses a hundred-pace-wide channel, he takes it to be a half-pace-wide 

irrigation ditch. When he crouches down to go out the city gate he takes it to be the small entrance [to the women's quarters]. If you press your eyes and look about, one thing will be seen as two; if you cover your ears and listen, silence will be taken as a great clamor, all because what is grasped has brought confusion to the senses.

Thus, looking down from a mountain top cattle are taken to be sheep, but no shepherd will go down to herd them because distance has obfuscated their size. Looking up from the base of a mountain at the trees at the top, hundred-foot trees seem like chopsticks, but no one who wants chopsticks will ascend the mountain to break them off because the height has obscured their length. When water stirs and reflections shake, people will not use the water to discern beauty and ugliness because it has been darkened. When the blind look up to Heaven and do not see the stars, people will not use their perception to determine whether things exist or not because their employment of vital essence is deluded. Anyone who makes decisions about things at such a time is one of the stupidest people of our age. When the stupid decide things, they take the doubtful to determine the doubtful, so their decisions certainly cannot be accurate. If they are not accurate, how can they avoid error? 14

Obfuscation has many sources: "What brings about obfuscation? Desires, hatreds, the beginning, the end, the distant, the near, the ex

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pansive, the shallow, antiquity, and the present all act as obfuscations. Now the myriad things all differ and thus naturally occlude each other. This is the common worry of mental techniques." 15 Even though everything in the world can, in Hsün-tzu' view, thus cause interference and obfuscation, certain strong emotions were generally recognized as particularly potent. A comprehensive list is provided by the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, which similarly viewed all conceptualizing and emotional activity as a potential source of interference:

Nobility, riches, eminence, awesomeness, fame, and profit pervert the thoughts. Appearance, actions, colors, the patterns 

of things, ch'i, and thought cause misperceptions in the mind. Hatred, desire, happiness, anger, grief, and joy entangle Virtue. Wisdom, capability, accepting office, leaving office, taking, and abandoning block off the Tao. When these forty-six do not stir in the breast, one will be upright. When upright, tranquil. When tranquil, clear and enlightened. When clear and enlightened, empty. When empty, without acting there is nothing that will not be done. 16

Hsün-tzu pointed out that strong emotions, such as fear, so thoroughly affect the individual as to dramatically block awareness: "To be externally endangered, yet internally feel no fear has never happened. When the mind is worried and afraid, the mouth might hold the choicest meats yet not know their flavor, the ears hear bells and drums and not know the sound, the eyes see the most majestic sacrificial robes and not recognize their appearance, the body enjoy the lightness and warmth of fine clothes and mats but not know their comfort."17

Conversely, when "obsessed" with an activity, when focused upon some objective, the person becomes oblivious to other threats and stimuli: "Among the populace of Ch'i there was one man who wanted to get some gold. Early one morning he put on his clothes and cap and went to a gold shop. He saw someone handling gold coins, so he reached out and snatched them. When the lictors arrested him and tied him up, they asked: 'With all these people here, how is it that you still grabbed the gold?' He replied, 'I never saw the people, I only saw the gold.'"18

This, of course, is merely an extreme case of concentration. A more general statement is found in the Huai-nan Tzu:

It is human nature that when the ears and eyes respond to externals and are moved, the mind and intentions know worry and pleasure. The hands and feet brush away gnawing insects and

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avoid cold and heat, for these are the ways in which one makes contact with things. If a bee or scorpion stings a finger, the spirit cannot remain placid. When mosquitoes and flies bite the 

skin, understanding cannot remain calm. Now worry and misfortune also attack the mind. It is not only poisonous stings from bees and scorpions or the grief from mosquitoes and flies that interferes with the desired tranquillity, quietness, vacuity, and emptiness. When the eye is looking at the tip of an autumn hair, the ears will not hear a thunderclap. When the ears are adjusting the sounds of the jade chiming stones, the eyes will not notice even the height of Mount T'ai. Why is this? When you are intent upon the small, the large is forgotten. 19

The Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu preserves some incidents that show the effect such "inclinations" or "obfuscations" may have upon the process of evaluating information and turning it into unreliable intelligence, although of course not strictly conceived in such terms:

In our time listeners mostly have that which they incline toward. When their inclinations are many, what they hear will be contrary to reality. What causes numerous inclinations? The chief factors are invariably likes and hatreds. Someone looking out to the east doesn't see the western wall and someone looking at southern villages does not see the northern region because of the direction of their thoughts.

For example, someone who lost a sickle suspected his neighbor's son. When he saw the son walking, it was the walk of someone who had stolen the sickle. Moreover, his facial expressions were those of someone who had stolen the sickle; his speech, actions, and attitude, all of them without exception were those of having stolen the sickle. Later, rummaging in a ravine, the owner found his sickle. The next day when he again saw his neighbor's son, neither his actions nor attitude evidenced having stolen the sickle. His neighbor's son was unchanged, only he had changed. This change was nothing other than having an inclination. 20

Another simple example with far-reaching implications is found in the Huai-nan Tzu as part of its extensive consideration of the process of perceiving and valuing:

In antiquity Hsieh-tzu had an audience with King Hui of Ch'in and the king was pleased with him. He queried T'ang Ku-liang 

about him, who replied: " Hsieh-tzu is a sophist from east of the

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mountains. He thus employed a persuasion on authority in order to gain a degree of favor with you." The king concealed his anger and waited for Hsieh-tzu the next day. When he had his audience the king contradicted him and didn't heed his words. His persuasion hadn't changed, but the listener's perspective was different. 21

The Huai-nan Tzu advocated inner tranquillity to avoid perceptual and emotional interference, not to perceive reality as such, but because emotions debilitate life's vital spiritual energy. 22 The crux of this view (which turns upon the concept of ch'i already encountered in the realm of military courage) unfolds in two chapters:

Human nature is settled and tranquil, but tastes and desires confuse it. Now what men receive from Heaven--the ears and eyes perceiving sound and color, mouth and nose perceiving fragrances and odors, muscles and skin perceiving cold and heat--their nature is one. Some people penetrate to spiritual enlightenment, some cannot avoid stupidity and madness. Why is that? The means they use to control them is different. For this reason spirit is the original source of knowledge. When the source is clear, then knowledge will be enlightened. 23

Now what is the means by which people are able to see so clearly and hear so precisely; their bodies are capable of rising and hundred joints bending and stretching; can discern black and white, see the beautiful and ugly, have the knowledge to distinguish sameness and difference, and be enlightened about right and wrong? Ch'i fills their bodies and spirit brings it about.

How do we know this is so? It is nature human that when someone is intent upon something the spirit becomes entangled there. His feet can stumble in pits and his head hit low-hanging branches and not be aware of it. You can summon him [by waving], but he can't see it, call him but he can't hear it. Even though his ears and eyes haven't been abandoned, 

they cannot respond. Why? His spirit has lost its preservation. Thus when attention is directed toward the small, the large is lost; when internally, the eternal is lost; on the upper, the lower is forgotten; on the left, the right is forgotten. However, if the ch'i fills out everywhere, then there won't be any place it is not present. For this reason the Sage esteems vacuity. 24

The reflective power of water, an image often employed by both Taoism and Buddhism, was similarly used by the Huai-nan Tzu to

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concretely portray the situation: "Now if there is a pan of water in the guest hall, it can be left to clear for a day but the reflection of the eyebrows still not be discernible. Stir it but once and even the square and round will not be distinguishable. Human spirit is easily muddied and difficult to clear, just like the pan of water." 25 Therefore, at least theoretically, if perhaps unattainably, achieving proper judgment requires tranquillity and dispassionate objectivity.

Sources and Credibility

Apart from personally generated hindrances to accurately interpreting data, numerous questions arise about the latter's nature, sources, and reliability. Several thinkers examined the phenomena of credibility-- one of the requisite traits of any ruler or commander--and how it might be established. For example, late in the Warring States period Han Fei-tzu enunciated a critical principle: "Words act in such a way that their credibility stems from greater numbers. Something untrue, if reported by ten men, is still doubted; by a hundred is taken to be so; and if by a thousand becomes irrefutable." 26 A number of the era's eclectic texts contain well-known stories that illustrate this observation, several turning upon the magic number three. For example, when three people reported the presence of a tiger in the marketplace, despite the absence of real tigers in the area, it was believed. 27 Similarly, when three different people separately ran up to Tseng-tz'u's mother, who was weaving at home, to report her son, already a model of decorum and righteousness and soon to be a famous 

Confucian scholar, had killed a man, even she eventually succumbed. 28

Normal human experience, coupled with stories such as these, no doubt prompted the observation that hearsay reports are particularly unreliable: "Now the way words are obtained must be investigated. After several exchanges white becomes black, black becomes white. Therefore if one learns something and analyzes it, it will be fortunate; if not, it would be better not to have learned it." 29 Among the more absurd examples cited by the text is the case of "finding a man when digging a well," contorted from finding someone to dig the well to finding him in the ground when the well was dug!

Although Mencius warned against rulers (and by implication others in power) accepting the unicameral voice of partisan groups in recommending people to office, and others spoke about the dangers of uniformity of view, rulers still failed to maintain the openness required to accept baleful news, a shortsightedness that contributed to Sung's extinction:

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Ch'i mounted an attack on Sung, so the king of Sung dispatched an observer to determine how far the invaders had advanced. The emissary returned and reported, "The invaders are nearby and the people of the state are afraid." The king's attendants all said: "This is what is known as meat spontaneously giving rise to worms. Given our strength and the weakness of Ch'i's army, how could this be happening?"

The king of Sung, enraged, had the observer executed, then sent another agent to observe Ch'i's forces who subsequently returned with an identical report. The king of Sung again improperly had him executed. Although this happened three times, he sent yet another scout to make observations. The invaders were quite near, the people of the state were terrified. The observer happened to meet his elder brother, who inquired, "The state being in extreme danger, where are you going?"

The younger brother replied: "I went to observe Ch'i's army for the king. I never expected them to be this close or that the populace would be so afraid. It also worries me personally 

because when the observers who preceded me reported that Ch'i forces were nearby, they were all executed. If I similarly report the true situation, I will die; if I do not, I must also fear death. What should I do?"

His brother said, "If you report the situation accurately, you will die before the others die and perish before others perish." Therefore he informed the king: "I have no idea where Ch'i's army might be. Moreover, the people are very tranquil." The king was elated and his attendants all said, "The earlier observers were appropriately executed." The king then presented him with generous gifts. Later, when the invaders indeed arrived, the king fled by driving off in a chariot all alone. The observer however became a rich man in another state.

