NO NATION HAS PRACTICED THE CRAFT of intelligence or theorized about it moreextensively than China, filling their military writings with discussions on concepts andtechniques, littering their histories and popular literature with records of clandestine activities.Moreover, rather than diminishing in the present era of ostensible peace and harmony, thesepractices have instead proliferated, expanding to target business and industry equally withgovernments. However, despite Sun-tzu Art of War being widely acknowledged as the firsttheoretical writing on agents and methods, and despite the presence of extensive chapters onthese subjects in subsequent military texts, the history of intelligence and spycraft in China hasnever been seriously attempted. In fact, apart from Chu Feng-chia's late Ch'ing dynasty pasticheentitled Chien Shu, the secondary literature is virtually bereft of books devoted to the subjectand the many journals devoted to China's history, whether in Chinese, Japanese, or Westernlanguages, devoid of articles. Whereas in pre-twentieth-centuryChina this absence might be attributable to the traditional disdain felt for military affairs in general and the "unrighteous"activity of spying in particular (not unlike the prejudice directed toward intelligence and spycraft in the West), it fails to explain the present lack of interest in China's achievements inthe thorny field of intelligence over the millennia. The Tao of Spycraft therefore focuses uponthe history and development of both overt intelligence theory and covert practices in China. Even though our subject matter is historically focused, since the PRC aggressively deploysthousands of agents of every type throughout the world who are ardently gathering commercial,industrial, and military intelligence, the materials included are not irrelevant to the present day.
Although based upon several years of extensive research in original Chinese materials andhopefully substantial in its conclusions, our study is designed to be accessible to anyoneinterested in things Chinese--whether history, intellectual developments, or military theory--as well as world military developments and the history of intelligence in general. We have perused in varying detail some fifty thousand pages of historical and theoretical writings andcompiled hundreds of
Our focus throughout is on externally directed intelligence efforts, whether military or covert, rather then internal security--in other words, between the independent states during the ancientperiod, factions during periods of fragmentation, and China and its external enemies duringthe imperial period. Internal measures directed toward controlling the indigenous populace, while neither unimportant nor uninteresting, constitute a radically different orientation thatmay be studied in Richard Deacon earlier book, the Chinese Secret Service, a popular, yetinsightful work that emphasizes such matters and late intelligence history in China and even the PRC. (In concord with our overall military interest and to keep it distinct from our work oncontemporary China, our
study extends only up to the appearance of Westerners and the deployment of hot weapons,roughly synonymous with the Ming dynasty. [The famous novel known as The Romance of theThree Kingdoms, although apparently influential in establishing China's clandestine intelligenceservice prior to World War II, thus also falls outside the scope of our work.] However, contemporary Chinese practices have recently been addressed by Nicholas Eftimiades inChinese Intelligence Operations.)
The sprawling nature of China's military and political history prompted a bifurcated organization rather than either a chronological progression or a topical examination. Since theformative period for intelligence activities falls into the ancient
era, the initial section on antiquity examines the fundamental practices stimulated by theincessant conflict among the individual states as the Chou dynasty disintegrated, and theremainder of the book focuses on intelligence theory illustrated by cases from later history andchapters from the military texts. Whereas the theoretical materials from the latter are representative and comprehensive, the historical examples, especially less detailed ones from the twenty-five dynastic histories, could have been multiplied almost endlessly, easily doubling the length of the book. However, the most interesting and important cases, as well as all thebasic practices and types of agents, fully evolve during the ancient period, essentially defining the field thereafter. Consequently, the earlier cases are disproportionately significant, as well asintrinsically more intriguing.
In order to provide as many original materials as possible, we have included extensivetranslations but refrained from summarizing and rephrasing them thereafter, assuming they will prove self-explanatory upon careful examination. Although this converts the book intosomething of a hybrid sourcebook, in intelligence work accuracy lies in details, which are bestconveyed in their original form, as directly as possible, not grandiose schemes and charts. Moreover, since we hope this book will interest a wide audience, including sinologists, wehave deliberately eschewed the employment of intelligence jargon while severely limiting thenumber of footnotes on translation matters, unlike in our Military Methods. However, three major topics-- the theory of agents, evaluating men, and configurations of terrain-- areextensively detailed so that the progression and ongoing reintegration of ideas across the sweepof centuries may be clearly seen by readers with corresponding interests.
The past decade has witnessed a great resurgence in Chinese interest in matters antique ranging from Confucian theory to the Taoist classics and military writings, spawning a vast horde ofsecondary works bent on applying ancient insights to every conceivable contemporary problem. One or two popular, poorly
researched books touching on Chinese intelligence methods have even appeared, largelydirected to business applications or developing esoteric tactics that will allow their readers to overcome others in even the most dire and unrealistic circumstances. These frequently citepassages and ideas from Sun-tzu and Han Fei-tzu--China's Machiavelli--but rarely explore substantial theory or historical practice. However, contemporary interest flourishes, and verymuch in accord with the centuries-long tradition of examining the past for knowledge and lessons, these traditional materials are reputedly once again being perused in the PRC's thinktanks and spy schools for techniques, insights, and paradigms adaptable to China's quest forworld domination, for forging a military and intelligence science with indigenous Chinesecharacteristics. Thus, while the Tao of Spycraft is strictly a historical study, it has contemporary relevance because the lessons that are being taught and mind-set instilled, whether in state-sponsored contexts or popular media, are mainly derived from China's centuries of intrigue.
As always it is a pleasure to acknowledge the efforts and cooperation of others in thedevelopment of this book. Thanks are due first of all to Professor Nathan Sivin for hisilluminating ruminations on many subjects, not the least being ch'i and calendrical matters; nextto Drs. Sean Sheehan and Rick Williams for overviews on covert medical matters; Brigadier General Karl Eikenberry for advice on military subjects; Professor Bruce Brooks, founder of theWarring States Project, for raising critical questions and generously sharing his knowledge ontexts and dating; Howard Brewer and Guy Baer for insightful discussions over the years onintellectual and spiritual matters both Chinese and Japanese; H. Jeffrey Davis for fruitful conversations; Antoinette Loézere and Ed Swiniarski for intriguing narrations; Peter Kracht forhis initial interest; Laura Parsons and Rob Williams for the courage to see it through; George Potter for valuable reference materials; and Max Gartenberg for his expertise in many matters. Happily, Lee T'ingrong has again honored the book with his calligraphy. As in our previous works, while I am responsible for the primary research, translations, conceptions, and historicalconclusions,
Finally, we would like to reiterate that this is a historical study based upon readily accessiblematerials and open, printed sources. None of our many clients, friends, relatives, or associates in the United States or Asia, including the PRC, provided any restricted materials whatsoever.Even though this project is in part an outgrowth of a paper presented at the Society for Military History's Sixty-third Annual Meeting sponsored by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence in April 1996, there is no connection whatsoever with any intelligence agency inthe United States or abroad. Moreover, although I have been a careful, hopefully astute, studentof intelligence theory and methods over the years and our consulting practice has largely focused upon information and analysis, I have not been actively involved in any aspect of formal intelligence work on behalf of any government since the Vietnam era.
Ralph D. Sawyer
THE TAO OF SPYCRAFT
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Part One EARLY HISTORY
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1 Early Records
and the First Spies
DESPITE BEING COMMONLY PERCEIVED as long having been a politically and culturally integrated state, China suffered almost incessant warfare and rampant political intrigue over the three millennia of its tenuous geopolitical existence. In consequence, as early as the turbulentSpring and Autumn
( 722-481 B.C.) and Warring States ( 403-221 B.C.) periods a body of military theory evolvedthat gradually acquired canonical status centuries later. Remarkably, these ancient tactical classics--famous works such as Sun-tzu Art of War and Wu Ch'i's Wu-tzu--retained theirapplicability through successive dynasties because military practices were essentially continuous until the advent of hot weapons and contact with the West. Moreover, they werestudied not only by professional military men, but also by statesmen, bureaucrats, and philosophers, often in conjunction with the records of battles and intrigues preserved in China'sextensive historical writings.
