The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays on the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

Brief A–Z entries describe the main people, events, politics, social issues, institutions, and policies that make the topic unique, and entries are cross-referenced for ease of browsing. Extensive bibliographies are divided into several general subject areas, provid- ing excellent access points for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more. Additionally, maps, photographs, and appendixes of supplemental information aid high school and college students doing term papers or introductory research projects. In short, the historical dictionaries are the perfect starting point for anyone looking to research in these fields.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

 

Israeli Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana, 2006.

Cold War Counterintelligence, by Nigel West, 2007.

World War II Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2008.

Sexspionage, by Nigel West, 2009.

Air Intelligence, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2009.

Middle Eastern Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed, 2009.

German Intelligence, by Jefferson Adams, 2009.

Ian Fleming’s World of Intelligence: Fact and Fiction, by Nigel West, 2009.

Naval Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2010.

Atomic Espionage, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2011.

Signals Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2012.

British Intelligence, Second Edition, by Nigel West, 2014.

World War I Intelligence, by Nigel West, 2014.

United States Intelligence, Second Edition, by Michael A. Turner, 2014.

Intelligence Failures, by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey, 2015.

International Intelligence, Second Edition, by Nigel West, 2015.

Russian and Soviet Intelligence, Second Edition, by Robert W. Pringle, 2015.

Chinese Intelligence, Second Edition, by I. C. Smith and Nigel West, 2021.

 

 

 

 

 

Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence

Second Edition

 

 

I. C. Smith and Nigel West

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Published by Rowman & Littlefield

A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com

 

Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2021 by I. C. Smith and Nigel West

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

 

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

 

Names: Smith, I. C. (Ivian C.), author. | West, Nigel, author.

Title: Historical dictionary of Chinese intelligence / I. C. Smith and Nigel West.

Description: Second edition. | Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield, [2021] | Series: Historical dictionaries of intelligence and counterintelligence | Summary: “The second edition of Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence covers the history of Chinese Intelli- gence from 400 B.C. to modern times. It contains a chronology, an introduction, an extensive bibliography, and a dictionary section with more than 400 cross-referenced entries on the agencies and agents, operations and equipment, and tradecraft and jargon. It is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Chinese intelligence”—Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020035964 (print) | LCCN 2020035965 (ebook) | ISBN 9781538130193 (cloth) | ISBN 9781538130209 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Intelligence service—China—History—Dictionaries. | Military intelli- gence—China—History—Dictionaries.

Classification: LCC JQ1519.5.I6 S65 2021 (print) | LCC JQ1519.5.I6 (ebook) | DDC 327.1251003—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035964

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035965

 

^TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

 

Printed in the United States of America.

 

 

“One of the delightful things about Americans is that they have absolutely no historical memory.”

—Zhou Enlai, March 1954

“It’s intellectual property . . . it’s the greatest transfer of wealth in history” (referring to China’s endless campaign of economic espionage)

—General Keith Alexander, U.S. Army (retired), former head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command

“Unlike Russia . . . the Chinese are strategic, patient, and they set down foundations of organizations and are very consistent narratives over a long period of time.”

—Peter Garnaut, former adviser to Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull, May 2018

“I think China, from a counterintelligence perspective, in many ways represents the broadest, most challenging, most significant threat we face as a country. And I say that because for them, it is a whole state effort. It is economic espionage as well as traditional espionage;

it’s nontraditional collectors as well as traditional intelligence operatives; it’s human source as well as cyber means.”

—FBI Director Christopher Wray, July 2018

“The Chinese are a very vicious intelligence culture.”

—Bob Anderson, retired FBI official, as quoted by Jim Sciutto in The Shadow War, 2019

 

Contents

 

 

 

Editor’s Foreword                                                                               ix

Acknowledgments                                                                               xi

Reader’s Notes                                                                                  xiii

Acronyms and Abbreviations                                                                xv

Map                                                                                               xxiii

Chronology                                                                                      xxv

Introduction                                                                                         1

THE DICTIONARY                                                                           17

Bibliography                                                                                    469

About the Authors                                                                             483

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

vii

 

 

 

 

 

Chinese intelligence is not quite like any other form of intelligence, East or West. First of all, China itself is “divided” in that there is the Communist- dominated People’s Republic of China; the currently democratic but earlier Kuomintang-dominated Republic of China, better known as Taiwan; Hong Kong and Macao, which have been fairly autonomous but are being reinte- grated; and a community of overseas Chinese located in East Asian coun- tries, Europe, and the United States. During the Cold War, China was an opponent of Western countries, but the relationship has become incredibly complex, with issues less military and more commercial.

In order to make sense of it all, it is necessary to embed the intelligence scene into a broader historical, political, and economic context. This second edition of the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence contains a chro- nology and introduction, both of which address an understanding and chro- nology of the many twists and turns of Chinese intelligence. The details are then provided in the dictionary section, with entries on numerous people, including top politicians from the chairman on down. There are entries on numerous cases, many ending “successfully” for China’s opponents in the sense that the spies got caught, but not before they had managed to acquire information and crucial secrets. Many useful books have been written on the topics addressed in this book, and they are listed in the bibliography.

The authors, I. C. Smith and Nigel West, both know the situation from the inside. Smith worked for the FBI for 25 years, developing considerable fa- miliarity with the intelligence practiced by the People’s Republic of China, and was a crucial part of several of the cases described in this book. After retirement, he became an analyst of and commentator on the broader threat to the United States of China’s growing presence and influence. To give his personal views, in 2004 he published his autobiography, Inside. His coau- thor, Nigel West, has always been interested in Chinese intelligence as part of his ongoing study of intelligence in general, as reflected by a series of books he has written over the past several decades, including half a dozen in this series. He is widely known as an expert’s expert on espionage, and this historical dictionary fills one of the few remaining gaps.

Jon Woronoff Series Editor

 

 

 

ix

 

 

 

 

 

During the course of our research, we received support from intelligence and counterintelligence professionals as well as clandestine sources who, by the very nature of their status, must remain anonymous, with their contributions included without attribution.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xi

 

 

 

 

 

China is the name of several different states, including Imperial China, the Republic of China (ROC), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but in these pages the ROC is referred to as Taiwan, and for brevity China will be used for both Imperial China and the PRC. Similarly, South Korea will be used for the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Democratic People’s Repub- lic of Korea (DPRK) will be referred to as North Korea.

On 11 February 1958, the Fifth Session of the First National People’s Congress in the PRC adopted the Hanyu Pinyin romanization system for standard Mandarin, replacing the Wade-Giles and other systems of roman- ization. Hanyu means “Chinese language,” and Pinyin literally means “spelling sound.” The PRC approved the changes to improve the literacy rate among adults and remove the vestiges of China’s past, which had been dominated by foreign powers and the government of the defeated Kuomin- tang (KMT). Overnight, “Mao Tse-tung” officially became “Mao Zedong,” “Chou En-lai” became “Zhou Enlai,” “Canton” became “Guangzhou,” and “Peking” became “Beijing.” Some names remained the same, such as Kang Sheng and Shanghai. We use Pinyin romanization except for historical fig- ures such as Yuan Shih-kai and individuals associated with the KMT, like Chiang Kai-shek, Tai Li, and Sun Yat-sen.

We also use the Chinese method of writing Chinese names, beginning with

family names (surnames) followed by given names. Using Mao Zedong as an example, Mao is the family name followed by the given name Zedong.

This can be somewhat confusing, as overseas Chinese, Haiwai Huaren or Huaqiao in simplified Chinese (those living outside China), frequently adopt Anglicized names and the Western practice of using given (or first) names followed by surnames. For example, Larry Wu-tai Chin’s Chinese name is Jin Wudai. But not all overseas Chinese Westernize their names, so Wen Ho Lee (Lee being his family name) changed his name, but Min Gwo Bao (Min being the family name) did not. We use the names used by the individuals themselves and, when necessary, cross-reference them to ensure accuracy. As Chinese names have the family name first and given name last, Mao Zedong appears under the letter M, and Chiang Kai-shek is found under C, not K.

To make the dictionary easier to use, there are many cross-references, and any item with its own entry is bold. Any other related entries are listed in see also references at the end of entries.

 

xiii

 

 

 

 

 

ABW              Agencia Bezpiecznenstwa Wewnetznego (Polish security service)

ACSC             Australian Cyber Security Centre

ACSEJ           Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers in Japan AFSA Armed Forces Security Agency

AFSS             Air Force Security Service

APT               advanced persistent threat

ASA               Army Security Agency

ASD               Australian Signals Directorate

ASIO             Australian Security Intelligence Organisation BAAG    British Army Aid Group

BfV                Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution)

BND              Bundesnachrichtendienst (German federal intelligence service)

BIIR               Beijing Institute of International Relations BISE          Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering

BUAA            Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics CAAC        Civil Aviation Administration of China

CAC               China Aerospace Corporation CAEA China Atomic Energy Authority

CAEIT           China Academy of Electronic and Information Technologies

CAEP             China Academy of Engineering Physics

CAIFC           China Association for International Friendly Contact CALT       China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology CAS   China Academy of Science

CASC             China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation CASEJ Chinese Association of Scientists and Engineers in Japan

xv

xvi • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CASIC           China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation CAST China Academy of Space Technology

CAT               Civil Air Transport

CCCC             China Communications Construction Company CCDI       Central Commission of Discipline Inspection CCEG      Central Case Examination Group

CCP               Chinese Communist Party

CCSB             Central Committee Special Branch

CDIC             Central Discipline Inspection Commission CDSA Central Department of Social Affairs

CEIEC           China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation CGNPC           China General Nuclear Power Company

CHEC            China Harbor Engineering Company CHICOM    Chinese Communist

CHIS              Chinese Intelligence Service

CIA                Central Intelligence Agency

CICIR            China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations CID      Central Investigation Department

CIFE              Combined Intelligence Far East

CIG                Central Intelligence Group

CIIL               China Innovative Investment Ltd.

CIISS             China Institute of International Strategic Studies CITSC    China Information Technology Security Center CMC Central Military Commission

CMPB            China Maritime Police Bureau

CNAMC         China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company CNEIC           China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation CNNC    China National Nuclear Corporation

CNPC             China National Petroleum Company CNSA        China National Space Administration CNSC            Central National Security Commission

COCOM         Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls

COSTIND       Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense

CP                 Communist Party

CPPCC           Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CPUSA      Communist Party of the United States of America CRBC    China Road and Bridge Corporation

CSIC              China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation CSIS            Canadian Security Intelligence Service

CSIS              Center for Strategic and International Studies CSS       China surface-to-surface missile

CSSA             Chinese Students and Scholars Association CSTO         Collective Security Treaty Organization CT    Chinese terrorist

DCI                director of central intelligence

DCIS              Defense Criminal Investigative Service DDO   deputy director for operations

DF                 Dong Fang

DGSE            Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (France) DGSI      Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (France) DIA     Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI               director of national intelligence

DO                 Directorate of Operations

DoE               Department of Energy

DPP               Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)

DPRK            Democratic People’s Republic of (North) Korea DSB   director Hong Kong Special Branch

DSD               Defence Signals Directorate

DST               Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire

EAGLE          Export and Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement ELINT electronic intelligence

ETI                Energy Technology International

FBI                Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIS              Foreign Broadcast Information Service FECB     Far East Combined Bureau

FISA              Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 1978 FISC            Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court FLI          Foreign Language Institute

FSB               Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnotsi (Russian Federal Security Service)

FSO               foreign service officer

GC&CS          Government Code and Cypher School GCHQ     Government Communications Headquarters

GRU              Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie (Soviet military intelligence service)

GSD               General Staff Department (People’s Liberation Army) GSOMIA   General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement HASP            High-Altitude Sampling Program

HCUA            House Committee on Un-American Activities HEU          Harbin Engineering University

HKD              Hong Kong dollars

HKP               Hong Kong Police HUMINT     human intelligence

HVA              Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (East German foreign intelligence service)

IAD               Istrebitel’naia Aviatsonnaia Diviziaa (Fighter Aviation Regiment)

IAEA             International Atomic Energy Agency

IAPCM           Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics

IB                  Intelligence Bureau (India)

IBMND          Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense IC            Intelligence Community (U.S.)

ICBM             Intercontinental ballistic missile

ICE                Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IIR                 Institute of International Relations

ILD                International Liaison Department

ILD/PLA        International Liaison Department of the People’s Liberation Army

INDICS          Industrial Intelligent Cloud System INER       Institute of Nuclear Energy Research INEW            integrated network electronic warfare

INSCOM        Intelligence and Security Command (U.S. Army) IPR  Institute of Pacific Relations

IRBM             Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile ISLD      Inter-Services Liaison Department IW                 information warfare

JS/CMC          Joint Staff of the Central Military Commission JSSL    Joint Services School for Linguists

KGB              Komitei Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Soviet intelligence service)

KIS                Kuomintang Intelligence Service

KMT              Kuomintang

KPA               Korean People’s Army (North Korea)

KPD               Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German Communist Party)

Legat              legal attaché

LLVI              low-level voice intercept

MASINT        measurement and signature intelligence MCP   Malaya Communist Party

MEI               Ministry of Electronics Industry

MI5                British Security Service

MI6                British Secret Intelligence Service

MI9                British Escape and Evasion Service

MEI               Ministry of Electronics Industry

MII                Ministry of Information Industry

MIB               Military Intelligence Bureau

MID               Military Intelligence Department

MIIT              Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

MIRV             multiple independent reentry vehicle MoD          Ministry of Defence

MOST            Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC MPAJA   Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army

MPS               Ministry of Public Security

MSS               Ministry of State Security

NASA            National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCIX             National Counterintelligence Executive NCNA    New China News Agency

NCRIEO         North China Research Institute of Electro-Optics NIC       National Intelligence Council

NIE                National Intelligence Estimate

NINT             Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology NIO   national intelligence officer

NIPRNET       Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network NIS           National Intelligence Service (South Korea) NIS    Naval Investigative Service

NKVD            Narodni Kommisariat Vnutrennih Dei (Soviet intelligence service)

NOC              nonofficial cover

NRSC             National Remote Sensing Center NSA    National Security Agency

NSB               National Security Bureau (Taiwan) NSCN          National Socialist Council of Nagalim

NUAA            Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronomics

OBOR            One Belt, One Road (Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st- century Maritime Silk Road)

OGPU            Obyeddinenoye Gosudarstvennoye Politischekoye Upravlenie (Soviet intelligence service)

OMS              Foreign Liaison Department of the Comintern ONI           Office of Naval Intelligence

ORE               Office of Research and Estimates

OSO               Office of Special Operations

OSS               Office of Strategic Services

PAP               Chinese People’s Armed Police

PDA               personal digital assistant

PIDE              Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (Portugal) PLA       People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF           People’s Liberation Army Air Force PLAN     People’s Liberation Army Navy PoW               Prisoner of War

PRC               People’s Republic of China

PVA               People’s Volunteer Army

QED              quiet electric drive

RAF               Royal Air Force

RAT               remote access tool

RATS             Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure

RAW              Research and Analysis Wing (Indian intelligence service) RCMP            Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RHKP            Royal Hong Kong Police

RII                 Resources Investigation Institute

ROC               Republic of China

ROK              Republic of Korea

RSGS             Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station RSM            Radio Squadron Mobile

RU                 Revolutionary Union

SA                 Sturmabteilung

SACO            Sino-American Cooperative Organization SAM           surface-to-air missile

SASAC          State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

SASIC            State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council

SASTIND       State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

xxii • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

SCO               Shanghai Cooperation Organization SIOM         Shanghai Institute of Fine Mechanics SIS Secret Intelligence Service

SLBM            submarine-launched ballistic missile SLO            security liaison officer

SNPTC           State Nuclear Power Technology Company Ltd. SOAS     School of Oriental and African Studies

SOE               Special Operations Executive SRBM      short-range ballistic missile SRW                      Strategic Reconnaissance Wing

SSD               State Security Department (North Korea) SSTC  State Science and Technology Commission SSU      Strategic Services Unit

STS                Special Training School

SVR               Sluzhba Vnezhney Razvedki (Russian Federation intelligence service)

SWIEE           Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment

SWW             Sluzhba Wywiadu Wojskowego (Polish foreign intelligence service)

TACAN          tactical air navigation

TAO               Office of Tailored Access Operations (NSA) THAAD       Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

UAP               United Australia Party

UAV              unmanned aerial vehicle UFWD            United Front Work Department

UNESCO        United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USPERS         U.S. persons

USTC             University of Science and Technology of China VLSIC     very large-scale integrated circuit

VSSE             Belgian State Security Service

Map

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xxiii

 

Chronology

 

 

 

400 B.C. Sun Tzu writes The Art of War.

625 A.D. Empress Wu Chao creates China’s first intelligence agency.

1839 First Opium War breaks out.

1856 Second Opium War results in foreign concessions granted in Shanghai and Kowloon opposite Hong Kong.

1894 The First Sino-Japanese War begins over control of Korea.

1895 The Qing dynasty, defeated by Japan, sues for peace.

1898 The Boxer Uprising begins in an attempt to expel all foreigners from China.

1901 The Boxer Protocol signed, with China paying huge indemnities to eight nations for damages incurred during the Boxer Uprising.

1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance formed.

1904 Russo-Japanese War begins.

1905 Japan wins Russian concessions in southern Manchuria. Sun Yat-sen forms the revolutionary Alliance Society in Tokyo.

1906 Ralph Van Deman visits Peking to collect intelligence about the city’s fortifications.

1908 Pu Yi, aged just 2 years and 10 months, named emperor of China.

1911 The Qing (Manchu) dynasty collapses after 2,000 years of imperial rule. Sun Yat-sen returns from Hawaii to be first president of the republic.

1912 The First Chinese Republic is proclaimed with Sun Yat-sen as presi- dent when Pu Yi abdicates his imperial throne following nationwide elec- tions. Founding of the Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party.

1913 Nationalist party leader Song Jiaoren assassinated in Shanghai as he boards a train for Peking to head a coalition democratic government.

1915 Xin Qingnian (New Youth) magazine founded by Chen Duxiu and becomes the focus of revolutionary youth, with Mao Zedong contributing articles under a pseudonym.

 

 

xxv

xxvi • CHRONOLOGY

1916 The warlord era begins in China following the death of Yuan Shih-kai. 1917 Pu Yi installed as emperor for 12 days by warlord general Zhang Yun. 1918 Agnes Smedley indicted on espionage charges.

1919 The May Fourth Movement organizes widespread protests against the Japanese and the signing of the Versailles Treaty.

1920 Mao Zedong, while teaching in an elementary school, starts a Commu- nist Party cell in Changsha, Hunan Province.

1921 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded in Shanghai. Soviet agents establish a rezidentura in Peking.

1922 Kang Sheng flees to Germany and later meets Zhou Enlai in France.

1923 The Nationalist Party (KMT) is revitalized by Sun Yat-sen with guid- ance from Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin.

1924 Sun Yat-sen proclaims an alliance between the KMT and Communists. Already a Communist, Zhou Enlai returns to China from France to be ap- pointed Dai Jitao’s deputy of the Nationalist Party’s political department.

1925 Sun Yat-sen dies, and his designated successor, Liao Zhongkai, is assassinated by the Green Gang from Shanghai. Chiang Kai-shek succeeds him as head of the Nationalist Party.

1926 Deng Xiaoping returns to China after studying in Moscow.

1927 Peking police raid the Soviet consulate. Chiang Kai-shek breaks with Moscow and attempts to annihilate the CCP with a severe crackdown in Shanghai and other cities.

1928 Agnes Smedley travels to China. Tai Li appointed head of Chiang Kai- shek’s Clandestine Investigation Section.

1929 Mao Zedong creates first Chinese soviet republic in Jiangxi Province. The Malayan Communist Party created. The Soviet consulate in Harbin is raided by Chinese police.

1930 Richard Sorge posted to Shanghai.

1931 Hilaire Noulens arrested in Shanghai. HMS Poseidon sunk. Japan in- vades Manchuria. Nationalist armies commanded by Chiang Kai-shek encir- cle the Jiangxi soviet in an attempt to destroy the CCP.

1932 The Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) begins cryptographic opera- tions on Stonecutter’s Island, Hong Kong. Pu Yi installed as ruler of Man- chukuo by the Japanese.

1933 Richard Sorge leaves Shanghai for Tokyo.

1934 The British Government Code and Cipher School intercepts and reads MASK, the Comintern’s wireless traffic exchanged between Moscow and Shanghai. Chiang Kai-shek’s German-trained officers drive the Communists out of Jiangxi, and the Long March to northwest China begins.

1935 Mao Zedong assumes leadership over the Red Army during the Long March. The U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence establishes a network with Tai Li to spy on the Japanese.

1936 Chiang Kai-shek abducted in the Xi’an incident. Kang Sheng visits Paris for the Comintern.

1937 The MASK intercepts are terminated. Kang Sheng returns to China after four years in the Soviet Union. China signs a nonaggression pact with Moscow. The Second Sino-Japanese War begins as Japan invades Manchu- ria.

1938 Kang Sheng heads the Central Department of Social Affairs, the She- huibu, the CCP’s security and intelligence arm. Tai Li persuades the Com- munist Zhang Guotao to defect to the KMT. Herbert Yardley employed to break Japanese ciphers.

1939 Yan’an students arrested on espionage charges.

1940 Agnes Smedley detained by the British in Hong Kong.

1941 Under Japanese threat, the FECB is evacuated from Hong Kong to Kranji, Singapore.

1942 Morris Cohen captured by the Japanese in Hong Kong as he attempts to rescue Madame Sun Yat-sen. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) sends a mission to China. The Malayan Communist Party begins a guerrilla cam- paign against the Japanese occupation. Tai Li heads joint Sino-American intelligence operations.

1943 Larry Wu-tai Chin recruited by the U.S. Army in China as an interpret- er.

1944 Richard Sorge executed in Tokyo. The Dixie Mission arrives in China.

1945 Leaked OSS reports prompt an investigation of Amerasia. Pu Yi is captured by the Soviet Red Army.

1946 Tai Li is killed in an aircraft accident.

1947 Lai Tek is exposed as a mole by the Malay Communist Party leader Chin Peng and murdered. The civil war continues in China with the Commu- nists gradually gaining the upper hand. Martial law is established in Taiwan following a rising against the Nationalist government.

1948 Joan Hinton moves to China. Qian Xuesen returns to China after 10 years’ research in France. An emergency is declared in Malaya.

1949 Larry Wu-tai Chin joins the U.S. consulate in Shanghai as a translator. The CCP’s Central Department of Social Affairs is reorganized, with many of its officers transferred to the newly established Ministry of Public Secur- ity, the Gonganbu. KMT forces led by Chiang Kai-shek withdraw to Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Zhonghonghua Renmin Gonghe- guo, is proclaimed by Mao Zedong. Mao holds talks with Joseph Stalin in Moscow.

1950 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is signed in Moscow. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Douglas Mackiernan is killed trying to enter Tibet, prompting the Chinese occupation. A Nationalist F-10 reconnaissance aircraft is shot down, killing the crew of six. North Korea invades the south. Zhu Chenzhi is executed in Taiwan. The Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) predicts that Chinese troops will cross the Yalu River to fight United Nations forces in Korea. Joseph Stalin repatriates Pu Yi to China. Colonel John Lovell is captured and later killed after his RB-45C is shot down over the Yalu River.

1951 Signals intercepts prove Chinese MiG-15 fighters are being flown by Soviet pilots. CIA officer Hugh Redmond is arrested in Shanghai. General Douglas MacArthur calls for an attack on China and is relieved of his com- mand. Counterrevolutionary campaigns begin in China and the Labor Re- form Program (Laogai) is established.

1952 TROPIC aircrew is captured in China. Larry Wu-tai Chin joins the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) in Okinawa.

1953 Colonel John Arnold is taken prisoner near the Chinese town of Antung in Liaoning Province while dropping agents from a B-29. A British Govern- ment Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) base is opened at Little Sai Wan on Hong Kong Island. A U.S. Navy P2-V Neptune is shot down near Shantou (formerly Swatow) in China’s Guangdong Province.

1954 The first Taiwan Straits crisis breaks out with a conflict between Tai- wan and the PRC. Diplomatic relations at chargé d’affaires rank is estab- lished between London and Beijing. Taiwan signs a mutual defense pact with the United States. A Cathay Pacific flight is shot down near Hainan Island, killing 10.

1955 Mao Zedong decides to develop a Chinese atomic weapon. A Sino- Soviet atomic energy collaboration agreement is signed. An Air India Con- stellation airliner is sabotaged in Hong Kong.

1956 Communist-inspired rioting in Hong Kong. Premier Zhou Enlai an- nounces a 12-year plan to modernize Chinese technology. Qian Xuesen is deported to China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bombs Tibetan monasteries. U.S. Navy P4M-IQ Mercator is shot down over the Chengzu Islands near Shanghai with the loss of 16 crew.

1957 E. D. Vorobiev is appointed to head a Soviet nuclear technology trans- fer program to Beijing. The CIA commences U-2 overflights of the PRC from Peshawar in Pakistan. Malaya is granted independence. The Great Leap Forward, launched by Mao Zedong, results in an economic collapse. The Hundred Flowers Movement of relative intellectual freedom in the PRC is quickly followed by the Anti-Rightist Campaign, which results in the arrest of 300,000 intellectuals.

1958 A Taiwanese P4Y reconnaissance aircraft makes an emergency landing at Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong. A Taiwanese RB-57D is shot down over Shandong Province by a MiG-15. Soviet physicists are sent to the PRC to assist in the atomic weapons project. Second Taiwan Straits crisis as the PLA shells the island of Quemoy.

1959 Qian Xuesen meets Klaus Fuchs, just released from Wakefield Prison in England. Nikita Khrushchev withdraws technical support for the PRC’s nuclear program. A U.S. P4M-IQ Mercator is attacked off Wonsan in North Korea. A Taiwanese RB-57D is shot down near Beijing by an SA-2 Guide- line missile. A famine caused by the Great Leap Forward begins, which will kill an estimated 30 million over three years.

1960 TOPPER missions begin to insert remote sensors in the PRC. CIA U- 2s withdrawn from Peshawar and Atsugi. Work stopped at the plutonium- producing reactor at Jiuquan in Gansu Province and concentrates on uranium enrichment at Lanzhou, Gansu. Construction of a nuclear test center begins at Malan in northwest China. Corona satellite imagery becomes available in the United States. A Black Cat U-2 overflies mainland China from Taiwan.

1961 Larry Wu-tai Chin joins the FBIS in Santa Rosa, California. Chan Tek Fei is arrested in Hong Kong. Professor Wang Minchuan defects in Greece. Two PLAAF pilots are reported to have defected to South Korea in Septem- ber. Albania withdraws from the Warsaw Pact.

1962 Bernard Boursicot is posted to Paris. Taiwanese Colonel Chen Huai- sheng’s U-2A is shot down over Nanchang. Chao Fu defects in Bonn. Mao Zedong abandons the Great Leap Forward. The PRC attacks across the Sino- Indian border in the Himalayas.

1963 The Lanzhou nuclear facility begins production of enriched uranium. General Chiang Ching-kuo proposes an attack on the nuclear sites at Haiyan (Koko Nor, Qinghai Province) and at Lanzhou to the CIA. Major Yeh Chang-yi’s U-2C is shot down by an SA-2 missile. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is signed in Moscow but is not ratified by the PRC. Zhou Hongjin defects to the Soviet Union.

1964 The CIA flies U-2 missions over mainland China from Charbatia in India. The PRC tests an atomic bomb at Lop Nor. Taiwanese Colonel Nan Ping Lee’s U-2G is shot down over Fujian Province. President Charles de Gaulle recognizes the PRC. A Taiwanese U-2 photographs the Lanzhou ura- nium-enrichment plant at night with an infrared camera.

1965 Taiwanese Major Wang Shi-chuen’s U-2C is shot down near Beijing by an SA-2 missile. Larry Wu-tai Chin becomes a U.S. citizen. The Chinese ambassador in Tanzania is implicated in a plot to overthrow Dr. Hastings Banda in Malawi.

1966 Kwame Nkrumah is deposed in a coup while visiting Beijing. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is launched in the PRC by Mao Ze- dong. The USS Banner is harassed by PRC fishing boats in the East China Sea. A New China News Agency (Xinhua) editor, Lau Yvet-sang, defects to Taiwan from Hong Kong. The plutonium reactor at Jiuquan goes critical. Four PLA officers walk into India from Tibet and seek asylum.

1967 Two Taiwanese U-2s overfly Lop Nor from Takhli in Thailand. Cap- tain Hwang Lung-pei’s U-2C is shot down by an SA-2 missile near Jiaxing. Riots paralyze Hong Kong. An SR-71 photographs the detonation of a Chi- nese hydrogen bomb. Former prime minister Harold Holt disappears in Aus- tralia while swimming near his home. Pu Yi, the last emperor of China, dies in Beijing after being severely criticized by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. PRC state chairman Liu Shaoqi dies in obscurity in a makeshift prison.

1968 Purge of PRC security organs by Kang Sheng. Mao Zedong denounces the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. A U.S. Navy Skyraider is shot down over Hainan Island.

1969 Wang Yuncheng and Lu Futian are executed. PRC and Soviet troops clash along the border at the Ussuri River. Liao Ho-shu defects in the Nether- lands. The PRC conducts its first underground nuclear test. A D-21 drone overflies Lop Nor and crashes in Siberia.

1970 Larry Wu-tai Chin joins the FBIS headquarters in Rosslyn, Virginia. The PRC puts its first satellite, the Dong Fang Hong-1, into orbit. A U.S. Navy SK-5 drone lands accidentally on Hainan. CIA officer Hugh Redmond dies after 19 years’ imprisonment in Shanghai.

1971 Lin Biao killed in a plane crash in Mongolia. A nuclear weapons development program begins in Taiwan. U.S. national security adviser Henry Kissinger makes a secret trip to Beijing. A PRC mission arrives at the United Nations in New York.

1972 Katrina Leung makes contact with PRC intelligence officers. Taiwa- nese U-2 overflights terminated by President Richard Nixon and he visits Beijing in February.

1973 Paul Yu commits suicide on an airliner en route from Taipei to Honolu- lu. James Lilley opens a CIA station at the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, and the PRC opens a liaison office in Washington, D.C. Greg Chung joins the Rockwell Corporation. Two Taiwanese analysts employed by GCHQ at Little Sai Wan defect to the PRC. Two KGB illegals are arrested in Hong Kong.

1974 A Soviet Mil-4 Border Guard helicopter strays into the PRC, and three crewmen are arrested in the Altai Krai. The PRC seizes the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea from Vietnam. The CIA withdraws from Taoyüan in Taiwan.

1975 Bernard Boursicot rejoins the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The PRC’s first ELINT satellite launched from Jiuquan. Three Soviet Border Guard helicopter crewmen released by the PRC.

1976 Zhou Enlai dies in January. The death of Mao Zedong in September ends the Cultural Revolution. Hua Guofeng assumes the post of CCP chair- man and orchestrates the arrest of the Gang of Four, including Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. Zhou Shaozheng appointed head of the Central Investigation Department.

1977 Hua Guofeng is pushed aside by Deng Xiaoping with support from the PLA.

1978 The Gang of Four are put on trial in Beijing by Deng Xiaoping. Thou- sands of ethnic Chinese are expelled from Vietnam. Two atomic-powered remote sensors are found on Nanda Devi in the Himalayas.

1979 U.S. diplomatic recognition is transferred from Taipei to Beijing. The PRC attacks and occupies the northern part of Vietnam for 29 days. Deng Xiaoping suppresses the Democracy Wall movement in Beijing and dissident Wei Jingsheng is imprisoned. The PRC opens an embassy in Washington, D.C., and consulates in New York and San Francisco. The United States moves into its embassy in Beijing that was constructed under total Chinese control.

1980 Jock Kane complains about poor security at Little Sai Wan. Nikolai Zhang convicted of espionage in the PRC. Last atmospheric nuclear test is conducted by the PRC. Stanislas Lunev is posted to the GRU rezidentura in Beijing.

1981 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiates TIGER TRAP, a surveillance operation on an aeronautical engineer, Min Gwo Bao. Yue Zhonglie is convicted of spying for the Soviets.

1982 Larry Wu-tai Chin receives an award in Beijing. TIGER TRAP is extended to Wen Ho Lee. Deng Xiaoping approves nuclear proliferation policy. GCHQ’s base at Little Sai Wan closes down, with operations moved to Chung Hum Kok. Min Gwo Bao resigns from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

1983 The FBI is granted authority to electronically monitor Larry Wu-tai Chin. The PRC establishes the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the Guojia Anquanbu. Chi Mak begins to pass U.S. Navy research documents to the MSS. The PRC contracts to build the El Salam reactor in Algeria.

1984 Henry Liu is murdered in Daly City, California. Da Chuan Zheng is convicted of the illegal export of embargoed radar equipment.

1985 PLANESMAN defects to the United States. Larry Wu-tai Chin is arrested. Greg Chung makes an unreported visit to the PRC. Admiral Wang Hsi-ling of the KMT’s National Intelligence Service is convicted of Henry Liu’s murder.

1986 Gu Weihao of the PRC’s Ministry of Aviation Industry travels to the United States to visit Greg Chung, a Boeing engineer. Roland Shesu Lo is sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment in Beijing for espionage. Hu Yaobang is replaced as the CCP’s general secretary by Zhao Ziyang.

1987 Greg Chung passes information through Chi Mak. Two Chinese diplo- mats are expelled after being caught in an FBI double-agent operation. The Cabinet Office in London establishes an interdepartmental working party to study Chinese espionage. Hou Desheng is arrested in Washington, D.C. End of martial law in Taiwan. Colonel Chang Hsien-yi compromises Taipei’s nuclear bomb project. SIS acquires a Silkworm missile.

1988 Larry Engelmann meets Xu Meihong in Nanjing. The China National Nuclear Corporation is formed.

1989 Hu Yaobang dies in Beijing. In response to demonstrations, Deng Xiaoping imposes martial law. Thousands of Chinese students are massacred in Tiananmen Square, and demonstrators are killed in Chengdu, Sichuan, by the PLA. Hu Simeng is exposed as a source in Berlin for the CIA, the MSS, and the East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung. Wen Ning is recruited by the FBI as a source inside the PRC consulate in Los Angeles.

1990 A Pakistani nuclear weapon is tested at Lop Nor. A PLAAF MiG-19 lands accidentally at Knivechi near Vladivostock and is released five days later. The CIA learns that an M-11 training missile and erector-launcher have been supplied to Pakistan by the PRC.

1991 Admiral Wang Hsi-ling is granted clemency and released from prison in Taiwan. Douglas Tsou of the FBI is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.

1992 Wu Bin is arrested by U.S. Customs and charged with illegally export- ing night-vision goggles to Hong Kong. Diplomat Wen Ning defects from the PRC consulate in Los Angeles. The PRC signs the 1968 nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. Iran test-fires a Shahab-3 IRBM. North Korea test-fires the Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile over Japan. Stanislas Lunev defects to the United States.

1993 Amgen discovers an attempt by a Chinese agent to steal a vial of patented drug cultures. North Korea tests the No Dong missile. The PRC sells M-11 road mobile short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) components to Pakistan.

1994 Chin Peng travels to Australia. Kim Il-sung dies in North Korea and is replaced by his son Kim Jong-il.

1995 The PLA occupies islands claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea. Two U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officers are expelled from the PRC for monitoring PLA exercises in southern China. The GCHQ base at Chung Hum Kok is transferred to Geraldton in Western Australia. A techni- cal surveillance operation on the PRC’s embassy in Canberra is terminated.

1996 The Economic Espionage Act is passed by the U.S. Congress. Hughes aircraft and Loral missile technology is stolen.

1997 Hong Kong is returned to the PRC. Death of Deng Xiaoping in Beijing.

1998 Peter Lee admits to selling classified information. Pakistan conducts an underground nuclear test. Won Chong-hwa is recruited by the North Korean State Security Department.

1999 The PLA establishes a signals intercept site in Cuba. The Cox Commit- tee investigates the theft of U.S. neutron bomb technology. The PRC embas- sy in Belgrade is bombed by accident during a North Atlantic Treaty Organ- ization (NATO) air raid. The Falun Gong movement is banned and perse- cuted in the PRC after holding a silent vigil in Tiananmen Square. Wen Ho Lee is dismissed from Los Alamos and indicted on 59 felony counts.

2000 The Canadian Security and Intelligence Review Committee criticizes the joint Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)/Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) SIDEWINDER Report, which revealed links be- tween triads and the PRC’s intelligence service. Wen Ho Lee pleads guilty to one felony and is sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment.

2001 A U.S. Navy EP-3A Aries II reconnaissance aircraft is damaged in a midair collision and makes an emergency landing on Hainan Island. The former chief of the Shenyang City Justice Bureau, Hao Guangsheng, defects in Toronto.

2002 Chinese cyber attacks code-named TITAN RAIN in the United States. The FBI opens a legal attaché’s (legat) office in Beijing with responsibility for liaison with the PRC and Mongolia.

2003 Lee Lan and Ge Yuefie are charged with theft from NetLogic Micro- systems. Brian Regan is sentenced to life imprisonment after being arrested at Dulles Airport in August 2001. Special Agent William Liu is appointed the FBI’s legat in Beijing.

2004 The PRC puts Nanosatellite-1 into orbit. The MSS’s Li Fengzhi defects in the United States. Computer hackers traced to the PRC attack the U.S. Army’s Information Systems Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Ari- zona; the Defense Information Systems Agency in Alexandria, Virginia; the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego; and the Space and Strategic Defense Installation in Huntsville, Alabama.

2005 Chi Mak is arrested in Los Angeles. Chen Yonglin defects in Australia, and Hao Fengung defects to Canada. Zhao Ziyang dies while under house arrest in Beijing. The PRC tests an anti-satellite missile. Wen Ning is charged with exporting embargoed technology to the PRC.

2006 Li Fangwei is identified as a weapons proliferator supplying Iran with banned aircraft parts. Former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ronald Montaperto is convicted of espionage for the PRC. North Korea attempts to conduct an underground nuclear test. Wen Ho Lee awarded $1.6 million in compensation. The U.S. State Department reports that Chinese intruders have penetrated its computer system. The Pentagon’s NIPRNET system is attacked from mainland China.

2007 Zhang Jiyan defects in Ottawa. U.S. State Department official Donald Keyser is convicted of passing secrets to a Taiwanese agent, Isabelle Cheng. A Song-class submarine penetrates the USS Kitty Hawk’s protective screen while on exercises. Chi Mak is sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. Laura Wang-Woodford is arrested in San Francisco. Xiadong Sheldon Meng is convicted of exporting fighter training software to the PLA Navy.

2008 A member of British prime minister Gordon Brown’s entourage is honeytrapped in Beijing. Greg Chung is arrested in California. Won Chong- hwa is arrested in South Korea. Qi Hanson delivers MicroPilot aircraft con- trols to the PRC. Dr. John Reece Roth is convicted of passing plasma data to the PRC. FirmSpace is indicted on conspiracy charges relating to the illicit export of carbon fiber. Taiwanese agents Guo Wanjun and Wo Weihan are executed in the PRC for espionage. The United States moves into a new embassy in Beijing.

2009 USNS Impeccable is harassed by five PRC boats. Yan Zhu is arrested in New Jersey on software theft charges. Lu Futian is charged in Oregon with the illegal export of microwave amplifiers. David Yen Lee is arrested in Chicago and charged with the theft of trade secrets. MI5 circulates The Threat from Chinese Espionage. Germany expels a diplomat from the Mu- nich consulate for spying on local Uighur refugees.

2010 Google experiences an Aurora cyber attack. The National Security Council downgrades the PRC as a threat to U.S. security. The CIA screens Extraordinary Fidelity as a training aid. Glenn Shriver is arrested after at- tempting to join the CIA. The Xinhua propaganda chief Wan Wuyi is re- ported to have defected while studying at Oxford University. Death of An- drew Roth in London. Huang Kexue is charged with economic espionage. Colonel Lo Chi-cheng is arrested in Taiwan and charged with espionage.

2011 Wang Qing is arrested in India and deported. Glenn Shriver is sen- tenced to four years’ imprisonment. General Lo Hsien-che is arrested in Taiwan and charged with espionage. American geologist Xue Feng is sen- tenced in Beijing to eight years’ imprisonment. Matthieu Tenenbaum is sus- pended from Renault with two other senior managers, Xian Hongwei and Li Li, are indicted in Alexandria, Virginia, on defense export charges. The U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive identifies the PRC as using proxy systems to conduct cyber espionage.

2012 British businessman Neil Haywood is murdered by Gu Kailai. The records of 22 million security clearance applicants held by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management are hacked from China. Lai Changzing is sentenced

to life imprisonment for corruption, The FBI initiates an investigation of former CIA officer Jerry Lee. Mo Hailung is convicted for the theft of geneti- cally modified corn seed.

2013 Xi Jinping announces the Silk Road Economic Belt. Two MSS vice ministers are purged for corruption. Huawei operates Skycom in Iran. Jiang Bo is arrested at Dulles Airport with a NASA laptop. NSA contactor Edward Snowden leaks secrets from Hong Kong.

2014 The U.S. Department of Justice indicts five named members of PLA Unit 61398. U.S. Army reservist Colonel Benjamin Bishop is convicted of passing secrets to his Chinese girlfriend. The Chinese ambassador Ma Jish is recalled from Iceland and accused of spying for the Japanese. Su Bin is arrested in Vancouver and convicted in Los Angeles of stealing plans for the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighters. Wang Dong indicted as a partici- pant in PLA Unit 61398 cyber attacks.

2015 The Macao gambling tycoon Ng Lop Seng is arrested in New York. MI5 issues an espionage alert. Xu Jiaqing is charged with theft from UBM. Yan Shiwei and Roger Uren are implicated in a bribery scandal at the UN.

2016 An FBI technician in New York, Kun Shan, is convicted of supplying information to the MSS. The former Soviet aircraft carrier Kuznetsov is declared combat ready in China. Sun Funyi is arrested for attempting to evade the export ban on carbon fiber. Xue Yu is arrested for the theft of GlaxoSmithKline trade secrets.

2017 Candace Claiborne, a U.S. State Department official, is arrested and charged with illicit contacts with the MSS. Keith Mallory is convicted of espionage. China passes a law requiring commercial companies to cooperate with the country’s intelligence agencies.

2018 The MSS is identified as the culprit in the loss of data relating to 500,000 Marriott Hotel customers. Zhang Yujing attempted to enter Presi- dent Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida. Former MSS minister Ma Jian is sentenced to life imprisonment on bribery charges. The head of Interpol, Meng Hongwei, is imprisoned in China for corruption.

2019 Former CIA case officer Jerry Lee confesses to conspiracy to spy. President Trump declares an emergency and bans trade with Huawei. Zhang Zhaoxi and Zheng Xiaoqing are indicted on charges of stealing proprietary information from GE. Former DIA case officer Ron Hansen pleads guilty to selling classified material to MSS. Two diplomats are expelled after they breached security at a U.S. naval facility in Norfolk, Virginia. Wang Liqiang defects in Sydney, Australia.

Introduction

 

 

 

Although China’s intelligence activities may not have been well docu- mented, they can be traced back to the ancient writings of Sun Tzu, and espionage has been a characteristic of Chinese domestic politics and interna- tional relations ever since.

The tangled relationship between Taiwan and mainland China has meant that both governments have created alliances on the basis of their mutual hostility, sometimes with unlikely partners, and the adversarial nature of some of those links with third nations can have more to do with their attitude toward an opponent than any perceived mutual foreign policy goals or inter- ests. Thus the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), having fought the Japanese, developed close ties with Tokyo in the postwar era, and the Soviet Union, having nurtured the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), would become intensely hostile during the lengthy Sino-Soviet split, just as the United States, having supported anti-Communist guerrillas in Tibet and on the main- land, reversed its course during the administration of Richard Nixon. Equally complicated has been Hong Kong’s anomalous role, both as a British colony and then as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC, an increasingly uneasy arrangement as evidenced by the huge demonstrations held in Hong Kong in June 2019 protesting a proposed new law in China that allows for extradition of Hong Kong residents to China. When it comes to policy made in Beijing, nothing is quite what it seems.

China is an ancient civilization, and there have been many Chinas, from

the first dynasties of the Shang and Zhou, through the imperial era to the period of feudalism and warlords, to the dominance of the KMT and finally the civil war that led to the creation of the Republic of China (ROC), leaving the mainland under Communist control and called the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

 

 

OVER THE AGES

 

Following Qin Shi Huangdi, the first emperor of a unified China, who was born in 259 B.C., there have been 156 successors, many of them brought to power by rebellion, plots, assassinations, and political maneuvering. Succes- sion in China is not always for the fainthearted! Some tried to emulate the perceived success of the Qin state, a proto-totalitarian regime that built the

 

1

Great Wall and created a vast security apparatus to perpetuate a reign that lasted a mere 14 years by conquering its neighbors and rivals, thereby estab- lishing a bureaucracy that exercised near total control over the population in an area that covers much of modern China, including all the land between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. The Qin empire succumbed to a coup mounted in 208 BC by a minor official, Liu Bang, who founded the Han dynasty, which would rule the empire for a further 400 years. However, the first secret intelligence institution was probably established by the Empress Wu Chao in 625 AD when a textbook of interrogation techniques was compiled for her very extensive security apparatus that ruthlessly removed or executed all who threatened her during 45 years of rule.

With a bloody history of war and invasion, culminating in the Manchu establishment of the Qing dynasty in 1644, China’s military supremacy reached its zenith under Qianlong, who reigned from 1736 to 1793 and resisted Lord Macartney’s blandishments to open the country to foreign trade. There followed the First Opium War in 1839, a conflict that resulted in concessions granted to the European powers, including Hong Kong Island to the British in perpetuity, and then in 1851 the Taiping Rebellion, in which an estimated 70 million Chinese died.

In 1856 the Second Opium War left Kowloon, opposite the island of Hong Kong, in British hands, and foreign embassies established in Peking, marking the final phase of the empire. The 1895 defeat of Emperor Guangxu’s imperi- al army and navy by the Japanese over control of Korea effectively spelled the end of the Manchu empire, which subsequently suffered the humiliation of the collapse of the Boxer Uprising against foreign intervention in China, backed by the Empress Dowager Cixi.

Much of the Qin emperor’s innovations, including a merit-based civil service, would endure until 1912, when Sun Yat-sen’s Republic of China was declared, by which time the Han sphere of influence had extended to Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand. With a history of expansionism and of resistance to periodic invasion from the north by Mongols, the deter- minedly centralized Chinese political and cultural system was rooted in au- thoritarianism.

 

STATE ACTORS

 

At center stage in the PRC is the omniscient Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the domestically ubiquitous Ministry of Public Security (MPS), while in Taiwan (ROC) the National Security Bureau (NSB) fulfills the dual role of internal security and foreign intelligence collection. Other members of the cast include the United States, with branches of the Central Intelli-

gence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) fully engaged, together with Great Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) managing a station in Beijing, and the Security Service (MI5) represented in Hong Kong, where Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) previously maintained a large electronic intelligence collection facility throughout the Cold War. In addition, the Soviet KGB and GRU attempted to run operations in Beijing, as did the French Direction Générale de Securité Extérieure (DGSE). All of these organizations, including their forerunners, such as the British Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD) and Combined Intelli- gence Far East (CIFE), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the NKVD, were active participants in the region, with the Australian and New Zealand signals intelligence agencies taking supporting roles.

While the Western agencies tended to concentrate their resources on tech-

nical collection, relying on aerial reconnaissance flights, remote sensors, and satellites to monitor China’s development into a world superpower, Beijing continues to take advantage of its vast diaspora to penetrate overseas targets, acquire embargoed technology, steal proprietary software, and transfer the research needed to save the decades of expensive investment usually asso- ciated with the production of thermonuclear weapons, sophisticated missile guidance systems, an aerospace industry, advanced lasers, an indigenous computer manufacturing capability, advanced biomedical development, and even research into strategic crops such as corn and rice.

 

 

MODERN ESPIONAGE

 

Although the PRC has long engaged in espionage, relatively little was initial- ly known about Chinese techniques, methodology, personnel, and organiza- tions in comparison with what the West has learned about other more con- ventional intelligence agencies that conduct operations across the world. Whereas most intelligence services have suffered damaging defections, the number of MSS professionals who have switched sides is relatively small. And if conditions for clandestine operations in Moscow were challenging during the Cold War, the hostile environment in Beijing has continued to be next to impossible. Indeed, the Second Chief Directorate of the Komitei Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB), notorious for maintaining continu- ous, ubiquitous surveillance on foreigners, could have learned a few lessons from their MSS counterparts, who had fewer visitors to follow, with their targets easier to identify, in a capital where all embassies are concentrated inside a single compound, a diplomatic ghetto with just one entrance, which made conventional tradecraft virtually redundant.

In spite of these difficulties, the West has learned that the MSS behaves in a very different way than its adversaries and has not, until recently, relied on clandestine contacts, dead drops, cutouts, sophisticated communication sys- tems, or the other conventional ways of engaging in espionage. The arrest of Peng Xuehua by the FBI in October 2019 revealed that espionage directed by the MSS in Beijing had employed traditional tradecraft, a remarkable break from the organization’s usual methodology. This was a development that would be watched closely to ascertain whether it was an anomaly or another instance of the MSS’s ability to evolve. Hitherto, the MSS had consistently preferred a more relaxed, casual approach, often exploiting a social contact to extract information rather than documents, and without the usual incriminat- ing exchange of recognizably classified data. The evidence of dozens of espionage cases suggests that the MSS prefers to concentrate on individuals of ethnic Chinese heritage and cultivates them over a long period, sometimes many years, developing a friendship with their individuals. Appeals for tech- nical help will then be made, and though they may only succeed in a tiny number of cases, the results are clearly beneficial to Beijing. The principle appears to be that, if enough targets are asked for help, one or two may respond. The plea, typically to assist “the higher kingdom” and implicitly not to inflict damage on the United States, thus taking a positive rather than a negative stance, is occasionally rewarded, and gradually an individual, who has perhaps acknowledged the universal nature of scientific knowledge, may be drawn into conduct that would fall into the criminal category of compro- mising classified information.

The Thousand Talents Program adopts that tactic, an approach suggesting

that a potential recruit can help Mother China without any real malice toward the United States. The result has been large numbers of principally ethnic first-generation immigrant Chinese academics, scientists, and technicians, all possessing an expertise identified as a requirement by the PRC, entering into arrangements with Chinese universities and state-owned companies. They receive large salaries, academic honors, and other accolades, which enable the expertise gained in the United States to be shared, thereby relieving the PRC of considerable research and development costs. Others are allowed to establish companies or to participate in so-called joint ventures in the PRC and exploit information gained from their employment in the United States. Often the information provided will be of a proprietary or restricted nature that has not been licensed for disclosure, but is a priority for the PRC. Indeed, recent examples of Chinese-inspired industrial espionage suggest that the profit motive has been a major influence on those providing stolen technolo- gy to PRC entities.

Thus, at the outset, the request for assistance may be modest and unthreat-

ening, and perhaps calculated to be in a form the target is likely to know and perhaps consider relatively unimportant. The common characteristic is the

length of time devoted to such activities, although the Chinese always take a long view in preference to short-term advantage. Perhaps this is not surpris- ing for a civilization that built 5,000 kilometers of the Great Wall 200 years before the birth of Christ, and for a culture that enjoyed whole libraries of printed books decades before Johannes Gutenberg developed a printing press in Europe.

The MSS seems to like working on people with a shared culture, language, and history, and when one considers the disproportionate representation of scientists of Chinese origin in the American research arena, at a time when only 1 percent of the population in the United States has this ethnic back- ground, the organization’s strategy makes practical sense. A graduate student on a visit to mainland China may well have a future in a sensitive area of interest to his PRC counterparts, and a light “pitch” may pay dividends in the future. Nor is the MSS embarrassed by a refusal. Its personnel are nothing if not persistent and will renew a request for assistance as if none had been made previously.

This is not to say that MSS handlers lack subtlety. One characteristic of their management of cases is their preference for individuals whom they regard as reliable and trustworthy, devoid of the personality flaws that the KGB liked to exploit during the Cold War. Whereas the Soviets were always keen to accommodate the financial demands of their sources, the Chinese have, in the past, regarded indebtedness as a poor motive for espionage. The KGB often found itself responding to requests for money from divorcees undergoing a cash crisis or others who had made poor investments and sought to capitalize on their access to classified material, but the MSS prefers to deal with sources who have no such obvious problems. It may be that such individuals are ambitious, but their cooperation is based on a perceived mu- tual advantage, not exploitation. Any study of Chinese espionage cases re- veals that, unlike the Soviets, the MSS does not seek to acquire information by bribery or extortion, and oftentimes it doesn’t pay for what it receives, at least not directly. In the Chi Mak example in 2005, he admitted that his only reward for more than 20 years of espionage had not been vast riches or promises of a numbered bank account in Switzerland, but an assurance that his sister-in-law’s ailing mother in Guangzhou would be “taken care of” by his MSS handler, David Pu Pei-liang. However, there have also been a few cases where trusted, long-term sources have been paid handsomely, among them Larry Wu-tai Chin and Katrina Leung.

By concentrating on targets in good financial standing and eschewing

those with poor credit ratings, the MSS has in the past avoided individuals who may attract unwanted attention during routine security screenings. In recent years, individuals such as Candace Claiborne, Kevin Mallory, and Ron Hansen, who all experienced financial problems, cooperated with the MSS. While it appears that the MSS specifically targeted Claiborne because

of her indebtedness, Mallory and Hansen simply volunteered their services as a way out of their difficulties. It must be assumed that in the course of their cooperation, the MSS became aware of their financial issues and decided the return was worth the risk, again an indication of the MSS’s ability to evolve operationally. Typically, individuals cooperating with the Chinese intelli- gence services are considered hardworking, frugal, and solid citizens, and their usually high standing in the community makes discreet investigation more difficult and often serves to encourage investigators to contemplate the possible innocence of a quarry instead of working from an assumption of guilt.

Because the Western experience of hostile intelligence operations was accumulated mainly during the Cold War, counterintelligence experts invari- ably fall back on the Soviet bloc model as the way to monitor an adversary and detect the distinctive patterns of espionage. However, the Chinese have opted for an entirely different strategy, one that often falls below the radar of counterintelligence vigilance. The conventional approach during the period of superpower confrontation was to establish an opponent’s order of battle, place the identified active intelligence officers under physical and technical surveillance, and then wait for the handlers to lead the watchers to their agents or their operating areas. Once a contact had been spotted, the trick was to catch the person in an illegal act. This coup would then open numerous possibilities, perhaps of running a spy back as a double agent or entrapping the handler.

For decades, this was how the counterintelligence game was played, but it

does not work with the Chinese, who do not run formal rezidenturas or stations and have not relied on dead drops or clandestine meetings. The Chinese espionage model is based on providing a safe environment in which potentially willing participants can be encouraged to contribute helpful infor- mation at their own pace. Absent is the more usual pressure to grab material before the source, through his or her own folly, attracts the security author- ities. While a Western counterpart will be in a hurry to accomplish a recruit- ment before a routine rotation elsewhere, the MSS is content to let nature take its course, sometimes waiting years to seize the right opportunity. In one case in Canada, the Chinese appeared content to leave an agent for 24 years before activating him.

The MSS subscribes to, and practices, the theory that recruitment is a process, not an event. If the West can be said to rely on the sniper’s rifle to find precisely the right person to pitch, the Chinese prefer the scattergun, sponsoring thousands of students and scientific delegations, confident that someone of interest will eventually emerge. There are estimated to be 300,000 Chinese undergraduates in the United States alone, with more than 30,000 official groups visiting sensitive sites. While the idea of employing students as agents would strike most Western intelligence officers as a very

risky stratagem, the MSS refers to them as chen di yu (bottom-sinking fish) and regard them as a useful resource that perhaps one day will reward them with dividends.

Chinese intelligence collection is also markedly different in its reliance on what is termed in the West “natural cover.” The MSS relies heavily on genuine journalists, academics, students, and businessmen who really are what they seem, whereas for years the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and its allied agencies have employed their own professional personnel under nonofficial cover, the so-called NOC. But there is a great difference between the amateur who collects whatever comes his way and then undergoes a debriefing upon his return home and the trained officer who manifests all the usual telltale signs of a career collector, routinely engaging in countersurveil- lance measures, searching his hotel rooms for covert devices, and applying standard tradecraft. In contrast, the Chinese journalist really is a writer, and the Chinese academic’s credentials are absolutely authentic. Neither needs the expensive and often laughably inadequate backstopping associated with American and British operations. The result is that Chinese students and businessmen both look and behave authentically because their cover really is their occupation, and they have no need of clandestine communications sys- tems or to hold a covert rendezvous on a park bench. Culturally, the Chinese have a huge advantage here as the CIA is banned from employing American clerics or journalists, whereas any Chinese granted permission to travel abroad knows the price may be a relationship with the MSS. As for a ban on occupations, the Chinese spent years developing a Roman Catholic priest with absolutely watertight credentials to act as a contact and courier for Larry Wu-tai Chin. Indeed, considering that one of the MSS’s more recent targets is the Falun Gong movement, the agency can be said to be entirely devoid of religious scruples. One has to assume the MSS has targeted the Falun Gong movement in Western countries for penetration, even while subjecting its members to surveillance and harassment.

The practice of ensuring that their personnel can withstand outside scruti-

ny also extends to the front companies that the Chinese utilize to collect technology. These firms engage in actual business and are expected to be economically self-sufficient. Indeed, the businessmen in charge of the com- panies are allowed to make as much personal profit as they are capable of, so long as they continue to funnel the needed technology back to the PRC. Since these traders and merchants appear to be legitimate and run genuine firms, not shell companies, their illicit activities are often hard to detect. The American response to this is to bring criminal charges for whatever offenses have been committed, irrespective of whether espionage can be proven. Ac- cordingly, there are plenty of investigations conducted that result in convic- tions for money laundering, breaches of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and violations of export regulations that invariably have an underlying intel-

ligence dimension. Unspoken is the certainty that anyone dealing with a Chinese state-owned enterprise inevitably will have some kind of link to the MSS or a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entity, another factor that blurs the distinction between espionage and routine commerce. Indeed, recent leg- islation passed in the PRC requires PRC companies to cooperate with PRC intelligence and security forces when asked.

Another challenge for Western authorities, principally those of the United States, France, Australia, Great Britain, Japan, and Germany, who seek to engage in business partnerships while protecting themselves from hostile penetration, is the reluctance of many firms to declare incidents of cyber attack or internal fraud for fear of undermining public confidence and com- pany stock values. Plenty of security consultants have an interest in promot- ing anxieties about the vulnerabilities of the West’s computer infrastructure, yet reliable statistics of specific incidents are hard to gather, and victims are reluctant to file reports, even when legally required to do so. Nevertheless, mainland China is consistently identified as being the source of much of the world’s malicious software and the origin of concerted hacking and cyber spying.

Over the past decade, the PRC’s burgeoning economy has been fueled in

part by state-sponsored organizations, including the MSS, which have en- gaged in what amounts to industrial espionage on an epic scale. This cross- fertilization between the business community, the military, and the intelli- gence apparatus has had some adverse consequences, such as rampant cor- ruption. Since President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign began in 2012, over 100,000 CCP members, out of a total of approximately 5 million mem- bers, have been arrested and expelled from the Party. The estimated total population of the PRC is 1.4 billion, with only about 6 percent allowed membership in the CCP. Significantly, no one with past links to Xi has been arrested during the current crackdown, suggesting the campaign has less to do with corruption than with a consolidation of Xi’s power.

Xi Jinping is easily the most ideologically driven ruler of China since Mao Zedong. Though he was mistreated during the Cultural Revolution, the expe- rience seems only to have strengthened his loyalty to the CCP. Indeed, Xi increasingly invokes Mao’s call for “revolutionary struggle,” and on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC, he declared, “We must continue to consolidate and develop the People’s Republic, and continue our struggle to achieve the two centenary goals and to realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.” Xi has developed a personality cult to rival Mao’s with his Xi Jinping Thought, Xijinping Sixiang.

Born in 1953, the first Chinese ruler to be born after the establishment of the PRC, Xi is relatively young for a Chinese ruler, and absent a sudden calamity, as well as with his accumulation of absolute power with no term limits to his rule, he will serve as the absolute, hard-line, ideologically driven ruler of China for years to come.

However, by the end of 2019, Xi’s problems had increased threefold. Pro- democracy candidates won overwhelmingly in Hong Kong’s elections; leaked internal CCP documents showed Xi’s personal involvement in the controversial detention of Uighurs in “reeducation” camps; and the defector Wang Liqiang in Australia claimed to have been a co-optee of the PLA’s military intelligence apparatus and revealed his involvement in the kidnap- ping of Hong Kong booksellers and interference in Taiwan’s elections and in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy groups. These events, combined with the back- ground of an economic downturn and increased resistance to the PRC’s belligerence and trade policies, served to create a significant challenge for Xi in the medium term.

With a government obsessed with maintaining power, it is incumbent that improving the lives of the people in China be the CCP’s primary goal. This is occurring while China’s internal problems are growing, such as wealth in- equality, an aging population and a shrinking cheap labor base, a slowing of economic growth, horrific environmental degradation, and a virtually nonex- istent social welfare system. When in the past China relied on the manufac- ture and export of basic, low-wage, lower-value goods such as clothing, furniture, and consumer electronics to drive its economy, it competed with such developing countries as Mexico, Brazil, and Taiwan, and with the in- creasingly robust economies of such countries as Vietnam. However, the subsidized companies in China under the “Made in China 2025” program now puts them in direct competition with the already established highly industrialized countries, who are increasingly concerned about China’s entry into the high-tech market.

Population experts predict that China’s overall population will start to

shrink by 2027, as the birthrate has fallen below the replacement level re- quired to maintain present population levels. Consequently, the current work- force of those between 15 and 64 years of age is shrinking, and by 2040 it will be at least 100 million less than at present. China will have twice as many elderly as children under 15, with the elderly having increased from 135 million to 325 million in 25 years, with the median age of all Chinese rising from 25 in 1990 to 48 by 2040. This is compounded by tens of millions of surplus males in China due to its “one-child” policy maintained between 1979 and 2015.

Some experts also predict that India will supplant China as the world’s most populous nation by 2030, with a working-age group at least 200 million more than the Chinese. By 2040, India’s population will still be growing, while China’s will be in a rapid decline, with about one-quarter of the Chi- nese population over the age of 64, compared to about 10 percent in India.

China’s overall inefficient allocation of resources, and the oppressive po- lice state as embraced by the Communist Party leadership, are intended to encourage economic growth, with the ambition of becoming a world power that will overtake the United States.

The CCP is well aware from its country’s own none too distant past that an economic crisis may lead to increased unemployment and social unrest, which threatens its stranglehold on power. While the world’s second-largest economy, in reality, China remains a developing country. The average per capita income is around $8,000 compared to $56,000 in the United States. The CCP must raise the standard of living of its populace in order to remain in a position of dominance.

Being a totalitarian state, the PRC exercises control over its own popula- tion and its visitors. The MSS is naturally suspicious of all tourists, foreign residents, students, and anyone engaged in any kind of research, and this natural antipathy dates back centuries to previous dynasties that for genera- tions closed China to all foreigners, as well as to more recent times and the privations endured during foreign occupation. The Stalin-like paranoia ex- tends far beyond those who might be approaching the very low threshold of what is termed a “state secret,” which could be a bridge, railway line, or manufacturing plant and includes social contacts that might be deemed sub- versive or as intended to undermine the Party. Thus, a very large number of potential suspects come to the attention of the MSS, and MSS functions are considered a priority by the Party, a status reflected in the almost unlimited resources available to the security organs. What a difference when compared to the relative handful of Chinese specialists fluent in Mandarin and Canto- nese available to MI5 and the FBI. Furthermore, these two agencies enjoy minimal relative political influence, and their operations and resources are curtailed by budget considerations and other sensitivities. No director-gener- al of MI5 or director of the FBI has ever had a seat in the cabinet or attended cabinet meetings, whereas the Minister of State Security in Beijing is not just a member of the Central Committee but also a highly influential figure in the overall government structure.

This exalted status is reflected at both the social and political level. MSS

personnel are respected within their community and form part of an elite. The same can hardly be said of FBI special agents or their British Security Ser- vice counterparts. While the exact number of personnel devoted to China by

U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence agencies remains classified, it is clearly inadequate given the scale of the Chinese presence, considering the

1,900 accredited Chinese diplomats, the estimated 363,000 students, and the many visiting delegations and travel groups. The numbers are overwhelming. Keith Riggin, a CIA officer who retired in 2006 after a career spanning 24 years, protested that “if the American people knew the number of officers going against the Chinese, they would be appalled,” and he cited “frustra- tion” as one of his reasons for leaving the agency. However, there are signs that the extent of the Chinese threat is gaining recognition, and there are reports that the FBI has enhanced its staff devoted to the challenge. In July 2019, the Department of Justice announced that it has established a special division just to deal with Chinese espionage and theft of trade secrets.

The arrest of an ethnic Chinese in the United States on espionage charges prompts complaints of racism and racial profiling, and several counterintelli- gence careers can be seen to have perished in such an adversarial environ- ment. Not so in the PRC, where the detention of students, journalists, and academics is practically routine if not an occupational hazard. A complaint of racism in a Western liberal democracy is considered a serious charge, with potential implications up and down the chain of command in any organiza- tion. In contrast, ill-disguised contempt for foreigners is a fact of life in China, as is the openly racist behavior endured daily by African students in the PRC.

The United States in particular has paid a heavy price for the longtime practice of essentially opening its borders to the Chinese without any sem- blance of reciprocity. Many Chinese students, both privately sponsored (holding F-1 visas) and government sponsored (J-1), remain in the country after the completion of their studies and act as sources that the PRC can exploit to gather sensitive technology. The Chinese have also been most successful in obtaining the cooperation of first-generation immigrants, and by allowing students, businesspeople, and others to remain in the United States, they constantly replenish the most fertile area of their success.

The Beijing authorities do not just hope or expect that overseas Chinese will cooperate with the motherland but simply assume that immigrants from China will retain their allegiance. After all, they are ethnically Chinese first! The Chinese do not accept that an ethnic Chinese can have an allegiance to any country but to Zhongguo, translated literally as the “Middle Kingdom,” for they are, in their minds, the geographical center of the universe and the cultural center of the world.

Thus, it can be said that the Chinese approach to intelligence collection and counterintelligence is quite unique, wholly unlike the Western or Soviet model. It may seem to have some very distinct disadvantages, but when one considers the country’s objectives, focused principally on technology trans- fer, the offensive would appear to be sustained, relentless, and effective.

It may be that gathering intelligence in mainland China is somewhat easier now than during the era of the “bamboo curtain” when little was known about events inside that vast country, and the current regime’s expanded interests, requiring support for a burgeoning economy by securing its supply of raw material such as oil and ore from Latin America and Africa, has provided new opportunities to study the MSS. Previously insular and espous- ing little interest in other countries apart from Albania and North Korea, the PRC now recognizes a demand, driven by modernization and industrializa- tion, to expand its horizons and make new alliances overseas so as to fuel the new economic giant. And just as in previous centuries Chinese trade has not been in the form of colonization but of barter and tribute, the modern mer- chants emphasize their disinterest in local politics and pledge never to inter- fere in domestic issues such as respect for human rights. In many countries, such terms look very attractive compared to the Western competition, where increasingly there are potentially inhibiting strings attached to the most os- tensibly innocuous trade deals. Gone are the days when Western countries or multinational companies could ruthlessly exploit their Third World partners or rely on murky subcontractors to evade minimum standards in pay and work conditions. Instant global communications mean that politicians and companies are vulnerable to complaints about any dubious practices, but the Chinese make a virtue out of a policy of noninterference in countries like Tanzania, Somalia, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe, where their activities are not subject to external independent scrutiny. For regimes reluc- tant to adopt Western-imposed values and standards, the Chinese commit- ment to noninterference amounts to a guarantee that would never be forth- coming from other rival nations and is therefore perceived as mutually bene- ficial. The Chinese cast a blind eye, and a despotic or corrupt regime remains free to retain some control of its own future, immune to the lobbying of activists and the carping of media critics.

The burgeoning Chinese economy, though somewhat stalled compared to

past growth and with the need to secure foreign sources of essential raw materials and energy, has transformed the country and the Chinese Commu- nist Party from adopting a fundamentally isolationist stance to taking on the role of a world player committed to international trade, globalization, and the internet. In consequence, those two pillars of the state, the MSS and PLA, have been obliged to make significant adjustments. Having previously been preoccupied with domestic security, protection of the country’s closed fron- tiers, and separatist pressures from Tibet and Taiwan, the Party has relied on these two organs to play their part in modernization. With the entire military- industrial complex in the hands of the Party, it was inevitable that the MSS and the PLA would become immersed in the need to achieve the leadership’s new objectives. In 2013, Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Jingji Dai Yu 21

Shiji Haishang Sichou Zhi Lu, involving more than 150 countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas, including the Caribbean, in a grand infrastructure development and investment project that expands Chinese influence around the world.

For external intelligence analysts familiar with the symbiotic relationship between the KGB and the Kremlin, the course taken by Beijing looks very novel, as the gray area perceived between intelligence agencies and commer- cial enterprises seems hard to delineate. However, in the Chinese example, no such distinction can be made, with hundreds of research institutes operat- ing under the PLA’s sponsorship while being closely associated with osten- sibly independent commercial enterprises. From Beijing’s perspective, at- tempting to make such distinctions is wholly futile, for the Party is the state, and the MSS and the PLA are committed to the Party. And when the Party owns, manages, and directs industry, it is entirely logical that other Party agencies should be deployed in support of an objective identified as a priority by the leadership.

In this scenario, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao redefined the Party’s goals,

stressing modernization and technology. But in the absence of fraternal sup- port from Moscow, the development of an indigenous aerospace industry and the production of stealth equipment, phased array radars, photoreconnais- sance satellites, computer networks, and sophisticated guided weapons was not easy to accomplish without the essential building blocks of skilled per- sonnel, integrated circuitry, and advanced research facilities. Even when the COCOM restrictions on sensitive exports evaporated in 1994, to be replaced by uncoordinated, fragmented, and often unenforced individual bans on spe- cific technologies, Beijing was obliged to resort to subterfuge, and especially the MSS and PLA, to bridge the gap.