Now ascending a mountain and seeing cattle as sheep and sheep as pigs, even though the nature of cattle is unlike sheep, and that of sheep unlike pigs, stem from the perceiver's circumstances being excessive. To then be angry at the smallness of the cattle and sheep is the greatest madness. To be mad, yet implement rewards and punishments, this is the way the king of Sung was destroyed. 30

Remarkably, the king of Sung ignored the magic rule of three--the number of emissaries who made identical reports--because he was misled by a coterie of flatters and sycophants who seem to have been remarkably oblivious to their own fates, just as the famous Yen-tzu

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(seen in the Spring and Autumn historical section) had warned 31 and Han Fei-tzu had particularly emphasized in his many passages devoted to controlling power and ensuring a flow of information. The Huai- nan Tzu later admonished: "When listening is lost midst sycophancy and flattery and the eyes in colors, but one wants to have affairs be correct, it is difficult." 32 And even the Wu-tzu describes an incident in which Wu Ch'i offers a similar warning:

Once when Marquis Wu was planning government affairs, none of his numerous ministers could equal him. After dismissing the court he had a happy, self-satisfied look. Wu Ch'i entered 

and said: "Once in antiquity when King Chuang of Ch'u was planning state affairs, he discovered none of his ministers could equal his talents. After he had dismissed the court he wore a troubled countenance. Duke Shen inquired, 'Why does your lordship have a troubled countenance?' He replied, 'I have heard it said that there is no lack of Sages in the world, and no shortage of Worthies in a state. One who can get them to be his teacher will be a king, while one who has them as his friends can become a hegemon. Now I am not talented, yet none of my ministers can even equal me in ability. Our state of Ch'u is in deep trouble.' This is what the king of Ch'u found troublesome, yet you are pleased by it. I therefore dare to be fearful!" Marquis Wu immediately looked embarrassed. 33

The speaker or informant's position, entailing personal interests and desires, was also known to affect the veracity and interpretation of the material. Preliminary to the substance of his persuasion, Lou Huan said to the king of Ch'in:

Have you heard about Kung-p'u Wen-po's mother? He served in the court of Lu, and when he died from illness two women killed themselves in his house. Because his mother didn't weep upon hearing about his death, her maid inquired, "When has there ever been a mother who did not weep over her son's death?"

His mother replied: " Confucius is a Worthy, but when he was expelled from Lu my son didn't follow him. Yet immediately after his death two women committed suicide over him. Obviously he must have excelled in what he should have been sparing in, and was generous with women."

Based upon what she said, she was a worthy mother. However, if uttered by his wife, such words wouldn't be anything but jeal

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ousy. Although the words might be identical, when the speaker is different, the mind changes in response. 34

This was, in effect, how the king of Sung was poisoned to the truth and the underlying psychological mechanism by which King Hui of Ch'in, mentioned previously, was turned against Hsieh-tzu. 

Semblances and Doubt

Many Warring States texts comment upon the problems of evaluating men, events, and motives from perceptual evidence alone, making such concerns common thereafter. One particularly well-known concrete image encapsulates the problem: "A madman ran east and his pursuers also ran east. Their running to the east was identical but the reasons they ran that way different. A drowning man sank into the water, his rescuers also entered the water. Their entering the water was the same but their reasons different." 35 More philosophically phrased, "What causes people to be greatly confused and deluded is invariably the mutual resemblance of things. What jade merchants worry about is stone that resembles jade, while those who appraise swords worry that one will look like the famous blade Kan Chiang. What worthy rulers worry about is that the people often hear the disputations of those who seem to have penetrated the Tao." 36 The conclusion inevitably follows that all doubtful semblances must be investigated but with the important qualification, "by the right man." 37

The problem of semblances raises the question of standards and measures, guidelines for discriminating and judging among possible interpretations. An argument over the critical characteristics in swords that appears in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu has important connotations:

An expert in appraising swords said: "White is the means by which a sword is sturdy, yellow the means by which it is resilient. When yellow and white are intermixed it will be sturdy and resilient, and therefore a good sword."

His critic said: "White is the means by which to make it inflexible, yellow to make it not sturdy, so when yellow and white are intermixed it will neither be sturdy nor resilient. Moreover, when it is soft, it will bend; when sturdy, it will break; so when a sword is breakable and bendable, how can it be an advantageous weapon?"

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The nature of the sword has not changed, but one takes it to be good, another to be bad, because theory causes it. 38

Although a certain degree of unreality has crept in here, the verbal sparring still illustrates the defining impact fundamental theories have in engendering divergent perspectives and providing parameters for evaluation and interpretation. Since similar cases have already been explored in the historical section, one additional example with remarkably different conclusions will suffice to illustrate the growing consciousness of such standards:

King Chuang of Ch'u wanted to attack Ch'en so he dispatched an agent to observe it. The emissary returned and reported, "Ch'en cannot be attacked."

King Chuang asked, "Why not?"

He replied, "Their walls are high, moats deep, food reserves numerous, and the state peaceful."

The king said: " Ch'en can be attacked. Now Ch'en is a small state, yet their reserves are ample. For their reserves to be ample, their taxes and impositions must have been heavy. When military taxes are onerous, the people will resent their ruler. Since their walls are high and moats deep, the people's strength must be exhausted." He mobilized the army and attacked them, subsequently seizing Ch'en. 39

The Confucians basically evaluated by an ideal of Virtue, righteousness, and benevolent administrative policies; the Legalists, by strictness and effective rewards and punishments; the Taoists, by minimal government measures; and the military theorists, by a balanced view that combined benevolent government with strictness in rewards and severity in punishments. A Huai-nan Tzu passage constructed from ancient incidents encapsulates the first two:

Duke P'ing of Chin spoke inappropriately, so his music master struck at him with a lute but merely brushed his lapel, shattering the lute against the wall. The duke's attendants wanted to plaster the wall over to conceal the marks, but Duke P'ing said, "Leave it, for I will take them as a reminder of my error." When Confucius heard about this incident, he 

remarked, " DukeP'ing wasn't unconcerned about threats to his body, but he wanted to have people come forth and remonstrate." Han Fei-tzu heard about it and said: "Whenever a minister commits an offense that goes unpunished,

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it opens the way to all transgressions. Because of such practices Duke P'ing never attained hegemony."

One of Mi-tzu's honored guests had a visitor. After observing their interview, upon the visitor's departure Mi-tzu said to his guest: "Your visitor has just three faults. He looked at me and smiled, so he is conceited. He spoke about matters but didn't acknowledge his teacher, which is contrariness. Although his relationship is shallow, his words were deep. This is disorder." Mitzu's guest said: "He smiled when he looked upon my lord, an expression of politeness. When he spoke, he didn't allude to his teacher, a sign of penetration. Although the relationship is shallow, he spoke deeply. This is loyalty."

The visitor's appearance remained the same, but one observer regarded him as a superior man, the other a common man. This is due to the observer's perspectives being different. Thus when people agree about their interests and dislikes, their words are seen as loyal and they grow increasingly close, but when they are distant, even excellent plans are doubted. For example, if a mother causes blood to flow down to her son's ear while treating a carbuncle on his head, her behavior would be seen as an expression of love, but if performed by a stepmother would be judged by a passerby as abusive. The nature of the event was unchanged, but the means by which it was judged differed. From the top of a city wall cattle appear like sheep and sheep like pigs because the standpoint is high. If you peer at your reflection in a pan of water your face will be round, but in a cup it will be oval. The shape of your face hasn't changed, the difference in roundness and ovalness being produced by the means employed to peer at it. 40

Doubt and the Military Perspective

The uncertainty raised by semblances and divergent value schemes, compounded by questions of a reporter's reliability, 

could lead only to doubt, the anathema of all commanders. Even though doubt would presumably provoke incisive intelligence analysis and prompt effective counterintelligence measures, it equally undermined confidence in the results. The military classics all decried its inimical power to erode confidence and pernicious ability to cause hesitation, dooming armies to defeat. The T'ai Kung said, "Of all the disasters that can befall an army, none surpasses doubt."41 Wu Ch'i similarly commented, "The greatest harms that can befall the army's employment stem

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from hesitation, while the disasters that strike an army are born in doubt."42 Even Hsün-tzu, who disparaged tactics and other realistic measures as mere expediency in comparison with the irresistible power of Virtue, conceded, "When spying on the enemy and observing their changes, you want to be hidden and deep, want to compare extensively and analyze, so that when you meet the enemy in a decisive battle, you will base your strategy on what you are clear about, not what you doubt."43

The military writings rarely discuss theoretical issues of intelligence, focusing instead on the problems of gathering information, placing agents, running covert operations, and confirming reports through cross-checking. However, Chieh Hsüan, author of the Ping-fa Pai-yen, having lived at the end of the Ming and doubtlessly been exposed to the long heritage of Buddhist, Taoist, and Neoconfucian thought on mind, substance, and principle, devoted two of his definitions to essential intelligence questions. For Chieh Hsüan "doubt" can be a stimulus to certainty, while its problematic aspects should be exploited against the enemy:

Definition: Stirring confusion in the enemy's mind is termed "doubt."

Original Text: Because the military is the Tao of deceit, there will inevitably be doubt. However, one who suffers from unfounded doubt will certainly be defeated. 

Explanation: Although doubt is an affliction that besets both ancient and modern armies, it is also the means through which generals and commanders can be effective. Because men obviously have eyes, they cannot avoid seeing things. When they see similitudes, they will be doubtful. Because men certainly have ears, they cannot avoid hearing things. When they hear things that sound like something else, they will be doubtful. Because men clearly have minds, they cannot be without awareness. When they are aware of similitudes, they will be doubtful. 44 Except for the most stupid, who falls into dark obstinacy and insensitivity? Thus it can be said that antiquity and the present suffer the same affliction.

Accordingly, if I have something about which I am doubtful, I proceed to analyze it. I plot affairs myself but decide them with many others, for only then can I destroy the doubtful and gain the useful. Since these doubts originate in wisdom and plans, they cannot be escaped even for an instant, nor can they be taken lightly. You cannot be lax or lethargic in responding to them, or too shallow or hasty in planning. The more you know, the more

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doubtful you will become. The more doubtful you are, the more you will know. If you determine the veracity of your doubts, you will be victorious; if you fail to determine their veracity, you will be defeated. Therefore it is said that through doubt generals and commanders can be effective. Thus the ancient generals excelled at dispelling their own doubts and stimulating doubts in others.

One example he cites in his definition was the famous Han dynasty episode in which the vastly outnumbered Li Kuang, isolated in steppe territory, not only had his troops dismount, but also had them unbuckle their saddles to convince the Hsiung-nu pursuing him that they were laying a trap. Chieh thus concluded, "To dispel your own doubts, use intelligence; to stimulate doubt in others, employ cleverness."