The disproportionate influence of the early classics on subsequent military theorizing, includingthe nature and objectives of China's intelligence activities over the past two millennia, shouldnot be underestimated. 1 The assumptions and principles expounded by Sun-tzu, China's earliestknown theorist, largely defined the parameters and categories that were vigorously followedthereafter, particularly in assessments of the enemy and the thrust of spycraft. Many of hisconceptions may be traced into the T'ang, when they were particularly expanded following theunrelenting strife and intrigue that had marked the previous centuries of disunion,
and then on through the Sung into the Ming. In every case the authors embraced Sun-tzu'sprinciples and analysis but expanded the methodological details, categories of operatives, range of activities, types of mission, and psychology of recruitment, eventually emphasizing security and counterintelligence measures to frustrate increasingly numerous and effectiveagents, both diplomatic and covert.
Chinese intelligence efforts have historically focused upon rulers and powerful officials, economic factors, and military plans, capabilities, dispositions, and movements. The data collected were comparatively analyzed to determine probable intentions, develop a netassessment, and plot possible reactions. Clandestine operations naturally evolved to gather secret information critical to "preparing against the unforeseen," resulting in the employment of several types of agents, methods of control, and techniques of analysis. Preserving secrecy became critical, necessitating efforts to prevent foreign agents from easily acquiring both openinformation and secret plans while stimulating counterintelligence activities to thwart andmanipulate enemy agents. Covert measures and psychological operations designed to disrupt the enemy's government, solidarity, and
capabilities--including conducting assassinations, sowing doubts and rumors, bribing andcorrupting officials, and executing estrangement techniques--rapidly multiplied even in the early period.
China's historical writings, while varied and voluminous, are unfortunately sketchy for theearly Chou, Spring and Autumn, and Warring States periods. However, the limited extantmaterials still provide a fairly comprehensive picture of intrigue, machination, and ingenuity,even though their terseness often requires imaginative interpretation and their reliability has been questioned. Moreover, apart from their fundamental value as chronological history, they subsequently assumed a life of their own, one validated by centuries of assiduous study,eventually providing the basis for popular tales and a core of general belief. Bolstered by Confucian reverence for antiquity, they also came to function as
Your subject has heard that these barbarians are raiders who plague us while the classics are theessence of our state. We must be prepared against the passions of such barbarians. Since the classics contain timeless methods for governing, they cannot be loaned to other peoples. TheTso Chuan states: "The Shang did not plan against the Hsia, the Yi [barbarians] did not confuse the Hua [Chinese]." The way to resist their untamed hearts and be free of misfortune is toprepare.
In antiquity when King P'ing-tung visited the Han court seeking the Shih Chi and the writings of the philosophers, Emperor Ch'eng did not grant his request because the Shih Chi is replete with military strategies and the books of the philosophers with crafty techniques. So if the Hanemperor was unwilling to show his own beloved relative these books on the conduct of warfare,how can we today hand over classics filled with such information to our nemesis, the Westernbarbarians?
Moreover, I have heard that by nature the Turfan are cruel and decisive, their emotions sensitiveand sharp, and they excel in studying everything. If they penetrate the Book of Documents, theywill certainly know how to conduct warfare. If they
thoroughly understand the Book of Odes, they will know the martial. If their teachers probedeeply into the Li Chi, they will know about the monthly ordinances. When their experiencedsoldiers have penetrated the Tso Chuan, they will learn numerous deceptive methods andstratagems for employing troops. When they become thoroughly familiar with the literarypieces in the Wen Hsüan, they will know the regulations governing war dispatches. How willthis differ from loaning weapons to the invaders and providing them with provisions?
I have heard that when the state of Lu embraced the Chou Li, Ch'i did not attack them. WhenWu learned how to employ chariots, Ch'u's troops were exhausted in running for their lives.2 The former preserved their state by maintaining the classics, the latter endangered their stateby losing their tactics. Moreover, having been sent out in marriage, the princess has traveled agreat distance to a foreign state where she should be embracing the rites of the Yi peoples, notturning around and seeking our outstanding books. According to my bumbling analysis, this isnot really the princess's idea. I suspect that some defector is encouraging these teachings amongthem.
If your majesty is concerned about losing the affection of the Turfan and preserving the state'scredibility so there is absolutely no other way, I suggest you eliminate the Ch'un Ch'iu [and TsoChuan] because it was composed when the virtue of the Chou was already in decline, when thefeudal lords were forcefully violating the constraints of rites and music, each going forth toengage in warfare. At that time prevarication was born, at that time change and deceit arose.There were cases of ministers summoning their rulers as well as seizing the awesomeness andname of hegemon. If you provide them with this book, it will be a source of misfortune to ourstate. In the Tso Chuan it states that [as his reward for valor] Yu-hsi requested certain minorprivileges in court dress which, when granted, prompted Confucius to say: "Alas, why not give him more cities? Only names and vessels [of state] cannot be loaned to men."3 These barbariansclearly covet expensive goods and disdain territory, so you can formally
present them with silks and generously gift them with jades. Why must you grant what theyseek and thereby increase their knowledge? 4
The antecedent cited in which the emperor refused to provide the Shih Chi and other philosophical works even to his own uncle, the nominal king of a subsidiary Han fief, issimilarly illuminating. First, it implies that nearly a century after its completion the Shih Chiwas still largely retained in the court archives rather than generally circulated. Second, political works, including historical writings and the arguments of the philosophers, were seenas equally filled with insidious, potentially dangerous materials, viewed as veritable textbooksof plots and machinations, techniques and subterfuges. Thus, they were not granted to the kingof P'ing-tung in 29 B.C. despite his royal lineage because General Wang Feng advised:
Some of the works of the philosophers are contrary to orthodox classical studies and criticizethe Great Sages of antiquity, others illustrate ghosts and spirits and believe in oddities andcuriosities. The Shih Chi contains the strategies of the Warring States, the horizontal andvertical alliances, tactical power and deception, the unorthodox measures employed bytacticians at the rise of the Han, Heavenly Offices, disasters, abnormalities, mountain passesand strategic points, and the topography of the realm, none of which should be in the hands ofthe feudal lords. 5
These works, together with the military writings and Twenty-five Dynastic Histories, providethe basis for this study.
Yi Yin and Early History
Deliberately gathering information about one's enemies doubtlessly commenced with the earliestNeolithic conflicts, although short-term reconnaissance and direct line-of-sight observation, aided by concealment and the advantage of height, would have been the only means available. Over the centuries the few military theorists and historians who contemplated the issues of intelligence gathering in China have often attributed the earliest known spy activities to King Shao-k'ang, said to
have ruled the Hsia dynasty in the nineteenth century B.C., because he apparently dispatchedan agent to clandestinely observe his father's murderer while secretly developing the powerbase necessary to successfully restore Hsia rule, an event traditionally dated to 1875 B.C. Thekey historical reference, much cited thereafter, actually appears in the Tso Chuan, embedded inWu Tzu-hsü's futile attempt to persuade the king of Wu to exterminate their archenemy, thestate of Yüeh under King Kou-chien, now that they had vanquished it. This single line runs, "Shao-k'ang employed Ju-ai to spy upon Chiao." 6
By the end of the historical, though poorly documented, Hsia dynasty at least one famous figureis identified as a covert agent, while another was instrumental in subverting and overthrowing the Shang dynasty around 1045 B.C. According to Sun-tzu: "In antiquity, when the Shang arose, they had Yi Yin in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, they had Lü Ya (the T'ai Kung) in theShang."7 Sun-tzu's view apart, neither of them appears to have acted in the usual role of spies--that is, agents dispatched on clandestine missions--being instead "defectors," experts who hadabandoned perverse governments to perform advisory roles for moral contenders. However, despite being volunteers rather than recruited informants, they have still been considered"spies" (chien), immediately suggesting the broad scope of the term chien in ancient China. 8
Even though agents and observers had no doubt been plying their trade for centuries, Yi Yineventually became recognized as China's first covert agent because Sun-tzu thus dubbed him so. However, the historical materials that purportedly chronicle ancient Chinese history--particularly the Shang Shu (Book of Documents)--are devoid of any justification for Sun-tzu'sascription. Rather than some secretive, shadowy figure, in a motif much repeated thereafterthese writings portray a recluse who righteously abandoned his pastoral obscurity and nominalallegiance to the tyrannical Hsia to guide a youthful ruler embarking upon the course of virtueand benevolence. In its earliest form the story simply located him on the periphery of the Hsia, but over the centuries it became more romanticized and explicit, even
ally resulting in Mencius's definitive portrait in the middle Warring States period.