However, the ability of Western analysts to grasp the full nature of the challenge varies greatly, and a proposal in October 2009 from the U.S. Na- tional Security Council to downgrade the threat posed by the PRC to “Prior- ity 2” was opposed by the director of national intelligence, Admiral Dennis

C. Blair, and by CIA director Leon E. Panetta. The very fact that the White House could have made such a suggestion was a reflection not only of the attitude of Barack Obama’s administration, noting that Obama downplayed Russia as a threat during a presidential debate as well, but of the extent of the debate among analysts studying Beijing.

The PRC’s increased assertiveness has been fostered in part by countries simply looking away when China defies the norms of responsible behavior. For instance, in 2016 an international tribunal overwhelmingly ruled against China’s claim of sovereignty across 90 percent of the South China Sea. This case against China was brought by the Philippines in 2013 after China seized a reef, Scarborough Shoal, over which both countries claimed ownership. The Philippines asked that the tribunal find China in violation of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which had been ratified by both China and the Philippines. In its judgment, the tribunal ruled that any of China’s historic rights were “extinguished” by the treaty it had previously signed and, further, that several disputed rocks and reefs claimed by China were too insignificant for China to claim control of any economic activities around them. Accordingly, China was declared by the tribunal to have en- gaged in unlawful behavior when Scarborough Shoal was seized. However, President Xi Jinping immediately rejected the decision, with his Foreign Ministry confirming that “China does not accept or recognize” the ruling. As the tribunal has no enforcement powers, China has continued to build bases on reclaimed land, asserting its sovereignty over the whole disputed area. In response, the administrations of both Barack Obama and Donald Trump have largely ignored the issue, thereby effectively encouraging China to defy the judgment.

In a Western context, it would be inconceivable that the CIA could be

tasked to steal industrial secrets for Lockheed Martin or that the British Government Communications Headquarters would intercept commercially sensitive conversations for BAE Systems, but in the PRC the Party’s interests are best served by expedient exploitation of MSS’s resources to assist in the need of a particular technical research institute to acquire a special chip or some embargoed item of equipment so it can be reverse engineered to the benefit of a subordinate manufacturing plant. Since all these entities are part of the state and have a duty to serve the Party, the Chinese logic is obvious, even if it is utterly alien to Western practice.

This is not to say that the MSS has failed to adapt, and it is noticeable how the PRC intelligence services have evolved, for example from their initial total reliance on ethnic Chinese for any sort of intelligence gathering to a willingness, even an eagerness, to use non-Chinese for their purposes, as illustrated by the recent examples of Glenn Shriver, Candace Claiborne, and Kevin Mallory. Generally speaking, they continue to rely on ethnic Chinese, usually first-generation immigrants to the United States, to acquire sophisti- cated technical data and equipment, and on non-Chinese for information related to government policies. But in part that can be explained by the simple fact of a concentration of ethnic Chinese engaged in technical work, while those in government service are usually non–ethnic Chinese.

Clearly the PRC’s intelligence apparatus has gained confidence and even a degree of recklessness, especially in the area of cyber espionage. In Septem- ber 2019, two Chinese diplomats, one of whom was identified as an intelli- gence officer, accompanied by their wives, approached a sensitive military base near Norfolk, Virginia, and were denied entry. But instead of exiting the area as instructed, they entered the site and evaded security personnel until they were finally stopped by fire trucks. They claimed they did not under- stand English and that the incident was an innocent mistake, but they were

expelled without any public acknowledgment. This episode was followed by the State Department’s announcement of restrictions on PRC diplomats re- quiring them to provide advance notice before meeting state or local officials or visiting academic or research facilities. Just as the PRC has become more aggressive in its conduct of intelligence operations, the United States has reciprocated by countering their efforts.

In many circumstances the Chinese intelligence establishment behaves very differently from its Western counterparts and poses special challenges to counterintelligence analysts who spent a lifetime during the Cold War learning to develop countermeasures appropriate for a Soviet or Warsaw Pact adversary. As can be seen in the pages that follow, the Chinese evolution has been very effective but also very, very different.

 

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ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. The prestigious Chinese Academy of Sci- ences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, is listed by the U.S.-China Economic and Se- curity Review Commission as a civilian research and development organiza- tion that routinely engages in the collection of sensitive technology. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

AFGHANISTAN. A neighbor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and a source of regional instability, Afghanistan is a major focus of Beijing’s security and intelligence apparatus, which, having consistently ruled out armed intervention, is anxious to protect a significant state-sponsored eco- nomic investment. Major aid projects include the Karakorum Highway, which links Xinjiang Province to Pakistan, built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation in partnership with Pakistan’s National Highway Author- ity and financed by the Export-Import Bank of China. By 2008 Chinese companies had invested an estimated $580 million in some 33 different infra- structure improvement schemes that benefited from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) protection. In addition, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation has also committed itself in 2007 to copper mining at Aynak in Logar Province, south of Kabul, which is intended to employ up to 10,000 Afghans and provide the central government with an income of $400 million a year. With deposits valued at $88 billion, the Aynak mine represents the largest foreign investment in Afghanistan’s troubled history. Other Chinese interests include a partnership between the Afghan Ministry of Communica- tions and the Chinese-owned companies Huawei and ZTE to install a digital telephone network linking a planned 200,000 subscribers.

China is Afghanistan’s third-largest trading partner, and in 2015 it was

estimated that their trade approached $1 billion. In 2016 the countries signed a $100 million Belt and Road Initiative, Yidai Yilu Changyi, and China is investing $46 billion in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. China is intensely interested in Afghanistan maintaining a secular government as it attempts to keep Afghanistan from falling into a category of “Three Evils,” San Ge Xie, of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.

 

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Western intelligence analysts presume the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, is well represented among personnel employed by the PRC’s commercial investments in Afghanistan, but the U.S.-sponsored and -trained Afghan National Directorate of Security, preoccupied with do- mestic terrorism, has not registered the MSS as a significant adversary or target.

 

AGEE, PHILLIP. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer formerly based in Mexico, Agee volunteered his services to the KGB in Mexico City in 1973 following his divorce and a refusal by the CIA of his request for financial assistance, but he was turned away by a Soviet security officer who did not believe such a scruffy individual could really be an authentic CIA officer. Allegedly he was also rejected by Colonel Krepkogorsky, a KGB officer in the United States, who suspected a provocation. Agee subsequently flew to Cuba, where his offer was accepted with alacrity, and he was subse- quently handled by Directorate K’s Oleg Nichiporenko. Under his guidance, Agee wrote Inside the Company: A CIA Diary and disclosed details of the CIA’s operations conducted against the PRC.

It is unclear if Agee had direct contact with the Chinese, but given the historically close relationship between the Chinese and their Communist counterparts in Cuba, it is highly likely that the Chinese received information provided by Agee. Later, during the Vietnam War, Agee reportedly volun- teered to help in the interrogation of American prisoners of war, and while it is uncertain if his offer was taken up, he definitely had the opportunity to extend the cooperation he had provided the Cubans to the Chinese. Agee is known to have divulged virtually all the information he had at his disposal, and that included details of operations conducted against the Chinese.

The son of a wealthy businessman from Tampa, Florida, Philip Agee studied at Notre Dame University but left the law school before graduating and in 1956 was drafted into the U.S. Army. While undergoing his military training, he volunteered to join the CIA, and in 1960 he was sent on his first overseas assignment, under diplomatic cover to Ecuador and then Uruguay, during which time he married and had two sons. In 1967, having returned to Washington, D.C., he was sent to Mexico City, where he began an affair with an American divorcée with strong Leftist political sympathies, and under her influence he resigned from the CIA in the autumn of 1968 but remained in Mexico, working for a local company. In early 1970, more than a year after he had left the agency, Agee started work on the book that was to make him notorious.

Agee acquired a Nicaraguan passport, which he used to maintain his resi-

dency in Hamburg and later to enter Canada and slip back into the United States before settling in Cuba to run a travel agency. He died in Havana in February 2008 following a medical operation for a perforated ulcer.

AIRBORNE COLLECTION. Throughout the postwar and Cold War eras, mainland China has been the target of airborne intelligence collection opera- tions conducted by aircraft operating from Taiwan and from U.S. Air Force bases in Japan. From 1950 photo reconnaissance missions were undertaken by the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SRW) from Yokota, Japan, flying RB-29 Superfortresses equipped with the K-30, a 100-inch focal plane camera designed to capture imagery obliquely, and one flew over Shanghai on 25 August 1951. Electronic and signals intelligence flights were also undertaken by a 91st SRW detachment of RB-45C Tornados. When the U-2 and then the SR-71 Blackbird high-altitude aircraft became operational, they also participated in clandestine overflights. See also CIVIL AIR TRANS- PORT (CAT); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

ALBANIA. The trenchant criticism of Joseph Stalin by Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in Moscow in February 1956 served to alienate the Communist leader- ship in both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Albania. Khrush- chev’s secret speech, which quickly leaked to Western intelligence analysts, caused deep resentment in Tirana and Beijing, where Enver Hoxha and Mao Zedong felt considerable loyalty to the Soviet dictator.

For 19 months Tirana came under intense pressure from the Kremlin to adopt Khrushchev’s new policy, and some discreet economic sanctions were applied, such as a restriction on Soviet travel to Albania, the withdrawal in August of East German technicians, and the hasty closure of the Pashaliman Red Banner Fleet naval base at Vlorë, leaving behind four Whiskey-class diesel-electrics. Khrushchev’s original donation, of 12 submarines, had been intended to put strategic pressure on the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but that policy had to be abandoned.

However, as the Eastern Bloc advisers departed, they were replaced by personnel from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which supplied Alba- nia’s navy with 45 Type 25 Huchuan-class fast motor torpedo boats armed with up to four 533 mm torpedoes, and some Shanghai-class coastal anti- submarine warfare patrol vessels. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) also took over the management of the submarines, but they were rarely operational up until their official decommissioning in 1998.

An increasingly stubborn and paranoid Hoxha came to fear a Moscow- inspired uprising or even a coup d’état, suspecting that Khrushchev was attempting to regain Tito by offering him the chance to absorb Albania into a greater Yugoslavia. Hoxha’s rift with Moscow offered the Chinese an oppor- tunity to exercise influence in the Balkans and provide a convenient military and intelligence base in Europe at a time when the mainland was effectively closed to Europeans and travel overseas by Chinese officials was very unusu- al. Although Albania effectively became the PRC’s surrogate client state,

there is no evidence that, at a time when the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was preoccupied with domestic security issues, the opportunity was taken to establish wider intelligence networks in Europe.

Relations between Hoxha and the Kremlin continued to decline until Octo- ber 1961, when Khrushchev made a speech at the 22nd CPSU Congress criticizing Albania, which was an undisguised and unexpected attack on Beijing, prompting the Chinese delegation, led by Zhou Enlai, to return home prematurely. The dramatic walkout, which included Tao Zhu, the in- fluential Guangdong first secretary, took place at a moment of economic crisis in the PRC and the threat of food shortages, crop failure, and mass starvation when Tao had privately advocated reaching an accommodation with the Soviets for reasons of expediency, despite differences of opinion over Yugoslavia, Laos, and Albania. This view was not shared by two other more militant members of the delegation, Kang Sheng and Peng Zhen. Kang had already criticized Khrushchev at a Warsaw Pact meeting early in 1960, and there had been other manifestations of Mao’s unwillingness to accept Khrushchev’s leadership of the international Communist movement or to adopt the increasingly liberal Soviet interpretation of Marxist-Leninism.

Both sides of the dispute adopted the tiny state of Albania as a surrogate,

leaving support or criticism of Tirana as implicit attacks on the leadership in Beijing and Moscow, although the true depth of the schism would not be- come apparent until the end of 1961 when the Chinese republished in mid- November Hoxha’s accusations of “anti-Marxist conduct,” of “lies, pressure, threats, slanders and inventions,” of “opportunism,” “revisionism,” and “treachery,” made nine days earlier on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. To reinforce the message, the Chinese sent Hoxha a message of congratulations on the Albanian Party’s 20th anniversary. The Kremlin then broke off diplomatic relations with Tirana in early December, and the TASS news agency circulated a comprehensive critique of the Albanian ideology that had previously been published in the theoretical journal Kommunist. In February 1962, at the Albanian Party’s Fourth Congress, there were defiant attacks on the “revisionists,” predicting that an economic blockade would fail because “socialist Albania is not alone.” As predicted, in that same month, the PRC signed an agreement to provide equipment and loans to build 25 chemical, metallurgical, and power plants worth 112.5 million rubles, amounting to much the same aid that had been received from Moscow over the past four years. The divide became more apparent when Hoxha failed to attend the Warsaw Pact meetings in Moscow in March and August, and stayed away from the 40th-anniversary celebrations of the Czech Party held in Prague in May. Meanwhile, the PRC gained influence in Tirana and be- came a major purchaser for the country’s sole strategic export of chromium.

Hoxha’s relationship with Moscow was never restored, leaving Tirana as a strange and unique Chinese ideological outpost in Europe, albeit isolated in the Balkans and surrounded by the Sigurimi, Hoxha’s xenophobic security apparatus. The PRC’s ambitions to extend its influence further from Tirana never materialized, although Albania played a significant role in assisting Beijing to accomplish a key foreign policy objective, membership in the United Nations, in 1971. Then, following President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing, interpreted by Hoxha as an act of betrayal, the Sino-Albanian rela- tionship soured, deteriorating further when Tito accepted an invitation from the PRC in September 1977, until July 1978 when the PRC terminated all aid programs.

In April 2017 Chinese vice premier Zhang Gaoli and Albanian president Bujar Nishani signed a Belt and Road Initiative, Yidai Yilu Changyi (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Jingji Dai He 21 Shiji Di Haishangsichou Zhi Lu), an agreement designed to enhance Albania’s infrastructure, agricultural, and production output and tourism. China is Albania’s major trade partner, with an estimated

$636 million in trade in 2016. See also PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA)

 

AMERASIA. In August 1945 Philip Jaffe, the editor of Amerasia, a fort- nightly periodical devoted to American policy in the Far East, was the sub- ject of an urgent investigation conducted by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) following the leakage of classified information published in the Janu- ary 1945 edition. An article titled “British Imperial Policy in Asia” drew on a secret report written by OSS’s Southeast Asia chief, Kenneth Wells, and after a complaint from the British, OSS’s security division had conducted a covert search in March of Amerasia’s editorial offices in New York, an operation that proved that Jaffe had retained thousands of official documents, and in June Jaffe and his coeditor Kate Mitchell were arrested, together with a U.S. Naval Intelligence officer, Andrew Roth, and two State Department officials, John Service and Emmanuel Larsen, and charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. Jaffe pleaded guilty and received a fine and a suspended sentence, but although indicted, charges against his codefendants were dropped when they became aware that they had been the subject of illegal searches and wiretaps.

Concerned that the legal principle of “the fruit of the poisoned tree” would

compromise any prosecution, the case was abandoned, although many com- mentators believed that influence had been exercised to avoid political em- barrassment, allegations that were later pursued by the congressional Tyd- ings Committee. At the time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) believed that the Amerasia case had been an example of Jaffe and other Communist sympathizers attempting to exercise influence in favor of the

China lobby, but later study of the VENONA texts revealed that one of his contacts, Joseph M. Bernstein, was an active Soviet illegal code-named MARQUIS, which put an altogether more sinister interpretation on the en- tire episode and on the motives of Service and Roth, who had supplied Jaffe with the secret documents.

Bernstein only came under suspicion as a Soviet spy in 1949 when another mole, Judith Coplon, was asked to report from her section in the Department of Justice any interest in him from the FBI. Born in Connecticut and educated at Yale and the Sorbonne, Bernstein was a gifted linguist and traveled widely in Europe, working for a time as a newspaper reporter in Bucharest, before he returned to the United States in 1938. He then worked for Julio Alvarez de Vayo, formerly the foreign minister of republican Spain, and then for the Czech journalist Otto Katz, helping him write J’Accuse in 1940 under the pen name André Simon. Pretending to be a well-informed Frenchman who could not reveal his true identity because his family lived under the Nazi occupation, Katz’s best seller was not much more than a tract of Communist propaganda based on newspaper research assembled by Bernstein.

During the war, Bernstein attempted to obtain a government job but was

rejected because he omitted much of his prewar career on his application, so the Civil Service Commission branded him as lacking “loyalty or morality.” In 1946 he attracted the FBI’s attention when he was spotted meeting another espionage suspect, Mary Jane Keeney. A single VENONA text from the GRU rezident in New York, Pavel Mikhailov, dated 16 August 1944 and attributed to Bernstein, contained details of conversations held between Chi- ang Kai-shek and General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell in China, sourced to Thomas A. Bisson.

1.  Information of MARQUIS [Joseph Bernstein]:

a)  After unsuccessful conversations with the Communist party about the role of the 8th Army, CHIANG KAI-SHEK sent an extra five divi- sions to strengthen the army blockading the SHENSI–KANSU–NINSIA areas (ARTHUR’s [Thomas Bisson] information).

b)   For a while in government circles the question of sending their representatives for direct contact with the government of the areas indicat- ed was urgently discussed. This intention is explained by the desire of the American command to establish air bases on the territory of those regions.

c)  In the Lend-Lease Division of the War Department among the com- missioned personnel there is increasing resistance to fulfilling shipments for the USSR (particularly in connection with the Red Army line). The most vehement advocate of curtailing shipments is Major A. PEABODY (information of RHODES, and employee of the Division and an old ac- quaintance of FARLEY).

d)  Military circles are also resisting Lend-Lease consignments to the Chinese government, insisting along with this on increasing consignments to General STILWELL (the same source).

2.  Information of SMITH [Leonard Mins]: Beginning on 13th August the Russian Division of the O.S.S. has been working night and day on the compilation of some kind of urgent report (SMITH could not find out the details—he supposes the report is being for ROOSEVELT’s conference with CHURCHILL.

Never charged with espionage, Bernstein was subpoenaed to give evi- dence to a grand jury in 1953, but nevertheless continued to contribute articles to Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) publications until his death in 1975.

The other VENONA evidence consisted of three messages sent by Mikhailov, to Moscow. Two were very fragmented, but the text dated 16 June 1943 was explicit and served to incriminate Bernstein and one of his sources, Thomas Bisson.

1.  MARQUIS (Joseph Bernstein) has established friendly relations with

T. A. Bisson (in future ARTHUR) who has recently left BEW [Board of Economic Warfare]; he is now working in the Institute of Pacific Rela- tions and in the editorial offices of MARQUIS’s periodical. ARTHUR is evidently well informed and has agents in government institutions.

2.  ARTHUR passed to MARQUIS, so that as his colleague in the editori- al office he might get acquainted with them, copies of four documents:

(a)  his own report for BEW with his views on working out a plan for shipments of American troops to China.

(b)  a report by the Chinese embassy in Washington to its government in China about the dimensions and means of trade between the Japanese in the occupied territories and Chinese industrialists in free China territory.

(c)   a brief BEW report of April 1943 on a general evaluation of the forces of the sides of the Soviet-German front and the prospects of the German summer offensive;

(d)  a report by the American consul in Vladivostock, WARD, on the economic and political situation in the Vladivostock area.

3.  The reports are in translated form. We will pass on valuable points by telegraph.

4.  A check on ARTHUR’s personal connections will be undertaken on the spot. At the same time make use of the Centre’s opportunities for check- ing.

 

Like China Today, Amerasia was published by the China Aid Council, a Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) front, but the extent to which it was also engaged in espionage remains moot. Jaffe came to believe that he had been tricked into reaching a plea bargain with the author- ities, and Andrew Roth fled abroad to begin a new career as a journalist in London, never to return to the United States. Roth died in July 2010.

AMGEN. In 1993 the Amgen biotechnology company, based in Thousand Oaks, California, discovered that a Chinese agent had penetrated the compa- ny and had attempted to steal a vial of patented cell cultures for Epogen, a drug used for treating anemia worth $1.2 billion in annual sales. An investi- gation conducted internally revealed that the suspect had made more than 70 calls to the People’s Republic of China and had used intermediaries to offer the drug, used in kidney dialysis, for sale. Caught as he entered a laboratory illicitly, the suspect confessed and was fired. As no criminal offense had been committed, the matter never came before the courts. See also TECH- NOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

ANUBIS. The code name given by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to a diplomat, Ning Wen, who worked at the People’s Republic of China (PRC) consulate in San Francisco from 1986, and then at Los Angeles from 1988 as the science and technology attaché.

Born in Shanghai in 1949, Wen was educated at Tsinghua University, Qinghua Daxue, and studied as a graduate student at Berkeley, earning a PhD in engineering, having married Lin Hailin. In 1989, apparently disillu- sioned by the Tiananmen Square massacre, Ning Wen was recruited by the FBI’s Steve Johnson and kept him supplied with information until he de- fected in March 1992, when he was scheduled to return to the PRC. He was then accommodated in an FBI safe house in the San Fernando Valley until he was resettled, with his wife and daughter, in Manitowoc, Wisconsin. There he was handled by the FBI’s Melvin Fuqia, who was unaware that, as well as working for a local manufacturer, the Manitowoc Company, the defector had set up his own firm, Wen Enterprises, which had a thriving business buying embargoed computer chips and reselling them to Beijing Rich Linscience Electronics, an importer run by Qu Jianguo and his wife Wang Ruoling. The suspicious nature of these sales was reported to the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2001, a year after Wen had acquired American citizenship and had been posted by his employer to Hangzhou to manage the Manitowoc Company’s refrigeration plant. According to the tip, Wen’s consignments were destined for the 54th Research Institute, Di 54 Yanjiu Suo, a well- known front for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun.

An investigation was launched, and in September 2004 Wen and his wife

were arrested on the day Qu Jianguo and his wife arrived in Wisconsin from Beijing to stay with them. In May 2005, Qu pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiring to export electronics without the required license and was fined

$2,000 and 46 months’ imprisonment. His wife received six months and a

$1,500 fine for deliberately undervaluing chips to evade export controls. Lin Hailin pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment and a

$50,000 fine, while her husband went to trial, was found guilty, and was sent

in January 2006 to a minimum-security federal prison at Duluth for five years and fined $50,000. See also FOURTH DEPARTMENT; MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY (MEI).

 

ARMED  FORCES  SECURITY  AGENCY  (AFSA).  The  principal

American cryptographic organization before and during the Korean War, having been created in May 1949, the AFSA achieved considerable success in reading North Korean encrypted communications, but after the armistice in July 1953 the traffic available for interception reduced dramatically as the enemy switched to landlines and the newly created National Security Agen- cy (NSA), established in November 1952, reduced its coverage of the region, transferring its limited resources to Soviet targets.

The AFSA monitored plaintext transmissions and employed signals analy- sis techniques to build an accurate order of battle for the People’s Libera- tion Army (PLA) and report from July 1950 a growing concentration of troops in Manchuria. Within two months, six of the nine field armies that would join the war were identified, and there were other clues. Intercepts showed that ferries at Anshan were reserved for military use, and the PLA was ordering maps of Korea in large quantities. Eventually, on 16 October, the 372nd Regiment under radio silence crossed the Yalu River and engaged United Nations forces. The AFSA was the only Allied intelligence agency to accurately predict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) intervention.

Prior to the Chinese entry into the conflict on 16 October 1950, the AFSA relied on diplomatic reporting from the Burmese and Indian embassies in Beijing for political information about the PRC’s intentions, apparently shared with selected foreign ambassadors by Zhou Enlai. In one example, on 25 September 1950 Dr. Kavalam Madhava Panikkar informed New Delhi that the Chinese intended to deploy Chinese troops in Korea if United Na- tions forces advanced beyond the 38th parallel. Even though the AFSA had monitored PLA movements from Shanghai toward Manchuria for some weeks, analysts at Arlington Hall failed to make the right interpretation, and the arrival of 260,000 infantrymen of the 42nd Army over the Yalu River came as a surprise to the remainder of the U.S. and Allied intelligence com- munity.

Some limited NSA work on Chinese signals continued from Okinawa,

with a young New Yorker, Milton Zaslow, concentrating on the PRC’s Min- istry of Railways, a useful window on the country’s transport and logistical infrastructure. After November 1950, when regular PLA divisions were ad- vancing toward Seoul, the AFSA planned to establish intercept stations at Sinanju to cover North Korean traffic and one in Pyongyang to concentrate on Chinese and Soviet communications. The deteriorating military situation forced the AFSA to cancel any deployment to Sinanju and withdraw the entire detachment to Pyongyang, operating under 15th Radio Squadron Mo-

bile (RSM) cover. By February, the AFSA was picking up plenty of tactical Chinese voice channels and, to exploit this source, a Nationalist Chinese general in Tokyo was persuaded to recruit native speakers from Taiwan for the Army Security Agency (ASA), where they were employed on low-level voice intercept (LLVI) as civilians but paid officers’ salaries.

By the end of hostilities, the ASA had expanded its operations, usually conducted close to the front line, to 22 LLVI stations, which produced the overwhelming majority of communications intelligence during the conflict. One unexpected bonus was the discovery in September 1952 that sound detection systems, designed to warn of the approach of enemy troops, were picking up Chinese telephone conversations transmitted on tactical landlines. This accidental breakthrough was exploited by the ASA and the 25th Infan- try Division, deploying small teams of linguists and analysts to LLVI units. The resulting information was both timely and accurate and enabled local commanders to bring down artillery barrages and air strikes whenever the intelligence indicated a concentration of enemy troops. The AFSA also de- veloped a working relationship with South Korea’s embryonic military cryptographic organization and shared information using the BACCHUS electro-mechanical cipher system, and DIANA one-time pads.

With the AFSA concentrating on Chinese signals, the AFSA achieved

considerable success with traffic analysis and gradually developed an accu- rate order of battle for the entire People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) and, by monitoring its radio nets, predicted the offensive of 15 July 1953, which resulted in a significant defeat for the 46th Army. It also made a significant contribution to the battle for the Pusan perimeter. According to the NSA’s official history, “in the first month of the war the AFSA read more than one- third of all North Korean cipher messages received, and by December AFSA was reading more than 90 percent.”

Following a review of what was perceived to be the AFSA’s poor perfor- mance by the Brownell Committee, the organization was replaced in Novem- ber 1952 by the National Security Agency. See also AIRBORNE COLLEC- TION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

ARNOLD, JOHN. On 12 January 1953 a United States Air Force B-29 of the 581st Squadron was illuminated by radar-guided searchlights and then shot down by Chinese MiG-15s from Antung airfield while on a night mis- sion to drop an agent over Liaoning Province. Three of the aircrew were killed, and 11 were taken prisoner, including the pilot, Colonel John Arnold. They were tried on charges of espionage, their cover story of a leaflet drop having been disbelieved, and in November 1954 Radio Beijing announced their conviction. They were freed in August 1955 in Kowloon as the Geneva Conference on Indochina opened. See also TROPIC.

ATOLL AA-2. On 24 September 1954 a major dogfight took place between MiG-17s and Taiwanese F-86 Sabres armed with AIM-9B Sidewinder air- to-air heat-seeking missiles. Although 11 MiG-17 Frescos were shot down in the engagement, one managed to return to base, having been hit by a Side- winder that failed to detonate. The missile was removed from the airframe and delivered to the Toropov design center, where it was studied by Soviet analysts and used to reverse engineer the AA-2 Atoll. See also SOVIET UNION.

 

AUSTRALIA. From the end of World War II, Australian security and intel- ligence agencies have regarded China as a significant regional target for collection, with the Defence Signals Directorate taking the lead in collaborat- ing with Allied communications intercept sites in Hong Kong and Singa- pore. In addition, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) monitors the diplomatic missions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and occasionally attracts a well-informed asylum seeker. These defectors, usually regarded as reliable in providing local insights into the activities of the ubiquitous Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, enables ASIO to maintain a watch on the PRC’s efforts to exercise influence over the increasing Asian immigrant community. ASIO had initially assessed local MSS personnel as being more interested in monitoring the supporters of Taiwan, Tibet, Falun Gong, and the democracy movement than in engaging in conventional espionage against Australian interests.

Historically, ASIO had always regarded the Chinese threat, which demon-

strably escalated with the establishment of diplomatic relations in December 1972, as being secondary to the rather more obvious Soviet bloc challenge, and only a handful of officers were ever assigned to the task. In January 1976, ASIO, then based in Melbourne, employed a staff of 506, of whom only a hundred were engaged in intelligence collection. Most of them were deployed against the Soviets, and the Chinese section, designated B4, amounted to just two desk officers at headquarters. In December 1977, B4 was absorbed into E4, a new Asian Affairs Group in E Division, which would expand to 10 officers.

Routine surveillance on Chinese diplomats proved that intelligence profes- sionals were active in the Chinese and Taiwanese communities, which amounted to some 50,000 people. In addition, the identified MSS representa- tive was observed to cultivate the Chinese Youth League, the Australia- China Friendship Society, and the Communist Party of Australia (Marxist- Leninist) leadership, including Duncan Haigh Clark. The embassy com- pound, housed in a former motel in Canberra’s northern suburb of Watson, had high security and was not easily overlooked from any nearby buildings.

ASIO’s study of Chinese intelligence activity, especially in Victoria, sug- gested that the local priority was influence peddling rather than conventional collection, and monitoring this essentially long-term activity posed a prob- lem where E4 was obliged to produce tangible results in periodic report summaries. In short, ASIO concluded that the Chinese focus, even relating to Taiwan, was not particularly clandestine or demonstrably illegal. Surveil- lance was stepped up when a consulate-general was established by two dozen consular officials in Sydney in March 1979, but this development did not alter the overall assessment.

The Communist Party chairman, Ted Hill, was pro-Chinese, having been feted in Beijing in May 1982, and was suspected of receiving direction and financial support from intelligence personnel posing as diplomats, but the evidence for this assessment was thin to nonexistent. During that decade, after prolonged monitoring, ASIO came to view its Chinese adversary “as an amorphous, omnivorous vacuum cleaner” that conducted operations from mainland China rather than through formal MSS stations under diplomatic cover, so there was “no evidence of direct espionage” in Australia. This was the verdict delivered by ASIO’s director-general, Sir Edward Woodward, to his prime minister, Malcolm Fraser, in February 1981, confirming that “it did not appear that the Chinese Intelligence Services were very active in Austra- lia,” although he acknowledged “considerable ignorance” on the part of Western intelligence agencies on the subject.

In more recent years there has been increased concern about Chinese inter-

ference in Australia’s domestic politics, and between 2013 and 2015, entities with Chinese connections donated more than $5.5 million to Australian polit- ical parties. The payments were made by organizations or individuals acting on their behalf, such as Huang Xiangmo, the Chinese billionaire who moved to Sydney in 2011 and purchased a $12 million mansion, He donated $2.7 million (Australian) to local political parties but was thought to have been a surrogate for the United Front Work Department, Tongzhan Bu (United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Tongzhan Bu). Accordingly, Huang’s permanent resident status was canceled in 2019 and his application for citizenship rejected. Following a $141 million judgment for understating his income between 2013 and 2015, Huang demanded that the Labour and Liberal parties return his contributions and referred to Australia as a “giant baby.”

China is Australia’s largest trading partner, and China’s considerable in-

vestments in Australia are considered by ASIO to be a very real security issue. Two Australian politicians, Gladys Liu and Sam Dastyari, have been investigated for receiving illegal payments from Chinese entities, with Das- tyari eventually resigning from Parliament.

In 2018 the Australian government introduced laws designed to counter the activities of foreign agents through the registration of lobbyists, while publicly noting that China was trying to interfere in Australia’s internal af- fairs. The passage of this legislation damaged relations with China, which were further strained when the Chinese were blamed for a series of cyber attacks. Nevertheless, as yet no individual has ever been prosecuted in Aus- tralia for Chinese espionage.

In a report released in October 2019, ASIO’s former director-general Dun- can Lewis reported that due to the emphasis on countering terrorism-related threats, intelligence gathering on foreign interference was not receiving ade- quate attention. “ASIO has limited scope to redirect internal resources to address the increasing gap between demand for our counterespionage and foreign interference advice, and our ability to furnish this assistance.”

ASIO’s 2018 budget was $361.91 million, and the organization employed about 1,900 personnel, but the Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, confirmed that the budget would be enhanced and staffing would rise to above 2,000 personnel.

In November 2019, Wang Liqiang, who claims to be a co-optee of the People’s Liberation Army’s, Renmin Jiefangjun, intelligence apparatus, de- fected to Australia and admitted his involvement in influencing elections in Taiwan and penetrating pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong. See also ZHAO BO; CHEN YONGLIN; CYBER ESPIONAGE; INDUSTRIAL ES- PIONAGE; RIO TINTO ZINC.

 

AUTUMN ORCHID. Code name for the Second Department, Di Er Bu- men, operation to collect intelligence and monitor political developments in Hong Kong and Macao before the handover of the territories by Great Britain and Portugal.

 

AVENTURA TECHNOLOGIES INC. On 7 November 2019 the directors and senior managers of Aventura Technologies Inc. of Commack, New York, were charged with fraud, money laundering, and the illegal importa- tion of equipment manufactured in China. Those charged included Jack Ca- basso, age 61; Frances Cabasso, age 59; Jonathan Lasker, age 34; Christine Lavonne Lazarus, age 45; Wayne Marino, age 39; Edward Matulik, age 42; and Alan Schwartz, age 70. Prosecutors also seized the Cabassos’ 70-foot luxury yacht and froze $3 million in 12 financial accounts.

According to the prosecution, Aventura had made approximately $80 mil- lion over the previous decade, including over $20 million in federal govern- ment contracts, while falsely claiming its products had been manufactured at its headquarters in Commack. In reality, since at least 2006, Aventura had imported its merchandise, principally from the People’s Republic of China

(PRC), and then resold them as American made or as manufactured by a small number of other countries. In particular, Aventura imported networked security products from PRC manufacturers with known cybersecurity vulner- abilities and resold them to U.S. military and other government installations, claiming they were American made. Specifically, in March 2019, a laser- enhanced night-vision camera costing $13,500 was surreptitiously marked for identification, and two weeks later it was delivered to the Naval Subma- rine Base in Groton, Connecticut. In another example, the Department of Energy (DoE) ordered $156,000 worth of networked automated turnstiles from Aventura to be installed at a Tennessee facility. In January 2019, turn- stiles from China were intercepted and again marked for identification. Two weeks later, the items were delivered to the DOE facility.

In 2018, Aventura sold the U.S. Air Force 25 body cameras for use by

security personnel at an air force base. However, Chinese characters were spotted on the built-in screen of one of the cameras, and when the firmware was downloaded it revealed that the camera had been manufactured in China. Upon examination, the camera was found to contain multiple preloaded im- ages that were designed to be displayed on the built-in screen, including the air force logo, the logo of the PRC manufacturer, and the logo of the PRC’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu.

 

AVOCADO. Code name for precautions taken to protect U.S. computer systems against cyber attacks originating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), AVOCADO was introduced in November 2008 following a series of intrusions traced to computers located in the PRC. Among the targets have been the Pentagon’s Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR- NET), which in August 2006 lost 20 terabytes of data. Three months later the

U.S. Naval War College closed down its internal systems for two weeks after Chinese hackers had penetrated them. Then in June 2007 the Department of Defense took 1,500 terminals offline when the secretary of defense’s private office was targeted. Soon afterward, in October, some 1,100 staff members at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory received suspicious emails containing a malicious attachment that a few opened, thereby contaminating a database at the nuclear weapons facility. Other sites that have attracted attacks are the White House’s internal information network, which was hit in November 2008, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shut- tle support systems at the Kennedy Space Center and the Goddard Space Flight Center. See also INFORMATION WARFARE; INFORMATION WARFARE MILITIA; TITAN RAIN.

B

BANDA, DR. HASTINGS. In 1965 a plot to assassinate Dr. Hasting Banda, the autocratic ruler of Malawi, was exposed, and the People’s Republic of China’s ambassador to Tanzania was implicated. Previously Nyasaland and part of the Central African Federation, Malawi’s security had been MI5’s responsibility, but when the federation was dismantled in 1964, Banda had declined MI5’s offer to have the security liaison officer (SLO) in Salisbury accredited in Blantyre too, but accepted an SLO in Zambia.

Malawi had received independence from Great Britain in July 1964, but almost immediately Banda, who had been the country’s prime minister since February 1963, was challenged by four cabinet ministers whom he promptly dismissed. They fled the country, and in July 1966 Banda was the only candidate in the newly declared republic’s presidential election. He remained president for life until he was removed from office in a 1993 referendum. He died in November 1997, aged 101.

 

BANNER, USS. A U.S. National Security Agency signals intelligence plat- form, the USS Banner undertook regular patrols off the coast of the Chinese mainland until November 1966, when the ship was the subject of intensive harassment from Chinese fishing vessels. At only 176 feet long, the Banner had been operational for only a year when it was deployed to intercept Chinese traffic in the East China Sea off Shanghai.

 

BEIJING ELECTRONIC SPECIALIST SCHOOL. Technicians destined for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, invariably undergo training at the Beijing Electronic Specialist School, Beijing Dianzi Zhuanye Xuexiao, before graduating as technical support officers for the MSS Investigation Department or as specialists in classified communica- tions.

 

BEIJING INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (BIIR).

The Beijing Institute of International Relations, Beijing Guoji Guanxi Xueyu- an, also known as the University of International Relations, Guoji Guanxi

 

31

Xueyuan, was established at the behest of Zhou Enlai. It has long been associated with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and has been described as a “School of Spies.” Subordinate to the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Zhongguo Dang- dai Quanxi Yanjiu Suo, with which it shares its academic staff, the BIIR prepares students for international assignments, some with MSS sponsorship, but others for the Foreign Ministry and news organizations reporting busi- ness and international affairs. The BIIR’s relationship with the MSS is in- tended to be covert, and no documents circulate internally that suggest the BIIR is anything other than a legitimate educational facility; but in reality it prepares training manuals, offers intelligence-related courses, and conducts external conferences attended only by MSS staff.

 

BEJUCAL. In 1999 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established a signals intelligence station at Bejucal, south of Havana, Cuba, with several satellite radomes that U.S. intelligence agencies assessed could be deployed to intercept American military and civilian communications. At a second site, northeast of Santiago de Cuba, the PLC built another facility, and reportedly China also provided Fidel Castro’s regime with sophisticated antennas to block Radio Martí broadcasts.

 

BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE. The Belt and Road Initiative, Yidai Yilu Changyi, officially the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Jingi Dai He 21 Shiji Di Haishangsi- chou Zhi Lu, or One Belt, One Road (OBOR), Yidai Yilu, is a global strategy implemented by President Xi Jinping in 2013, involving infrastructure devel- opment, currently in more than 150 countries. While some laud the effort in principally undeveloped countries, critics contend it is part of the People’s Republic of China’s effort to gain dominance and provides convenient cover for intelligence-gathering operations and justification for a military presence. See also ALBANIA; PAKISTAN.

 

BERGERSEN, GREGG W. A weapons system policy analyst employed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Department of Defense agen- cy responsible for supervising the sale of defense equipment to foreign buy- ers, Gregg Bergersen was arrested in February 2008 and charged with pass- ing classified information to Tai Shen Kuo, a Taiwanese with a furniture manufacturing business in New Orleans.

Apparently the victim of a classic Chinese “false-flag” operation, Berger- sen was led to believe that Kuo was working for Taiwan when in fact he had been recruited by a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, contact in Guangzhou. Accordingly, he supplied Kuo with information and

documents that were supposedly intended to assist him in developing defense exports to Taiwan. Among the items passed were details of the Po Sheng (Broad Victory) project, which was designed to upgrade existing Taiwanese command-and-control systems; blueprints of the Defense Department’s Glo- bal Information Grid communications network; and pages of the secret 2007 Javis Report, which listed Defense Security Cooperation Agency sales planned over the next five years. In July 2008, Bergersen was sentenced to

57 months’ imprisonment. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

BISHOP, BENJAMIN PIERCE. A 57-year-old U.S. Army officer holding the rank of lieutenant colonel in the reserve, Benjamin Bishop worked at the

U.S. Pacific Command on Oahu as a contract employee for the defense contractor Referentia Systems Inc. since May 2012. Bishop had held a Top Secret security clearance since July 2002 and Secure Compartmented Infor- mation access from November 2002 to April 2012. On 15 March 2013, Bishop was arrested at work and charged with “communication of informa- tion related to the national defense to a person not entitled to receive it” and the “unlawful retention of documents and plans relating to the national de- fense.”

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), between May 2011 and April 2012, Bishop provided classified national defense informa- tion to an individual, identified only as a 27-year-old Chinese woman study- ing in the United States on a J-1 visa as a graduate student at a university in the Washington, D.C., area.

The J-1 visa she possessed was nonimmigrant in nature and had been provided to promote cultural exchanges, with English-language proficiency requirements. Such visas are largely sponsored by the recipient’s govern- ment, but also by a host university or by the private sector.

Bishop and the Chinese woman had met in Hawaii during a conference relating to international military defense issues and in June 2011 had begun an affair, though he did not declare the relationship to his employer, as required. Bishop and his wife had divorced in 2012, when she had returned to Ogdon, Utah.

The FBI suggested that the Chinese woman “may have been at the confer- ence in order to target individuals such as BISHOP who work with and have access to U.S. classified information.”

FBI physical and electronic surveillance revealed their intimacy from June 2011, when Bishop received several briefings reminding him of his obliga- tion to report relationships with foreign nationals. Nevertheless, in February 2012 Bishop submitted a leave request to travel to Great Britain to visit the woman, but, according to the FBI, he “changed the name of PERSON 1 by

slightly changing her given name to a masculine form of the same name and by adding a letter to the surname of PERSON 1, thereby obscuring the gender and identity of PERSON 1.”

The FBI’s interception of Bishop’s emails showed that on 14 May 2012 he had transmitted information about current war plans, nuclear weapons, and relations with international partners to the woman, all at the Secret level. Then, on 2 September, he had telephoned her to tell her of a planned deploy- ment of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons and to explain the ability of the United States to detect low- and medium-range missiles. On 12 September he called her again twice and disclosed information about the deployment of

U.S. early-warning radar systems in the Pacific Rim. She was also heard several times to tell Bishop that she did not want him to disclose classified information to her, and he would reply that he would not; but he did anyway, and she continued to ask him about his work.

In November 2012 the FBI searched Bishop’s home, and 12 secret docu- ments were discovered, including Defense Planning Guidance 2014–2018. Others were Optimizing U.S. Force Posture in the Asia-Pacific, U.S. Depart- ment of Defense China Strategy, and a classified photograph of a Chinese naval asset his lover had asked for.

On 5 February 2013 the woman asked Bishop to find out what Western nations knew about the operation of a particular Chinese naval asset, and although this was rather outside his usual sphere, he researched open and classified sources for the information. In doing so, he misrepresented himself to other U.S. government personnel as an active-duty army officer in order to gain access to the classified information.

In March 2014 Bishop pleaded guilty to various charges, and on 18 Sep- tember he was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

 

BLACK BAT SQUADRON. The Black Bat Squadron (Hei Bianfu Zhong- dui) was the name applied to the Taiwan Air Force’s 34th Squadron that was equipped by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with reconnais- sance aircraft and Taiwanese pilots at the height of the Cold War between 1953 and 1967. The squadron routinely overflew the mainland to drop agents and collect signals intelligence.

The squadron was supplied with the Douglas A-26C/B-26C, P2V-7/RB- 69A, C-54, C-123, C-130, the P-3A armed with Sidewinder air-to-air mis- siles, and the unarmed B-17G. Their mission was to fly at low altitude to evade hostile radar and air interception, while the P-3A was restricted to international airspace, at least 40 miles off the coast, to monitor signals traffic. Most flights took place at night from Hsinchu in northern Taiwan, earning the squadron its black bat symbol.

The squadron flew 838 missions with a loss of 148 crew, or two-thirds of the original squadron’s strength, and 15 aircraft. Some crewmen were cap- tured in mainland China and eventually returned to Taiwan, and the unit’s last overflight took place on 25 January 1967. Nevertheless, the Black Bats remained operational and conducted missions over Vietnam, participating between 1971 and 1972 in the CIA’s main street project that monitored North Vietnamese communications.

In March 2010 the ashes of five missing aircrew were interred at the Martyr’s Shrine near Taipei.

 

BLACK CAT SQUADRON. The Taiwan Air Force’s 35th Reconnaissance Squadron was known as the Black Cats (Hei Mao Zhongdui) and flew a total of 102 U-2 surveillance flights over the mainland between January 1962 and February 1972 while purporting to be undertaking high-altitude weather re- search.

Some 26 Taiwanese pilots completed training in the United States and conducted 220 missions, some over North Korea and North Vietnam. Alto- gether five U-2 aircraft were shot down over the mainland, with three aircrew killed and two taken prisoner. Another pilot was killed while flying a mission off China’s coast, and a further six were killed in training accidents that claimed seven aircraft. The flights were terminated shortly after President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972.

 

BLACKBIRD. From January 1966, the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird was the principal airborne platform deployed along the periphery of mainland Chi- nese airspace. This astonishing aircraft, 107 feet long and 56 feet wide, built mainly of a heat-resistant titanium alloy, flew at a speed of up to 2,600 mph at an altitude of over 100,000 feet, and during 20 years of operational service it proved invulnerable to attack, despite more than 1,000 attempts, most of them during the Vietnam War.

Equipped with long-range sensors and an oblique camera with a 30-inch focal length, the SR-71 produced an ultrathin 10,500-foot Kodak film strip containing 1,600 frames with a ground resolution of 12 inches. Each frame measured 73.3 inches by 4.5 inches, covering 72 nautical miles and giving a panoramic view of the ground below. In addition, the Blackbird carried a side-looking airborne synthetic aperture radar capable of collecting imagery from between 10 and 80 miles away in any weather, with a ground resolution of 10 feet. When configured for signals intelligence collection, the aircraft could hoover up traffic from a radius of 390 nautical miles.

Operated by the Ninth Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Beale Air Force Base near Marysville, California, but deployed to Kadena on Okinawa, Ja- pan, the Blackbird, of which 32 were built, made a major contribution to

intelligence collection operations conducted against mainland China, often without infringing on the country’s airspace. In June 1967, when the first hydrogen bomb was tested at Lop Nor, the event was photographed by an SR-71.

Almost as soon as SR-71 flights were detected, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun, began researching countermeasures, con- centrating on advanced laser weapons developed at the China Academy of Sciences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Me- chanics, Shanghai Guangxue Jingmi Jixie Yanjiu Suo, where laser nuclear fusion was studied by Deng Ximing and an alternative weapon effective at high altitude was pursued by Wang Zhijiang. However, by the time the aircraft was withdrawn from operations in 1998, no SR-71 had ever been lost to hostile action, although 12 crashed in accidents. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; SENIOR BOWL.

 

BOEING 767-300ER. In September 2002 technicians from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) discovered 27 listening devices installed in a Boe- ing 767-300ER that had been ordered by the China Aviation Supplies Import and Export Group Corporation, Zhongguo Hangkong Wuzi Jin Chukuo Jitu- an Gongsi (now the China Aviation Supplies Holding Company, Zhongguo Hangkong Wuzi Konggu Gongsi), as President Jiang Zemin’s personal air- craft and delivered the previous month. The plane, at a cost of $120 million, included a large bedroom suite with a shower room and a sitting area com- plete with a large television. The miniaturized, satellite-controlled equipment had been installed while the aircraft was undergoing a $15 million custom refit in San Antonio, Texas, by Dee Howard Aircraft Maintenance, Gore Design Completions, Rockwell Collins, and Avitra Aviation Services, super- vised by 75 PRC security officials.

The investigation into how the Chinese found the sophisticated hardware,

so quickly retrieved from the presidential bathroom and bedroom, led to a leak inquiry that would implicate a Los Angeles–based agent of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, Katrina Leung. The subsequent mole hunt, code-named PARLOR MAID by the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation (FBI), would conclude that Leung had compromised her FBI han- dlers and passed classified information to Beijing. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

BOURSICOT, BERNARD. A French diplomatic service officer, Bernard Boursicot was identified by a defector, Yu Qiangsheng, as the victim of a bizarre honeytrap in Beijing, where he had been posted to the French em- bassy in 1964 at the age of 20 as an accountant and had formed a relationship with an actor, Shi Peipu, a female impersonator who later claimed to have

borne him a child. She said the baby boy, Bertrand, had been sent to live with relatives in the north so as to avoid persecution during the Cultural Revolu- tion, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming. To maintain the illicit relationship, Boursicot was persuaded to bring embassy papers to Shi Peipu’s home, where they were copied by Ministry of State Security personnel. He was eventually introduced to the child in 1973 while on a visit to the People’s Republic of China, having resigned from the foreign service the previous year.

In 1975 Boursicot rejoined the foreign service and was posted to the con- sulate in New Orleans; then he was transferred to the French embassy in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, where he resumed his espionage so that he could continue his affair with Shi Peipu. Eventually he brought both to Paris in 1983, and Shi Peipu found work as an opera singer.

When Yu identified Boursicot, he was placed under observation by the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) and was found to be living with his son and the actress, who actually turned out to be a man. Under interrogation he admitted that the child had been bought from a family of Uighurs, an ethnic group from northeast China with Caucasian features. Boursicot, whose strange story was to become the subject of a book, Liaison; a play, M. Butterfly; and a movie, was sentenced in May 1986 to six years’ imprisonment, but he was released after having served four years. See also DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ EXTÉRIEURE (DGSE).

 

BOXER UPRISING. The first modern example of foreign intelligence col- lection in China, the Boxer Uprising of 1899 was suppressed by a large international force that relied on information supplied by missionaries, min- ing engineers, and businessmen working in the north of the country. The U.S. forces, deployed from the Philippines and led by Admiral Adna Chaffee, a veteran of the American Civil War and the Indian plains war, relieved the siege of Peking by entering the city through a weakly defended route iden- tified by a network of agents. Because of a perceived lack of detailed knowl- edge of the Chinese military, one of the first graduates of the U.S. Army War College, Ralph Van Deman, began a series of visits in 1906 to sketch Pe- king’s fortifications and defenses. Upon his return to Washington, D.C., having been withdrawn because of protests over his activities, Van Deman was appointed head of the U.S. General Staff’s mapping section and later was responsible for the creation of a military intelligence branch within the War Department.

 

BRITISH ARMY AID GROUP (BAAG). Operating from Hong Kong, the British Army Aid Group was established in March 1944 to give humanitarian aid to prisoners of the Japanese. It was under the command of an Australian

doctor, Lindsay Tasman Ride, who had escaped from Hong Kong and joined MI9, the Escape and Evasion Service. By May 1945, BAAG had provided assistance to 130 British and American personnel, 350 Indians, and several thousand Chinese and had sent missions deep into China to construct medical clinics, distribute rice, and offer famine relief. The BAAG also collected intelligence about the Japanese on the mainland for the local British Secret Intelligence Service station, the Inter-Services Liaison Department, and circulated pro-Allied propaganda until the conclusion of hostilities.

 

BU JIANJIE. In December 2018, reports emerged from within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that Bu Jianjie, the 64-year-old head of the China Shipbuilding Industries Corporations (CSIS), 718th Research Institute, Zhongguo Chuanbo Zhonggong Jituan Gongsi Di 718 Yanjiu Suo, had been arrested and expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Cen- tral Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of Chi- na, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, the high- est internal control institution within the CCP, in effect the foremost anticor- ruption body in China, released a statement: “Bu Jianjie violated organiza- tional discipline, obtained Canadian citizenship in violation of regulations, and failed to report personal matters.” Bu was also accused of business malpractice, embezzlement, and taking bribes.

CSIS is one of the two largest shipbuilding conglomerates in China and is

totally owned by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, Guowuyuan Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guan- li Weiyuanhui. The CSIS is responsible for shipbuilding in the north and west of China, and the 718th Research Institute, located in Handan, Hebei Prov- ince, is a state-owned research and development institute. Bu is reported to have been intimately involved in research on China’s submarine program and was involved in fueling systems for the air-independent propulsion technolo- gy that allows conventional submarines to stay submerged for long periods and produce less noise than nuclear-powered submarines. The 718th Re- search Institute makes hydrogen for submarine fuel cells as well as other high-energy fuels such as lithium sulfur hexafluoride, which can be used to power torpedoes or unmanned underwater vehicles. According to current assessments, China is expected to have 11 nuclear and 6 conventional sub- marines by 2020.

Originally from Hebei Province, Bu studied, after the Cultural Revolution,

at the Harbin Engineering University, Harbin Gongcheng Daxue, one of China’s foremost universities for engineering and marine-related projects. According to the official Hebei Worker’s Daily, Hebei Gongren Ribao, Bu spent part of 1996 as a visiting scholar at Canada’s University of Western Ontario and Queens University and upon his return said that he had been asked to remain in Canada, although Canadian officials have not commented

on the claims made by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that Bu had obtained Canadian citizenship and had concealed that information from the CCP, a violation of Chinese law.

Bu has not been accused of spying, but besides being expelled from the CCP, his retirement benefits have been canceled and his case transferred to the Hebei Provincial People’s Procuratorate, Hebei Xing Renmin Jianchayu- an, for prosecution. Bu’s case follows that of Sun Bo, the general manager of CSIS who was arrested on 17 December on similar charges.

 

C

CALDWELL, OLIVER J. One of the first representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in China and fluent in Mandarin, the Fuchou di- alect, and Japanese, Oliver Caldwell acted as a liaison officer with the Kuo- mintang but found his organization rejected by General Joseph Stilwell’s staff in India. Upon his return to Chongqing, he was to develop a close relationship with Tai Li, as he later documented in his 1972 memoirs, A Secret War: Americans in China, 1944–1945. See also DIXIE MISSION.

 

CAMPCON. In 1996 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted an inquiry code-named CAMPCON into political campaign contributions to the Democratic Party from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The inves- tigation, assisted by Katrina Leung, code-named PARLOR MAID, had been prompted by events that followed inaccurate political forecasting made about the 1980 election by Cao Quisheng, then first secretary of the political sec- tion of the PRC’s embassy in Washington, D.C. Having assured Beijing that the incumbent, President Jimmy Carter, would be reelected, Cao had been embarrassed when Carter was defeated in a landslide by Ronald Reagan.

Following this failure, the PRC made a concerted effort to compete with Taiwan for influence on Capitol Hill and at the White House and by 1996 had begun to make cash donations to the Democrats and to President Bill Clinton, who had been befriended by Yah Lin “Charlie” Trie, the owner of a Chinese restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, where I. C. Smith was the FBI special agent in charge. Born in Taiwan, Trie had emigrated to the United States in 1974 and eventually acquired citizenship. After making a large donation to Clinton in 1996, Trie wrote to the president expressing concern about American policy and tensions arising from the PRC’s military exer- cises being conducted near Taiwan. In response, Clinton directed a National Security Council staffer to reply.

Another Chinese who attempted to exercise influence over the Clinton White House, investigated during CAMPCON, was John Huang, who had been born in China but raised in Taiwan after the Communist takeover in 1949. He emigrated to the United States in 1969 and became a citizen seven

 

41

years later. After graduating from university, Huang met two Indonesians, Mochtar and James Riady, who headed the Lippo Group, and he later worked for them when they bought out a local bank in Arkansas. He later moved to Los Angeles, but after Clinton’s election in 1992, he lobbied for a post in the administration on the basis of his links to Clinton and his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

In 1993 Huang was appointed deputy assistant secretary for international economic affairs, having received a $750,000 severance package from the Lippo Group. Two years later, Huang moved to a fund-raising position at the Democratic National Committee (DNC). When he was later interviewed by Department of Commerce investigators, Huang refused to answer questions 2,000 times, citing his Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate himself, when asked if he was acting as an agent of the PRC military.

Another suspect interrogated during CAMPCON was Ng Lap Seng (the Cantonese romanization, used in Macao instead of the Mandarin romaniza- tion, Wu Lixing), who owned extensive real estate holdings in Texas, Hong Kong, and Macao and was the business partner of Wang Jun, chairman of one of the PRC’s largest financial conglomerates and who also headed a leading arms firm. Ng also became a political contributor after Charlie Trie first helped him purchase and renovate an old hotel in Little Rock. Ng gave the DNC $15,000 shortly after he had formed a company, Sin Kin Yip Inc., and later said that he believed that giving contributions to Clinton and the Democrats would ensure that he would have access to U.S. markets. Later, Trie introduced Wang Jun to President Clinton at the White House. At the time, Wang was chairman of Poly Technologies, Baoli Keji, a weapons man- ufacturer affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army’s Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Jie- fangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui. His father, Wang Zhen, was a hard-liner in Beijing who advocated crushing the pro-democracy movement during the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989.

The FBI later established that between 1994 and 1996 Trie received more

than $900,000 in wire transfers from Ng and that there was a correlation between the wire transfers and Trie’s contributions to the DNC. On one occasion, Trie showed up with $460,000 in $1,000 contributions, some on sequentially numbered money orders made out in different names but with the same handwriting. On another occasion, Trie sat at a fund-raising event with Ng at the same table as President Clinton, after Trie had made a

$100,000 contribution.

Another suspect was Johnny Chung, who was found to have made 49 visits to the Clinton White House between 1994 and 1996 and to have donat- ed $366,000 to the DNC. Chung later told federal investigators that $35,000 of the money he had donated came from the PRC’s military intelligence, and he testified to a U.S. House of Representatives committee that he had been

introduced to the then head of the Second Department of the People’s Libera- tion Army General Staff, Jiefangjun Di Er Ju Zong Canmou Bu (now the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Jun- shi Weiyuanhui Canmou Bu), Major General Ji Shengde. According to Chung, Ji promised to give $300,000 for Clinton’s reelection, an assertion later denied by the PRC.

In June 1999, Ji was removed from his post after being involved in a smuggling scandal in Fujian Province and was sentenced to death, but he later received a commuted sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.

In total of 22 suspects, including Huang, Trie, and Chung, were convicted of various crimes relating to CAMPCON, and some others fled abroad. Several congressional committees pursued the issue, among them the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, chaired by Republican senator Fred Thompson, before whom I. C. Smith testified concerning the obstacles the FBI overcame to pursue the investigation.

 

CANADA. Responsibility for investigating and countering Chinese espion- age in Canada lies with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), although the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) pursues criminal mat- ters concerning the theft of industrial and commercial secrets. Chinese diplo- matic representation includes an embassy in Ottawa and consulates in Cal- gary, Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, where diplomats have reportedly harassed members of Falun Gong and other dissident groups.

Vancouver in particular has a large ethnic Chinese population, amounting to half a million in a city of about 2.5 million residents, making up the largest single ethnic group. Canada, as a member of the Five Eyes intelligence- sharing alliance, has largely been a consumer of intelligence relating to Chi- na and has avoided any confrontation of consequence with the Chinese until the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer, in Vancouver in November 2018 on a warrant issued in New York. Thereafter relations between the two countries declined, and in June 2019 a pair of Chinese Su-30 aircraft buzzed the HMCS Regina in international waters east of Shanghai, coming within 300 meters of the ship, the first such action taken by the Chinese navy toward a Canadian ship.

Demonstrably, Canada is now faced with new challenges regarding the Chinese. It has a large ethnic Chinese population and has encouraged immi- gration from China in the past. The Chinese diplomatic presence is well represented, and with the new antagonistic relationship with China, CSIS in particular is tasked with developing a strategic plan that will result in a more aggressive approach to Chinese espionage within its own borders. See also CHEN YONGLIN; HAO FENGUNG; HAN GUANGSHENG; INDUSTRI- AL ESPIONAGE; HANSON, HAROLD DEWITT.

CANBERRA EMBASSY. In April 1995, after five weeks of litigation over a government injunction to prevent publication of a story alleged to have national security implications, the Australian media revealed that a long- term technical surveillance operation had been conducted against the Peo- ple’s Republic of China’s newly constructed embassy in Canberra and had provided the West’s signals intelligence community with a hugely valuable source of information. Reportedly some 30 linguists had been employed to process the recorded conversations, and the access included a clandestine video feed that had been inserted into the building during construction. Pre- mature disclosure instantly terminated the project.

 

CATHAY PACIFIC. On 22 July 1954 a Cathay Pacific DC-4 flying from Bangkok to Hong Kong was attacked by La-9 Fritz fighter near Hainan Island, killing 10 of the 18 passengers and crew. When the USS Philippine Sea launched two U.S. Navy AD-4 Skyraiders to search for survivors, they were attacked by a pair of La-7 Fins. More carrier-borne planes were then launched, which shot down the mainland Chinese fighters. See also AIR- BORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CENTRAL BUREAU 610. According to the testimony of a defector, Chen Yonglin, formerly the first secretary at the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) consulate in Sydney, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui, created a spe- cial office in July 1999 to supervise the Falun Gong issue, which later became the Department of External Security Affairs, and then Central Bu- reau 610, Zhongyang Ju 610.

Evidence related to the bureau’s activities was released by the federal German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) following an investiga- tion conducted in the recruitment in 2005 by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, of an academic, a Chinese immigrant who had been a German citizen since the 1990s. The individual had applied for a visa at the Berlin embassy to visit his sick father but instead had been questioned about his Falun Gong membership. He was invited in March 2006 to a further meeting at a Berlin hotel with PRC officials named only as “Xiaohua Zapatero” and “Bin C.” In October 2009 the academic’s home in Lower Saxony was raided by the BfV seeking evidence that since September 2008 he had forwarded all material distributed to Falun Gong’s mailing list to an email address located just outside Shanghai. Although the academic pleaded innocence, he was informed that the two men he had met in Berlin were not researchers but senior MSS officials working for Central Bureau 610 who

were under BfV surveillance at the time. He was also accused of having opened a GMX email account in January 2009 to receive Falun Gong circu- lars and of having shared the password access with the MSS.

 

CENTRAL CASE EXAMINATION GROUP (CCEG). During the Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjeji Wenhua Dageming, the Cen- tral Case Examination Group, Zhongyang Anjian Shencha Zu, was headed by Kang Sheng for the purpose of investigating “anti-party activities.” Estab- lished in 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, its members included Premier Zhou Enlai and Wang Dongxing, who headed Mao Ze- dong’s security unit. With unchecked power and unfettered by legal process- es, the CCEG began to take on political opponents, including Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, which was the last such investigation conducted by the CCEG before it was disbanded in 1978. See also MINISTRY OF STATE SECUR- ITY (MSS).

 

CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION (CCDI).

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, is the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) most powerful investigatory agency. The CCDI is responsible for eliminating corruption within the CCP’s mem- bership and is not externally accountable to the police, the judiciary, or any other institution. Created in 1949 on a model established in 1927, the CCDI was dormant during the period of the Cultural Revolution (Great Proletar- ian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjienji Wenhua Dageming) but was reconsti- tuted in 1978 and headed by Chen Yun. Chen is considered to be one of the CCP’s Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchan- dang De Ba Wei Chang Lao, and in the 1980s and 1990s was considered the second most powerful person in China next to Deng Xiaoping. The CCDI is based in an anonymous walled compound that accommodates two 10-story buildings in Beijing’s Ping’anli district. The compound is protected by a high wall and armed guards.

The CCDI consists of 20 departments, eight of which conduct investiga-

tions in specific parts of the economy, including the ministries and state- owned business, and the government. Each of the eight principal directors has the power to authorize telephone and email intercepts, and they rely on the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, to provide the technical resources required. Previously the CCDI had depended on the Min- istry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, to conduct wiretaps, but this arrangement had led to too many leaks. It is rumored that many suspects taken into indefinite custody, or shuang gui (double rule), commit suicide.

Theoretically the secretary of the CCDI, who serves a five-year term, is directed by a CCP committee, which sets priorities and targets. Once an inquiry has been initiated, a review is performed three months later to deter- mine whether further investigation is warranted.

The CCDI has a reputation for exercising independence and pursuing indi- viduals such as those known as the princelings, thought to enjoy high-level protection. Although some princelings enjoy immunity in Beijing, that privi- lege does not always extend to the other cities and provinces, and some parents have endured incarceration for the crimes of their children.

The CCDI itself has not been immune from corruption. Zeng Jinchun, the organization’s most senior officer in Chenzhou, Hunan Province, between 1997 and 2006, was accused with his wife and children of having received

31.5 million yuan in bribes from the construction and mining industries and for failing to explain the source of assets worth another 28.77 million yuan. In August 2009 he was sentenced to death in Changsha. Also implicated was Li Dalan, the local Party chief in Chenzhou who received a suspended death sentence, and 158 other officials and businessmen. Similarly, Wang Huayan, the CCDI leader in Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces between 1998 and 2009, where he had also been the CCDI’s influential Party secretary, was also accused of having abused his power to amass a fortune. To save his life he has cooperated with the authorities, expressed public remorse, and public- ly urged people to denounce corruption, saying “transparency is the best method of fighting corruption.”

Details of the CCDI’s activities are rarely publicized, although Black Box, written anonymously by three authors describing themselves as “no ordinary Chinese” and published in Hong Kong, has documented high-echelon cor- ruption and the CCDI’s interventions. Given Xi Jinping’s virtually total con- trol of the CCP, there are indications that the CCDI is being used to exact political retribution from would-be rivals to his power. The current secretary of the CCDI is Zhao Leji, aged 62, who was elevated to his term in October 2017 and is a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee.

 

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS (CDSA). The origi-

nal intelligence branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Central Department of Social Affairs, Zhongyang Shehui Shiwu Si, was founded in 1939 and was headed by Kang Sheng. It provided the Party leadership with information largely drawn from foreign news agencies and open sources.

During the Yan’an period, the CDSA provided the CCP leadership with reports on the world situation and on the major events and issues taking place abroad. These efforts were based on news reports from foreign press agen- cies and a limited number of foreign newspapers and books. During the conflict with the Kuomintang in the post–World War II Chinese Civil War between 1946 and 1949, the CDSA’s intelligence was considered pivotal to

the final victory. After the CCP had consolidated state power, the intelli- gence system played an increasingly important role, and the CDSA’s head, Li Kenong, was appointed head of the renamed Central Investigation De- partment formed in 1953, and the CDSA was dissolved. However, both the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, can trace their roots to the CDSA.

 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). Created in 1947 by the

National Security Act in succession to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Group, the CIA fulfilled its mission to collect intelligence about mainland China, principally from stations in Hong Kong and Taipei, Taiwan. After the Communist victory in 1949, the CIA relied on personnel operating under nonofficial cover, but in April 1951 the danger of this strategy was demonstrated when Hugh Redmond was arrested in Shanghai and endured 19 years of harsh imprisonment before he died, protesting his innocence to the end.

With limited resources in the Far East, largely because of the hostility of General Douglas MacArthur, the CIA’s reporting after the outbreak of the Korean War was very poor, although George E. Aurell, the station chief in Tokyo, relayed a warning from a Chinese Nationalist officer in Manchuria that 300,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were concentrated close to the Korean border. One of Aurell’s subordinates at the three-man station, Bill Duggan, based in the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet base at Yokosuka, predicted that the Chinese would cross the Yalu River and intervene, but he was ignored. Similarly, a CIA officer in Taiwan, Bob Myers, relayed reports from his Nationalist contacts that the PLA was moving north to the Manchu- rian border, but they were ignored by MacArthur’s intelligence staff.

On 20 October 1950, four days after the first Chinese troops had joined the conflict, the CIA concluded that the soldiers had been deployed to protect local Chinese hydroelectric plants and on 28 October insisted that the forces were merely “scattered volunteers.” Two days later, as hundreds of thou- sands of PLA troops engaged American ground forces, a CIA assessment suggested that a major Chinese invasion was unlikely.

Increasingly allied with the Kuomintang (KMT), the CIA established a large station in Taiwan, which would be headed by the formidable Dr. Ray Cline and staffed by some 600 personnel, some of whom worked under semitransparent Western Enterprises commercial cover. Through Chiang Kai-shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo, the CIA attempted to develop a “Third Force” on the mainland during the Korean War by sponsoring Nationalist guerrilla groups and frequent raids intended to harass the Communists. In parallel, the CIA also monitored Taiwan’s clandestine nuclear bomb project and recruited an agent, Colonel Chang Hsien-yi, within it.

As part of a plan to support Tibetan nationalists, the CIA sponsored and trained a guerrilla force, having established a training facility at Camp Hale in Colorado, but the campaign was suppressed with ruthless efficiency by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and was eventually abandoned because of political expediency and concern about hostile penetration of the groups of volunteers.

The CIA’s first station in Beijing was opened in 1973 following the ap- pointment of Jim Lilley as station chief, and thereafter the relationship pros- pered with a formal agreement to exchange intelligence collected about the Soviets from intercept sites established in Xinjiang.

As well as collecting information about the PRC’s military capability, the CIA monitored Beijing’s activities as a major weapons proliferator, supply- ing nuclear and missile technology to other countries, including North Ko- rea, Iran, and Pakistan. In 1997 the CIA reported that

during the last half of 1996, China was the most significant supplier of weapons of mass destruction goods and technology to foreign countries. The Chinese provided a tremendous variety of assistance to both Iran’s and Pakistan’s ballistic missile programs. China was also the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting period.

 

That the CIA was considered an important target by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, is demonstrated by the very considerable investment made in the skilled cultivation and management of the Directo- rate of Intelligence analyst Larry Wu-tai Chin. Chin, who was detailed to assist in interviewing People’s Liberation Army soldiers who had been cap- tured or surrendered during the Korean War, would return to Hong Kong and provide the names of those cooperating with the United States to his han- dler, Ou Qiming. When those soldiers were repatriated, they were arrested and invariably killed.

The MSS’s interest in penetrating the CIA is demonstrated by the time and effort given to the recruitment of Glenn Duffie Shriver and directing him to gain employment with the CIA.

The CIA’s traditional answer to the Chinese challenge has been to adopt a generous open-door policy toward defectors to encourage other potential line crossers to seek asylum in return for supplying information.