Another important definition focuses on the process of determining information about the enemy, one Chieh terms "fathoming": 

Definition: Applying effort to thoroughly seek out something is termed "fathoming."

Original Text: When two armies meet, there must be tests, when two generals are locked in a standoff, there must be fathoming. When you fathom the enemy, you can avoid the substantial and strike the dispersed. When you detect the enemy fathoming you, display some shortcoming in order to lead them to your strength. However, if your own fathoming activity plunges into the vacuous, it may provide the means for an enemy to deceive you. Thus although you undertake one analysis, you must be doubly prepared. To anticipate the unforeseen is a complete technique, the Tao of [successful] generals.

Explanation: Surveyors have methods for fathoming heights and depths, breadth and distance. If one knows the height but not the distance, or knows the breadth but not the depth, then a single estimation may be employed. But if neither height nor depth, breadth nor distance is yet known, then a double reckoning is used. This approach clearly derives from topography. As for estimating the disposition of enemy forces and measuring a general's wisdom, merely select what is appropriate and use it. The methods of singular and double estimation are simply standards for surveying.

Examples: Chu Tan lured the enemy forward because he knew that the Northern Jung could not make estimations and thereby successfully defeated them three times. Sun Pin decreased the number of cookstoves over several days, knowing that P'ang

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Chüan was capable of calculating the army's strength from them, and subsequently set up his crossbowmen in an ambush at Maling. Thus depending upon whether the enemy is more or less wise, their fathoming efforts will be shallow or deep.

The outcome at Ma-ling furnishes a perfect example of exploiting well-understood evaluative parameters to implement misleading measures and thereby deceive the enemy. Although no doubt detailed in execution, Sun Pin's measures simply 

enticed P'ang Chüan into an erroneous deduction by presenting easily observable phenomena that confirmed his arrogant preconceptions of Ch'i's cowardice. Because all armies undertake reconnaissance activities, generals must be alert to the danger of drawing fatal conclusions from false phenomena, whether observationally derived, gained through prisoner interrogation, or obtained through one's own spies.

Standards, mentioned in the definition of fathoming, are essential to any thorough, systematic approach to information analysis. The military texts thus contain numerous detailed observations correlated with conceptual inferences derived from categories of terrain, numbers, and character that became the defined standards for understanding enemy behavior and evaluating capabilities. However, even the Huai-nan Tzu noted that Sages employ standards: "Now one who relies upon his ears and eyes to hear and see troubles his form but isn't enlightened, one who uses knowledge and thought to govern embitters his mind without achievement. For this reason the Sage unifies his standards for measure and never changes what is appropriate or his constant measures." 45

Moreover, given that knowledge is extensive but human life short, without learning experientially derived standards, it will be impossible to discern and judge, to make estimations and realize conclusions:

Human knowledge is shallow, while things are always inexhaustibly changing. When someone who previously did not know something now knows it, it is not because they personally experienced it but because they acquired it through learning. Now when things are frequently seen, people recognize them; when affairs are frequently attempted, they become capable of performing them. Through misfortune one learns to make preparations, through difficulty discerns the convenient. Doesn't it require technique to observe the knowledge of a thousand years in a single lifetime through the unchanging theories of the past and present wherein the patterns of the Tao are all fully present? If someone wants to discriminate high and low but cannot, if you teach

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them to use sighting tubes and the water level, they will be pleased. If they want to distinguish the light and heavy but have no means, if you give them a balance and steelyard, they will be happy. If they want to know the distant and near but cannot, if you teach them the method of the golden eye, they will be elated. So how much the more so knowing how to respond to an amorphous, ever-changing world? 46

From another perspective this same argument was advanced by Tung Chung-shu for employing the Ch'un Ch'iu as the ultimate guide and measure: "The Tao of the Ch'un Ch'iu is to honor Heaven and model on antiquity. Even someone with a skillful hand cannot form squares and circles without resorting to the compass and rule. Even those with sensitive ears cannot adjust the five notes without employing the six pitch pipes. Even those with wise minds cannot tranquilize All under Heaven without perusing the former kings. Thus the Tao bequeathed by the former kings is equally the standards and pipes for All under Heaven." 47

Other Issues and Perceptions

Any reader with even minimal knowledge of contemporary intelligence practices perusing China's philosophical and political works will invariably note perceptive assertions that reflect important issues and illuminate difficulties. However numerous, being scattered and isolated, they represent fleeting insights derived from observing and pondering human experience rather than any systematized, objectively directed consideration. Although innately interesting, a simple enumeration of them for some twenty pages would not prove particularly valuable. Nevertheless, two issues merit at least brief note: the concept of correctness in names and the nature of human activity and inherent biases. The former, eventually dubbed the doctrine of the rectification of names, received its greatest impetus from Confucius's famous statement on government essentials: "Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister a minister, the father a father, and the son a son." 48 Even though much verbiage has been devoted to explicating this brief utterance, it simply means that people should fulfill the duties and obligations of the roles they find thrust upon them by the world at large. More abstractly, names and reality 

should correspond, so Confucius's prescriptive notion is eventually reversed and etherealized to become an entire doctrine of names needing to be correct for functions to be performed. Other thinkers, ranging from the Taoist and Mohists to

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such so-called Logicians at Kung-sun Lung-tzu, tackled aspects of the question, but the prevalent view among martial experts and government officials grappling with intelligence issues is perhaps best expressed in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu: "When names are correct there is order, when names are lost there is chaos. Licentious theories cause names to be lost, for when they prevail, the inappropriate is taken as appropriate, the nonexistent as the existent, the incorrect as correct, the correct as incorrect." 49 Obviously the ramifications of misnaming the "weak" or "dispirited" when applied to an enemy could be horrendous.

The second issue, the viability of dissonant information, similarly impacts upon the army's fortunes and the state's survival. As earlier examples have already illustrated, a lack of openness to divergent views, to information that does not confirm predetermined perceptions or, even worse, contravenes the individual's personal interests, tends to result in such information being rejected, whether accurate or not. Consequently, decisions that fail to acknowledge discordant data and disagreeable conclusions invariably prove incorrect. Two proclivities were noted in the philosophical writings. First, men tend to be deeply committed, virtually buried within their own views. Thus Hsün-tzu observed: "When a person has something he has acquired (by dint of effort), he only fears to hear of its negative aspects. Relying upon his own attainment to observe other methods, he only fears to hear about their attractiveness."50 The Huai-nan Tzu similarly noted: "Now men take as worthy what they are pleased with and speak about what they like. Everyone in the world esteems Worthies, some to be ordered, some to be chaotic. It is not that they deceive themselves, but that they seek what agrees with them." 51 Moreover, "man's misfortune is to be obfuscated by some minor aspect and thereby unenlightened about the great patterns." 52 

The Pao P'u-tzu concurred, stating, "Most men are wise in minor matters but stupid in great ones."53 An explanation is perhaps found in another Pao P'u-tzu statement: "It is normal human nature to esteem the distant and slight the nearby. Trusting their ears and doubting their eyes, this is a misfortune of both antiquity and the present."54

Second, there is the problem of background and learning, for without adequate experience, including on the battlefield, the visible may be neither understood nor noticed. People naturally commence from their experience: "Now whenever men undertake affairs, without exception they all start with what they know, order their thoughts, ponder, and calculate, and thereafter dare to decide their plans. That some of them prove profitable, others harmful, is the difference between stupidity and wisdom." 55 This being true, some structuring must oc

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cur before the person reaches the stage of minimal wisdom, becomes capable of evaluating and analyzing:

Achievement precedes fame; affairs precede achievement; words precede affairs. If one doesn't know affairs, how can he comprehend words? If he doesn't understand emotions, how can he speak appropriately? Men must have something by which they instruct their minds, only thereafter can they listen to theories. If they do not instruct their minds, they have to train them in studies. If they do not, it has never been the case from antiquity until the present that they could listen to theories. 56

True in all realms, it would be particularly so in the military sphere, with its mission and specialized knowledge. As the Lü-shih Ch'un- ch'iu pointed out: "Knowing that one does not know is best. The misfortune of those who are mistaken is not knowing but thinking that they know. Many things seem to be of the same category but are not, thus they lose their state and destroy their people." 57

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11 Knowing Men

EVALUATING MEN AND MOTIVES, crucial to many aspects of intelligence work, has a sophisticated history in traditional China, where enormous time and energy were spent in trying to fathom others, determine the implication of actions, and estimate the likelihood of attacks and subversion. Unfortunately, apart from briefly discussing character flaws in commanders and offering a few cursory thoughts on the qualities required for making appointments, the military writings little ponder the topic. Therefore, to examine the concepts found in general consciousness and elucidate the problems and methods proposed for evaluating men, whether in the abstract or within concrete situations where failure might fate an agent to death, recourse must be to the political and philosophical works from China's intellectually formative Warring States period. Because the factors are many and the concepts extensive, a somewhat lengthy digression is required to adequately delimit the concerns confronting anyone responsible for fathoming character and discerning hidden motives behind often complex facades.

Chih jen, "knowing men," was an all-encompassing term for a concept emphasized in the Warring States period when a state's very survival came to depend upon selecting and employing loyal men of ability. In actuality there were many dimensions to this problematic process, several of which evolved into the distinct traditions of emphasis extensively discussed in the following pages. However, perhaps the most famous element subsumed by the idea of knowing men was the almost mythic act of recognizing the true worth of some lowly, ignominious individual who had been forced to dwell in obscurity until the critical moment. Although the unknown might come from any economic or political level, the lower and more degrading the level was, the more striking the contrast with subsequent events was. Moreover, the act of recognition often created a psychological bond

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between the two members in a dramatically forged relationship, a felt debt for which the person essentially mortgaged his life 

and future. Kuan Chung's remarks about why he mourned for Pao Shu-ya vividly illustrates the intensity of this bond: "Those who gave me birth were my parents; he who knew me was Pao Shu-ya. A gentleman will die for one who knows him, so how much more will he feel grief upon his death?" 1 When necessary, these men would repay their benefactors with their very lives, avenge insults, and eliminate threats. Such was the material of stories, several of which are preserved in the Shih Chi, particularly in the collected biographies found in the chapter entitled "The Assassins."2

Many Sages and wise counselors were similarly discovered in miserable circumstances or among common tradesmen while maintaining the posture of a recluse. According to one of China's best-known stories, the T'ai Kung (whose biography appeared in the initial section) appeared in the peripheral state of Chou virtually out of nowhere after wandering as a commoner for many years; he was discovered while fishing on the banks of the Wei River. His apparent strategic contribution to the Chou's rise and their eventual vanquishing of the Shang impressed upon subsequent generations the importance of knowing men, recognizing talent, and cultivating the skills to evaluate character and intent.