A chapter in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, a late third century B.C. eclectic text, preserves the mostdramatic account to be found among China's numerous historical writings. Not only does itintegrate the image of a moral paragon with the deviousness of a seasoned spy; it also includesa painful cover story:
Because Emperor Chieh of the Hsia dynasty was immoral, brutal, perverse, stupid, and greedy, All under Heaven quaked in fear and were greatly troubled. However, reports of his deeds were contradictory and confused, so it was difficult for anyone to fathom the true situation. Availing himself of the emperor's awesomeness, the prime minister Kan Hsin was brusque and insulting to both the feudal lords and the common people. Because the worthy and outstanding ministerswere all anxious and resentful, the emperor killed Kuan Lung-feng to stifle rebellious stirrings. The common masses, in consternation and confusion, all wished to emigrate elsewhere and, afraid to speak directly about the situation, lived in constant terror. Although the great ministersshared the same worries, they dared not cooperate to mount a revolt. Meanwhile Emperor Chiehincreasingly regarded himself as a great worthy, boasted of his transgressions, and even viewedwrong as right. The imperial way was blocked and stopped, the populace in total collapse.
Terrified and troubled that the realm was not at peace, T'ang wanted Yi Yin to go and observethe mighty Hsia. However, he feared that Yi Yin would not be trusted, so he personally shot himwith an arrow. Yi Yin then fled to the Hsia. After three years he reported back to T'ang at hisenclave at Hao: "Earlier Chieh was befuddled and deluded by his consort Mo Hsi and now loveshis two concubines from Min-shan, so he doesn't have any concern for the common people. Thewill of the people does not support him, upper and lower ranks detest each other. The hearts of the people are filled with resentment. They all say that Heaven fails to have pity on them, so theHsia's mandate is over."
T'ang exclaimed: "What you have just said is much like a prophetic lament!" They thenswore an oath together to evidence their determination to extinguish Hsia.
Yi Yin went again to observe the mighty Hsia, where he learned from Mo Hsi that "the previous night the emperor had dreamt there was a sun in the west and a sun in the east. Whenthe two suns engaged in combat, the western sun emerged victorious and the eastern sun was vanquished." Yi Yin reported this to T'ang. Although the area was suffering from a severedrought, in order to keep faith with the oath he had sworn with Yi Yin, T'ang still mobilizedtheir forces. Thereafter he ordered the army, after proceeding out from the east, to make theiradvance into Hsia territory from the west. Chieh fled even before their blades had clashed, butwas pursued out to Ta-sha where he was finally killed. 9
Remarkably, this episode already incorporates many crucial elements of spycraft. First, from theoutset Yi Yin--whatever his wisdom and moral qualifications--was deliberately employed as acovert agent responsible for determining the true state of affairs in the Hsia, an enemy entity despite the Shang's own theoretical obligations toward their ruler. Second, he was given aplausible pretext for voluntarily allying himself with the perverse Chieh: a visible arrow wound(no doubt preceded by rumors and vivid, if inaccurate, accounts) emblematic of T'ang's hatred.Third, just as many rulers and innumerable officials throughout Chinese history, Chiehsuccumbed to sexual indulgence and the allure of beauty. Moreover, Mo Hsi, much dejected because new, foreign concubines were monopolizing the emperor's favors, acted as thearchetypal slighted beauty in secretly revealing the king's frightening dream. (ThroughoutChinese history many jealous consorts and concubines poisoned, stabbed, or otherwisemurdered their unfaithful husbands and lovers, as well as betrayed their secrets, frustrated theirplans, and thwarted their interests.) This information allowed King T'ang to exploit the ancientbelief in the prophetic nature of dreams by enacting a scenario that actualized Chieh's secretfears. The advance of King T'ang's
army from the west thus proved sufficient to trigger Chieh's terror and flight. Furthermore,Chieh's downfall was undoubtedly hastened because the hostile state of Minshan had consciously exploited the debilitating power of women and sex. The two new concubines whoso fascinated him were neither accidental acquisitions nor battlefield spoils, but instead were gifts deliberately presented by the minor state of Min-shan that lay in the barbarous area of northwest Szechwan, far beyond the central core area of Hsia-Shang culture, to debauch hismind and deflect further incursions. Finally, the importance of prophetic events, sayings, andphenomena may be seen in T'ang's reaction to Yi Yin's initial report, for he was apparently astounded that Yi's words echoed what was probably a common saying predicting such a downfall.
The enigmatic Yi Yin eventually garnered a hallowed place in Chinese history as one of thevirtuous paragons cited by Confucian literati seeking to justify the employment of worthymen to China's despotic rulers. He, the T'ai Kung, and a few other idealized figures became famous for having rescued their eras, not to mention monarchs, while ever espousing thevirtuous ways of Yao, Shun, Yü, and the other semimythical Sage emperors of remoteantiquity. They were inevitably portrayed as active, yet unsullied, pure, yet effective, and theShang Shu purportedly preserves Yi Yin's admonitory speeches charging the youthful rulerwith the practice of virtue at the Shang dynasty's inception. However, it otherwise providesnothing more than a sparse record of his activities, noting only that somewhat more than adecade after he was summoned to King T'ang's court the Shang successfully overthrew theHsia in a brief battle. (The preface to the Shang Shu adds the comment that Yi Yin had beenembarrassed to serve under the Hsia and therefore returned to Hao, the site of T'ang'sdomain.) He is further depicted as having continued as prime minister under two or three of T'ang's successors, even temporarily deposing one of them for a lack of virtue until restoring him to the throne following three years of enforced, isolated soul-searching. 10
However, the Bamboo Annals, increasingly viewed by scholars as a somewhat reliable sourcefor the period, offers a startlingly different conclusion to this otherwise idealized story, statingthat Yi Yin actually usurped the throne and was eventually executed when the rightful king escaped his confinement. 11
Befitting his status as China's first recognized covert agent, Yi Yin's historical image thussubsumes two different personae: a virtuous, self-sacrificing minister, and the skilled spy whomade the conquest possible. The former was trumpeted by naive Confucians emphasizing theidea that Virtue alone is sufficient to dominate the realm, the latter stressed by political realists in the late Warring States period. Although Yi Yin's name appears in a multitude of texts, 12 hewas definitively canonized as a paragon of virtue by Mencius when queried by a disciple as towhether, as commonly suggested, Yi Yin had sought a position under T'ang by becoming a cookrather than having been immediately recognized for his surpassing wisdom and virtue. (TheHuai-nan Tzu, a somewhat later work, notes that being troubled by the realm being ungoverned, "Yi Yin harmonized the five flavors, slung his cooking vessels over his back, and went forth." Itadds that "he went to Chieh five times, and also to T'ang five times, wanting to make the turbidclear and the endangered tranquil."13) In reply, Mencius pedantically described Yi Yin as the epitome of righteousness: a scholar fending for himself in the countryside, contentedly plowing his fields while practicing the Tao of the ancient Sage emperors. No amount of profit could coerce him into forsaking the path of righteousness, nothing cause him to commit the slightesttransgression. Thus, despite the misery wrought upon the empire by Chieh, he im perturbably declined the gifts accompanying T'ang's fervent invitations three times before finally deciding that the empire desperately required his services and responded to T'ang's fervent call, muchbesought and accordingly honored. Thereafter, in the Mencian account, he transformed King T'ang into a ruler morally qualified to rescue the world from Chieh's tyranny, no covert actionsor secret missions ever being mentioned. 14
Mencius's version may of course be seen as a hopeful projection of the process that rulersshould undertake in humbly extending sincere invitations to moral exemplars (such as himself)to participate in their governments. However, the story persisted that after Yi Yin had failed towin T'ang's attention despite many audiences, he finally resorted to becoming his cook and thereby ingratiated himself sufficiently to gradually offer his persuasions. At the end of theWarring States period the brilliant but ill-fated Han Fei-tzu, often termed China's Machiavelli,in fact employed this story to illustrate the difficulty of achieving the objectives of persuasion: "In high antiquity T'ang was the most sagely, Yi Yin the most knowledgeable. But when thewisest persuaded the sagest, after seventy times he still had not been accepted. Only afterpersonally carrying the cooking utensils and becoming a chef did they gradually become closerand more intimate and did T'ang fully realize his substance and employ him." 15
Several centuries later Liu Shao, author of the incisive Jen-wu Chih, struck a balanced view:"Yi Yin's virtue was sufficient to sharpen their customs, his laws adequate to rectify All under Heaven, and his methods enough to plot the court's victory." 16 Moreover, even the Chuang- tzu,the penultimate Taoist classic, contains an interesting anecdote that unexpectedly illuminates Yi Yin's realistic methods and tactics. When he was about to invade the Hsia, T'ang asked PuSui how to proceed but was snubbed because such mundane, despicable topics did not fall within Pu's purview. After Kuang Wu similarly rebuffed him, he inquired about Yi Yin and wasadvised that Yi was "strong and able to endure insults." King T'ang then employed Yi Yin, they plotted a successful attack, and then T'ang sought to cede the empire to Kuang Wu, whodisparagingly condemned the king for imagining he might be greedy enough to accept it, just ashe had earlier thought him to be a brigand who would betray Chieh, his nominal lord. 17
Chuang-tzu's anecdote implicitly raises the question of how defectors and traitors might bedistinguished. From the dominant Confucian perspective, anyone who abandons a perverse ruler to support virtuous rebels claiming the Mandate of Heaven is a discerning defector, a herorather than a traitor. Defectors are therefore ideologically and ethically motivated to
In sum, China's first spy thus has two faces--the first a moral paragon and idealistic adviser, thesecond a realist highly versed in subterfuge, skilled in disguising his intentions and motives, capable of acting as an observer and strategist, clearly courageous in the face of the enemy, andcompellingly wise when confronted with tactical problems. It is of course this second visage that the military writers, popular legend, and many Legalist writings praise enthusiastically.