In recent years, the CIA was rocked by the compromise of virtually all its human source contacts inside China and the arrest of a recently retired CIA operations officer, Jerry Chung Shing Lee, by the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation in January 2018. While the damage assessment of Lee’s cooperation with the Chinese has not been released, it is clear that the damage was overwhelming and brought into question how such a low-ranking individual could have such access to a wide range of the CIA’s assets. There has been

disagreement within the U.S. Intelligence Community as to the cause of the compromise of the CIA’s assets in China, with some taking the position that the agency’s computer systems had been penetrated, while others lay the blame squarely on Lee.

The internal turmoil has been compounded by President Donald Trump’s questioning of the value of human source intelligence and his disdain for intelligence collection in general. The CIA is believed to have over 20,000 employees, with an enhanced budget over the past few years, in part due to the greater emphasis on the China target.

The current head of the CIA is Gina Cheri Haspel, aged 63, who was appointed in May 2018 to succeed Mike Pompeo, who was moved to the State Department. Haspel, who has 30 years of CIA experience and twice headed the London station, is the agency’s first female head. She had also supervised a “black site” in Thailand where enhanced interrogation tech- niques were applied to terrorist detainees. See also CIRCUS; CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT); NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); SINO- SOVIET SPLIT; TIBET; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CENTRAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT (CID). The Central In-

vestigation Department, Zhongyang Diaocha Bu, has its origins in a proposal by Yang Shangkun to Zhou Enlai in March 1955 to establish a research department, separate from that of the military, to report directly to the Chi- nese Communist Party’s Central Committee. In what was reportedly a meet- ing held late at night in the office of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou agreed to the estab- lishment of the CID, and this decision was approved by Mao Zedong in April of that year, with Li Kenong its first head.

The CID, which was established to provide strategic intelligence for eco- nomic, military, and the CCP leadership’s strategic decision making, was little known inside China itself.

The CID remained intact until the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, at which time it was abolished and its duties absorbed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), General Staff Department (GSD), Second Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu, Di Er Bu, in June 1969. The CID was reconstituted in the post–Cultural Revolution period until its duties were absorbed by the newly formed Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, in 1983.

 

CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION. The Central Military Commis- sion (CMC), Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui, actually consists of two parallel groups: the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui, and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin

Gongheguo Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui. The former is a Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) organ, and the latter is a state organ under the National People’s Congress. Membership of both bodies consists of the same individ- uals, in effect a single institution under two different names. As a result, Xi Jinping chairs both commissions as general secretary of the CCP and what is in effect the paramount leader of the PRC itself.

The CMC has control over almost 7 million personnel, and virtually all its members are senior generals, though the most important posts are held by senior members of the CCP to ensure absolute control of the group and their loyalty to the CCP and the survival of the PRC itself.

The CMC provides direction on all matters involving the PLA, including appointments of senior personnel; deployments of troops of the PLA army, navy, and air force groups; and arms spending.

 

CHAN TEK FEI. Employed as a linguist at the British Government Com- munications Headquarters (GCHQ) signals intelligence base at Little Sai Wan in Hong Kong, Chan Tek Fei was arrested in 1961 following an osten- sibly routine customs search and charged with espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic of China. Allegedly he was found to be carrying classified documents, lists of GCHQ personnel with descriptions of their vulnerabil- ities, and details of an affair between his wife and a senior GCHQ officer, who was promptly transferred. See also GREAT BRITAIN.

 

CHANG FEN. The alias of a defector from the Soviet KGB, Chang Fen was granted political asylum at John F. Kennedy Airport in late December 1982. Born in China, he had escaped to Alma Ata, where he was imprisoned for having crossed the frontier, but he was recruited while in captivity by the KGB as an illegal. Sent on a mission to Mauritius with a Canadian passport, Chang took a TWA flight to New York, without any luggage, and surren- dered to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He spent Christmas with Ed Worthington, an FBI special agent, at his home in Pennsylvania and then was flown to Florida for a lengthy debriefing in a warm climate.

His defection was kept secret, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arranged for another Chinese agent to maintain contact with the KGB and appear at a rendezvous in Nairobi. This ploy was intended to identify Soviet intelligence personnel and expose KGB activities in the region.

When eventually the deception was terminated, the KGB assigned a senior security officer, Vitali Yurchenko, the task of determining what had hap- pened to the illegal who had disappeared. As Yurchenko admitted while being debriefed in the United States in September 1985, following his defec- tion, he had concluded that the agent had been compromised in Kenya be- cause of a passport problem but had not actually defected. In 1988 the Read-

er’s Digest writer John Barron published a sanitized account of the case, The Spy Who Would Be Free, omitting details of the CIA’s lengthy double-agent stratagem.

 

CHANG HSIEN-YI. In December 1987 the deputy director of Taiwan’s Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) sought political asylum in the United States and disclosed details to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the country’s clandestine nuclear weapons development program. According to Colonel Chang, the INER, an ostensibly civilian organization, had been diverting plutonium into a military project for years and had evaded inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Colonel Chang had been recruited by the CIA when he was a military cadet and had supplied information to his handlers for more than 20 years. His documenta- tion provided absolute proof of Taiwan’s covert bomb project, which had been monitored by the CIA’s Rob Simmons during the early 1970s.

Under intense diplomatic pressure, the Taipei government undertook to suspend the program permanently, while Beijing declared that possession of nuclear weapons would be a legitimate reason for an attack on the island.

 

CHANG, THERESA. On 21 June 2007 Theresa Chang pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements related to the export to Taiwan of nickel powder, a commodity controlled because of its nuclear application, without an export license. On 11 October 2007 she was sentenced in the Northern District of California to three years’ probation and fined $5,000. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CHAO FU. Formerly a security officer at the People’s Republic of China embassy in Stockholm, and married with a child, 27-year-old Chao Fu be- came increasingly disillusioned with the contrast between his life in China and the comparative wealth and freedom of Sweden. He tried to defect to the local American embassy but could not find anyone who spoke Mandarin. He had already decided that the neutral Swedes would not help him, so he planned to leave the country. However, after he had come under the suspi- cion of colleagues and was confined to his room, he managed to slip away and take the keys to the embassy Chrysler. He then drove into the Swedish countryside and, following a series of misadventures, walked and hitchhiked to the U.S. embassy in Bonn, where in August 1962 he applied for political asylum. By Christmas Chao had been resettled in the United States.

CHAO TAH WEI. In March 2008 Chao Tah Wei, a 53-year-old resident of Beijing and a naturalized U.S. citizen, ordered 10 thermal imaging cameras from FLIR Systems Inc. for $53,000, and the following month he was ar- rested, along with Guo Zigong, a Beijing resident aged 49, as they attempted to smuggle them onto a Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), Zhongguo Minyong Hangkong Ju, flight from Los Angeles International Air- port to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Under interrogation by the Export and Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement (EAGLE) team, he admitted having smuggled three other cameras to the PRC in October 2007 for Guo, the director of a Beijing engineering company. Chao pleaded guilty to charges of violating the export ban on the equipment and gave evidence at the weeklong trial of Guo, who was convicted in February 2009. Chao was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment, and Guo received 60 months. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CHARBATIA. In 1962, following border clashes with the People’s Repub- lic of China, the Indian government, having been refused help bym the So- viet Union, appealed to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assis- tance in monitoring People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movements across the frontier. Agreement was reached for the temporary deployment of U-2 aircraft at Charbatia, near Cuttack, having been flown in from Cubi Point in the Philippines. Between May and December 1964 several missions were flown successfully over the People’s Republic of China and Tibet. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CHEN WENQING. Chen Wenqing was born in 1960 in Sichuan Province and was a student at the Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Xinan Zhengfa Daxue, in Chongqing between 1980 and 1984. He was em- ployed by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, upon gradua- tion and by 1990 had been promoted as the MPS’s deputy director in Leshan, Sichuan Province. In 1992 he was appointed director, then MPS deputy director for Sichuan Province, a post he held until 2002. He also served as deputy director-general of the People’s Government between 1998 and 2001. The following year he was named procurator of the Provincial People’s Procuratorate, an organization that has authority for both the investigation and prosecution of crimes in the individual provinces.

From 2003 to 2008 Chen was a deputy to the 10th National People’s Congress, Di Shi Jie Quanguo Renmin Diabiao Dahui, China’s national legislature. He was also, from 2006 to 2011, secretary for the Chinese Com- munist Party’s (CCP) provincial committee in Fujian Province, serving on the Commission for Discipline Inspection.

Between 2007 and 2012, Chen was first a member, then the deputy secre- tary of the 17th CCP Central Committee, Central Commission for Disci- pline Inspection (CCDI), of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchangdang Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, the CCP’s highest internal control institution. He was then the CCDI’s youngest member ever and served under Commission Chairman Wang Qishan, helping to lead a massive anticorruption campaign against senior CCP members in which more than 100 were purged, including Zhou Yongkang, once secretary of the then Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Zhongyang Zheng- zhi Falu Shiwu Weiyuanhui, and former head of the Ministry of State Se- curity (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu.

Chen continued to be promoted to important posts and was named as a delegate to the 17th National Congress (2007–2012); deputy secretary of the Fujian Province Provincial Committee (2011–2016); delegate to the 18th National Congress; and first as a member, then deputy secretary of the Cen- tral Committee’s CCDI. In November 2016 he was promoted head of the MSS, an appointment signifying the confidence of Party chairman and presi- dent Xi Jinping.

 

CHEN YONGLIN. On 26 May 2005, Chen Yonglin, the 38-year-old first secretary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) consulate in Sydney, Australia, defected, followed a few days later by Hao Fengung, described as a “low-ranking” Chinese intelligence officer. Formerly a university stu- dent in Beijing during the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, Chen had joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991 and later claimed that his father had died after being tortured during the Cultural Revolution, Wu- chanjieji Wenhua Dageming.

Before his defection, Chen had been in covert contact with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Australian Security Intelligence Organ- ization (ASIO). Chen claimed that his duties included monitoring Chinese dissidents in Australia, especially members of the Falun Gong. Chen and Hao insisted that the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, had hundreds of spies and informants in both Australia and Canada whose responsibility was to both harass Falun Gong members as well as steal com- mercial and scientific secrets. However, Hao’s assertion that the Chinese had thousands of spies in Canada was disputed by Michael Juneau-Katsuya, a former Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) officer, who drew a distinction between agents and sources, saying that Hao’s claim was likely referring to paid informants and that he found that figure to be entirely plausible. This retiree also said that CSIS had estimated that Canada lost $12 billion annually due to Chinese industrial espionage.

Fearing his abduction, Chen, his wife, and his six-year-old daughter went into hiding, but he emerged briefly to address a rally in Sydney to com- memorate the 16th anniversary of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massa- cre. He was granted a permanent protection visa about six weeks after his defection, together with Hao, on 21 July 2005. Chen appeared before the

U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations to give evidence on “Falun Gong and China’s Continuing War on Human Rights.” Chen testified, “I am aware there are over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants in Australia, and the number in the United States should not be less.” He also revealed the existence of Central Bureau 610, Zhongyang Ju 610, and produced an inter- nal consular document, Five Poisonous Groups, Wu Ge Youdu Tuanti, which identified Falun Gong members, Tibetan separatists, Uighur activists, Tai- wanese independence supporters, and pro-democracy campaigners as targets for surveillance and harassment. Later the same year he gave further evi- dence to parliamentary committees in Brussels and London about human rights in the PRC. See also TAIWAN; TIBET.

 

CHENG, PHILIP. On 3 December 2007, Philip Cheng, aged 60 of Cuperti- no, California, was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and fined $50,000 for illegally exporting a night-vision camera and related technology to the People’s Republic of China. Cheng was originally indicted in 2004 for viola- tions of the federal Arms Export Control Act and three counts of money laundering, and his guilty plea on 31 October 2006 followed trials in Febru- ary and March 2006, which had ended in hung juries.

According to the prosecution, Cheng conspired with Martin Shih, the own- er of Night Vision Technology, who died shortly before the indictment. Documents seized from Cheng’s home and his trash bins revealed that the two men had entered into agreements to export thermal imaging and infrared technology to the PRC. During an interview with federal agents in June 2003, Cheng acknowledged that he had acted as Night Vision Technology’s agent with PRC entities and that he was “probably wrong” to have trans- ferred a Panther I camera to the North China Research Institute of Electro- Optics (NCRIEO), Huabei Guangdian Yanjiu Suo, established in 1956, where research into infrared and lasers is conducted, and the state-owned China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), Zhong- guo Dianzi Jin Chukou Zong Gongsi, which was sanctioned in 2006–2008 for violation of the Iran, North Korea, Syria Nonproliferation Act. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

CHEUNG, MARK. Identified as a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guo- jia Anquanbu, officer, Mark Cheung was a theology graduate and Roman Catholic priest who had run a parish in Southeast Asia before he began working at the Church of the Transfiguration on Mott Street in New York’s Chinatown in 1972. Alleged to have had a wife and child in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Cheung was thought to have been sent to the United States to act as a case officer for Larry Wu-tai Chin. When Chin was arrested, Cheung quickly left New York for Hong Kong, but soon after he was interviewed there by special agents Pat Dolley and Larry Goff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), he disappeared into the PRC and has not surfaced since. See also ILLEGALS.

 

CHI MAK. In October 2005 a 66-year-old retired power engineer, Chi Mak, was arrested at his home in Los Angeles and charged with having passed defense secrets to the PRC for the past 20 years. A naturalized U.S. citizen of Chinese origin, Chi Mak worked for a defense contractor, Power Paragon, and was charged with having compromised thousands of documents, includ- ing plans of the new DD(X) warship and developments in the sensitive field of quiet electric drive (QED). Also arrested were his wife, Rebecca Liu-wa Chu, and his brother Tai Wang Mak and his wife, Fuk Heung Li; his nephew Billy Chi Mak, a lead engineer on QED research, had also been under sur- veillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) since June 2004, an operation that accumulated transcripts of 20,000 telephone calls, recordings of conversa- tions held in Chi Mak’s 1998 Oldsmobile, and videos from his office in Anaheim and two rooms in his home.

Among the evidence seized was a CD-ROM containing 200 restricted

documents encrypted and hidden beneath music tracks. The topics covered by the documents included QED applications for the new Virginia-class submarines, kinetic energy missiles for submarines, torpedo designs, electro- magnetic launch systems for aircraft carriers, and missile detection equip- ment. Of particular concern to the investigation was the apparent loss of details concerning the AEGIS radar system, technology that had been sup- plied to several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) navies as well as to Japan and Taiwan. In his confession, Mak admitted that prior to 2001 he had regularly traveled to Hong Kong to deliver material to his brother Tai Wang Mak, who had then been living in the PRC.

Found guilty at his trial in May 2007, Chi Mak was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment and a fine of $50,000. The following month, Billy Mak and Fuk Li pleaded guilty and were deported, with Billy receiving credit for the 11 months he had spent in prison awaiting trial, while Tai Wang Mak re- ceived 10 years’ imprisonment.

During Chi Mak’s trial in May 2007, the FBI revealed that a search of his Los Angeles apartment had revealed a letter written by Gu Weihao, an agent of the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China, Zhongguo Hang- kong Gongye Jituan Gongsi, to a former Boeing engineer, Greg Chung, asking him to collect data on commercial airliners and the space shuttle and then pass the information to Chi Mak, who would relay it to China. Gu was related to Chi Mak’s wife and supplied her with letters to Chung. Also found in Mak’s apartment were documents relating to the F-16 Falcon fighter and the space shuttle, items that were out of Mak’s field of expertise and had most likely been provided by Chung. See also CHINA NATIONAL NU- CLEAR CORPORATION (CNNC); CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CHI TONG KUOK. On 17 June 2009, Chi Tong Kuok, a citizen of Macau, was arrested in Atlanta, Georgia, while he was in transit for Panama, where he was to meet undercover federal agents who intended to seize controlled technology. The arrest was the result of a lengthy sting operation conducted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).

Kuok was escorted back to San Diego, California, where he was indicted for attempts to acquire on eBay sensitive defense technology used to encrypt American military and government communications and then export the items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He was also charged with conspiracy to export defense articles and smuggle goods from the United States and with money laundering. According to the prosecution, Kuok negotiated with undercover agents to obtain PRC-148 radios, a multiband transceiver used by U.S. Special Forces, and the key required to operate the cryptographic functions on a KG-175 Taclane Encryptor, a sophisticated piece of electronic equipment used to encrypt classified communications on military networks.

In 2006 Kuok had approached a contact in the defense industry in search of software for a VDC-300 airborne data controller, a device that secures satellite communications from American military aircraft. The contact re- ferred Kuok to an undercover agent in San Diego who began to negotiate with Kuok about a shopping list of military technology that grew to 43 items, ranging from a GPS receiver with anti-spoofing defenses to the AN/CYZ-10 crypto key management device developed by the National Security Agency (NSA). Despite frequently expressing fears that he might be dealing with someone working for the NSA, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Kuok continued to negotiate, and in March 2008 he paid $8,000, channeled through Western Union, for two PRC-148 radios, shipping them to his address in Macao. Later, using a

Yahoo! email address and a different name, Kuok attempted to purchase the KG-175 Taclane, but the company refused to ship the item; however, it did allow an investigator to negotiate on its behalf.

Kuok, who had used the aliases Edison Kuok, Yoko Chong, Yoko Kawa- saki, and others, told investigators that he had been “acting at the direction of officials of the People’s Republic of China” and that “he and PRC officials had sought the items to figure out ways to listen to or monitor U.S. govern- ment and military communications.”

At his trial in San Diego in March 2010, Kuok’s attorney asserted that his client’s attempt to acquire restricted technology had been coerced by PRC officials, but after the defense failed to offer a witness to support this claim, he was found guilty. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

CHIANG CHING-KUO. Born in 1910, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo was educated in Shanghai and then at the newly estab- lished Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow where he denounced his father’s April 1927 White Terror in Shanghai, when the Communists were purged. In exile in the Soviet Union, he attended a military academy and married a Russian before becoming a manager of a heavy machinery factory in Sverd- lovsk. In 1937 he returned to Nanking via Hong Kong, gradually gained his father’s trust within the Kuomintang (KMT), and in August 1949 was ap- pointed head of the KMT’s intelligence services. He merged the notorious Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics with Tai Li’s Military Bureau of Investigation and Statistics to create the Reference Group of the Presiden- tial Palace’s Confidential Office, an organization that he headed for 25 years. “CCK,” as he was known to his Western friends, cultivated the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), on whom he came to rely, as a lifelong diabetic, for his supply of insulin.

Elected prime minister in succession to his father, Chiang became presi-

dent six years later, but in October 1984 he was implicated in California in the murder of his biographer, Henry Liu. The following year he announced that the dynasty was over by posting his son Alex to Singapore as Taiwan’s trade commissioner. Chiang died in January 1988, aged 77. His son died in July 1991, aged 46.

 

CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Born in Zhejiang in 1887, Chiang pursued a military career and embraced the politics of Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang party (KMT) in its attempts to overthrow the imperial dynasty that ruled China. In 1912, when the Republic of China was established, Chiang became Sun’s close confidant and was appointed head of the Whampoa Military Academy after Chiang, Sun, and Soviet agent Mikhail Markovich Grusenberg, who

used the nom de guerre of Borodin, had returned from Moscow. This acade- my provided him with a base of support that remained loyal to him through- out the remainder of his leadership of the KMT, a political movement that was largely dependent on rigid discipline, a ubiquitous security apparatus, and an extensive intelligence organization.

Chiang married Soong Mei-ling, the youngest of the three daughters of the wealthy and influential Soong family, while Sun married the middle daugh- ter, Soong Ching-ling. After Sun’s death in 1925, Chiang assumed the mantle of the leadership of the KMT, which split with the Communists, prompting a civil war. When the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1937, Chiang’s KMT forces reestablished a relationship with the Communists, then led by Mao Zedong. Chiang was regarded as the leader of China by the Allies during World War II, but the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 reignited the civil war. By 1949, Chiang’s forces were forced to withdraw to the island of Taiwan, where he established himself as head of a Republic of China government-in- exile. His rule of Taiwan was characterized by martial law until his death in 1975, never having made good on his vow to return to the mainland. See also CHIANG CHING-KUO.

 

CHIANG KEWILIN. Formerly chief of the New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua, in Cairo, Chiang Kewlin defected to Taiwan after 12 years of experience with the organization and denounced his colleagues, claiming that most of the NCNA’s military section were professional intelligence officers who had attended the NCNA’s own language school for three years. All, he said, had more than 10 years’ Party membership and had been recruit- ed straight from high school.

 

CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI. Born in Peking in 1924, Larry Wu-tai Chin, Jin Wudai, worked for the U.S. Army’s liaison office at Fuchou in southern China in 1943 and joined the U.S. consulate in Shanghai as an interpreter. Although it was never established precisely when he was recruited by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a mole, he was actively engaged in espionage for the Communists by 1948. In 1952, having become a natural- ized American citizen, he was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Chin’s early career, which included a stint as an interrogator in 1952 for the State Department where he questioned Chinese prisoners of war in Ko- rea, and with the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) in Okinawa, led to an FBIS posting in California, and finally to an appointment as a CIA case officer based in Virginia. With access to the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on China, he had met his Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, handlers on trips to London, Macao, Hong Kong,

and Toronto and had not only compromised thousands of classified docu- ments but had also betrayed the sources upon which the CIA depended for information from inside the PRC. At his trial on 17 counts of espionage, the prosecution intended to show, with the aid of color charts, that Chin had influenced almost every facet of Sino-American relations over several decades. The sheer volume of the material he sent to Beijing required the MSS to take up to two months to translate and process it.

Although Chin retired from the CIA as a senior analyst in July 1981, he appears to have concealed the exact date from his MSS handler and soon afterward was feted at a banquet held at the MSS headquarters in Beijing, where he was appointed an honorary MSS officer. Chin tried to cover up the fact that he had lost access to classified information and maintained contact with CIA colleagues so he could pick up additional information. He also bought a copy of The Puzzle Palace by James Bamford to give the impres- sion that he was also closely involved with the National Security Agency (NSA).

Chin had most recently kept a rendezvous with the MSS in East Asia in March 1985 when he was arrested in November 1985 after a defector re- vealed that the veteran CIA translator had been supplying the CIA’s secrets to the PRC and was believed to have sold information for more than $1 million over a period of 33 years, longer than any other spy known to have worked against the United States. Decorated for his distinguished service, Chin had been so highly valued by the CIA that after his retirement the agency had tried to persuade him to come back to work full time. While under surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it was learned that Chin maintained an office in the Watergate building in Washing- ton, D.C., and often stayed there in preference to living with his wife in their apartment on Duke Street in Alexandria, Virginia. He also conducted several affairs, was a heavy gambler, and twice was the subject of complaints that he had molested young girls in his neighborhood. The full extent of his real estate investments was never revealed, but they were substantial, and a finan- cial audit of his assets revealed that he owned some 30 rental properties in the Baltimore area, made regular trips to casinos in Las Vegas, and had his gambling debts paid off by bank transfers from Hong Kong.

At his trial Chin claimed that his additional income was derived from a

successful blackjack method, but he was found to have maintained meticu- lous records and was challenged about his travel to the PRC, in particular being questioned about a specific hotel room in which he had stayed that was known to have been under the MSS’s control. Confronted with what ap- peared to be incontrovertible evidence against him, Chin offered to act as a double agent and was then invited to describe the extent of his contacts with the MSS. For just over an hour Chin elaborated on his espionage, mentioning that he had supplied the Chinese with sensitive CIA material relating to

Henry Kissinger’s historic visit to Beijing in 1971 in preparation for Presi- dent Richard Nixon’s momentous change in U.S. foreign policy. When Chin had completed his exposition, he was arrested, and his confession was the basis of his prosecution.

Chin was indicted on 17 espionage and tax evasion charges, but rather than face a long prison sentence of up to 133 years and a $3.3 million fine after he was convicted by a federal jury in February 1986 of espionage, conspiracy, and tax evasion, Chin suffocated himself in his cell in the Prince William County Jail with a plastic garbage bag. His widow, Cathy, suspicious that Chin should have had access to the shoelaces he used to secure the bag around his head, later claimed in The Death of My Husband: Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a book printed in Chinese in Taiwan and published privately, that he may not have taken his own life, although not all versions of the book contain this allegation. Chin’s son, a physician, was allowed to examine his father’s body and found no reason to challenge the coroner’s verdict of suicide.

Those who knew Chin well were sure that he anticipated two life terms but was most frightened of losing all his rental properties, and that he killed himself before he was sentenced and made to forfeit his assets, thus prevent- ing the Internal Revenue Service from taking any action that would impover- ish his family. An alternative view, held by Dr. David L. Charney, the re- nowned psychiatrist who has interviewed numerous defendants convicted of espionage, suggests that Chin committed suicide due to remorse, not because of his espionage, but rather because he had failed his longtime PRC handler, Ou Qiming, noting that Ou was Chin’s sole handler throughout his espion- age career, an unprecedented manner of handling a source. According to Charney, Chin had retained Ou’s confidence during a sustained relationship over the decades of his clandestine work for the PRC, and the fact that he was caught and arrested was, in Chin’s eyes, a personal failure and he had let Ou down.

Although never disclosed publicly, Chin’s arrest had taken place as a

consequence of a tip from PLANESMAN, actually Yu Qiangsheng, who had also been responsible for compromising the French diplomat Bernard Boursicot.

Chin is considered a great hero by many in the PRC, credited with having made a major contribution to the normalization of relations between the United States and mainland China. When the first overtures were made to the Chinese, Mao Zedong initially thought the approach was probably a provo- cation that could lead to embarrassment. However, Zhou Enlai, who had a considerably broader worldview and experience than Mao, thought it was something that warranted further inspection, so he had turned to Shen Jian to authenticate the overture. It was Shen’s initiative that led to Chin being able to provide confirmation and thereby allow the negotiations that led to nor-

malization. Thereafter Chin was able to provide the Chinese with the posi- tions to be taken by the Americans in negotiations. See also CHEUNG, MARK.

 

CHIN PENG. The secretary-general of the Malayan Communist Party, Chin Peng succeeded Lai Tek in March 1947 after he was exposed as a Special Branch mole and murdered. Chin Peng led the PRC-backed insurgency in Malaya during the Emergency, which was declared in June 1948 and lasted 12 years. In 1955 Chin Peng established contact with the Malaya Special Branch and attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a truce. Two years later he abandoned his guerrilla headquarters close to the Thai border and fled to Beijing. In 1989 Chin Peng announced the end of hostilities against Malaysia and in 1994 traveled to Australia. Four years later he visited Shoreham in Sussex to lunch with his old adversary, and Lai Tek’s handler, John Davis of the Malaya Special Branch. When Davis died in October 2006, a tribute to him from Chin Peng was read at the funeral. See also GREAT BRITAIN.

 

CHINA ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING PHYSICS (CAEP). The China

Academy of Engineering Physics, Zhongguo Gongcheng Wuli Yan Jiu Yuan, originally known as the Ninth Academy, Di Jiu Xueyuan, was founded in 1958. It received its current name in the 1980s and is located in Science City, a purpose-built enclave four miles north of Mianyang, Sichuan Province. It is subordinate to the General Armament Department of the People’s Libera- tion Army (PLA), Jiefangjun Zong Zhuangbei Bu. Although ostensibly a semi-independent organization, the CAEP is fully integrated into the PLA’s intelligence structure and supervises the design, development, and construc- tion of the country’s nuclear weapons. Its staff has included upward of 10,000 researchers and technicians. It includes at least 12 research institutes and over a dozen key laboratories. Some of its affiliated institutes include the following: the Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics, Xinan Liuti Wuli Yanjiu Suo; the Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry, Xinan He Wuli Yu Huaxue Yanjiu Suo; the Southwest Institute of Chemical Materials, Xinan Huagong Cailiao Yanjiu Suo; the Southwest Institute of Explosives and Chemical Engineering, Xinan Zhayao Yu Huagong Xueyuan; the South- west Institute of Structural Mechanics, Xinan Jieguo Lixue Yanjiu Suo; and the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, Yingyong Wuli Yu Jisuan Shuxue Yanjiu Suo.

The physicist Deng Jiaxian, considered the father of China’s nuclear pro-

gram, born in 1924, was affiliated with the CAEP and was a 1950 graduate of Purdue University. After receiving his PhD, Deng returned to China within nine days of his graduation and did not publicly resurface for almost 20 years. He died in July 1986.

CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORATION

(CASIC). The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, Zhong- guo Hangtian Kegong Jituan, formerly the China Aerospace Corporation (CAC), Zhongguo Hangtian Zong Gongsi, is believed to be staffed by well over 150,000 employees. Founded in 1999, CASIC underwent several name changes but in July 2001 settled on its current name. CASIC oversees 7 academies, 2 scientific research and development bases, 6 publicly listed companies, and over 620 companies and institutes and employees. It is headed by Gao Hongwei as chairman and Li Yue as president. In 2017 its total assets were estimated to be in excess of $44 billion.

The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Zhongguo Hangtian Keji Jituan Gongsi, is believed to have more than 175,000 employees and was officially established in July 1999, having also been part of the China Aerospace Corporation. It is headed by Lei Fanpei, who serves as both chairman and president.

Because the CASIC and CASC are at the heart of the aerospace research conducted by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC), they are recipients of Beijing’s intelligence collection efforts in the technology field and are also a target for foreign espionage and counter-proliferation operations. For exam- ple, in 2009 Dongfan “Greg” Chung was convicted of the theft of over 300,000 pages of sensitive documents from Boeing dealing with the United States space shuttle program, in which the company had invested over $50 million.

In September 2015, Ohio State University professor and NASA scientist Li Rongxing suddenly submitted his resignation from the university by email from China, where he had taken a sabbatical. Li, who was an expert in geospatial information and had worked on the Mars and Mars Rover projects, had enjoyed access to NASA’s most sensitive space exploration data. His wife, Jue Tian, was detained in March 2014 as she was catching a flight from San Francisco to Shanghai, after it was discovered she was carrying defense-related information on a thumb drive.

CASIC and CASC and their many subordinate organizations have re- ceived considerable advantages from the transfer of research undertaken abroad, and in a comparatively short period of time they have developed sophisticated missile systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads, built rockets to insert payloads into orbit, and exported the technology required to do both.

As well as attracting the attention of foreign agencies concerned with counter-proliferation, the development of satellite and anti-satellite systems has potentially profound strategic implications for the PRC’s capacity to engage in technical intelligence collection and prevent others from running similar programs. Since the PRC placed its first satellite, the Dong Fang Hong-1, into orbit in April 1970, 13 years after the Soviets launched the

Sputnik, an entire launch industry has been established. In 2018 China com- pleted 39 orbital launches, more than any other country, including the United States, where 31 were launched. By early 2019, China had 299 orbiting satellites, more than Russia with 153, but much less than the U.S. total of 901.

In 2013 China launched its Shiyan-7 satellite as well as one termed Chu- angxin-3. Over a period of time, Shiyan-7 maneuvered around Chaungxin-3, then suddenly the latter “disappeared” from monitoring screens. Later it re- appeared, so observers concluded that Shiyan-7 had “captured” Chaungxin-3 and then released it. The capability of catching another satellite, instead of simply destroying it, amounted to the establishment of a new weapon.

In 2016 China launched the SJ-17 satellite and by 2018 was maneuvering it at an altitude of well over 20,000 miles and moving it between orbits.

On 2 January 2019 Beijing announced that the Chang’e-4 mission had accomplished the unprecedented feat of landing on the dark side of the moon, and some analysts believe China will attempt to place astronauts on the moon within its 2031–2035 Five Year Plan.

As China’s largest missile development and manufacturing enterprise, CASIC is a huge conglomerate of diverse companies with the capability to produce a wide range of missile-related weapons, such as cruise missiles, air defense systems, solid-propellant rockets, and space technology. It is actively engaged in aerospace defense, commercial aerospace projects, and the indus- trial internet, including the Industrial Intelligent Cloud System (INDICS), the first such platform in China and among the first in the world.

On 5 September 2013, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin were present at the G20 summit held in St. Petersburg when CASIC’s chairman, Ge Hongwei, signed an agreement with Rostec (officially, the State Corpora- tion for Assistance to Development, Production, and Export of Advanced Technology Industrial Product). This was followed in July 2017 by a similar agreement between CASIC and Germany’s Siemens AG to cooperate in the fields of industrial internet and intelligent manufacturing as part of China’s Made in China 2025, Zhongguo Zhizao Erling Erwu, and Germany’s “Ger- man Industry 4.0” initiatives.

CASC also develops civilian-related products such as chemicals, machin- ery, electronics, and medical care equipment, as well as environmental mate- rial. Like CASIC, CASC is a state-owned corporation under the auspices of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), Guowuyuan Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyu- onhui.

Unlike the United States, where the space program is frequently changed and postponed, the PRC is single-minded in its pursuit of domination in space and represents a growing intelligence requirement and priority for Beijing’s collection apparatus. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

CHINA AID COUNCIL. A front organization created and controlled by the Communist Party of the United States of America, the China Aid Council sponsored two publications, China Today and Amerasia, that peddled a line sympathetic to the Communist cause while ostensibly appearing to be politi- cally neutral and using aliases on the journals’ mastheads to conceal the true identities of the editorial staff. Backed by a well-funded foundation sup- ported by plenty of entirely respectable academics and philanthropists who were unaware of the organization’s true role, the periodicals were intended to influence public opinion and policy makers, but their true purpose was ex- posed by Elizabeth Bentley in 1945 when she named the China Aid Coun- cil’s executive director, Mildred Price, as a Soviet spy.

 

CHINA ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL FRIENDLY CON-

TACT (CAIFC). The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAFIC), Zhongguo Guoji Youhao Lianluo Hui, is a front organization run by the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhon- gyang Junshi Weiyuanhui Zhengzhi Gongzuo Bu. The CAIFC describes itself as a “social organization devoted to fostering international and regional peo- ple-to-people exchanges,” concealing its ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Originally established in 1984 under the PLA’s General Politi- cal Department, Jiefangjun Zong Zhengzhi Bu, CAIFC’s principal targets for its influence operations are Japan and the United States, as well as South- east Asian countries.

 

CHINA CABLES. In November 2019 the International Consortium of In- vestigative Journalists published a large quantity of classified Chinese Com- munist Party documents relating to the internment of Uighur and other mi- nority Muslims. The material revealed President Xi Jinping’s personal in- volvement in the extra-judicial confinement of an estimated 1.8 million Ui- ghurs in Xinjiang Province in “reeducation” camps estimated to number between 1,200 and 1,400. See also FIVE POISONS; UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT (UFWD).

CHINA INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

(CIISS). The China Institute of International Strategic Studies, Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Yan Jiu Suo, is the foreign policy and national security re- search organization of the People’s Liberation Army’s Military Intelligence Department (MID). The integrated nature of the relationship with the Second Department, Di Er Bumen, of the PLA’s General Staff is not publicly ac- knowledged. The permanent staff are all current or recently retired PLA officers and routinely switch between the CIISS and posts in the MID. The CIISS is located in Luoyang and Nanjing and publishes Wai Jun Dongtai (Foreign Military Trends) every 10 days for distribution at the division level throughout the armed forces. In recent years, the CIISS has sponsored forums that attract representatives from nations around the world, including the small independent nations of the South Pacific.

 

CHINA INSTITUTES FOR CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS (CICIR). A cover organization originally run by and for the Eighth Bureau, Di Ba Ju, of the highly secretive Central Investigation De- partment, Zhongyang Diaocha Bu, the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, Zhongguo Xiandai Guojii Quanxi Yanjiuyuan, is said to have been established at the behest of Zhou Enlai. It was wholly integrat- ed into the Eighth Bureau (later the Eleventh Bureau, Guojia Anquanbu Di Shiyu Ju) of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and is based in northwestern Beijing. It acts as an analytic resource, publishing its own journal, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations). The CICIR serves as the analysis branch of mainland China’s intelligence apparatus and employs some 150 research analysts and 220 support staff, maintaining links with foreign policy research organizations and frequently hosting visiting academics. The CICIR participates in a wide range of scholar exchanges and fact-finding missions with foreign institutions and academic bodies. Its academic staff is shared with the Beijing Institute of International Relations (BIIR), Beijing Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan, another MSS front institu- tion.

 

CHINA NATIONAL NUCLEAR CORPORATION (CNNC). Created in

September 1988, the China National Nuclear Corporation, Zhongguo He Gongye Jituan Gongsi, replaced the Ministry of Nuclear Industry and acts as an umbrella organization responsible for the development of civil nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and the import and export of nuclear technology. The CNNC supervises fuel processing and production, the manufacture and management of civil power plants, hydrogen bombs, waste disposal, and the acquisition and sale of technology.

The close association of Chi Mak with a CNNC official, as revealed by a photograph recovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the spy in China accompanied by his wife and a CNNC official, suggested that the CNNC was also engaged in illicit procurement of nuclear technology. Subordinate to the CNNC are the Institute of Materials, formerly the Special Parts Factory responsible for fabricating nuclear weapons; the China Atomic Energy Authority, which is based in Beijing and liaises with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna; the China Institute of Atomic Energy in Tuoli; the Nuclear Power Institute of China in Chengdu, respon- sible for the design, construction, and operation of all the country’s reactors; and the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), an export organization identified in August 1996 by a U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) intercept as selling nuclear components to an unsafeguarded Pakistani weapons laboratory.

In 2019, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that China has

270 nuclear warheads, and its threat is growing due to its ability to place multiple warheads on its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and its development of missile submarines and strategic bombers. See also CHINA ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING PHYSICS (CAEP); CHI- NESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

 

CHINA NATIONAL SPACE ADMINISTRATION (CNSA). The China

National Space Administration, Zhongguo Hangtian Zong Gongsi, was es- tablished in April 1993, and as the national space agency of China it has overall responsibility for China’s space program. It is subordinate to the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), Guojia Guofang Keji Gongye Ju, which is itself subor- dinate to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Gongye He Xinxihuabu. Essentially, the CNSA is the PRC government agency that rep- resents China internationally, although it also oversees intergovernmental scientific and technical exchanges, enforces national space policies, and has overall management responsibility for the country’s massive national space science industry.

The China space program has achieved remarkable success, as evidenced

by over a dozen Chinese astronauts who have traveled in space.

In October 2019 the CNSA was embroiled in a dispute when a CNSA representative, Vice Administrator Wu Yanhua, was denied a visa to attend a weeklong gathering of the International Astronautical Congress in Washing- ton, D.C. While the United States claimed the required applications had not been submitted in time, commentators suggested that this incident was a consequence of tightened enforcement. Neither of China’s rocket-making giants in China’s space program—the China Aerospace Science and Tech-

nology Corporation (CASC), Zhongguo Hangtian Keji Jituan Gongsi, and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), Zhong- guo Hangtian Kegon Jituan—were present at the conference.

 

CHINA, REPUBLIC OF. See TAIWAN.

 

CHINCOM. The generic Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for a series of counterintelligence operations conducted by the FBI’s former Intelligence Division, now the National Security Division, intended to recruit Chinese Communists in the United States. One success was the re- cruitment of a senior ethnic Chinese who entered into an ideological debate with an FBI informant and was later enrolled as an informant himself.

 

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP). With its inspiration drawn from the Bolshevik revolution, the CCP began in Shanghai in 1921 and, like its Russian model, relied on a ubiquitous security arm to eliminate dissent and protect the state from counterrevolutionaries. The Party’s principal in- strument of repression was the Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA), Zhongyang Shehui Shiwu Bu, a ruthless organization known as the Shehuibu and headed by Kang Sheng. Later the CDSA would evolve into the Central Investigation Department (CID), Zhongyang Diaocha Bu, headed by Li Kenong but would be abolished during the Cultural Revolu- tion (Great Prolaterian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dagem- ing), when some of its intelligence responsibilities were absorbed by the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff, Jie- fangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Er Bu, leaving internal security in the chaotic hands of the Red Guards, Hong Weibing. The CID would be reestablished in 1972 and in 1976 headed by Zhou Shaozheng. He was purged in 1982, and the following year the CID was subsumed into a new Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, under Lin Yun. In 1985 he would be replaced by Jia Chunwang following the defection of Yu Qiangsheng.

In all its various forms, the totalitarian state’s security apparatus has

served the Party rather than the country, based on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s reliance on the NKVD and then the KGB as its sword and shield. However, during the rule of Mao Zedong both the CCP and its security apparatus remained obedient to the chairman, who used the Party as a vehicle for a series of radical political campaigns, including the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Baihua Qifang, of 1956; the Great Leap Forward, Da Yue Jin, in 1958; and the decadelong Cultural Revolution, which kept him in power and served to eliminate any rivals. Purges were an essential compo- nent of these campaigns, and the Party formalized the procedures for con- ducting them by creating various bureaucratic entities, such as the Central

Case Examination Group, which supervised the expulsions of an estimated 2 million suspects and the reeducation of cadres. After Mao’s death, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchangdang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, rid the Party of the 17 million members recruited during the Cultural Revolution, and some 30 million surviving victims were rehabilitated by the Central Party Rectification Working Leadership Commission, which, once Deng Xiaoping gained power, also punished those held responsible for the excess- es, including Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, who were tried posthumously and expelled from the Party. While these measures restored order, the indivisible nature of the Party and government remained intact, with the Party exercising power through its pervasive presence in every office, factory, ideological classroom, cultural gathering, youth movement, school, university, and vil- lage.

Following the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protests of June 1989,

which were suppressed by the PLA’s 27th Group Army and elements of the 17th Airborne Corps, but also with reports of PLA groups fighting one an- other, a further purge was conducted, with a million cadres sent for rustica- tion and reeducation, and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Junshi Weiyu- aanhui, exerting more influence over the Central Committee. While the de- mocracy movement was ruthlessly suppressed, the Party responded to the public criticism by introducing measures to reduce the endemic nepotism and corruption.

Despite these reforms, the CCP organs continue to oversee both the central and regional governments, and although the Party has evolved and embraced globalization and increasing commercialism, it retains a firm grip on every aspect of political and economic life in the PRC. With the rise of Xi Jinping and his consolidation of virtually unlimited power, the CCP has returned to many of the vestiges of its more conservative past. He has called for a continuation of the “revolutionary struggle” formerly espoused by Mao Ze- dong that brought the CCP to power in 1949. This in spite of growing discontent within China itself and the continued protests in Hong Kong, where pro-democracy demonstrators push for greater autonomy. Xi’s re- sponse has been to impose measures that presage a return of an even greater police state, and his much-vaunted anticorruption campaign is seen as some- thing akin to Mao’s Cultural Revolution, as simply a means to consolidate his personal power and eliminate rivals.

 

CHINESE COURSE. In 1951 the British Joint Services School for Lin- guists (JSSL) was established at Bodmin in Cornwall and four years later moved to the HMS Bruce at Crail in Fife, Scotland. Hitherto the individual

branches of the armed forces had to run their own language courses, with the Royal Air Force (RAF) teaching Chinese to selected student at Kidbrooke in south London.

Initially intended to train Russian interpreters and intercept operators, a Chinese Course was created soon afterward, with students drawn from na- tional servicemen drafted into the forces. The Chinese Course included atten- dance at London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in Russell Square, or at Cambridge University, with RAF personnel billeted at RAF Uxbridge. The course usually lasted a year, including a final month spent at RAF Wythall for technical training. From October 1952 those passing the final exam were posted to Lymun Camp, near Shaukiwan in Hong Kong, for duties as intercept operators, manning positions at an RAF radio station, Old Belvedere, on Victoria Peak.

In June 1956 the Chinese Course was moved to Worth Maltravers in Dorset, and then in April 1957 to RAF Pucklechurch in Gloucestershire. In September 1959 it shifted to RAF Tangmere in West Sussex, and in Septem- ber 1964 it was transferred to RAF North Luffenham in Rutland. Altogether an estimated 250 linguists underwent the JSSL Chinese Course, and most were posted to Little Sai Wan in Hong Kong. See also CHINESE COMMU- NIST PARTY (CCP); GREAT BRITAIN.

 

CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING. On 7 May 1999 the new People’s Re- public of China embassy in Belgrade received a direct hit from six 2,000- pound GBU-31 precision bombs dropped by a United States Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber during an air raid conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Three Chinese journalists, Shao Yunhuan, Xu Xinghu, and Xu’s wife Zhu Ying, were killed, and the military attaché, Ven Bo Koy, was badly injured.

The five-story building at Bulevar Umetnosti 2 had been erroneously iden- tified as a military target, the Yugoslav Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement, and an investigation into the blunder was conducted by Britt Snider, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) inspector-general. He dis- covered that a CIA contract officer had relied on an out-of-date street map to locate the building and had used a parallel street to work out the exact street address. A further review of the target list, intended to highlight hospitals, schools, churches, and diplomatic premises, had failed to spot the mistake, and a warning from an analyst familiar with the city had gone unheeded. The correct site, a warehouse suspected of holding missiles parts destined for Iraq and Libya, was located 300 yards away, and the error was spotted by a CIA analyst who made a call the U.S. Department of Defense Task Force in Naples, Italy, suggesting the coordinates were wrong. He gave a second, follow-up warning, but by then the aircraft had been dispatched on its 15- hour flight, and it was too late to correct the data.

As a result, the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, fired the contract employee and reprimanded six others in the management chain, making them ineligible for promotion or financial rewards for a year, while commending the lone analyst. The United States government issued an apol- ogy to Beijing and compensated the families of the three Chinese killed in the accident and the 20 others injured, but the damage to Sino-American relations proved considerable and prompted a group of ostensibly indepen- dent computer hackers based in the PRC to launch a concerted attack on U.S. government-related internet websites. See also CYBER ESPIONAGE.

 

CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH. Western intelligence analysts monitor the development of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefang- jun, as a means of assessing the country’s military power and the PRC’s foreign policy objectives. Analysts interpret PLA plans to develop ships and weapons with an offensive capability as implying expansion, as opposed to investment in coastal defense, which suggests reduced or static ambitions. Naval strength is considered a relatively easy target on which to collect intelligence, as it is hard to conceal shipbuilding yards from overhead recon- naissance. Throughout much of the Cold War, the PLA’s Navy (PLAN), Jiefangjun Haijun, was a relatively insignificant coastal force incapable of venturing further afield. In terms of threat, the absence of modern submarines or nuclear missiles provided reassurance that the country had adopted a pure- ly defensive posture. However, in recent years the PLAN, with its stated goal of becoming a “blue-water” navy, has attracted the attention of analysts because of a demonstrable investment in the very specific areas that create anxiety among potential adversaries.

In 2019 the PLAN’s strength (excluding aircraft) totaled over 700 assets,

comprising 1 operational aircraft carrier, 52 frigates, 33 destroyers, 42 cor- vettes, 76 submarines, 192 patrol vessels, and 33 mine warfare vessels. This is a substantial increase over the totals in 2009 when the PLAN consisted of 75 surface warships, including 26 destroyers and 48 frigates, with an addi- tional 77 fast attack craft. The navy’s submarine fleet totaled 57 attack die- sels, including 7 Russian Romeos and 21 Kilos.

The recent expansion of the PLAN’s strength is a reflection of the coun- try’s growing commitment to protecting the sea-lanes and enforcing the country’s strategic goals in the Straits of Taiwan and farther afield, into the Western Pacific. The priorities have been assessed as coastal defense, mari- time security, and protection of the claimed 200-mile economic exclusion zone, as well as the more traditional preoccupations of exercising sovereign- ty in the disputed territories of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. These unre- solved historical foreign policy disagreements bring the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into conflict with Vietnam, Japan, Brunei, the Philippines,

Malaysia, and Taiwan. In pursuit of these objectives the PLAN embarked on a modernization program intended to expand the surface and submarine fleet and enhance the navy’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capa- bilities even as it pursued its goal of demonstrating its strength as a world power. Xi Jinping, standing on the very spot where Mao Zedong announced the formation of the People’s Republic 70 years earlier, declared, “There is no force that can shake the foundation of this great nation. No force can stop the Chinese people and Chinese nation forging ahead.” The PLAN is at the forefront in projecting that newfound strength and commitment to compete with the United States.

The PLAN’s investment in submarines has been a cause for concern. In 2019 the PLAN possessed six Tang-class nuclear ballistic missile subma- rines, with two under construction. There were six Jin-class ballistic subma- rines in service and at least one Xie-class ballistic submarine operational. The Jin class is the most modern of China’s ballistic submarines, featuring 12 launch tubes for the long-range JL-2 missile, which has a 5,000-mile range and can carry three or four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) capable of hitting targets on the U.S. mainland from Chinese wa- ters.

The nuclear submarine fleet also included at least nine Shang-class attack submarines and three of the older Han-class attack submarines. Of the esti- mated 56 conventional submarines in service, there were 18 Yuans, 14 Songs, 12 Kilos, and 13 Mings.

The PLAN has a single operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which is engaged as a training ship. Originally laid down in 1985 for the Soviet Navy and named the Riga, it was renamed the Varyag and then put up for sale by Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Never near completion, the hull was purchased by subterfuge in 1998 by a Macau company, Agencia Turistica E Diversoes Chong Lot Limitada, supposedly for conversion as a floating casino. After a tortuous journey, it ended up in the Liaoning ship- yard, where construction was completed with an orthodox “ski-jump” flight deck without catapult launch capability. A second carrier, also of the ski- jump type, is undergoing sea trials, and in 2019 a third, more advanced carrier was announced as under construction. The latter is believed to be designed by the 701 Research Institute of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, Zhongguo Chuanbo Gongye Zong Gongsi, Di 701 Yanjiu Suo, and will include an electromagnetic catapult launch system similar to that used by the most modern U.S. Navy carriers.

The PLAN’s large number of 42 corvettes are designed principally for

coastal defense, while the larger destroyers, totaling 35, and 49 frigates are deployed in the South China Sea and beyond. Combined with a large number of 65 landing ships, 7 amphibious transport ships, 33 mine countermeasure ships, and 16 replenishment and support ships, the PLAN represents a large

and increasingly capable naval presence in the western Pacific. However, the PRC is unwilling to be limited to the South China Sea, and the PLAN has established a 90-acre base in Djibouti. The PRC has also made overtures to the Philippines regarding the former American base at Subic Bay.

In October 2019 the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral John Aquilino, observed, “I would expect to see a [Chinese] carrier deployment in the Indian Ocean.” Chinese Type-520 destroyers and Type-54 frigates regu- larly transit the area, both equipped with sophisticated anti-ship missiles. Chinese nuclear submarines also patrol the Indian Ocean where they are tracked by the Indian Navy along with the U.S. Navy. As Admiral Aquilino remarked, “the increased weaponization . . . by China is a threat to all free and like-minded nations.”

China has developed the Yulin Naval Base, Yulin Haijun Jidi, on the southern coast of Hainan Island as a facility for a growing nuclear submarine fleet. The site, which is partially underground, includes tunnels carved into the mountains to accommodate up to 20 submarines, and the harbor is ca- pable of handling aircraft carriers. Located about 150 miles from Da Nang on the Vietnam coast, it is strategically located to control the sea-lanes entering the South China Sea. The volume of tanker traffic through the Straits of Malacca leading into the South China Sea is three times that of the Suez Canal and five times that of the Panama Canal. The PRC has claimed sove- reignty over virtually the total area of the South China Sea and continues to build bases on atolls and small islands in support of that claim. However, the

U.S. Navy has rejected the claim and continues to sail through the disputed waters.

The PLAN has been the beneficiary of equipment developed through re- verse engineering as well as conventional espionage. In 2014, Chinese hack- ers Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong successfully breached sensitive U.S. Navy computer systems, and in 2019 a U.S. Navy officer, Lieutenant Fan Yang, was charged with passing restricted technology to the PRC.

The context of the PLAN’s expansion is a growing militarization of the area, as manifested by the naval strength of the regional powers, with Indo- nesia possessing 221 total assets, including 24 corvettes and 5 submarines; South Korea, 166 total assets, including 1 aircraft carrier, 13 frigates, 12 destroyers, 13 corvettes, and 16 submarines; Myanmar, 155 total assets, in- cluding 5 frigates and 3 corvettes; Japan, 131 total assets, including 4 aircraft

carriers, 37 destroyers, 6 corvettes, and 18 submarines; the Philippines, 119 total assets, including 3 frigates and 10 corvettes; Taiwan, 87 total assets, including 24 frigates, 4 destroyers, 1 corvette, and 4 submarines; Thailand,

81 total assets, including 1 aircraft carrier, 7 frigates, and 7 corvettes; Viet-

nam, 65 total assets, including 9 frigates, 14 corvettes, and 6 submarines;

Malaysia, 61 total assets, including 6 frigates, 6 corvettes, and 2 submarines;

Australia, 47 total assets, including 2 aircraft carriers, 10 frigates, 2 destroy- ers, and 6 submarines; and Singapore, 40 total assets, including 6 frigates and 6 corvettes.

Traditionally the PLAN, with a strength of 700 aircraft, has deployed them to provide the coastal-based fleet with air cover, but as the PLAN increasing- ly operates further from its bases, the need for aircraft with greater range and offensive capabilities grows. The expansion into aircraft carriers also re- quires suitable aircraft, and in 2018 the PLA Navy announced the develop- ment of a new aircraft to replace the old J-15, which was plagued with crashes and technical issues. The expectation is that in an effort to reduce the weight problems previously experienced, the new designs will likely benefit from stolen technology. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

 

CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The commitment of the People’s Re- public of China (PRC) to the development of atomic weapons, made in January 1955, became clear to external analysts in 1957 when Mao Zedong opened a debate between “modernizers” and “traditionalists” within the Chi- nese military establishment, which culminated in December 1957 in an arti- cle published in Shijie Zhishi. This article advocated Soviet sharing of atomic technology as a response to the United States’ decision to develop weapons jointly with Great Britain and to deploy arsenals across the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership in pursuit of a doctrine of limited nuclear conflicts using tactical weapons. The following month a high-level delegation traveled to Moscow, led by Marshal Peng Dehuai, minister of national defense; General Su Yu, PLA chief of staff; and Marshal Ye Jiany- ing, to negotiate with Marshal R. Malinovsky for nearly three weeks.

Clearly the mission’s objective was to persuade the Kremlin that Soviet

technical aid should be stepped up so that the PRC could develop its own atomic weapons and at least counter American support for Taiwan. Howev- er, at the conclusion of their meetings, Western analysts detected a curious divergence in views. Whereas Marshal Peng referred to “the heroic Soviet army” being “equipped with the latest nuclear weapons,” Malinovsky re- marked that “the might of our armies is based not only on the fact that they are armed with modern first-class weapons, but primarily on the fact that they are closely linked with their people,” an observation that was interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union was not quite so enthusiastic about sharing nuclear military secrets with its Chinese friends. As the truth dawned on the Chinese, their public pronouncements subtly changed, and propaganda from Beijing suggested that weapons alone did not decide the outcome of war and that the American “paper tiger” had been beaten in Korea even though the PRC did not possess nuclear weapons.

In fact, the exchanges in Moscow had taken place against a backdrop of increasing political tension between Mao and Nikita Khrushchev and the latter’s decision the following year to withdraw all Soviet technicians from the PRC, one of the first overt manifestations of the gravity of the Sino- Soviet split. Nevertheless, Western intelligence analysts, seeking to divine what was really happening in the Sino-Soviet relationship, concluded in 1962 that

the Chinese Communists have no atomic or nuclear weapons and little hope of acquiring more than a token nuclear capability in the near future. Even if they should test an atomic device in the near future it will probably take at least a decade for them to perfect simple modern delivery vehicles. This means that China cannot use its own military to advance its political goals except in a very limited sense. For achieving the major political goals—the absorption of Taiwan, for example—it must rely on Soviet military power, which is not always at Chinese disposal.

 

This assessment made by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) followed five years of U-2 overflights of the PRC, which had commenced from Paki- stan in August 1957, and just two years later, on 14 October 1964, a Chinese bomb test was detected at Lop Nor in Xinjiang Province, an event that was eloquent proof of the inadequacy of the CIA’s prediction.

Initial experiments with high explosives had been conducted at the Tuoli laboratory 20 miles south of Beijing, and a test detonation, without enriched uranium, was completed successfully on 20 November 1963 and went unde- tected. By the end of the year the enrichment facility at Lanzhou in Gansu was in production, and on 14 January 1964 it delivered its first consignment of 90 percent enriched uranium, which was then machined in readiness for a bomb that was assembled at Malan. The test of the 22-kiloton device, weigh- ing 3,410 pounds and detonated on top of a steel tower 330 feet high, took place on 16 October 1964.

The speed with which the PRC detonated a bomb, based on the Fat Man weapon built at Los Alamos, took Western intelligence analysts by surprise. Study of the air sample recovered after the test found that the first test had not contained any plutonium, which meant that the weapon had been a third of Fat Man’s weight but with a yield four times more powerful than the Little Boy plutonium device.

The Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, with all its turmoil, did not deter the Chinese from continuing to develop its nuclear program, and the third test, in the spring of 1966, with a yield of 200–300 kilotons, revealed lithium-6 in the isotope traces, indicating that a booster had been employed in the chain reaction, a strong indication of a Chinese commitment to the development of thermonuclear weapons. This was fol- lowed at the end of the year with a test of a 122-kiloton weapon, and then on

17 June 1967 an aircraft dropped a 3.3-megaton uranium-only bomb. Thus, the PRC had accomplished the almost impossible, by detonating its first hydrogen bomb without any plutonium, and it had done so in just 32 months, a feat that had taken the United States seven years to achieve.

Success had been achieved with less than 4 percent of the tests conducted by the United States, and analysts concluded that PRC scientists, led by Purdue University–educated Deng Jiaxian and Qian Xuesen, had received vital assistance from the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs and his former Manhattan Project colleague Joan Hinton. In addition, it was believed that the PRC had collected air samples from American tests in the Pacific in 1958 and 1962 and perhaps had benefited from monitoring Soviet tests in Kazakhstan. Even so, considering the country’s economic plight, the feat was quite astonishing. During five years of atmospheric atomic tests, the PRC used two steel towers and delivered a further six weapons by air. The first underground test, in a tunnel mined into a mountain, was conducted on 23 September 1969, and the last atmospheric test conducted by any nuclear power was a 700-kiloton airburst on 16 October 1980.

As well as reporting on the PRC’s nuclear program, the CIA also moni-

tored Beijing’s investment in delivery vehicles, which were based on the Soviet R-1 rocket, designated the SS-1, which was actually a modified Ger- man V-2, and later became the Dong Fang (East Wind) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). The Dong Fang-2, a copy of the R-5 Shyster and designated CSS-1 (China surface-to-surface) with a range of 1,250 kilometers, was de- ployed for the 1966 missile test at Lop Nor.

By April 1984 the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had monitored 29 Chinese nuclear tests and predicted that future improvements would

depend on both overt contact with U.S. scientists and technology, and covert acquisition of U.S. technology. There is evidence that the Chinese have been successful in assimilating into their nuclear weapons program United States technology in areas such as high explosive, radiochemistry, metallurgy, welding, sup computers, numerical modeling, high speed photonics and underground drilling. Throughout the history of the Chinese nuclear weapons program they have followed closely advances in western technology. Increased access to this technology and continued Chinese efforts will in the 1980s and early 1990s show up as qualitative warhead improvements in terms of: (1) increased warhead reliability and confi- dence, (2) development of more compact warheads, especially for tactical nuclear applications and possibly for MRV warheads, (3) increased hard- ening of warheads in a nuclear antiballistic missile environment, (4) tail- ored output devices, such as enhanced radiation and (5) improved warhead safety, storage, and logistics procedures. Thus, in some areas, the gap between United States and Chinese nuclear technology may begin to nar- row.

Subsequent Chinese missile variants included the DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM, sold in 1981 to Saudi Arabia; the DF-4 (CSS-3) Long March–1 two-stage booster with a range of 7,000 kilometers; the DF-5 (CSS-4), a silo-based two-stage rocket with a 12,000-kilometer range; the DF-11 (CSS-7) road-mobile, solid- fuel SRBM; and the DF-15 (CSS-6), with a range of 2,500 kilometers. In January 1999 a Pentagon analysis assessed that there were 150 CSS-6 M-9 SRBMs aimed at Taiwan, a figure that would increase to 600 by 2005 based on production statistics from the China Academy of Rocket Motor Technolo- gy, formerly the Fifth Aerospace Academy.

The DIA reported in January 1996 that Liu Huaqing, chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuabhui, had visited Moscow and Kiev recently and expressed an interest in buying components for the SS-18 Satan heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Liu’s visit had followed a trip to Beijing made by Ukraine’s president Leonid Kuchma, who, the DIA observed, was a rocket engineer and had himself once been a director of the SS-18 production plant at Yuzhnoye.

The DIA noted that while the SS-18 booster rocket could be used for placing satellite payloads in orbit, it was not an obvious choice to carry sensitive equipment, and of course it also had a primary military function as a nuclear warhead delivery vehicle.

Beijing is working on an improved version of the CSS-4 ICBM and seems to be planning to incorporate multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology into its missile force. China’s interest in Russian SS- 18 military technology probably is linked to Beijing’s strategic force mod- ernization, particularly the areas of missile guidance, accuracy, rocket engines, and warhead improvements. Incorporating SS-18-related military guidance and missile technologies into China’s strategic missile forces would greatly improve Beijing’s ability to threaten targets in the United States.

 

The U.S. National Air Intelligence Center reported in November 1996 that SS-18 technology could enhance the performance of the DF-31 ICBM with a range of 5,000 miles, and the DF-41 with an estimated reach of 7,500 miles, each armed with a 500-kiloton-yield warhead.

China is now estimated to have maintained a substantial stockpile of around 270 nuclear weapons, including warheads for 18 CSS-4 Mod 2 silo- based ICBMs capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States. According to the DIA, the principal ICBM production complex, located at an underground site in Wanyan, was closed in December 1998 and relocated to a modern facility in Chengdu. The PRC’s strategic rocket capacity has been assessed as 70 DF-31 solid-fuel road-mobile MRBMs with a range of 8,000 kilometers and 12 CSS-N-3 SLBMs for the Xia submarine.

Having successfully built an arsenal of nuclear warheads, but failing to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until March 1992, Deng Xiaoping adopted a policy of proliferation and in 1982 passed the designs of the uranium CHIC-4 weapon to Pakistan. In February 1983 China agreed to build a duplicate of the reactor at the Beijing Institute of Atomic Energy Research in a remote location, at Ain Oussera, high in Algeria’s Atlas Moun- tains. Although the El Salam reactor would be described eight years later as a research facility, the secret deal raised the suspicion that China had agreed to help Algeria develop nuclear weapons.

On 26 May 1990 a test was conducted at Lop Nor for the Pakistanis. Thereafter the principal Pakistani physicist, A. Q. Khan, peddled the CHIC-4 bomb design to North Korea, Iran, and Libya and attempted to sell it to Iraq. According to communications intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA), in September 1996 the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), Zhongguo Heneng Gongye Gongsi, sold Khan 5,000 ring magnets, components for upgrading enrichment centrifuges, for $70,000. This event was significant because only three months earlier, on 11 May, the PRC’s Foreign Ministry had issued a statement confirming that “China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.” However, soon after- ward there was a further shipment of diagnostic equipment and a furnace for use with high-technology metals, and on 14 September the CIA reported that Ghulam Kibria, the Pakistani nuclear and missile procurement officer in Beijing, had met with CNEIC officials to discuss the measures to be taken to conceal the purchase’s true destination.

The Chinese told Kibria they needed end-user certificates for the sale and

all future dual-use shipments and other equipment for Pakistan’s unsafe- guarded facilities and vowed to discuss the certificates only with a “third party”—apparently the United States—probably to demonstrate that “Beijing is complying with its May commitment.   Kibria suggested possible lan-

guage for the false end-user certificates to make it appear that one item— probably the diagnostic equipment—was intended for the safeguarded Chashma nuclear power plant, which Chinese firms are building.”

The intercept indicates Kibria also suggested to the Chinese that all re- maining contracts, apparently for unsafeguarded facilities, be canceled and new ones drawn up naming unobjectionable end-users. Kibria claimed the Chinese reacted positively to the idea, but added this kind of agreement is “dangerous.” Such a subterfuge probably would require the approval of sen- ior Chinese government leaders.

In December 2003, following a lengthy joint Anglo-American intelligence investigation of Khan, scientists in Tripoli surrendered details of Libya’s nuclear weapons development program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Included was a plastic bag marked “Good Looks Tailor Shop” containing the CHIC-4 blueprints.

As well as studying the PRC’s stockpile of nuclear weapons, CIA and DIA analysts scrutinized delivery systems, which included some 50 Su-27 fighters built under license and armed with AA-11 radar-guided missiles; the F-10 indigenous multirole fighter; the F-8 interceptor; the FB-7 light strike air- craft; and an advanced stealth fighter project, the XXJ.

Of the nine countries known to possess nuclear weapons (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), China is among the seven countries with a smaller nuclear weapons capability. The weapons, with largely limited delivery ability, have tradition- ally been targeted at U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, India, and the Philip- pines, but it is believed that Beijing is seeking to develop a greater multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability with submarine- launched missiles to undermine the United States’ ability to defend against a nuclear attack. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; COX REPORT; IN- DUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; SENIOR BOWL.

 

CHINESE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) operates a network of signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept stations close to its foreign borders, with a large installation on Lake Kinghathu, at Jilemutu, and at Jixi monitoring Russian traffic in the northeast. Others at Erli and Hamian cover Mongolia. Indian communications are intercepted at Chengdu and Dayi, with Vietnam monitored from Kunming. In addition, there are large intercept facilities at Lingshui on Hainan Island; at Shenyang, near Jinan; and in Shanghai and Nanjing. Surveillance on Taiwan is main- tained by a chain of sites in the Fujian and Guangdong military districts. An estimated eight naval platforms also contribute to the PRC signals intelli- gence matrix, with an analytical center integrated into the South Sea Fleet headquarters at Zhanjiang. Intelligence collection aircraft include Antonov- 12 Cubs and converted Tu-154 transports. See also THIRD DEPARTMENT.

 

CHING NING GUEY. On 29 April 2016, Ching Ning Guey, aged 63, waived both an indictment and arraignment, agreeing to plead guilty to a single count of participating in the development of plutonium special nuclear material outside the United States. Punishment for that offense included a prison term of up to 10 years, a period of three years of supervised release, a fine of $250,000, and a special $100 assessment. The investigation underly- ing the indictment had been kept under wraps for over a year and was tied to the indictment of Ho Szuhsiung, alias Allen Ho, when Guey had provided assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) inquiries into Ho. Born in Taiwan, Guey had naturalized in 1990, and from 2010 to 2014 he was a senior manager at the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in its Pro- babilistic Risk Assessment Division. In that position Guey had access to

closely held information relating to the development and production of pluto- nium, usually referred to by the euphemism “special nuclear material.” He had originally met Ho in the early 1990s at a Chinese American Nuclear Technology Association event when Guey was among at least six scientists invited by Ho to assist in his scheme to provide information to the PRC. Guey began to help Ho as early as 2004 when Guey was employed at a Florida Power & Light (FP&L) nuclear plant. Guey provided specific “infor- mation regarding nuclear power plant outage times” for the specific use of China General’s Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant and also provided consulting services to Daya Bay while employed by FP&L.

The Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant, Dayawan Hedianzhan, is located in Guangdong Province northeast of Hong Kong, with two atomic reactors. It is 75 percent owned by the China General Nuclear Power Group, Zhongguo Tongyong Hedian Jituan, with the other 25 percent owned by the Hong Kong–based China Light & Power Group (CLP), which purchases about 70 percent of the Daya Bay plant’s output to provide Hong Kong’s power. In 1987 it was reported that 316 steel reinforcing bars were missing from the plant’s reactor platform, which did not meet accepted specifications. A Daya Bay plant spokesman denied there was a problem, explaining that it was all a mistake due to “mistaken perception” of architectural drawings. In 2010 it was reported that there was a leak in one of the plant’s fuel tubes, but that too was denied by plant officials. CLP reported in a statement that the leak fell below international standards and was not high enough to require reporting as a safety issue.

Between 25 and 29 November 2013, Guey traveled to the PRC at the

invitation of the China General Nuclear Power Group and provided three lectures drawn from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reports. Those lectures included the following topics: “Program on Technology Innovation: EPRI Material Management,” “A Method to Predict Cavitation and the Ex- tent of Damage in Power Plant Piping,” and “Assessment of EPRI Fuel Reliability Guidelines for New Nuclear Plant Design.” While not actually classified, the reports were not intended to be accessible by the PRC without the federal government’s specific permission. The EPRI is a nonprofit organ- ization that conducts research, development, and demonstrations relating to the generation, delivery, and use of electricity, and its periodic papers are restricted to those individuals and organizations that are EPRI members. The TVA was an EPRI member, and due to his employment, Guey had access to the EPRI reports but was not authorized to share them with nonmembers.

Guey was paid $15,500 for the presentations in a check sent by Ho to

Guey, who was living in Chattanooga, Tennessee. On 8 February 2018 a U.S. district court judge rejected the prosecution’s recommendation that Guey receive a three-year prison sentence, and his attorneys argued that Guey had no intent to harm the United States and that the charges were meant for

terrorists who use weapons of mass destruction such as dirty bombs and chemical weapons. Guey had already forfeited the $15,500 he received from Ho, and he was sentenced to three years’ probation.

 

CHITRON ELECTRONICS. In May 2010 Chitron Electronics, a company based in Waltham, Massachusetts, and Shenzhen, China, was convicted of conspiring to evade export controls on sensitive equipment with military applications over a period of 10 years. The Shenzhen Chitron Electronics Company Ltd., Shenzen Shi Chi Chuang Dianzi Youxian Gongsi, based in Shenzhen, had been formed and controlled by a Harvard-educated engineer, Wu Zhenzhou, alias Alex Wu. His wife, Wei Yufeng, alias Annie Wei, served as the office manager. Chitron Electronics was also found guilty of selling embargoed material, including phased array radar and satellite com- munications systems, to the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Zhongguo Dianzi Jeji Jituan Gongsi, a firm responsible for the procurement, development, and manufacture of electronics for the Chinese military. The company failed to appear at trial and was fined $1.9 million. Wu Zhenzhou was sentenced in January 2011 to eight years’ impris- onment. Wei Yufang was sentenced to 23 months’ imprisonment and faced deportation. A fourth defendant, Li Bo, alias Eric Lee, pleaded guilty to a charge of making false statements on shipping documents and faced five years’ imprisonment. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLO- GY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CHUNG, GREG. A 73-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen originally from China, Donfan “Greg” Chung was a senior Boeing engineer arrested on 11 February 2008 and charged with economic espionage for the People’s Re- public of China (PRC). In July 2009 he was found guilty of taking 300,000 pages of sensitive documents that included information about the U.S. space shuttle and a booster rocket in which Boeing had invested $50 million. “Mr. Chung has been an agent of the PRC for over 30 years,” ruled U.S. district judge Cormac J. Carney.