Knowing men was also considered increasingly critical to government and the wielding of power late in the Spring and Autumn period, and to the moral life of Confucians in the Warring States era. By then the wisdom and acumen necessary for selecting men were deemed two of the critical virtues demarking the great Sage rulers of antiquity, the Shang Shu even defining the essence of government as knowing men and settling the people. 3 Rulers were responsible for knowing men, whereas their subordinates, who were entrusted with actual administration, had to be knowledgeable about governmental affairs. Thus not only would the realm be well governed, but also the tasks of rulership would become minimal, allowing the monarch to enjoy prosperity and tranquillity.

There was a second tradition probably originating with Confucius that held the chün-tzu (perfected man) and anyone else aspiring to the role of the righteous and benevolent should know men, such knowledge being critical to their intercourse 

with the world. Confucius not only defined knowledge as "knowing men," 4 but also added, "Do not be concerned you are not known to men, but that you do not know men." 5 Furthermore, the idea that one should associate only with men intent on moral self-cultivation demanded that people be constantly scrutinized to prevent inimical friendships. Conversely, Con

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fucius proclaimed that failing to recognize potential comrades along the path would constitute an equally tragic loss: "Not to speak with someone who may be spoken with is to lose the man. To speak with someone who should not be spoken with is to lose one's words. The wise do not lose men, nor do they lose their words." 6

The third dominant orientation in evaluating men, one essential to intelligence activities, focused upon discerning thoughts and motives in context. Furthermore, in the attempt to determine what a person might be thinking, what motives his face might conceal, the issues of character and duplicity quickly arose. One of traditional China's major psychological thrusts thus pondered man's ability to create facades to successfully conceal thoughts and character. Two viewpoints received support: Some believed human behavior to be essentially transparent, others that it could easily obscure intentions and motives, making the process of evaluating uncertain even under optimal circumstances. Attempts to fathom character equally stimulated questions about the criteria that might be employed, whether certain characteristics would not invariably prove revealing. Actions and attitudes in intense situations were particularly believed to express mind and mood, especially behavior in the obligatory forms of etiquette and emotions in the rites of marriage, mourning, and other emotionally charged experiences.

A number of analytic approaches evolved, the criteria thus advanced becoming increasingly sophisticated and detailed from the Warring States period through the inception of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's first dynastic history in the Former Han. Although the criteria never remained static, for the purpose of explicating the issues besetting anyone attempting to evaluate men and 

motives for political or military intelligence purposes in pre-Ch'ing China, our discussion will focus on ideas current in the Han Dynasty, whether incorporated in earlier texts or expressed in the works of the Han period writers. Some differences will be elucidated, but the main references will be to anecdotes and representative material almost certainly known to members of the educated class entrusted with governing and defending the state. (The frequent illiteracy of commanders and generals in the earlier periods did not preclude their acquisition of such knowledge through discussions and oral study, particularly as "books" were mainly bulky bundles of bamboo strips or rolls of silk until the Han, and the traditional method of teaching was verbal.) The philosophic and political works naturally contain the most sophisticated theoretical discussions, as well as innumerable anecdotes and brief characterizations, but extensive developments are also found in the ritual texts, medical writings, and dynastic histories.

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Ssu-ma Ch'ien, author of the Shih Chi and progenitor of Chinese dynastic historical writing, even created personality archetypes that formed the basis for the classifications underlying many of his individual collected biographies. Remarkably consistent, these archetypes not only could be employed by later readers to recognize people, but also embodied his personal insights and the collective wisdom of his era. The final culmination of this effort was an even more detailed text, Liu Shao Jen-wu Chih, 7 which followed in the tradition of the earlier "Wen-wang Kuan" (The Offices of King Wen) chapter of the TaTai Li-chi, correlating abilities and offices, a trend that apparently gained strength only in the early Han. 8 Unfortunately, the extensive materials found in the dynastic histories, including the biographies, Ssu-ma Ch'ien's archetypes, and Liu Shao's lengthy work, must be left for another study, even though they clearly express an appreciation of personality types and consistency of tendency within character.

Basic Problems and Questions 

Despite his stress upon knowing men, Confucius offered few pronouncements on how to realize this elusive goal beyond implying that good men will practice the virtues he much espoused. When specifically asked how to evaluate men for office and recognize the wise, virtuous, and capable, his answer in the Analects was indirect and of little practical value: "If you appoint those you know, will others neglect those whom you do not know?" 9

Even more fundamental than the problem of method is the question of knowability itself, adverse experience prodding several thinkers to ponder man's opaqueness and openly doubt whether men might really be understood. For example, at the beginning of the Later Han dynasty Yang Hsiung noted that natural phenomena, being visible on a large scale, are easily observed, but good and evil, being basically a question of man's interior, of hidden character and motives, are both difficult to know. 10 Confucius himself shied away from terming individual men "benevolent" or "good" even when their behavior merited praise, being unsure of their true natures. 11 Furthermore, the evaluator's own qualifications frequently prove problematic. According to tradition, the Sages of antiquity, being paragons of talent and ability, had an innate power to fathom men and recognize others marked by similar excellence, causing more than one Warring States author to lament that only men distinguished by extraordinary talent could possibly recognize the merits of the obscure. 12 Accordingly, only through arduous study might a select few, never the ordinary hordes, become adept at knowing others.

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The question of knowability tended to be phrased in terms of whether men are transparent or not--whether their behavior, countenance, attitude, clothing, or some other aspect will betray them. Knowability itself can thus be resolved into a brief series of issues: Are men transparent or not? If men are knowable, are there any criteria or methods by which they can be fathomed? What are these criteria or methods? What problems are entailed by perspective? What problems are posed by the talent and moral character of the perceiver? This topic, with its multiple aspects, received considerable discussion in 

traditional China and was perhaps the object of more psychological speculation than even human nature and the emotions.

Not all their contemplations remained abstract and ethereal. Administrative policies and measures were formulated by Han Fei-tzu and others, while various criteria for selecting men to office, such as found in the "Offices of King Wen," were codified. Even the early medical writings, although approaching the subject from a unified psychophysiological perspective, evolved detailed personality indicators correlated with physique types. Speculation quickly stimulated the development of operational methods and spawned numerous individual applications, resulting in the classic evaluations of Confucius and his original disciples, among others. Clearly the watchword during China's formative intellectual period was "there is nothing harder than knowing men." 13 Moreover, as Shen Chien observed, men also differ with respect to the relative clarity or obviousness of their emotions and character, some appearing very open while yet being secretive, others appearing secretive while yet open. 14 The task was rendered more difficult by the problem of penetrating deceptive facades, an additional complexity beyond the fundamental problem of knowability. Failure to be cognizant of it could result in fatal errors.

There are two basic problems, the first being the questionable correlation between a person's invisible will, intent, thoughts, plans, and emotions and his behavior in the world. The most famous example employed to suggest the difficulty of understanding motives was that of a madman and his pursuers running east, previously noted in the basic intelligence section. The second problem stems from the simple misperceptions that frequently plague even the most common situations. For example, the Tseng-tzu Chia-yü records the case of an illfated man from Ch'u who covered his mouth whenever he spoke to the king in order to please him, but the king interpreted it as a deliberate insult and had him executed. 15 Motive and perception thus dramatically diverged and the man perished.

Compounding the perplexity, many of the concrete techniques suggested for fathoming men were often attacked as 

fundamentally deficient. A famous example was Mencius's assertion that he could dis

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cern a person's emotional state from the pupil of his eye. However, Wang Ch'ung disputed his claim by asserting that people have predetermined physical dispositions at birth; therefore the pupil, being part of the person's constitution, simply cannot reflect character or mood. 16 Other obvious criteria, such as name, reputation, appearance, words, and behavior, were found to be inconsistent when critically scrutinized.

The mind was therefore frequently said to be difficult to know, hidden and unsusceptible to the usual forms of scrutiny, even in writings stressing the importance of fathoming men and propounding likely methods. For example, the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, which advised looking at the signs visible in the person's countenance, behavior, inclination, and similar aspects, conceded that predicting behavior becomes impossible when the desires are unconstrained: "Affairs follow the mind, the mind follows the desires. In one whose desires have no measure, the mind is without measure. If his mind has no measure, then what he will do cannot be known." 17 Moreover, there are no visible traces to the mind: "Man's mind is hidden and concealed, difficult to see." 18 Accordingly, Confucius was among the first to question whether appearance and behavior truly reflect a man's nature or are merely superficial, socialized manifestations: "Is someone whose discussion is sincere and correct a perfected man? Or is it only a formidable appearance?" 19 To his regret he discovered the inadequacy of such criteria as appearance, language, deportment, and manner. 20

The military writers, for whom an error in judgment could entail bitter consequences, only infrequently discussed the process of evaluating men. Particularly interesting is an enumeration of fifteen discrepancies in appearance and inner substance attributed to the T'ai Kung:

There are fifteen cases where a knight's external appearance and internal character do not cohere. These are: He appears to 

be a Worthy but actually is immoral. He seems warm and conscientious but is a thief. His countenance is reverent and respectful but heart is insolent. Externally he is incorruptible and circumspect, but he lacks respect.

He appears perceptive and sharp but lacks such talent. He appears profound but lacks all sincerity. He appears adept at planning but is indecisive. He appears to be decisive and daring but is incapable.

He appears guileless but is not trustworthy. He appears confused and disoriented but on the contrary is loyal and substantial. He appears to engage in specious discourse but is a man of merit and achievement.

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He appears courageous but is afraid. He seems severe and remote but on the contrary easily befriends men. He appears forbidding but on the contrary is quiet and sincere. He appears weak and insubstantial, yet when dispatched outside the state, there is nothing he does not accomplish, no mission that he does not execute successfully.

Those whom the world disdains the Sage values. Ordinary men do not know these things, only great wisdom can discern the edge of these matters. This is because the knight's external appearance and internal character do not visibly cohere. 21

Finally, Wang Ch'ung noted that since the values normally employed to assess character stress conventional appearance, any man who maintains a facade of virtue and civility will be marked a gentleman and probably recommended for office, whereas the unconventional will simply be neglected. 22 This clearly undermines the reliability of using appearance, fame, and reputation, a dilemma subsequently considered in detail.