China's Second Spy: The T'ai Kung
Lü Shang, better known as the T'ai Kung, is a shadowy historical figure who reputedly played a crucial advisory role during the Chou's ascendancy, made the Shang conquest possible, and exercised a major command role in the battles that accomplished it. 18 Apart from his putativeidentification with the Six Secret Teachings--an extensive work of military theory--the T'aiKung has also been honored throughout Chinese history as its first famous general, theprogenitor of strategic studies, and the state's martial patron. 19 However, his identification as a"spy" no doubt results from his status as a defector, someone who fled the oppressiveconditions under the Shang court, after perhaps serving in some capacity, to wander about until finally being recognized in old age by King Wen for his sagacity. As the king's most trustedadviser, he presumably furnished detailed information about the Shang's strengths andweaknesses, as well as tactical information for the final assault that surprised the Shang bycrossing the frozen Yellow River to the south during January, thereby circumventing their westward pointing defenses. 20 However, if the Six Secret Teachings actually preserves hisessential
thoughts, he may equally well be viewed as the father of both tactics and spycraft, a role forwhich he has been both praised and condemned.
The essential background to the T'ai Kung's achievements was the archetypal battle between theforces of virtue, represented by the Chou dynasty, and those of evil, personified by King Chou,the Shang's perverse, debauched ruler. In a conflict reminiscent of T'ang's conquest of King Chieh of the Hsia, King Wen and his successor, King Wu, developed a powerful state on the western periphery of Shang culture. Although their policies were ostensibly based upon virtueand benevolence, designed to attract both disaffected peoples and willing allies, their rise alsoencompassed the brutal conquest of numerous smaller states. From the systematic way in whichthey proceeded and their uninterrupted success, they clearly had well-developed, although nowunknown, sources of information and certainly acquired further intelligence during theirexpansion from both captives and willing immigrants.
It has been suggested that the Chou easily developed alliances with nearby peoples, including disenchanted Hsia groups subjugated by the Shang, because of their agricultural heritage. Inperpetuating the Hsia's agricultural offices and reflecting the spirit of their remote ancestorknown as Hou Chi ("Lord of Millet"), the Chou had for many years dispatched advisers toinstruct other states in basic farming practices and seasonally appropriate activities. Theirefforts not only garnered them good will and respect, but also provided a perfect cover for aggressively seeking military and political intelligence, for acquiring a thorough knowledge of the inhabitants, customs, and terrain outside the Wei River valley. 21
According to the Yi Chou-shu, when the center of Chou government was located in Feng, King Wu was kept informed about Shang's offenses and atrocities by spies (tie). Determining their reports to be substantially credible, he advised the Duke of Chou about the contents,prompting the latter to comment that the time for attacking the tyrannical
Shang ruler had arrived. 22 Furthermore, the late Warring States Lü-shih Ch'un-chiu evencontains a dialogue showing how the king controlled his agents that, while definitely a fabrication, enjoyed credibility thereafter and added to the fund of ancient lore:
King Wu of the Chou deputed an agent to observe the state of Shang. The observer returnedto the Chou capital and reported, " Shang is in chaos." The king questioned him, "To whatdegree?" The agent replied, "Sycophants and evil-doers overcome the good." The king replied, "It is not yet time."
The agent again went to Shang and then returned to report, "Their chaos has increased." Theking asked, "To what extent?" The agent replied, "The worthy have fled." King Wu said, "It isnot yet time."
Once again the agent went to observe conditions and reported back, "Their chaos has becomeextreme." King Wu inquired, "In what way?" The observer replied, "The common people do notdare criticize or express their resentment."
King Wu sighed and then hastened to inform the T'ai Kung, who commented: "Whensycophants and evil-doers overcome the good it is termed 'extermination'; when the worthy flee it is called 'collapse'; and when the common people dare not criticize or express theirresentment it is termed 'punishments conquering.' Their chaos is extreme, beyond control!"
The king therefore selected three hundred chariots and three thousand tiger warriors, and setthe day with the feudal lords in the court for capturing the king of Shang. 23
The Chou royal house also seems to have benefited from more reliable sources of informationbecause many of its important members, including King Wen, had married Shang princesses.Furthermore, they were frequently compelled to pay homage and offer tribute to the Shang court, further exposing them to the political realities, coupled with opportunities for intelligencegathering, whether through observation or purchase. In this regard the Shang seem to havesingularly failed, having
Fei Chung attempted to persuade King Chieh: "The Lord of the West is a worthy so the hundredsurnames are pleased with him and the feudal lords submit to him. You must execute him, for if you do not he will certainly be a source of misfortune for the Shang."
King Chou replied: "You are speaking of a righteous ruler. How can he be executed?" FeiChung retorted: "A hat, even though worn through, must still be placed on the head; shoes,even though multicolored, must still tread upon the ground. Now the Lord of the West is a subject. He is cultivating righteousness so people incline toward him. If anyone will cause youmisfortune, it will be him! Any person who does not employ his worthiness on behalf of hisruler must be executed. Moreover, where is the transgression in a ruler punishing his subject?"
King Chou replied: "Benevolence and righteousness are what rulers employ to encourage theirsubordinates. Now as the Lord of the West loves benevolence and righteousness, it is notpossible to punish him." Fei Chung attempted to persuade him three times, then left the state.