Chung, who had worked on the space shuttle, had been compromised by the discovery of a letter addressed to him from Gu Weihao, a representative of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, Zhongguo Hangkong Gongye Jituan Gongsi, found by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Chi Mak’s Los Angeles apartment. Gu was related to Chi Mak’s wife, Rebecca Liu-wa Chu, and used her husband as a conduit to exchange messages by hand with Chung, and the document was explicit, noting that “in the past I have asked you to collect some quality control information at your conven- ience,” and undertook to pay him for any expenses incurred “while collecting or purchasing information.” This find led to a search on 11 September 2006

of Chung’s home where documents were recovered concerning the space shuttle’s phased array radar, the Delta IV rocket, and the C-17 Globemaster III military transport aircraft. One letter, addressed to Professor Chen Longku of the Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Gongye Daxue, referred to Chung as having “sent via sea freight three sets of manuals dealing with flight stress analysis.”

Various other documents suggested that Chung was an ideologically moti- vated spy who had been active for decades. One, mentioning the four reform goals announced in December 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, stated, “I don’t know what I can do for the country. Having been a Chinese compatriot for over thirty years and being proud of the people’s effort for the motherland, I am regretful for not contributing anything.   I would like to make an effort

to contribute to the Four Modernizations of China [Zhongguo De Si Ge Xiandaihua].” The reply to Chung, dated September 1979, acknowledged receipt of his package of information and observed, “We are moved by your patriotism.” Another letter, dated February 1985 from Chen Qinan, the depu- ty director of the state-owned China National Aero Technology Import and Export Corporation’s, Zhongguo Hangkong Jishu Jin Chukou Zong Gongsi, technical import department, provided a list of aeronautical topics for Chung to focus on, including metal fatigue, helicopter rotor blades, and aircraft propellers. This correspondence heralded Chung’s sponsored return to the PRC in June 1985 to give a series of lectures on aircraft design, the space shuttle’s forward fuselage, stress factors, and heat-resistant tiles.

Chung completed his unreported visit to the PRC and remained in contact with the China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CNAMC), Zhongguo Nanchang Shi Feiji Zhizao Gongsi, which provided him with questionnaires identifying the topics of interest. One requested:

Please introduce in detail how to determine the safety life and damage tolerance for the life conceptual design and operating procedure of an aircraft or part thereof. Should non-failure probability and confidence lev- el be considered for the actual measurement of the flight load spectrum?

U.S. military specification recommends using mainly average spectrum, what is the basis of this recommendation? How does the U.S. perform flight measurement and compiling of the tail load spectrum? Please intro- duce in detail. For aircraft life estimation by the aircraft companies in the U.S., what are the few commonly-used engineering approaches? What are the differences in determining the aircraft life for large civil aircraft versus military fighter planes? Introduce procedures and implementation process- es for aircraft maintenance and inspection outlines. Specific contents and frequency for inspections, monitoring technology for major parts under stress. What is the purpose of adding a spacer in the design (such as the Boeing 707 airplanes) in the butt joint on the wing? How many types of loaded flights are used for the fatigue tests of smaller fighter planes? What are the percentages for the mobile loading and the non-symmetrical load-

ing? When performing loading test, are the sequences of the loading ran- dom or are they derived manually? What approaches are used in the U.S. to determine the helicopter’s life? Is the safety-life fail-safe or damage tolerance approach being used to assure flight safety? What is the applica- tion?

 

At the end of December 1985 Chung had reported to Chief Engineer Feng that he had acquired Rockwell Aviation manuals for the F-100, X-15, and B- 70; 24 Rockwell manuals relating to the B-1 bomber; and 27 manuals con- cerning the stress loads on plexiglass canopies, and arrangements were made for a diplomat at the consulate in San Francisco, Zhen Lan Zhao, to receive the material so it could be sent to Beijing in the Chinese diplomatic pouch.

Other incriminating documents found at Chung’s home indicated that he had been in continuous contact with the Chinese since 1979 and had made numerous unreported visits to the PRC from 1985 onward. In a discussion concerning a plausible cover for these trips if Chung was challenged, it had been suggested that Chung’s wife might receive invitations to an art institute. In addition to these visits, there was also evidence that Gu had traveled to the United States to see Chung in 1986, and probably thereafter.

While under FBI surveillance, Chung was seen trying to get rid of thou- sands of documents he had hidden in the roof space of his home. He would conceal them in between pages of Chinese documents and then discard them in his trash. To the amusement of the FBI watchers, Chung would hide in bushes until the garbage truck arrived and then emerge to dispose of the incriminating material.

The judge convicted Chung on six counts of economic espionage, one count of acting as a foreign agent, one count of conspiracy, and one count of lying to a federal agent, but acquitted him on obstruction of justice. Chung had opted for a non-jury trial that lasted three weeks and ended on 24 June. His defense lawyers argued that Chung was a “pack rat” who hoarded docu- ments at his house but insisted he was not a spy, claiming that he may have violated Boeing policy by bringing the papers home, but he had not broken any laws and the U.S. government could not prove he had given any of the information to China. According to the prosecution, Chung had worked for Rockwell International until it was bought by Boeing in 1996, and had stayed with the Chicago-based company until he had been made redundant in 2002. However, after the Columbia space shuttle disaster in 2003, Chung had been rehired as a consultant and had been employed until he was fired when the FBI began its investigation in 2006. The prosecution alleged that Chung began to spy for the PRC in the late 1970s, a few years after he became a naturalized U.S. citizen and was hired by Rockwell. In November 2009 he

was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. See also CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORATION (CASIC); INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

CIRCUS. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) code name for a series of operations conducted in Tibet from June 1957 in support of Khampa tribes- men from the east of the country who opposed the occupation by the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC), circus began with eight Khampas who were exfiltrated from Tibet on a converted B-17 bomber flown from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines by experienced Polish pilots to Kermitola, near Dacca in East Pakistan. The team then underwent CIA guerrilla training at camps on Guam and Okinawa before being dropped back into Tibet from Kermitola in Operation st/barnum in October and November. In July the following year the CIA began dropping weapons to the fighters, employing a C-118 transport from Guam. During circus more than 200 guerrillas were flown to the United States to undergo training in the Rocky Mountains at Camp Hale, near Leadville in Colorado. Formerly a World War II winter warfare center, Camp Hale had accommodated the 10th Mountain Division before the CIA took over the site. Having undergone the guerrilla course, the volunteers returned either to Mustang, just inside Nepal, or to their home- land. circus was terminated in May 1965 when the last supply drop was completed and the 247,000 acres of Camp Hale were turned over to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service.

 

CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT). Founded after World War II by the leader of the famous Flying Tigers, General Claire L. Chennault, in partner- ship with another American, Whiting Willauer, CAT operated closely with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist air force and, based in Taiwan from October 1949, acted as a proprietary company of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undertaking clandestine propaganda leaflet-drop missions and recon- naissance overflights of Hainan Island and the mainland.

Exploiting gaps in China’s radar screen detected by electronic intelligence missions, flights were made by the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing from Yokota in Japan, and in March 1952 CAT aircraft began to penetrate deep into Chinese airspace in daylight with a Boeing B-17 and a Douglas DC-4 Skymaster, delivering Nationalist agents and collecting imagery. More than 100 of these missions were flown by Douglas A-25s, Consolidated PB-47s, and RB-69s, often U.S. Air Force aircraft repainted in CAT livery. In 1950 the CIA took over CAT entirely and, until the project was closed down in June 1976, flew missions along the border with Yunnan Province, communi- cating with agents and making parachute drops of matériel. See also TROP- IC; U-2.

CLAIBORNE, CANDACE MARIE. On 28 March 2017 Candace Marie Claiborne, aged 60, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and charged with obstructing an official proceeding and making false statements concealing numerous contacts with PRC intelligence agents over a period of years. An African American, she had been employed by the Department of State since 1999 and held a Top Secret security clearance, having served as an office management specialist in Baghdad, Khartoum, Buenos Aires, and both Shanghai and Beijing. Fluent in Arabic, Mandarin, Chinese, and Spanish, she had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and law enforcement from the University of the District of Columbia.

According to the criminal complaint, Claiborne failed to report numerous contacts with two Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, officers who had provided “tens of thousands of dollars in gifts and benefits to Claiborne and her family over five years.” These included cash wired directly into her personal bank account, an Apple iPhone and laptop comput- er, international travel, vacations, a fully furnished apartment, and a monthly stipend for a male acquaintance half her age who had also received a “schol- arship” to a fashion school in Shanghai, also paid for by the MSS. She also received numerous meals and Chinese New Year gifts, all passed to Clai- borne or through a co-conspirator, the younger male acquaintance. Shortly after wiring her $2,480, he tasked her with providing internal United States government analyses of a just-concluded U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The affidavit also noted that Claiborne kept a journal in which she had recorded that she could “generate 20k in 1 year.”

Apparently Claiborne had experienced financial difficulties, including

District of Colombia taxes amounting to $9,000. According to the FBI, on several occasions she provided the Chinese with written information regard- ing the U.S. position on political and economic issues. She was also said to have told her co-conspirator that her PRC contacts were “spies” and admitted that she had willfully misled State Department and FBI agents about them. After the State Department and FBI investigators contacted her, she had instructed her co-conspirator to delete evidence connecting her to the Chi- nese agents.

The young acquaintance eventually lost his “scholarship” after he commit- ted a serious crime in Shanghai, and while the MSS arranged for the police to drop the criminal charges, he was forced to leave the country, though both he and Claiborne remained in contact with the MSS.

Claiborne met with an undercover FBI agent posing as a Chinese official in Washington, D.C., for nearly two hours at her home, where she admitted her relationship with her foreign contacts in China, but on that occasion she refused to accept a cash gift and declined to enter into another information-

sharing arrangement. However, according to the FBI’s affidavit, she also did not report the contact by someone she believed to be a foreign agent, in violation of her oath.

On 24 April 2019, Claiborne pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to defraud the United States by lying to law enforcement and background inves- tigators and hiding her extensive contacts with and gifts from agents of the PRC, in exchange for providing them with internal documents from the State Department. On 9 July 2019, Claiborne was sentenced to 40 months in prison followed by 3 years of supervised release and fined $40,000.

 

CLINE, RAY. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Taipei between 1958 and 1962, Dr. Ray Cline was an influential figure in local politics, operating under the U.S. Naval Auxiliary Communications Center, and would be promoted to be the CIA’s deputy director of intelli- gence. Born in 1918 in Illinois and educated at Harvard on a scholarship, Cline served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II in China and joined the CIA in 1949. His foreign postings included London from 1951 to 1953 and Bonn from 1966 to 1969. Later he headed the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

As chief of the CIA’s analytical staff on the Sino-Soviet bloc between 1953 and 1957, he accurately predicted the split between the People’s Re- public of China and the Soviet Union. His contribution during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 gave him almost legendary status within the CIA and ensured that he remained an influential figure in Washington, D.C., long after his retirement to Georgetown University in 1973, after which he continued to be a keen advocate for the Chinese Nationalists and headed the Taiwan Committee for a Free China. He died in March 1996, aged 77.

 

COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO).

Created by the Russian Federation to offer mutual security in Central Asia, with a membership of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbeki- stan, the CSTO excludes the People’s Republic of China and is perceived by Beijing as a rival to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Shanghai Shi Hezuo Zuzhi.

 

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE FAR EAST (CIFE). The postwar succes-

sor of the Far East Combined Bureau, CIFE was Great Britain’s principal signals intelligence organization in the region during the Cold War. Based in Singapore, CIFE provided an umbrella for all local British security and intel- ligence operations and played a key role in the campaign against the guerril-

las known as “Chinese terrorists” during the Malaya Emergency. Among the Secret Intelligence Service professionals to head CIFE were Dick Ellis, James Fulton, Ellis Morgan, and Maurice Oldfield.

 

COMINTERN. The Third Communist International, headed by Grigori Zin- oviev from its creation in March 1919 in Moscow until 1926, was active in China, with representatives in Peking, Shanghai, and Harbin engaged in promoting a global Bolshevik revolution. Zinoviev was replaced in July 1935 by Nikolai Bukharin, who would be succeeded by a Bulgarian Communist, Georgi Dmitrov. The Comintern’s intelligence branch, the Foreign Liaison Department (OMS), ran a clandestine network in Shanghai headed by Hi- laire Noulens, but he was arrested in June 1931 and replaced by a series of illegals, among them Earl Browder and Max Steinberg. The OMS network operated in parallel with a separate GRU ring headed by Richard Sorge, and, among many other activities, it sponsored the English-language fort- nightly newspaper Voice of China, published by the Eastern Publishing Com- pany, which was headed by Manny Granich, a leading member of the Com- munist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). In New York, Gra- nich’s wife Grace had been Browder’s secretary.

 

COMMISSION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRY

FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (COSTIND). The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for Na- tional Defense, Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui, was the body responsible for the planning and development of new technology with mili- tary applications and for overseeing the modernization of the PLA. After its establishment, COSTIND sponsored the Beijing Institute of Systems Engi- neering, Beijing Xitong Gongcheng Yanjiu Suo; held a series of symposia to debate such subjects as information warfare; and enjoyed a close relation- ship with the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), Dianzi Gongye Bu. Headed originally by Zhang Aiping, COSTIND set policy for China’s exten- sive military industrial complex and selected priority projects, such as the development of advanced satellites, lasers, and remote sensors, for direct funding. CONSTIND exercised considerable influence on the direction of China’s high-tech industry and was perceived by Western intelligence ana- lysts as the key organization in Beijing responsible for identifying areas for industrial espionage.

In March 2008, COSTIND was merged into the Ministry of Industry and

Information Technology (MIIT) of the People’s Republic of China, Zhon- ghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongye He Xinxihuabu, and renamed the State

Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National De- fense (SASTIND), Guojia Guofang Keji Gongye Ju. See also PROJECT 863.

 

CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE. For many years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) denigrated Confucius, the great Chinese philosopher who lived between 551 BC and 479 BC, as part of China’s feudal past. However, in recent times Confucius has been rehabilitated, due in part to the CCP’s expediency. In 2004 China started a Confucius Institute, Kongzi Xueyuan, an outreach program under the auspices of the Office of Chinese Language Council International, Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Ban- gongshi, also known by its colloquial abbreviation “Hanban,” under the Ministry of Education, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu. The name has been trademarked, and the program is designed to promote Chinese language and culture, support local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural exchanges. As the China Post observed in 2014, “certainly China would have made little headway if it had named these Mao Institutes!” Beijing claims the Confucius Institutes program is a nongovernmental organization, but it is closely aligned with the CCP, and a former head of the Confucius Institute Headquarters was Liu Yandong, a vice premier and member of the CCP’s Politburo who formerly headed the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP, Zhongguo Gongchandang Tongyi Zhaox- ian Gongzuo Bu. The UFWD reports directly to the Central Committee of the CCP and is engaged in exercising influence over foreign countries. The Confucius Institutes are funded by the Chinese government, which purports to take a hands-off approach to their management. Institutes in the United States are provided with about $100,000 annually, which the host university

is expected to match.

However, Confucius Institutes, of which there are 500 worldwide, have become controversial. The CCP plans to have 1,000 in place by 2020, with the largest concentration in the United States, South Korea, and Japan, but there is increased resistance from universities to their presence on campus. Some of the concerns relate to finance, legal issues, and academic freedom, but questions have also been increasingly raised about improper influence over teaching and research. Industrial and military espionage has been sus- pected, and Professor Arthur Weldon of the University of Pennsylvania has asserted that “once you have a Confucius Institute on campus, you have a second source of opinions and authority that is ultimately answerable to the Chinese Communist Party and which is not subject to scholarly review.”

The CCP has been cautious to avoid allowing the institutes to act as mouthpieces for the CCP, but Li Changchun, once the fifth-ranking member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, asserted that the institutes were an “important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.”

In August 2014 Xu Lin, a senior Confucius Institute executive, became embroiled in a dispute in Portugal when she ordered her staff to tear all pages making reference to Taiwan’s academic institutions from the published pro- gram for a Chinese studies conference. This incident resulted in faculty members at the University of Chicago forcing the closure of the local insti- tute, with others following their example. In October 2019 the Belgian government denied entry to Song Xinning, the head of the institute in Brus- sels, due to concerns that he was cooperating with and acting as a recruiter for Chinese intelligence.

Within the United States, there is increasing concern about Confucius Institutes on university campuses, and in 2014 the American Association of University Professors urged their universities to cease collaboration with Confucius Institutes unless university authorities exercised absolute control of academic affairs. The Canadian Association of University Teachers called upon Canadian universities to end their ties with the institutes, and McGill University complied. In 2018, members of Congress from Texas wrote letters to four Texas universities urging them to close their institutes, and Texas A& M did so soon thereafter. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits universities that host Confucius Institutes from receiving Depart- ment of Defense funding for Chinese-language study.

 

COX REPORT. A redacted version of the Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the Peo- ple’s Republic of China—known as the Cox Report after the committee’s chairman, Congressman Christopher Cox—was released in May 1999, al- though the complete document remains classified. The report, which had a lasting impact on U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC), reached five major conclusions:

1.    The theft of nuclear and other technology by the PRC was not achieved in a vacuum and was the result of decades of hostile intelligence opera- tions conducted by the Ministry of State Security against U.S. weap- ons facilities such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

2.    The PRC had been successful in stealing the designs of the seven most advanced American thermonuclear weapons.

3.    The theft of those secrets had enabled the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate its own design, development, and testing of nuclear weap- ons, without the added burden of conducting its own research and development.

4.    The PRC’s next generation of nuclear weapons would benefit from stolen designs and would be much more effective.

5.    The PRC would be able to deploy small nuclear warheads much sooner than the previously predicted date of 2002, and the stolen designs would enable China to integrate Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology in its next generation of missiles.

 

Following circulation of the Cox Report, the director of central intelligence, George Tenet, appointed Robert Walpole in February 2000 to complete a study of the PRC’s nuclear espionage, a document that remains classified. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

CULTURAL REVOLUTION. The Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wen- hua Dageming (literally the Great Proletarian Cultural Great Revolution), was launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 and plunged the country into social, political, and economic turmoil that lasted a decade. By 1976 there was nationwide chaos, economic disaster, and little external intelligence activity conducted by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu. The MPS’s headquarters were attacked by the Red Guards (Hong Weibing), and the MPS head, Luo Qingchang, was thrown out of a window, breaking his legs. He was then paraded through the streets and subjected to humiliation while MPS files were seized and individual dossiers were used to identify candidates for criticism and banishment into the laogai prison system.

Following the catastrophic Great Leap Forward, Da Yue Jin, Mao’s un- challenged power was contested, and although he resigned his political posi- tion as state chairman of China, he refused to admit to a mistake, insisting that his plan had been “70 percent correct,” and retained the more important post of chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. After an initial alliance with Liu Shaoqi in an effort to discredit Peng Dehuai, who had earlier criti- cized Mao and threatened his power base, Mao turned on Liu in 1963 and asserted that the class struggle was an ongoing process that must be under- taken “yearly, monthly, and daily.” This resulted in the “Four Cleans” move- ment with the goal of purifying politics, economics, ideas, and organization of “reactionaries,” a campaign directed at Liu. By 1966, the Cultural Revolu- tion was under way, led by the Red Guards, Hong Weibing. Mao turned to his longtime associate Kang Sheng, the head of his security apparatus, to ensure that his ideological and security directives were carried out.

Kang played a key role in implementing the Cultural Revolution, as did

Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, who reportedly had been Kang’s lover before he introduced her to Mao. Jiang, together with Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao, became known as the “Gang of Four,” Sirenbang, and began a campaign to renew the spirit of the Chinese revolution. They at- tacked the “Four Olds,” Si Sui, of Chinese society (old customs, old culture,

old habits, and old ideas), and the Red Guards destroyed fully two-thirds of China’s famous temples, shrines, and other such heritage sites. Established political leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, and Peng Dehuai, were attacked, sometimes physically, and Deng’s son, Deng Pufeng, was thrown out of a second-story window, leaving him permanently confined to a wheelchair.

Intelligence personnel were also attacked, and Shen Jian, a longtime asso- ciate of Kang’s, was subjected to criticism. Only leaders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) escaped such behavior, and some officials, such as Shen, were able to find positions for family members in the PLA to avoid the wrath of the Red Guards.

The fact that during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution Larry Wu-tai Chin was not contacted by Chinese intelligence is an indication of the paral- ysis experienced by the MPS. However, by 1967 the Red Guards had come to be considered a liability, and they encountered resistance in some factories and even in rural areas, where they had never been as disruptive as in the major cities. Eventually the PLA was directed to restore order, and the fol- lowing year it put down the Red Guard movement, often violently. Mass executions and even cannibalism of students occurred in Guangxi Province, and there were similar incidents in Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Fujian, and Hu- bei Provinces. Finally, Mao himself met with Red Guard leaders and asked them to gently end the movement.

Lin Biao, as head of the PLA, gained considerable power and in 1969 was named as Mao’s designated heir, but after some semblance of order had been restored, Mao began to view Lin Biao, who had been prominent in establish- ing Mao’s personality cult throughout China, as a threat and turned on him. Lin was killed in a plane crash while ostensibly trying to flee to the Soviet Union in 1971, and it has been claimed that this was Kang Sheng’s handi- work.

The Cultural Revolution persisted beyond the death of Kang Sheng in 1975 but came to an end the following year when Mao and Zhou Enlai died. The Gang of Four was prosecuted, and Deng Xiaoping regained power to undo much of the harm inflicted by Mao over the previous decade. Contact with Larry Wu-tai Chin, for instance, was reestablished by the MPS, ena- bling him to resume his espionage. Modern Chinese intelligence personnel rarely discuss the Cultural Revolution, and usually the topic is only raised within a Party context.

CYBER ESPIONAGE. Impressed by the electronic warfare techniques em- ployed by the United States during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has adopted a policy of developing and deploying aggressive strategies intended to close down an adversary’s com- munications network, or to simply plunder its databases for information. One

attack, code-named NIGHT DRAGON, appeared to concentrate on the en- ergy sector. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report released in September 2009, attacks on U.S. Department of Defense computers from sources traced to mainland China rose from 43,880 in 2007 to 54,640 in 2008. As well as launching offensives against

U.S. government targets, the PRC has been the source of denial-of-service and other sabotage against China’s perceived opponents, such as Tibetan activists, the pro-democracy movement, Uighur separatists, and members of Falun Gong.

In recent years evidence has emerged of PRC students abroad engaging in cyber espionage, with a group at Leuven’s Catholic University accused of having attempted to sabotage the communications systems of the Belgian Parliament, the European Union’s headquarters in Brussels, and the head- quarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Other attacks have been traced to the PRC, including a monthlong assault on the Austra- lian Parliament’s computer system in March 2011. According to a U.S. State Department internal memorandum, the PRC sponsored Lin Yong, a notori- ous hacker known as “Lion,” who founded the Hacker Union of China, Zhongguo Heike Lianmeng, a group of ostensibly independent hackers who sought to avenge the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 by attacking U.S. government-related websites. Also mentioned is XFocus, the hackers who released the Blaster worm in August 2003, infecting computers using Windows XP and Windows 2000 operating sys- tems worldwide. In June 2009 a classified State Department circular claimed,

There is a strong possibility the PRC is harvesting the talents of its private sector in order to bolster offensive and defensive computer network opera- tions capabilities.  Potential linkages of China’s top companies with the

PRC illustrate the government’s use of its private sector in support of information warfare objectives.

 

The State Department identified Topsec, the PRC’s largest computer security company, and Venustech, another leading Chinese security firm, as part of the China Information Technology Security Center (CITSC), Zhongguo Xinxi Jishu Anquan Zhongxin, the entity that was Microsoft’s partner in distributing the Windows operating system in the country. However, during 2002 and 2003 Topsec employed Lion, and the company’s founder, He Wei- dong, publicly acknowledged that the PRC government had invested in his company, supplying half of Topsec’s start-up capital and awarding it re- search and development contracts.

In assessing what was termed the “cyber threat,” in confidential cables in 2008 the State Department claimed that since 2002 cyber intruders involved in the BYZANTINE CANDOR attack, which originated in the PRC, ex-

ploited the vulnerabilities of the Windows system to steal login data and access to hundreds of U.S. government and sensitive defense contractor sys- tems:

In the United States, the majority of the systems byzantine candor actors have targeted belong to the U.S. Army, but targets also include other Department of Defense services as well as Department of State, Depart- ment of Energy, additional U.S. government entities, and commercial sys- tems and networks.

 

In another cable headed “Diplomatic Security Daily,” a State Department memo described how officials involved in talks with the PRC at the Copen- hagen climate change summit in 2009 were subject to a cyber attack contain- ing the POISON IVY remote access tool intended to give hackers almost complete control over the victim’s system:

The message had the subject line “China and Climate Change” and was spoofed to appear as if it were from a legitimate international economics columnist at the National Journal. In addition, the body of the email contained comments designed to appeal to the recipients as it was specifi- cally aligned with their job function. . . . State Department employees dealing with sensitive matters are often targets of social-engineering schemes conducted by actors seeking to harvest sensitive information. As negotiations on . . . climate change continues, it is probable intrusion attempts such as this will persist.

 

An intrusion in March 2011 into the SecurID password authentication system marketed by EMC, the security component of the defense contractor RSA, compromised some of the 25 million key fobs that generate “one-time” ac- cess codes, which led to the cloning of tokens distributed to Lockheed Martin employees. The attack was found to have originated in an ostensibly harm- less email titled “2011 Recruitment Plan” but which actually enabled the downloading of POISON IVY, a notorious, Chinese-built remote access tool. In consequence the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) initiated Operation starlight, a group of independent consultants, to recommend countermeasures. Then, in October 2011, Representative Mike Rogers, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, protested that cyber attacks from the PRC had reached an “intolerable level” and called on the adminis- tration to “confront Beijing,” saying “I don’t believe that there is a precedent in history for such a massive and sustained intelligence effort by a govern- ment to blatantly steal commercial data and intellectual property.”

A month later, in November 2011, the U.S. National Counterintelligence

Executive (NCIX) released a report that identified the PRC and Russia as being the principal perpetrators of cyber espionage and quoted the National Science Foundation (NSF) as estimating annual American losses at $398

billion, mainly in the field of research spending, asserting that “China and Russia view themselves as strategic competitors of the United States and are the most aggressive collectors of U.S. economic information and technolo- gy.”

Relying on data assembled between 2009 and 2011 by 13 other U.S. agencies, including the CIA and the FBI, the NCIX report noted that corpora- tions, universities, and government departments were being deliberately tar- geted by hackers to “gather enormous quantities of information with little risk,” while acknowledging the difficulty in tracing the precise whereabouts of the culprits, who routinely employed dispersed routers in third countries. Priority targets appeared to be pharmaceutical companies, military equip- ment manufacturers, and any organization working on advanced materials, although the NCIX report stated that the threat had not been fully recognized, noting that according to a 2010 study “only five percent of corporate chief financial officers are involved in network security matters, and only 13 per- cent of companies have a cross-functional cyber risk team that bridges the technical, financial, and other elements of a company.”

The computer networks of a broad array of U.S. government agencies,

private companies, universities and other institutions—all holding large vol- umes of sensitive economic information—were targeted by cyber espionage.

The NCIX report concluded that “many companies are unaware when their sensitive data is pilfered, and those that find out are often reluctant to report the loss, fearing potential damage to their reputation with investors, custom- ers and employees.”

Chinese cyber attacks have had startling consequences. In 2001 an attack code-named TITAN RAIN was aimed at defense contractors involved in the F-35 stealth fighter. Over a two-year period from 2012, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management suffered the compromise of SF-86 security clearance forms involving 22 million applicants.

In 2015, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping signed an agreement stating that neither nation would “knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.” In effect this treaty barred either country from using state-sponsored hackers to target the other’s private companies, and initially there was a dramatic drop in Chinese-identified hacking, by as much as 90 percent according to some estimates. However, within a year the attacks resumed with even greater frequency. These attacks are driven in part by the “Made in China 2025,” Zhongguo Zhizao 2025, initiative as Chinese entities attempt to enhance China’s industrial sector to the point that it will catch up with the West by 2025.

Some of the cyber incidents attributed to China include attacks on the Marriott Corporation, accessing 500 million records; British Airways, 380,000 records; and Facebook, more than 30 million records. In February 2018, Chinese hackers were responsible for a botnet denial-of-service attack

on GitHub. In June, 2019, 1.76 billion records worldwide were leaked by hackers, although Chinese actors were not responsible for all of them. An estimated 54 percent of all this activity was targeted against the United States.

In August 2019 cyber attacks attributed to the Chinese include the distri- bution of malware to Uighur populations, hacking U.S. cancer research insti- tutes, and Huawei assisting two African countries in tracking political rivals and accessing their opponents’ cyber communications. See also AVOCADO; GH0STNET; INFORMATION WARFARE; INFORMATION WARFARE MILITIA.

D

DA-CHUAN ZHENG. In 1984 Da-chuan Zheng, Kuang-shin Lin, Jing-li Zhang, David Tsai, and Allen Yeung were convicted of conspiring to illegal- ly export restricted military equipment to the People’s Republic of China. All had been identified during a sting operation conducted by federal agents and

U.S. Customs as seeking to purchase various items, such as radar jamming equipment, including English Electric Valve Company traveling wave tube amplifier chains and Watkins-Johnson Inc. traveling wave tube amplifiers. Described as a businessman from Hong Kong, Da-chuan Zheng acknowl- edged under interrogation that in recent years he had spent some $25 million on similar purchases. An attempt by the defendants to appeal a definition in their indictments as too vague was dismissed in July 1985. See also TECH- NOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

DANILOV, VALENTIN. A respected Russian physicist and head of the Thermo-Dynamics Center at Krasnoyarsk State Technical University, Valen- tin Danilov was arrested in 2004 and sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment, having been found guilty of espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic of China.

 

DASTYARI, SAM. Born in 1983 in Mazandaran Province, Iran, Sam Das- tryari arrived in Australia in 1988 with his parents and attended local schools. At the age of 16, he joined the Australian Labor Party and then studied at the University of Sydney, but he failed to graduate, asserting later that he was too involved in “the movement and student politics.” He subsequently gradu- ated from Macquarie University with a degree in politics.

In 2010 Dastyari was elected as general secretary of the New South Wales Labor Party, and in 2013 he was appointed by the Parliament of New South Wales to fill a vacant seat in the Australian Parliament. He attempted to renounce his Iranian citizenship but did not perform the military service required under Iranian law to do so. However, Dastyari noted that he had been issued a tourist visa by the Iranian government, which he interpreted as tacit acknowledgment that he was no longer an Iranian citizen. He held

 

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various posts within the Labor Party, and after its defeat in the 2016 election, he was promoted to manager of opposition business in the Senate. However, in September 2016, he resigned after it was discovered that he had a promi- nent donor, Zhu Minshen, with links to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who had paid for some of his travel.

In 2001 Zhu had established the Top Education Institute in Sydney and embarked on a campaign to gain influence within both of the two prominent political parties in Australia. Between 2010 and 2015 he gave $186,000 to the national Labor Party, and between 2013 and 2015 he donated $44,000 to the New South Wales Liberal Party. He also gave Dastyari $1,670 after the senator exceeded his official travel allowance.

Zhu was a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confer- ence (CPPCC), Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi, a political en- tity that serves in an advisory capacity for the PRC’s legislative body. Its members are principally members of the CCP and its aligned groups. Zhu has also been affiliated with the Confucius Institute at Sydney University.

It was determined that the Yuhu Group, founded by Chinese billionaire Huang Xiangmo, had helped Dastyari settle a legal matter in the amount of about $44,000. Huang, either directly or indirectly, gave $2.7 million to Australian political parties. He had moved to Australia in 2011 and resided in a $12 million mansion in Sydney. Due in part to suspicions that Huang was working on behalf of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchan- dang Zhongyang Tongzhan Bu, his permanent residency was canceled, and in February 2019 his bid for citizenship was rejected, in effect denying him entry into Australia. He has demanded that his political contributions be returned, but the Australian Taxation Office is pursuing a $141 million judg- ment against him for understating his income between 2013 and 2015.

An investigation of Dastyari’s finances revealed that in 2014 the Australia-

China Relations Institute had paid for the catering of an afternoon tea party for him. Also, a 15-day trip made by Dastyari to China had been funded by the Australian Fellowship of China Guangdong Associations Inc. In 2016 a nine-day trip to China was bankrolled by the China-Australian Guangdong Chamber of Commerce.

When Dastyari spoke at a Chinese-language press conference to voice his opposition to the Australian government’s policy regarding claims made by China over the South China Sea, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull accused him of accepting Chinese money in exchange for supporting the PRC’s ex- pansion into the region. On another occasion, Dastyari provided Huang Xiangmo with countersurveillance advice and tried to persuade a Labor Party spokesman not to meet a member of a Hong Kong pro-democracy group. A former head of Australia’s Office of National Assessments referred to Das- tyari as an agent of influence and a willing part of China’s effort to build

local support for its global policy positions. Petitions began to circulate call- ing for Dastyari to be charged with treason, and under increasing pressure Dastyari resigned from Parliament in January 2018.

 

DEBENTURE. The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) code name for a “black radio” station established in Singapore in 1954 intended to improve the flow of middle-class Chinese refugees across the frontier to Hong Kong. As the screening of refugees was SIS’s principal source of intelligence, DEBENTURE was intended to encourage more people to make the hazardous journey over the border. Originally planned to be sited in Hong Kong, political objections meant the transmitter had to be located in a secure military compound elsewhere.

 

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA). The Defense Intelligence Agency was formed on 1 October 1961 by President John F. Kennedy and is one of several United States intelligence agencies collecting information about China. The DIA is headquartered at the Anacostia-Bolling Air Force Base outside Washington, D.C., and trains defense attachés prior to their deployment in Beijing. Defense attaché reporting is collated by analysts who circulate their own assessments or contribute to National Intelligence Esti- mates (NIE) compiled under the authority of the director of national intelli- gence, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Council. The DIA also contributes to the President’s Daily Brief and concentrates on assessing Chinese naval strength, the Chinese nuclear weapons program, and per- sonalities within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military hierarchy, and it routinely issues threat assessments within a classified environment.

An estimated half of all DIA staff serve abroad in diplomatic missions in

140 countries and specialize in the collection of both human-source intelli- gence (HUMINT) while also liaising with foreign military organizations. The DIA is also responsible for the highly technical measurement and signa- ture intelligence (MASINT) program.

DIA attempts to operate inside China have met with only marginal suc- cess, at best. DIA offices located within Chinese diplomatic compounds have come to consider clandestine operations as extremely difficult due to ubiqui- tous surveillance that borders on harassment. In 1995, two DIA officers were expelled from China. See also HOU DESHENG; MONTAPERTO, RO- NALD N.

 

DENG. In February 2010, a 41-year-old consular officer employed by South Korea’s consulate in Shanghai resigned following an investigation con- ducted by the Ministry of Justice into the activities of his Chinese wife, an attractive woman identified only as Deng. Three years earlier he had reported

his discovery at home of compromising photographs of her with two of his colleagues, together with a computer file containing a collection of confiden- tial consular documents, including details of visa applications and a list of cell phone numbers belonging to 200 members of President Lee Myung- bak’s reelection campaign. According to her husband, Deng had been a civil servant until five years earlier, and the suspicion was that she had passed information to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. See also HONEYTRAP.

 

DENG XIAOPING. The Communist politician responsible in 1983 for creating the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. An intel- ligence agency intended as an outward-looking intelligence service, Deng’s organization replaced the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, as the PRC’s principal security apparatus. This was a major development, as hitherto the country had been isolated, with few diplomatic missions over- seas, and almost wholly preoccupied with issues of internal security. The creation of the MSS, charged with conducting intelligence collection opera- tions overseas, was a significant turning point for the country.

Born in Sichuan Province in 1904, Deng Xiaoping came from a farming background, but he studied in France, where he was influenced by Marxism. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China in 1923 and worked his way up through the Party ranks and in 1934 participated in the 6,000-mile Long March, Changzheng, with Mao Zedong. He was instru- mental in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) economic reconstruction after the disastrous Great Leap Forward, Da Yue Jin, started by Mao, but was twice purged during the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming. Afterward he embraced the Four Modernizations of China, Zhongguo De Si Ge Xiandaihua, originally announced by Zhou Enlai in 1973, as the goals for the PRC advocating reform in industry, science and technology, agriculture, and the military.

Following Mao’s death in September 1976, Deng outmaneuvered Mao’s

chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, and, although never becoming premier or even CCP chairman, became the PRC’s de facto leader in 1978.

Deng had five children by his third wife. Their son, Deng Pufang, was thrown out of a window by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and was confined to a wheelchair for the remainder of his life. A daughter, Deng Rong, was assigned to the PRC’s embassy in Washington, D.C., after nor- malization, adopting the alias Xiao Rong. She was accompanied by her hus- band, a military attaché, He Ping, a son of Marshal He Long, a veteran of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Long March. Deng died in Febru- ary 1997. See also PROJECT 863.

DING, JIAN WEI. On 28 October 2008 a federal grand jury in Minnesota indicted Jian Wei Ding, age 50 of Singapore; Ping Cheng, age 46 of Manhas- set, New York; and Kok Tong Lim, age 36, also of Singapore, for conspiring to export Toray carbon-fiber material, which had space and uranium-enrich- ment applications, to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Between Febru- ary and March 2009, all three pleaded to a single count of conspiracy to violate Export Administration regulations.

Ding controlled several Singaporean import-export companies, one of which acquired high-technology items for the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), Zhongguo Kongjian Jishu Yanjiu Yuan, a research in- stitute working on Chinese spacecraft programs. According to the prosecu- tion, Ding’s role was to manage the companies, maintain a relationship with the Chinese end users of his Toray purchases, and provide the funding. Cheng’s role was to act as the agent in the United States for Ding’s compa- nies, while Lim made contact with potential suppliers. The trio negotiated with a company in Minnesota that purported to be a supplier of aerospace commodities, and Ding admitted that he sent Cheng there twice to inspect Toray material. He also acknowledged that he instructed Cheng to export the Toray material to Singapore and Hong Kong without the required export license.

Cheng admitted that he had traveled from New York to Minnesota to

inspect 104 kilograms of Toray material prior to its final acceptance by Ding’s companies and that he had instructed his freight forwarder to ship his purchase to New York for storage before it could be shipped illegally. Final- ly, Lim confirmed that he had urged the Minnesota company to place an order of Toray material on behalf of Ding’s companies. The three face charges with a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of $1 million. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

DIRECTION  GÉNÉRALE  DE  LA  SÉCURITÉ  EXTÉRIEURE

(DGSE). One of the few Western intelligence agencies to operate a declared station in Beijing, the DGSE’s director, General René Imbot, posted an offi- cer to the French embassy in 1986. Later Imbot’s own son Thierry was sent to Beijing in a liaison role, but he died in mysterious circumstances following the sale of French frigates to Taiwan. In 2000 the Sino-French relationship cooled when the DGSE representative, known only as Henri, a well-regarded graduate of the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales with a degree in Mandarin, defected and was resettled by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. Described as taciturn, it was suggested that Henri had been suffering from depression after his wife declined to accompany him to China, and he had begun an affair with his interpreter. See also FRANCE; HONEYTRAP.

DIXIE MISSION. In July 1944 the U.S. Army Observation Group, known as the Dixie Mission, attempted to establish a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The mission consisted of 18 experienced China hands led by Colonel David D. Barrett and was to provide military analyses, while John S. Service from the Department of State was to provide political analysis. Hitherto, local intelli- gence collection had been in the hands of the U.S. naval attaché in Chong- qing, Commander James McHugh, who would later be replaced by Commo- dore Milton Miles.

Initially President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration had sought Chi- ang Kai-shek’s permission to send the delegation into what was a Commu- nist-controlled area of Yan’an, but Chiang had refused. However, after Vice President Henry Wallace visited Chiang in Chungking in June 1944 and agreed to remove General Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, an ardent critic of Chiang, permission was granted. Ironically, Stilwell had strongly supported the idea of the Dixie Mission, which had been advocated by foreign service officer John Paton Davies Jr. to President Roosevelt. Another concession was for Chiang to have a direct link to Roosevelt through General Patrick Hurley, a Texas oilman with no Far East experience who was chosen for the task. Hurley likened the differences between Chiang’s Kuomintang (KMT) and Mao Zedong’s Communists to the differences between Democrats and Re- publicans in the United States.

In July 1945, Hurley visited Tai Li, the KMT’s spymaster and head of the

Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) in Chongqing. Tai and SACO’s deputy director, Admiral Milton “Mary” Miles, who was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), persuaded Hurley that the Dixie Mission was more than a conspiracy by State Department personnel to favor Mao’s Communists and that the mission intended to use U.S. Army para- troopers to lead Communist guerrillas in combat. That, argued Hurley, was tantamount to de facto recognition of the Communists and their declared objective of destroying the KMT.

Meanwhile, John S. Service was reporting to Washington, D.C., that Mao’s Communists were more akin to European socialists than Soviet Com- munists and that an agrarian capitalism would emerge without the violence associated with the Bolshevik revolution. Furthermore, Barrett had evaluated the PLA by observing exercises and attending officer training schools, and he commented on the PLA’s excellent performance in combat, even though it had been over four years since the PLA had been deployed in large numbers of troops against the Japanese, and on that occasion the conflict had been a setback for the PLA. Nevertheless, the PLA maintained the illusion that they, in contrast to the KMT, were active and effective fighters. In reality the Communists had simply allowed Dixie Mission personnel to see only what

they wanted them to see, which usually consisted of specially staged events. Nor did anyone ask to visit Kang Sheng, though he was active behind the scenes in denying access to any aspect of his intelligence apparatus.

In March 1947 the last members of the Dixie Mission left China, but they were caught up in political controversy. Barrett was denied promotion to general, and both Davies and Service were drummed out of the State Depart- ment. However, after the normalization of relations with China, Service re- turned to China, where he was warmly received by China’s elite, including Mao Zedong. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

DU SHASHAN. Hired by General Motors (GM) in Detroit in 2000, 41-year- old Du Shashan obtained a transfer to a hybrid technology division three years later and began copying proprietary documents. In 2005, five days after she had been offered severance, she copied thousands more documents and set up a company, Millennium Technology International, to trade with Cher- ry Automobile, a GM competitor in mainland China. On 23 July 2010, Du Shashan and her husband, Qin Yu, aged 49, who are both U.S. citizens, were indicted by a federal grand jury in Michigan on conspiracy and fraud charges, having been charged in 2006 with destroying documents sought by investigators after they had been observed near a dumpster from which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) later recovered shredded documents. According to GM, the value of the stolen information was estimated at $40 million. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION.

 

E

EAGLE CLAW. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for the investigation of Larry Wu-tai Chin.

 

EAST TIMOR. In December 2007, East Timor, having already received a pair of elderly Shanghai-class patrol boats, received an offer from a defense firm in the People’s Republic of China to construct and manage a radar station to monitor maritime traffic in the Wetar Strait, a strategically impor- tant narrows between East Timor and Indonesia’s island of Pulau Wetar. Although the East Timorese government in Dili was keen to identify illegal fishing in the country’s territorial waters, there was a suspicion that the gift, manned by Chinese technicians, would have a covert intelligence collection function to watch movements in a choke point used by nuclear submarines and other vessels to transit the Pacific and Indian Oceans. After consulting Australia, the United States, and the Philippines, the offer was declined.

 

EIGHTH BUREAU. The Eighth Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu Di Ba Ju, operated as the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiuyuan, and later became responsible for counterespionage operations against external threats. The Ninth Bureau, Guojia Anquanbu Di Jiu Ju, monitors all organizations and individuals deemed to be anti-China and against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it runs investigations. It shares this responsibility with another MSS department that concentrates on domestic counterespionage and takes on investigations into, for example, foreign adherents of Falun Gong, the pro-democracy movement, and Chris- tians who campaign overseas. Reportedly in a recent success, the Eighth Bureau identified a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general who had been spying for Taiwan.

 

863 PROGRAM. The State High-Tech Development Plan, Guojia Gaoxin Jishu Kaifa Jihua, better known as the 863 Program, 863 Jihua, was first proposed in 1966 by engineers Wang Ganchang, Wang Daheng, Yang Jiaxi,

 

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and Chen Fangyun to Deng Xiaoping. As a result of his endorsement, the 863 Program was approved and named after the date of its establishment, March 1966, or the Chinese date format of 86/3. Its goal was to kick-start the development of technologies in a wide range of areas, with the stated purpose of making China independent of foreign technologies and their attendant financial obligations.

The program was initially implemented during the Seventh Five-Year Plan and continued through the two subsequent five-year plans. Under the plan, about $200 billion was to be devoted to information and communications technologies, with an additional $150 billion devoted to telecommunications. The program initially focused on seven key technologies: biotechnology, space, information technology, laser technology, automation, energy, and new materials. Since its implementation, telecommunications were added in

1992 and marine technology in 1996.

The plan has met with some successes, including the Loongson computer processor, the Tianhe supercomputers, and the Shenzhou spacecraft, but in 2011 Huang Kexue, a Canadian scientist living in Westborough, Massachu- setts, pleaded guilty to passing trade secrets to China, at least some of which were part of the 863 Program, which was formally disbanded in 2016.

 

ELEVENTH BUREAU. The Eleventh Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu Di Shiyu Ju, acquired responsibility for running the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiuyuan, when the Eighth Bureau took over counterespionage. The Eleventh Bureau fulfills the role of the MSS’s analytic branch and compiles reports for the Central Committee and the Party leadership drawn from open sources, academic research, and secret intelli- gence from the Fifth Bureau, Guojia Anquanbu Di Wu Ju. Although theoreti- cally a secret organization, the Eleventh Bureau is becoming more open and draws on a network of similar facilities across the country. It is also more reliant on open source reporting, conducting what might in any other society be regarded as legitimate journalistic research, although their actual topics and priorities are considered classified. As pressure grows from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership for information relating to international affairs, so the status of the Eleventh Bureau has become elevated. Because of the expertise developed within the Eleventh Bureau, its personnel are often transferred to other key positions within the MSS.

 

ENGELMANN, LARRY. An American academic from San Jose State Uni- versity studying in Nanjing at the Center for Chinese and American Studies, Larry Engelmann developed a relationship in 1988 with Xu Meihong, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA), General Staff Department (GSD), Sec-

EVANS, RICHARD M • 105

ond Bureau, Jiefangjun Di Er Ju Zong Canmou Bu, officer. A graduate of the PLA’s Institute of International Relations, Jiefangjun Guiji Guanxi Yueyan, in Nanjing, she was assigned by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, to monitor his activities and determine whether he was an authentic scholar or a spy. Having encouraged the liaison, the MSS began to suspect, from the intercepted letters Englemann mailed to the United States, that Engelmann had succeeded in turning the tables on Xu and had recruited her. She was arrested, dismissed from the PLA, and returned to her village. Years later, through considerable guile and luck, she would be reunited with Engelmann, and they were married in the PRC. She was eventually allowed to travel to the United States, where they later divorced, but they collaborated to write an account of their experiences in Daughter of China.

 

EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL

MILITARY COMMISSION. Established in 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s reforms, the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Junwei Zhuangbei Fuzhan Si, headed by Li Shang- fu, oversees all military-related technology matters such as development and acquisition, replacing the General Armaments Division, Jiefangjun Zongwu Zhuangbei Bu, of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA). In 2018 the State Department imposed sanctions on the organization under the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act after it purchased both fighter jets and missiles from the Russian arms exporter Rosoboronexport.

 

ETHEREAL THRONE. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for Jeffrey V. Wang, a 37-year-old engineer born in Honolulu em- ployed by the radar division of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, the defense contractor designing components for the F-15 Eagle and F-18 fight- ers, as well as the B-2 bomber. He was identified as a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, source by an FBI informant who claimed to his handler, David LeSueur, to have good contacts at the People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC) consulate in San Francisco and had already named Katri- na Leung, code-named PARLOR MAID, as an MSS spy. A lengthy investi- gation of Wang was conducted, including participation by one of his friends, Denise Woo, who was an FBI special agent. The operation was eventually terminated when it was realized that the informant held a family grudge against Wang, but in August 2004 Woo was indicted on leaking sensitive FBI information to him. She was later dismissed and fined $1,000.

 

EVANS, RICHARD M. Born in April 1928 and educated at Magdalen College, Oxford, Evans joined the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1952 and was posted to the Beijing station in 1956 before returning to London the

following year. He was back in Beijing in 1962 for two years and spent four years in Berne from 1964 before transferring to the Foreign Office. He was then appointed head of the Far Eastern Department and ended his diplomatic career as ambassador in Beijing from 1984 to 1988. In 1983 he published an unclassified version of a personality profile he had drafted for SIS, Deng Xiaoping: The Making of Modern China. After his retirement, and having received a knighthood, he worked as a research fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford. See also GREAT BRITAIN.

 

EWERT, ARTHUR. Arrested in Rio de Janeiro in December 1935, Arthur Ewert was a seasoned revolutionary with a German background who had emigrated from East Prussia before World War I to Detroit, where he had found work in a leather factory and become an active trade unionist. In 1917 he and Elise Saborowski moved to Toronto, only to be arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and deported for attempting to organize a branch of the banned Communist Party. Undeterred, Ewert worked for the Commu- nist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) and was invited to Moscow by the Comintern. He attended the Fifth Congress of the CPUSA in New York in August 1927 as Joseph Stalin’s personal representative, and upon his return to Moscow he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Third International and also to the Reichstag as a Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands deputy.

In 1931 Ewert was sent on a mission to Yuzhamtorg in Montevideo,

Uruguay, the Comintern’s Latin American cover organization, and when this had been completed successfully, he was posted with Elise to Shanghai, the Comintern’s Far East headquarters, carrying false American passports in the names of Harry Berger and Machla Lenzychi. They remained in China until July 1934, when they were recalled to Moscow and prepared for a new assignment, to accompany Luis Prestes to Brazil and participate in the mili- tary coup that would establish a Soviet-style government.

Although sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, Ewert was amnestied in May 1945 but, upon his return to Germany in 1947, was found to have been driven insane by the torture he had endured in captivity. He died in 1959. His wife Elise, deported to Germany with Olga in 1938, was last seen alive at Lichtenburg in 1941.

F

FALUN GONG. Created in 1992 by Li Hongzhi, the Falun Gong movement is a pacifist, Buddhist-based religion that adopted Taoist gymnastic exercise. It gained political notoriety when, on the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the organization unexpectedly held a huge silent vigil in the center of Beijing before quietly dispersing. It is considered to be one of the Five Poisons, Wu Du, by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (along with Uighurs, Tibetans, members of the Chinese democracy movement, and supporters of Taiwan independence) and as a consequence is subjected to internal oppressive surveillance and internationally to harassment by PRC diplomats and intelligence personnel.

Banned in April 1999, the movement was publicly condemned as an ille- gal sect and became a target for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. Falun Gong’s worldwide network of co-religionists sus- tained cyber attacks that eventually were traced to the Information Service Center of Xi’an, Xian Shi Xinxi Fuwu Zhangxin, in Beijing, reportedly an MSS front organization. Information about the Central Committee’s re- sponse to Falun Gong has been revealed by defectors, among them Chen Yonglin, who in July 2005 disclosed the existence of Central Bureau 610, Zhongyang Ju 610, and Zhang Jiyan, the wife of an auditor based until March 2007 at the Chinese embassy in Ottawa. See also AVOCADO; CY- BER ESPIONAGE; INFORMATION WARFARE; INFORMATION WAR- FARE MILITIA; SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO); TITAN RAIN.

 

FAN YANG. Fan Yang, born in China in 1985, emigrated to the United States aged 14 and enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 2005, rising to the rank of machinist’s mate second class while assigned to the guided-missile cruiser USS Cape St. George and the Naval Reserve Cargo Afloat Rig Team 1. In 2006 he became a U.S. citizen and in 2011 earned an undergraduate degree in computer engineering from the State University of New York and a mas- ter’s degree from Syracuse University the following year. After attending officer candidate school, he was commissioned an ensign in 2012 and was

 

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later promoted to the rank of lieutenant (O 3), assigned to the highly sensitive Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Weapons School in 2018. While per- forming anti-submarine duties in Jacksonville as a naval flight officer flying aboard a P-8A Poseidon aircraft, he was granted a Top Secret clearance.

On 17 October 2019 Fan was arrested at the naval base while his wife Yang Yang, also known as Yang Chen and “Ynki,” was arrested at the couple’s home nearby. Yang and Yang Yang were charged with attempting to smuggle American-made inflatable boats and equipment to China by using a shell company in Hong Kong, but the ultimate purchaser was the Shanghai Breeze Technology Company Ltd., Shanghai Weifeng Keji Youxian Gongsi. Additionally, Fan was accused of providing a handgun to a foreign national as well as lying to a firearms dealer and the navy regarding his ties to the foreign national Ge Songtao, also known as “Sherman.” Aged 49, Ge was chairman of Shanghai Breeze Technology Company and had been issued a B1/B2 visa in September 2016, set to expire in September 2026, that allowed temporary entry into the United States for business and tourism.

Ge was also arrested on 17 October along with another Chinese associate,

Yan Zheng, aged 27, known as “the Mistress.” Both were charged with conspiring to submit false and misleading export information and attempting to export sensitive equipment to China.

An investigation involving scrutiny of some 400 emails exchanged be- tween Ge and Yang from November 2016 to September 2019 revealed an undeclared business relationship with Ge and the registration of the company BQ Tree LLC, which essentially represented Shanghai Breeze Technology’s interests in the United States. In the period under scrutiny, the company received wire transfers from Shanghai Breeze Technology in the amount of

$205,270. The intercepted emails also suggested that Fan had a long-standing account at the state-owned Bank of China, Zhongguo Yinhang, in Beijing dating back to at least December 2012.

Yang Yang was also accused of attempting to buy several inflatable boats, valued at $266,000, that were to be sent to the Fisheries Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongye Nongcunbu. The actual final destination of the boats had been concealed by sending them through Hong Kong businesses. The FBI recorded a conversation between Yang Yang and Fan noting that the end use of the vessels was the PRC. An examination of shipping records showed there had been 24 exports to Shanghai Breeze Tech- nology Company, including at least 10 boats, and a consignment of computer flash dives. The trial of the three defendants was set for July 2020.

 

FAR EAST COMBINED BUREAU (FECB). The cover name of the Brit- ish cryptographic organization in prewar Hong Kong, the FECB began oper- ations on Stonecutter’s Island in 1932 under the leadership of Captain Arthur

Shaw RN but was evacuated in 1941 to Kranji, Singapore, and then to Kandy. Shaw was succeeded by Captain John Waller and then by Captain F.

J. Wylie. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the FECB was replaced by Combined Intelligence Far East, located in Singapore. See also GREAT BRITAIN; SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS).

 

FARRELL, FRANK. Formerly a newspaper correspondent, Major Frank Farrell of the U.S. Marines operated as an intelligence officer in southern China during World War II and was successful in neutralizing Germans in Canton and Shanghai after the Nazi surrender in May 1945 when many were inclined to continue supporting local Japanese networks.

 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI). The FBI is unique

among the world’s law enforcement and security agencies, as it serves both a federal police function with responsibility for pursuing more than 200 cate- gories of federal crimes, and as the United States’ principal internal security agency. Because of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, the FBI is also increasing- ly required to conduct investigations abroad, mainly terrorist related, and posts a large number of personnel overseas. It was established in 1935 from the former Bureau of Investigation and is probably the best-known law en- forcement and security agency in the world. It is an increasingly intelligence- and threat-focused national security organization with both intelligence and law enforcement functions.

In May 2018, FBI director Christopher Wray testified at a budget hearing in Washington, D.C., and provided an overview of the organization’s staff and the size of its budget. Wray asked for a budget for fiscal year 2019 of

$8.87 billion, with a total of 34,694 personnel, including 12,927 special agents, 3,055 intelligence analysts, and 18,712 professional support staff. In December 2018 Wray referred to “37,000 FBI employees.”

The FBI’s budget is funded from two different areas of government, with the criminal division budgeted from one declared area while the budget for intelligence, counterintelligence, and international terrorism is drawn from the National Foreign Intelligence Program and is classified. There are 56 domestic field offices as well as more than 350 subordinate regional offices. Further, there are more than 60 international offices, headed by FBI agents referred to as “legal attachés,” who enjoy diplomatic status in the host coun- tries to which they are accredited.

In September 2002, after years of negotiations by a State Department team led by Donald Keyser, who long had a productive relationship with the FBI, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) allowed the FBI to open a provisional legal attaché’s office in Beijing for a period of two years. Special Agent Anthony Lau, who had been the legal attaché at the U.S. consulate-general in

Hong Kong, was transferred to Beijing. Upon his retirement in 2003, he was replaced temporarily by Special Agent William Liu. In April 2004, FBI Director Robert Mueller visited Beijing, and the PRC agreed to give the legal attaché’s office full diplomatic status, so Liu became the first fully accredited legat in Beijing, with responsibility for the PRC and Mongolia.

The FBI has a unique relationship with China’s security and intelligence organizations, cooperating with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, in criminal investigations while negotiating a diplomatic tight- rope with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, which engages in cyber espionage and theft of intellectual property and the recruit- ment of U.S. personnel.

The FBI is the principal agency responsible for counterintelligence opera- tions in the United States, and after normalization of relations with the PRC in January 1979, it increased the number of staff assigned to investigations involving China. FBI personnel had previously been assigned to monitor personnel centering around the United Nations; such groups as Maoist stu- dent organizations, the Revolutionary Union, and the Diaoyutai movement (Protect Diaoyutai, Baohu Diao Yu Tai); and any foreign intelligence spon- sors.

Concentrated on the Washington Field Office (WFO), the China Squad, the exact size of which remains classified, conducts classified physical and technical surveillance operations on hostile intelligence personnel based at the PRC’s embassy and liaises with its counterparts in the Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the State De- partment, and other 17 members of the U.S. Intelligence Community. FBI headquarters (FBIHQ) has liaison personnel assigned to the various compo- nents of the community, and senior FBIHQ management personnel also serve as the principal counterintelligence contacts for foreign liaison officers posted in Washington.

The FBI’s Chinese counterintelligence program is concentrated at head- quarters in the National Security Division (NSD), formerly the Intelligence Division, and has the two components of operational and analytical re- sources. Meanwhile, the Washington Field Office has a large squad devoted to Chinese counterintelligence and is the focal point of the FBI’s efforts at monitoring the PRC’s diplomatic and military establishment in Washington. Similar squads are located in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Hous- ton, and Chicago, where personnel with expertise in China matters have traditionally been assigned and where there are large ethnic Chinese commu- nities as well as international organizations such as the United Nations. Fur- ther, smaller numbers of FBI personnel are assigned Chinese investigations and are scattered around FBI field offices to monitor PRC activities, includ- ing students and traveling delegations.

The NSD is headed by an assistant director, though in the past very few had any real background in Chinese matters. Indeed, one assistant director minimized the threat posed by the PRC, disparaged the China program, and advocated its closure. Bruce Carlson was the first and only NSD assistant director to be truly a China expert, fluent in the language and with a real understanding of China’s history and culture.

The FBI’s essential expertise in China matters rested in select field offices, especially at the Washington Field Office and in New York and San Francis- co, where a small but dedicated cadre of FBI special agents developed con- siderable skill. These agents were imbued with Chinese history and culture, and many possessed Chinese-language skills. For many years, the FBIHQ Chinese counterintelligence program competed for resources and attention with those units covering the Soviet bloc, and in the field offices, with squads pursuing criminal investigations. While there were staff with considerable China backgrounds who headed the FBIHQ’s China Unit, at times there were some with very little relevant expertise. This was largely because the FBI’s China program had been relatively small during the formative years immedi- ately after the normalization of diplomatic relations, and because of the ab- sence of any established career path within the organization for personnel dealing with counterintelligence in general, and those assigned to Chinese counterintelligence in particular. Any ambitious FBI special agent assigned to China counterintelligence was obliged to transfer to other sections to achieve promotion to the FBI’s coveted Senior Executive Service.

The FBI is an integral part of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partner-

ship and has liaison personnel throughout the U.S. Intelligence Community. In particular, there is a close working relationship with the National Security Agency (NSA), and the FBI remains the agency’s principal consumer of domestic information.

The original small cadre of true China experts have all retired, and it appears those replacing them do not possess the same degree of historical and cultural awareness as their predecessors. But these agents, relatively young and inexperienced in China-related issues, take a pragmatic approach to China criminal investigations and have displayed considerable acumen in developing prosecutable cases. They are aided by the greatly enhanced ana- lytical capabilities of individuals with Chinese expertise who have in effect replaced the original core of China expertise. See also AMERASIA; ANU- BIS; BOEING 767-300ER; CAMPCON; CHANG FEN; CHI MAK; CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI; CHINCOM; CHUNG, GREG; ETHEREAL THRONE; GOWADIA, NOSHIR S; HOU DESHENG; KAO YEN MEN; LEE, DA- VID YEN; LEE, DUNCAN C; MIN GWO BAO; PARLOR MAID; PRICE, MILDRED; SHAN YANMING; SUCCOR DELIGHT; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; TECHNOLOGY COUNTERFEITING.

FIFTH ACADEMY. The Fifth Academy, Di Wu Xueyuan, was created by the Ministry of National Defense in 1956 and headed by Qian Xuesen. It became China’s principal research establishment concentrating on missile and satellite development.

 

FIFTH BUREAU. The Fifth Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu Di Wu Ju, is responsible for secret intelligence reporting and the assessment of intelligence before it is circulated to the Eleventh Bureau, Guojia Anquanbu Di Shi Yu Ju, for distribution outside the MSS.

 

FIRMSPACE. In October 2008 three employees and two directors of a Singapore-based import-export business, FirmSpace, were indicted on charges of conspiring to export embargoed carbon-fiber technology to the PRC. The sensitive material, with applications in the space technology and nuclear fuel enrichment fields, was ordered from a Minnesota manufacturer by Ding Jian Wei and Lim Kok Tong for delivery to an address in New York where a third employee, Cheng Ping, was to store it before it was shipped overseas. According to the indictment, FirmSpace’s directors were two Chi- nese nationals, Gao Xiang and Hou Xinlu. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

FIRST BUREAU. The First Bureau of the Second Department of the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) General Staff Department (GSD), Jie- fangjun Di Er Bu Di Yi Ju, is a geographic section concentrating on Taiwan and Hong Kong. It deployed personnel under commercial, journalistic, and academic cover and used the state-owned Bank of China, Zhongguo Yin- hang; state-owned China Resources, Hua Run; and the state-owned China Everbright Group, Zhongguo Guangda Jituan Gufen Gongsi, as vehicles for its operations.

 

FIVE EYES. To the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States, the Five Eye intelligence alliance is a vital part of their individual and collective security. To the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the alliance is a threat to its sovereignty and a primary example of the Anglosphere and a reminder of its recent prerevolutionary past when Western nations exploited China to the country’s detriment.

Five Eyes, sometimes abbreviated as FVEY, has its origins in the 1943 BRUSA Agreement (Britain-United States Agreement), which created the basis of cooperation between the U.S. War Department (the forerunner to the U.S. Department of Defense) and the British government’s Code and Cypher

School. BRUSA formalized the exchange of personnel and established joint rules and regulations for the handling of highly sensitive material. That agreement formed the foundation for all signals intelligence (SIGINT) activ- ities of both the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

On 5 March 1946 Colonel Patrick Marr-Johnson of the United Kingdom’s London Signals Intelligence Board and Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg of the U.S. State-Army-Navy Communication Intelligence Board signed the United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA), which ex- tended the wartime treaty in the peace and provided a framework for the worldwide interception and distribution of communications traffic.

In 1948 the UKUSA Agreement was extended to include Canada, fol- lowed by Australia and New Zealand in 1956. These three countries are referred to as “UKUSA-collaborating Commonwealth countries” in the up- dated agreement, which brought those countries’ SIGINT organizations into the fold, being Canada’s Communications Security Establishment, Austra- lia’s Defence Signals Directorate, and New Zealand’s Government Commu- nications Security Bureau.

A fundamental aspect of the Five Eyes is that the participating countries do not collect intelligence against one another. Instead, as Admiral Dennis Blair, a former director of national intelligence, said in 2013, “We do not spy one each other. We just ask.”

An essential component of the Five Eyes collaboration has been the dis- crimination program code-named ECHELON, which enables the identifica- tion of telephone traffic transmitted globally on satellite and microwave channels, thereby giving the participants the unique advantage of intercept- ing communications across the world. The extent of echelon’s capability was a closely guarded secret, but in 2015 the defector Edward Snowden con- firmed that echelon was part of a broader program, FROSTING, of which TRANSIENT was designed to intercept Russian satellite transmissions.

Initially, and well into the Cold War, the unique, unrivaled nature of the Five Eyes cooperation was dependent on the physical location of signals intercept sites and satellite ground stations that offered 24-hour coverage of the entire world, exploiting ionosphere bounce and other characteristics of broadcast propagation to give access to the communications traffic of poten- tial (and actual) adversaries.

In addition to the original five members of the UKUSA Agreement, there is a Nine Eyes Intelligence Alliance, which added Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway, as well as a Fourteen Eyes Intelligence Alliance that added Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001, intelligence collection priorities shifted from recognized state actors to groups of transnational ter- rorists, and this change in targeting coincided with a perceived greater threat

from an increasingly belligerent PRC as it embarked on a military buildup and engaged in the state sponsorship of industrial espionage intended to support the country’s burgeoning economy. The relatively new phenomenon of government-approved theft of other countries’ trade secrets and intellectu- al property, and its undisguised participation in cyber warfare, represented an unprecedented challenge to the West’s ability to develop and retain innova- tive technology. Accordingly, through its government’s behavior, the PRC virtually self-selected its status as a priority target for intelligence collection of all types.

Because of the essential interconnectivity of international communications and the mutual reliance on very advanced technology, the Five Eyes nations have encountered a dilemma as the dangers posed by Huawei are assessed and the company, inevitably compromised by its links to the PRC govern- ment, expands its worldwide influence through the 5G network. Meanwhile, the United States continues to persuade its fellow Five Eyes partners to block Huawei from building their countries’ 5G networks, the argument being that even peripheral involvement in the project could be abused by Beijing.

After decades of intense secrecy, there are indications that the Five Eyes partnership is emerging from the shadows. This may in part be an attempt to counter misconceptions and poor publicity generated by the 2014 Snowden disclosures, but in July 2018, when various intelligence heads met in Nova Scotia, the attendant publicity extended only to the dinner menu. In August 2018, when the Five Eyes members met on Australia’s Gold Coast, the Australian home affairs minister who hosted the gathering arranged for the members to be photographed together for the media.

For the PRC, the very existence of Five Eyes is anathema, and Beijing is acutely aware of the air, marine, and even underwater SIGINT collection operations conducted off China’s coast. Somewhat surrounded electronically and physically, China’s leadership feels boxed in, with limited ability to respond, and it is sensitive to what is perceived to be malign foreign interfer- ence through the West’s support of subversive elements and other manifesta- tions of external interference in the country’s economy and domestic affairs.

The principal offensive instrument is the Five Eyes alliance, and Snow- den’s defection served to highlight the scale and potential of a very real existential threat. In the immediate aftermath of the U.S. indictment of Hu- awei and the arrest in Canada of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer and the daughter of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, on a U.S. war- rant, the Global Times, Huanqui Shibao, an influential Chinese newspaper, weighed in. The Times, which is owned by the Chinese Communist Party’s official mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, Renmin Ribao, observed, “China should focus on the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, especially Australia, New Zealand and Canada, who actively follow the U.S. against China.”

FIVE POISONS. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has identified five groups, the Five Poisons, Wu Du, that are considered to be a threat to the stability of the CCP itself. Those groups are the Uighurs, especially the supporters of the East Turkestan independence movement; Tibetans, espe- cially those supporting the Tibetan independence movement; the Falun Gong; members of the Chinese democracy movement; and advocates of the Taiwan independence movement.

In ancient Chinese lore, the Five Poisons referred to the fifth day of the fifth month, which signaled the beginning of summer. Known as “Double 5th Day,” Tian Zhong Jie, it was considered to be one of the more hazardous days of the year because all the dangerous insects and animals would appear. Various means were adopted to combat the danger, including the consump- tion of poison and wearing Five Poison charms and amulets. See also CHI- NA CABLES; UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT (UFWD).

 

FONDREN, JAMES W. In May 2009 a senior Department of Defense officer based at the Pentagon was arrested and charged with espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), apparently having been recruited under a “false flag” by a Taiwanese, Tai Shen Kuo. However, a month later his indictment was changed to accuse him of having worked for Beijing for more than a decade. Aged 62, Lieutenant Colonel Fondren held Top Secret clearances as deputy director of the Washington liaison office for the U.S. Pacific Command. He was charged with passing secrets to Kuo, whom he had first met at a country club in Houma, Louisiana.

According to the indictment, Fondren wrote an email in 1998 stating that Kuo was using opinion papers on Taiwanese military issues that Fondren provided to ingratiate himself with the Chinese government. Then in 1999 the two men traveled together to the coastal town of Zhuhai in the PRC to meet a government official, Lin Hong, to whom Fondren promised to obtain reports on missile defenses in Taiwan. He would later exchange more than 40 emails with the Chinese between 1999 and 2000. Between June 1998 and January 2000, Kuo paid nearly $8,000 to Fondren’s consultancy, Strategy Inc. After his official retirement, Fondren returned as a contractor to the Defense Department, and Kuo apparently claimed to be working for Taiwan. Convicted in September 2009 on one count of passing classified information to an agent of a foreign government, Fondren was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on 22 January 2010, which he served in a federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE (FLI). Known as the People’s Lib- eration Army’s Institute 793, Jiefangjun Xueyuan 793, the Foreign Lan- guage Institute was absorbed into the People’s Liberation Army’s Institute of

International Relations, Jiefangjun Guiji Guanxi Yueyan, after the Cultural Revolution (Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Da- geming) in 1976. Located at Luoyang and Nanjing, the FLI provides training for personnel prior to an assignment overseas.