Selecting Men

Apart from the Confucians, who were oriented toward piercing disingenuous behavior, the main purpose for evaluating men was to select them for appointment to office, employment as personal advisers, and participation in clandestine missions. Several texts warned against allowing minor "defects" or 

character flaws to obscure a man's real worth, advising that few men are so perfectly virtuous as to escape critical scrutiny unscathed. The early Shang Shu asserts: "Do not be annoyed or impatient with the stubborn, do not seek completion in any one individual." 23 The Huai-nan Tzu is particularly clear: "It is human nature that everyone has some shortcoming. If overall the person is correct, then even though they may have small faults, they are not enough to be considered an impediment. If in the large they are not correct, then even though someone may have a local reputation for virtue, it is not enough to raise them to major office." 24 Consequently the emphasis should be upon the whole man, upon his general traits rather than some minor point or past error that, even if not precluding future greatness, would in a strict moral context be sufficient cause for rejection. Consequently, in a well-known story Duke Huan of Ch'i, the first hegemon, declined to have a man's reputation investigated in his hometown because "if we ask about it, I am afraid that he might have some small faults, and because of these minor transgressions, we would forget the great goodness of the man. This is the way rulers lose the empire's tal

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ented officers." 25 This statement was made in the face of a rather decided trend toward evaluating men by their associates, environment, past behavior, families, and hometowns because what a man's behavior revealed in these situations should be the most telling of all.

The question of methods constantly reappeared, with some authors venturing to suggest that objective techniques might be employed. However, favoritism was an obvious obstacle that could easily render any attempt at objectivity invalid. Thus the Han-shih Wai-chuan noted:

When the ruler of men wants to recruit archers who excel at shooting far and striking small targets, he flaunts rank and generous rewards in order to summon them. Within he does not favor his sons or younger brothers; without he does not conceal men from distant quarters, but selects those who can hit the target. Isn't this what is termed "the great Tao"? Even the Sages could not alter it. However, if in wanting to administer the state and govern the people, in seeking 

ministers, associates, and attendants, the ruler alone is not impartial but only prizes and employs sycophants and his cohorts, isn't this termed "erroneous"? 26

Similarly, the early military classic entitled the Ssu-ma Fa advised seeking out the talented even among the masses rather than confining the search only to men of rank. 27 Thereafter their words and actions should be compared, and if they cohere, these men should be appointed, with subsequent observation being imperative.

Problematic Theory of Transparency

The assumption that men are fundamentally knowable, termed "the theory of transparency" for convenience, holds that the major and minor aspects of human behavior invariably express an individual's true character, motives, and intent. It does not necessarily deny the ability to assume a facade, but it does assert that such fabrications will eventually be pierced by the knowledgeable. Confucius, who made several statements to the contrary that equally raise questions about knowability, also seems to have been a strong proponent of human fathomability: "Look at how someone acts, observe his reasons, and investigate what he rests in. How will the man be concealed?" 28

Scattered throughout the texts of the Warring States period are concise arguments defending the possibility of determining motives and intentions. Grounded upon analyses of human character and emotions, they represent well-conceived approaches to the question of whether men can be fathomed or not. A passage embedded in the

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Huai-nan Tzu stating that from the small and near the distant and large can be determined embodies the most dogmatic assertion of fathomability to be found anywhere, the author being certain that minor, incidental events invariably demark the larger outlines of character. 29 The Huai-nan Tzu passage thus evinces a positive commitment, despite an acute consciousness of the problems posed by people feigning emotions and behavior and such negative examples as Kou- 

chien deceiving Fu-ch'ai. Because of this human ability to manipulate appearance and create self-serving pretenses, officials must develop the skills and acumen necessary to penetrate deliberate facades. 30 Were people simple and transparent, few states would have perished: "If people could be made so that what they harbor within would be what they display without, so that what they harbor within would match what they manifest without as the two halves of a tally do, there wouldn't be any lost states or extinguished bloodlines." 31 The Huainan Tzu also recognized that the problems entailed by confusing appearances are not confined to the human realm, but also distort the perception of inanimate things in the form of semblances, as previously discussed. However, despite such contradictory observations, the author still considered it basically possible to evaluate men by carefully observing the minuscule and minute.

Mencius believed that the pupil of the eye would naturally reveal a man's inner nature as good or evil: "In the human body nothing surpasses the pupil of the eye in excellence. The pupil of the eye cannot conceal a man's evil. If he is upright within his chest, the pupil of the eye will be bright, but if he is not upright within his chest, the pupil will be dull. If you listen to his words and observe his pupils, how will a man be concealed?" 32 Although a simplistic scheme capable only of affirmation or denial, it still constitutes a strong assertion of transparency. However, he was not alone in suggesting that a person's eyes might unknowingly betray him. Apart from the commonly found assumption that they reflect courage and cowardice, an interesting theory of behavioral discrepancy keyed to the eyes is preserved in a predictive evaluation:

[In 574 B.C.,] when the feudal lords were convened at Chou, Duke Tan Hsiang, observing that Duke Li of Chin looked out far and stepped high, advised the duke of Lu, "Chin will soon suffer from rebellion."

The duke of Lu inquired, "Dare I ask if it will be an act of Heaven or because of men?"

He replied: "I am not a court astrologer, so how would I know the Tao of Heaven? I deduced from the Duke of Chin's manner that he would shortly suffer misfortune. 

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"Now in the perfected man the eyes determine the intent and the feet follow the eyes. Therefore, when you observe his manner, you can know his mind. When the eyes dwell in what is proper, the feet will appropriately pace it off. However, at this moment the Duke of Chin looks out far and his steps are high, so his eyes are not upon his body and his steps are not in accord with his eyes. His mind definitely has something unusual in it. When the eyes and body are not in accord, how can someone long persist?" 33

Several examples that attest to the accuracy of concealed motives being deduced from observing someone so self-absorbed in his plans for mounting an attack that he failed to perceive his immediate surroundings appear in the Warring States writings and subsequent dynastic histories. 34 Belief in the eye as an indicator of inner nature was thus not confined to Mencius alone, with one passage even portraying Confucius employing the eyebrows as prime indicators:

Confucius had an interview with a guest. After the guest departed, Yen Yüan commented, "Your guest is benevolent."

Confucius said, "His heart is filled with hatred, but his mouth with excellence. Whether he is benevolent I do not know. His words centered on benevolence."

Yen Yüan flushed with embarrassment. Confucius said, "Even a hundred feet of dirt cannot obscure the brilliance of an excellent piece of jade a foot in length, or a hundred fathoms of water obscure the luster of a superlative pearl one inch in diameter. Now the body, encompassing the mind, provides but an extremely thin concealment. If a man is congenial and good within, his eyebrows and eyelashes will manifest it. If there is some defect within him, his eyebrows and eyelashes will manifest it. If there is some defect within him, his eyebrows and eyelashes will be unable to conceal it."35

A verse from the Book of Odes then summarized the passage's thrust, expressing complete faith in man's ability to know others: 

The drums and bells are within the palace, But their sound is heard without.

Artifice and deception cannot endure,

The empty and vacuous cannot be maintained.

The medical writings, much of whose content would be common knowledge, even formulated physiological explanations for the eye's

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symptomatic sensitivity: "The mind is the concentrated essence of the five viscera, the eye its portal, and the complexion its glow. Thus when a man has virtue, the harmony of his ch'i is seen in the eye, whereas when it is lost or he is in sorrow, it is known from his complexion." 36 This passage reflects the concept that men are predisposed to physique, character, and illness at birth, so that a person whose viscera are all correct will normally be good and healthy. 37

An early, widely accredited passage from the famous I Ching advises how a man's composure and attitude will betray his contemplation of evil: "The language of someone about to revolt is ashamed; who has doubts in the depths of his heart, rambling. The language of an auspicious man is sparse; that of the fierce, excessive. The language of one who slanders the good is frivolous; that of one who has lost his principles, contorted." 38 Another section of the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu unquestionably asserts that a man's intentions and thoughts can be perceived from his countenance and behavior, that character may even be fathomed without words. 39 In support it cites the case of Confucius understanding a man's intent from his eyes alone and also a number of concrete cases in which the participants, due to a disjunction with the aspects expected within a particular context, are understood to be plotting some treacherous action.

A dramatic example of discerning intentions from countenance and attitude within a political-military context is found in Chih Po's self- destruction, an absorbing historical episode dating from the very beginning of the Warring States period. 40 Shortly after mighty Chin's powerful ministerial families had sundered the state into six segments, Chih Po, head of the most powerful 

family, coerced the powerful enclaves of Han, Wei, and Chao into a joint action to destroy the Fan and Chung-hang clans and annex their territory, only to then demand that his allies grant him additional land from their own domains. Even though all three states suffered similar coercion, only Han and Wei decided to appease him based on the reasoning seen in Han Kang-tzu's advice to his ruler: "Chih Po's character is to love profit and act recklessly and brutally. If we do not grant what he has requested, he will certainly inflict his army upon Han. By acceding, Chih Po will be inclined to continue his villainy and invariably request territory from some other state. Someone will certainly refuse, and when they do, Chih Po will attack them. In this way we can avoid misfortune and wait for the situation to evolve."

Although all three states developed identical analyses, only Chao had the courage to refuse Chih Po's demands and the foresight to immediately prepare for war, the ruler swiftly ensconcing himself in the bastion of Chin-yang. Chih Po then cowered Han and Wei into joining

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him in a concerted attack on Chin-yang, offering the additional inducement of equal shares in Chao's territory upon its defeat. After Chin-yang had been flooded and besieged for three years, Chao's hopeless situation prompted the high official Chang Meng-t'an to undertake a secret mission designed to split the besiegers' alliance. The traditional narrative--taken here from the Han Fei-tzu, where it illustrates the adverse consequences of becoming greedy and perverse--succinctly shows the clandestine process of subversion and how to both evaluate and misread visible indicators in a concrete context:

Chang Meng-t'an secretly held a meeting with the rulers of Han and Wei and said to them: "I have heard that when the lips are lost, the teeth will feel cold. At present Chih Po is leading you two in an attack that will shortly see Chao perish. However, when we are lost, you will be next."

They replied: "We know it. However, Chih Po's character is brutal and distant. If he discovers we are plotting against him, disaster will certainly result! How can we proceed?" 

Chang Meng-t'an replied: "Any plot will proceed from your mouths into my ears alone. No other man will hear of it." The two rulers agreed to turn against Chih Po, set the day, and then dispatched Chang that very night into Chin-yang to report their planned rebellion to his ruler, Chao Hsiang-tzu. When Chao Hsiang-tzu received Chang Meng-t'an, he bowed twice before him, filled with fear and joy.

The morning after reaching an accord with Chang Meng-t'an, the two rulers went to Chih Po's court. Coming out of the headquarters gate, they encountered Chih Kuo, who thought their appearance strange and therefore went in to see Chih Po: "The facial expression on these two rulers indicates they are about to change their allegiance."

Chih Po inquired, "What indicates it?"

"Their movements were bold and attitude arrogant, unlike their previous constraint. It would be best for you to act before them."