However, perhaps the critical factor in the Chou's deliberate rise was the remoteness of theWei River valley, situated in largely "bar barian" territory, whose isolation provided relativesecrecy and deterred casual visitors. Under the T'ai Kung's guidance, King Wen was able todevise and implement the policies necessary to nurture the state's strength without attracting undue attention. The Chou thus managed to perfect themselves in the era's measures and technologies, and systematically develop
Unfortunately, even though the T'ai Kung has been accorded great respect for his apparenthistorical role, there is considerable controversy over his exact accomplishments, as well as centuries of Confucian revulsion over the possibility that military power and tactical measureswere employed by the great moral paragons to achieve their conquest of the Shang. More significantly, there is a dearth of historical references to the T'ai Kung in the ancient sourcesthat reputedly chronicle the period's major events, although the Shih Chi and Yi Chou-shu bothprovide supporting evidence. However, his biography in the former, well known for some twothousand years, established a lasting image:
T'ai Kung Wang, properly named Lü Shang, was a native of the Eastern Sea area. One of hisancestors had served as a labor director and meritoriously assisted the legendary Yü inpacifying the flooding waters. In the interval between Emperor Shun and the Hsia dynasty hewas therefore enfeoffed at Lü, or perhaps at Shen, and surnamed Chiang. During the Hsia andShang dynasties some of the sons and grandsons of his collateral lines were enfeoffed at Lü andShen, some were commoners, and Lü Shang--the T'ai Kung--was their descendant. His originalsurname was Chiang, but he was subsequently surnamed from his fief, so was called Lü Shang.
Impoverished and in straits, Lü Shang was already old when, through fishing, he sought outKing Wen, Lord of the West. The Lord of the West was about to go hunting and so divinedabout the prospects for success. What the diviner said was: "What you will obtain will be neither dragon nor serpent, neither tiger nor bear. What you will obtain is an assistant for a hegemon or king."
Thereupon the Lord of the West went hunting and indeed encountered the T'ai Kung on thesunny side of the Wei River.
After speaking with him, he was greatly pleased and said: "My former lord, the T'ai Kung,said, 'There should be a Sage who will come to Chou, and Chou will thereby flourish.' Areyou truly this Sage or not? My T'ai Kung looked out [wang] for you for a long time." Thus he called him T'ai Kung Wang, and returned together with him in his carriage, establishing himas strategist.
Someone has said: "The T'ai Kung had extensive learning, and once served King Chou of theShang. King Chou lacked the Tao, so he left him. He traveled about exercising his persuasion on the various feudal lords but did not encounter anyone suitable, and in the end returned westwith the Lord of the West."
Someone else has said: " Lü Shang was a retired scholar who had hidden himself on theseacoast. When the Lord of the West was confined at Yu-li, San-i Sheng and Hung Yao, having long known Lü Shang, summoned him. Lü Shang also said, 'I have heard that the Lord of theWest is a Worthy and also excels at nurturing the old, so I guess I will go there.' The three men sought out beautiful women and rare objects on behalf of the Lord of the West, and presentedthem to the Shang king in order to ransom the Lord of the West. The Lord of the West wasthereby able to go out and return to his state."24
Although the ways they say Lü Shang came to serve the Lord of the West differ, still the essential point is that he became strategist to Kings Wen and Wu. After the Lord of the Westwas extricated from Yu-li and returned to Chou, he secretly planned with Lü Shang and cultivated his Virtue in order to overturn Shang's government. The T'ai Kung's affairs weremostly concerned with military authority and unorthodox stratagems, so when later generationsspeak about armies and the Chou's secret tactical advantage of power, they all honor the T'aiKung for making the fundamental plans.
The Lord of the West's government was equitable, even extending to settling theconflict between the Yü and Jui
When King Wen died, King Wu ascended the throne. In his ninth year, wanting to continueKing Wen's task, he mounted a campaign in the east to observe whether the feudal lords wouldassemble or not. When the army set out, the T'ai Kung wielded the yellow battle ax in his lefthand, and grasped the white pennon in his right, in order to swear the oath:
Ts'ang-ssu! Ts'ang-ssu!
Unite your masses of common people With your boats andoars.
Those who arrive after will be beheaded.
Thereafter he went to Meng-chin. The number of feudal lords who assembled of their ownaccord was eight hundred. The feudal lords all said, " KingChou can be attacked." King Wureplied, "Not yet." He had the army return and made the Great Oath with the T'ai Kung.
After they had remained in Chou for two more years, King Chou of the Shang killed prince Pi-kan and imprisoned the Worthy Chi-tzu. King Wu, wanting to attack the Shang, performed divination with a turtle shell to observe the signs. They were not auspicious and violent windand rain arose. The assembled dukes were all afraid, but the T'ai Kung stiffened them tosupport King Wu. King Wu then went forth.
In the eleventh year, the first month, on the day chia-tzu the king swore an oath at Mu-yeh andattacked King Chou of the Shang. The Shang army was completely defeated, so King Chou turned and ran off, and then ascended the Deer Tower. King Wu's forces pursued and beheadedKing Chou. On the morrow King Wu was established at the altars: The dukes presented clearwater, K'ang Shu-feng of Wei spread out a variegated mat,
the T'ai Kung led the sacrificial animals, and the Scribe Yi chanted the prayers in order toannounce to the spirits the punishment of King Chou's offenses. They distributed the moneyfrom the Deer Tower and gave out the grain in the Chü-ch'iao granary in order to relieve theimpoverished people. They enfeoffed Pi-kan's grave and released Chi-tzu from imprisonment. They removed the nine cauldrons of authority, rectified the government of Chou, and begananew with All under Heaven. The T'ai Kung's plans occupied the major part.
Thereupon King Wu, having already pacified the Shang and become King of All under Heaven, enfeoffed the T'ai Kung at Ying- ch'iu in Ch'i. The T'ai Kung went east to his state, stayingovernight on the road and traveling slowly. The innkeeper said: "I have heard it said that time ishard to get but easy to lose. Our guest sleeps extremely peacefully. Probably he is not going to return to his state." The T'ai Kung, overhearing it, got dressed that night and set out, reaching his state just before first light. The Marquis of Lai came out to attack, and fought with him for Ying- ch'iu, which bordered Lai. The people of Lai were Yi people who, taking advantage of thechaos under King Chou and the new settlement of the Chou dynasty, assumed Chou would beunable to assemble the distant quarters. For this reason they battled with the T'ai Kung for hisstate.
When the T'ai Kung reached Ch'i he rectified the government in accord with prevailing customs, simplified the Chou's forms of propriety, opened up the occupations of the merchantsand artisans, and facilitated the realization of profits from fishing and salt. The people turnedtheir allegiance to Ch'i in large numbers, and Ch'i thus became a great state.
When the youthful King Ch'eng ascended the Chou throne and the late King Wu's brothersKuan Shu and Ts'ai Shu revolted, the Yi people in the Huai River valley again turned against the Chou. So King Ch'eng had Duke Chao K'ang issue a mandate to the T'ai Kung: "To the eastas far as the sea, the west to the Yellow River, south to Mu-ling, and north to Wu-ti, thoroughlyrectify and order the five marquis and nine earls." From this
Ch'i was able to conduct a campaign of rectification to subdue the rebellious and become a great state. Its capital was Ying-ch'iu. Probably when the T'ai Kung died, he was more than a hundred years old.
The Grand Historian comments: "I went to Ch'i--from Lang-yeh, which belongs to Mt. T'ai,north to where it fronts the sea, embracing two thousand kilometers of fertile land. Its peopleare expansive, and many conceal their knowledge. It is their Heaven- given nature. Taking theT'ai Kung's Sageness in establishing his state, isn't it appropriate that Duke Huan flourished and cultivated good government and was thereby able to assemble the feudal lords in a covenant? Vast, vast, truly the style of a great state!"