 

FOURTH DEPARTMENT. The Fourth Department of the People’s Liber- ation Army’s (PLA) General Staff Department (GSD), Jiefangjun Di Si Bu Zong Canmou Bu, is the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) electronic warfare organization, also known as the Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department, Dianzi Duikang Yu Leida Bu.

The Fourth Department was probably established in 1990, though the ultra-secretive department has not confirmed its actual date. Very likely formed in response to the failure of the Chinese communications network during the border conflict with the Soviet Union in 1969, it evolved over the years into its present form. Later, the PLA was influenced by the electronic domination achieved by the United States at the outset of the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars, and over time the Fourth Department became the primary agency responsible for information warfare (IW), winning an internal struggle with the PLA’s Third Department of the General Staff Department (GSD), Jie- fangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di San Bumen, where responsibility for signals collection lies. A major influence on the role of the Fourth Department was PLA major general Dai Qingmin, who as head of the PLA’s Academy of Electronic Engineering, Jiefangjun Dianzi Gongcheng Xueyuan, wrote a de- finitive book describing what he referred to as “integrated network electronic warfare” (INEW), zonghe wangkuo dianzi zhan. Dai, now retired, was named as head of the Fourth Department in 2000 and served in that capacity for five years, but his ideas still influence the Fourth Department even today.

The research facilities most closely associated with electronic intelligence

(ELINT) and the development of radar jammers are the 29th Research Insti- tute, Di 29 Yanjiu Suo, in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, and the 36th Research Institute, Di Sanshiliu Yanjiu Suo, in Hefei, with academic study and training conducted at the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Electronic Engi- neering, Jiefangjun Dianzi Gongcheng Xueyuan, also located in Hefei, Anhui Province.

The PRC’s targets include the U.S. Navstar Global Positioning System, airborne early-warning platforms, and American military networks such as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Israel and China developed secret military ties that led to the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), Dianzi Gongye Bu, now the Ministry of Industry and In- formation Technology (MIIT) of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Gongaye He Xinxihuabu, reportedly contracting with several Israeli companies and forming joint ventures with the Southwest

Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE), Xinan Dianzi Shebei Yanjiu Suo; the Hebei-based MEI 54th Research Institute, Dianzi Gongye Bu Di 54 Yang- jiu Suo; and the Anhui-based East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering, Huadang Dianzi Gongcheng Yanjiu Suo, or the MEI 36th Re- search Institute, Dianzi Gongye Bu Di 36 Yanjiu Suo, under the generic title Project 863, Xiangmu 863. This had the desired effect of providing the Chinese with a substantial technological boost in developing ELINT capabil- ities.

Much of the Fourth Department’s ELINT research is undertaken by the SWIEE and the PLA’s General Staff Department’s (GSD) 54th Research Institute, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Wushisi Yanjiu Suo. An ELINT satellite program, known as technical experimental satellites, jishu shiyan weixing, was developed by the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics, Project 701, Shanghai Yuhang Ju Xiangmu 701. Western intelligence analysts subse- quently learned that the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology, Shanghai Hangtian Jishu Yan Jiu Yuan, established in 1993 as the Eighth Academy of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Zhongguo Hangtian Keji Jituan Gongsi, the successor of the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics, Shanghai Shi Hangtian Ju, took over the program.

The Fourth Department is also responsible for space-based photorecon-

naissance, euphemistically referred to as remote sensing, yaogan, and the collection of imagery. The first experimental imagery system was launched in November 1975, and by 2011 nine yaogan satellites were operational. Then in September 1987 the FSW-1, fanhuishi weixing, or recoverable satel- lite, was put into orbit from the Jinquan Satellite Launch Center, Jinquan Weixing Fashe Zhongxin, and returned to earth in Sichuan Province with its film. This was followed by the successful launch of four additional FSW-1 satellites between 1987 and 1992.

The FSW-2 variant, loaded with 2,000 meters of film, boasted a resolution of at least 10 meters, and the first, the Jianbing-1B, was launched in August 1992, with further insertions in 1994 and 1996, each lasting 15 or 16 days before returning with the exposed film cassette. These launches, described as “scientific surveys,” kexue diaocha, continued on 20 October 1996 but were followed by several different electro-optical remote-sensing platforms, in- cluding the FSW-3 and a series designed by the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), Zhongguo Kongjian Jishu Yanjiu Yuan, operating in a 700-kilometer sun-synchronous orbit with a five-meter resolution. Another series, the Ziyuan-1, or ZY-1, developed in a joint venture with Brazil, in- cludes a data transmission capability from an altitude of 778 kilometers with a 20-meter resolution.

The PRC’s intelligence satellites are managed by the National Remote Sensing Center (NRSC), Guojia Yaogan Zongxin, via a ground station at Lizhong. The NRSC’s research branch is the Institute of Remote Sensing Application, Yaogan Yingyong Yanjiu Suo, with five basic research depart- ments, three technology research departments, and the Center for Airborne Remote Sensing, Ji Zai Yaogan Zhongxin, and the Computer Applications Center, Diannao Yingyong Zhongxin, both sponsored by Project 863, 863 Jihua.

The PRC’s first indigenous synthetic aperture radar satellites, hecheng kongjing leida weixing, which can detect targets through clouds, became operational in 2004 following preliminary work at the China Academy of Sciences Institute of Electronics’ 501st, Zhongguo Kexueyuan Dianzi Xue Yanjiu Suo 501, and 504th Research Institutes, Di 504 Yanjiu Suo (Xi’an Institute of Space Radio Technology, Xian Kongjian Wuxiandian Jishu Yan- jiu Suo); the Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering, Shanghei Weixing Gongcheng Xueyuan; MEI’s 14th Research Institute, Dianzi Gongye Bu DI Shissi Yanjiu Suo; and the SWIEE. The China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control Center (CLTC), Zhongguo Weixing Fashe Yu Genzong Kongzhi Zongju, established in 1986, manages the China Deep Space Network, Zhongguo Shen Kong Wang. The program has been handicapped by the lack of ground stations for data relay satellites, shuju zhongji weixing. In 2011 the Chinese employed the Australian tracking station at Mingenew to track the launch of the Shezhou satellite, having closed a facility on Kiribati in 2003 when China terminated diplomatic relations in protest of the country’s formal recognition of Taiwan. However, in September 2019, Kiribati changed its recognition back to the PRC, and it is assumed China will reopen its moth- balled space station.

In 2017 the PRC inaugurated a 492-acre ground station in the remote

Neuquén Province of Argentina, an estimated $50 million investment. The agreement, negotiated between China and the financially stressed provincial government, gives China a 50-year free lease. The China Remote Sensing Satellite Ground Station (RSGS), Zhongguo Yaogan Weixing Dimian Zha, established in 1986, has ground stations in Miyun, Kashi, Sanya, Kunming, and Kiruna in northern Sweden.

The Fourth Department’s project to develop a space-tracking system be- gan with the launch of the first Dong Fang Hong communications satellite, which was developed by the Luoyang Institute of Tracking, Telemetry, and Telecommunications, Luoyang Shi Genzong Yu Yaoce Tongxin Yanjiu Suo, and then controlled from the Xi’an Satellite Control Center, Xi’an Waixing Jiankong Zhongxin, in eastern Beijing.

The PRC’s plans to develop an over-the-horizon radar with a range of 250 kilometers, initiated in 1967, stalled because of export restrictions on sensi- tive components, but it was able to resume in 1985 after steps had been taken

to acquire the technology. More recent research on the advanced radar, undertaken at the Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Gongye Daxue, has developed systems capable of tracking aircraft at a range of 1,000 kilometers as well as a high-frequency variant to monitor low-altitude and sea-skimming targets.

Another Fourth Department priority is phased array radar, on which China began research in 1970 at the MEI’s 14th Institute in Nanjing. As an ad- vanced radar system essential for space tracking and providing missile early warning, an experimental 7010 apparatus was installed at an altitude of 1,600 meters near Xuanhua, manned by a Second Artillery unit.

The Third Department is also developing and producing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), wuren jiashi feiji, at the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA), Beijing Hangkong Hangtian Daxue; the Research Institute of Unmanned Flight Vehicle Design, Wu Ren Feixingqi Sheji Yan Jiu Suo; and the Institute of Unmanned Aircraft, Wu Ren Ji Yanjiu Suo. The university changed its English name to Beihang University. Among its pro- jects is the ASN-209, developed by the Aisheng Technology Group Compa- ny Ltd., Ai Sheng Keji Jituan Yuexian Gongsi (ASN Technology Group Company Ltd.), which boasts a coverage range of 120 miles at about 90 mph, with a 10-hour endurance capability and a service ceiling of 16,000 feet. In 2012, the PRC and Egypt signed an agreement for Egypt to build 12 ASN- 209 UAVs, including technology transfer in order to enhance Egypt’s drone industry.

China’s increased effectiveness in developing space technology was dem-

onstrated by the launch of five new remote-sensing satellites on a Long March–11 rocket from the Jinquan Satellite Launch Center, Jinquan Weixing Fashe Zhongxin, in the Gobi Desert in September 2019. The carrier rocket was developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, Zhongguo Yunzai Huojian Jishu Yan Jiu Yuan, and the satellites by the Harbin Institute of Technology; it was operated by Zhuai Orbita Aerospace Science and Technology, Shuai Guidao Hangkong Hangtian Keji Youxian Gongsi.

 

FRANCE. French companies engaging in business partnerships in the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC) have found themselves the victims of indus- trial espionage, with joint ventures being abused as conduits for the illicit acquisition of proprietary commercial information. The state-owned Renault car manufacturer has claimed to have lost sensitive data through the corrup- tion of its senior management in the PRC, and TGV contractors bidding to participate in the construction of a high-speed train found themselves ex- cluded after they had made a significant commitment in sharing expertise.

The French intelligence community has issued warnings concerning the activities of 20,000 PRC students in France, citing the example of a visitor, a member of an official delegation, taking a sample of a patented liquid by dipping his tie into it while on a tour of a laboratory. Reportedly in 2000 the Direction Générale de la Securité Extérieure’s (DGSE) representative in Beijing succumbed to a honeytrap and defected.

Prior to the G20 finance ministers’ meeting in Paris in February 2011, a concerted attempt was made to illegally access an estimated 10,000 French government computers, an attack that was reportedly traced to the PRC.

In May 2018 two DGSE officers were charged with treason-related crimes involving China. Referred to as “Henri M” (Henri Manioc), a 71-year-old former DGSE station chief in Beijing in 1997, and “Pierre-Marie H” (Pierre- Marie Winterat), aged 68, they had been arrested in December 2017 and were accused of spying for a foreign power, compromising classified secrets, and delivering information detrimental to fundamental national interests. Re- portedly Manioc had conducted an illicit affair with his ambassador’s Chi- nese interpreter and had been honeytrapped.

One of those arrested was also charged with directly inciting treason. More specifically, they were charged with handing over sensitive information re- lating to the working methods of the DGSE. A third person, thought to have been the wife of one of the defendants, was charged with the concealment of treasonable crimes and placed under judicial control.

In October 2018 the French internal security service, Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), warned of the vulnerability of French citizens with LinkedIn accounts. The DST report indicated that some 4,000 individuals had been targeted by Chinese spies and “hundreds” had been swayed by offers of jobs or collaboration from fake LinkedIn contacts. See also BOURSICOT, BERNARD; CYBER ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

FRANK, DESMOND DINESH. On 8 October 2007, Desmond Dinesh Frank, a citizen and resident of Malaysia and the operator of Asian Sky Support in that country, was arrested in Hawaii by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and charged in November with conspiring to illegally export C-130 military aircraft and training equipment to the PRC, illegally exporting defense articles, smuggling, and two counts of money laundering. According to the prosecution, he had attempted to illegally ex- port 10 indicators, servo-driven tachometers used in C-130 military flight simulators, to Malaysia and ultimately to Hong Kong without the required license. In May 2008 Frank pleaded guilty to the charges, and in August he was sentenced in Massachusetts to 23 months’ imprisonment. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

G

GARDELLA, LAWRENCE. In October 1981, Sing a Song to Jenny Next, purporting to be the memoirs of a former U.S. Marine, Lawrence Gardella, who had died in February of that year, was published and was described as the “incredible true account” of a secret mission into China in May 1952. He claimed to have been parachuted into Manchuria to join a group of 25 Na- tionalist guerrillas and attack a nuclear facility beneath the Sungari reservoir. Having achieved his objective, Gardella recalled how, in the face of over- whelming odds, he trekked across 1,000 miles of China in just 22 days and made contact with American forces that arranged for him alone to be col- lected off the beach by a U.S. Navy submarine. Included in this story was a missed opportunity to have killed Mao Zedong. Upon his return, the lone marine was congratulated by President Harry S. Truman on 28 June 1952 at the U.S. Navy hospital at Annapolis, who swore him to secrecy.

In the decade following publication, numerous official documents were

declassified and released by the U.S. National Archive which revealed that some military units, including several Ranger companies, had indeed infil- trated North Korea during the Korean War, penetrating far behind enemy lines and invariably had been landed by sea. However, none of the units mentioned, nor the missions listed, bore any resemblance to Gardella’s tale. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

GE YUEFIE. In June 2006, two NetLogic Microsystems employees, Ge Yuefie, a Chinese national aged 34 of San Jose, and Lee Lan, an American aged 42 of Palo Alto, were indicted on industrial espionage charges, having been identified by a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) source as being responsible for the theft of trade secrets. The information had come from an anonymous email traced to Ge’s wife. According to the FBI’s Christian Cano, Ge and Lee had attempted to receive funding from Project 863, 863 Jihua, also known as China’s State High-Tech Development Plan, Guojia Goxin Jishu Kaifa Jihua, and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Gen- eral Armaments Division, Jiefangjun Zongwei Ke (now the Equipment De- velopment Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Jun-

 

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wei Zhuagbei Fuzhan Si), and had illegally downloaded proprietary software designed to develop a network coprocessor chip. The pair had formed SICO Microsystems, a Delaware corporation, to market information stolen from the Taiwan Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Company. See also TECHNOL- OGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT (GSD), PEOPLE’S LIBERATION

ARMY. The General Staff Department, Zongcanmou Bu, of the People’s Liberation Army was originally established in 1954 and was preceded by the General Staff of the People’s Revolutionary Military Committee, Renmin Geming Junshi Weiyuanhui Zong Canmou Bu. Like its predecessor, the GSD was controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhongyang Jun- shi Weiyuanhui, and was politically subordinate to the PLA’s General Politi- cal Department, Jiefangjun Zong Zhengzhi Bu. In January 2016 the GSD was abolished as part of the reforms of President Xi Jinping, and its duties were absorbed by the newly created Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui Canmou Bu.

In the more than 60 years of its existence, the GSD was headed by several luminaries of China’s revolutionary past, including Generals Huang Kecheng and Luo Ruiqing, as well as Deng Xiaoping, who assumed the position in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, after the position had been vacant from 1971 to 1975.

 

GENERAL STAFF OF THE PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY MILI-

TARY COMMITTEE. In the wake of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the General Staff of the People’s Revolu- tionary Military Committee, Renmin Geming Junshi Weiyuanhui Zong Can- mou Bu, was established under the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui, and under the political control of the Maoist PLA’s General Political Department, Jiefangjun Zong Zhengzhi Bu. In 1954, its duties were absorbed by the newly formed PLA General Staff Department (GSD), Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu.

 

GENG HUICHANG. In August 2007, Geng Huichang, a 58-year-old eco- nomics specialist from Hebei Province, was named the PRC’s minister of state security in succession to Xu Yongyue.

Geng Huichang was born in 1951 in Hebei Province and from 1985 to 1990 was deputy director of the China Institutes of Contemporary Inter- national Relations (CICIR), Zhongguo Xiandai Guoji Guanaxi Yanajiuyu- an. The CICIR was established in 1965 after Premier Zhou Enlai ordered the creation of a number of colleges and universities to focus on international affairs. The CICIR was established in 1965, falling under the Central Foreign

Affairs Leading Group, Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu, of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Zhongguo Gongchandang. The Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group was later changed to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Zhongyang Waishi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, and, attesting to the importance placed on the organ- ization, its director is Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CCP and president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The CICIR, while assuming the role of a think tank, established links with its counterparts, including the Asia Forum in Japan and the Sigur Center of George Washington University.

The CICIR is affiliated with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guo- jia Anquanbu, which provides oversight from its Eighth Bureau as well as its funding. Between 1990 and 1992, Geng was director of the American Re- search Department of the CICIR, and from 1992 to 1998 he was head of the CICIR. In March 1998 he was named as the fourth minister of the MSS, a position he retained until November 2016. During the decade from 2007 to 2017, Geng was a member of the 17th and 18th Central Committees of the CCP. He was the first head of the MSS to have had a foreign affairs back- ground instead of politics or with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu.

Described as being knowledgeable about both Japan and the United States, Geng was largely considered an academic and was described as “dis- creet in conduct and prudent in speech.” He was an expert on commercial intelligence and delivered a speech in February 2006 on ways to protect and obtain commercial secrets, signaling China’s intent to enhance its economic espionage efforts in the United States. During this period, the MSS continued to suffer from corruption within its ranks, and in 2013 two MSS vice minis- ters were purged for corruption and misuse of ministry resources. Xi Jinping promptly reined in the MSS’s independence and consolidated his own power by establishing a Central National Security Commission (CNSC), Zhon- gyang Guojia Anquan Weiyuanhui, with himself at its head, thereby eliminat- ing the once-powerful Central Political and Legal Committee, Zhongyang Zhengfawei. This strategy was reminiscent of Zhou Yongkang, who as head of the MPS and the Central Political and Legal Committee exercised consid- erable control and independence of the PRC’s police and intelligence agen- cies. The State Security Committee is something akin to the U.S. National Security Council and placed Xi in a position to exercise greater oversight of the MSS’s daily activities.

In 2016, Geng was named as deputy director of the CCP Central Commit-

tee’s subcommittee for Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese. After being replaced by Chen Wenqing as MSS minister, Geng was ap- pointed a member of the CCP’s Central Committee, assigned to the Central Politics and Law Commission, the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and the Commission for Taiwan Affairs. See also SONG XINNING.

GERMANY. With a Uighur émigré population estimated at several thou- sand, concentrated in Munich, the Federal Republic of Germany has become a target for Chinese intelligence operations conducted by Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, personnel operating under consular cov- er. In December 2009 a Chinese consular officer was expelled, having been accused of spying on the expatriate Uighur community, and in April 2011 a 64-year-old Uighur identified only as “L” was charged with having passed information about local Uighurs to the MSS between April 2008 and Decem- ber 2009.

Chinese monitoring in Germany is not restricted to the Uighurs, as was demonstrated in 2011 when Zhou Chaoying, a 55-year-old German national of Chinese descent, was arrested for spying on the Falun Gong and reporting to the Chinese “610” office, i.e., Central Bureau 610, Zhongyang Ju 619. An investigation revealed that he had traveled back and forth between Ger- many and China during the years of his spying and had routinely provided Chinese officials in Germany with reports on the activities of the Falun Gong. He was later sentenced to two years’ probation and was fined 15,000 deutsche marks.

By 2016 there were an estimated 212,000 ethnic Chinese in Germany, including well over 130,000 who were PRC nationals, a 35 percent increase over 2013. The Federal Ministry of the Interior estimated that Chinese eco- nomic espionage was costing Germany between 20 and 50 billion euros annually.

In November 2018 German prosecutors filed criminal charges against a 48-year-old Chinese-born German national for stealing trade secrets in order to set up a Chinese copycat chemical reactor in China. The former Lanxess employee had conspired with another German, a 40-year-old ethnic Chinese who had received the trade secrets via email and then sought to sell them commercially in China.

German companies seeking to develop joint ventures in the People’s Re- public of China (PRC) have also found themselves victims of industrial espionage, with Chinese partners either expropriating proprietary technology or illicitly copying and exploiting sensitive data. One such example was the design of Germany’s high-speed ICE train, which was found incorporated into the Chinese equivalent.

Germany’s intelligence relationship with China is complicated in that when in 1979 the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) was forced by the Islamic revolution to close down its intercept sites in Iran, secret arrange- ments were made to open two new facilities in Xinjiang Province to monitor events inside Afghanistan after the invasion by the Soviet Red Army over Christmas 1979. As an expedient, the NSA collaborated with the Chinese and the German federal intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), to establish the new sites at Korla and Qitai and to have a group of

Chinese technicians trained in Germany. However, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the United States withdrew from partic- ipation and moved to sites in Outer Mongolia, leaving the BND behind.

China is Germany’s largest trading partner, worth about $204 billion in 2017, mainly in machine and technology equipment. As a result, Germany has not imposed a ban on Huawei and its proposed 5G network. Concern expressed by the German internal security service, the Bundesamt fur Ver- fassungsshutz (BfV), and pressure from the United States have combined to create uncertainty over whether Germany will embrace or reject Huawei’s bid to establish Germany’s 5G network.

 

GH0STNET. In March 2009 a concerted attack on computer targets in the West identified as having originated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was named “Gh0stNet” and was traced to an attempt to download illicit software, usually in the form of a Trojan horse virus containing a remote access tool (RAT) known as “Gh0st RAT” and concealed behind innocent-looking email attachments sent to systems run by Tibetan refugees on behalf of the Dalai Lama at Dharamsala in India.

Pentagon intelligence analysts declared that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “often cites the need in modern warfare to control information, sometimes termed ‘information dominance’” and suggested that “China has made steady progress in recent years in developing offensive nuclear, space and cyber-warfare capabilities, the only aspects of the PRC’s armed forces that, today, have the potential to be truly global.” This view conformed to a policy announced at the 10th National People’s Congress in 2003 concerning the creation of “information warfare units” when General Dai Qingmin was reported as having predicted that internet attacks would be mounted in ad- vance of military operations to cripple enemies. Since then the PLA has been linked by Western investigators to the Red Hacker Alliance, an ostensibly independent group of cyber saboteurs responsible for numerous attempts to overwhelm target commercial and government websites and systems in the United States.

Between 2007 and 2009, Gh0stNet was thought to have been responsible

for many coordinated “denial-of-service” attacks, and some 1,395 computers in 103 countries had been found to contain covert programs, including some located in embassies that remotely activated recording systems. A Cam- bridge University study titled “The Snooping Dragon: Social Mailware Sur- veillance of the Tibetan Movement” published in March 2009 concluded that Gh0stNet had been officially sponsored by Beijing. Another study, com- pleted by the forensic analysts Mandiant in 2010, concluded that the “vast majority” of the advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks experienced by American firms such as Google and Adobe could be traced back to the PRC. The attack aimed at Google was especially sophisticated and was discovered

to have compromised the search engine’s source codes for the Gaia password management system and to have accessed the legal discovery portals used by the company’s management to cooperate with information requests from law enforcement agencies.

In 2008 ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Marathon Oil all sustained sim- ilar attacks, although the damage did not become apparent until the following year. An estimated 20 percent of Fortune 100 companies had endured similar attacks, such as the notorious Aurora incident in January 2010, which had varied in severity from the siphoning off of proprietary data to the deliberate sabotage of card payment encryption systems. According to Mandiant, the APT attacks are characteristically sophisticated and can easily defeat or circumvent most conventional commercial countermeasures. The specially designed malware involved in these incidents was often low profile and camouflaged, averaging an insignificant 121.85 kilobytes in size, making them hard to detect. See also CYBER ESPIONAGE; FALUN GONG; IN- FORMATION WARFARE; INFORMATION WARFARE MILITIA; SHADOW NETWORK; TIBET; TITAN RAIN.

 

GONGAN. The Chinese colloquial reference to the Gonganbu, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).

 

GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS (GCHQ).

The principal British signals intelligence organization, GCHQ maintained a large establishment at Little Sai Wan between 1953 and 1982 and employed military personnel and civilians to monitor mainland Chinese radio transmis- sions. According to a disaffected GCHQ analyst, the facility was heavily penetrated by Chinese agents, although the only case that resulted in a prose- cution was that of Chan Tek Fei in 1961. Later, in 1973, two linguists of Taiwanese origin defected to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and are thought to have compromised many of the local operations. In May 1980, Jock Kane, a 32-year veteran of the organization, complained publicly about wide-scale corruption at Little Sai Wan, and in 1984, after his retirement, the British government injuncted him on national security grounds to prevent publication of his memoirs, GCHQ: The Negative Asset. See also GREAT BRITAIN.

 

GOWADIA, NOSHIR S. A naturalized U.S. citizen originally from India, 68-year-old Noshir Gowadia was arrested in October 2005 at his home in Haiku, Hawaii, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and charged with having sold classified information to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) about the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber for $110,000. An avionics engi- neer who had played a key role in the development of the bomber and an

acknowledged expert on infrared signature suppression, Gowadia was later charged with having attempted to sell information relating to advanced cruise missiles to unnamed individuals in Israel, Germany, and Switzerland. Be- tween November 1968 and April 1986, Gowadia worked for Northrop Grum- man, and he later became a contractor at the Los Alamos National Laborato- ries in New Mexico. Court documents revealed that Gowadia had been the subject of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) emergency warrant in 2004 when his computer was examined at Honolulu International Airport. During interviews conducted before he was formally arrested, Gowadia ac- knowledged having attempted to sell information to contacts in Singapore.

Originally from India, Gowadia received his PhD at the age of 15 and made six trips to the PRC between 2003 and 2005. He was suspected of having visited Chengdu in 2003, where he was thought to have contributed to the development of the J-10 advanced jet fighter produced by the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute. Also compromised was the next-generation stealth technology used by the F-15 Eagle, F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning, F-117 Nighthawk, and B-1 bomber.

Prior to his trial, which began in May 2010, the prosecution alleged that evidence of bank accounts in Switzerland and Lichtenstein had been discov- ered when Gowadia’s multimillion-dollar oceanfront home on Maui’s north shore had been raided. Apparently Gowadia, having become involved in a dispute with the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the U.S. Air Force in 1993, had enabled Chinese engineers to design a cruise missile able to evade air-to-air heat-seeking missiles. He had also sent classified information to a Swiss official in 2002 as part of a proposal to develop infrared reduction technology for a military helicopter and had given secrets to foreign busi- nessmen in Israel and Germany in proposals to develop the same kind of technology for commercial aircraft.

Gowadia’s trial lasted four months, and in August 2010 the jury took six days to find him guilty on 14 charges of conspiracy, tax evasion, money laundering, and breaches of arms export controls. He was sentenced to 32 years’ imprisonment. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

GREAT BRITAIN. With a history of military and commercial interests in China dating back to the Opium Wars in 1839, Britain’s presence in the International Settlement in Shanghai and its control over Hong Kong gave successive United Kingdom governments a strong strategic motive to recover its colony when it was liberated after 44 months of Japanese occupation in August 1945. Among the first British personnel to return to Hong Kong were members of the British Army Aid Group (BAAG), which also fulfilled an intelligence collection role on the mainland.

During the Cold War, Hong Kong provided an invaluable listening post from which Britain and its allies could monitor developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a country governed by a totalitarian regime and largely closed to outsiders. Britain’s responsibilities included internal secur- ity, reliant on the Royal Hong Kong Police (RHKP) and Special Branch liaising closely with MI5; external defense, with a permanent garrison in the New Territories protecting the border and the Royal Navy patrolling the coastline; the Royal Air Force based at Kai Tak, equipped with helicopters, fighters, transports, and amphibious aircraft; and Government Communica- tions Headquarters (GCHQ) analyzing signals intelligence at Little Sai Wan. In addition, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) maintained a local station, sharing the task of screening refugees with a project developed in 1950 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief, Fred Schul- theis, operating from the United States consulate-general.

Britain was in conflict with the PRC, albeit through Communist surro-

gates, during the Malaya Emergency, and much of the government’s subse- quent foreign policy east of Suez was dictated by a requirement to defend Hong Kong from a neighbor that exercised a grip on the colony’s water supply, could not be prevented from mounting an invasion overland, and effectively controlled much of the local workforce. This uneasy relationship was maintained until Beijing’s leadership indicated that the lease over Kow- loon would not be extended in 1997 and that the PRC’s historical claim to British territory on the mainland would be renewed. After lengthy negotia- tions, a compromise was reached, with the Communists pledging to establish a Special Administrative Region in which many of Hong Kong’s conventions and customs could survive separately for 50 years without total integration into the PRC.

The British intelligence authorities encouraged a generation of Sinologists,

prominent among them Percy Cradock, Richard Evans, and Nigel Inkster, although there was rarely a consensus about Chinese Communist intentions, especially in relation to Hong Kong’s future. Whereas Beijing took the clos- est interest in the colony’s internal affairs, it would not appear that the politi- cal leadership made any attempt through the PRC’s intelligence services to influence the course of the negotiations. Following the 1997 handover, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, apparatus in London has, according to MI5, concentrated on technology acquisition, maintaining a large staff at the London embassy to support these business-oriented opera- tions.

Within Whitehall, officials have expressed concern recently that China is capable of shutting down businesses with cyber attacks and spy malware embedded in Chinese-manufactured computer and telecommunications equipment. The Security Service, MI5, has monitored Chinese cyber espion- age directed against the Rio Tinto Group’s computers, and Robert Hannigan,

a former director of the GCHQ, has asserted that Chinese hackers have engaged in economic espionage against British universities and engineering companies, all on behalf of the Chinese government.

Fear of infrastructure sabotage was highlighted in July 2019 by a Parlia- mentary Intelligence and Security Committee report that suggested a ban on Huawei could make the networks less secure by reducing the number of suppliers, noting that all four UK carriers are already building their 5G systems networks using Huawei components. It has also been proposed that the country’s telecom supply chain might be strengthened by requiring car- riers to design and manage networks to meet new standards and by subject- ing operators to more rigorous oversight. The considerations are to be weighed against estimates that delaying Huawei’s involvement in developing the country’s 5G network would postpone the network’s completion by up to 18 or 24 months and cost the economy $5.6–$8.5 billion.

In November 2019, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute reported “un- precedented” levels of cooperation between British universities and Chinese defense companies. Of the 16 university laboratories worldwide run jointly with Chinese enterprises, 10 are in the UK. It was noted that the University of Manchester and London University’s Imperial College host 6 between them. Both the Sino-British Joint Advanced Laboratory on Control System Technology at the University of Manchester and Imperial’s Advanced Struc- ture Manufacturing Technology Laboratory have partnerships with the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), Zhongguo Yanzai uojian Jishu Yan Jiu Yuan, which is subordinate to the huge state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Zhongguo Hang- tian Keji Jituan Gongs, which develops space launch vehicles and interconti- nental ballistic missiles. The report also noted research undertaken at the University of Strathclyde and the University of Nottingham involving auton- omous rendezvous systems for satellites that can be used for anti-satellite missions. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

GU SHUNZHANG. Born in Shanghai, Gu Shunzhang became active in the workers’ movement, then the Shanghai Trade Union, and finally the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the same time, Gu was associated with the notorious Shanghai mob boss Du Yuesheng and his Green Gang, one of several secret societies engaged in Shanghai’s considerable organized crime, principally prostitution and drug trafficking. He assured those in the CCP that he was an avowed Communist and was chosen in early 1925 to maintain Party discipline and organize strikes. As a result, he was sent to Canton for further training where he caught the eye of a Soviet intelligence officer, Mikhail Borodin (real name, Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg), and briefly became his bodyguard. He was then sent to Vladivostok for training in espi-

onage and upon his return was promoted head of Zhou Enlai’s security service, where he acquired a well-earned reputation for personally participat- ing in the extermination of CCP traitors.

Gu was also a practicing magician, and in April 1931 he traveled to Wu- han, ostensibly for a performance, but with the real purpose of assassinating Chiang Kai-shek. However, he was recognized by Chiang’s security staff and arrested. After being tortured, he agreed to cooperate with Chiang’s forces and reveal the identities of CCP members in Wuhan, but he said he would provide details of the Shanghai CCP apparatus only to Chiang him- self. The two days taken to move Gu from Wuhan to Shanghai allowed time for Qian Zhuiangfei, one of Zhou Enlai’s “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” Longtan Sanjie, to intercept a message about Gu’s arrest and for Li Kenong to warn Zhou and other high-ranking CCP members in Shanghai so they could escape.

Gu’s flirtation with Chiang’s KMT was short-lived, for in late 1934 or early 1935, he was ordered shot by Chiang.

 

GUAN FUHUA. In 1983 Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky, a KGB offi- cer working under TASS journalistic cover at the Tokyo rezidentura, at- tempted to recruit Guan Fuhua, a photochemist from the China Academy of Sciences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, who was researching cures for radiation sickness at the Tokyo Technological Institute. Although local KGB officers usually approached their Chinese targets by offering them part-time work as language teachers, Preobrazhensky gained Guan’s trust by paying a profes- sional interpreter to translate much of his course work into good English. In return, Guan supplied his KGB contact with Chinese and Japanese data of value to the Russian chemical industry, but this attracted the attention of the Tokyo police, who arrested both men, and they were promptly expelled. Under interrogation, Guan revealed that he had been trained to communicate by radio with Moscow and had routinely received messages broadcast from a Russian “numbers station.” See also SOVIET UNION.

 

GUANXI. An ancient Chinese practice of relationships and obligations, guanxi essentially means that there are obligations to be of assistance to those who have assisted you in the past, which extends to family members. Guanxi is often a factor in Chinese intelligence gathering, especially for overseas Chinese, Haiwai Huaren (Huaqiao in simplified Chinese). See also HONEYTRAP; MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS).

GUO SHENGKUN. Guo Shengkun was born in October 1954 in Jiangxi Province, and during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjie- ji Wenhua Dageming, he was sent to the Wuliting labor camp in rural Jiangxi Province where, in December 1974, he joined the Chinese Communist Par- ty (CCP).

Between 1977 and 1979, Guo studied mining at the Jiangxi Institute of Metallurgy, now the Jiangxi University of Science and Technology, Jiangxi Ligong Daxue, and this led to a career in the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Corporation. In 2000 Guo was instrumental in the creation of the state-owned Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), becoming the gen- eral manager, and he oversaw the listing of a Chinalco subsidiary, the Alumi- num Corporation of China Ltd. (Chalco), on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges.

In 2004, Guo was named deputy party chief of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and in 2007 was appointed Party chief of Guangxi, a position he held until 2012 when, in December, he was made the 13th minis- ter of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, replacing Meng Jianzhu, despite having minimal legal or law enforcement related experience. In that capacity, Guo also became first political commissar and Party Com- mittee first secretary of the Chinese People’s Armed Police, Zhongguo Ren- min Wuzhuang.

In March 2017 Guo was the recipient of a letter signed by 11 foreign embassies criticizing China for its human rights violations. Those not signing the letter included both the European Union and the United States. The latter was notable, for the State Department’s human rights report had recently accused China of numerous human rights violations, including “arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of life, executions without due process, illegal deten- tions at unofficial holding facilities known as ‘black jails,’ torture and coerced confessions of prisoners, and detention and harassment of journal- ists, lawyers, writers, bloggers, dissidents, petitioners, and others whose ac- tions the authorities deemed unacceptable.”

Guo remained as head of the MPS until November 2017 when he was replaced by Zhao Kezhi. After serving as the deputy secretary of the Politi- cal and Legal Affairs Committee under the CCP’s Central Committee, Zhon- gyang Zhengfawei, Guo was named secretary on 31 October 2017. He was also appointed secretary of the Politburo and as a member of the CCP’s Central Committee Secretariat, Zhongguo Gongchandang.

In September 2018 Guo called for stronger “reform through education” for prisoners in Xinjiang, the far western region populated by Uighurs, of whom more than 1 million are held for political indoctrination. This viewpoint was contrary to his predecessor, Meng Jianzhu, who announced that China would stop the use of labor camps, laogai, by the end of 2013. After traveling to Xinjiang, Guo said, “We should comprehensively adopt legal education,

psychological counseling and vocational training, innovate and strengthen reform through education work for prisoners and make efforts to make them turn over a new leaf.”

 

GUO WANJUN. On 28 November 2008 a Chinese missile expert was exe- cuted with Wo Weihan, having been convicted of espionage for Taiwan and the United States. Both men had been arrested in 2005, and at their trial two years later Guo was convicted of having sold classified ballistic missile in- formation to Wo, who was described as a businessman and was said to have received $400,000 from the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB), which had given his wife $300,000 to open a restaurant in Austria. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

GUOANBU. The unofficial title of the foreign branch of the People’s Repub- lic of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), the word is an acronym for Guojia Anquanbu, an organization created in 1983 and announced by Pre- mier Zhao Ziyang to the Sixth National People’s Congress. See also ILLE- GALS; OVERSEAS CHINESE.

 

GUOJIA ANQUANBU. See MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS).

H

HAINAN INCIDENT. On 1 April 2001 a U.S. Navy EP3V Orion ARIES

(Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System) II aircraft, one of 12 of the Fleet Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ-1) at Kadena on Okinawa made an emergency landing at Lingshui on the Chinese island of Hainan after it had been in a collision with one of two Navy F-8 twin jet Finback II interceptors. Wang Wei, the pilot of the MiG-21 variant, ejected, but his body was never recovered.

Based at the Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington, VQ-1 was the U.S. Navy’s largest squadron, with 75 officers and 350 other ranks, and flew from detachments deployed to Misawa on Honshu, Manama in Bahrain, Rota in Spain, Crete, and on counter-narcotics flights from Manta in Ecua- dor. With a duration of 10 hours, the EP3Vs undertook routine signals intelli- gence intercept missions, but the flight in April would experience harassment in international airspace from one of the Chinese pilots.

The crew of 24, which included three women, attempted to destroy the signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercept and link-11 story book secure com- munications equipment aboard but were taken into custody before they could complete the task. They were released after 11 days, and the United States paid $34,567.89 for food and lodging for the crew as they were detained. Further, the United States issued a letter of “sorrow and regret,” and Presi- dent George W. Bush wrote the deceased Chinese pilot’s widow a letter of condolence. The plane was dismantled and in July loaded onto a giant Anto- nov An-124 leased cargo aircraft when the Chinese refused to allow it to be repaired and flown out to the Lockheed Martin factory in Marietta, Georgia, where it was reconstructed, updated, and returned to duty. The EP3V’s pilot, Lieutenant Shane Osborn, who would be decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross, was flown out with his crew on a chartered Continental 737 to Anderson Air Force Base on Guam and then transferred to a C-17 to Hick- ham Air Force Base in Hawaii for debriefing. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

 

 

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HALPERN, ERIC. The founder of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Eric Halpern spent most of World War II as a Jewish refugee from Vienna in Shanghai, but when he applied for a visa in 1946 to enter Hong Kong, the local security liaison officer (SLO) referred the request to MI5’s headquar- ters in London, where there was considerable disquiet on the grounds that he had been associated with the Japanese during the war and was thereafter suspected of having intelligence links to the Soviets, the Kuomintang, and the United States. The SLO was asked to “take some action to remove him from Hong Kong” because “he looks to us as if he is the kind of person who, as long as he remains, will be a perpetual and rather nagging security head- ache.”

In 1939 Halpern, then aged 37, had joined the staff of a Shanghai journal, Finance & Commerce, but it closed down in December 1941 when the city was occupied by the Japanese. Thereafter, according to MI5, Halpern had been “one of the chief rats for S. Saito, the former head of foreign affairs in the Shanghai Municipal Police.” A dossier compiled by the Office of Strate- gic Services (OSS) described him as “a suspicious character” who had col- laborated with Saito in black market speculations and extortion schemes. Halpern’s OSS file recorded that when he had reached Hong Kong on a visitor’s visa in 1946, he immediately contacted the Special Branch and claimed to have come to the colony “in order to resume publication of Fi- nance & Commerce.” However, his MI5 file also shows that at that time a police informant told Special Branch that “his publishing activities were merely a blind” and that Halpern’s main purpose was “to contact U.S. intelli- gence.”

Halpern also applied for a job with British intelligence, telling Special

Branch that he had worked for OSS in Shanghai, informing the Americans about “atomic research by the Japanese in China . . . especially the activities of General Tai Li (head of Nationalist Chinese intelligence) and his people in connection with atomic research.” However, he said, he preferred “British progressiveness of thought” to the U.S. “mode.” Accordingly, he wrote of himself, “the applicant is desirous of serving the British Empire.” In London, Halpern’s application was described as “possibly . . . a penetration attempt on behalf of Americans or some other power,” and his credentials were checked with the Americans, prompting the head of Special Branch to conclude, “I am not at all convinced that the Americans have not made more use of him than they care to say.”

Halpern’s MI5 file reveals that it was decided to allow Halpern to stay in Hong Kong “in the hope that it would be possible to find out for whom he was working.” In December 1947 he was prosecuted “for giving frivolous information about his nationality when registering at a hotel,” and when he visited Singapore and Ceylon, the local SLOs were alerted by MI5 and asked to report on his activities. The SLO in Colombo reported to his counterpart in

Hong Kong that “although nothing adverse is recorded by the police here, his behavior is said by them to have been rather peculiar.” Then, in 1952, the SLO contacted London with an offer to cover Halpern’s expenses while a guest of a Soviet-organized economic conference in Moscow.

Halpern remained with the Far Eastern Economic Review until 1958, when he was succeeded by the flamboyant Derek Davies, a former Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer who edited the magazine until 1989. Da- vies, who died in 2002, had worked on the Financial Times after serving with SIS in Saigon, Hanoi, and Vienna.

 

HAN GUANGSHENG. Formerly a senior People’s Republic of China (PRC) security official who had worked for the Central Bureau 610, Zhon- gyang Ju 610, Han Guangsheng disappeared while part of a delegation visit- ing Toronto in 2001 and applied for asylum, claiming to have been the head of the Shenyang Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, where he also had responsibility for local labor camps.

On 7 July 2005, Han surfaced to support claims by Chen Yonglin and Hao Fengung that the PRC was managing informants in Canada’s Chinese community and routinely gathered economic intelligence, saying, “I do know that the Chinese Communist Party sent people to collect intelligence infor- mation, including embassy and consulate staff. Some of the reporters coming from state Chinese media and visiting scholars are also given special spying tasks to carry out.”

Hao’s application for asylum was rejected in 2005 by the Canadian Immi- gration and Refugee Board on the grounds that he had been “complicit in crimes against humanity.” He is believed to still be appealing the decision.

 

HANSEN, RON ROCKWELL. On Friday, 1 June 2018, Ron Rockwell Hansen, a 58-year-old resident of Syracuse, Utah, was arrested by the Feder- al Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as he boarded a connecting flight to China at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. He was charged with the at- tempted transmission of national defense information to the People’s Repub- lic of China and related crimes in a 15-count indictment.

Hansen, who speaks both fluent Mandarin and Russian, had retired in 2006 as a warrant officer from the U.S. Army, where he had been trained in both signals and human intelligence. From 2000 to 2006 Hansen had been assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a case officer, and after his retirement he had continued his work with the DIA as a civilian contractor while maintaining a Top Secret security clearance.

In December 2006 Hansen resigned from the DIA and became involved in two companies, H-11 Digital Forensics Company LLC and H-11 Digital Forensics Services LLC. Between 2007 and late 2011 Hansen maintained an

office and an apartment in Beijing, where he began an association with two Chinese whom he identified by their anglicized names of “Robert” and “Amy.” Hansen later told the FBI that Robert maintained close connections with PRC intelligence agencies at a time when Hansen enjoyed access to classified national defense information.

In early 2012 Hansen sought employment with various U.S. intelligence agencies and contacted former colleagues for help, approaching U.S. Army Intelligence, through a former DIA colleague, with an offer to work as a double agent against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Later that same year he applied to rejoin the DIA, and at a meeting at DIA headquarters in 2013 he suggested that he would operate as a source against the PRC. In 2015 Hansen approached the FBI with an offer to work as a double agent against the PRC. He also contacted a congressman, assigned to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, proposing that he work as a member of the representative’s staff. None of these attempts to regain access to government secrets were successful.

Hansen’s army monthly pension of about $1,900 per month had been enhanced only occasionally, from September 2012 to June 2018, by income from his businesses. His income tax returns between 2013 and 2016 showed his income as less than $40,000 each year. In 2014, for instance, Nuvestack’s income tax business losses claimed were $1,114,889, with $4,000 in gross receipts. From 2012 to June 2018, Hansen’s unsecured debt ranged from

$150,000 to $200,000, and by late 2016 he had exhausted his credit limit and had borrowed against credit cards issued to members of his family.

The FBI began investigating Hansen in 2014 and interviewed him on 15 occasions, during which he related how Robert had introduced him to two officers of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, who used the anglicized names of “David” and “Martin.” Robert would set up meetings in private rooms in teahouses and hotels in Beijing and during a 2015 business trip was offered $300,000 annually for “consulting services.” Later Hansen said he had been handed off to another MSS handler, “Max Tong,” whom he would meet exclusively, though at one point he provided the FBI with a sheet of paper containing names and contact information for his PRC intelligence service contacts that revealed he had originally met with Tong in 2011. He also related how he had been asked by the MSS to attend conferences and exhibitions dealing with forensics, information security, and military communications and to conduct product research. He received mon- ey, he said, by being overpaid for purchases of computer forensic products. When asked how he would continue to obtain information, Hansen told the FBI that he had advised the MSS officers that he would “start going to Washington, D.C., and meeting with friends who are in the intelligence com- munity and try to elicit classified info from them.”

Physical and technical surveillance on Hansen showed his attempts to contact former DIA and Defense Department colleagues, some of whom he had not been in contact with in years. In 2015 he gave the FBI two thumb drives containing several reports he had written and others he had obtained while employed by the government. He explained, when asked, that he safe- guarded the material by storing the information on external drives kept in a safe at his home. Both contained classified material that Hansen was not authorized to have. In December 2015, during a final meeting with the FBI, Hansen emphasized his value to the PRC and suggested that the MSS could direct him to contact two DIA officers in Texas and Georgia. The FBI warned Hansen not to accept any MSS offers of work and instructed him to report any further contacts with the MSS.

During one of his interviews with the FBI, Hansen recalled how he had

had meetings with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and a court-authorized search of his MacBook Pro computer revealed photographs of Hansen with uniformed MPS officers, including some in a room with the MPS logo on the wall of the room. The FBI finally concluded that Hansen had begun attending conferences on behalf of his PRC contacts as early as 2013 and continued to see them through 2017. The FBI surveillance of some of these encounters showed Hansen typing notes on his laptop and taking photographs, as well as making the false claim that he had been recalled to military duty.

In 2012, during the period Hansen had applied to join the DIA, he had not traveled to the PRC, but from April 2013 until June 2018, he visited on 40 occasions, and the FBI arranged for him to be searched and questioned by

U.S. Customs when he returned. Between 2014 and 2017 he was found to be carrying cash as well as various cellphones, smartphones, thumb drives, a laptop computer, and other digital storage media. For example, on 30 June 2014 Hansen failed to initially declare $19,222; he admitted the failure and completed the required financial form. On 5 December 2015 a search of Hansen’s luggage revealed a concealed passcode-protected thumb drive be- hind a sock in the toe of a shoe. The thumb drive contained information from an Intelligence and National Security Summit held in September 2015, which a forensic examination found had been accessed during Hansen’s stay in the PRC. Furthermore, Hansen was in possession of $53,000 in cash, telling the customs inspector that the money was from the sale of a NetWitness server, though he could not produce documentation to support the claim.

On 18 April 2016 the FBI searched Hansen’s hotel room while he was

attending an Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association conference and found LinkedIn data relating to several former DIA and Department of Defense colleagues, as well as information detailing the loca- tion of DIA facilities.

The FBI’s scrutiny of Hansen’s email account revealed several communi- cations with “Max,” who wrote of his anxiety for Hansen to return to the PRC, at a time when he had reapplied for DIA employment, though he did not mention those contacts. The FBI discovered that by July 2014 Hansen had used various cell phones to communicate with his PRC acquaintances. When he returned from the PRC on 9 July 2014, customs officers found a Nokia PRC cellphone in addition to his U.S. smartphone. On 14 December 2015 he had a Xinda brand PRC cell phone that showed communications with “Martin.” On another occasion an FBI forensic image of his phone showed several stored calls and text messages with “Martin Chen.”

After Hansen’s visit to the PRC in April 2013, he began to receive large sums of money and used three methods to move the money. He either carried it physically, made Visa card transactions, or sent wire transfers. According to the FBI, he had been paid “not less than $800,000 in funds originating from the PRC” during the period from May 2013 to June 2018. Hansen was alleged to have used “the majority of the funds to benefit himself, his family members, and other entities, such as Nuvestack and AC-FPS in which Han- sen had a vested interest.”

The FBI also learned that Hansen had circumvented export regulations and that on 29 November 2016 “Amy” had asked him to buy Recon Mac OS X Forensics with a Paladin 6 program manufactured by Sumuri Recon that contained cryptographic capability, software banned for export on anti-ter- rorism and national security grounds. On 12 December Hansen had pur- chased the software for $1,717.95, purportedly on behalf of Nuvestack Inc., and directed an associate to ship the material to Amy in the PRC. Later, on 23 December, Amy confirmed receipt of the embargoed consignment, and several similar transactions followed.

Bizarrely, during a meeting on 24 May 2016 in San Antonio with the DIA, Hansen had described how he was trying to work for the FBI as a double agent, but he “had to give the MSS something to keep stringing them along.” The DIA agent filed a report and assisted the FBI, reporting conversations with Hansen in which he had acknowledged having disclosed ongoing con- tact with the MSS, including meetings with senior MSS officers. On one occasion, he sent the source a copy of material he had retained from his period as a contractor, information that was still classified, and on another, before a trip in April 2018, Hansen had discussed with the source his ability to facilitate, without detection, the sale of national defense information to the PRC. Upon his return, Hansen had met the source and again discussed how national defense information could be sold to PRC intelligence and raised the possibility of doing a debriefing with the PRC in either Mexico or Canada. He also boasted that the PRC would pay up to $200,000 if the source could deliver the operations plan of the U.S. military regarding potential military

intervention with China. Hansen explained that he would help the source launder any money received and made plans to meet prior to Hansen’s next visit to China.

On 2 June 2018, Hansen took a taxi to a prearranged location near the airport in Seattle to meet the source, who brought two documents with him, both clearly marked as secret. Hansen reviewed the material and then dis- cussed the content for about two hours while taking intermittent handwritten notes, stating that he would transfer them to a computer later. They debated how the source could store documents in the future, and Hansen told the source that once they were placed in a digital format, he should cut a hole in a tree and store the device there. He also asked for the source’s date of birth, email address, employment locations, social media accounts, and family members, as the PRC contact would want to vet him. He also explained that while the source would not get paid for this trip, he would arrange for a future payment to be sent to him. The source then dropped Hansen off near the airport, and as Hansen walked toward the terminal entrance he was ar- rested by the FBI.

On 15 March 2019, Hansen pleaded guilty to attempted espionage and

faced up to 15 years’ imprisonment. On 23 September 2019, Hansen was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment after the judge cited Hansen’s coopera- tion with the FBI. Court records show that Hansen was paid at least $800,000 over the period of his espionage, including a $300,000 consulting fee. How- ever, it was noted in court that Hansen had taken more money from China into the United States, but investigators were unable to account for all he had received.

 

HANSON, HAROLD DEWITT. In March 2009 a retired U.S. Army colo- nel, Harold Dewitt Hanson, and his Chinese wife, Yaming Nina Qi Hanson, were charged with conspiracy to violate an export ban on sales of computer- ized controls for unmanned aerial vehicles to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Hanson worked at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center and for a Maryland company, Arc International LLC. According to the prosecution, Hanson began in 2007 to attempt to acquire autopilots from a Canadian manufacturer, MicroPilot of Manitoba, Canada, for export to the Xi’an Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group, Xi’an Xiang Yu Hangkong Jishu Jituan, in the PRC. Initially Qi Hanson claimed that the autopilots would be used by a model airplane club in China, but when told the autopilots had been de- signed for use on unmanned aircraft, not for model airplane use, she insisted that they would be used by U.S. aircraft to record thunderstorms, tornadoes, and ice pack melting rates in the Arctic.

After having purchased 20 of the autopilots for $90,000 and her false

assurances, in August 2008 Qi Hanson flew to Shanghai and personally delivered the items to the Xi’an Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group. Both

Hansons pleaded guilty on 13 November 2009 to felony false statement violations, and in February 2010 Qi was sentenced to 105 days in jail with credit for time served, placed on one year of supervised release, ordered to pay a fine of $250 and a $100 special assessment fee, and ordered to attend an event sponsored by a U.S. Department of Commerce education training program. Hanson was sentenced to two years’ probation, fined $250 and a

$100 special assessment fee, ordered to perform 120 hours of community service, and also ordered to attend a U.S. Department of Com- merce–sponsored export training program. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPION- AGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

HANSON HUANG. A Chinese American born in Hong Kong in 1951, Harvard-educated lawyer Hanson Huang was detained in Beijing under mys- terious circumstances in January 1982, and although embassy diplomats ex- perienced great difficulty in gaining consular access to him, his old friend Katrina Leung, code-named PARLOR MAID, was able to visit him in pris- on on her very first attempt. Apparently arrested in his hotel while employed by Armand Hammer’s Occidental Oil, Hanson was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for espionage after having resigned from Webster & Sheffield, his firm in New York, mentioning that he intended to seek treatment for his cancer in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). After graduating from Har- vard Law School, Hanson had gained a post at the prestigious Chicago firm Baker & McKenzie.

The PRC authorities made no public reference to Hanson’s arrest until

February 1984, and there was no obvious reason for his incarceration as he had been considered previously, while a student in the United States, as a PRC loyalist who had campaigned for the PRC’s sovereignty during the territorial dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea, claimed by both Taiwan and Japan.

 

HAO FENGUNG. In June 2005 Hao Fengung defected from the PRC con- sulate in Sydney, just two weeks after the first secretary, Chen Yonglin, had taken the same decision. Hao said he was a member of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and was assigned to the Central Bureau 610, Zhongyang Ju 610, which had been created in 1999 to monitor and disrupt Falun Gong activities overseas. Hao told his Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) debriefers that there were 1,000 Chinese spies in Canada, and two years later he gave similar evidence to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. See also AUSTRALIA; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

HARBIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. Although closely associated with the People’s Liberation Army, the Harbin Institute of Technology, Haerbin Gongye Daxue, is a legitimate academic establishment under the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu. In 2010 the Astronautics Innovation Research Center, Hangtian Chuanxin Yanjiu Zhong Xin, was established in conjunction with the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, Zhongguo Hang- tian Keji Jituan Gongsi, and the institute continues to be a major contributor to China’s space exploration and weapons programs.

 

HEYWOOD, NEIL. In November 2011 a 41-year-old British businessman, Neil Heywood, was murdered in his hotel room in Chongqing. The initial cause of death was reported as alcohol poisoning but later was declared to be the administration of potassium cyanide. Heywood, who had worked for the Hakluyt Foundation and represented an Aston Martin dealership in China, and who had a wife and children in Beijing, had developed a close relation- ship with Gu Kailai, the wife of an ambitious politician, Bo Xilai, then a member of the Politburo. The suspicion was that Heywood had cultivated Bo and arranged for his son to attend Harrow School and Balliol College, Ox- ford, with covert Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) sponsorship.

The political scandal in China, which resulted in Bo Xilai’s imprisonment for corruption and his wife’s conviction on a murder charge, drew consider- able, unwelcome attention to some of the recruitment techniques associated with the organization, such as the provision of places at expensive private schools, with the benefit of funding from an opaque educational trust, for the children of the influential. To dampen the speculation, Foreign Secretary William Hague issued a carefully worded statement in April 2012 to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, declaring,

It is long established government policy neither to confirm nor deny spec- ulation of this sort. However, given the intense interest in this case it is exceptionally appropriate for me to confirm that Mr. Heywood was not an employee of the British government in any capacity.

 

HIGH-ALTITUDE SAMPLING PROGRAM (HASP). The Central In-

telligence Agency’s (CIA) High-Altitude Sampling Program commenced in September 1957 with the delivery to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing of five specially modified U-2 aircraft designed to collect evidence of Soviet nuclear tests. In 1958 the project was extended to the People’s Repub- lic of China where Detachment C made regular HASP overflights until the end of 1959. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

HINTON, JOAN. A graduate of Cornell and the University of Wisconsin, Joan Hinton was a gifted physicist and a committed political activist, al- though never a formal member of the Communist Party of the United States of America. Born in 1921 and educated at Bennington College, she joined the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos but, having attended the first test in July 1945, resigned when President Harry S. Truman decided to drop atomic weapons on Japan. She then worked with Enrico Fermi at the Argonne Laboratory in Chicago and in December 1947 moved to Shanghai, where she married an American agriculturalist and lived with her brother William and his wife, both ardent Communists.

In September 1951 Hinton publicly denounced the United States govern- ment for what she alleged was the use of germ warfare in Korea and contin- ued thereafter to make English-language propaganda broadcasts from Beij- ing. She settled in Xi’an but in 1966 moved back to Beijing as a permanent resident, an extraordinarily rare status, considered by the Western intelli- gence community to be a reward for her contribution to the development of the uranium weapon, modeled on the Fat Man bomb she had worked on at Los Alamos. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; QIAN XUESEN.

 

HO CHIH-CHIANG. A Taiwanese businessman, Ho Chih-chiang was charged by the Shihlin Prosecutor’s Office in Taiwan in April 2010 with spying for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), bribery, and violating the laws protecting the island’s national security. According to the indictment, Ho, who had conducted business in the PRC, had been recruited by a PRC intelligence agency in 2007 to collect national security information in Tai- wan in exchange for financial incentives and other privileges. Acting on Chinese instructions, Ho had attempted to recruit a National Security Bu- reau (NSB) officer named Chao in an effort to find out about the govern- ment’s policies on Falun Gong, Tibetan independence, Japan, and diplo- matic information. Allegedly Chao had been offered liquor, $20,000, and other sums several times larger than his retirement pension in return for details on the NSB’s overseas operations and its satellite communication routings, but the offer had been rejected. See also TIBET.

 

HO SZUHSIUNG. On 14 April 2016 a two-count indictment was unsealed in the Eastern District of Tennessee charging Ho Szuhsiung, alias Allen Ho; the China General Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC), Zhongguo He Dongli Zong Gongsi; and Energy Technology International (ETI) for conspiracy to unlawfully engage and participate in the production and development of plutonium outside the United States without prior authorization from the

U.S. Department of Energy (DoE). Ho was further charged with conspiracy to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign country, the People’s

Republic of China (PRC). The prosecution marked the first time the Depart- ment of Justice (DOJ) had brought a case under a 1946 Cold War–era coun- ter-proliferation statute.

Ho was born in Taiwan and entered the United States in 1973 to attend the University of California, and in 1974 he married his wife, Anne. In 1980 Ho received his PhD in nuclear engineering from the University of Illinois and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1983. Though Ho, who spent a consider- able amount of time in China working in his consulting business, had no children with his wife, he fathered a son in 2007 in China, where he was known to keep two apartments, one for himself and one for his mistress and child.

The CGNPC, formerly known as the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company, Zhongguo Guandong Hedian Gongsi, is a state-owned entity con- trolled by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis- sion (SASAC) (Guowuyuan Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui), which controls over 100 large corporations in the PRC. Energy Technology International was a Delaware corporation established by Ho in 1992, with Ho as owner and president, which delivered his consulting services. According to the indictment, Ho enlisted the assistance of several scientists in the Unit- ed States who were experts in nuclear technology at the behest of CGNPC to provide assistance in the development of “special nuclear material” in China. The indictment identified such individuals, by occupation and expertise but not by name, who were approached by Ho to assist in the scheme, but one was later identified in government documents as Ching Ning Guey, a Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) source who assisted in the investigation of Ho and would later plead guilty to related charges and receive a probation- ary sentence. He had been paid $15,555.20 by Ho for services to CGNPC, which was later forfeited to the U.S. government as part of his plea deal.

Ho’s previous employment at the Westinghouse Corporation helped him

cultivate those he intended to work with, although Guey was an exception in that he had worked for the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), where he had been Ho’s colleague. He had met Ho some years earlier at a Chinese American Nuclear Technology Association event in the early 1990s.

One individual, a resident of South Carolina, had been employed by West- inghouse as a mechanical engineer and held a patent for nuclear assembly design that he had obtained while working for Westinghouse. He had begun to consult with Ho in 2010, but when he declined to provide proprietary information to a question posed by a Chinese scientist, he was laughed at and never invited to participate again.

Another South Carolina resident, who had been born in the PRC, was a naturalized U.S. citizen, and during his Westinghouse employment he was responsible for mechanical design and structural integrity evaluations of nu- clear fuel assembly and core component designs, as well as fuel development

and design for utilities in Japan and Korea. He told investigators that Ho said, “Retired or active Westinghouse people are all acceptable. Please help but do not openly announce the news. I don’t want to alert Westinghouse.” His four decades of employment, which ended in 2011, included his assistance in transferring AP1000 technology to China. AP1000 had been developed by Westinghouse and had been transferred to the state-owned State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), Guojia Hedian Jishu Gongsi, in what the company had considered at the time to be a very real business coup. The SNPTC was established in 2007 to obtain third-generation nuclear tech- nology from foreign suppliers and to implement and manage nuclear power projects. This engineer said he had provided CGNPC with information on how to test nuclear fuel assembly hardware, but he claimed it was informa- tion readily available on Google, noting that the PRC government had blocked access to the U.S. online search engine. At one point, the engineer confirmed that he had asked Ho if permission had been granted to share such information with CGNPC, and Ho claimed he had applied for permission and was paying a lawyer $800 an hour for his advocacy.

In fact, Ho had sent two letters to the DOE. In one he claimed he and his

consultants were engaged in information technology support work, and the DOE replied that no further permission was required. The other letter, which more closely detailed his actual intentions, was never approved, even after an exchange of correspondence in which the DOE asked further questions to which Ho responded.

A Pennsylvania resident had met Ho when worked for Westinghouse from 1974 to 1997 as a nuclear engineer with a specialty in nuclear fuel analysis. He initially quoted Ho an hourly rate to work with him, thinking it would dissuade Ho from any further discussions, but Ho accepted the offer.

Another Pennsylvania resident had also been involved in the transfer of technology to the PRC involving the AP1000 nuclear reactor, of which four were currently under construction. He questioned the whole issue of West- inghouse selling the technology in a commercial endeavor and then having the government pursue criminal charges. He alleged that he had attempted to rely on his memory to present briefings he had given previously while at Westinghouse. At one point he had provided CGNPC officials advice about an AP1000 manual that the company retained in a limited-access room. He assumed that, given the fact that the company had the manual and that West- inghouse was considering selling the reactors to CGNPC, all was above- board.

A Colorado-based scientist who had not worked for Westinghouse but had been employed in the field since 1974 had founded his own company to offer technical services to the nuclear power industry. He had traveled to the PRC in 2011 after an earthquake and tsunami had destroyed Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. He provided CGNPC with advice on how to keep such

plants safe in such events and viewed such activities as simply nuclear engi- neering without any sinister motive. In November 2014 this scientist had made a return trip to the PRC and had worked with CGNPC staff. In January 2015 Ho paid this scientist $22,698.54 for consulting services and travel expenses.

On 1 August 2017, Ho pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges and was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised probation, and a $20,000 fine.

 

HOLT, HAROLD. A former prime minister of Australia, Harold Holt dis- appeared while swimming near his home in Portsea, Victoria, in December 1967. The official police report into the incident concluded the following year that, despite the absence of a body, he had most likely died of drowning. This was the generally accepted verdict until 1983 when a respected Reuters journalist, Anthony Grey, published his sensational book, The Prime Minis- ter Was A Spy, which claimed that Holt had been a lifelong spy, working first for the Nationalist Chinese and then for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and had been spirited away from his home by submarine shortly before the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) closed in on him.

The author of four novels and the survivor of two years of solitary confine- ment in his home in Beijing as a hostage during Mao Zedong’s disastrous Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, Grey was an experi- enced foreign correspondent who also presented a current affairs program broadcast on the BBC World Service. Grey did not identify the original source of his story but described him as a retired Royal Australian Navy officer who, “not wishing to draw undue attention to himself,” decided he would prefer to remain anonymous. With such a creditable author, the book was taken quite seriously by many commentators, as it appeared to be a very detailed dossier of a truly astonishing case of top-level espionage.

Grey alleged that Holt had been recruited in 1929 by Sung Fa-tsiang of the Chinese consulate-general in Melbourne who had bought a series of maga- zine articles from the young Queen’s College law undergraduate. A year later, having signed receipts for several payments, Holt was allegedly asked by Sung’s replacement, Li Hung, who was later to be China’s vice consul in Sydney, to act as a secret representative of the nationalist Kuomintang government, and thus began his clandestine relationship with China that was to last the rest of his life. When in August 1935 Holt had been elected to the House of Representatives for the right-wing United Australia Party (UAP), he was “a fully-fledged spy” and had been given the nom de guerre “H. K. Bors.” However, in May 1967 Holt allegedly read an ASIO report referring to his own secret code name and took fright, calling an emergency meeting

with Wong, at which he asked to be rescued. Wong judged that Holt was close to a breakdown, and plans were made to infiltrate the spy by submarine the following December from the beach off his holiday home.

According to Grey, Holt was seized by two Chinese frogmen as he snor- keled in shallow water and conveyed aboard the escape hatch of a submarine lying submerged close by. The prime minister was then spirited away to China where he was granted political asylum and supposedly lived in quiet retirement for many years, advising Beijing on international trade issues.

According to the author, the book was written after he had met an un- named mysterious Australian businessman who first approached him in May 1983, having undertaken much of the research while pretending to work on Holt’s biography. The businessman was Donald Titcombe, a former Austra- lian naval intelligence officer who claimed that he had been tipped off in July 1973 by a Chinese official and had become interested in the story and had traveled to Hong Kong in 1975 to obtain semi-official confirmation. At a further meeting organized in Macao in February 1983, Titcombe had sought further details, and although he had not received any conclusive proof, he was able to persuade Grey that the central story had been corroborated and was supported by plenty of circumstantial evidence.

While Grey apparently never questioned the credentials of his informant, it turned out that Lieutenant Commander Titcombe had been accused in 1967 of sharing classified information with his mistress and subsequently had been asked to resign his commission in the Royal Australian Navy. Since then, Titcombe had pursued a controversial business career as an entrepreneur seeking to promote yachting marinas in such diverse locations as Grenada, Chichester, and Conway, but none had proved viable. When the Observer and the Sunday Telegraph denounced the book as a hoax, Titcombe had sued for libel, and his litigation was settled by the Observer, although in 1989 he abandoned the action against the Sunday Telegraph.

 

HONEYTRAP. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, occasionally uses sexual entrapment in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a technique to coerce potential agents, including foreigners, al- though it does not deploy its own staff to participate and instead depends on intermediaries and surrogates. Evidently the MSS regards the risks inherent in allowing one of their own officers to engage in seduction as unacceptably high, although other Chinese women are sometimes encouraged to cultivate a suitable target, both domestically and overseas, and the MSS has been known to intervene once a relationship with an individual of interest has begun and to request cooperation. Generally, MSS women officers are well educated and would be unwilling to compromise their careers or the interests of their families by engaging in such activities themselves. Similarly, the MSS itself, as a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organ, is reluctant to acknowledge

requiring its own personnel to act in a way that might embarrass the leader- ship. Nevertheless, if the opportunity arises, the MSS will certainly turn a blind eye to an entrapment that could reap dividends, and it will also try to create the conditions in which a potential source encounters prostitutes or other potentially susceptible women.

When the MSS adopted honeytraps in the mid-1980s, the case officers involved were inexperienced, and initially the results were unpromising. In one incident a former KGB officer was invited to visit the PRC after he had been approached in Russia by an MSS agent posing as a businessman, and he formed an attachment to a Chinese journalist. However, the MSS case officers intervened too early, before a sexual relationship had started, and the Russian withdrew, leading the MSS to conclude that honeytraps require plen- ty of time to flourish before an overt step is taken. In a case of industrial espionage detected by a French intelligence agency, the representative of a major pharmaceutical company was wined and dined by a Chinese girl who slept with him. He was later confronted with a video recording of the encoun- ter in an attempt to blackmail him, which proved successful.

In early 2006 a cipher clerk attached to the Japanese consulate in Shang-

hai committed suicide after he had succumbed to blackmail involving an illicit relationship and then reported it to colleagues. Although the death was an isolated incident, there have been plenty of suspected honeytraps, with

U.S. foreign service officers (FSO), unaccompanied by their spouses, being apparent targets. In one example in the early 1990s, a married FSO, alone in Shenyang, was found to have developed a sexual relationship with a foreign service national woman employed at his consulate. The affair, which was detected early, with the FSO quickly being transferred home, was later found to have been part of an intelligence operation conducted by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, although it remained unclear whether any classified information had been compromised. Nor was it obvious what, if any, role had been played by the MSS, which in 1984 created a local branch to support provincial MPS operations in Liaoning Province and the city of Shenyang.

In other cases, a U.S. diplomat fathered a child with an embassy guard in Beijing, and FSO dependents have become involved with local Chinese, doubtless under MSS sponsorship and supervision. In 2000 the defection of a representative of the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) in Beijing appeared to be motivated by an extramarital affair, but it is likely that the MSS simply allowed the relationship to develop without having stage-managed it from the outset.

Unlike the Soviet KGB and its East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung counterparts, the MSS has not institutionalized honeytraps or established a specialist department devoted to sexual entrapment techniques. Instead, all MSS operational groups are familiar with the methodology and, with the

sanction of senior personnel at director and ministerial levels, can obtain the required authority to plan and mount such a scheme. See also BOURSICOT, BERNARD; DENG; FRANCE; GUANXI; LO HSIEN-CHE; JAPAN; MI5; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

HONG KONG. Hong Kong, which roughly translates to “fragrant harbor” in Cantonese, is officially the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonguo Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzhengqu. Under the policy adopted at the time of the 1997 take- over by China, Chinese laws on the mainland don’t apply to Hong Kong. This policy was to last for a duration of at least 50 years.