Chih Po replied: "I formed a close alliance with these two rulers to destroy Chao and equally divide its territory into three. Because of the basis of our alliance, they would never violate it. Our armies have been exposed here at Chin-yang for three years. Now that we are about to seize it and enjoy the profits, how could they have any intent to betray me? It's certainly not possible, so drop it and don't mention it again."

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The next morning the two rulers went to Chi Po's court and again encountered Chih Kuo when they came out of the headquarters gate. Chih Kuo went in to see Chih Po and reported, "Did you inform them of what I said?"

Chih Po asked, "How did you know it?"

"This morning, when the two rulers came out from your court and saw me, their complexions changed and they glared at me. Without doubt their intentions have changed, so it would be best to kill them."

Chih Po said: "Drop it, do not speak about it again." 

Chih Kuo replied: "Impossible, you must kill them. If you cannot kill them, you should draw them closer."

Chih Po asked, "How should I draw them closer?"

Chih Kuo said: " Wei's strategist Chao Chia and Han's strategist Tuan Kuei are both capable of altering their rulers' plans. If you agree to enfeoff each of them with a district of ten thousand households upon Chao's destruction, you will ensure their rulers' intentions remain unchanged."

Chih Po replied: "If we divide Chao into three after destroying it and I further enfeoff each of them with ten thousand households, I will gain very little. It's not possible." When Chih Kuo realized his words would be ignored, he departed from the camp and even changed his clan name to Fu.

On the appointed night Chao's forces slew the troops guarding the dike's embankments and destroyed parts of them so that the water would flood Chih Po's encampment. While Chih Po's army was chaotically trying to rescue themselves from the water's onslaught, Han and Wei's forces mounted a sudden pincer attack from the two wings and Chao Hsiang-tzu led his troops in a frontal assault. They severely defeated Chih Po's army and captured Chih Po himself. 41

In concluding, Han Fei-tzu cited an opinion already common in his era: " Chih Po perished, his army was destroyed, his state was divided into three, and he became the butt of the realm's laughter. Thus I say that being greedy, perverse, and loving profit are the foundation for extinguishing your state and killing yourself."

This well-known account shows not only how appearance and countenance might effectively be employed within a battlefield context to fathom men and motives, but also how personal beliefs, emotions, and desires can prejudice analysis. Given the three years' suffering already endured by the coalition forces and the uncertainty of successfully mounting a revolt, except in historical hindsight Chih

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Po's interpretation was in fact the most probable. However, it would not have been unreasonable to undertake some simple precautions to thwart any possible defection, thereby saving himself from an ignominious death and undying fame as a paradigm of greed and stupidity rather than the glorious name he sought as the founder of a vast, unified empire! Moreover, this episode illustrates the need for vigilance in security measures, for Chang Meng-t'an was able to exit and reenter not only the besieged city, but also the very center of the besiegers' camp and successfully undertake a subversive mission by no doubt exploiting the negligence that usually accompanies "certain" victory.

Another case associated with the legendary Kuan Chung shows the simplistic but effective detection of hidden motives from demeanor and appearance:

When Duke Huan of Ch'i convened the feudal lords, Wei's ruler was tardy. Later Duke Huan held court with Kuan Chung and plotted to attack Wei [for its offensive behavior]. When he retired from court to enter the inner palace, his consort, a princess from Wei, seeing him from afar, descended the hall and bowed repeatedly before him, apologizing for the duke of Wei's offense. Duke Huan said, "I have no issue with Wei, so why are you apologizing?"

She replied: "When I saw you enter the hall, your steps were high and ch'i robust, signs that you intend to attack a state. But when you saw me, your appearance changed, evidence that you intend to strike Wei."

The next day when Duke Huan assembled his court, he requested Kuan Chung to come forward. Kuan Chung said, "Have you abandoned the attack on Wei?"

Duke Huan asked, "How did you know?"

Kuan Chung replied: "When you convened the court, you were respectful and your words were slow. When you saw me, you looked embarrassed, so I knew it."

Duke Huan commented: "Excellent! With you to govern external matters and my wife to administer the inner palace, I know I will never become the butt of the realm's laughter."42 

What Duke Huan thought to conceal and not speak about was detected by Kuan Chung in his appearance and voice and by his wife in his step and intentions. Although Duke Huan did not say anything, it was like the brilliance of a candle in the darkness of night. 43

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Perceiver's Qualifications

The question of individual variation in expressiveness, some people being more direct and open than others--their emotions literally "leaking out"--was occasionally raised in conjunction with assertions of transparency and suggestions of discernible criteria. However, it was little pursued, perhaps because of an abiding concern in the question "Transparent to whom?" Experience apart, since knowledge, intellectual abilities, and moral development are rarely uniform, people similarly differ in their ability to fathom others. Paragons such as Mencius claimed powers that ordinary men might not possess, and although Confucius seems to have been adept at character analysis, his disciples consistently erred and were constantly wondering about the ways in which the Master proceeded, prompting questions about their own moral development. For example, Confucius is often portrayed as having been capable of immediately recognizing another Sage even without speaking to him, quoted in one instance as having said: "Before I saw the man, I knew his inclinations. After I saw the man, his mind and intent were both clear."44

Tung Chung-shu asserted that only a Worthy might know another Worthy, and the Huai-nan Tzu includes a striking, all-encompassing statement: "From the exterior the sage knows the interior; from what is visible he knows what is hidden."45 The Shuo Yüan even resurrected the eyebrow theme:

The shape of the eyebrows is connected with and expressive of countenance. The tone of the sound is affected and moved by the mind. When Ning Ch'i beat on a cow horn and sang the Song of Shang, Duke Huan heard it and raised him to office. Pao Lung knelt on a rock and recited the ancient texts, and Confucius, hearing him, dismounted from his carriage. Yao and Shun, on seeing each other, did not depart from the shade 

of the mulberry tree, and when King Wen raised the T'ai Kung, it was not because of having known him for long.

When men of ability see each other, they do not await some test before they know each other. When two gentlemen meet, they do not have to be involved in financial dealings and the division of goods before they know each other's honesty, or face hardship and danger together before they know each other's courage. From the way they decide affairs they can already discern courage, from their taking and yielding can already perceive honesty. Thus when someone sees the tail of a tiger, he already knows it is larger

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than a fox, and when he sees the tusk of an elephant, knows it is larger than a cow. When one joint is seen a hundred are known. Looking at it in this way, from what can be seen one can fathom what is not yet manifest. Seeing a small joint is decidedly adequate to know the whole body. 46

Liu Shao later deduced from the limitations of class attraction that only men of the same type, whether Sages or rogues, can truly recognize each other. Thus transparency might be a circumscribed possibility at best, limited to a closed set determined by the perceiver's own character and virtues, clearly problematic in the realm of agent selection, in recognizing potential subversives among the corrupt and willful.

Two or three widely circulated stories give evidence of a common belief in the ability of wise men to fathom character and detect motives and thoughts, even though forced to observe the subjects at some distance through the use of multiple indications and comparative criteria. The most frequently recorded story concerns another incident involving Duke Huan and Hsüan Chung:

Duke Huan and Kuan Chung closed the doors and planned an attack on the state of Chü. Before their plans had been put into action they were already known throughout the state. Duke Huan angrily said to Kuan Chung: "You and I closed the doors and planned an attack on Chü. Although the plan has not yet 

been put into action, it is known throughout the state. What is the reason for it?"

Kuan Chung said, "There must be a Sage in the state."

Duke Huan said: "So. On that day there was an attendant who in placing the mat and serving the food looked up at us. It must be him." Thereupon he ordered the servers to come again, but not in turn. In a while Tung-kuo Ya arrived. The duke ordered the chief of protocol to bring him forward, seated him in the place of an honored guest, and asked, "Are you the one who spoke about attacking Chü?"

Tung-kuo Ya replied, "Yes."

Duke Huan asked: "I didn't speak publicly about attacking Chü, yet you have. What is the reason for this?"

Tung replied: "I have heard that the perfected man is good at making plans, and the common man is good at figuring them out. I thought it out." The Duke asked, "How did you figure it out?" "Happiness and joy are the appearance of bells and drums. Profundity and quietness are the appearance of mourning attire. Effusive

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fullness with the fingers and toes moving is the appearance of military affairs. On that day when I saw you two in the tower, your mouths were open and not closed. This was talking about Chü. 47 You raised your hand and pointed, your power will be inflicted on Chü. Moreover I have observed that among the minor feudal lords only Chü is not submissive, so I said you would attack it."

Duke Huan remarked: "Excellent. 'From the minute he hits upon brightness,' this is what the phrase refers to."48

The Body as Naturally Expressive

The Li Chi and similar texts advance the idea that the sound of the voice and other aspects of the body naturally express human emotions. Because the mind affects the entire body, true emotion has real external counterparts, whereas a feigned exterior is a facade that will lack the depth of actuality and 

eventually be betrayed by vestiges of actual emotions. The Huai-nan Tzu concurred, observing that apparently identical sounds may elicit dramatically different reactions because the nature and intensity of the underlying emotion are different: "The sounds were the same, but the credibility that they were able to elicit was different. This was due to the emotions involved. Thus when the mind is stricken with grief, then the songs are not happy, whereas when the mind is happy, weeping will not be sorrowful." 49 Clearly underlying emotions are thought to be amenable to detection.

However, there is an almost constant dialogue among the various possibilities and positions within the Li Chi. The basic idea is one of harmony between form and substance, expression and content. Yet there is the danger posed by the extremes of too great an uncontrolled intensity in the emotions overwhelming the idealized form, or too great a stress upon the form resulting in the absence of real content. Both are emphasized at different times. Consequently, given the perfection of form under the li, it would seem that the proper performance would accord with the context and that the absence of substance could not be detected. This is a problem that was neither raised nor even considered during the period.

Finally, there was still another theme associated with the problem of transparency: the difficulty of properly expressing actual emotional substance where attitudes, rather than emotions, were demanded, such as in the performance of filial duties. Even Confucius, who viewed filiality as natural and fundamental, lamented that "it is the

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appearance that is difficult." 50 According to Hsün-tzu (whose writings were incorporated into the Li Chi), society's various roles all have appropriate expressions associated with them. 51 Because producing the expression would be difficult, if it were to constitute the sole measure of emotional appropriateness, many would fail. Tautologically this indicates a lack of proper internal substance, essentially reaffirming the principle of transparency. However, difficulty arises because the behavior evoked by emotional substance may not necessarily cohere with the idealized expression specified by the ritual texts and 

social convention. Sincere, strenuous efforts to create the proper appearance can then only yield a socially defined facade, leading to numerous secondary and tertiary considerations. Consequently, simply proceeding on the basis of the human body being naturally expressive would not be without problems, though a quasi-belief in transparency based upon it persisted throughout Chinese history.