Despite the lucidity of his biography and its frequent citation in various writings, over thecenturies the T'ai Kung's reputation equally derived from the infamous book associated with hisname, the Six Secret Teachings, which purportedly records his strategic advice and tacticalinstructions to Kings Wen and Wu in the mid-eleventh century B.C. (The present bookunquestionably dates from the middle to late Warring States period; however, even today sometraditionalists still believe it reflects the mature heritage of military studies found in the strongstate of Ch'i and therefore preserves at least vestiges of the oldest strata of Chinese military thought.) Accordingly, the Six Secret Teachings would be the only Chinese military classicwritten to facilitate revolutionary activity because the Chou's aim was nothing less than a dynastic revolution. Paradoxically, Confucians throughout the imperial period excoriated thetext because the T'ai Kung depicted therein vociferously insists upon exploiting every meansavailable to achieve victory rather than confidently relying upon the benign power of Virtue.Critical measures therefore include feigning and dissembling to deceive the enemy and allay suspicions; using bribes, gifts, and other methods to induce disloyalty and cause chaos andconsternation; and undertaking "civil warfare," a systematic, unorthodox program that stressespsychological techniques and covert methods to undermine and enervate the enemy, such as bydistracting them and
The Six Secret Teachings also analyzes numerous battle situations and formulates generalprinciples to guide the commander's efforts to determine the most effective tactics based uponclassifications of terrain, aspects of the enemy, and the relative strength of the forces. Intensiveefforts to gather information must always be mounted because, in accord with the analytic thrustof Chinese military science, the enemy must be carefully evaluated and judgments weighedbefore a decision whether to attack or defend can be calculated. Among the numerous relatedtopics are techniques for psychological warfare, procedures for probing and manipulating theenemy, ways to induce fear, and methods for deception. Because subterfuge and psychologicalploys manipulate the enemy and thereby hasten their demise, confusion should be incited in theenemy's ranks, such as through disinformation. Furthermore, all weaknesses in an opposing general should be fully exploited and assaults directed toward undefended positions. No generalshould ever suffer a defeat from lack of training, preparation, or tactical intelligence.
Additional important issues found throughout the book concern military communications andthe paramount need for secrecy, evaluation of the situation and decisive action when themoment arrives, various indications and cues for fathoming the enemy's situation, and theeveryday basis for military skills and equipment. In addition, more than half the book is devotedto tactical principles, questions of command and control, the nature of leadership, and essentialpolicies for the state. In sum, the work by which the T'ai Kung came to be known--one that hasenjoyed numerous vernacular Chinese and Japanese translations in recent decades, as well ascartoon versions and abstracted applications for business endeavors--is a vast compendium of military science. Although certainly not China's first theoretical work, it founded the T'ai Kung'sreputation for over two thousand years.
Tzu Kung
Along with Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung, Tzu Kung, who was active in the last decade of the sixthcentury B.C. and first decade of the fifth, is the third figure frequently identified as an earlycovert agent. A section of Confucius's biography in the Shih Chi briefly characterizes him withcitations from the Analects, the famous composite writing embodying the Master's sayings, andpurportedly preserves his successive discussions with the era's major feudal powers in hisfervent quest to prevent Ch'i from exterminating the small state of Lu. Although almostcertainly the product of later Warring States writers, 25 these dialogues may still reflect the essence of his arguments since he clearly persuaded several rulers to significantly alter theirmilitary plans, mostly to their regret.
Tzu Kung was prompted to undertake his mission when Confucius, openly ruing the imminentdestruction of their ancestral state, sarcastically wondered why none of his disciples had beenstirred to action. The Shih Chi unfolds the following events that probably occurred about 498B.C. near the end of the Spring and Autumn period, right after Sun-tzu's strategies had madeWu powerful:
Tuan Mu-hsi, known as Tzu Kung, was a native of the state of Wei. Thirty-one years youngerthan Confucius, he had a sharp tongue and spoke skillfully, prompting Confucius to frequentlyupbraid him for his argumentiveness. Confucius once asked him, "Who is superior, you or YenHui?" Tzu Kung replied: "How would I dare compare myself with Hui? When Hui hears one thing he knows ten; when I hear one thing, I know two."
When Tzu Kung had completed his studies with Confucius, he asked, "What sort of man amI?""You are a vessel," Confucius responded. "What sort of vessel?""A jade vessel forsacrificial grains."26
Ch'en Tzu-ch'in asked Tzu Kung, "With whom did Confucius study?" Tzu Kung replied: "TheTao of Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty has not yet totally fallen by the wayside, but isstill present in men. The worthy recognize the important aspects, the unworthy the minoraspects. Thus everyone still
retains the Tao of Kings Wen and Wu, so where would Confucius not learn? Why shouldhe have had a constant teacher?"27
Ch'en Tzu-ch'in further inquired: "When Confucius goes to a state, he invariably learns about itsgovernment. Does he seek it out, or is it given to him?" Tzu Kung replied: "The master actscongenially and respectfully, and gains information through courtesy. Isn't his seeking thusdifferent from other men?"28
Tzu Kung asked Confucius, "What do you think about being rich, yet not arrogant, or poor, yetnot a sycophant?" Confucius replied: "It is acceptable. However, it is not as good as being poor,yet taking pleasure in the Tao, being rich, yet loving the true forms of behavior."29
T'ien Ch'ang, a high official in Ch'i, wanted to bring about chaos in his native state but wasafraid of the four great families surnamed Kao, Kuo, Pao, and Ying. Therefore he shifted the forces under his control, intending to attack the state of Lu. Confucius, having heard about it, addressed his disciples: "Our ancestral graves are located in Lu, the state of our fathers and mothers. When the state is now thus endangered, why haven't any of you gone forth to takeaction?" Tzu Lu requested permission to go, but Confucius stopped him. Tzu Chang and TzuShih similarly requested permission to go, but Confucius would not grant it. Tzu Kung thenasked to go and Confucius agreed.
Tzu Kung first went to Ch'i, where he spoke with T'ien Ch'ang: "Your lordship's attack on Lu isin error because it is a difficult state to attack. Its fortifications are narrow and low, its moatsconstricted and shallow, its ruler stupid and lacking in benevolence, and the ministers false anduseless. Moreover, the officers and people detest military service. You cannot engage them incombat. It would be better for your majesty to attack Wu. Now Wu's walls are high and wide, the moats broad and deep, their armor stout and new, the officers carefully selected and well fed. Valuable vessels and elite troops are all gathered
there. Moreover, Wu employs enlightened officials to preserve them. They would be easy toattack."
T'ien Ch'ang angrily flushed and said: "What you consider difficult everyone else takes aseasy; what you consider easy everyone else believes to be difficult. What do you mean byinstructing me in this fashion?"
Tzu Kung replied: "I have heard it said that one who suffers from internal difficulties shouldattack the strong, but one who suffers from external pressures should attack the weak. Now youare troubled about internal affairs. I have heard that your lordship has been enfeoffed three timesunsuccessfully because some of the important ministers do not heed your words. Now if your lordship destroys Lu and thus broadens Ch'i, your victory will make the ruler arrogant. Destroying Lu will also cause the ministerial families [who command the armies] to be furtherhonored, while your achievements will not rank among them. Therefore you will daily becomefurther estranged from the ruler.
"When the ruler has become arrogant and the great ministers are free to pursue their desires, yet you seek to accomplish great deeds, it will be difficult. In general, when rulers becomearrogant, they give free rein to their desires, but when ministers grow arrogant, they wrangle. For this reason differences will force you to defer to the ruler while you will have to struggle with the ministers. In such circumstances your position in Ch'i will be endangered. Thus Iadvised that it would be better to attack the state of Wu.
"If you attack Wu and fail to be victorious the people will perish outside while within the statethe high ministers' positions will be empty. Then you will not have any powerful enemies within the ministerial ranks nor excesses in the people below. A solitary ruler will then govern Ch'i, and it will be your majesty."
T'ien Ch'ang said: "Excellent! However, I have already sent my forces forth against Lu, sowithdrawing them now to send
against Wu would cause the great ministers to be suspicious. What should I do?"
Tzu Kung replied: "Your lordship's forces should merely assume a position there withoutattacking. Meanwhile, I would like permission to go to Wu and persuade the ruler to rescue Luby attacking Ch'i. You could then employ your army to respond to their offensive."