Hong Kong was long a center for British intelligence operations since the establishment of the Far East Combined Bureau in 1932. The colony ac- commodated both an MI5 security liaison officer and a Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station to support the local Special Branch and collect intelli- gence on mainland China. Also located in Hong Kong were the regional signals intelligence organization at Little Sai Wan, several Royal Air Force (RAF) radio interception facilities, and a large radar installation, manned by the RAF 117 Signals Unit atop Tai Mo Shan, at an altitude of 2,000 feet in the New Territories.

Throughout the Cold War, Hong Kong was a major center of espionage as a principal gateway in and out of the mainland, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Royal Cana- dian Mounted Police Special Branch, the Australian Secret Intelligence Ser- vice (ASIS), and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) maintained local representatives there. In addition, the Soviets established both KGB and GRU rezidenturas in the colony, the Taiwanese ran a news agency front, and the Chinese operated from several local front organiza- tions, including the Communist Party’s office in the Federation of Trade Unions building.

Since becoming a special administrative region in 1997 under control of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong has acquired the status of a transshipment point for embargoed goods, often military equipment, to be diverted across the border to the mainland. Dozens of ostensibly legitimate Chinese-controlled businesses, and organizations such as the pro-Beijing newspapers Takung Pao and Wen Wei Po, have sprung up on the island, whereas their true function is to support PRC-sponsored intelligence opera- tions and facilitate illicit technology transfer.

Under China’s “one country, two systems” policy, residents have chafed under the increasingly tighter controls imposed by the PRC, in violation of the 1997 agreement. In 2014 the central government attempted to implement a system of nominee screening before allowing elections, which led to a series of protests known as the Umbrella Revolution. Discrepancies in the

electoral register, disqualification of elected legislators after the 2016 Legis- lative Council elections, and the enforcement of national law in the West Kowloon high-speed railway station raised further concerns regarding the promised autonomy. In 2019, when Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced proposed legislation to extradite fugitives to mainland China, there were increasingly violent protests. At one point, units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were staged just outside Hong Kong, and Chinese gangs, ap- parently having reached an accommodation with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), took part in beating protesters. The PRC imposed censorship on the mainland to suppress reporting of the disorder. See also AUTUMN ORCHID; BRITISH ARMY AID GROUP (BAAG); CANADA; GREAT BRITAIN; KASHMIR PRINCESS; LI CHUSHENG; TECHNOLOGY AC- QUISITION.

 

HOU DESHENG. The assistant military attaché at the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embassy in Washington, D.C., Hou was arrested by the Feder- al Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on 21 December 1987 with Zang Weichu, an official from the PRC consulate in Chicago, as they received supposedly classified documents in a restaurant, and both were expelled.

The FBI’s surveillance of Hou had revealed his visits to the Vector Micro- wave Research Corporation in Alexandria, Virginia, which was headed by a former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), retired Lieuten- ant General Leonard Perroots. His company received a large number of classified contracts from the Defense Department, and Hou attempted to gain information about a U.S. Navy electronics program. At the FBI’s request, Vector pretended to cooperate with Hou and allowed him access to a suppos- edly classified document deliberately left unattended in the office. The oper- ation concluded when Hou, who often complained of his $75 a month salary, was taken into custody.

Upon his return to Beijing, and while still working for the Chinese govern- ment, Hou was appointed the local representative for Mayes & Company, a business owned by the original founder of Vector, Donald Mayes. Under scrutiny by U.S. investigators, Vector ceased trading in 1998, and Mayes, who was living in Mexico when Hou was hired, refused to discuss him, although a subordinate was quoted in the Washington Post describing Hou as “a conduit to other people.” See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

HU DI. Hu Di attended China University in Beijing where he befriended Qian Zhuangfei and his wife, Zhang Wenhua. In 1925, the three secretly joined the Communist Party, using filmmaking as cover for their clandestine activities. After Qian had infiltrated Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang

(KMT) intelligence agency in 1929, he aided the entry of both Hu and Li Kenong too, enabling them to penetrate the KMT, with Li reporting directly to Zhou Enlai. When Zhou’s security chief, Gu Shunzhang, was captured by the KMT in 1931, he defected to Chiang’s side to save himself. Qian intercepted a telegram about Gu’s arrest and notified Li, who warned Zhou of Gu’s defection. This allowed Zhou, Kang Sheng, and other high-ranking staff to escape Shanghai. Li also sent a telegram to Hu in Tianjin so he could board a foreign ship and sail back to Shanghai, where he and Qian escaped to join Mao Zedong’s Red Army in Jiangxi Province. After participating in the epic Long March, Changzheng, and arriving in Sichuan in 1935, a dispute broke out between Red Army generals Zhu De and Zhang Guotao on the question of which direction the march should take. Hu sided with Zhu, who advocated marching north toward Yan’an, and an infuriated Zhang de- nounced Hu as a KMT spy and had him executed in September. Zhou re- ferred to Li, Qian, and Hu as the “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” Longtan Sanjie.

 

HU SIMENG. A graduate of Beijing University, 30-year-old Hu Simeng married a fellow student, Horst Gasde, in 1966 and returned with him to East Berlin to take up an academic post teaching languages at Humboldt Univer- sity. She was recruited by her husband to supply information to the Haupt- verwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) about her students and the local Chinese émigré community, without declaring that she was already working as a source for the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. In 1978 she was deliberately “dangled” by the HVA in an attempt to pene- trate the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Berlin base and was recruit- ed, placing her husband on the CIA’s payroll. Both academics continued to work for the CIA and HVA until they were exposed in 1989 when the East German regime collapsed.

 

HUA GUOFENG. Born on 21 February 1921 in Shanxi, Hua Guofeng embraced communism and took a revolutionary name, “Hua Gufeng,” adopted from Zhonghua kangri jiuguo xianfeng dui, literally, “Chinese Anti- Japanese National Salvation Vanguard.” He was initially part of the Japanese resistance and he took part in the Long March, Changzheng, in 1936 before joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1938. He served in the Eighth Route Army under the legendary Zhu De for 12 years, rising to the level of propaganda chief.

In 1949 Hua moved with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to Hunan, where he remained a local CCP official until 1971. He had been appointed a local party official before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and in 1952 was appointed secretary of the area that

included Mao Zedong’s hometown of Shaoshan, where he demonstrated his complete loyalty to Mao by constructing a memorial hall dedicated to him. He had met Mao in 1955, but a 1959 visit to his hometown apparently convinced Mao that Hua was a loyal albeit simplistic follower.

Representing the Hunan Provincial Party at the 1959 Lushan Conference, Hua wrote two papers that defended communes as well as the disastrous Great Leap Forward, Da Yue Jin. He even argued that the death toll of the Great Leap Forward, said to be 30–40 million people, was greatly exaggerat- ed. Hua’s loyalty to Mao guaranteed him a bright political future.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dagem- ing, served to develop his relationship with Mao, as he energetically led the movement in Hunan, and in 1971 he was called to Beijing to direct Zhou Enlai’s State Council staff, although he only remained in the capital a few months before he returned to Hunan. In that same year he was appointed to the commission investigating the Lin Biao matter, Lin Biao Zhuan’anzu Bao- mizu, as its junior member, an indication of Mao’s confidence in Hua’s complete loyalty. In 1973 he joined the Politburo, and Zhou Enlai placed him in charge of modernizing agriculture.

Upon the death of Li Zhen in 1972, Hua was appointed as the fourth head of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, during the throes of the Cultural Revolution. This was done in spite of Hua’s having no back- ground in the law, security, or intelligence, but his complete devotion to Mao outweighed his disadvantages. His selection for the post had Kang Sheng’s backing, and in 1973 he joined the CCP’s Central Committee.

Hua’s tenure at the MPS was characterized by his complete subservience to Mao, Kang, and even Mao’s main bodyguard, Wang Dongxing, who was consolidating his own power base. On 16 December 1975, Kang Sheng died, and 22 days later, on 8 January 1976, so did Zhou Enlai. The demonstrations that ensued far outstripped anything imagined by Hua at the MPS, as had the appearance of mourning for Zhou, and they were specifically targeted against the Gang of Four, Sirenbang, and the Cultural Revolution. On 4 February 1976, Hua was named acting premier after Zhou’s failed attempt to have Deng Xiaoping take over the government. On 5 April Hua reacted by order- ing the MPS to clear the area, resulting in 100 casualties and several thou- sand jailed. He also caused Deng, who had been severely treated during the Cultural Revolution, to be placed under house arrest after he was attacked by Jiang Qing’s Gang of Four. Deng’s supporters then targeted Hua, proclaim- ing him as a “rightist,” but Hua produced a document that he claimed had come from Mao, written in shaky handwriting: “With you in charge I am at ease.” When Mao died on 9 September 1976, it became clear to Hua that the Gang of Four was a political liability, so on 6 October, after consulting with Wang Dongxing, they were arrested, and Hua remained as head of the MPS until March 1977. However, Hua was outmaneuvered by Deng and his fol-

lowers, which led both Hua and Wang Dongxing to have to make humiliating self-criticisms at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee held in December 1978. Hua was especially ridiculed for his “Two Whatevers,” Liang Ge Fan Shi, statements: “We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and unswervingly follow whatever instruc- tions Chairman Mao gave.” Deng’s retribution was more subtle, and he al- lowed Hua to retain his titles for a period, but without the attendant power. Hua eventually faded from public view in Beijing, largely ignored by both the CCP and the public, and he died on 20 August 2008.

 

HUANG, ANDREW. On 10 April 2007 Andrew Huang, the owner of McAndrew’s Inc., an international export company, pleaded guilty in Con- necticut to one count of making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), having been charged the previous year with operating as a representative for the Chinese Electronic System Engineering Corpora- tion, Zhongguo Dianzi Xitong Gongcheng Gongsi, an organization described as the technology procurement arm of the government of the People’s Re- public of China (PRC). Huang was alleged to have helped broker the illegal sale and transfer of millions of dollars’ worth of telecommunications equip- ment from the PRC to Iraq between 1999 and 2001. See also TECHNOLO- GY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

HUANG KEXUE. In July 2010 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Huang Kexue, a 45-year-old Canadian scientist living in Westbor- ough, Massachusetts, and charged him with 17 counts of economic espionage on behalf of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including the theft of a commercially important pesticide. Huang was born in the PRC, and he was employed for five years by Dow Chemicals in Indiana before he was fired in 1978.

In October 2011 Huang admitted he had passed trade secrets belonging to Dow AgroSciences and Cargill to Hunan Normal University, Hunan Shifan Daxue, with losses valued at $7 billion. See also CANADA; INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

HUANG XIAN. In May 1985 Huang Xian, a Chinese from Hong Kong who had been convicted of espionage and sentenced the previous year to 15 years’ imprisonment, was released from prison in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) because of his “willingness to serve Chinese modernization.”

 

HUAWEI. Started with an investment of about $5,000 in 1987, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. has grown to be the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment and the second-largest manufacturer of smart

phones. The company, with 150,000 employees and $38.6 billion in annual revenues, is a major competitor to United States–based Cisco. The company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile phone infrastructure, WLAN routers, and fiber-optic cable. The company’s founder, Ren Zheng- fei, was estimated in March 2019 to have a net worth of $2.1 billion.

Ren was born in Guizhou in 1944, but during the Japanese occupation he moved to Guangzhou where his father worked in a Kuomintang (KMT) munitions factory. In 1958 Ren’s father became a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ren attended Chongqing University, Chongqing Daxue, in the 1960s and joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to work in the information technology research unit. Despite his father’s mem- bership in the CCP, Ren himself was denied membership for most of his military career due to his family’s past association with the KMT. His tech- nological skills were apparent, and in 1978 he was selected to represent the PLA at a National Science Conference. However, Ren retired from the PLA in 1982, reportedly due to a force reduction that cut about half a million active-duty personnel. Ren moved to Shenzhen and began his own electron- ics business, which initially sold telephone exchange equipment from Hong Kong, before developing a manufacturing program.

Now a member of the CCP, Ren has been married three times. His first

wife was Meng Jun, with whom he had two children, a son, Meng Ping, and a daughter, Meng Wanzhou, both of whom took their mother’s surname. Meng Wanzhou is Huawei’s chief financial officer. His second wife was Yao Ling, with whom he had a daughter, Annabel Yao, who is 25 years younger than her half sister. She studied computer science at Harvard University and is an accomplished ballerina who made her debut at the prestigious Le Bal des Débutantes in Paris in 2018. His third wife is Su Wei, said to be a former secretary.

Ren has consistently claimed that Huawei has no ties to either the PLA or the CCP, an assertion that has been largely disputed by critics who note that Huawei received substantial state support at crucial times during its expan- sion.

On 28 January 2019, the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Wash- ington in Seattle indicted Huawei Device Co. Ltd and Huawei Device USA Inc., charging that Huawei and T-Mobile entered into an agreement in 2010 for Huawei to supply wireless phones to T-Mobile. In 2011 Huawei began supplying phones to T-Mobile for distribution in the United States, and the following year T-Mobile agreed to grant Huawei USA engineers access to T- Mobile’s “Tappy” robotic testing system for the purpose of testing Huawei phones prior to their release. Tappy is a robotic, largely automated testing process that tests phones for an extended period to measure the phone’s performance and stability under extended usage, providing substantial sav- ings over doing the testing manually. In effect, the Tappy system replicates

how humans would use phones over an extended period of time. The Tappy system was housed in a secure laboratory that required special badge access to enter.

Previously T-Mobile had required that Huawei execute two nondisclosure agreements, stating that its employees would not photograph T-Mobile’s robotic testing system, would not attempt to copy or discover Tappy’s soft- ware source codes or trade secrets, would not attempt to reverse engineer Tappy’s software or hardware components, and would not attempt to bypass any security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to Tappy. Further, Huawei agreed that its employees would have access to the Tappy system solely for the purpose of testing phones and would not use T-Mo- bile’s confidential information except in the performance of its agreement with T-Mobile.

The indictment detailed the measures taken by Huawei to obtain informa- tion relating to Tappy as it began to develop its own testing device in 2012, known as xDeviceRobot. The investigation leading to the indictment deter- mined that Huawei engineers, urged on by their parent company in China, “violated confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements with T-Mobile by secretly taking photos of ‘Tappy,’ taking measurements of parts of the robot, and in one instance, stealing a piece of the robot so that Huawei engineers in China could try to replicate it.” When these breaches were discovered and T- Mobile threatened to sue, Huawei undertook an internal investigation, insist- ing that the actions were those of “rogue actors” within the company and did not represent Huawei official policy. However, emails detailed in the indict- ment clearly revealed that the conspiracy to steal T-Mobile’s secrets was a concerted effort on a company-wide scale. Indeed, an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uncovered emails demonstrating that Huawei had offered bonuses to employees based on the value of infor- mation they had stolen from companies around the world. Huawei also pro- vided employees with an encrypted address they could use to email informa- tion to China.

The 10-count indictment included one count of theft of trade secrets, one

count of attempted theft of trade secrets, one count of obstruction of justice, and seven counts of wire fraud. On 1 December 2018, Meng Wanzhou, aliases Cathy Meng and Sabrina Meng, was detained by Canadian authorities at Vancouver International Airport as she changed planes while traveling from Hong Kong to Mexico. The arrest was based on a warrant that had been issued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, charg- ing Meng with “conspiracy to defraud multiple international institutions.”

Meng was born in February 1972 in Sichuan and graduated from the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Huazhong Keji Daxue, in Wuhan, Hebei Province, in 1997. She initially worked for the China Con- struction Bank, Zhonghua Jianshe Yinhang, one of China’s four major banks,

before joining Huawei. In 2001, she moved to Vancouver, where she ob- tained permanent residency status, which expired in 2009, and she also held permanent residency in Hong Kong from 2011. In 2007, she married Liu Xiaozong, a businessman with whom she has a daughter and three stepsons from Liu’s previous marriage.

At a bail hearing Meng was released on $10 million (Canadian), subject to conditions, including electronic surveillance and the surrender of seven pass- ports. On 6 March 2019, protesters outside the courtroom burned a Chinese flag and displayed photographs of two Canadians being detained in China after Meng’s arrest.

The PRC embassy in Ottawa and the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued strong protests concerning Meng’s arrest, and in retaliation two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, were detained by Chinese authorities. Canada’s ambassador to Beijing, John McCallum, said, “From Canada’s point of view, if [the U.S.] drops the extradition request, that would be great for Canada,” but on 26 January 2019, McCallum was fired by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.

Two days later, on 28 January, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York issued a superseding 13-count indictment against Huawei Tech- nologies Co. Ltd., Huawei Device USA Inc., Skycom Tech Co. Ltd., and Meng Wanzhou. It was explained that Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. was a global networking, telecommunications, and services company located in Shenzhen, Guangdong, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), whose parent company is Huawei Technologies Company Ltd. Among the numer- ous subsidiaries owned by Huawei is Huawei Device USA Inc., located in Plano, Texas, and Skycom Tech Co. Ltd., a corporation registered in Hong Kong whose main operations were conducted in Iran. Meng Wanzhou was noted to have served as the chief financial officer (CFO) for Huawei since 2010, and between approximately February 2008 and April 2009, Meng served on the Skycom board of directors. She also served as the deputy chairwoman of the board of directors of Huawei. The indictment outlined how Huawei and Meng as CFO, as well as other Huawei employees, de- ceived numerous global financial institutions and the U.S. government re- garding Huawei’s business activities in Iran. Beginning in 2007, Huawei employees lied about Huawei’s relationship with Skycom, falsely asserting it was not a Huawei affiliate and that Huawei had only limited operations in Iran and did not violate U.S. regulations related to Iran. This relationship had continued even after the media reported in 2012 and 2013 that Huawei oper- ated Skycom as an unofficial affiliate in Iran, while Meng was serving on Skycom’s board of directors. It was also alleged that Meng and other em- ployees falsely claimed that Huawei had sold its interest in Skycom in 2007 and that Skycom was merely Huawei’s local business contact in Iran. By deceiving banks as to the actual relationship with Skycom, these banks con-

tinued their links with Huawei and cleared Skycom-related transactions through the United States, which exposed them to civil or criminal penalties for processing transactions related to Iran through the United States. Huawei, according to the indictment, also lied to U.S. government authorities about its business relations with Iran. The indictment included three counts of conspir- acy to commit bank fraud, two counts of bank fraud, one count of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, four counts of conspira- cy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, one count of a violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, one count of money laundering conspiracy, and one count of conspiracy to ob- struct justice. The indictment also included forfeiture provisions.

Concern about Huawei’s business practices and its relationship with the CCP, the PLA, and the PRC’s intelligence apparatus has been expressed for years, and in 2003 Cisco Systems Inc. filed a lawsuit against Huawei for unlawful copying of its intellectual property. The suit was dropped only after Huawei agreed to modify its product lineup and to cease competing with Cisco with products derived from the intellectual property thefts. In a similar incident in 2010, Motorola sued Huawei for trade secret theft after an em- ployee, Jin Hanjuan, was arrested carrying a large quantity of electronic and paper documents, $30,000 in cash, and a one-way airline ticket to China. She (and others) had schemed to sell the stolen information in China, and an investigation determined that a codefendant and former Motorola employee, Pan Shaowei, had established a Chinese company, Lemko, after meeting Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, to discuss building wireless technology for Huawei based on Motorola technology. Jin was convicted and received a four-year prison sentence.

In October 2012 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

issued an Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, which concluded that “Huawei did not fully cooperate with the investigation and was unwill- ing to explain its relationship with the Chinese government or Chinese Com- munist Party”; “Huawei did not provide clear and complete information on its corporate structure and decision-making processes, likely remains depen- dent on the Chinese government for support”; “its assertions denying support by the Chinese government are not credible”; “Huawei’s corporate history suggests ties to the military, and Huawei failed to provide detailed answers”; “Evidence shows that Huawei exhibits a pattern of disregard for the intellec- tual property rights of other entities and companies in the United States”; “former and current Huawei employees provided evidence of a pattern and practice of potentially illegal behavior by Huawei officials.”

On 18 June 2018 a German company, SolarEdge Technologies, filed a lawsuit for patent infringement against Huawei involving SolarEdge’s signif- icant investment in its innovative DC-optimized inverter technology, claim- ing Huawei had used patented technology without authorization.

In July 2018, the Australian government announced plans to ban Huawei from its 5G project over security fears and noted, “It’s a Chinese company and under Communist law, they have to work for their intelligence agen- cies.”

In August 2018 Huawei was found guilty of infringing on LTE technology patents with some smartphones and must pay the Texas-based company PanOptis $10.5 million. The patents involved technology that decoded pic- ture and audio data, and Huawei used the patents without paying the requisite licensing fee.

On 16 November 2018 the district court in Dusseldorf, Germany, ruled that Huawei (and ZTE) infringed patents of two patent holders of MPEG LA’s AVC patent portfolio license by using their technologies in mobile phones that implement the AVC/H.264 standard.

In January 2019 the Polish government announced that it had arrested a Chinese manager at Huawei’s local office and one of its own former counter- espionage officers, charged with spying for China. Wang Weijing, alias Stan- silaw Wang, and a Polish citizen, Piotr Durbajlo, were arrested by Poland’s internal security service, Agencia Bezpiecznenstwa Wewnetznego (ABW). Wang is a former Chinese diplomat who graduated from the Beijing Univer- sity of Foreign Studies, Beijing Waiguoyu Daxue. Durbajlo formerly worked for the ABW as the deputy director in the Department of Informational Security. At the time of his arrest, he was employed by the French firm Orange, Poland’s leading communications provider. Huawei fired Wang after the arrest, and both Wang and Durbajlo face 10 years’ imprisonment if convicted.

On 8 January 2019, Oxford University suspended donations from Huawei

due to “public concerns raised in recent months surrounding UK partnerships with Huawei.” This announcement followed Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson’s remark that he had “very deep concerns” about Huawei’s in- volvement in the UK’s rollout of 5G. Apparently the British government had received advice from GCHQ expressing concerns over the quality of Huaw- ei’s engineering and the company’s commitment to security.

On 18 February 2019, New Zealand’s prime minister, Jacinda Arden, an- nounced an independent assessment of the risk of using Huawei Technolo- gies in its 5G networks after it was suggested that British precautions could be used by other nations. In November 2018, New Zealand’s signals intelli- gence agency rejected an initial request from telecommunications service Spark to use 5G equipment provided by Huawei. Soon afterward, in April 2019, current and former Pentagon officials warned of the risks to future

military operations posed by allies using Chinese technology in their 5G wireless telecommunications networks. They suggested that allies allowing Chinese firms, including Huawei, to equip their networks posed an unaccept- able risk of espionage and disruptive cyber attacks on military operations due to the firms’ ties with the Chinese government. Further, the group cited a 2017 Chinese law that requires Chinese companies, if directed, to cooperate with surveillance activities.

The Huawei controversy became headline news on 23 April when the Daily Telegraph published a leak from the National Security Council, at- tended by intelligence chiefs and senior members of Prime Minister Teresa May’s cabinet. The report claimed, with considerable accuracy, that the prime minister had agreed to allow Huawei to play a major role in building the UK’s 5G internet system, despite continued pressure from the United States. Williamson was accused of being the source of the leak and fired.

On 8 May 2019, Meng Wanzhou’s extradition hearing was held in Van- couver, where her defense claimed that her arrest had been politically moti- vated, citing statements made by President Donald Trump in which he had suggested that the charges against Meng could be dropped if it would help ongoing contentious trade talks between the United States and China. Meng’s arrest continued to have political and trade ramifications for Canada, including the death sentences for two Canadians arrested on drug-trafficking charges. Observers interpreted this development as pressure on Canada to release Meng. China also blocked imports of Canadian shipments of canola and pork worth billions of dollars.

On 19 May 2019, President Trump added Huawei to a trade blacklist of companies that makes it difficult for them to conduct business with their U.S. counterparts, prompting Google to cease providing Huawei with access, technical support, and collaboration involving its proprietary applications and services, a move bound to damage Huawei’s smartphone business out- side China.

In November 2019 the Australian Strategic Policy Institutes International Cyber Policy Centre concluded that many Chinese high-tech companies, including Huawei, were directly supporting China’s surveillance of Xinjiang Province and the mass indoctrination campaign, especially against the Ui- ghurs.

 

HUTCHINSON, MILTON. The pilot of a Martin P4M-1Q Mercator based at VQ-1, the U.S. Navy’s electronic warfare squadron at Iwakuni, Japan, Lieutenant Commander Milton Hutchinson was killed just after midnight on 22 August 1956 when Chinese MiG fighters attacked his aircraft in interna- tional airspace 32 miles east of Wenzhow. His mission was a routine signals interception flight flown on behalf of the National Security Agency (NSA). All of his crew also perished, and in the subsequent sea rescue search con-

ducted by the Seventh Fleet, only three bodies and some debris were recov- ered by the USS David J. Buckley. The bodies of two technicians were later found by the Chinese and returned, but rumors persisted that two other men had survived the crash and had been held prisoner in Shanghai. In March 1957 a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer, Captain Henry D. Chiu, reported that there was credible evidence to believe that two survivors had undergone interrogation by their captors, were in good health, and, from the description given, could possibly be identified as Lieutenant James B. Deane and either Warren E. Carron or Leonard Strykowski. In the absence of further news and any diplomatic links with Beijing, the incident was quietly shelved. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

HWANG JANG YOP. The most senior North Korean politician ever to defect, Hwang Jang Yop was head of the Kim Il-sung University and then chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly, a post he held for 11 years until 1983 when he was dismissed for what was alleged to be his too-close interest in China’s capitalist reforms. Even though Hwang had been the principal theoretician responsible for developing the Juche idea, the state ideology; had written a revisionist history of the Democratic People’s Repub- lic of Korea (DPRK) that marginalized the Soviet Union’s role; and had taught Kim Jong-Il, he was purged, and in 1997 he seized the opportunity to defect while on a visit to Beijing.

Reportedly Hwang had been cultivated for years by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, through an intermediary, a prominent Chinese scholar. Hwang later moved to South Korea and became a vocal critic of the Pyongyang regime.

 

I

ILLEGALS. Known within the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) intelli- gence community as leng qizi, which translates as “cold chess pieces,” ille- gals are agents sent on missions under nonofficial cover with instructions to remain dormant or frozen until activated. Reputedly this term was coined by Zhou Enlai in the 1930s when he was conducting underground work in Shanghai and he counseled his agents to “do well the work of being a dormant chess piece,” zuohao leng qizi de gongzuo. More recent references credit Zhou with having “put in place the dormant chess pieces,” baibu de leng qizi. The phrase was also used by a Li Fengtian in early 2010 to describe how the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, had sought to seed Hong Kong with long-term sleeper agents.

Unlike the Russian use of illegals, as evidenced by the arrest of 10 agents in the United States in July 2010, PRC illegals tend not to be given clandes- tine operational assignments and simply integrate into the target host society, preparing to be called upon to play a key role in the future. See also CHANG FEN; CHEUNG, MARK; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

IMPECCABLE, USNS. In March 2009 the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed ocean surveillance ship conducting sonar searches for submarines, was the subject of prolonged harassment by five Chinese boats in international waters 75 miles south of Hainan Island. They included fishing boats, an intelligence vessel, and a patrol boat that maneuvered aggressively to within 25 feet of the American ship and was sprayed with a fire hose. Their objective was to disrupt the Impeccable’s operations, which had been monitored by Chinese Y-12 reconnaissance aircraft, and the harassment resulted in a formal diplo- matic protest to Beijing. Almost simultaneously, another U.S. surveillance ship, the USNS Victorious, was approached in the Yellow Sea by a Chinese ship that illuminated the warship’s bridge with a blinding, high-intensity spotlight. U.S. Navy analysts concluded that these two episodes were con- nected and had been undertaken deliberately in support of the People’s Re-

 

 

 

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public of China’s (PRC) disputed claim to an exclusive economic zone ex- tending 200 miles from the country’s coastline. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

INDIA. Sharing a long border in the Himalayas with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India has a long history of commercial rivalry and territorial disputes with both Imperial China and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In October 1962 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked at Ladakh and briefly occupied disputed Indian territory before withdrawing the following month. Nevertheless, the PRC continued to give covert support to Naga rebels in a conflict that would continue in the Jotsoma jungles, at an estimated loss of 100,000 lives, until a cease-fire was negotiated in 1977.

In 1967 there were further skirmishes in Sikkim, and in 1987 tension rose again, with the Indian government concerned about the influence of the Maoist Communist Party of India, particularly in the border states. Sino- Indian relations have also been worsened by the asylum India offered to the Dalai Lama and his supporters after the 1959 uprising in Tibet.

The PRC is a significant intelligence collection target for the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s Cabinet Office intelligence branch based in New Delhi and created in 1968, while the deployment of PLA forces along the frontier was monitored by the Military Intelligence Directorate, later renamed in 2002 as the Defense Intelligence Agency. In addition, India’s formidable internal security apparatus, the Central Bureau of Intelligence, formerly the Delhi Intelligence Bureau, has maintained a close watch on the Communist Party of India, a Maoist movement suspected of links with Beij- ing, with weapons and funds supplied by the PRC, although the leadership in Beijing has consistently denied this support. Historically, however, the PRC has maintained contact with sympathetic tribes and rebel movements in the border provinces and has participated in undermining successive administra- tions in the buffer state of Nepal.

Evidence of the PRC’s relationship with rebels in Naga emerged when in

January 2011 Wang Qing, a Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, officer operating as a television correspondent was detained and deported after having held a meeting with Thuingaleng Muivah, a leader of the Na- tional Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), the province’s breakaway movement. According to Anthony Shimray, a Bangkok-based arms dealer who had tried to broker the sale of $1 million in Chinese missiles to the Naga insurgents and was arrested by Indian authorities, the PRC had a close inter- est in supporting the insurgents active near the frontier at Tawang in Aruna- chal Pradesh.

The historical animosity between China and India shows no signs of abat- ing. India, which will likely supplant China as the world’s most populous nation by 2030, also remains concerned about the relationship between Paki-

stan and China and is sensitive to perceived hostile intelligence activities, such as the incident in 2011 when a Chinese research vessel, disguised as a fishing boat, was observed off the coast of India. In 2018, a PLA Navy electronic intelligence ship spent two weeks in the same general area.

The PLA Navy’s investment in Djibouti has served to heighten tension in the region and encouraged the U.S. and Indian navies to cooperate in moni- toring Chinese submarines and the increased traffic of Chinese surface ves- sels in the Indian Ocean.

In 2012, the “Luckycat” hacking campaign targeted India as well as Japan and Tibet. A Trojan horse was inserted into a Microsoft Word file which breached India’s ballistic missile defense program. The attacks were traced to a former graduate student, Gu Kaiyuan, who was employed by Tencent, China’s leading portal company. In March 2019, Indian intelligence agencies claimed that China was attempting to spy on Indian naval bases by establish- ing Chinese businesses in those ports. See also CHARBATIA; CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH; CHINESE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE; GH0STNET; GOWADIA, NOSHIR S; KAO LIANG; KASHMIR PRIN- CESS; LEE, DUNCAN C; MALAYAN PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA); NANDA DEVI; ORIENTAL MISSION; PAKISTAN; SERVICE, JOHN S; SHADOW NETWORK; SHANGHAI COOPERA- TION ORGANIZATION (SCO); SINO-SOVIET SPLIT; SOVIET UNION; SMEDLEY, AGNES; SUN WEIGUO; THIRD DEPARTMENT.

 

INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. The Western concept of industrial espion- age, defined as the illicit acquisition of commercially sensitive proprietary information, is alien to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where no such narrow distinction exists between state and private interests. With industry overwhelmingly in the hands of the state, the state exercises control over commercial entities that in the West would not be regarded as wholly owned state assets. Accordingly, the PRC seeks to protect its assets by extending official secrecy laws to cover ordinary commercial transactions, as the direc- tors of the Australian mining combine Rio Tinto Zinc discovered in 2009 after having negotiated iron ore supply contracts. In implementing its “Made in China 2025,” Zhongguo Zhizao 2025, strategic plan in 2015, the Chinese sanctioned what is in reality state-sponsored industrial espionage.

In parallel, the PRC promotes the interests of the state’s commercial enter-

prises by officially sponsoring the collection of proprietary information from foreign competitors and the recruitment of sources and intermediaries who engage in the illicit acquisition of protected data and the circumvention of foreign export controls. As the PRC’s principal nondiplomatic overseas rep- resentative organization, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia An- quanbu, is the chosen channel for much of this activity, with numerous examples of technicians stealing processes and software, ostensibly indepen-

dent businessmen attempting to purchase embargoed equipment, and well- funded front companies acting on behalf of unidentified clients in Singapore and Hong Kong.

According to French intelligence reports, PRC state-sponsored industrial espionage relies on variations of three familiar techniques. The first is the “lamprey,” in which a project is announced inviting international contenders. A false competition between rival foreign firms is created, with the partici- pants encouraged to improve their product demonstrations, but once their technical data has been compromised, the project is ostensibly abandoned, leaving the Chinese principals in possession of various proprietary items. In a recent example, France’s embassy in Beijing arranged a six-month course for Chinese engineers in support of a bid to sell TGV transport technology, but eventually interest waned, and the PRC developed its own version, which included components from the TGV and the German ICE train.

Another technique, known as the “mushroom factory,” involves a joint venture that is created in partnership with a foreign firm that is dependent on the transfer of processes that then become available to local competitors that offer almost identical products. One such victim was Danone, the French dairy producer that went into business with Wahada, the Chinese drink com- pany. However, when Schneider Electric tried to sue China over the breach of a patent registered in 1996, the company was taken to court in the PRC, accused of counterfeiting, and fined 330 million yuan. In other examples, a General Motors joint venture to produce the Spark was undermined by a rival vehicle, the Future, manufactured with GM designs, and the partly state- owned French carmaker Renault discovered in January 2011 that its staff had been bribed by Chinese to disclose confidential information relating to the development with Nissan of electric car technology. Matthieu Tenebaum and two other senior executives were suspended pending an investigation into what was described by the Élysée Palace as a “Chinese link” and what industry minister Eric Besson called “economic warfare.” See also AUS- TRALIA; CHAO TAH WEI; CHENG, PHILIP; CHEN YONGLIN; CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORATION (CASIC); CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; CHANG, THERESA; COX REPORT; DU SHASHAN; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI); FRANCE; FRANK, DESMOND DINESH; GERMANY; GE YUEFIE; GOWADIA, NOSHIR S; HANSON, HAROLD DEWITT; HONEYTRAP; HUANG KEXUE; JIN HANJUAN; KHAN, AMANULLAH; KOVACS, WILLIAM; LEE, DAVID YEN; LIANG XIUWEN; LIN HAI; LI QING; LIU SIXING; MENG HONG; MENG, XIAODONG SHELDON; MOO, KO-SUEN; NAHARDANI, AHMAD; PROJECT 863; ROTH, JOHN REECE; SUCCOR DELIGHT; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; TSU,

WILLIAM CHAI-WAI; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA); WANG- WOODFORD, LAURA; WEN HO LEE; WU BIN; XU BING; XU WEIBO; YANG FUNG; YU XIANGDONG; ZHONG MING.

 

INFORMATION WARFARE. In 1985 a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) staff officer, Shen Weiguang, wrote Information Warfare, which was serialized two years later by the PLA’s leading newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao. Since then the PLA’s Commission of Science, Technology, and National Defense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui, has pursued the topic and sponsored symposia that have been addressed by some of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) most influential figures, including Qian Xuesen and Zhu Guangya. All have endorsed a strategy of information-based warfare as a key part of the PLA’s modernization.

After the 1991 Gulf War, when analysts were impressed by the U.S. coali- tion’s impressive performance, advocates of information warfare, such as Qian Xuesen, attended the third annual COSTIND Science and Technology Committee meeting in March 1994 and demanded the establishment of a national information network and associated technologies. Then in Decem- ber 1994, COSTIND sponsored a symposium, “Analysis of the National Defense System and the Military Technological Revolution,” and another, “The Issue of Military Revolution,” in October 1995. The result was the establishment of an Informational Warfare Research Institute and work on an information warfare simulation center.

Some of the PRC’s leading strategists convened in Shijiazhuang in De- cember 1995 for a “Forum for Experts on Meeting the Challenges of the World Military Revolution,” at which 30 experts called for the development of weapons that can “throw the financial systems and army command sys- tems of the hegemonists into chaos.”

The advocates of information warfare (IW) claim that these tactics are perfect for modern asymmetrical conflict, where underdeveloped countries can gain an advantage against a nation that is “extremely fragile and vulner- able when it fulfills the process of networking and then relies entirely on electronic computers.” They suggested that the PRC should abandon the strategy of “catching up” with more advanced powers and “proceed from the brand-new information warfare and develop our unique technologies and skills, rather than inlay the old framework with new technologies,” thereby leapfrogging into the 21st century as a preeminent military power.

At a COSTIND national directors’ meeting convened in December 1995, General Liu Huaqing, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandong Zhongyang Jun Shi Weiyuanhui, asserted that “information warfare and electronic warfare are of key importance, while fighting on the ground can only serve to exploit the victory. Hence, China is more convinced [than ever] that as far as the

PLA is concerned, a military revolution with information warfare as the core has reached the stage where efforts must be made to catch up with and overtake rivals.”

Articles in the PLA’s newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, and in academic jour- nals, such as the Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), stress the need to develop “perfect weapons” that serve as “trump cards” (shashoujian) to exploit an adversary’s reliance on sophisticated microelectronics.

The PRC’s very public preoccupation with electronic warfare has fueled the suspicion that Beijing routinely sponsors cyber attacks on Western elec- tronic infrastructure, concentrating on some very sensitive sites. For exam- ple, in November 2004 it was reported that systems at the U.S. Army Infor- mation Systems Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; the De- fense Information Systems Agency in Arlington, Virginia; the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego, California; and the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense installation in Huntsville, Alabama, had all experienced intrusions traced back to computers located inside the PRC. See also AVO- CADO; FALUN GONG; GH0STNET; INFORMATION WARFARE MILI- TIA; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; TITAN RAIN; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

INFORMATION WARFARE MILITIA. In 1998 press reports from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) disclosed that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) computer technicians in Shanxi Province had collaborated with “a certain Datong City state-owned enterprise” to create an experimental Infor- mation Warfare Militia, Xinxi Zhan Minbing, staffed by 40 personnel drawn from 30 local universities, scientific research institutes, and other facilities. Their purpose was to develop a capability to jam enemy radar systems, interrupt communications, and attack computer networks. Then, in 2006, the influential People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science, Jie- fangjun Junshi Kexueyuan, published a paper that endorsed the concept of electronic warfare operations and called for the creation of additional units. Since then, according to data collected in 2008 by iDefense, an internet security consultancy, a further 33 Information Warfare Militia units have been established across the PRC, usually accommodated in university com- puter science departments, research institutes, and technology firms staffed by young graduates. In March 2008 the PLA announced that a unit had been formed in Yongning County in Ningxia Province consisting of 80 personnel divided into three detachments dedicated to computer network warfare, data collection and processing, and network defense.

In 2009 the United States–China Economic and Security Review Com-

mission received a report contracted from the Northrop Grumman Corpora- tion, Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation, which noted that the Ministry of Pub-

lic Security (MPS), Gonganbu, had posted recruitment messages on two of the PRC’s most notorious computer-hacking forums, www.EvilOctal.com and www.XFocus.net, offering careers for skilled operators. In addition, vol- ume 6 of Guofang, National Defense, published in 2008, included an article by Ding Shaowu titled “Some Thoughts about Organizing the Provincial Military District Setup to Conduct Training in a Complex Electromagnetic Environment,” which drew attention to U.S. Army electronic warfare tech- niques successfully applied during recent military campaigns in Kosovo in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003. This advocacy prompted a debate within the Chi- nese open literature, principally in Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Zhongguo Guofang Bao (China National Defense News), Jiefang- jun Bao (People’s Liberation Army Daily), and the official newspapers of China’s seven military districts, about the need to catch up with Western doctrine. In particular, the term “integrated network electronic warfare” (INEW), zonghe wangkuo dianzi zhan, appeared frequently and was defined as

techniques such as electronic jamming, electronic deception and suppres- sion to disrupt information acquisition and information transfer, launching a virus attack or hacking to sabotage information processing and informa- tion utilization, and using anti-radiation and other weapons based on new mechanisms to destroy enemy information platforms and information fa- cilities.

 

This virus concept (bingdu) was embraced by the PLA General Staff, which in 2007 circulated a revised Outline for Military Training and Evaluation that included a directive to consider training “under complex electromagnetic environments” a core activity. According to a report published in January 2008 by Jiefangjun Bao, 100 senior officers had assembled in the Shenyang Military Region to observe an exercise in which INEW was demonstrated, and the PLA defended itself from simulated cyber and electronic attacks.

While the evidence of the existence of Information Warfare Militias is clear, the extent of their operations remains a matter of speculation. Howev- er, according to Joel Brenner of the U.S. National Counterintelligence Exec- utive, a substantial proportion of the growing number of cyber attacks mounted against the American electronic infrastructure has been traced back forensically to the PRC. In 2007 a total of 43,880 malicious attacks were recorded as having been made against the U.S. Department of Defense, a figure revealed by Colonel Gary McAlum, chief of staff of the U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations, and this esca- lated by 20 percent the following year to 54,640 incidents. Often specific facilities in the PRC could be identified as having been responsible for an attack, but more often it was the nature of the episode, and the information sought, that betrayed the likely identities of the perpetrators.

In an example of computer hacking as a method of intelligence collection rather than sabotage, the PRC was accused by South Korea of having pene- trated Seoul’s Ministry of Defense in June 2010 to access sensitive informa- tion about a recent decision to purchase several Global Hawks, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance platform from Northrop Grumman in San Diego. A highly controversial procurement previously banned under the Missile Technology Control Regime, the drones represented a significant improvement in Seoul’s surveillance capability and evidently thus became a priority target for Beijing’s hackers. See also CYBER ESPIONAGE; FA- LUN GONG; GH0STNET; TITAN RAIN; UNITED STATES OF AMERI- CA (USA).

 

INSTITUTE 21. Also known as the Red Mountain Institute, Hong Shan Xueyuan, Institute 21, Yanjiu Suo 21, was built in 1963, 10 miles northwest of the test headquarters at Malan, as the PRC’s principal diagnostics and radiochemistry research facility for the country’s nuclear weapons program. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

 

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. The People’s Liber-

ation Army’s (PLA) Institute of International Relations, Jiefangjun Guiji Guanxi Yueyan, is subordinate to the Second Department of the General Staff Department (GSD) and until 1964 was known as the School for Foreign Cadres of the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui Waiguoyu Ganbu Xueyuan. It is responsible for training military attachés, their assistants and associates, and secret agents, mimi tegong, to be posted abroad. It also provides officers to military intelligence sections of various military districts. The institute was formed from the PLA 793 Foreign Language Institute, Jiefangjun 793 Waiyuxueyuan Zhongyang, after the Cultural Revolution and has two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.

 

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS (IPR). A front organization run covertly by the Communist Party of the United States of America before World War II, the IPR was headed by Owen Lattimore and then Michael Greenberg, both identified as Soviet agents. The IPR’s true role, to influence public opinion relating to U.S. policy toward China with Communist propa- ganda, was exposed by Elizabeth Bentley in 1945 when she made a lengthy statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See also PRICE, MILDRED.

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DE-

FENSE (IBMND). Taiwan’s parallel intelligence organization, operating in competition with the more powerful National Security Bureau (NSB) con- trolled by the Kuomintang (KMT), the UBMND’s principal area of activity was in northern Thailand and Burma, supposedly running agents across the border into Yunnan Province in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the “golden triangle.” The IBMND was implicated in the international nar- cotics trade and in 1977 was suspected of having supported Ma Sik-yu and his younger brother Ma Sik-chun, Hong Kong’s major heroin wholesalers who had backed the Oriental Daily News, the colony’s Chinese-language pro-Nationalist newspaper. When the Royal Hong Kong Police swooped on the Ma empire in February 1977, both men fled to Taiwan where they were protected from extradition.

In 1983 the appointment of Admiral Wang Hsi-ling, who had spent the

previous 12 years in Washington, D.C., as the IMBND’s director caused controversy. His predecessor had been dismissed for corruption, but Wang’s career had been in the rival NSB. However, in October the following year he was implicated in the murder of Henry Liu, and all IMBND personnel were expelled from the United States. Wang was arrested in Taipei in January 1985 and served six years of a life sentence until released in January 1991. In the meantime, the IMBND was dismantled and replaced by a new organiza- tion, the Ministry of National Defense’s Intelligence Bureau.

 

INTERAERO. On 17 August 2004, a California aircraft parts supplier, Interaero Incorporated, operated by Arthur Hale, was fined $500,000 in Washington, D.C., having pleaded guilty to a breach of the Arms Export Control Act and admitted to having exported six shipments of military air- craft parts, valued in excess of $40,000, to China between June 2000 and March 2001, knowing that the consignments were actually destined for Iran. Included were Hawk missiles and parts for F-4 Phantoms and F-5 Tiger fighters. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT (ILD). The International

Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operates under the control of the Central Committee and is responsible for links with foreign political parties and routinely collects intelligence and conducts intelligence operations overseas. The Zhonggong Zhongyang Duiwai Lianluo Bu, trans- lated literally as “Chinese Communist Party Central Foreign Liaison Depart- ment,” has undergone a transformation of sorts as international communism has been on the ebb. Originally the ILD gained some notoriety when compet-

ing with the Soviet Union for influence within the worldwide Communist movement, but it also served as a vehicle for intelligence gathering (i.e., secret work, or tewu) while it was under the control of Kang Sheng.

Always subordinate to the CCP, the ILD evolved during the period of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and the Soviet collapse and began to portray itself as conducting relations with any foreign political party, Communist, social- ist, or otherwise. The ILD’s head has traditionally held ministerial status and even outranked the country’s foreign minister. The current head, Song Tao, was born in 1955 and is a former ambassador to Guyana and to the Philip- pines. He later served as head of the disciplinary office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

 

INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT (ILD/PLA). The Interna-

tional Liaison Department of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Polit- ical Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Guoji Lianlu Chu, had been identified by the 2004 Intelligence Threat Handbook, published by the OP- SEC Inter-Agency Support Staff, as an agency engaged in the clandestine collection of intelligence in the United States. Although primarily a propa- ganda and psychological warfare unit targeted against Taiwan, the depart- ment was listed in May 2009 by U.S. director of national intelligence Dennis Blair as being active in the United States. In 2016 the ILD/PLA was replaced by the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhon- gyang Junshi Weiyuanhui Zhengzhi Gongzuo Bu, during Xi Jinping’s re- forms.

 

INTER-SERVICES LIAISON DEPARTMENT (ISLD). The Far East

branch of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) before and during World War II operated under the semitransparent cover of the Inter-Services Liaison Department from offices in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. The ISLD made a pact with the Chinese-dominated Malaya Communist Party to devel- op intelligence-gathering networks behind the Japanese lines. See also GREAT BRITAIN; LAI TEK.

 

IRAN. The relationship between China and Iran dates back to at least 200

B.C. and has remained relatively intact, covering not only trade but intermar- riage. China’s implementation of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR), Yidai Yilu (the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Jingidai He Ershiyi Shiji) initiative, has served to create new links, establishing China as Iran’s largest trading partner. With China switch- ing from coal to petroleum, Iran has benefited from the oil purchases, and the China National Petroleum Corporation, Zhongguo Shiyou Tianranqi Jituan Gongsi, has signed an agreement to drill 19 wells in natural gas fields in

southern Iran. Another Chinese exploration company, the Sinopec Group, Zhongguo Shihua Jituan, has acquired a half share of fields in Yadavaran worth about $100 billion. In 2011 Iran agreed to give China exclusive rights to several Iranian oil and natural gas fields, and Beijing undertook to treat any attack on those areas as an attack on its own sovereign territory.

Following the imposition of international financial, economic, and military sanctions on Tehran in 1979, the Islamic Republic nevertheless has acquired nuclear and military matériel. In 2009 a group of Iranian businessmen based in Dubai were indicted in Manhattan on charges of conspiring to conceal banned transactions, together with Li Fangwei, manager of the Chinese com- pany LIMMT Economic and Trade Company, Li Mu Te Jingmao Gongsi, a company indicted by the district attorney in New York for the misuse of Manhattan’s banks and offenses relating to the proliferation of illicit missile and nuclear technology. Li remains an international fugitive.

When in 2019 Iran signed up publicly for Beijing’s OBOR initiative, it was believed that China had been training the Iranian military, providing technical support, and building a missile factory and a test range. There are also indications that Iran obtained Chinese-made anti-ship surface-to-ship missiles and that China sold Iran precursor and dual-use chemicals. Certainly nuclear cooperation dates back to the 1980s and led to a formal nuclear cooperation agreement in 1992. However, collaboration is now thought to have ended, and China opposes Iran’s nuclear weapons program. See also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; INTERAERO; MONTAPERTO, RONALD N; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); NORTH KOREA; SHANGHAI COOPERA- TION ORGANIZATION (SCO); WANG-WOODFORD, LAURA; WEI LEFANG; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

ITT CORPORATION. On 27 March 2007 the ITT Corporation, a leading manufacturer of military night-vision equipment for the U.S. military, agreed to pay a $100 million penalty and admitted to have illegally exported re- stricted night-vision data to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Singa- pore, and Great Britain. The company also pleaded guilty to charges that it had omitted statements of material fact in required arms export reports. The

$100 million penalty is believed to be one of the largest ever in a criminal export control case, and as part of the plea agreement the company must invest $50 million of the penalty toward the development of advanced night- vision systems for the U.S. armed forces. See also INTERAERO; TECH- NOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

J

JAPAN. With a mutual hostility dating back centuries, Sino-Japanese rela- tions have been characterized by war and from 1931 by the occupation of Manchuria, followed by continuous combat on mainland China until the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The tension remains elevated, only partly due to the historical animosities, but also because of the increased militarism of China and maritime disputes concerning sovereignty over the Senkaku (Diaoyutai) Islands and allegations of espionage. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan provided the United States with bases from which to conduct signals intelligence operations, including airborne collection and high-altitude aerial reconnaissance flights. During the Korean War, Japan’s naval and air bases proved of critical importance for the United Nations’ forces.

While Japan was demilitarized during the American postwar occupation,

trade channels developed with the PRC, thus making each a target for mainly economic intelligence collection, but the relationship was suspended by Beij- ing in 1958 as Tokyo cultivated Taiwan as an important commercial partner. However, the Sino-Soviet split forced Mao Zedong to restore the unofficial links, and in 1963 he established a trade mission in Tokyo. In September 1972, after President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing, formal diplomatic recognition was given to the PRC. Despite the tension between the countries, trade has flourished, and in 2010 China overtook Japan as the world’s sec- ond-largest economy and enjoyed the top two-way trading partnership.

In Japan, economic intelligence collection is the responsibility of the Nai- cho, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, which is an analytical organization devoid of clandestine collection facilities, thus making it diffi- cult to penetrate, although Beijing has often attempted to exercise political influence in Tokyo through local Communists. In March 2003 the U.S. Na- tional Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) reported that Beijing sponsored two groups, the Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers in Japan (ACSEJ) and the Chinese Association of Scientists and Engineers in Japan (CASEJ), both of which were dedicated to the PRC’s objectives in the mili- tary and commercial fields and in the science and technology sectors. Both

 

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groups sponsored “Returnee Friendship Committees,” distributed propagan- da, and promoted academic conferences and other gatherings, often held in the embassy in Tokyo, where information could be exchanged in a forum that circumvented “Western protectionism.” According to the NCIX, the ACSEJ had been formed in 1993 and had achieved 731 members, many of them engaged in sensitive research. Japan is a major PRC intelligence target, sec- ond only to the United States.

In 2011 the “Luckycat” hacker group in China engaged in cyber espionage in Japan, traced back to Gu Kaiyuan, who had been a graduate student at the Chengdu University of Information Technology, Chengdu Xinxi Gongcheng Daxue. In September 2015 China announced the detention of two Japanese who had been arrested the previous May, one in Liaoning Province near the North Korean border and the other in Zhejiang Province near a Chinese military facility.

In 2018 the Tokyo Broadcasting System’s Houdou Tokushu (News Spe- cial) devoted a program to the issue of Japanese spies arrested by the Chi- nese, and in October 2019 a Japanese professor from Japan’s Hokkaido University was detained in Beijing on suspicion of spying for Japan.

In 2019 South Korea threatened to withdraw from the General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement, a 2016 treaty with Japan covering the ex- change of intelligence relating to North Korea and China, because of the ongoing dispute about Japan’s use of forced labor for Japanese companies and the use of “comfort women” during World War II. However, in Novem- ber 2019, under pressure from the United States, Seoul consented to continue participation, but only with the face-saving condition of being able to with- draw unilaterally at any time. See also KAMISEYA; NATIONAL SECUR- ITY AGENCY (NSA); U-2.

 

JI SHENGDE. Born in 1948, one of six children of Ji Pengfei, Ji Shengde was a longtime Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member who joined the Red Army in 1931. He was the People’s Republic of China’s third foreign minister, serving from 1972 to 1974, and held other important and high- profile roles, including overseeing the negotiations with Great Britain for Hong Kong’s return to China.

Ji Shengde was regarded as one of China’s “princelings,” the privileged children of the CCP elite. By 1992, at the relatively young age of 44, Ji Shengde was named as the head of the PLA’s General Staff Headquarters, Intelligence Department (Second Department), Renmin Jiefangjun Zong Canmoubu Qingbaobu, with the rank of major general, succeeding Xiong Guangkai. For many years, the PLA had run commercial enterprises in order to assist in budgeting, a practice that started under Deng Xiaoping. This was allowed after Deng slashed the PLA’s budget to divert funds toward econom- ic development.

In the summer of 1996, Liu Chaoying introduced Johnny Chung, a U.S. political operative and huckster, to Ji. Chung would become embroiled in the campaign finance controversy involving President Bill Clinton’s reelection campaign that same year. Liu held the rank of lieutenant colonel in the PLA and married the daughter of Admiral Liu Huaqing, herself a princeling. Chung testified in May 1999 before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee that he and Liu had met Ji in an abalone restaurant in the Guangdong seaside city of Zhuhai. Ji had waited in the kitchen until he and Liu arrived. There, Chung testified, Ji stated, “We really like your presi- dent. We hope he will be reelect [sic]. . . . I will give you 300,000 U.S. dollars. You can give it to . . . your president and Democrat Party.” Chung received the $300,000 through Liu but kept most of it for his personal use, actually giving the Democratic National Committee only $35,000. Chung also testified that he had hired Ji’s son, a student at UCLA, at his facsimile business in Torrance, California.

In June 1999 Ji was transferred to the head of the Military Systems Depart-

ment of the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences, Zhongguo Renmin Jie- fangjun Junshi Kexue, a think tank that studies military organization and related topics. The PLA insisted the transfer was a lateral move and had nothing to do with the public exposure of Ji’s meeting with Chung.

However, the following year, Ji was implicated in a smuggling scandal involving Lai Changxing that centered around the Fujian Province port of Xiamen. Lai had originally fled to Canada where he negotiated a return to China to face charges, with China making assurances that Lai would not receive the death penalty, and on 18 May 2012 Lai was sentenced to life imprisonment and all his properties in China were confiscated.

The investigation into Ji’s corruption intensified after the death of his father in February 2000, when it was reported that Ji had not been allowed to attend his father’s funeral. Ji was charged with embezzling millions from PLA state-run corporations and investing in the stock market and real estate. He was found guilty and sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve, usually meaning to a life sentence after two years. However, Ji’s sentence was re- duced to 20 years after he reportedly made a confession. His wife is said to live in Los Angeles.

 

JIA CHUNWANG. Born in 1938 in Beijing, Jia Chunwang joined the Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP) in 1962 and two years later graduated from Tsinghua University, Qinghua Daxue, in Beijing in the Engineering and Physics Department. Established in 1911, Tsinghua University is a major research center whose alumni include numerous political, academic, busi- ness, and cultural leaders, including two Nobel Prize recipients and People’s Republic of China (PRC) president and CCP general secretary Xi Jinping.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, between 1966 and 1972, Jia was sent to a reeducation school because of his university education. While in the camps, he performed manu- al labor and was reindoctrinated with Chairman Mao Zedong’s teachings. In the years following his graduation, Jia advanced through a number of Beijing municipal area positions within the CCP until 1982, when he was named as a member of the 12th CCP Central Committee. In 1982 Jia also served as the national head of the Communist Youth League, Zhongguo Gongechanzhui, and in 1984 he was appointed deputy secretary of the CCP’s Municipal Committee of the Beijing Municipality. The following year Jia was named as the second minister for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia An- quanbu, replacing Ling Yun who was dismissed after the defection of high- ranking MSS officer Yu Qiangsheng, alias Yu Zhensan. When asked to comment on the defection of Yu, Jia only responded, “It’s very regrettable.”

At the time of Ling’s dismissal, groups from within the MSS public secur-

ity and central investigation elements both insisted that the new MSS head should come from among their respective cadres, and to avoid further inter- nal conflict, Jia, an outsider to both groups, was appointed. Reportedly Jia harbored bad memories of and resentment for his treatment during the Cultu- ral Revolution and detested the Soviet KGB. However, he is said to have admired both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the French Direction Générale de la Securité Extérieure (DGSE).

During his long career Jia occupied several positions of influence and authority. Between 1987 and 2007 he was a member of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th CCP Central Committees. From 1998 to 2003 he served as the vice procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan. Jia remained the MSS director until March 1998, a period when the organization became a formable intelligence organization. After 13 years, he was replaced by Xu Yongyue, and Jia was named as the 10th minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, in March 1998, replacing Tao Siju. As the MPS head, he also assumed the position of first political commissar of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, Zhongguo Renmin Wuzhuang. His tenure at the MPS was largely unremark- able, and without the scandal that would envelop his successor, Zhou Yong- kang.

Jia stayed as head of the MPS until December 2002 when he was pro-

moted procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, a position somewhat comparable to that of the attorney general of the United States.

 

JIANG BO. On 16 March 2013, Jiang Bo, aged 31, was boarding a plane at Dulles International Airport with a one-way ticket to Beijing when he was stopped by U.S. Homeland Security. According to his arrest warrant, Bo’s travel was sudden, and he was under federal investigation. During an inter-

view, Jiang acknowledged possession of a cell phone, a memory stick, an external hard drive, and a new computer. However, in the subsequent search, he was found to have additional media, including a second laptop, another hard drive, and a SIM card. Previously, in November 2012, Jiang had traveled to China with a laptop belonging to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that was believed to have contained sensitive information. Upon his return the following month, Jiang had been asked to return the computer equipment and was barred from entering the NASA facility. Accordingly, Jiang was arrested for lying to federal officers while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) continued its investigation of Jiang for violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

A native of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Jiang was a researcher working on source code for high-technology imaging at NASA’s Langley Research Center. He had originally arrived in the United States in 2007 as a PhD student in electrical and computer engineering at Old Dominion Univer- sity in Norfolk, Virginia, where he earned his doctorate in 2010. After ob- taining his PhD, Jiang was employed at the National Institute of Aerospace, which had a cooperative relationship with NASA at Langley, Virginia. Due to the influence of a professor at Old Dominion who had left academia for a civil service position with the Electromagnetics and Sensors Branch at the NASA facility at Langley, Jiang was considered for a contract position at the same facility. The former professor was killed in an automobile accident, but his former colleagues hired Jiang in January 2011, even though they had only met him once.

Early in his tenure at NASA, Jiang was given unrestricted access to the

former professor’s work files without consulting NASA security staff, and he was provided with a computer that allowed him to copy material from his former professor’s hard drive. A search of Jiang’s electronic devices at the time of his arrest did not reveal any sensitive information, but he had broken NASA regulations by downloading copyrighted movies, television shows, and pornography on the NASA-owned laptop. On 2 May 2013 Jiang pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count of misusing government office equip- ment and was sentenced to time served, about seven weeks. He was also ordered to leave the United States within 48 hours.

After Jiang’s departure, two of his NASA supervisors were indicted for allowing Jiang unrestricted access to NASA computers and for letting him take the NASA computer to China in November 2012. In October 2015, Glenn A. Woodell pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of violating a NASA regulation and order relating to allowing foreign nationals access to sensitive information. He was fined $500 and given probation for six months. In December 2015, Daniel J. Hobson pleaded guilty to similar charges and was placed on probation for six months. Both had retired from NASA at the time of their guilty pleas.

JIANGNAN SOCIAL UNIVERSITY. Located in Suzhou, the Jiangsu So- cial University, Jiangnan Shehui Daxue, is sometimes referred to as the Institute of Cadre Management Suzhou, Suzhou Ganbu Gualli Xueyuan. Ji- angnan Social University was intended to be an annex of the Beijing Institute of International Relations, Beijing Guoji Quanxi Xueyuan, but instead has become a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, training facility for headquarters personnel, teaching spycraft, firearms, driving skills, and the like. It publishes the Journal of Jiangnan Social University, Jiangnan Shehui Xueyuan Xuebao.

 

JIANGSU NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION CENTER. Opened in

2009, the Jiangsu National Security Education Center, Jiangsu Sheng Guojia Anquan Jiaoyu, is located in Nanjing’s Yuhuatai Memorial Park of Revolu- tionary Martyrs, Yuhuatai Lieshi Jinian Gongyuan, and originally was off- limits to foreigners, However, when it reopened in 2016, foreigners were allowed to visit the museum, which celebrates the clandestine roles and objects of China’s revolutionary heroes, It contains exhibits relating to Chi- na’s contemporary threats, such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. Also listed are such organizations as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as the internal threats by such groups as the Tibetans, Uighurs, and Falun Gong.

 

JIN HANJUAN. Formerly employed for eight years by the Motorola Corpo- ration in Schaumberg, Illinois, Jin Hanjuan was indicted in April 2008 in Illinois on three charges involving the sale of proprietary information con- tained in thousands of documents to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to the cellular telephone manufacturer Lemco, without authorization.

Aged 37, Jin had been arrested on 28 February 2007 by U.S. Customs officials at Chicago O’Hare International Airport as she was about fly on a one-way ticket to the PRC. A U.S. citizen, Jin was born in China and was carrying 1,300 electronic and paper documents from her former employer, Motorola; a European company’s product catalog of military technology written in English; as well as documents describing military telecommunica- tions technology, written in Chinese. She was also carrying $30,000 in cash, having only declared $10,000.

Jin, who had joined Motorola in 1998, took a medical leave of absence in February 2006, but between June and November of that year she negotiated with a Chinese company, Lemko, to develop communications software. On 26 February 2007 Jin returned to work at Motorola but omitted to mention her new job in the PRC. Between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. she downloaded more than 200 technical documents from Motorola’s secure internal computer net-

work. At about 12:15 p.m. she had sent her resignation by email to her manager. However, later the same evening, she returned to her office and removed additional documents.

Motorola filed a civil suit against Jin, as well as Wu Xiaohua and his spouse, Pan Shaowei; Sheng Xiaohong; and Bai Xuefeng, all former Motoro- la employees who had also taken up jobs with Lemko, alleging that they had tried to steal the technical specifications of the SC300 base transceiver sta- tion, internet technology for cellular systems.

At a hearing in November 2011, Jin asked for a non-jury trial before a federal judge, declaring that she was only a bad employee, not a spy. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

JIN WUDAI. See CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI.

 

JOINT STAFF OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION (JS/

CMC). Under reforms brought about by President Xi Jinping in 2016, the Joint Staff of the Central Military Commission, Zhongyang Junshi Weiyua- nahui Canmou Bu, was established to assume the duties of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department (GSD), Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu. Like his predecessor, the JS/CMC is under the control of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Zhon- ghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui. The department continues to supervise the PLA’s recruitments, mobilization, operations com- mand, training, and administration. The command remains in Beijing, and the current head, appointed in August 2017, is General Li Zuocheng, who was born in 1953 and joined the PLA at age 17. As a company commander he served in the Sino-Vietnamese War and participated in a protracted 26- day battle during which he was wounded, but he refused to quit his com- mand. He became a war hero, and his rise through the PLA’s ranks was steady. In July 2015 he was promoted to the rank of general, shang jiang, the highest rank for Chinese military officers on active duty.

 

K

KAMISEYA. The U.S. National Security Agency’s (NSA) largest overseas facility, Kamiseya in Japan occupied the tunnels of a wartime torpedo stor- age site and consisted of a large antenna field, an airstrip, and underground accommodation for intercept operators and traffic analysts. Located some 500 miles off the coast of mainland China, Kamiseya was the NSA’s window into the People’s Republic of China and processed traffic collected from aircraft flown from both Japan and Taipei, Taiwan. It was originally occu- pied by the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949. The NSA withdrew in 1995. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; CENTRAL IN- TELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

KANG SHENG. Born in 1898, Kang Sheng joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925 and until he succumbed to cancer in 1975 spent his entire career in the Chinese security and intelligence apparatus and at one point headed the Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA), Zhongyang Shehui Shiwu Bu. He was also closely connected to Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing, whose mother had been in domestic service in his father’s house- hold, and as young revolutionaries, it is likely they were lovers before Kang introduced her to Mao Zedong, who immediately became infatuated. She exacted great influence over Mao up through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, and reportedly continued to confide in Kang as to Mao’s thoughts even as she shared Mao’s bed.

In 1958 Kang, who invariably dressed in all-white clothing, adopted Yu Qiangsheng and sponsored his entry into the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, an organization he would supervise as a member of the CCP’s Political Bureau in 1966 following the death of Li Kenong.

During the Chinese Civil War, his principal adversary was Tai Li (Di Li in today’s Pinyin romanization), and it is doubtful there were two more blood- thirsty individuals on opposing sides in modern history. Because of his role in the Cultural Revolution, Kang was dismissed as a member of the CCP and

 

 

 

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is now considered a nonentity. His name is rarely mentioned in official circles. However, Chinese intelligence professionals recognize the essential role he played in building the country’s intelligence structure.

 

KAO LIANG. Appointed secretary of the Chinese mission to the United Nations in 1983, Kao Liang had been secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) committee in Hungchao before joining the New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua. He headed the NCNA bureau in New Delhi until it was closed down after accusations of political interference, and in 1961 he opened an office in Dar es Salaam as the NCNA’s chief African correspon- dent. He was implicated in a coup plot in Zanzibar in 1964 and backed Sheik Bubu, who later became that country’s foreign minister. Kao was expelled from Mauritius and was thought to have served as an assistant to the legen- dary Colonel Kan Mei, the military attaché who had been active in Nepal, Tibet, and India before organizing guerrilla camps in the Congo.

 

KAO YEN MEN. Following an investigation that lasted six years conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Kao Yen Men of Charlotte, North Carolina, was arrested on 3 December 1993 as a member of a spy ring that had attempted to obtain advanced naval weapons and related technology. The owner of several Chinese restaurants in the Charlotte area, Kao had been under FBI surveillance when he was seen meeting Chinese intelligence per- sonnel who offered him up to $2 million to obtain embargoed American technology, including the U.S. Navy’s MK 48 Advanced Capability Torpe- do, the F-404-400 General Electric jet engines used to power F/A-18 fight- ers, and the fire-control radar for the F-16 fighter.

Kao subsequently paid $24,000 to an undercover FBI agent for embargoed oscillators used in satellites and on 22 December 1993 was ordered by a federal judge to be deported for overstaying his visa and for acts of espion- age. A decision not to prosecute Kao was made by the Department of Justice to prevent the disclosure of counterintelligence sources and methods and to avoid offending the Chinese government. However, fearing Chinese repri- sals, Kao requested deportation to Hong Kong and left behind his wife, who was a naturalized U.S. citizen, and their two children.

 

KASHMIR PRINCESS. On 11 April 1955 an Air India Constellation, the Kashmir Princess, crashed into the sea en route for Djakarta after a time bomb detonated in an engine cowling under the wing at an altitude of 18,000 feet. All 16 passengers, including members of a delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attending the Bandung Conference, were killed, although the pilot and two of his crew escaped. The delegation, including a

group of New China News Agency, Xinhua, correspondents, was to have been headed by Zhou Enlai, the former premier, but he changed his plans at the last moment, perhaps having been tipped off to the attempt on his life.

An investigation conducted by the Hong Kong Police Special Branch, led by Assistant Superintendent “Ricky” Richardson and Charles Scobell, with considerable cooperation from the Chinese authorities, established that the aircraft had been sabotaged while under guard in Hong Kong and that the culprit was an engineer who was supposedly employed by the Hong Kong Engineering Maintenance Company and a member of the Kuomintang intel- ligence service. He had concealed the device in an oily rag and then fled to Taiwan aboard a China Airlines plane. Although the Chinese claimed that the incident had been orchestrated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Special Branch investigation found nothing to support the allega- tion.

 

KAZAKHSTAN. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) former Soviet neighbor, and since 1996 a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organ- ization (SCO), Shanghai Shi Hezuo Zuzhi, Kazakhstan has become the focus of considerable investment by Beijing in an apparent effort to diversify the country’s reliance on foreign energy imported by sea, and therefore a signifi- cant intelligence collection target. Sharing a 1,100-mile border and indepen- dent since 1991, Kazakhstan is also a subject of interest for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, because of the large number of Uighur refugees who have sought asylum there.

As the PRC’s principal energy partner in Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s state oil company, KazMunayGaz, has received financial support from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Zhongguo Shiyou Tianranqi Jituan Gongsi, in exchange for 15 percent of the country’s total oil production, which is now channeled east to Xinjiang. The CNPC has also partnered with KazMunayGaz to build a $3 billion, 1,800-mile oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang, and the $7.3 billion, 4,200-mile Central Asia Gas Pipeline from Turkmenistan. Other local Chinese energy investments include large financial stakes taken by the Export-Import Bank of China, Zhongguo Shu- chu Ru Yinhang, in the Aktobemunaigaz Company, PetroKazakhstan, and MangystauMunayGaz.