The Basic Principle

On the premise that all men are fundamentally alike, despite differences in emphasis and development, one fundamental assumption visible throughout the Warring States and subsequent periods was the belief that other people might be fathomed from oneself. Hsün-tzu even ventured to assert that not only are contemporaries identical, but also over the ages human nature and emotions remain alike, contrary to views depicting an ever-changing world. 52 Thus the key injunction was "Measure emotions by emotions, and man by man," meaning "Measure the emotions of others by your own emotions and other people by yourself." 53 Preparation for this commenced with oneself: "If you want to conquer others, you must first conquer yourself. If you want to discuss others, you must first discuss yourself. If you want to know men, you must first know yourself."54

The Mencius, despite the complete absence of the term "knowing men," contains the best-known example of this concept: Mencius's vaunted ability to penetrate King Hui's mind and perceive his true motives. Being pleased by their discussion, the king commented by citing the famous line from the Book of Odes that encapsulates such skills: "The Book of Odes states, 'The minds of other men, I am able to measure.' This refers to you, Master."55 This is a more limited, focused application of the general understanding early exemplified by the Sages who could project from themselves and thereby know other men. Accordingly, Mo-tzu symmetrically suggested that people might learn about themselves by using other men as their mirrors: "In antiq

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uity there was a saying, 'The chün-tzu does not use water as a mirror, but finds his mirror in men. Using water as a mirror you will see your countenance, but if you use men, you will see fortune and misfortune.'"56

Despite the use of the term "measure" in such passages on evaluating, the modern Western obsession with quantifying personality (on the assumption that quantified measures are both possible and inherently more reliable than dynamic descriptions) never appeared in ancient Chinese thought. Active tests that exploit normal human situations and employ false stimuli were conceived for evaluating character and ability, whereas some traits, such as anger, inherently include a dimension of amplitude. ("See how angry he becomes.") Tangential suggestions along the lines of "measuring" were sometimes made but never realized in either doctrine or practice, even though Mencius also states: "Only after weighing is the weight of things known, only after measuring is their length known. All things are so, the mind especially." 57 Perhaps the closest approach may be found in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, which compared choosing men with a carpenter's work: "It is like the chief carpenter building a room in the palace. He measures the size and knows the materials required, estimates the effort, and knows the number of men."58

Constancy

Another observation fundamental to the project of fathoming men-- the essential consistency of human behavior--might be termed "the principle of constancy" for convenience, although it was really an assumption rarely made explicit, except in highly concrete form. 59 Its importance cannot be overestimated, for without the assumption that human behavior is essentially consistent and therefore expressive of core character, projecting future behavior and discerning patterns and personality in current and past actions become impossible. Moreover, because it was popularly believed that facades are difficult to maintain indefinitely, the longer a person evinces a particular behavioral pattern, the more likely it actually manifests his "true" nature. (When this assumption was consciously emphasized in fathoming men, the perceiver 

apparently became oblivious to certain other problems, such as the effects of environment and the plasticity of human nature. The application of principles in evaluating men was thus selective rather than deliberately exclusive.)

Confucius's evaluation of Yang Hu, a man who had been forced to flee from one state to another because he proved greedy and disloyal

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each time he acquired power, provides a simple example of projecting behavior on the basis of constancy. Based upon this repeated behavioral pattern, Confucius accurately predicted that Yang Hu would certainly suffer an ignominious end. More generally, Mencius subsequently stated: "A man who ceases his efforts where he should not will abandon them anywhere. A man who is parsimonious with those with whom he should be generous will be parsimonious everywhere."60 Granting that people generally acquire fixed habits early in life, a man's end may therefore be foreseen by midlife: "Someone who is still disliked at forty years of age will end by being so." 61

The principle of constancy is also evident in significant situations that require its existence and applicability to be routinely emphasized because the principle underpins any extrapolation of situational dynamics to analogous circumstances. The family was particularly viewed as a proving ground for children and a stage where character might be perceived prior to a person's entrance into society at large. The respectful, fraternal, and, above all, filial person would normally be expected to behave similarly once thrust into the web of real-world relationships. Respect for clan elders and filial behavior toward parents presumably grounded a person's attitude toward his elders and superiors in general, including the ruler, should the respectful person be fortunate enough to attain power and position. Therefore the Analects quotes Tzu Yu, one of Confucius's prominent disciples, as saying: "Few men who have been filial and brotherly have ever been inclined to oppose their superiors. No one disinclined to oppose his superiors ever liked to cause rebellion."62 

Criteria for Evaluating

If the assumption that people may be fathomed is allowed, the immediate problem becomes whether any reliable criteria exist and what they might be. From the early Chou onward it was widely felt that many external signs might indicate a person's character and motives, the most frequently cited including words, actions, desires, countenance, manner, bearing, adherence to the li (etiquette or normative forms of behavior), physical features, and the eye. The Lü-shih Ch'un- ch'iu even approvingly noted that a few famous men were able to "physiognomize" horses, to detect their inner or true worth by gazing on their exteriors, and men, states, and affairs were thought to be equally amenable to such external scrutiny. 63 Still another view held that a man's character and qualifications could be detected from his works, achievements, and creations, 64 with Wang Ch'ung believing that the writings of unknown scholars could be similarly investi

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gated. 65 Finally there were proponents who extrapolated from exceptional talent (such as singing) because any expert attainment was thought to indicate a man whose overall abilities far exceeded mere singular skills. 66

The Puzzle of Reputation

Officials selecting men for positions or missions frequently relied upon fame and reputation. Particularly when an individual was closely identified with important deeds, well-known virtuous acts, or other highly visible accomplishments, his talents were felt to surpass the ordinary, his character to have been revealed by his works. Mind and character being intangible, such historical evidence was generally felt to provide incontrovertible evidence. However, doubts were still raised about the validity of fame and reputation, skeptics being troubled by the problem of motivation and the difficulty of distinguishing between actual deeds and mere reputation, especially because rapidly growing reputations were rarely investigated. 67 Moreover, it was well known that fame might be manipulated and a virtuous image deliberately crafted through highly visible acts of sacrifice, daring, or incorruptibility. Many 

men consciously manipulated their images, and some even died just to create a name for posterity, particularly if they were not as virtuous as those who jumped into rivers or perished in forest fires rather than betray their values. Throughout Chinese history the range of opinion on the possibilities of discerning character thus extended from complete disbelief in the reliability of fame as a valid indication of worth, to complete faith in it as the most reliable indicator. Tempering measures that adjusted for the tendency of stories to become exaggerated and the fanciful to creep in, to distinguish between fame and actual accomplishments, were devised. Even though achievements were considered highly reliable indicators, gaining full knowledge of them was a problem in itself.

Confucius apparently grappled with the problem of reputation, pondering whether there could be any substance to reports of virtue and vice, and decided further investigation would always be required because numerous factors affect public opinion: "When the masses hate someone, you must investigate it. When the masses like someone, you must investigate it." 68 Even the very founders of the Chou dynasty purportedly struggled with this difficulty, according to the Six Secret Teachings:

If the ruler takes those that the world commonly praises as being Worthies, and those that they condemn as being worthless, then the larger cliques will advance and the smaller ones will retreat.

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In this situation groups of evil individuals will associate together to obscure the Worthy. Loyal subordinates will die even though innocent. And perverse subordinates will obtain rank and position through empty fame. In this way, as turbulence continues to grow in the world, the state cannot avoid danger and destruction. 69

Although popular opinion might provide an initial basis for consideration, a better indication was felt to be the character of the people making such recommendations: "Tzu Kung inquired, 'What about someone loved by all the people of his village?' 

Confucius replied, 'It is still insufficient evidence [for goodness].' 'What if all the people of his village hate him?' Confucius replied: 'It is still insufficient evidence [for evil]. It would be preferable that the good people of the village love him and the bad hate him.'"70

Mencius, who felt that new appointments naturally disrupt the established social order, displace members of prominent families, offend the ruler's relatives, and raise the lowly over the honorable, continued Confucius's thoughts when queried by a ruler about the problem of reputation and approbation:

When your attendants all say that a man is worthy, it is not yet certain. When your high officials all say that someone is worthy, it is not yet certain. When all the citizens of the state say that someone is worthy, investigate, and if you find him to be worthy, employ him.

When all your attendants say a man is unworthy, it is not yet certain. When all your high officials say that someone is unworthy, it is not yet certain. When all the citizens of the state say someone is unworthy, investigate, and if he is unworthy, dismiss him. 71

Thus generally the ruler--and by implication anyone else entrusted with responsibility for selecting and tasking men--should not rely upon the uncorroborated judgments of others, but where an opinion is widely held, determine for himself whether a man matches his reputation.

Although most other thinkers gave greater or lesser credence to fame and reputation, many saw at least some likelihood of substance in a good reputation and suggested appropriate techniques for further consideration. For example, the Ta-Tai Li-chi concluded that if the people generally approve of some aspects of a man and the reverse, "there must be some substance in it." 72 Parts of the Hsin Hsü found public approbation an inadequate recommendation, but also its ab

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sence a recommendation against employing someone. 73 The Chung Lun advocated evaluating the opinion of the masses, never trusting reputation alone, always opting for self-reliance 

when one's conclusions differ. 74 However, Shen Chien advocated a middle path--not necessarily relying on others nor oneself, but considering all aspects of the man. 75 Finally, a section in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu even asserted that words that report past events, particularly the ancient past, are to be doubted--events may be reported out of context, and they should be evaluated with reference to general principles and human emotions to determine whether they are conceivable or not. In this fashion excessive credence will be avoided and the evaluator will be protected from errors. 76

A number of authors also pointed out that fame, achievements, and the attainment of high office depend upon fate and destiny. Quite simply, without opportunity even the most talented individuals go unnoticed and die forgotten; without ever having been entrusted with power, no man can sufficiently display his character or manifest his abilities. Even Confucians would languish unknown without challenges and the temptations of authority and influence.

Appearance

Appearance, comprising physical characteristics, manner, and bearing, provides another foundation for evaluating. Not easily dismissed, it probably constituted the most frequently employed basis for making judgments in traditional China, just as in the West today. Difficulties were similarly envisioned by a number of thinkers, engendering a general skepticism of the reliability of appearance alone. Again Confucius was among the first to regret having based an evaluation solely upon behavior and manner, 77 and Mencius found that appearance usually reflects a person's power and position, that people assume airs appropriate to their station and role, complicating the effort to perceive underlying character. 78 However, unlike the dubious attitude displayed toward words, greater confidence was allotted evaluating by general appearance even though the latter might be a deliberate semblance designed to attain certain ends, merely an external but necessary acquiescence in the real world. Again, appearances that persist were thought more likely to reflect the interior man. A typical middle ground was struck by Hsün-tzu, who believed that an individual's personal habits and choice of clothes would betray his intent. 