T'ien Ch'ang agreed and had Tzu Kung proceed south on his mission, where he gainedaudience with Fu-ch'ai, king of Wu. Tzu Kung said: "I have heard that a true king does notexterminate generations or a hegemon strengthen his enemies. A weight of a thousand tons canshift when but a few ounces are added. Right now the state of Ch'i, with its ten thousandchariots, and my own state of Lu, with its thousand, are struggling with Wu for supremacy. 30 Iam afraid that you will be endangered by this conflict. However, rescuing Lu would result in aglorious name, attacking Ch'i would produce great profits. Nothing would be moreadvantageous than dispelling the worries of the feudal lords above the Ssu River and executing brutal Ch'i in order to bring about its subjugation to mighty Chin. Even the wise would have nodoubts about the fame that would be achieved for preserving the lost state of Lu and actually putting strong Ch'i in straits."
Fu-ch'ai replied: "Excellent. Although we once engaged Yüeh in combat, isolated their forces, and then defeated them at K'uai-chi, the king of Yüeh has disciplined himself through enduringgreat suffering, nurtured his warriors, and harbors a burning intention to avenge himself.31 Wait until we attack Yüeh, and then I will heed your words."
Tzu Kung said: "Yüeh's strength does not exceed Lu's, nor does Wu's might exceed Ch'i's. Ifyou defer attacking Ch'i to strike Yüeh, Ch'i will have already pacified Lu. Moreover, yourmajesty was just now concerned with garnering a name for preserving the lost and continuing the extinguished, whereas attacking the small state of Yüeh while being frightened of
mighty Ch'i is not courageous. Now the courageous never avoid hardship; the benevolent do notimpoverish the straitened; the wise do not lose the moment; nor do kings extinguishgenerations--all just to establish their righteousness. Preserving Yüeh would display yourbenevolence to the feudal lords, while rescuing Lu by attacking Ch'i would impose your awesomeness on Chin. The feudal lords would then inevitably be compelled to lead each otherto pay court to Wu, and hegemony will thus be achieved.
"Now your majesty must certainly hate Yüeh. I would like to go east for an audience with Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, to convince him to dispatch troops to support you. This will truly emptyout Yüeh, although the image will be of following the other feudal lords in this concertedattack on Ch'i." Elated, the king of Wu then had Tzu Kung go to Yüeh.
Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, had the roads cleared, went to meet him in the suburbs, andthereafter personally escorted him to the guest house, where he asked, "How is it that such a great official has deigned to so dishonor himself with a visit to our uncivilized state?"
Tzu Kung replied: "I have just persuaded the king of Wu to rescue Lu by attacking Ch'i. Hewants to do it but fears Yüeh and so said, 'Wait until I attack Yüeh, and then it will be possible.' Thus the destruction of Yüeh is therefore certain. Now to not have any intention to repay Wu [for permitting your survival] but yet cause them to have doubts is stupid. To be intent ontaking revenge against others but let them know about it is disastrous. To allow the discoveryof affairs that have not yet been initiated is dangerous. These three are great worries inundertaking affairs."
Kou-chien bowed twice and said: "Formerly I failed to calculate our strength, engaged Wu incombat, and ended up being in difficulty in K'uai-chi. The pain of this experience haspenetrated my very bones. Day and night I have gritted my teeth and parched my mouth,seeking only to engage the king of Wu in a fatal struggle. This has been my wish."
Thereafter he further queried Tzu Kung, who advised: "The king of Wu is fierce and brutal, hisministers cannot withstand him. The state has been exhausted in frequent warfare, the officersand troops lack endurance, and the common people harbor resentment. The great ministerssuffer from internal turmoil, and Wu Tzu-hsü has perished because of his direct remonstrance. Chancellor Po P'i controls affairs and accords with the ruler's excesses in order to preserve hisown position. 32 This is the government of a doomed state. Now if your majesty were to send forth some troops to support their rescue of Lu, it would encourage their ambitions. Furthermore, if you were to send valuable treasures in order to assuage his heart and speak humbly in order to honor his court, it is certain that the king would attack Ch'i. If he engages incombat without being victorious, it would be your good fortune. If he proves victorious, then hisarmy will certainly approach Chin. I would like to go north to have an audience with the duke of Chin and bring it about that he will attack Wu, for then Wu will inevitably be weakened. Withits spirited soldiers all being spent in Ch'i and its heavy armor entangled in Chin, if your majesty exploits their exhaustion, Wu's extinction will be inevitable."
Kou-chien, being greatly pleased by these prospects, granted permission for Tzu Kung to seeChin and moreover sent him a hundred ounces of gold, a precious sword, and two superlativelances. 33 However, Tzu Kung did not accept them but went back to report to the king of Wu: "Irespectfully reported your majesty's words to the king of Yüeh. Terrified, he said: 'Iunfortunately lost my parents while still young and, failing to calculate our internal strength, attacked and thus offended the state of Wu. Our army was defeated and I was insulted, beingisolated at K'uai-chi. The state was empty and overgrown with brambles, but through the greatking's generosity we were able to survive and continue our ancestral sacrifices. Until I die I would never dare forget it, so what plots could I possibly entertain against the king of Wu?'"
Five days later Yüeh deputed the high official Wen Chung to bow before the king of Wu and say: "From the Eastern Sea where my lord Kou-chien has been established, I have been deputed to act as a minor emissary to inquire about your
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the arrows and points fly. Moreover, your humble servant offers some twenty thousand poundsof armor that our ancestors had stored away, including iron spears and glistening swords, in order to honor your army's officers."
The king of Wu, greatly pleased, informed Tzu Kung: "The king of Yüeh wants to personally accompany me in our attack upon Ch'i. Should I allow it?" Tzu Kung replied: "You should not.Now to empty out a ruler's state, to employ all his masses, and moreover have the ruler followon would not be righteous. My lord should accept his monetary gifts, allow his forces toparticipate, but deny the presence of the ruler himself."
The king of Wu assented and declined Kou-chien's suggestion. Thereupon he mobilized troopsfrom nine commanderies to attack Ch'i while Tzu Kung departed for Chin, where he spoke with the Lord of Chin: "I have heard it said that if plans are not first determined, it will be impossibleto respond to exigencies; if the troops are not first ordered, it will be impossible to conquer the enemy. Now Ch'i and Wu are about to engage in battle. If Wu fails to be victorious, Yüeh willcertainly cause disorder there. If they manage to conquer Ch'i, their troops will inevitably approach Chin."
The duke of Chin, seriously troubled, inquired, "What should we do?" Tzu Kung responded, "Prepare your weapons and rest your troops while awaiting them." The ruler agreed. Tzu Kungdeparted and went to Lu. The king of Wu indeed engaged Ch'i in battle at Ai-ling and inflicteda serious defeat. He captured the troops of seven generals and remained in the field, notreturning to Wu but, as predicted, approaching Chin to confront them above Yellow Pool. WhenWu and Chin fought for supremacy, Chin mounted an attack and severely defeated
Wu's armies. The king of Yüeh learned of it, forded the Yangtze River, and suddenly attackedWu, encamping seven kilometers from the capital. The king of Wu heard about thesedevelopments, abandoned Chin, returned to Wu, and engaged Yüeh in battle at Five Lakes. Hefailed to be victorious in three battles and could no longer defend the city gates. Yüeh's forcesthen surrounded the king's palace, killed King Fu-ch'ai, and executed Chancellor Po P'i. Threeyears after destroying Wu, Yüeh faced east and became recognized as hegemon. Thus onceTzu Kung ventured forth, he preserved Lu, brought chaos to Ch'i, destroyed Wu, and achievedhegemony for Yüeh. Tzu Kung's single mission caused the strategically powerful states to destroy each other, and within a decade each of the five states experienced significant changes.34
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Tzu Kung loved real estate speculation and was able to profit from the material changes of thetimes. He enjoyed speaking about people's good points but was unable to conceal their errors. He frequently served as prime minister in Lu and Wei, and his family accumulated a fortune of one thousand ounces of gold. He finally died in Ch'i.