In addition, the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company, Zhongguo Ganddong Hedian Gongsi, now the China General Nuclear Power Group, Zhongguo Tongyong Hedian Jituan, entered a joint venture with the Kazakh National Nuclear Company in April 2009 to develop the Irkol uranium mine, thought to be capable of producing 250 tons of yellowcake a year. To facili- tate transport, Beijing has also committed to a “New Silk Road” through northwestern Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, and to back the Kazakhstan Develop- ment Bank’s loan to buy Chinese railway rolling stock.

KENYA. In June 1965 the Kenya Special Branch uncovered a Chinese plot to infiltrate agents and weapons into the country, apparently with the inten- tion of mounting a coup to replace Jomo Kenyatta with his vice president, Odinga Odinga, whose house had been bugged. A member of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) embassy was expelled, and the following year Odinga was replaced. Kenyatta was so impressed by the efficiency of his Special Branch, which had been trained and mentored by British MI5 person- nel, that he asked MI5 to establish a local security apparatus, the National Security Executive, headed by an MI5 officer.

 

KEYSER, DONALD W. The 59-year-old deputy chief of the U.S. State Department’s East Asia bureau was arrested in September 2004 when he admitted having become infatuated with 37-year-old Chiang Nian-Tzu, known as Isabelle Cheng, a Taiwanese intelligence officer based at Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Washington, D.C. As many as 3,659 classified docu- ments were recovered from his home, and at his trial in October 2007 Keyser pleaded guilty to three felony charges and was sentenced to a year and a day’s imprisonment in a federal penitentiary and a $25,000 fine.

The couple had become intimate in 2002 when President Jiang of the People’ Republic of China (PRC) had visited the United States and Chiang had asked Keyser for information. He had replied in an email, “Your wish is my command.” Later, in a tapped telephone conversation, after the pair had been watched making love in a car by a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special surveillance group unit, he had remarked, “The food was good. The wine was good. The champagne was good, and you were good.” When Keyser was arrested, Cheng promptly returned to Taiwan.

Fluent in Mandarin, with his fourth wife working at the Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA), Keyser had been educated at the University of Mary- land and had spent two years at the Stanford Inter-University Center in Taiwan. Keyser’s wife, who was also found to have removed classified docu- ments from the CIA and knew that her husband had been bringing home material from the State Department, was transferred to the office of the director of national intelligence, John Negroponte. See also NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB).

 

KHAN, AMANULLAH. On 23 July 2003, arrest warrants were served on Amanullah Khan, a 54-year-old naturalized American of Pakistani origin who used the alias Wali Merchant. Two days earlier U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents had arrested one of his associates, Ziad Jamil Gammoh, known as “Al Gammoh,” a 53-year-old naturalized American, originally from Jordan. Both men had been indicted for attempt-

ing to illegally export military components for F-4 and F-5 fighters to China, and they were also charged with conspiring to export parts for the F-14 Tomcat, the AH-1J attack helicopter, and Hawk surface-to-air missiles.

Together Khan and Gommoh had run United Aircraft & Electronics, an unincorporated business in Anaheim, California, that purchased and resold aerospace, military, and defense aircraft parts to various foreign commercial and government buyers. However, during an ICE investigation, agents creat- ed a fictitious company, Sino-American Aviation Supply, which purported to be based in Shenyang, China, and negotiated to buy restricted items and have them shipped to China without the required export licenses.

On 7 November 2005, Gammoh was sentenced to 78 months’ imprison- ment, and on 28 November, Khan was sentenced to 188 months’ imprison- ment. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

KIM SOO-IM. On 18 June 1950, Kim Soo-im was executed at Kempo Airport, Seoul, having been convicted of espionage for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Originally trained in the dental clinic of a missionary col- lege, she had been recruited as a spy by her lover, the Communist Lee Kung Kook, in 1942, and after the war she had been employed as a receptionist at the Banto Hotel, which was used by the U.S. Army as a military headquar- ters. While working on the switchboard, Kim listened in to many of the telephone calls and relayed this intelligence, and other information she picked up from lonely soldiers, to the North Koreans. Later she would be transferred to a secretarial post in the U.S. provost marshal’s office, where she had access to counterintelligence material. By the time the cease-fire had been agreed to, Kim had proved very successful and had established a photo- graphic studio in the basement of her home so she could process the secrets she had stolen. Her arrest came when she turned her attention to spying on the government headed by President Syngman Rhee, who was elected in August 1948. See also SOUTH KOREA; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

KINDRED SPIRIT. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for the investigation into Wen Ho Lee.

 

KOREAN WAR. The intervention by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) in the Korean War in October 1950 had been anticipated by the U.S. Armed Forces Security Agency, which had monitored People’s Liberation Army (PLA) movements from Shanghai toward Manchuria from July, and even after elements of the Fourth Army crossed the Yalu River and engaged South Korea’s forces, leaving some captives for interrogation, there was a

widespread belief that the PRC would not intervene. This view was especial- ly prevalent among General Douglas MacArthur’s G-2 staff, headed by his director of intelligence, Charles Willoughby, who asserted that the prisoners of war were simply isolated Chinese volunteers and did not represent proof that PLA divisions had joined the war. That view changed on 25 November when Chinese troops completely overwhelmed the U.S. Eighth Army, re- versing MacArthur’s advance and transforming it into a rout before the front stabilized around Seoul.

After the war had started, the CIA’s Office of Research and Estimates (ORE) remained undecided on the issue of Chinese intervention and between 10 July and 9 November 1950 produced 10 intelligence memoranda for the directors of central intelligence (DCI), Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter and his successor General Walter Bedell Smith. The CIA’s reporting came primarily from radio monitoring by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); press reports from Hong Kong, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Shanghai of Chinese troop movements; and some CIA human sources managed by Office of Spe- cial Operations (OSO) bulletins. The CIA’s internal account of the Korean War records that

among OSO intelligence reports were some 554 reports disseminated dur- ing the critical period July–November 1950. According to the OSO’s sum- mary in April 1951 “a considerable number of reports derived from Chi- nese sources . . . trace the movement of Chinese Communist military forces northwards into Manchuria and towards the Korean border, indicat- ing units, equipment, and other order-of-battle details.” Also included in OSO’s listing of reports are seven “indications based on Chinese Commu- nist commercial activities in Hong King . . . and thirteen indications of CHICOM or CHICOM-USSR conferences and policy statement relating to war preparations.”

 

The first of the series of relevant ORE intelligence memoranda to raise the issue of Chinese intervention was dated 8 July 1950 and suggested that the Kremlin might order a covert or even overt Chinese participation in the war. On 19 July the ORE’s regular Review of the World Situation remarked that although the PRC had the capability to intervene, it probably would not unless directed to do so by the Soviets. On 16 August, ORE warned of the PRC’s military capacity, and on 1 September it predicted that “the stage has been set for some form of Chinese Communist intervention or participation in the Korean War” and that “some form of armed assistance to the North Koreans appears imminent.” A week later, on 8 September, an intelligence memorandum titled “Probability of Direct Chinese Intervention Korea” re- ported that, although there was no direct evidence, “limited covert Chinese Communist assistance to the North Korean invaders, including the provi- sion of individual solders, is assumed to be in progress at present,” noting the

presence of an estimated 400,000 Communist troops in Manchuria and that an “increasing Chinese Communist buildup of military strength in Manchu- ria, coupled with the known potential in that area, make it clear that interven- tion in Korea is well within immediate Chinese Communist capabilities. Moreover, recent Chinese Communist accusations regarding U.S. ‘aggres- sion’ and ‘violation of the Manchurian border’ may be stage-setting for an imminent overt move.”

The ORE Review of the World Situation dated 20 September speculated that the most likely Chinese or Soviet intervention, as the North Korean forces crumbled following the amphibious landings at Inchon, would take the form of integrating Chinese Communist “volunteers” into regular North Ko- rean units. The Review also warned that the forces in Manchuria “could enter the battle and materially change its course at any time.” However, on 12 October 1950, ORE 58-50, headed “Threat of Full Chinese Intervention in Korea,” under Bedell Smith’s signature, was handed to President Harry S. Truman as he flew to Wake Island to confront General MacArthur. The document observed that “despite statements by Chou Enlai, troop move- ments to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border viola- tions . . . there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea,” concluding that “such action is not probable in 1950” and asserting that “from a military standpoint, the most favorable time for intervention in Korea had passed.” Much the same opinion was expressed in the next Review, dated 18 October.

In Korea itself, the position was very different. From 12 October, some

30,000 Chinese troops had crossed the Yalu River, and by the end of the month another 150,000 had entered Korea. They were committed to combat for the first time on 25 October, against South Korean and American forces, and around 25 were captured. Based on those interrogations, DCI Bedell Smith initially suggested that the Chinese had been deployed to protect Chi- nese hydroelectric installations along the Yalu River, but on 1 November he informed Truman that “it has been clearly established that Chinese troops are opposing UN forces. Present field estimates are that between 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese Communist troops organized into task force units are operat- ing in North Korea while their parent units remain in Manchuria.”

A week later, on 8 November, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 2 estimated the number of Chinese troops in Korea at 40,000 and reported that they were engaging UN troops up to 100 miles south of the Yalu River. Troop numbers in Manchuria were now estimated at 700,000, of which up to 350,000 could be available “within 30 to 60 days for sustained ground opera- tions in Korea.” In reality, the PLA had infiltrated 300,000 soldiers over the Yalu in support of the remaining beleaguered 65,000 North Koreans.

On 24 November, as MacArthur continued to express confidence in his offensive, NIE 2/1 was circulated, titled “Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,” which observed that “available evidence is not conclusive whether or not the Chinese Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort.” However, all doubts evaporated on the following day when the PLA counterattacked with 30 divisions, at a time when there were only 12 divi- sions on the order-of-battle charts at MacArthur’s headquarters in Tokyo, prompting Truman to say on 28 November, “The Chinese have come in with both feet,” and MacArthur to acknowledge that “we now face an entirely different war.”

Both men were right. In the face of this unexpected onslaught, the U.S. Seventh Infantry Division sustained appalling losses, the Second Infantry Division suffered one-third casualties and had virtually all its equipment destroyed, and at one moment the entire First Marine Division was almost encircled and in danger of decimation. Over the next two months the UN forces retreated south 200 miles to Pusan.

Chinese preparations for the counterattack of 25 November had gone un- detected because the U.S. Eighth Army had come to rely on the interrogation of prisoners of war (PoW) as the best source of enemy intelligence and had acquired a pool of some 100 Chinese prisoners to question. However, there was a lack of suitable interpreters, and the first captives turned out to be turned Nationalists who were terrified of the PLA and, when passed up to division or corps levels, reluctant to make any disclosures. Furthermore, some had been primed with bogus details of the PLA’s order of battle, and it would later become clear that the Chinese had kept their most experienced, battle-hardened Communist troops for the second, massive offensive.

During this period, from the North Korean invasion on 25 June, MacAr- thur’s Far East Command compiled a secret Daily Intelligence Summary, up to 30 pages long, drawn from PoW interrogations, signals intelligence sum- maries, aerial reconnaissance, foreign-language newspaper articles and radio bulletins, and two other sources of espionage. One was a network of agents established and run by the legendary John Singlaub, a World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran who specialized in recruiting former Korean POWs who had fought with the Japanese and whom he trained for infiltration back into Manchuria. Singlaub’s organization was charged with collecting information about Communist North Korean intentions, and his reporting was considered reliable. Less so was Willoughby’s secret Korean Liaison Office in Seoul, which purported to be in contact with 16 agents in the North, although there was some skepticism about their loyalty.

Far East Command also received consular and other reports from the Kuo-

mintang (KMT) in Taiwan and Hong Kong, which provided good warnings, but they had been discounted because of their perceived political motives for exaggerating the PRC threat. In addition, there was some evidence that the

KMT occasionally recycled information it had originally acquired from Ma- cArthur’s headquarters. Nevertheless, although the U.S. Far East Command consistently underestimated the number of PLA troops in Korea, despite escalating the figures from 70,000 on 25 October to nearly 210,000 five days later, it did track the forces in Manchuria quite well, reporting 116,000 in July, 217,000 in early August, and 415,000 to perhaps 463,000 by early November.

The Air Force Security Service (AFSS) also ran an intercept program, code-named YOKE, monitoring the enemy’s ground control communica- tions and radar, based at Pyongtaek with advance facilities at Kimpo, near Seoul, and on Pyong-Yong-do Island. Here AFSS personnel listened into Korean, Chinese, and Russian channels, and as the demand for Chinese linguists grew, the AFSS enlisted General Hirota, formerly the head of Ja- pan’s wartime signals intelligence agency, to provide a team of 12 Chinese- speaking Japanese to augment a group of school-trained American Chinese linguists who were installed at the Chosun Christian College in Seoul (later Yonsei University). The YOKE program proved very successful and was in part responsible for the impressive performance of the F-86 Sabre, equipped with a radar gunsight, against the MiG-15s, which were less maneuverable but boasted a higher ceiling and greater firepower. On one memorable occa- sion, 15 enemy jet fighters were shot down by F-86s without loss, having been vectored to their targets by ground controllers relying on tactical inter- cepts rather than early-warning radar.

The AFSS’s ground control intercept program proved so successful that

there were leaks, with even the media reporting on its activities, causing Detachment 3 of the First Radio Squadrom Mobile (RSM) to suspend opera- tions for a few days in October 1951 to demonstrate to the U.S. Fifth Air Force what was at stake. Having gained the attention of senior officers, new communications security measures were introduced to protect the source.

In early 1952 a Chinese switch toward the use of VHF equipment threat- ened to terminate the AFSS’s ground control interception, but a new facility on Cho-Do Island, off Wonsan, put the antennae in range and restored the quality of communications intelligence available to the United Nations forces. According to a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) review, “Com- munications Intelligence remained the principal source of intelligence for threat until 27 July 1953, when the armistice was signed at Panmunjom.”

American signals intelligence airborne collection operations were flown from November 1950 by the RB-50B, a variant of the RB-29 Superfortress, by the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SRW) from Yokota, Japan. They began monitoring the North Korean air defense radars, which was an easy task as they were of American origin, having been supplied to the Soviets during World War II. However, the following year, improved RUS-2 early-warning radars were detected, followed by the discovery of SON-2

fire-control systems found near Pyongyang. Each time a new system was identified by analysts, the appropriate countermeasures were developed and aircraft fitted with jammers. By the end of the conflict, the 91st SRW had grown to 400 aircraft, including a detachment of RB-45C Tornados from Barksdale Air Force base in Louisiana.

It was not until the defection of a North Korean MiG-15 pilot, Lieutenant No Kum-Sok, on 21 September 1953 that detailed information about Chinese air operations in Korea became available. Having flown his aircraft from Dabdong to Kimpo, he revealed that the ill-equipped People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had been strengthened in 1950 by two Istrebi- tel.naia Aviatsonnaia Diviziaa (IAD, or Fighter Aviation Regiments). The 106th IAD had been deployed to defend Shanghai against Nationalist air raids from Taiwan, while General Ivan Belov’s 151st Guards IAD had been sent in July 1950 to train Chinese pilots and protect the 13th Chinese Peo- ple’s Volunteer Army north of the Yalu River. Hitherto the PLAAF had acquired a few Soviet-supplied MiG-9 and MiG-15 jet fighters, but it had not been in any position to assist the North Korean Air Force, which had been decimated by American bombers. However, in November 1950, vastly superior MiG-15s had appeared over the Yalu and proved highly effective until the hasty introduction of F-86 Sabres a month later. Thereafter two rotating Soviet IADs, initially the 324th and the 303rd, consisting of 30 MiG- 15Bs in each, flying from Shenyang, and then from Myaogou in PLAAF or North Korean livery, with the pilots wearing Chinese uniforms, engaged the American planes, but only well behind the front line and under strict instruc- tions not to fall into enemy hands.

By the end of hostilities, the Soviets had some 13,000 combat personnel in

China, with a similar number of support staff centered on a corps headquar- ters at Antung. Almost all were withdrawn at the end of February 1952, leaving behind only a few technical elements of the 17th Fighter Aviation Regiment. Altogether the Soviets lost an estimated 278 aircraft and 127 pilots.

Both the Soviets and the Chinese were intensely interested in the F-86, and when one of the fighters was shot down by a Soviet MiG on 6 November 1951, the airframe, No. 1319, was recovered, even though the pilot was rescued. It was taken to the Andung airbase for examination and was later shipped to Moscow. Six months later, in May 1952, Colonel Bud Mahurin was shot down, and his Sabre was also retrieved relatively intact. See also LOVELL, JOHN S; SOVIET UNION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

KOVACS, WILLIAM. On 4 October 2006, William Kovacs, the owner and president of Elatec Technology Corporation in Massachusetts, was sentenced in the District of Columbia to 12 months’ and a day imprisonment, three

years’ supervised release, and 300 hours of community service for illegally exporting a hot press industrial furnace to a research institute in China that was described as being affiliated with the country’s aerospace and missile programs. Kovacs and Elatec had been charged in November 2003 and had pleaded guilty on 28 May 2004.

Another defendant, Stephen Midgley, separately pleaded guilty on 28 January 2005 to making false statements in export documents that the fur- nace did not require an export license when the goods were shipped to China. Midgley was sentenced to one year’s probation and 120 hours of community service and was fined $1,500. In addition, the Bureau of Industry and Secur- ity gave Midgley a $5,000 administrative penalty. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

KUCZYNSKY, URSULA. Known by her married name of Ursula Beurton, her nom de guerre of Ruth Werner, and her GRU code name of SONIA, she was an exceptionally successful case officer taught her craft by Richard Sorge in Shanghai. Born into a family in Berlin that was to become well known for its commitment to radical socialism, Ursula’s father moved to England to take up an academic appointment in Oxford in 1933 as the Nazis took power. Her sister, Brigitte, was recruited as an agent by the Soviet GRU, and her brother, Jurgen, was to lead the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) in exile. Ursula worked in a bookshop selling “progres- sive literature” and briefly visited New York to do relief work among the homeless. In 1929 she married an architect, Rolf Hamburger, and they set up a home together in Shanghai where she fell under the influence of other Soviet agents, among them Agnes Smedley, and campaigned for the release of Hilaire Noulens.

Already committed to the Communist cause, Ursula was recruited into the

GRU by Sorge, although at that early stage she was uncertain of the exact nature of the organization. “Only two years later did I know that it operated under the intelligence department of the Red Army General Staff. It made no difference to me. I knew that my activities served the comrades of the coun- try in which I lived.”

In February 1931 their son Micha was born, but this event did not cement their marriage, which was under strain, primarily because of political differ- ences. “I could not talk to him about the people who were closest to me or the work on which my life was centered.” Hamburger was deliberately excluded from Ursula’s clandestine activities, and he had no idea that Sorge used their house to store secret information. Only later did he convert to communism, by which time Ursula had left him. In the meantime, she had spent six months in Moscow undergoing a GRU training course, returning to meet

Rolf in Prague and return to China via Trieste in April 1934. They settled in Mukden and in June 1935 moved to Peking, where she became pregnant by Ernst, a GRU agent with whom she had trained in Moscow.

Ursula returned to Moscow with Micha late in 1935 and after a brief stopover continued her journey via Leningrad to London where she was reunited with her family. She then moved with Rolf to Warsaw, where Janina was born in April 1936, but after a mission to Danzig, she was recalled to Moscow to receive further training, the Order of the Red Banner, and a new assignment in Switzerland.

In October 1938, Ursula was living in the village of Caux, above Mon- treux, with her two children, supervising a network of agents that included members of the International Labour Organization of the League of Nations in Geneva and the I. G. Farben plant in Frankfurt. However, her passport was false, and in 1939 she divorced Rolf, who had been ordered back to China, and married a young English veteran of the Spanish Civil War, Len Beurton, in order to acquire British citizenship.

In December 1940 Ursula made her way to England via Barcelona, Ma- drid, and Lisbon with her children and rented a house in Oxford, where in late 1942 she was joined briefly by Len before he was called up for service in the Coldstream Guards. While in England, Ursula acted as a GRU case officer for Melita Norwood, who supplied atomic secrets from the British Non-Ferrous Metals Association, and for Klaus Fuchs, a role that led to MI5’s interest in her in August 1947. Although on the one occasion when she was interviewed she denied any connection with espionage, she fled to East Germany in February 1950, the day before Fuchs appeared at the Old Bai- ley. In her retirement she lived in East Berlin, an unapologetic Communist, devoted to Len and their son Peter, who was born in September 1943, and her biography was published in 1977. She died in 2000, soon after the loss of her husband. See also SOVIET UNION.

 

KUN SHAN. On 1 August 2016, Kun Shan Chun (Cantonese romanization), alias Joey Chun, aged 47, pleaded guilty to a single count under the Foreign Agents Registration Act in Manhattan, New York, having been arrested on 16 March. For the past 19 years Chun had been employed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) New York office where he was an electron- ics technician in the Computerized Central Monitoring Facility. Chun was originally arrested on 16 March 2016.

Born in Guangdong in 1969, Chun had entered the United States in 1980 and became a citizen in 1985. He had been employed by the FBI since 1997 and the following year was granted a Top Secret clearance. He had reported to the FBI that he had met Joey Yan Yi Zhou (Zhou Yanyi) in August 2011

and married her in late 2013. It is unclear if Chun had met Zhou in China, but she was a PRC national. She adopted the anglicized given name of “Joey,” as had Chun.

From at least 2006, Chun and some family members maintained a finan- cial relationship with the Zhuhai Kolion Technology Company, Zhuhai Ke Li An Keji Gongsi, in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, in southern China next to Macao, described as a subsidiary of the Chinese Hubei Dinglong Chemical Company, Zhongguo Hubei Ding Long Huagong Gongsi, founded in 2004 and involved in the manufacture of toner cartridges.

Through Kolion, according to the indictment, “Chun was asked to perform research and consulting tasks in exchange for financial benefits, including foreign travel.” Chun’s association with Kolion began after a 2005 visit to China, and on 13 January 2006 Chun sent an email to a “Mr. Su,” who was affiliated with Kolian: “Just want to take this opportunity to thank you for a very informative introduction to your company.” Chun included that he was “delighted that [I] met you and Mr. Chow. I hope we will continue to work together in the future.” Chun then included a Skype account, three email addresses, a telephone number, and his physical address and asked that they “start communicating soon through the internet.”

On 27 November 2007, Chun emailed “Simon Chow” with his passport number as well as that of his mother and a third individual. He departed on a trip to Hong Kong and China on 30 November, returning on 14 December 2007. On 18 December 2007, “Mr. Su,” who stated that he had learned a lot from their discussions, asked Chun to review an attachment relating to a printer cartridge. Chun forwarded the message to his brother, and on 27 February 2008 he emailed his brother, “Those guys want us to help them out to buy the device, all the programming, and erase them entirely.   They

will give us money for the time we spend on this research.”

On 20 May 2009, Chun received an email addressed to shareholders of Kolion and signed by “Simon Zhou,” noting that “Zhou” is the Mandarin dialect spelling of the Cantonese dialect name “Chow.” On 3 June 2009, “Simon” sent an email to Chun regarding Kolion’s five-year anniversary, and in a response Chun congratulated Kolion on its success and added that he hoped to be able to visit the company. On 9 November 2009, Chun sent “Simon” passport numbers for himself and other relatives, and on 6 Decem- ber 2009 he departed on a trip to Hong Kong, China, and Thailand, returning on 24 December.

On 7 January 2010, Chun emailed his brother saying he needed to obtain a solid-state hard drive for “the people in China . . . they are paying.” He explained he wanted “Aunt Chun” to take it to them, and instead of being reimbursed by wire transfer, they should “just give money to father so he can bring it back.” On another occasion, Chun asked his brother where he could

locate companies that remanufactured toner cartridges, and after receiving a link to a website for such a company, Chun stated he needed a lot more information so he could provide Kolion with a report.

On 29 September 2011, “Simon” sent an email to Chun that included information relating to hotels in France and Italy, said to be “Five Star Hotel the entire way.” Chun provided passport numbers and full names for himself and Zhou, his future wife. In an email to his brother and another relative, Chun noted, “It’s short notice, got invited to a 10-day trip to Europe by the company in China.   Joey Zhou is traveling with me, well her ticket has to

pay for.” Chun and Zhou departed on the trip on 5 October 2011, returning on 14 October.

It was during the 2011 trip to Italy and France that Chuns’ Kolion asso- ciate introduced him to a Chinese government official, not further identified, though presumably a representative of the Chinese Ministry of State Secur- ity (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. The official told Chun he worked for the Chinese government and that he was aware Chun worked for the FBI. During subsequent meetings, all abroad, the official asked questions concerning sen- sitive information about the FBI, and among other things, Chun provided the identity and potential travel patterns of an FBI special agent. In March 2013 Chun downloaded an FBI organizational chart from his FBI computer and, after removing the names of FBI personnel, sent it to the Chinese official. On another occasion, in January 2015, the official tasked Chun with acquiring information relating to technology used by the FBI, and he subsequently photographed documents in a restricted area of the FBI’s New York office that summarized sensitive details regarding FBI surveillance techniques. After sending them to his cell phone, he passed them on to the official in China.

While it is unclear precisely how the FBI became concerned about Chun,

an undercover source was introduced to him in February 2015. The source purported to be a U.S. citizen, born in China, and claimed he was an indepen- dent contractor working for, among others, the Department of Defense. There were a series of meetings between the two, all of which were recorded, and in March 2015 Chun explained how he had come to be associated with Kolian and how he had been asked to consult by providing ideas relating to technology and to ship materials from the United States to China. He also noted that his Kolian associates “deal with the government” and “probably have some government people.” He also related how his associates paid for prostitutes for him when he traveled to China, that his mother owned stock in Kolion, and that his parents had also received money from Kolion. He dis- closed how, about five years earlier, his mother had met a “section chief” whom he believed to be associated with the Chinese government and that he knew “this government guy” but did not wish to “get involved because once I get involved, then I have to disclose that.”

Chun said that his parents wanted him to work with Kolion and that his parents had invested in Kolion 10 years previously and had purchased prop- erty in China. Allegedly it had been his parents who had told Kolion about his U.S. government employment. And they had notified Kolion before he traveled to China. Chun explained how Kolion associates constantly asked, “What do you have for us?” and if there was nothing, they would become “kind of like pissed off.”

In April 2015 Chun mentioned that Kolion staff liked to travel once a year and would ask him where he wanted to go. He communicated with his contacts in China on a WeChat application and avoided using the phone for anything important. WeChat, Weixin, literally “micromanage,” is a Chinese multipurpose messaging and social media application that was developed by Tencent Holdings Ltd., Tengxun Konggu Youxian Gongsi, a huge Chinese conglomerate that has close ties to the Chinese government.

Chun confided how he was scheduled to travel to Europe in June 2015 and promised to introduce the undercover source to his Chinese associates, as he had already told them that he was a consultant who might be in a position to be helpful. He wished to act as a “sub-consultant” and wanted the informant to pay him for making the introduction. He also said he had been paid “a couple thousand dollars” on at least one previous occasion.

In July 2015, the informant traveled to Hungary and met Chun twice. At the first rendezvous, Chun explained that his Kolion associate was too busy but had given him 500 euros to entertain him. On the following day, he claimed that he knew “firsthand” that the Chinese government was actively recruiting individuals who could provide assistance, and it offered immigra- tion benefits and other compensation. On August, during a further series of meetings, Chun told the informant that if he agreed to help the Chinese, he should “do [his] own thing.   If you make any money, just give me a bit.”

Chun explained that he was “already in deep shit” because he had not re- ported his contacts while traveling to China. He also admitted that he had lied about his contacts: “I lied. I reported certain people, not everybody.”

Initially Chun was charged with four counts of lying to FBI personnel involving various security-related issues based on his unreported contacts with foreign nationals. His plea to the single count of violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act is a reflection of his subsequent cooperation, and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.

KUOMINTANG (KMT). Created as a nationalist political movement in 1912, the KMT received support in 1923 from the Comintern, but in 1927 the Communists were purged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in antici- pation of his capture of Peking the following year. Following the Japanese invasion of 1937, the KMT withdrew to Chongqing, but several different Nationalist intelligence organizations competed against each other. The larg-

est was the Resources Investigation Institute (RII), headed by General Wang Ping-shen, which operated under the umbrella of the Institute for Internation- al Studies. The RII operated both domestically and abroad, with George Yeh representing the organization in Delhi and liaising with the regional British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) director, Leo Steveni.

The Chinese Civil War continued after the Japanese surrender in 1945, and the KMT was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949 where the Republic of China (ROC) was established, in a state of permanent conflict with the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC) that continues to this day. During the Cold War, until President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, the ROC received considerable intelligence and technical support from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with successive CIA station chiefs in Taipei exercising considerable influence both locally and over the CIA’s Far East Division. One such chief, Dr. Ray Cline, would later be promoted to the CIA’s deputy director for intelligence.

In 1955 the establishment of the National Security Bureau (NSB) ab- sorbed the functions of the KMT’s Social Work Committee and the Overseas Maneuvers Committee. See also INTER-SERVICES LIAISON DEPART- MENT (ISLD); JAPAN; STENNES, WALTER.

 

KYRGYZSTAN. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) former Soviet neighbor, since 1991 independent and since 2001 a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Shanghai Shi Hezuo Zuzhi, Kyrgyzstan has received substantial infrastructure investment from Beijing, including a commitment by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), Zhongguo Luqiao Zong Gongsi, a subsidiary of the huge China Communications Con- struction Company (CCCC), Zhonggo Jiaotong Jianshe Zong Gongsi, to rebuild a 50-mile stretch of the strategically important Irkeshtam–Osh high- way and to construct a new $2 billion railway that would connect the coun- try’s coal mines to Kashgar. One of the Ministry of State Security’s (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, role in Kyrgyzstan is to ensure the protection of these key assets. The country’s capital, Bishkek, is considered a convenient and safe environment by both the MSS and the Russian Sluzhba Vnezhney Razvedki (SVR) in which to conduct intelligence operations. Because of years of anti- Maoist propaganda in the Soviet Union, MSS personnel often adopted a “false flag” and pretended to be Kyrgyz or Kazakhs when attempting to recruit Russians.

Despite the close ties between China and Kyrgyzstan, which include joint

military exercises, tensions remain. China has concern for the narcotics traf- ficking within Kyrgyzstan, and there is resentment among locals about the influx of Chinese businessmen in the Naryn free-trade zone as they continue to dominate the import and export of small goods.

Economically undeveloped, Kyrgyzstan enjoys considerable strategic sig- nificance and, in spite of pressure from the SCO, accommodates a U.S. Air Force base at Manas that is used to support operations in Afghanistan. Now firmly within the PRC’s sphere of influence, and a target for intelligence collection by both the PRC and the United States, in 2002 Kyrgyzstan was the PRC’s first partner in bilateral military maneuvers on the border, code- named EXERCISE 01, involving hundreds of troops from both sides.

 

L

LAI TEK. The veteran secretary-general of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), elected to the post in April 1939 in Singapore, Lai Tek came from Saigon, where, as a Comintern agent of Chinese origin, he had acted as an informer for the local French Sécurité. Recruited as a mole by the Malaya Special Branch in 1934, he was run successfully as a source until March 1947, when he was exposed by his successor, Chin Peng, traced to Bangkok, and strangled. Always backed by Beijing, Lai Tek was handled by John Davis, a Chinese-speaking Malaya Special Branch officer who transferred to the Inter-Services Liaison Department at the outbreak of war. Lai Tek’s complicated life, which included leadership of the wartime Communist resis- tance under the nom de guerre Hang Cheng and acting as a double agent against the Japanese Kempeitai, came to an end after he had looted the MCP’s funds and fled to Hong Kong.

 

LAM, WAI LIM WILLIAM. In October 2006 Wai Lim William Lam, a 32-year-old from Hong Kong, was arrested and charged with attempting to smuggle goods from the United States to Hong Kong. Lam had purchased a night-vision rifle scope, two submersible night-vision monoculars, a night- vision sniper scope, and a combat optical scope in Stamford, Connecticut. Two months later, Lam pleaded guilty to the charge. See also TECHNOLO- GY ACQUISITION.

 

LAU, HING SHING. On 3 June 2009, Hing Shing Lau, alias Victor Lau, a Hong Kong resident, was arrested at the Toronto International Airport on a provisional arrest warrant issued in the United States. Lau was found to be carrying $30,000 in cash, thought to have been the final payment for 12 infrared thermal imaging cameras purchased from a firm in Dayton, Ohio. The cameras were intended for export to Hong Kong and China, and Lau had originally contacted the company in the hope of exporting cameras manufac- tured in Texas. On three occasions he transferred a total of $39,514 from Hong Kong as partial payment for the cameras, and according to the prosecu- tion, Lau continued to phone and email his business contact to complete the

 

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purchase before finally arranging to take delivery of the cameras in Toronto. The cameras had a wide variety of civilian and military applications, includ- ing use in unmanned vehicles, weapon sights, and security and surveillance products. Lau was extradited to Ohio for trial and charged with two counts of violating export control laws and four counts of money laundering. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

LAU YVET-SANG. In November 1966 a New China News Agency, Xin- hua, editor, Lau Yvet-sang, defected from Hong Kong to Taiwan.

 

LEE, DAVID YEN. In May 2009 a 52-year-old businessman living in Ar- lington Heights, Illinois, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion (FBI) and charged with having stolen proprietary information belonging to his former employer, the Valspar Corporation of Wheeling, Illinois, where he had been technical director of new product development until a couple of months earlier. Lee, a naturalized U.S. citizen, had resigned soon after re- turning from a visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and examina- tion of his laptop revealed that it contained a data-copying program and that he had downloaded 44 gigabytes of Vaspar’s trade secrets with a value of between $7 million and $20 million onto a USB drive without authorization. Before leaving Valspar, Lee had joined Nippon Paint Holdings Company Ltd., a large Japanese company with offices in Shanghai. See also INDUS- TRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

LEE, DUNCAN C. A descendant of Confederate general Robert E. Lee, Duncan Lee was a Soviet spy code-named KOCH who supplied information from inside the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) about developments in China. Born in 1914 in China, where he lived for 13 years with his mission- ary parents, and fluent in Mandarin, Lee graduated from the University of Virginia and then studied as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, where he met his Scottish wife, Ishbel. He later attended Yale Law School, where he and his wife joined the Communist Party of the United States of America, and gradu- ated in 1939 to join Donovan Leisure, the New York law firm headed by General William “Wild Bill” Donovan. However, three months later, when Donovan was appointed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s coordinator of information, Lee joined the organization as his assistant, with the U.S. Army rank of captain, and continued in the same role when OSS was created.

He then moved to Washington, D.C., where he stayed briefly with Mary

Price, a Soviet spy code-named DIR, to whom he had been introduced by her sister, Mildred Price, the executive director of the China Aid Council. Lee had met her in the spring of 1942 through his membership in the Institute for

Pacific Relations and began an illicit affair with her. However, when Ishbel learned of the relationship in the autumn of 1943, Mary broke it off, fearing that Lee’s wife, who knew of his espionage, would compromise him.

By May 1943, Lee had been transferred to OSS’s legal department but continued to have access to classified information, and he reported on Chi- ang Kai-shek’s intention to hold a meeting with Communist Party leaders in Siam to discuss relations with the Kuomintang. These reports were highly valued in Moscow. At the end of June 1943, Lee left the United States on a fact-finding tour of OSS’s bases in Asia for General Donovan and did not return until early October. He reached Chongqing but nearly failed to com- plete the return journey when he and his two companions, John S. Service- of the U.S. embassy and the war correspondent Eric Sevareid, were forced while en route from Kunming in a C-46 to parachute into the Naga Hills and make an epic journey across the Burmese forest to India. No sooner had they bailed out of their apparently stricken aircraft than the engines recovered and the pilot landed safely at Chabua.

When Lee eventually returned home, much emaciated by his experience,

he resumed his espionage but, according to Elizabeth Bentley’s evidence to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “although I succeeded in getting from him more than Mary [Price], he almost always gave it to me orally and rarely would he give me a document, although under pressure he would hand over scraps of paper on which he had written down important data.” She revealed that she had held a rendezvous with Lee outside his house every two weeks and had spent up to three hours debriefing him, memorizing his infor- mation. When Lee had visited New York on business, he had also routinely called her from a pay phone and arranged other meetings at which he passed on secret data. When the NKVD rezidentura in New York suggested replac- ing her as Lee’s contact, she objected, noting his anti-Semitism and pointing out that it was inappropriate to appoint a Jew as her successor.

Within a few days of his arrival in Washington, Lee had told his contact

that an OSS representative in China had recruited a small group of Japanese Communists whom he intended to infiltrate back into Japan. He also re- ported that OSS intended to use the same strategy with some Korean Com- munists as the Japanese were importing Korean labor. A month later he disclosed that OSS had reached an agreement with the Kuomintang on con- ducting joint sabotage operations against the Japanese, and Moscow assessed this report as accurate, noting that the British had been doing the same since 1942.

Identified as a spy by Bentley and exposed by numerous references to KOCH in the VENONA traffic, Lee was summoned to appear as a witness by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, where he denied any involvement with espionage. Instead of suing Bentley, he went into a private law practice in Washington, D.C., while the FBI kept him under discreet

surveillance and recommended his dismissal from the U.S. Army Reserve, in which he held the rank of lieutenant colonel. Lee lost his appeal and then left the country to represent the American International Group in Bermuda. He later moved with his second wife, a Canadian, to Toronto, where he died in 1988. See also AMERASIA; SOVIET UNION.

 

LEE, JERRY CHUN SHING. A 54-year-old former U.S. Army officer, originally from Hong Kong, who served as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) case officer for 14 years, Jerry Lee, alias Zhen Cheng Li, an ethnic Chinese, admitted in May 2019 that he had conspired to commit espionage for the Chinese government and pleaded guilty to criminal charges before T.

S. Ellis III, a federal judge in Virginia.

“Lee sold out his country, conspired to become a spy for a foreign govern- ment, and then repeatedly lied to investigators about his conduct,” G. Za- chary Terwilliger, U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, said in a statement. “This prosecution should serve as a warning to others who would compromise our nation’s secrets and betray our country’s trust.”

In around 2010, the CIA noticed that assets inside China, by some reports numbering at least 20, were being systematically arrested and in many cases executed. In some circles, there was speculation that the Chinese had com- promised the agency’s computer systems, and this explanation gained cred- ibility when in 2014 the Chinese reportedly obtained 18 million government personnel files through cyber theft.

On 15 January 2018 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Lee, alias Zhen Cheng Li, at Kennedy International Airport as he was prepar- ing to return to his home in Hong Kong. He was arrested for one count of conspiracy to gather or deliver national defense information to aid a foreign government and two counts of unlawfully retaining documents related to national defense.

A naturalized U.S. citizen, Lee was born in Hong Kong but grew up in Hawaii and served in the U.S. Army from 1982 to 1986. He graduated from Hawaii Pacific University in 1992 with a bachelor’s degree in international business management and in 1993 with a master’s degree in human resource management. He served with the CIA’s Clandestine Service from 1994 to 2007, resigning after becoming disgruntled for not receiving promotions. The FBI’s criminal complaint noted that Lee had served in “various overseas positions and locations, which all required a Top Secret clearance,” reference to assignments in Harbor City, California, and Tokyo, Japan. In July 2007, after resigning from the CIA, Lee returned to Hong Kong, where he was employed by Japan Tobacco International to investigate tobacco smuggling and counterfeiting. However, he fell under suspicion when information leaked to the mainland Chinese about those inquiries into organized crime and North Korea. He was fired in 2009 but filed unfair dismissal complaints,

and then in 2010 he established a company, FTM International, with Barry Cheung Kam-lum, a former Hong Kong police officer, but that business failed and Lee sold his share of the company to his partner in December 2011. In 2013, upon his return to Hong Kong from Virginia, Lee was em- ployed by the Estée Lauder cosmetics company, where he remained until 2015, after which he was employed by the auction house Christie’s as head of its security department.

The investigation into Lee dated back to August 2012 when the FBI searched Lee’s hotel room in Honolulu, where he and his family were staying while traveling from Hong Kong to Virginia. Reportedly he had been lured back to the United States with a pretext job offer from the CIA. Then, on 15 August, Lee’s hotel room in Fairfax, Virginia, was searched by the FBI, revealing two small books, one described as a datebook and the other as an address book. Both contained handwritten notes that were photographed and found to contain classified information. The datebook “contained handwrit- ten information pertaining to, but not limited to, operational notes from asset meetings, operational meeting locations, operational phone numbers, true names of assets, and cover facilities.” The address book “contained true names and phone numbers of assets and covert CIA employees, as well as addresses of CIA facilities.”

CIA scrutiny of the material suggested it had been derived from actual

cables Lee had written while serving as a case officer. Unaware of the covert searches, Lee did not mention this material in five separate interviews con- ducted by the FBI in northern Virginia.

According to the indictment, on 26 April 2010 Lee met two Cantonese- speaking officers of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquan- bu, in Shenzhen who told him they knew of his background and that they too had a similar professional experience. They offered him $100,000 in cash in exchange for his cooperation and said they would take care of him for life. Lee subsequently met with a CIA officer on 11 May 2010 and disclosed the MSS contact, but he did not mention the financial reward offered. That same month Lee began to receive written tasking from the MSS contained in envelopes that Lee’s business associate delivered to him. Twenty-one such taskings were received by Lee until at least 2011, including requests for sensitive information about the CIA, and on occasion the envelopes were accompanied by gifts for Lee. On 14 May 2010, Lee made a deposit into his personal HSBC bank account in Hong Kong for $17,468 and made many more deposits over the next three years. On 26 May 2010, in response to taskings from the MSS, Lee used his laptop to create a document that “per- tained to certain locations to which the CIA would assign officers and a particular location of a sensitive operation to which the CIA would assign officers with certain identified experience.” In the summer of 2010, Lee also provided the MSS with a floor plan of a CIA facility abroad.

On 12 July 2010, Lee emailed Barry Cheung Kam-lum, asking, “Any meeting with our friends in China?” When Kam-lum responded in the nega- tive, Lee replied that it would be OK if no action were taken at the time and said, “I will maintain contact with our friends.” The following day Kam-lum disclosed in an email that he had heard from one of the MSS officers that his colleague would be in Hong Kong and wanted to meet them both to “discuss the further arrangements of the meeting before the meeting date.” Lee re- sponded, “Good news indeed.”

At a pretext meeting with the CIA on 8 March 2012 in McLean, Virginia, ostensibly to consider an offer of future employment, Lee lied that he had not traveled to China in approximately two years since he had reported the initial contact with the MSS officers in Shenzhen. However, on 22 April 2012 an email account in the name of one of Lee’s daughters was created from Guangzhou by the MSS for covert communications. One such message, sent on 9 February 2013 under the heading “How’s Christina?” contained the query, “Long time no see, How’s Christina’s grade book? We have not seen her recent grade book for a few months, maybe little girl always like chang- ing her mind.”

During the pretext interviews, Lee gave the CIA a falsified bank statement for his business, FTM International, which appeared to show a balance of more than HKD$2 million, when there was actually only HKD$78,146.64 in the account. Clearly Lee had attempted to convey a false impression of his business success.

Soon afterward a former CIA officer known to Lee reported that she had been approached outside the United States on 30 May by two MSS officers who had described themselves as being in the same line of work as her and asked her about her previous work.

On 22 November 2019, Lee was sentenced to 19 years’ imprisonment, noting that the government never proved, nor decided to publicly confirm, that Lee actually provided the Chinese with classified information. However, it was asserted that Lee had received more than $840,000 while receiving requests for CIA names, methods, and locations. His sentencing did not resolve the issue of whether his identification of numerous CIA assets or a compromise of CIA’s computer systems led to the deaths of those assets.

 

LEE LAN. See GE YUEFIE.

 

LEE, PETER. A naturalized American from Taiwan, Dr. Peter Lee had worked as a laser expert at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories before being employed by the defense contractor TRW Inc. on a classified anti-submarine project for the U.S. Navy. In January 1985 Lee visited Beijing and was invited to lecture at the People’s Republic of China’s

(PRC) Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM), Yingyong Wuli Yu Jisuan Shuxue Yanjiu Suo, a branch of the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), Zhongguo Gongcheng Wuli Yan Jiu Yuan, where the country’s nuclear weapons designers were concentrated.

Code-named ROYAL TOURIST by the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion (FBI), Peter Lee had been a friend of Wen Ho Lee at Los Alamos, and under interrogation he admitted that he had met Chen Nengkuan, the Yale- educated leader of the Chinese nuclear weapons program and head of the CAEP, in his hotel room. Lee had made several trips to Beijing and, in a plea bargain with the prosecution in March 1998, admitted to having compro- mised classified information, in return for a fine of $20,000 and a year in a halfway house. Specifically, Lee had passed information relating to the U.S. Navy’s Radar Ocean Imaging project, a submarine detection program con- ducted jointly with Great Britain. Because of the sensitivity of the research, a plea bargain was agreed to avoid public disclosure of the details. Jim Lilley, formerly a U.S. ambassador to the PRC and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief in Beijing, commented in 2004 that “Peter Lee’s case was they had this guy giving this very sensitive data to the Chinese on underwater detection of submarines. They ran into this case where the Navy would not allow a court case against him because of the data. So, they had a bargain plea, and he got off basically. For stealing very high-level stuff, he gets probably, what, a couple of months in a halfway house.”

Peter Lee was only slightly connected to the FBI’s investigation of Wen

Ho Lee, code-named KINDRED SPIRIT, which it inherited from the origi- nal review of the PRC’s acquisition of the W88 technology. See also OVER- SEAS CHINESE.

 

LEE, SAM CHING SHENG. On 30 December 2008, Sam Ching Sheng Lee, aged 63 and a native of China, and his nephew, Charles Yu Hsu Lee, aged 31 of Taiwan, were arrested on charges relating to a conspiracy to obtain and illegally export sensitive technology to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Part owner and the chief operations manager of the Multimil- lion Business Associate Corporation in Hacienda Heights, California, Lee was charged with assisting unnamed people in the PRC to illegally procure export-controlled thermal-imaging cameras in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and Export Administration Regulations. The prosecution alleged that between April 2002 and July 2007, and after they had been made aware of the export restrictions, the Lees exported 10 cameras. Charles Lee purchased them from suppliers for about $9,500 each and gave them to his uncle for shipment to China. One of the recipients was

identified as an employee of a company in Shanghai engaged in developing infrared technology. See also OVERSEAS CHINESE; TECHNOLOGY AC- QUISITION.

 

LE-FANG WEI. See WEI LEFANG.

 

LEUNG, KATRINA. See PARLOR MAID.

 

LI BIN. For years Li Bin had been the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foremost diplomat for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhonggua Renmon Gonghego Waijaibu, on the Korean Peninsula. He was fluent in Korean, outgoing in nature, and had served three tours in the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang and two tours in the Chinese embassy in Seoul. His 18 years of service on the Korean Peninsula included the rank of ambassador in Seoul from 2001 to 2005. A graduate of Kim Il-sung University in North Korea, he had developed a special relationship with North Korean strongman Kim Jong-il.

Li was born in 1956 in Beijing, and after his graduation from Kim Il-sung University he began a diplomatic career. As he rose through the ranks, he became China’s single most knowledgeable diplomat dealing with both Ko- reas, and after his tour as ambassador in Seoul, Li returned to China, where he was named as a special envoy for the Korean Peninsula, in effect making him the point person for the then six-party negotiations led by China and including South Korea, Russia, Japan, and the United States, to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. However, after several months, Li was suddenly transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and assigned as deputy mayor of Weihei, a relatively small city on the Yel- low Sea.

In early 2006 it emerged that Li had been under investigation by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, for betraying state secrets. South Korean media reported that Li was suspected of divulging information relating to Kim’s visit to China, an event that had been reported widely, but not in the PRC, where the Chinese press had remained silent due to the obsessive secrecy of Kim himself. The South Korean reporter Park Ki Sung, who had first broken the story of Kim’s trip by rail, denied that Li had been his source, asserting that Kim’s distinctive personal train had been spotted crossing the border. The Chinese authorities were unpersuaded by the expla- nation, and it was alleged that Li had disclosed considerable information relating to Chinese and North Korean diplomatic communications, as well as personal material about Kim himself.

Some reports suggested that Li had a reputation as a heavy drinker, with a particular affinity for late-night drinking sessions where he would down what South Koreans referred to as “bomb shots,” being whisky mixed with beer. Some observers blamed Li’s excessive drinking for causing him to become a “blabbermouth.”

At the time he was taken into custody, Li was initially charged with leak- ing information to the South Korean media, but after several interrogations, it was leaked that Li had divulged state secrets to officials of the United States and South Korea. In 2007 he was “lightly sentenced” to seven years’ impris- onment for economic crimes.

 

LI CHUSHENG. The long-serving deputy director of the New China News Agency, Xinhua, in Hong Kong, Li Chusheng was widely regarded during the Cold War as the senior Chinese intelligence officer in the colony, and he had previously served as the Chinese chargé d’affaires in Djakarta, Indone- sia.

 

LI FENGZHI. In 2004 Li Fengzhi, a 36-year-old PhD graduate of the Beij- ing Institute of International Relations, Beijing Guoji Quanxi Xueyuan, where he had been taught by the principal, Liu Hui, and a member of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, defected to the Unit- ed States. He had joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1995, although he was sympathetic to the pro-democracy demonstrators, and was recruited originally as a technical support officer at the MSS office known as Unit 8475, Danwei 8475, in Liaoning Province.

The MSS sent Li to Denver to study for a PhD in politics and diplomatic philosophy, but while there he applied for political asylum, a request that was resisted by the U.S. government. Federal prosecutors initially claimed that Li was not really an MSS officer but merely an academic who was attempting to pass himself off as one in an effort to remain in the United States. After a federal judge ruled in favor of Li, the prosecutors submitted an appeal, as- serting that he was a threat to national security.

In March 2009, five years after he had been resettled in the United States, Li stated that the MSS spends most of its time trying to steal secrets overseas but also works to ensure the security of the CCP by monitoring and repress- ing internal political dissent and religious activity. He also described the MSS’s internal counterintelligence role in China, targeted against a per- ceived threat from foreign intelligence agencies. Li confirmed that the MSS’s primary goal, as set out in a highly restricted internal manual, patterned after the Soviet Union’s KGB, is to “control the Chinese people to maintain the rule of the Communist Party.”

According to Li, the MSS concentrates on penetration of the U.S. Intelli- gence Community and the collection of Western secrets and technology. He also described the censorship of the internet to prevent the Chinese popula- tion from learning about the outside world. While recognizing the need to develop the MSS’s existing liaison relationship with the Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to counter international terrorism, Li warned that American agencies should approach such cooperation with caution, as the MSS is an organ of the Communist Party and does not directly serve the interests of China or its people. Li was finally given political asylum and lives in the United States.

 

LI JAIQI. Released from prison in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1975 after having served 28 years on charges of having spied for Taiwan, Li Jaiqi returned to Beijing in 1981 accompanied by his courier, Cai Ping, and his adopted daughter Qiu Yunnei. All three were arrested in June 1983, and Li, aged 56, was sentenced to life imprisonment for having sent more than 120 messages concealed by secret ink. Cai received three years and Qiu five for passing confidential documents to her father. See also NATIONAL SE- CURITY BUREAU (NSB).

 

LI KENONG. The leader of Zhou Enlai’s fabled “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” Longtan Sanjie, during the early 1930s in Shanghai, Li Kenong, Hu Di, and Qian Zhuangfei are credited with saving the lives of Zhou, Kang Sheng, and other high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members after Zhou’s chief of security, Gu Shunzhang, defected to Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT).

Li had studied in France, where he, as did many others, undoubtedly embraced communism and concealed his ideological transformation upon his return to China. The three penetrated the KMT’s inner circle, and Li pro- vided intelligence directly to Zhou himself. Li joined Mao Zedong’s Long March, Changzheng, after being exposed while openly warning Zhou of Gu’s defection and was the only one of the three to survive the Chinese revolution. He was a deputy chief of staff in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a vice minister for foreign affairs. In 1947, he was appointed head of the Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA), Zhongyang Shehui Shiwu Bu, replacing Kang Sheng, and then in 1955 he led the Central Investigation Department (CID), Zhongyang Diaocha Bu. He was promoted to the rank of general, shang jiang, though he never served in a combat role. He died in 1962 and was succeeded by Luo Qingchang. See also LONGTAN SANJIE.

LI QING. On 26 September 2008, Li Qing was sentenced in California to a year and one day in custody, followed by three years of supervised release, and fined $7,500 for conspiring to smuggle military-grade accelerometers from the United States to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). According to the prosecution, Li conspired with an unindicted co-conspirator in China to obtain up to 30 Endevco 7270A-200K accelerometers for what she was told was a “special” scientific agency in the PRC. The accelerometer has military applications in the development of missiles and smart bombs and in calibrating the g-forces of nuclear and chemical explosions.

Li originally approached Endevco to purchase and export the accelerome- ters, but the company notified federal authorities, who set up a sting opera- tion. When told by an undercover agent, “I don’t think the U.S. government will give us a license to export these items to China,” Li replied that she did not wish to get into trouble and would refer the matter to a friend. The agent then received an email sent from chinaman326@hotmail, who still wanted to purchase the items, and investigators established that the source of the mes- sage was in Beijing. Previously the same hotmail account had been accessed from an internet account belonging to Li’s husband, and an intercept on Li’s telephone revealed calls to a number in Beijing. At one point, Li conducted a three-way telephone call with the agent and her co-conspirator to discuss the delivery of the accelerometers to the PRC. Li was indicted on 18 October 2007 and pleaded guilty on 9 June 2008. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUI- SITION.

 

LI RONGXING. On 15 February 2014, Ohio State University (OSU) re- ceived an email from longtime professor Li Rongxing, also known as Ron Li, aged 56: “With this email I resign from my position at Ohio State Univer- sity.” The email had been sent from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

A naturalized U.S. citizen born in China, Li had been employed at OSU for 18 years and, at the time of his resignation, was a world-renowned profes- sor in OSU’s Department of Civil, Environmental and Geodetic Engineering. He was considered an expert in geospatial information and had worked on the Mars and Mars Rover Projects at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). He had helped guide the rover vehicle at the time of the 2003 Mars Exploration Rover mission and was the participating scientist for the 2009 lunar orbiter.

Li had lied when he stated he had no contact with researchers in the PRC, as he had been in touch with Tongji University, Tongji Daxue, in Shanghai and was even listed as a professor and director for the area involving spatial information, and he had taken a 2012 sabbatical at the university. An exam- ination of his computer in the United States revealed that he had collaborat- ed with the PRC over a long period.

Tongji University was established in 1903 by the German government and is one of the PRC’s most prestigious education institutes, particularly known for its engineering, business, and architecture schools. Indeed, the civil engi- neering school has been ranked first in the PRC for decades. It also has a School of Aerospace Engineering and Applied Mechanics, Tongji Daxue Hangtian Gongcheng Yu Yingyong Lixue Xueyuan, and has over 35,000 stu- dents, both undergraduate and graduates, with almost 3,000 academic staff.

China has openly discussed its space exploration goals, including a land- ing on Mars by 2020, a mission that would have been unlikely without the critical assistance of someone like Li. At the time of his resignation, Li had told OSU that he was in China taking care of his ill mother. On 1 March 2014, Li’s wife, Tian Jue, attempted to fly from San Francisco to Shanghai, but she was searched by Homeland Security inspectors, who found thumb drives in her possession that contained national defense information. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted an investigation of the Lis with the assistance of OSU, but Li himself has not resurfaced since his resignation.

 

LI SHAOMIN. In July 2001 an American academic, Li Shaomin, was con- victed in Beijing on charges of having spied for Taiwan. Born in China, Li had a doctorate from Princeton University and was employed as a teacher at a Hong Kong university when he was arrested, according to the People’s Daily, Renmin Ribao, which referred to his guilty plea and recent examples of Taiwanese agents using sex to lure Chinese students to adopt a “hostile ideology.” See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

LI TSUNG-JEN. In 1965 the 74-year-old General Li Tsung-jen, a former vice president and acting president of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1947, who in 1950 had settled in Eaglewood Hills, New Jersey, rather than move to Taiwan, flew to Switzerland with his wife and defected to Beijing. Long a political opponent of Chiang Kai-shek, Li later claimed that he had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to overthrow the gener- alissimo in a coup and had fled the country to avoid being pressured into participating in the plot.

 

LI YEH-TSENG. Expelled from Addis Ababa in 1968 with his wife Chen Chun-ying, Li Yeh-tseng was a career New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua, professional, and an intelligence officer. After military service prior to 1949 he headed the reporting from the Korean War, was appointed a regional news editor in Beijing, and in 1958 was transferred to the Middle East, where he headed the NCNA bureau in Damascus.

LI ZHEN. Born in Hebei in 1914 to a wealthy peasant family, Li Zhen joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1937 and was a Long March, Changzheng, participant. He climbed the ranks of the People’s Lib- eration Army (PLA), attaining the rank of general, and by 1971 was a vice minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, when he was named as part of a commission, Lin Biao Zhuan’anzu Baomizu, to look into Lin Biao’s death in an air crash on 13 September 1971, at the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming.

The commission was headed by Kang Sheng, but it was actually run by Mao Zedong’s loyal bodyguard Wang Dongxing, and Li was considered to be the lead investigator. The commission, ostensibly established to investi- gate any conspiracy involving General Lin Biao and others, was in reality used to ferret out supporters of the dead general.

In 1971 Li was entrusted with the security for Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China, and after the death of Xie Fuzhi, the head of MPS in March 1972, Li was named as his replacement, the MPS’s third minister. However, Li was found hanging in his residence by Wang Dongxing in January 1973, his death called a suicide.

 

LIANG XIUWEN. In February 2003, 34-year-old Liang Xiuwen, known as Jennifer Liang, was arrested with her 48-year-old husband, Zhuang Jinghua, and charged with conspiring to illegally export to China F-14 fighter parts and components for the Hawk, TOW, and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles sys- tems. Together they owned Maytone International in Thousand Oaks, Cali- fornia, and on 15 April 2005 Liang was sentenced to 30 months’ imprison- ment and fined $6,000 after her husband had been sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

LIAO HO-SHU. In January 1969 the 42-year-old acting Chinese chargé d’affaires in the Netherlands, Liao Ho-shu, turned up at the Dutch police headquarters wearing only pajamas and a raincoat and requested political asylum. A few days later he was flown to the United States for debriefing by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Three years earlier, in July 1966, Liao had been involved in the abduction and death of a 42-year-old engineer, Xu Zuzai, who had been forcibly re- moved from his bed in the Red Cross Hospital after he had been found badly injured in the street, allegedly following a fall from a window. His removal from the X-ray department, where his skull fracture and spinal injuries were undergoing treatment, had been orchestrated by Liao. However, according to a bulletin released by the New China News Agency, Xinhua, Hsu had been induced by a “secret U.S. agent” to desert and betray his country. The Chi-

nese chargé, Li Enzhou, revealed that Xu had died of his injuries after he was returned to the Chinese embassy, so the Dutch police surrounded the build- ing, demanding access to the eight other engineers in Hsu’s delegation to find out what really happened. The Chinese retaliated by announcing the expul- sion of the Dutch chargé in Beijing, but they refused to allow him an exit permit until the Chinese engineers were released.

This diplomatic standoff lasted for five months, until the end of the year, when a compromise was reached and the Dutch police were allowed into the surrounded premises to conduct an inconclusive investigation.

 

LILLEY, JAMES. The first Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief to serve at the U.S. Liaison Office established in Beijing in the move toward normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1973, Jim Lilley was appointed following talks between Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong. Between 1951 and 1974, Lilley worked in the Far East Division of the CIA’s Clandestine Service, serving in Vientiane between 1965 and 1968, and in 1984 he was appointed the U.S. representative in Taipei. In 1989 he was posted by Presi- dent George H. W. Bush to Beijing as ambassador, and he remained there until his retirement in 1991.

Born in Qingdao, China, in 1928 where his father was an executive with Standard Oil and his mother a teacher, and known by the Chinese name “Li Jieming,” Lilley learned to speak Mandarin as fluently as he spoke English and French. In Taiwan between 1982 and 1984, Lilley often met President Chiang Ching-kuo and other leaders in and out of government and was exceptionally well informed about local conditions and political develop- ments.

Soon after Lilley’s appointment in Beijing, the scale of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square escalated, and the CIA’s station in Hong Kong warned that an attempt might be made to seize the pro-democracy leader, Fang Lizhi, from his refuge in the U.S. embassy. Diplomats observed the protesters and troops from monitoring points and vehicles and by listening in, with permis- sion, on ABC-TV’s internal radio communications. As tensions rose, the military attaché Larry Wortzel received a warning by telephone to evacuate the diplomats’ apartments before the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) raked the buildings with rifle fire. Confidential contacts provided some in- sight into debates among the Chinese leadership.

In his 2005 memoirs, China Hands, Lilley recalls having been present in 1977 when Vice President George H. W. Bush met Deng Xiaoping and describes the administration’s debate over the August 1982 communiqué with the PRC that was supposed to limit U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and he mentions a secret Ronald Reagan memorandum that effectively nullified the communiqué. He also reveals Reagan’s simultaneous “six assurances” to

Taiwan that promised no pressure to negotiate with Beijing and describes the controversial arms sales to Taiwan, which included the Indigenous Defense Fighter and the F-16 fighter.

Widely recognized as probably the only American diplomat to have been admired and trusted by both the governments of Taiwan and the PRC, Lilley was appointed the U.S. ambassador to South Korea in 1986. While in Seoul he delivered a personal letter from President Ronald Reagan to South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan that helped avert a military crackdown on pro- democracy demonstrators. After his retirement in 1988, Lilley continued to write and comment on Chinese issues, and he died on 15 November 2009 in Washington, D.C.

 

LIN BIAO. During the night of 12 September 1971, Lin Biao, minister of defense and deputy to Mao Zedong, was killed when his aircraft, a British- built Trident, crashed in Mongolia while apparently en route to the Soviet Union. Soon afterward rumors circulated that Lin, who in 1969 had been designated as Mao’s heir apparent, had been involved with his wife, Ye Qun; their son; and a group of senior military staff officers in a plot to assassinate Mao and replace him. Among those who were purged following Lin’s death were Huang Yongsheng, the chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the air force commander, Wu Faxian. Rumors also persist that Lin’s death was the result of some clandestine intervention by the ubiquitous intelligence chief Kang Sheng, who supposedly had arranged for an air accident to be staged as cover for the murder of Lin and his associates in Beijing. Kang himself headed the group that investigated the death of Lin, noting that the bodies recovered at the crash scene and turned over to the Soviets were unrecognizable.

After his death, Lin was condemned as a traitor and, along with his former

political ally Jiang Qing, was accused of being a “major counterrevolution- ary.” Lin is also considered to have been one of the most able commanders of the PLA, having been especially effective during China’s civil war when he directed the PLA’s conquest of Manchuria and personally led his Red Army troops into Peking. However, his involvement in the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, and his effort in 1971 to restore the position of state chairman led to his being mistrusted by Mao, and he joined the ranks of many who, though loyal, were betrayed by Mao and Kang.

 

LIN HAI. On 3 May 2001, Lin Hai, aged 30; Xu Kai, aged 33; and Cheng Yongqing, aged 37, were indicted in New Jersey for stealing proprietary information from Lucent Technologies and selling it to the state-owned Da- tang Telecom Technology and Industry Group, Da Tang Dianxin Keji Cha- nye Jituan, one of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) largest phone and

computer manufacturers, which had developed the Chinese TD-SCDMA-3G mobile telecommunications standard. Having obtained advanced degrees in America before joining Lucent at very large salaries, Lin and Xu had busi- ness visas. Cheng, a naturalized American, was the vice president of Village Networks, a New Jersey–based information technology company.

According to a further indictment issued in April 2002, the trio had created a company, ComTriad Technologies, and received $1.2 million from Datang as part of a joint venture to produce computer software for use in low-cost internet data services. Having stolen Lucent’s PathStar software system, they marketed it to Datang as the CLX-1000.

Lucent had extensive business dealings in the PRC, having signed lucra- tive contracts and invested millions in Chinese companies, and Datang de- nied emphatically that it had engaged in anything improper. Accordingly, in September 2001, the U.S. district attorney requested the PRC government’s cooperation to obtain documents relating to Datang’s relationship with Com- Triad and sought permission to interview Datang employees. A year later the request was granted, and in 2003 prosecutors set a precedent by taking depo- sitions from Datang employees for a trial to be held in the United States. However, in 2004 Lin jumped bail, presumably returning to China, and all charges were dropped against Xu and Cheng. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPI- ONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

LIN YING. On 17 April 2019, Lin Ying, aliases Ying Lin, Randi Lin, and Randy Lin, aged 48, pleaded guilty to acting as an agent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) by working at the direction and control of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers assigned to the Permanent Mission at the United Nations.

A naturalized U.S. citizen, Lin was born in the PRC and was employed by the state-owned China International Airlines Company, Zhongguo Guoji Hangkong Gongsi (Air China Limited, Zhongguo Guoji Hangkong Gufen Youxian Gongsi), first as a ticket agent at John F. Kennedy International Airport between 2002 and 2015, and then as a station manager at Newark International Airport from 2015 to 2016. During the investigation, the Feder- al Bureau of Investigation (FBI) searched her residence, bank accounts, safety deposit boxes, and electronic devices.

The indictment described how, in about 2012, another China International Airlines employee refused to accept an unaccompanied package and was admonished by Lin, who lectured him on his loyalty to the PRC and insisted that it was a long-standing practice to accept unaccompanied packages from PRC Mission employees for shipment on the airline. Indeed, the airline’s general manager subsequently distributed a memorandum authorizing China International Airlines employees to accept unaccompanied packages from PRC UN personnel for shipment to Beijing.

Lin was originally indicted in 2015 for making cash transactions to evade currency transaction reporting requirements and was arrested on 25 August. A year later, in a superseding indictment, she was charged with smuggling, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice, but in September 2017, the smuggling charge was dismissed by a judge.

In December 2017 the government filed a further indictment, charging Lin with acting as an agent of a foreign government and claiming that on 26 June 2014 she checked in two large shrink-wrapped boxes from two PLA officers under the names of actual passengers, though the PLA officers did not actual- ly make the flight. It was also claimed that on 24 July 2014 Lin had assisted a PLA officer who was about to depart on an outbound flight and had passed through a Transport Safety Administration (TSA) security check by taking a SIM card from the officer’s phone and passing it to a second PLA officer who had already passed through the check, effectively avoiding scrutiny by TSA personnel.

The indictment described her receipt of gifts of duty-free liquor and elec- tronic devices from individuals at the PRC Mission, and free contracting work at her two residences from PRC staff. Those workers had been author- ized to only work at the PRC Mission and were strictly prohibited from working outside the mission itself.

Lin had come to the FBI’s attention during an investigation of Macau billionaire Ng Lapa Seng, who was involved with the 1996 campaign finance investigation of President Bill Clinton’s reelection and was the subject of an inquiry relating to a bribery scandal at the United Nations. Ng was eventually convicted of bribery charges with UN official John Ashe and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. The investigation revealed that Lin was respon- sible for renovating and furnishing a $10 million mansion on Long Island, the home of Qin Fei, who was suspected of being affiliated with a Chinese intelligence service. Ng had told the FBI that Qin was a consultant at Ng’s company, Sun Kian Ip Group, and Lin was alleged to have facilitated Qin’s escape from New York on a China International flight to Beijing on 28 October 2015.

As part of her guilty plea, Lin agreed to forfeit about $25,000 as well as an

additional $145,000 for the unauthorized work done by PRC personnel, and she faces up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

 

LING YUN. Ling Yun was born in June 1917 in Zhejiang as Wu Peilin and, like many of the early adherents to communism, changed his name. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1938, and after being en- gaged in political activism in Shanxi Province for a period, he traveled in 1939 to the CCP’s central base in Yan’an, Shaanxi. There he became affiliat- ed with the Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA), Shihuibu, headed

by Kang Sheng, which had been formed by the CCP’s Central Secretariat on

18 February 1939 with responsibility for counterintelligence and intelli- gence.

Ling continued with the CDSA until the formation of the People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC) in 1949, when Kang Sheng’s “secret work,” tewu, net- work was moved to the newly formed Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu. Ling initially served as the head of the Guangzhou office in 1950, and by February 1964 he was promoted the MPS vice minister. Seven months later he was named deputy for the Shandong Province at the Third Congress of the People’s National Assembly. In those roles he would partici- pate in discussions with Indonesia’s foreign minister, Dr. Subandrio.

Despite having worked with Kang Sheng since the early days of the revo- lution in Yan’an, Ling was arrested in 1967 in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanijieji Wenhua Dageming, and essentially disappeared from public view for almost a decade, held in the notorious Qincheng prison near Beijing, a maximum-security prison built in 1958 with the aid of the Soviet Union and which mainly housed political prisoners. Kang said Ling and others had “conspired with American and Chiang Kai-shek special agents and conducted special agent and espionage work.” Ling was tortured but, unlike many, survived, perhaps due to his long association with Kang.

In 1975 Ling reemerged and assumed his duties as vice minister of the MPS again, almost as if nothing had happened, and in 1978 he was named as a deputy for the municipality of Shanghai. In July the following year, Ling was part of a delegation that traveled to the United Kingdom and was re- ceived by Queen Elizabeth II, and in October he accompanied Premier Hua Guofeng to Paris, where he was briefed on French technology, including modern radar systems.

In 1983 Ling relinquished his position as the MPS vice minister and on 30 June was named as minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guo- jia Anquanbu, which undertook a security review of PRC embassies that resulted in the recall of diplomats, with Ling observing, “The intelligence agencies and secret services of certain foreign countries have increased their spying activities as regards China’s state secrets and have sent special agents into our country for the purposes of subversion and destruction.”

Ling remained head of the MSS until September 1985, when he was replaced by Jia Chunwang, following the embarrassing defection of a high- ranking MSS official, Yu Qiangsheng, and the arrest by the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation (FBI) of Larry Wu-tai Chin, though he remained as an MSS “consultant.” Ling died on 15 March 2018 in Beijing at the age of 100.