79 Therefore, someone who wore antique clothes and visibly preserved ancient ways, rather than succumbing to the customs of a decadent age, would presumably be a conservative scholar bent on maintaining past

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virtues. 80 (Of course, as Han Fei-tzu frequently noted, such a person might also be an eccentric or someone trying to draw attention to himself as a moral exemplar. Although Hsün-tzu did not mention these possibilities, he obviously was not ignorant of them.) Similarly a man who overstepped the sumptuary regulations to wear the clothing reserved to a higher rank was obviously presumptuous. Should it be the costume of a king or ruler, he could be planning a revolt, as in the following example from the Spring and Autumn period:

At the assembly of the feudal lords at Kuo, Prince Wei of Ch'u was preceded by two men bearing halberds. Shu-sun Mu-tzu commented, "The prince of Ch'u is splendidly dressed, more like a ruler than a mere high official."

Cheng Tzu-p'i said, "I have doubts about him having two men wielding halberds precede him."

Ts'ai Tzu-chia commented: "Ch'u is a great state, while Prince Wei is its prime minister. Isn't it appropriate that he have two men precede him with halberds?"

Mu-tzu replied: "It should not be so. The emperor has his tiger guards to train people in martial skills. The feudal lords have their clan guards to defend them against disaster and harm. High officials have footmen to undertake affairs. Officers have secondary chariots so that they may race off on missions. Now Prince Wei is merely a high official, yet he wears the clothes of one of the feudal lords, so he must certainly intend to become one. Someone without such ambition wouldn't dare enter among the feudal lords while wearing clothes suitable to their rank.

"Now clothes are the pattern of the mind just as the crack patterns appearing on a turtle shell when you heat the inside for divination. If the prince doesn't become ruler of Ch'u, he will certainly perish. He will not again meet with the feudal 

lords." PrinceWei indeed rebelled and killed the ruler, replacing him. 81

Confucius apparently embraced this view because in a discussion with Duke Ai, Confucius projected behavior on the basis of constancy, asserting that people who evince the proper commitments rarely commit evil. 82 (With the choice of the word "rarely" Confucius turned a blind assumption into a more circumscribed means of estimating character, with allowances for exceptions.) When Duke Ai pointedly raised the question whether a person might be known by his clothes, Confucius disallowed the possibility but granted that if a man's clothes and habits were both turned toward antiquity, it might be assumed he would probably not commit evil. However, clothing alone

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would never be adequate for judging a man as worthy and employing him for a position or on a mission. The topic of appearance thus seems to have occasioned more concrete pronouncements than generalities, including admonitions not to grant credibility to certain types of readily identified people. Two famous illustrations are: "Do not employ clever speakers with ingratiating appearances, who toady and flatter," 83 and "Clever words and an ingratiating appearance rarely mark the benevolent." 84

The creation of behavioral facades and deceptive appearances was considered difficult, fraught with a likelihood of self-betrayal. Even though appearances maintained over a period of time acquire reasonable credibility, under stress or temptation people often betray them in the most ordinary details, much as Mencius noted, "A man who loves fame will be capable of yielding a state of a thousand chariots, but if he is not such a man even when he gives up a basket of cooked rice or bowl of bean soup, it will be visible in his appearance." 85

Apart from facades designed to mislead and misrepresent, there was another difficulty best termed "the problem of semblances," already discussed under basic intelligence. Because semblances prompt erroneous conclusions, even Confucius apparently became perturbed: "I hate weeds, fearing 

they will be confused with edible sprouts. I hate loquaciousness, fearing it will be confused with sincerity. I hate the sounds of Cheng, fearing that they will bring confusion to pure music. I hate purple, fearing it will be confused with vermilion. I hate the [pedantical] sincerity found in the villages, fearing it will be confused with virtue."86 In the same vein a man with the appearance of a cultured gentleman might actually lack substance, being all well (cultured form) and little chih (substance). This accords with Confucius's early pronouncement regarding the problem of balancing substance and expression: "Substance dominating cultivated form results in barbarism, cultivated form dominating substance results in fastidiousness. Only when substance and cultivated form are harmoniously integrated is someone a perfected man." 87 Only men with expertise such as found among gemologists can distinguish between appearance and reality and discuss the true nature of things, including human character.

Motives, Behavior, and Action

A larger question is posed by whether appearance and behavior can actually be identified with apparent motives and, if so, what means exist for determining the latter. Any solution must resolve the underlying problem that behavior, while appearing identical, may result from dif

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ferent motives: Different paths may lead to the same result, radically different attitudes to the same activity. Somewhat abstractly, Confucius ruefully observed: "Some are born and know things; some study and know them; some learn them through hardship. With regard to their knowing them, it is the same. [As for achievements], some rest in principles and take action; some do things out of a consideration for profit; some do it through coercion. So far as their being successful, it is all one."88

The Huai-nan Tzu illustrated the existence of varying developmental histories for observable phenomena. For example, by nature the extremely scrupulous never compromise their principles to accept employment under disreputable rulers and therefore, in the absence of inherited 

wealth, will be found suffering from poverty. However, few are the poor who suffer impoverishment because they refused to accept immoral employment, with its accompanying riches and power. Therefore, concluding that the poor are all scrupulous would be absurd. Similarly, there are many paths to wealth, including inheritance, theft, misuse of power, and honest acquisition through commercial activities, so wealth alone cannot be cited in condemning a man, even under a debauched ruler. 89 Thus from appearance alone a person's actual history and motives cannot be uniquely determined, so character may remain essentially opaque.

A second difficulty suggested by the Huai-nan Tzu was the unreliability of singular acts. Single acts of knowledge do not constitute wisdom or one of grief an expression of true sorrow. Any individual instance of behavior may entail remarkably different meanings for the actor and observers and fit into a rather immoral course of action overall. Only repetition, a series of acts along the same path, in the same direction, was thought to convey any real validity. Since any action may have been initiated for many different reasons, the fathoming of character without true knowledge of underlying motives becomes complex, a question resolvable only by time and context. The most dramatic example cited is regicide, normally the most heinous crime imaginable in traditional China. However, a monarch's murder may have been prompted by hatred, greed, political rivalry, desire for power, anger, revenge, or even a belief in having received the Mandate of Heaven. 90

To distinguish the good from the evil requires standards that can serve as a referent, a value matrix such as furnished by the core beliefs of Confucianism. However, the difficulty of translating abstract virtues into concrete personality traits constitutes another problem. In one rebuttal the Literati in the Discussions on Salt and Iron raised the point that without a visibly good man, a Worthy who immediately garners general approbation, the less good and evil cannot be comparatively known. 91 As Lao-tzu pointed out, good and evil are mutually

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defining concepts, immediately implying that relativity plagues all evaluative processes, obviating the simple adoption of some abstract value system such as Confucianism.

Words, Speech, and Language

A very likely candidate for evaluating a man was thought to be "words," what a man said and how he expressed it, including his writings. Mencius, for example, was confident he could discern the speaker's mind on this basis: "When his language is prejudiced, I know where he is occluded. When his language is dissolute, I know where he has sunken. When his language is perverse, I know where he has ventured off. When his language is evasive, I know where he is impoverished. Given birth in the mind, they harm the government. Being manifest in government, they cause harm to affairs.'" 92 Mencius's unusual powers presumably derived from an intense moral self-cultivation that somehow laid transparent the motivations of other men. However, closer examination of his criteria indicates but a limited range, all related to moral casts of mind rather than specific motivations. Since Mencius was an acknowledged, as well as self-professed, moral exemplar, his powers were considered exceptional and therefore unattainable to ordinary men immersed in the world of immediacy.

Hsün-tzu felt that from the way a man spoke his progress along the moral way could still be detected, though care had to be exercised in correlating the content of his words with his behavior and appearance. Thus someone who lacked sincerity in speaking about the right subjects--the virtues of old, the rulers of antiquity--wouldn't delight in such topics, evidence that his speech was mere dissembling. In contrast, the perfected man focused his intent upon the Way, put it into practice, and took pleasure in speaking about it, his words, actions, and attitude all cohering. 93 Similarly, when a man surnamed Ying explained why he had not remained with Yang-tzu, a reputed gentleman, he cited a theory that probably enjoyed great credence in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods: "Appearance is the flower of emotion, and words are the linchpin of appearance." 94 Words were considered the outward embellishment of the body, whereas the body manifests the inner emotions. Therefore words and 

appearance, having an inherent relationship, should cohere; consequently, disharmony indicates a facade. Ying further believed that prevarications could not be effectively maintained, eventually disintegrating and betraying the individual's true inner nature.

Confucius was the most famous of those who experienced difficulty in relying upon words to evaluate men, prompting him to rhetorically ask, "If a man's discussions are sincere, does this mean he is a per

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fected man, or is it only his appearance that is formidable?"95 He was compelled to conclude: "The virtuous will be sure to speak correctly, but those whose speech is good may not always be virtuous. Men of principle are sure to be bold, but those who are bold may not always be men of principle."96 By definition, the virtuous are circumspect in speech and dedicated to the Way. However, the class of all good speakers includes the nonvirtuous, those who are wise enough to imitate the traits of the good for ulterior motives, such as personal profit and illicit gain. This leads to the famous corollary already seen: "Clever words and an ingratiating appearance rarely mark benevolence." 97 Moreover, as widely recorded, Confucius felt he had erred in his estimation of Tzu Wu, having discovered him to be asleep during the daytime after previously characterizing him as one of his eloquent disciples. 98 He therefore formulated his well-known operational rule: "The perfected man does not recommend a man because of his words or dismiss words because of the speaker." 99

Essentially two different dimensions to the problem were thus envisioned. The first was the simple failure of men to live up to their words, sometimes brought about by their cultivating an eloquence that was widely admired and often profitable in itself. The second was the conscious use of deception, of dissembling and advocating something not believed, of deliberately trying to create a distinctive impression because of the common knowledge that men were judged not only by what they say, but also by their sophistication and expressive ability. (The latter constitutes another problem altogether because some people are naturally more talented and therefore enjoy an 

immediate edge in the world. However, it was little discussed, perhaps because the process of self-cultivation and the study of the classics should lead to a mastery of verbal expression based upon classical models. The embellishment of language, while sometimes evidence of insubstantiality, became commonplace and therefore problematic. 100) Since persuasion was a profession practiced during the Warring States period and an essential court skill in all eras, the weight attached to words became extremely important. Even though sophists were generally disdained, they still enjoyed wide audiences and found opportunities to be heard, with only Han Fei-tzu advocating draconian methods to make men accountable for their proposals. Consequently, evaluations by words alone were felt to be risky and uncertain, and final reliance never could be placed upon them. 101