A modern reader puzzling through this lengthy biography might find Tzu Kung's reputation asan "agent" (chien) somewhat mystifying. Clearly he visited Ch'i as an overt spokesman for Lu. However, his subsequent visits, especially to Wu, which foolishly became persuaded to attackthe strong state of Ch'i and eventually perished from its disregard of Wu Tzu-hsü's warning, were ostensibly to benefit the rulers he was addressing, not Lu, although they should havesuspected that he was acting for Lu. Moreover, even though this was a period when diplomatic personnel frequently embarked on critical missions to save their states and acquire allies, theopenness of the Warring States when peripatetic persuaders sought ready ears for their methods and strategies had not yet evolved. Tzu Kung simply acted on behalf of Lu to subvert the otherstates, exploiting existing conflicts and even internal dissensions, as in Ch'i. Therefore, althoughhis work was largely overt, he has still been considered an "agent," and his activities shouldtherefore be seen as both defining and reflecting the greater scope of the
term's meaning throughout Chinese history. As the Shih Chi summarized, "Once Tzu Kung ventured forth, he preserved Lu, brought chaos to Ch'i, destroyed Wu, and achieved hegemonyfor Yüeh."
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2 The Spring andAutumn Period
THE FIRST PERIOD OF CHINESE HISTORY for which narrative materials becomeavailable, known as the Spring and Autumn period after the annals that chronicle it, is normallydated from 722 to 481 B.C. The terse Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn Annals), traditionally said to have been personally edited by Confucius to reflect his moral approbation of politicalbehavior during an increasingly turbulent period and serve as a handbook for future generations, becomes comprehensible only through its three classic commentaries, the famous Tso Chuanand the comparatively ignored Kung Yang and Ku Liang. Because all three were composedduring the subsequent Warring States period, acrimonious controversy revolves around whether they accurately record Spring and Autumn history--the basic events having been distorted by later conceptions and reinterpreted to support politicized perspectives--or may be simply inaccurate. Although the veracity of events and relevance of interpretations clearly impingeupon the chronological accuracy of any intelligence history based upon them, irrespective of their fictional or substantial nature, the episodes and beliefs recorded in the Tso Chuan equally assumed a life of their own. Once penned, circulated, and assiduously studied, the stories andevents became common knowledge, trusted and applied by subsequent generations, constantlyrevisited by military theorists and political writers throughout the imperial period.
Many of the entries in the Tso Chuan, although sometimes quite cryptic, provide crucialinsights into the military history and political intrigues of the Spring and Autumn period, an era that saw several of the essentially feudal states originally
established by the Chou dynasty after their conquest of the Shang in 1035 B.C. becomeincreasingly pow
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erful and independent. Regional rivalries arose; states, whether in pursuit of power or defensiveintegrity, invaded each other; and warfare expanded from chariot-centered battles largelyconducted by the nobility, generally limited to some ten or twenty thousand combatants, toclashes between the massive infantry armies that supplemented vastly greater chariot forces. During the Spring and Autumn period survival suddenly became a question of economic andmilitary preparedness, political acumen, effective central government, unwavering control of themasses, mobilization capability, strength and training of standing forces, and degree of professionalism. Acquiring knowledge about other states, whether friendly or hostile, grewcritical because intentions had to be fathomed, preparations made, political actions initiated, and campaigns planned. The hundreds of incidents recorded in the Tso Chuan create a vivid portraitof these developments and provide a compelling picture that the individual statesconscientiously gathered military and political intelligence, even though rarely depicting clandestine agents being employed on specific missions. Tangentially, these incidents also provide a record of many other aspects of intelligence operations; incorporate materials onevaluating men and motives; show the employment of covert measures to subvert, debilitate, and betray; portray the role of omens and divination; and illustrate how knowledge thus gainedwas deliberately exploited. In many ways the period was more complex than the Warring Statesera that followed--even though the latter is associated with the inception and development of political and philosophical doctrines--simply because many more states were struggling tosurvive and fighting for power, dramatically multiplying the number of potential alliances. Incontrast, by the commencement of the Warring States period only seven significant states remained, virtually locked in an interminable death struggle.
Time and Communications
In the Spring and Autumn period cities were largely isolated, scattered about a rural countrysidestill marked by major woods and extensive marshes. Transportation and mountedcommunication were limited to ox-drawn carts and wagons, horse-drawn carriages, andmilitary- style chariots. All three modes were equally constrained by the primitive road systems,which often became impassable quagmires after rain or snow, and somewhat impeded by thevarying track widths found in different regions. Pack animals were also employed andmercantile goods increasingly circulated, particularly in areas with water transportation.However, the average person traveled, if at all, on his feet, while horses were not ridden for several more centuries, thereby precluding the establishment of the swift messenger servicesfound in
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the imperial period, always remaining comparatively few and expensive throughout Chinesehistory.
These circumstances fundamentally affected the transmission of information and therefore itsnature and relevance. A highly dedicated messenger proceeding on foot could perhaps achievetwenty miles per day for a sustained period and someone driving a fleet chariot easily double, but without prepositioned relay stations, a change of horses, and great urgency, the normal transmission of ordinary diplomatic and military information was severely constricted. However, the impact of these limitations was considerably ameliorated by the lengthy period needed to mobilize armies and advance them across similarly constricted terrain. Roads notbeing open thoroughfares, army columns would be strung out for miles, while innumerable logistical problems had to be solved and discipline maintained. For example, speakers in theTso Chuan noted that approximately three months were required to respond to a military threatdeveloping some two thousand kilometers away, to put forces on target from the date news was received, assuming the existence of a minimal standing force that might be rapidly provisionedand dispatched. When resisting an invader coming from some distance, the defenders wouldnormally enjoy a preparation time of days or weeks based upon a sustained army advance of perhaps twelve miles
per day compared with the slowest messenger's rate of twenty to forty and a normaltransmission time for vital information between states of several days. 1
Unlike later historical periods when, for example, messages are said to have been hidden in waxor rice balls--a development facilitated by the discovery and popularization of paper in the late Han dynasty--little information has been preserved about communication techniques. Apartfrom messages simply memorized by couriers and oral presentations extemporaneously composed, brush-written characters furnished the standard medium. Therefore the key questions simply become what materials could be written upon and how they might be protected from water since moisture would render the message illegible.
During the Spring and Autumn period two materials were widely employed: narrow, thin slatsof wood--usually bamboo--and cloth, especially silk. The bamboo slips could be boundtogether with cords and rolled up when more than a couple of sentences were required. Cumbersome and bulky, they might serve adequately for diplomatic personnel and othersunlikely to be searched or molested, but clearly not in doubtful circumstances or where robbersand brigands might attack, especially as captured information could prove valuable.Conversely, silk and other cloth materials might easily be written upon and easily concealed,whether under layers of clothing or in innocuous objects. (No doubt garment linings and undergarments frequently
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served to communicate clandestine messages, although there are no concrete references to it inthis early period.) Hard objects, such as bowls, vessels, and wooden items, might also have messages written or inscribed upon them in relatively obscure places. However, becausewriting materials were limited in antiquity, great reliance was placed upon memory, and prodigious feats in this regard remain legion. Insofar as entire books were commonly memorized for study purposes and their subsequent recitation deemed flawless, lengthy diplomatic or military communiqués could be similarly treated. The difficulty--or morecorrectly, the fatal flaw--is that the
messenger himself not only had to be physically present to verbalize his report, but also had tobe in a conscious, unimpaired condition. Anyone suspected of conveying covert informationcould easily be detained, poisoned, or otherwise slain en route, the contents then irretrievablylost. In contrast, messages committed to writing existed independently of their originators or carriers and could be passed from person to person, forwarded innocuously, even unknowingly,without arousing suspicion, especially when buried among merchandise being plied by theitinerant traders increasingly common in the period.
Naturally such difficulties with communication means and modes not only restricted the rangeof possible covert activities, but also made the passing of information from clandestine sources to their consumers more difficult, often necessitating perilous face-to-face contact. Aninformant, traitor, or agent might have vital information but nothing at hand beyond a dining plate upon which to write. This conjures up imaginative scenes of people desperately trying towedge bulky dishes or even valuable items into a dead drop outside a privy wall or buryingthem in a stable's straw for later retrieval where some bumpkin might suddenly stumble uponthem! Although the advent of paper obviously facilitated clandestine communications, mere inconvenience and difficulty never deterred the truly determined, particularly when the fate ofthe state or vast rewards lay at stake.
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