LINDSAY, MICHAEL. A British academic and Secret Intelligence Ser- vice (SIS) wireless operator, Michael Lindsay was politically sympathetic to the Communist forces to which he was attached in Yunnan Province in 1943. As an adviser on radio communications, Lindsay was in a good position to keep SIS informed of local conditions and developments and, according to Richard Aldrich’s Intelligence and the War against Japan, was a key source for the British and ensured they were well-informed about Mao Zedong. See also GREAT BRITAIN.

 

LINKEDIN. On 31 August 2018, Walter Evanina, the head of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, warned that the Chinese use of LinkedIn to solicit unwitting individuals to provide sensitive informa- tion was increasingly a problem. He explained that the Chinese, using faked LinkedIn accounts, contact thousands of LinkedIn members at a time, noting that LinkedIn has 575 million users in more than 200 countries, including 150 million members in the United States. Senator Mark Warner of the Senate Intelligence Committee said the Chinese exploitation of LinkedIn “demonstrates the length to which Chinese intelligence will go, and the 21st- century counterintelligence challenges facing us in a world where every- body’s got an online footprint.”

U.S. officials have noted that the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, uses individuals who are not actual members of the organ- ization but who work with them by setting up fake accounts and facilitating introductions to approach potential recruits. While Russia, North Korea, and Iran also use LinkedIn to identify recruitment targets, it is the Chinese who pose the greatest threat.

In October 2018 the French newspaper Le Figaro published information ostensibly obtained from the French internal security service, Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, and the external service, Direction Générale de la Securité Extérieure, that French citizens were guilty of “culpable naive- ty” over the threat posed by the Chinese use of LinkedIn, despite a warning from the British Security Service, MI5. According to the reporting, some 4,000 individuals had been targeted in France, and “hundreds” had been swayed by offers of jobs or collaboration from fake LinkedIn accounts run by Chinese spies posing as headhunters, consultants, or think tanks. One example cited was the offer of a free Southeast Asia diving holiday, and another was an offer to pay for short reports taken from confidential informa- tion sources. Reportedly the French had identified at least 15 such companies believed to be run by Chinese intelligence, such as the China Center for International Politics and Economy, Zhongguo Guoji Zhengzhi Jingji Zhong- xin.

In 2015 MI5 issued a Security Service espionage alert, warning that “hos- tile foreign intelligence services are increasingly using LinkedIn to find, connect with and recruit current and former” government employees. MI5 said it had already identified a number of retirees with connections to foreign intelligence service cover companies.

In 2017 the German internal security service, Bundesamt fur Verfas- sungsshutz (BfV), warned of the Chinese setting up fake social media ac- counts in an attempt to connect with senior diplomats and politicians, not only in Germany but other European countries too. Their nine-month investi- gation revealed that the Chinese had attempted to contact at least 10,000 German citizens. The BfV said the Chinese outreach was a “broad attempt to infiltrate parliaments, ministries and administrations.”

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu, retorted that the BfV assessment was “complete hearsay and groundless.” See also MALLORY, KEVIN PATRICK.

 

LITTLE SAI-WAN. The local signals intelligence (SIGINT) analytical site on Hong Kong Island’s east coast, Little Sai-Wan was the Far East head- quarters of the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) monitoring radio communications inside mainland China. From its establishment in 1953 under Royal Air Force control, the facility became part of GCHQ’s worldwide Composite Signals Organization in January 1964, receiving signals intercepted at Chung Hum Kok and at Old Belvedere atop Victoria Peak on Hong Kong Island, and from Tai Mo Shan and Tai Wei in the New Territories. Prior to civilianization in January 1964, when GCHQ took over responsibility for signals intelligence operations in Hong Kong, the task had been divided between the Royal Navy on Stonecutter’s Island and some 500 officers and men of the Royal Air Force 367 and 743 Signals Units. In addition, an 18-strong detachment from the Royal Australian Air Force’s 3 Telecommunications Unit, based at RAAF Pearce in Western Aus- tralia, provided additional support.

In August 1954 a total of 15 wireless positions were operational at Old

Belvedere, with a further 23 sets working at the other stations, producing 30,315 intercepts. By December the intercepts grew to 43,782 generated by a total of 50 sets. By the following year, 53 sets, working 5,038 hours a week, produced 49,804 intercepts. In March 1957, 64 sets, averaging 7,003 hours a week, produced 61,149 intercepts.

The 367 Signals Unit was disbanded in 1962, and Little Sai Wan closed down in 1982 and moved to a purpose-built facility at Chung Hum Kok on the southern side of Hong Kong Island, and in January 1995 it was trans- ferred to the Australian Defence Signals Directorate base at Kojarena, near Geraldton in Western Australia. See also GREAT BRITAIN.

LIU FUZHI. Born in Guangdong in 1917, Liu Fuzhi joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1938 while a student at the Yan’an North Shaanxi Public School. Over the course of several decades, Liu served in numerous positions, such as secretary general to Eighth Route Army com- mander Zhu De, director of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and secretary of the political commissar to Deng Xiaoping. Other positions, not inclusive, included director of the Social Affairs Department of the North China Bureau of the CCP’s Central Committee and director of the Social Department of the Central Committee of the Shanxi-Hebei Central Commit- tee.

In 1949, after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Liu was named assistant director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Minis- try of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, under Luo Ruiqing and, at the same time, director of the First Section of the Political Security Bureau of the Department of Social Affairs, Shehuibu.

In 1952, after Mao Zedong’s “Three Anti Campaign,” Sanfan, and the subsequent “Five Anti Campaign,” Wufan, while serving as Luo’s deputy, Liu managed the daily repression and deportation of individuals to the lao- gai, the PRC’s vast network of gulag prison camps and state farms. The MPS’s Eighth Bureau, Di Ba Ju, was concerned with deportations, guarding the camps, and their economic management. Liu made those facilities self- sufficient, as he used prison labor to build the camps, ensured that the prison- ers grew their own food, and enforced Luo’s ideas of rehabilitation through forced labor.

Liu was imprisoned for much of the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, and was finally released in 1977. On 20 June 1983, Deng Xiaoping named Liu as head of the MPS, an organization that had been rebuilt after the debacle of the Cultural Revolution. He served in that capac- ity until 1985 and later was named to other positions within the CCP’s hierarchy, such as the first political commissar of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, Zhongguo Renmin Wuzhang, and he was a member of the 12th and 13th Central Committees of the CCP.

Liu died in August 2013 at the age of 96 and is buried in a place of honor in the Babaoshan (literally, “Eight Treasure Mountains”) Revolutionary Ce- metery, reserved for the CCP’s elite.

 

LIU, GLADYS. Born in 1964, Gladys Liu emigrated from Hong Kong to Australia in 1985 and later studied at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University and at La Trobe University in Melbourne. Deaf in one ear, she studied speech pathology and worked for the Victoria Education Department for 14 years while also running two restaurants and a pharmacy. Divorced in 2007, she served as an adviser to two premiers of Victoria, and her two children studied at Harvard and Oxford Universities.

In 2018 Liu formally notified the Hong Kong immigration department of her Australian citizenship, acquired in 1992, as she was still considered a Hong Kong citizen. In 2001 she began to participate in Liberal Party politics and in May 2019 was elected as the first Chinese Australian to the House of Representatives. However, the media linked her to the World Trade United Foundation, an organization with ties to the Chinese People’s Political Con- sultative Conference, Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi, a political body that serves in an advisory capacity for the PRC’s legislative body. Membership is restricted to members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and those politically aligned with the CCP. Liu claimed to have left the World Trade United Foundation in 2016 and acknowledged a past honorary role in the Guangdong Overseas Exchange Association, Guangdong Sheng Haiwai Jiaoliu Xiehui.

The China Overseas Exchange Association, Zhongguo Haiwai Jialliu Xie-

hui, is subordinate to the State Council and has merged with the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, Zhongguo Gog- chandang Zhongyang Tongzhan Bu.

Liu was also connected with the Shandong Overseas Exchange Associa- tion, Shangdong Sheng Haiwai Jiaoliu Xiehui, and later admitted she was an honorary president of the United Chinese Commerce Association of Austra- lia, Aodaliya Huaren Shangye Xiehui, and the Australian Jiangmen General Commercial Association, Aodaliya Jiangmen Zonghe Shanghe Xiehui, al- though she asserted that she had ended her association with both groups. Furthermore, Liu was accused of having failed to disclose a $40,000 dona- tion to the Liberal Party.

Liu’s media critics noted her reluctance to condemn China’s military ex- pansion in the South China Sea, although she did remark that “China is not a democracy and is run under an authoritarian system.”

In 2017 Liu presided over the Liberal Party conference in Victoria and supported motions in favor of foreign investment in agribusiness and the purchase of agricultural land permissible without approval of the Foreign Investment Review Board, positions that were consistent with China’s. In 2018 the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) assessed the guest list of an event organized by Liu and recommended that Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull not attend.

 

LIU, HENRY. A prominent Chinese American and author who wrote under the pen name Chiang Nan, Henry Liu was shot dead in the garage of his home in Daly City, California, in October 1984, apparently to silence his many articles critical of the Republic of China (ROC). The biographer of Chiang Ching-kuo, Liu had made powerful enemies and, despite agreeing to tone down his comments and accepting a retainer from the notorious Intelli- gence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, was assassinated.

His killers, led by Chen Chi-ti, fled to Taiwan, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered a videotape implicating the Kuomintang, and eventually evidence emerged that the assassination had been ordered by Vice Admiral Wang Hsi-ling. Chen Chi-ti was convicted of the murder, as was Tung Kuei-sen, who stood trial in the United States in 1988. Lui’s widow, Helen Liu, later sued the ROC in American courts, and following a major political scandal in Taipei, her claim was settled. An account of the case was published in Fires of the Dragon by David E. Kaplan. See also NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB).

 

LIU LIANKUN. Between July 1995 and March 1996, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a series of missile tests in the Taiwan Straits, termed the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. The Chinese-made M9 missiles splashed down near the Taiwanese ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung and were fired in an apparent attempt to frighten Taiwanese voters away from support- ing any declaration of independence in an upcoming election. The PRC had repeatedly vowed to attack Taiwan if there was ever a declaration of inde- pendence by the ruling Taiwanese government. While initially suspecting that the tests anticipated an invasion, the Taiwanese military announced that the missiles being fired by the PRC did not pose a danger to Taiwan as they were not armed with active warheads. This disclosure prompted the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to search for a traitor, which resulted in the arrest in 1999 of a retired PLA major general, jiefangjun shaojiang, Liu Liankun, aged 58; a senior colonel of the PLA, jiefangjun gaoji shangxiao, Shao Zhengzhong, aged 56; and Liu’s mistress on charges of espionage on behalf of Taiwan.

Liu was the department director of the PLA’s General Logistics Depart-

ment, Jiefangjun Zong Houqin Bu, at the time of the missile tests and had been recruited by Taiwanese agents in Hong Kong after Liu was fined

$1,250 when he was implicated in a corruption scandal involving a PLA front company and had consequently been denied promotion. In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping had cut the defense budget while increasing economic spending in an attempt to boost the economy. As a result, the PLA had been allowed to operate front companies to supplement its budget, resulting in widespread corruption. It was Liu’s mistress who played a central role in the recruitment as she had acted as an intermediary to transfer funds from Tai- wan to Liu. Investigators claimed they found $650,000 at Liu’s home and another $1 million in an overseas bank account.

Besides providing Taiwan with the information about the missiles with dummy warheads, Liu was said to have provided Taiwan with information on troop movements and other logistical matters. One PLA member com- mented that “Taiwan knows how much equipment we have. No wonder Taiwan wasn’t worried during the 1996 military exercises.”

In April 2018, after years of denying that Liu had been a source, Taiwan’s Military Information Bureau (MIB) unveiled a memorial to him at its head- quarters in Taipei, inscribed with confirmation that Liu had not only pro- vided information regarding the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, but also details about the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. The Taiwanese also admitted making two mistakes that had led to Liu’s death. They acknowledged that they should have found another means to advise the population of the dimin- ished threat of the PRC’s missiles, and further, they should have expedited Liu’s visa to allow him to escape.

Liu was executed by lethal injection on 15 August 1999. Shao was con- victed by the same court and executed, but the fate of Liu’s mistress has not been revealed.

 

LIU SIXING. In March 2011, Sixing “Steve” Liu, an engineer employed by L-3 Communications, was arrested and charged with illegally exporting pro- prietary military data to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

LO CHEN-HSU. In 1983 Lo Chen-hsu, the left-wing editor of the Hong Kong New Evening Post, which followed a pro-Beijing editorial policy, was arrested while on a visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and sen- tenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for passing information to the United States. Having confessed, Lo was released after a few months.

 

LO HSIEN-CHE. On 25 January 2011, 51-year-old Major General Lo Hsi- en-che, head of the telecommunications and information warfare department of the Taiwanese army’s command headquarters for the previous three years, was arrested and charged with having been recruited as a spy by the main- land Chinese in 2004 when he was serving in Bangkok as a military attaché. Allegedly he had been ensnared in a classic honeytrap by a tall, elegant young woman who traveled on an Australian passport.

The recently retired secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, General Ting Yu-chou, commented that it would have been easy for Lo to gain access to “extremely confidential military information of great value to the mainland, such as combat operation plans,” which was inter- preted as suggesting that Lo had betrayed vulnerabilities of the Po Sheng communications system, a network built by Lockheed Martin to link Taiwan directly to the U.S. Pacific Command in the event of a conflict. Such contin- gency plans are regarded as exceptionally sensitive, and Lo enjoyed some access to them during the period he was engaged in espionage. As a conse- quence, Taiwan introduced new security screening procedures, including the use of polygraphs for officers promoted to senior posts.

LOCKWOOD, ANNE. Metaldyne, headquartered in Plymouth, Michigan, has annual revenue of over $2 billion, runs 50 plants in 13 countries, and employs well over 7,500 people. It primarily designs and supplies metal- based components and assemblies for the auto industry.

In August 2004 two companies that made Metaldyne-developed connect- ing rods received unsolicited requests from a Chinese company, Chongqing Huafu Industry Company Ltd., Chongqing Hou Fu Shiye Youxian Gongsi, which declared that it was planning to make powdered metal connecting rods and inquired about buying equipment. The approach included three attach- ments that Metaldyne staff recognized as being their own company trade secrets, and they immediately identified Anne Lockwood and Liu Fuping as likely suspects in the theft of the company’s proprietary information.

Anne Lockwood, aged 52, had been Metaldyne’s vice president of sales, and Liu, aged 42, also worked for Metaldyne as a metallurgist in the division that had developed the connecting rods and reported directly to Lockwood. Liu, a U.S. citizen, had been transferred to Metaldyne’s office in Shanghai. Lockwood had resigned from the company in February 2004 and had been followed by Liu in April. Thereafter Lockwood had formed a company in May 2004 and had attempted to obtain a contract from Chongqing Huafu Industry Company Ltd., to whom Lockwood had been introduced by Liu.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Metaldyne had spent 10 years and millions of dollars perfecting the technology associated with making connecting rods from powered metal and was one of only two companies in the world that made powdered-metal connecting rods. The particular design was for new connecting rod prototypes that would be fitted in 2007 International Truck and Engine models.

In February 2005 Lockwood and Liu were arrested for stealing Metaldyne trade secrets, and it emerged that Lockwood had obtained both electronic and paper copies of confidential and proprietary information about Metaldyne’s internal and manufacturing costs. In February 2008 both defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to steal confidential and proprietary information belong- ing to Metaldyne, and Lockwood’s husband, Michael Haehnel, a former senior Metaldybe engineer, who had been charged with the misdemeanor of accessing stored electronic records, also pleaded guilty.

In February 2009 Lockwood was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, Liu received nine months, and Haehnel six months.

LONG MARCH. In February 1996, a Long March 3D, Changzheng 3D, rocket carrying a Loral Intelsat 708 satellite into orbit failed upon liftoff at the Xichang Satellite Launch Center, Xichang Weixing Fashe Zhong Xin, also known as the Xichang Space Center, Xichang Hangtian Zhongxin, and crashed into a local village. This was the third such incident involving com- mercial payloads in 38 months and prompted an independent investigation

sponsored by the launch provider, the China Great Wall Industry Corpora- tion, Zhongguo Changcheng Shiye Gongsi, now the China Aerospace Sci- ence and Technology Corporation, Zhongguo Hangtian Jeji Jituan Gongsi. Headed by Loral’s Dr. Wah Lim, a technical committee including respected industry experts from Hughes Space and Communications, Daimler-Benz Aerospace, and retirees from Intelsat, British Aerospace, and General Dy- namics conducted a thorough review of the incident and concluded that there could have been several possible causes, not just the one found by the initial Chinese inquiry. This verdict was accepted by the launch provider, which was led by the independent review committee to the principal problem.

However, the advice proffered by the committee had not been submitted in advance to the State Department or cleared by the appropriate authorities, prompting an investigation pursued by the U.S. Defense Technology Secur- ity Administration, which alleged that Hughes and Loral had inadvertently passed sensitive information to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that had not been covered by the original Intelsat export license granted to cover the launch. In the Department of Defense’s final assessment, “Loral and Hughes committed a serious export control violation by virtue of having performed a defense service without a license,” and the matter was referred to the Department of Justice for consideration of a prosecution.

The Long March, referred to as the “CZ,” is the PRC’s principal and most reliable launch system and is scheduled to be improved by the introduction of the CZ-5 that was to be operational in 2014. The next generation of rocket, the Pioneer (Kaituoxhe) or KT series, has been under development since 2000 and reportedly has failed in five test flights attempted in 2009 and 2011. See also CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORA- TION (CASIC); TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA); WENCHANG SPACECRAFT LAUNCH SITE.

 

LONGTAN SANJIE. Zhou Enlai, who was as adept at tewu (secret work) as he was at navigating the murderous and Byzantine world of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics, was well aware that to combat Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) in the early days of the CCP’s resistance, there was a critical need for better intelligence. Consequently, in the late 1920s, Zhou recruited three individuals on behalf of the Teke, the CCP’s intelligence apparatus, to penetrate the KMT in Shanghai and report only directly to him.

Li Kenong, also known as “Li Zetian” and “Li Leizhong,” was chosen to lead the team. He had studied in France and at one time had served as a deputy to Kang Sheng, the dreaded CCP intelligence chief. Li had secretly joined the CCP in 1927 while working simultaneously as a local propaganda leader for the KMT. In 1929, at Zhou’s direction, he joined the KMT’s secret police, having adopted the alias Li Zetian. Li’s work for the KMT included

both cryptography and radio communications, and he was placed in charge of the investigation of CCP activities as well as the collection of information relating to suspected opponents.

Li was joined by a physician and film director, Qian Zhuangfei, who had been born Qian Beiqi and, after medical school and his marriage to a fellow doctor, Zhang Zhenhua, had joined the CCP in 1925. In 1929 Zhou asked Qian to join a radio training class in Shanghai that was run by Xu Enzeng, the head of the KMT’s Investigation Department. The school was a prime source of KMT recruits, and Qian, a star student, quickly gained Xi’s trust, which facilitated the penetration of the KMT by both Li Kenong and Hu Di.

Hu Di was born Hu Baichang, and he also used the names “Hu Beifeng” and “Hu Ma.” He had met Qian Zhuangfei and Zhang Zhenhua when a student at China University in Beijing. He joined the CCP in 1925, and the three established the Guanghua Film Li Company, which was used as a cover for their clandestine CCP activities. They also rose within the KMT, with Hu appointed chief of the KMT’s Tianjin secret service agency, disguised as the Great Wall News Agency, while Li became head of the Shanghai unit, under the cover of the Broadcast News Service, and Qian continued as Xu En- zeng’s confidential secretary. Their reporting, usually done by Li in Shang- hai, went directly to Zhou Enlai, who may not have shared his sources with Kang Sheng, in spite of Li’s long relationship with Kang. Their intelligence reporting, for instance, helped the Communist Red Army defeat the first two of Chiang Kai-shek’s encirclement campaigns.

In April 1931, Gu Shunzhang, Zhou’s chief of security and head of the

CCP’s dreaded Red Brigade, was arrested in Wuhan while on a mission to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek. Gu, who was more of a Shanghai gangster than a dedicated Communist, was tortured and defected to the KMT. He revealed his knowledge of CCP activities in Wuhan but said he would provide infor- mation of the Shanghai CCP’s activities only to Chiang himself. The two-day delay in Gu’s transfer from Wuhan to Shanghai served to give the CCP sufficient time to avoid a complete catastrophe.

While in Nanjing, Qian saw a message from the Wuhan KMT announcing Gu’s capture. He delayed its further distribution and dispatched a son-in-law to Shanghai to warn Li, who attempted to notify Chen Geng, the CCP’s Shanghai intelligence chief. However, their prearranged clandestine meas- ures failed, so Qian took the extraordinary step of compromising his KMT cover. Recognizing the danger posed by Gu’s cooperation, Li searched for Chen and alerted him. They then went directly to Zhou who immediately warned hundreds of clandestine CCP members in Shanghai and, further, allowed Zhou, Kang, and top CCP members Li Weihan and Qu Qiubai to escape. Li also telegraphed to Hu Di, who promptly took a foreign ship from Tianjin to Shanghai where, in August 1931, both Hu and Qian met and traveled to the CCP base in Jiangxi Province. With his cover compromised,

Li also fled to Mao Zedong’s base in Jiangxi Province. While much of the Shanghai CCP leadership escaped arrest, at least 40 high-ranking personnel and another 800 members were detained and executed as a direct conse- quence of Gu’s defection.

Only Li lived to see the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1935, after the fabled Long March, Changzheng, from the Jiangxi base, Qian was killed as the Red Army was crossing the Win River in Guizhou. Hu would be accused by General Zhang Guotao as a KMT spy and executed in September 1935. Li lived until 1962 and, though he had never commanded an army, was made a general.

Zhou Enlai lionized the three as “the three most distinguished members of the Party,” noting that he owed his life and the lives of other high-ranking CCP members to their exploits. He referred to the three as the “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” Longtan Sanjie, and even today they are held with great reverence within the PRC’s intelligence community.

 

LOVELL, JOHN S. The most senior American intelligence officer to be captured and interrogated by the enemy during the Korean War, Colonel John S. Lovell, aged 46, was taken prisoner on 12 December 1950 when his RB-45C Tornado was shot down by Soviet MiG-15s while on a reconnais- sance mission over the Yalu River. Although his pilot, Captain McDonough, and the jet’s other two aircrew were killed, Lovell survived and was ques- tioned by both Soviet and North Korean interrogators. As a member of General Pearre Cavell’s air intelligence staff at the Pentagon, Lovell was exceptionally well informed and was found to be carrying a restricted U.S. Air Force handbook on the Soviet order of battle. His belligerent attitude enraged his North Korean captors, who paraded him through a local village wearing a placard identifying him as a war criminal, and he was beaten to death by the local inhabitants.

Following Lovell’s death and the loss of a potentially priceless source of

information, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel took over the supervision of all prisoner interrogations, and a total of 262 U.S. Air Force pilots underwent the experience. After the armistice, several pilots remained in Chinese hands, including a Canadian, Squadron Leader Andrew MacKenzie, who was not released until 4 December 1954, and the following year four F-86 pilots were freed, leaving an unknown number unaccounted for, among them Wing Commander John Baldwin, a Sabre pilot who went missing over Korea, and nine other RAF aircrew. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

LU FUTIAN. In April 2009, a 61-year-old Silicon Valley businessman, Lu Futian, was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and charged with illegally exporting microwave amplifiers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The technology, with a military application, was the subject of a trade embargo, and Lu was alleged to have instructed em- ployees to conceal the equipment’s true destination. Lu had founded two companies, Fushine Technology of Cupertino, California, and Everjet Sci- ence and Technology Corporation, based in the PRC. The indictment quoted an internal company email from Everjet to Fushine: “Since these products are a little bit sensitive, in case the maker asks you where the location of the end user is, please do not mention it is China.” In another email, Lu in- structed a subordinate to pretend the end user was Singapore rather than China. Lu was charged with one count of conspiring to violate export regula- tions, two counts of making false statements to a government agency, and one count of violating U.S. export regulations. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

LUNEV, STANISLAV. One of the very few Soviet military intelligence officers to defect, Colonel Stanislav Lunev worked at the Russian Federation embassy in Washington, D.C., under diplomatic cover in May 1992 when he was granted political asylum to remain in the United States. When debriefed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), he revealed that he had previous- ly been posted to the Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie’s (GRU) rezi- dentura in Beijing, between May 1980 and December 1983, under TASS news agency cover.

Born in 1946, Lunev graduated from the Suvorov Military Academy in 1964 and studied Chinese at Nanyang University in Singapore. According to him, he had replaced a GRU officer, Oleg Mastrukov, at the TASS bureau, which was headed by the embassy rezident, Vasili Soloviev, until September 1980 when he was succeeded by his deputy, Evgeni Kalachev. As recruiting local Chinese was considered a next-to-impossible task because of the scale of hostile surveillance, which often amounted to harassment and even vio- lence, the rezidentura concentrated on the cultivation of Western journalists and relied for information on friendly Yugoslav, Czech, and Vietnamese intermediaries. One successful recruitment was an Italian correspondent, code-named ZAG, who enjoyed good access to the Communist Party and had been granted an interview with Li Xiannian. Although Lunev asserted that “Chinese counterintelligence officers outnumber foreigners almost one hundred to one,” he was the first Soviet “in at least five years to recruit a Chinese national.” His first agent was Zhan, a student at Peking University and the son of a local army district divisional commander, with access to

classified Central Committee papers, but Lunev was ordered to drop him on the grounds that Zhan’s information was too good to be true, and most likely he was a double agent.

Lunev’s second recruit was Lu, an engineer at the Beijing metallurgy factory who supplied data on locally manufactured weapons, and his third was Zhao, a railway official whose girlfriend Jiang worked in a department at the Ministry of Foreign Trade handling arms exports to Africa. Both supplied valuable information, and Zhao would later be sponsored by the GRU to emigrate, via Singapore, Australia, and Canada, to the United States, where he had a relation employed by Northrop Grumman on stealth technology.

Lunev’s account of the GRU’s operations in Beijing included a hair-rais- ing episode in which one of his colleagues, Stepan Koldov, was lured to a rendezvous by an agent who had been caught and turned by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. At the last moment, the rezidentu- ra’s zenit intercept station discovered that some 200 MSS personnel and 24 surveillance cars had been alerted to Koldov’s departure from the embassy, so he was given a signal to abort the meeting. The GRU believed that the MSS intended to beat Koldov to death and then claim he had been set upon by outraged local citizens.

M

MA JIAN. Born in September 1956 in Jiangxi Province, Ma Jian graduated from the Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Xinan Zhengfa Daxue, located in Chongqing, a municipality (along with Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) under the direct control of the central government. He spent most of his professional career in China’s security apparatus.

In 2006 Ma Jian was appointed vice minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, under Minister Xu Yongyue. He re- mained in that position during the appointment of the largely academic Geng Huichang as MSS minister the following year. He served as the vice presi- dent of the China Law Society, Zhongguo Fa Xuehui, and was a member of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Confer- ence, Di Shi Er Jie Quanguo Renmin Xieshang Hui Yi Quanguo Weiyuanhui. At the MSS, Ma was in charge of the MSS’s Eighth Bureau, Guojia Anquan- bu Di Ba Ju, responsible for counterintelligence targeting foreigners.

In 2015 Ma was investigated for a number of crimes, including taking bribes and misuse of his position. In particular, he was charged with receiv- ing bribes from Guo Wengui, a fugitive financier living in New York. Guo, the subject of an Interpol arrest warrant that the U.S. authorities chose to ignore, is a member of President Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Club in Flori- da and has requested political asylum.

In May 2017 Sun Lijun, a vice minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and an assistant, Liu Yanpang, traveled to Washington, D.C., to discuss cybersecurity, but they also raised the issue of forcibly returning Guo to China. However, when Liu traveled to New York he was detained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for violating the terms of his visa. Although he was quickly released after pressure from the State Department, the FBI confiscated his cell phone and laptop.

Ma was said to have had six mistresses and at least two illegitimate chil- dren, and he was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 2016. He was tried in the Dalian, Liaoning Intermediate People’s Court, Dalian Shi Zhongi Renmin Fayuan, where he was charged with taking bribes worth $16 million and making over $7 million from insider trading.

 

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Many of the bribes concerned Guo, who had lucrative construction contracts ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. On 27 December 2018 Ma was sen- tenced to life imprisonment.

 

MA JISH. In September 2014, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ambassador to Iceland, Ma Jisheng, and his wife, Zhong Yue, were reported to have been secretly arrested by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, after he had been recalled from Reykjavik. Reportedly Ma’s arrest had been based on an allegation of espionage for Japan.

Aged 56, Ma had a master’s degree in history and had specialized in Asian affairs during his academic career, having been assigned to the PRC embassy in Tokyo from 1991 to 1995 and again from 2004 to 2008. He had been promoted ambassador to Iceland in 2012 but had departed in January, with the PRC’s Foreign Ministry citing personal issues.

The Chinese state-run Global Times published an editorial commenting that “in recent years we have frequently witnessed vicious incidents where top Chinese diplomats, military officers and senior research fellows of think- tanks have been involved in espionage and selling intelligence.” Supposedly those individuals had “developed distorted values and indulged themselves, hankering after cash and a life of luxury, so they were easily targeted by foreign intelligence services.” There were also unsubstantiated reports that Ma had been executed.

 

MACAO. Officially the Macao Special Administrative Region of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gonghguo Aomen Tebie Xing- zhenggu, Macao was a Portuguese colony until December 1999, when sove- reignty was passed to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Macao has a population of about 700,000, and Cantonese is the principal language. It is the most densely populated area in the world, with over 21,000 people per square kilometer. Casino gaming and tourism are the principal sources of income.

Macao was a target for intelligence collection operations conducted by the Ministry of State Security’s (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, Third Bureau through its local representative cover organization, the New China News Agency, Xinhua. One such MSS operation, code-named WINTER CHRY- SANTHEMUM, was reportedly targeted against individuals and companies from Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Known as Dongtian juhua or simply Dongju in colloquial Chinese, the Third Bureau supervised operations in both territories and targeted individu- als with local associations. While some agents were in place at the time of the 1949 conquest of the mainland, most are thought to have been more recent arrivals, often representing themselves as businessmen or people with profes-

sional occupations. The MSS relies on the Third Bureau to monitor foreign political organizations and figures, to penetrate political groups deemed to be potentially hostile or subversive and watch their contacts with outside politi- cal groups, and to maintain surveillance on Taiwanese organizations and their leaders, especially those with military connections. Although Third Bu- reau personnel are assigned to specific targets, the MSS allows them to pursue related cases should the opportunity present itself.

During the Cold War, especially after the withdrawal of the Portuguese secret police, Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), following the 1974 revolution in Portugal, Macao was a convenient environment for the MSS to meet agents, create front companies, and use the territory as a con- duit for clandestine procurement programs. Macao, like Hong Kong, is not subject to Chinese national laws, but unlike Hong Kong, it has not experi- enced the convulsions of resistance to the PRC’s increasingly draconian rule. See also CHEN YONGLIN; CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI; HOLT, HAROLD; MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (MID); SUN YAT-SEN; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

MACKIERNAN, DOUGLAS. A graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Douglas Mackiernan was a Central Intelligence Agen- cy (CIA) officer who lost his life in Tibet under mysterious circumstances in 1950. During World War II he had served in the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and it is believed that he was on a secret mission to Lhasa for the CIA when he was beheaded by Tibetan soldiers.

Operating under consular cover and accompanied by Frank Bessac, an academic who left the CIA in 1947, Mackiernan was killed during a shooting incident on the frontier that also resulted in the deaths of two other members of the group, which had made an epic, two-month journey across the desert from Sinkiang Province to establish contact with the Dalai Lama. The mis- sion ended in double disaster because, as well as the perhaps avoidable loss of life, the Chinese Communists invaded soon afterward, using the presence of American spies as a pretext. In 1959, in the midst of a brutal suppression of Tibetans by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Dalai Lama fled into exile, and Tibet has been under uneasy occupation by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ever since.

It is alleged by his biographer, Thomas Laird, in Into Tibet that Mackier- nan’s consular cover in Tihwa (today Ürümqi), subordinate to the U.S. em- bassy in Nanking, was to conceal his principal task, which had been to monitor and maybe sabotage Soviet extraction of uranium ore from Koktogai in neighboring Turkestan and to report on activity at the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk, but the precise nature of his mission remains unknown. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

MADE IN CHINA 2025. Made in China 2025, Zhongguo Zhizao Erling Erwu (Zhongguo Zhizao 2025), is a strategic plan issued in May 2015 by Premier Li Keqiang with the goal of moving away from being the world’s industrial leader of cheap goods of low quality to higher-value goods and services. Essentially the plan was a road map for China to upgrade the indus- trial capability of Chinese industries.

The stated objectives include a substantial increase in Chinese domestic content of core materials by 40 percent by 2020 and by 70 percent by 2025. The plan specifically targets high-tech fields, including semiconductors, the aerospace industry, the pharmaceutical industry, the automotive industry, information technology, and robotics, all of which have been dominated by companies outside China.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) described the plan as an effort to emulate the German industrial model, with the intention of upgrading the overall value of its industrial product and to directly com- pete with the United States. The Chinese government is said to have commit- ted about $300 billion to the project.

The Council on Foreign Relations in 2018 warned that the Made in China 2025 program offers a “real existential threat to U.S. technological leader- ship,” while Premier Li Keqiang maintains that the plan is consistent with the country’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. On 15 June 2018 the Trump administration imposed higher tariffs on Chinese goods that, in the main, were products included in the Made in China 2025 plan.

The Made in China 2025 program has ultimately placed greater emphasis on the illegal acquisition of restricted and proprietary information from high- tech companies that will continue to be the targets of a relentless attack by the PRC’s intelligence apparatus. In effect, the Made in China 2025 initiative has given an impetus to state-sponsored espionage and the theft of intellectu- al property.

 

MAIHESUTI, BABUR. In March 2010, Babur Maihesuti, a 62-year-old Uighur who had been a political refugee in Sweden for the past 13 years, was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment for spying on other Uighur expa- triates for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Maihesuti was convicted of “aggravated illegal espionage activity” after he had been found to have col- lected personal information about exiled Uighurs, including details of their health, travel, and political activity, and then passed the material to a PRC diplomat and a Chinese journalist who were PRC intelligence officers. He had also traveled to the United States in May 2009 to attend the Third General Assembly of the World Uighur Congress. In sentencing, the judge observed that by opening the door for a large power like China to spy on its

nationals in Sweden, China could use the same network for other kinds of espionage. When the Swedish government declared the implicated diplomat persona non grata, Beijing retaliated by expelling a Swedish envoy.

 

MALAN. Named after a desert flower, Malan is the People’s Republic of China’s nuclear weapons test center in Xinjiang Province, located 1,200 miles west of Beijing near the city of Uxxaktal, and is known as Base 21, Jidi 21, and the Northwest Nuclear Technology Institute, Xibei He Jishu Yanjiu Suo. From the moment work began on the site in 1960 to accommodate 2,000 military personnel and 8,000 civilian technicians and support staff, it was the target of foreign intelligence collection, and in 1964 it received “596,” the atomic weapon that was detonated at Lop Nor on 16 October. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; SENIOR BOWL.

 

MALAYA EMERGENCY. The Chinese-inspired insurgency in Malaya be- tween 1948 and 1957 was intended to undermine the newly created Federa- tion of Malaya and was opposed by Great Britain, initially by a police Special Branch, a small Security Service headed by Colonel John Dalley, and army military intelligence units led by the local director of military intelligence, Colonel Paul Gleadell, with additional support from Combined Intelligence Far East (CIFE), located in Singapore and headed by Dick Ellis of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). However, there was a lack of inter- agency cooperation because of a legacy of bitterness over the wartime activ- ities of Force 136 personnel who disobeyed orders in 1941 to surrender to the Japanese and instead fought a guerrilla war in the jungle while others en- dured captivity. Opposed only by a dysfunctional local security apparatus, the Chinese-sponsored insurgents gained a considerable advantage when the secretary general of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), Lai Tek, was exposed in March 1947 as a long-term Special Branch asset who had been recruited in 1939.

MI5’s E Branch, responsible for colonial affairs, was represented in Kuala

Lumpur by the security liaison officer (SLO) Arthur Martin and in Singa- pore by Courtenay Young and then Alex Kellar and Jack Morton. The ap- pointment of Sir William Jenkin as security adviser was intended to coordi- nate CIFE, Special Branch, and the Security Service, but it was the arrival in 1950 of Sir Robert Thomson as director of operations that transformed the response to the challenge posed by the MCP.

In 1952, upon the resignation of Police Commissioner Colonel Nicol Gray, General Sir Gerald Templer took over as high commissioner and began to isolate the MCP by recruiting a large Home Guard and armed police militia. Under Templer, MI5 provided Arthur Martin and Alec MacDonald to run the

Special Branch in Kuala Lumpur, with Keith Wey as SLO and Guy Madoc heading the Security Service. One of their first measures was to introduce a comprehensive identity card system that was intended to identify and isolate the insurgents, who were known as Chinese terrorists or simply “CTs.”

Using informers, the Special Branch developed an accurate order of battle for the CTs and their civilian supporters, the Min Yuen, and was able to help the security forces pinpoint the CTs’ jungle hideouts. In October 1951, under increasing pressure, Lai Tek’s successor, Chin Peng, gathered his Politburo together for a meeting with Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ad- visers to change the MCP’s tactics, which were contained in a document that became known as the October Directive. In effect, the strategy of indiscrimi- nate attacks on villages, post offices, laborers, reservoirs, and electric power stations was deemed to be counterproductive, and instead the MCP would concentrate its effort on British mining and plantation staff and their families so as to avoid alienating the general population.

In April 1952 the defection of a senior Min Yeun leader, Nam Fook, led to a major defeat for the CTs, a setback that was followed in May by the beheading of an MCP Central Committee member, “Shorty” Kuk, by his own bodyguards, who claimed the reward of $200,000. Then in July the notorious “Bearded Terror of Kajanj,” Liew Kon Kim, was trapped in his jungle camp protected by a swamp and shot dead during a sweep of the area by a British patrol acting on Special Branch intelligence. Other defectors included a regional political officer, Moo Tay Mei, and a senior commander, Ming Lee, who simply became disillusioned with the MCP.

It was the defection of another senior MCP official, Hor Lung, who sur- rendered to a lone policeman in April 1958, that proved the campaign’s turning point. Encouraged by the promise of an immense reward, Hor Lung spent four months moving from camp to camp, telling the cadres that the MCP had abandoned military action. Altogether 152 CTs and 28 of their top commanders obeyed his order to surrender, thus incapacitating the MCP permanently. A further roundup in Johore in August 1958, code-named TI- GER, eliminated the remaining CTs, and by the end of the year the Special Branch estimated that there were only 868 CTs at large, of whom 485 had taken refuge in southern Thailand.

The application of orthodox counterintelligence techniques to counter the terrorists resulted in their penetration, and a relationship with the MCP’s charismatic leader Chin Ping, cultivated by his former Force 136 command- er, John Davis, ensured the insurgency’s ultimate defeat. With skillful man- agement, Chin effectively destroyed the threat from the MCP and provided a model for intelligence-led counterinsurgency campaigns. The strategy proved so effective that it was repeated in the Borneo conflict, and Sir Robert Thompson recommended the adoption of similar tactics in Vietnam. In 1957

the jungle fighting came to an end, and the Emergency was terminated in 1960, three years after independence. Chin Peng published his memoirs, My Side of History, in Singapore in 2003.

 

MALAYAN PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA). Upon the

surrender of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942, 165 members of the Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) slipped into the jungle and underwent training by British personnel in guerrilla tactics to harass the enemy. Thus the MCP, with strong intelligence links to the Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP), formed the nucleus of the MPAJA, an or- ganization that would grow to a strength of 10,000 and be trained and armed by Force 136, the regional Special Operations Executive (SOE) organization. Created in 1929 by Chinese veterans of the Comintern’s Far East Bureau in Shanghai, the MCP exercised considerable influence over the local Hai- nanese community in Malaya and by 1937 virtually controlled the labor movement, even after the Party had been outlawed by the British colonial administration. However, following the Japanese occupation, the MCP pro- vided the only disciplined resistance to the enemy, had outmaneuvered the local Kuomintang (KMT), and received support from the British. By Febru- ary 1943 the MPAJA was in direct contact with Force 136 in Ceylon and received liaison personnel who were infiltrated into the country by air and submarine, as well as large quantities of weapons. With this logistical sup- port, the MPAJA eliminated the rival Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Army, sponsored by the KMT, and prepared for a major campaign in 1945 timed to coincide with Operation ZIPPER, the liberation of Malaya by Allied troops

from India.

The unexpected Japanese surrender in August 1945 gave the MPAJA the opportunity to disarm the enemy and seize the country before British and Indian troops could take control. However, divisions within the MCP pre- vented its leader, Lai Tek, from mounting a coup, and by September the British had established a military administration in Kuala Lumpur and re- gained much of the countryside. The MPAJA agreed to be disarmed and surrendered 5,497 small arms, but they omitted to reveal the location of jungle caches containing Japanese weapons that would later be used by a hard core of 4,000 MPAJA veterans who went underground to continue a campaign against the British, masterminded by the MCP and which in June 1948 resulted in the declaration of an emergency. See also GREAT BRIT- AIN; MALAYA EMERGENCY.

 

MALLORY, KEVIN PATRICK. At the Montgomery Chinese Branch of the Mormon Church near Washington, D.C., where songs were sung in Chi- nese, Kevin Mallory, aged 60, was known as “Mao Zhiping,” but on 22 June

2017 he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and charged with passing classified documents to an agent of the People’s Re- public of China (PRC).

Mallory graduated from Brigham Young University with a political sci- ence degree in 1981, initially serving on active duty with the U.S. Army until 1986. While remaining in the reserve, he worked for the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service from 1987 to 1990, and from 1990 to 2013 for various U.S. government agencies, for cleared defense contractors, and on active-duty U.S. Army deployments. Fluent in Mandarin, Mallory lived in Iraq, China, and Taiwan, where he married Mariah Nan-hua in Tai- pai. His work for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the State Depart- ment, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allowed Mallory to retain his security clearances until 2012, when he left government service to work with GlobalEx LLC, a Milwaukee-based firm that provided consultants to small businesses, covering market strategies, government affairs, and rela- tions. Mallory was listed as the single representative in the Washington, D.C., area, using his home in Leesburg, Virginia, as a business address. However, having bought the property in 2006, he experienced financial trou- ble two years later. In early 2017 he was approached on the social media jobs site LinkedIn and asked if he would like to join the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai Shi Shehui Kexueyuan.

Established in 1958, the academy is operated by the municipal government

of Shanghai, and according to the FBI, the Shanghai State Security Bureau, a component of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, has had a close relationship with the academy, uses academy staff as both spotters and assessors, and State Security Bureau intelligence officers use academy affiliation as cover.

In March 2017 Mallory traveled to Shanghai, where he met an individual who represented himself as working for the academy, and he made a second trip on 21 April 2017. Upon his return to the United States, Mallory was searched by U.S. Customs and claimed he had been abroad on business for GlobalEx LLC, a company he had founded in 2010. When questioned, he alleged that he had been employed by a member of his church to give advice about anti-bullying and family safety matters. The search revealed $16,500 in

U.S. currency in his carry-on luggage, and he was allowed to amend his incomplete customs declaration.

On 24 May, Mallory was interviewed by the FBI and described how he had met a Chinese national through the LinkedIn site in February of that year. After several phone conversations, he had traveled to Shanghai in both March and April, where he had met three individuals. He also related how in March he had contacted two former CIA colleagues, one from his church and

the other a contractor, asking if they would put him in touch with someone from the CIA’s East Asia Division. Both men had reported Mallory to the CIA’s Office of Security.

Mallory, in a text to the contractor, noted that the Chinese had asked him “a few questions that could have only come from our side of the house.” The contractor, who later testified at Mallory’s trial from behind a screen using the pseudonym “John Doe,” said he took that to mean that the Chinese had penetrated the CIA. Ralph Stevenson, the other CIA acquaintance, agreed with the contractor’s assessment and recalled how he had rebuked Mallory for his behavior. On 12 May, Mallory attended a videotaped meeting with Michael Dorsey of the security office at the CIA’s Langley headquarters, where Mallory explained how he had met with two Chinese, both named Yang, in a hotel room in Shanghai. Mallory at one point joked, “If I were running an agent, I’d pick a nicer hotel.” He said he was asked about the Trump administration, policy related to currency manipulation, missile de- fense, and the U.S. attitude toward the South China Sea, and “it was . . . obvious . . . they were spies.” When he related to the Chinese that he had applied for government employment, including with the CIA and Homeland Security, they were quite enthusiastic. Mallory mentioned that he had been given a Samsung Galaxy phone with special encryption capabilities as a means of contacting the Chinese during his April 2017 trip to Shanghai, but he had not brought it to the interview, expressing concern that the Chinese might have installed some sort of tracking device. He agreed to take it to a subsequent meeting at a hotel, where the CIA could examine it in a security pouch that blocked cell signals.

On 24 May, Mallory attended a second interview with the CIA but was

met by FBI personnel. He signed a consent form to allow an examination of the phone and stated that he had been given the phone in April and trained on how to use it, explaining that a special application allowed the phone to facilitate steganography (the concealment of information inside an image). In the case of Mallory’s phone, the image, chosen by the Chinese, was of horses grazing in front of a mountain range. Both parties had to be online and to send files through the secure version of the application, which was a custo- mized version of the Chinese messaging service WeChat. Both had to sign in with a password, and Mallory’s password was the English word “password.”

Mallory disclosed that he had written two papers for the Chinese using information from his memory and from open sources, but he denied passing them any other documents. He also admitted that he had received payments of $10,000 and $15,000 for his March and April trips, explaining that this was consistent with daily billable rates plus expenses and that he anticipated traveling again in June.

When Mallory’s cell phone was examined by an FBI technician, James Hamrock, it was noted that the device did not perform as intended and had “crashed” at some point, so instead of concealing communications, it had actually created a log of Mallory’s contacts, which included a reference to the delivery of more documents. The phone also contained information relat- ing to a foreign intelligence service, and one recovered message from Mallo- ry stated, “I can also come in the middle of June. I can bring the remainder of the documents I have at that time.” In explanation, Mallory denied there had been other documents beyond the two innocuous papers and insisted that he had simply been playing the Chinese along. However, a further search con- ducted on 2 June revealed more compromising messages. On 3 May a Chi- nese wrote, “I suggest you send all and retype the handwriting. And NO1 is obvious the first page of a complete article, where the else is and why it is black on top and bottom.   We will try our best to apply for another sum of

amount, as you required. However, I’m not sure it will be the same amount

for now and I will try, and for safety, we cannot send u in one time or in a short period altogether, need to figure out a better way.” To this, Mallory had responded, “The black was to cross out the security classification (top secret/

/orcon).   I had to get it out without chance of discovery. Unless read in

detail, it appeared like a simple note.   I have arranged for a USD account

in another name. You can send the funds broken into 4 equal payments over 4 consecutive days. . . . When you agree I will send you the bank E.g. instructions.”

Later in the same conversation Mallory wrote, “It was dicey (look it up) when they asked for me by name. If they were looking for me in terms of State Secrets, and found the SD card   we would not be talking today. I am

taking the real risk as you, and higher up bosses know.   When you get the

OK to replace the prior payment, then I will send more docs, I will also type my notes. NOTE: In the future, I will destroy all electronic records after you confirm receipt.   I already destroyed the paper records. I cannot keep these

around, too dangerous.”

On 5 May, Mallory had written, “Your object is to gain information, and my object is to be paid for.” The Chinese responded, “My current object is to make sure your security and try to reimburse you.” Mallory also noted, “I can also come in the middle of June. I can bring the remainder of the documents I have at that time.” An examination of the four documents found on the device revealed that three were U.S. government documents, one of which was classified at the Top Secret level and two at the Secret level. At the time of the FBI’s raid on Mallory’s residence and his arrest on 22 June, it was noted that the WeChat device on Mallory’s phone had been deleted.

At the conclusion of his trial on 8 June 2018, Mallory was found guilty of espionage and three related charges after his defense team had failed to persuade the jury that he had actually been acting as a freelance triple agent

in an attempt to entrap the Chinese. The prosecution contended that he had lied about taking money and the classified documents. After the verdict, the assistant attorney general John C. Demers remarked, “Unfortunately, this case is not an isolated incident. The Chinese government is a sophisticated and determined adversary.”

On 17 May 2019, Mallory was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, with the federal judge observing that if he “had concluded that sources had been compromised, I would impose a far more severe sentence.” He also told Mallory, “If you choose to play footsie with another country and give infor- mation to another country, you have made a decision to commit a crime.”

 

MAO ZEDONG. Born in 1893 in Hunan Province, Mao came from a peas- ant background, although his father, a farmer and grain dealer, attained wealth. For the next several years, Mao alternated between study and work on the farm, eventually embracing Marxist theories, and attended the first session of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai in 1921. He developed a unique view of Marxism that became known as Maoism, which was a distinctive, peasant-based revolutionary the- ory, emphasizing guerrilla warfare and “winning hearts and minds” through education. He gained increasing influence within the CCP and in 1934 led his army on a 6,000-mile “Long March,” Changzheng, from Jiangxi to Shaanxi, fleeing the Kuomintang (KMT) army of Chiang Kai-shek. This yearlong epic journey on which he was joined by such luminaries as Zhu De, He Long, Deng Xiaoping, and later Zhou Enlai, served to consolidate Mao’s control over the CCP.

Mao early on embraced the use of torture against those opposed to him and

established a reputation as a ruthless disciplinarian, eliminating all oppo- nents, whether real or imagined. The final withdrawal to Formosa of the KMT in 1949 led to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and years of constant upheaval, with various five-year plans; the Great Leap Forward, Da Yue Jin; the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Bai- hua Qifang; and finally the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchan- jieji Wenhua Dageming, where his fourth wife Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four, Sirenbang, became prominent. Throughout these episodes, Mao was able to survive because of his complete control of the intelligence apparatus.

At Mao’s direction, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, was formed and reflected the sadistic personality of its founder, Kang Sheng. Although its primary mission, based on the Soviet NKVD model, was the protection of the CCP, it also fostered the cult of personality sur- rounding Mao himself. The MPS was largely replaced in 1983 by a rehabili- tated Deng Xiaoping when he formed the Ministry of State Security (MSS),

Guojia Anquanbu, but the MPS remains a powerful and sinister presence in the PRC. Mao died in September 1976, having outlived Kang Sheng, who died in 1975, and Zhou Enlai.

In 1987 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed that one useful source of information about Mao had been Morris Childs, a senior figure in the Communist Party of the United States of America who had been recruited by the FBI as an agent in 1958. The subject of John Barron’s Operation Solo, Childs was personally acquainted with Mao and found Mao loathsome. He once told FBI Agent I. C. Smith that Mao was “smelly,” with “bad breath,” “bad manners,” and, perhaps the most damning, a “peasant!”

 

MASK. Between February 1934 and January 1937, the British Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) intercepted and read clandestine wireless traffic exchanged between the Comintern headquarters in Moscow and vari- ous illicit stations overseas, including one in Shanghai. Analysis of the sig- nals, code-named MASK, revealed the existence of a worldwide Communist organization and provided clues to the true identity of hundreds of Soviet agents in the Far East. Altogether 939 messages from Moscow were read, and 634 from London, making a total of 1,573 decrypts. The length of the individual messages varied from a couple of lines to several paragraphs, but they revealed the scale of the Kremlin’s global espionage network. See also GREAT BRITAIN; SOVIET UNION.

 

MENG HONG. Having worked for DuPont for 11 years researching organic light-emitting diodes, Meng Hong was found guilty in June 2010 of transfer- ring the company’s proprietary information about chemical processes to his email account at Peking University, Beijing Daxue, known colloquially as Beida. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION.

 

MENG HONGWEI. Born in the northern China city of Harbin in 1953, Meng Hongwei joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1975 and gained a law degree from Peking University and a master’s degree from Central South University. He is said to have had 40 years of experience working within China’s criminal justice system and in 2004 was made a vice minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu. In that ca- pacity, he also acted as deputy director of China’s State Oceanic Administra- tion, Guojia Haiyang Ju, and director of the China Maritime Police Bureau, Zhongguo Haijing Ju, all under the MPS umbrella.

In 2004, Meng became head of Interpol’s China branch, and on 10 No- vember 2016 he was elected as Interpol’s first Chinese head, but his tenure became controversial when the Chinese government submitted extensive lists of business leaders and officials supposedly accused of corruption, allega- tions thought to have been politically motivated.

On 25 September 2018 Meng flew to China from Interpol’s headquarters in Lyon, via Stockholm. That same day, Meng sent his wife, Grace Meng, a message, “Wait for my call,” that also included an emoji of a knife, which she took to mean he was in danger. Hong Kong’s South China Post reported that Meng had been detained by “discipline authorities,” prompting Interpol to demand further information on 6 October. The CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, then revealed that the anticorruption National Supervisory Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gonghe- guo Guojia Jiancha Weiyuanhui, was investigating Meng for taking bribes. Interpol then received a letter of resignation, ostensibly from Meng, effective immediately, and on 26 October Meng was removed from the prestigious Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi, China’s foremost political advisory body.

On 27 March 2019, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

announced that Meng had been expelled from the Communist Party, re- moved from all posts, and referred for prosecution. He was accused of taking bribes and of an abuse of power to “willfully squander national assets to give his family a luxurious life.” The MPS head, Zhao Kezhi, commented that authorities would “firmly and thoroughly eradicate pernicious influence from Zhou Yongkang,” a reference to the former head of the MPS who was sen- tenced to life in prison, widely considered to be political retribution by Chi- nese president Xi Jinping. In May 2019 Meng’s wife and seven-year-old twin sons were granted refugee status in France, and the following month Meng pleaded guilty to charges of accepting $1.65 million in bribes. In January 2020, it was announced that Meng was sentenced to 13 years, 6 months, in prison and fined 2 million yuan (about $290,000).

 

MENG JIANGZHU. Born in July 1947 in Jiangsu Province, Meng Jianzhu moved as a teenager to Changxing Island, a 34-square-mile island in the southern channel of the Yangtze River in Shanghai, to work as a tractor driver, and he continued to work on the rural agricultural cooperative for the next 13 years. He attended Shanghai Mechanical College, now part of the University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai Ligong Dax- ue, as a part-time student, eventually receiving a master’s degree in engineer- ing. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1971 and in 1981 became head of the rural cooperative. His early political career was spent in Shanghai, where in 1996 he was promoted to deputy CCP secretary of

Shanghai, one of the more powerful posts in Shanghai’s political hierarchy, and he held this position until 2001 when he was appointed as CCP secretary of Jiangxi Province. He was low-key, shy, and retiring, avoided cameras and the media, but he also practiced a strong adherence to established rules and principles.

On 28 October 2007, Meng was moved to Beijing, where he was ap- pointed the 12th minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gon- ganbu, replacing Zhou Yongkang. The following year, he was named a deputy to Zhou on the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhenfa Weiyuanhui. In November 2012 Meng became a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Zhengzhiyu, and suc- ceeded Zhou as head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In December 2012, Guo Shengkun succeeded Meng as head of the MPS.

While Zhou Yongkang underwent severe criticism and eventually dis- grace, Meng remained untouched by his association with Zhou, despite hav- ing served for five years as Zhou’s deputy on the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission.

In January 2013, Meng announced that China would stop the use of its estimated 350 labor camps, laogai, by the end of the year, where it was conservatively estimated that 160,000 individuals were held under its “reedu- cation through the use of labor.” Also, on 9 January 2013, Meng criticized the practice of interference by local officials in court proceedings, as it was common practice for local members of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission to pass notes to judges while a trial was under way, telling the judge how to rule on the case.

The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission’s power was greatly diminished by CCP secretary-general Xi Jinping during Meng’s time as its head. In November 2016 Meng acted as President Xi Jinping’s special envoy in meetings with Saudi Arabia’s ruler, King Salman bin Abdulaziz. This resulted in the announcement of a five-year plan for Saudi-China cooperation in security matters, including counterterrorism and joint military exercises, despite China’s disdain for the Saudis’ support for Islamic networks and China’s long-standing support of Iran and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syr- ia.

In October 2017 Meng retired from the Central Political and Legal Affairs

Commission.

 

MENG, XIAODONG SHELDON. A 44-year-old Canadian software engi- neer who is a native of China, Meng Xiadong “Sheldon” pleaded guilty in August 2007 at Cupertino, California, to charges of having violated the Eco- nomic Espionage Act and the Arms Export Control Act. On 18 June 2008, Meng was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and fined $10,000 for the

theft from his employer, Quantum3D Inc., of the source code for the Mantis

1.5.5 program, a fighter training system, for the Beijing Lantian Aviation Simulation Technology Company, Beijing Lantian Hangkong Fangzhen Ji- shu Youxian Gongsi, a subsidiary of the state-owned Aviation Industry Cor- poration of China, Zhongguo Hangkong Gongye Jituan Gongsi. Meng had established a competing company in China and had made sales proposals to not only China but also Malaysia and Thailand. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

MI5. The British Security Service branch responsible for monitoring the activities of suspected intelligence officers operating from the People’s Re- public of China (PRC) embassy in Portland Place routinely reported that it was unable to provide adequate coverage of the 500 accredited diplomats in London, by far the largest diplomatic mission in the capital. According to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, defector PLANES- MAN, the embassy was “the most productive in terms of reporting” on science and technology of all the MSS’s overseas stations and had been rated fourth in overall importance.

In 1987 the Cabinet Office established an interdepartmental working group to study the problem and received a report from MI5’s K Branch (counterespionage) stating that, as well as the large group of intelligence personnel based at the embassy, there were some 2,000 students at an esti- mated 300 different colleges in Great Britain and that several thousand delegates of various kinds were granted visas annually. As a result, protective security advisers from C Branch embarked on a program of improving the awareness of “List X” defense contractors engaged in classified work who had developed links with Beijing and had accepted visiting Chinese on work experience schemes.

The Cabinet assessment in 1988 concluded that “the Chinese Government is not hostile to the British Government or NATO in the way the Soviet Government and the Warsaw Pact are. We should recognize the distinction between [Soviet] spying with the hostile intent of gaining an advantage over an enemy, and [Chinese] spying with the purely selfish intent of gaining a national advantage.”

Nevertheless, the official British policy remained committed to improving bilateral relations with Beijing and encouraging the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to send officers to British training courses. Indeed, MI5 re- ported that “the Chinese enjoy an access to the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces that is not afforded to any other Communist country” and noted that the Chinese were “now authorized to receive Confidential infor- mation from the MoD.”

In 2009, MI5 circulated a 14-page document, The Threat from Chinese Espionage, to 300 selected British banks, businesses, and financial institu- tions, which described a widespread Chinese effort to honeytrap vulnerable men, asserting that the Chinese intelligence services try to cultivate “long- term relationships” and have been known to “exploit vulnerabilities such as sexual relationships . . . to pressurize individuals to co-operate with them.”

How the Chinese Intelligence Services Meet Their Intelligence Re- quirements

The Chinese intelligence services acquire political, military, commercial and scientific intelligence by targeting foreigners and foreign organisa- tions that have come to their attention through any number of ways, any- where in the world. For example, presence at trade fairs, exhibitions, conferences, lectures, membership of institutes, research facilities, lan- guage training in China, the diplomatic or social circuit, military duty, media, publicity and websites. It is also possible that they might identify you as being of interest through the information you use to apply for a visa, particularly if you mention you are a government official or the employee of a high-tech company.

It is worth noting that ethnic Chinese, whatever their nationality, are likely to be at greater risk of approach by the Chinese intelligence services because of their perceived shared heritage and potential to help the “moth- er country.”

 

The Human Approach

The Chinese intelligence services generally take a non-confrontational approach when dealing with foreigners. An undercover intelligence officer might be introduced to the person being targeted by a legitimate Chinese contact as a friend or colleague. The undercover intelligence officer will then try to develop a friendship or business relationship with the target in order to elicit sensitive information. This process can last years. If the target is considered to be an expert in their field they might be invited to give lectures to an invited audience and to share ideas on an all expenses trip. The combination of lavish hospitality and flattery can be very effec- tive in encouraging the target to open up more than they had perhaps intended. The target might not be aware that they have been disclosing information of value to the Chinese intelligence services, much less that the Chinese consider them to have been recruited.

While the Chinese intelligence services prefer to use friendship and gentle persuasion to achieve their aims, they will also exploit vulnerabil- ities such as sexual relationships and illegal activities to pressurise indi- viduals to cooperate with them. They may also try to elicit cooperation from people of Chinese descent by threatening family members who still live in China.

 

 

Espionage: China

1.     The threat of espionage did not end with the collapse of Soviet communism in the early 1990s. A number of countries are continu- ing to seek sensitive information from UK sources. Traditionally state-sponsored espionage has been carried out for geo-political reasons—to protect the state from foreign threats or to maintain a state’s political regime. However, commercial espionage is a meth- od for a country to maintain its position in world affairs through the development of a strong economy. Examples of commercial espi- onage include the theft of trade secrets, copyrights or other confi- dential material, such as contractual agreements and details of negotiating positions.

2.     It is estimated that at least 20 foreign intelligence services are cur- rently operating in the UK against UK interests. The Russian and Chinese intelligence services are particularly active, and currently present the greatest concern. For example, the number of Russian intelligence officers in London is at the same level as in Soviet times.

3.     The threat against UK interests is not confined to UK territory. Foreign intelligence services may find it easier to target UK inter- ests in their home countries, where they have much greater freedom of action than they would have in the UK itself. Foreign intelli- gence services are also known to target UK interests in countries where there are far less restrictions and their activities may be tolerated or go undetected by the local authorities. They may also receive support from the host nation.

 

Introduction

The relationship between the UK and China is good and the UK Govern- ment is encouraging the growth in business. The UK is one of the largest investors in China and also receives significant inward investment from China. This bilateral trade is growing rapidly. China has been the UK’s fastest growing export market since 2002 and in December 2007 became the UK’s largest Asian export market. The continuing rapid growth of the Chinese economy is a major driver of world economic growth. This has benefits but also has challenges. For example, it has increased the compe- tition faced by industries and business sectors in the rest of the world and it increases the competition for raw materials, such as hydrocarbons.

 

Why Are the Chinese Involved in Commercial Espionage?

 

1.     With the death of Mao Zedong (first chairman of the Communist Party of China) and the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Com- munist Party of China (CPC) realised that ideology alone was not

sufficient to maintain power. The CPC recognised it would have to deliver a strong economy with material gain for the individual to ensure continued political dominance.

2.     Deng Xiaoping (second chairman of the CPC) began China’s eco- nomic reform, partially opening China to the global market. Chi- na’s economy has since grown rapidly. In its five-year economic plan (2006–2010) the CPC outlined that China must maintain fast and stable economic growth and support the building of a harmoni- ous society. The CPC’s aim is to raise the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) by 7.5% annually for the next five years.

3.     In order to achieve such rapid economic growth Chinese industry must retain a competitive edge. For example, other countries such as India and Vietnam are currently competing with China to offer cheap manufacturing bases for western companies. The increased demand for raw materials, such as oil and iron ore, and new envi- ronmental and labour laws, have led to cost increases, making man- ufacturing in China more expensive. This has caused some factories to close, suggesting that Chinese industry is struggling to compete in an open market. China is also attempting to diversify its econo- my, for example, through the manufacture of better made high end products. This diversification of the economy will require the Chi- nese to increase their knowledge of design and manufacturing pro- cesses.

4.     Espionage offers a relatively cheap, quick and easy method to ob- tain information that can help Chinese companies remain competi- tive. Many of China’s biggest companies are state owned, or have close links to the state. They may receive intelligence collected by the Chinese intelligence services, and are also able to undertake commercial espionage for their own benefit. It is for these reasons that China currently represents one of the most significant threats to the UK.

 

What Are Chinese Espionage Priorities?

 

1.     China’s espionage requirements usually fall into the following cate- gories: political, military or economic. All parts of the UK’s nation- al infrastructure fall into at least one of these categories. In terms of commercial espionage, the Chinese regime currently places a par- ticular emphasis on aerospace, space, scientific research and mili- tary developments but it has also been active in the energy, raw materials, telecommunications and transport sectors.

2.     In terms of UK industry, the Chinese have targeted defence, ener- gy, communications and manufacturing companies. However, any UK company might be at risk if it holds information which could benefit the Chinese. For example, we are aware that other UK industries have been targeted by Chinese electronic espionage ac- tivity. These include public relations, business consultancies and international law firms. Some of these companies have been tar- geted in their own right; others have been “third parties” and used to target companies for which they provide services.

3.     As well as China’s national espionage requirements there are likely to be regional requirements too. China has recently increased the level of autonomy in the provinces. This has meant that in some cases local officials have sufficient powers to request assistance from China’s intelligence services. As some local officials are in control of local companies, they are able to use the intelligence services to their advantage, requesting information to increase the competitiveness of local companies. This is likely to result in Chi- na’s intelligence services taking an interest in a broad range of information from a variety of business sectors.

 

What Types of Information Are the Chinese Interested In?

Any information which could be used to give a competitive advantage is of interest to the Chinese. For example, we are aware that espionage has been used in attempts to gain information on military and defence technol- ogies, details of patents and high-end design technology, commercial contract negotiations and during takeover bids.

 

Who Is Spying for the Chinese?

There are a number of organisations within China that have an intelligence gathering role. These civilian organisations such as the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security, which collect foreign intelli- gence and monitor foreign visitors to China. Military organisations within the People’s Liberation Army are also responsible for collecting military intelligence including information on defence technology. Employees of private companies may also be involved in commercial espionage—being tasked by their parent company to steal information from competitors. How?

 

1.     The Chinese intelligence services have a number of methods for obtaining confidential material. Some use traditional espionage methods, such as cultivating a longer-term friendship with a British employee. Others are directed against electronic equipment such as mobile phones and computer networks. The espionage techniques which the Chinese may employ vary from country to country.

2.     In Europe and North America, the main method of espionage against UK industry is electronic attack. This is due to the difficul- ties of operating human agents in these countries. In China the intelligence services have few resource constraints in terms of both man-power and technology. The close proximity of other countries in the Far East is likely to make operating in these countries easier. Some of these countries may also be allies of China, allowing the Chinese intelligence services to operate with few restrictions. This allows them to use a wide variety of the techniques described be- low. However, Japan has historically been a difficult country for Chinese intelligence services to operate in. In Africa the Chinese authorities are likely to be able to operate with few restrictions.

 

The Human Agent

The Chinese intelligence services can identify foreigners of interest through a number of means such as trade fairs, exhibitions and business visas. Once identified an undercover intelligence officer may try to devel- op a friendship or business relationship, often using lavish hospitality and flattery. The Chinese intelligence services have also been known to exploit vulnerabilities such as sexual relationships and illegal activities to pressur- ise individuals to cooperate with them.

 

Telephones and PDAs

In China and its allied countries, there is a high threat of phones (both mobile and landlines) being intercepted by Chinese intelligence services. It is likely that Chinese network operators will cooperate with Chinese intelligence services, giving them easy access to network information. Mobile phones and PDAs have varying facilities for data storage. They could be stolen, allowing access to this information, or accessed via Blue- tooth, wireless connectivity or infrared links.

 

Laptops

If a laptop is stolen or confiscated it could be accessed or tampered with. A determined individual could steal the standard access control mecha- nism within a laptop. Following unauthorised access, information could be stolen. However, perhaps more damaging could be the installation of hard- ware of software, such as keystroke loggers. These could allow repeated, unauthorised access and modification or copying of data over a period of time.

Other Vulnerabilities

 

1.     Hotel rooms in major Chinese cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, which are frequented by foreigners, are likely to be “bugged” by the Chinese intelligence services. Furthermore, there have been cases in which hotel rooms have been searched whilst occupants are out of the room.

2.     Business cards, which contain email addresses, provide Chinese intelligence services with valuable information which could be used to conduct electronic attacks against an individual’s organisa- tion.

 

During conferences or visits to Chinese companies, you may be given gifts such as USB devices or cameras. There have been cases where these “gifts” have contained Trojan devices and other types of malware.

 

In December 2006, MI5’s director-general, Jonathan Evans, warned that Chi- na routinely conducted state-sponsored espionage against vital parts of Brit- ain’s economy, including the computer systems of big banks and financial services firms. Almost on cue, there was a security incident when, in January 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown visited the PRC accompanied by some 25 senior businessmen, among them Sir Adrian Montague, the chairman of British Energy; Arun Sarin, then chief executive of Vodafone; and Sir Rich- ard Branson, the head of Virgin. On the second day of the tour in Shanghai, one of Brown’s aides was approached by an attractive Chinese woman in the hotel disco, and after a couple of hours of dancing, he invited her back to his room. The next morning, he reported to the prime minister’s protection team that his Downing Street–issued BlackBerry cell phone had been stolen. A classic honeytrap was suspected, but no evidence emerged to indicate that the loss of the unencrypted but codeword-protected equipment had led to a breach of security. A few months later, in May 2008, U.S. commerce secre- tary Carlos Gutierrez had a very similar experience when the contents of a government laptop were copied while he was on an official visit to Beijing. See also BANDA, DR. HASTINGS; HALPERN, ERIC; HONG KONG; KENYA; KUCZYNSKY, URSULA; MALAYA EMERGENCY; NKRU- MAH, KWAME; ROYAL HONG KONG POLICE (RHKP); SECURITY LIAISON OFFICER (SLO); SPECIAL BRANCH; TSANG, JOHN.

 

MIAO CHEN-PAI. In July 1966, a 29-year-old former member of a Chi- nese foreign aid delegation to Damascus applied for, and was granted, politi- cal asylum in New York.

MiG-19. On 25 August 1990, a Chinese MiG-19, designated “Farmer” by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), landed accidentally at the Russian airbase at Knevichi, near Vladivostock. The pilot and plane were released five days later. See also SOVIET UNION.

 

MIL-4. In March 1974 a Soviet Border Guard Mil-4 helicopter accidentally strayed into Chinese airspace and landed south of Belesha in the Altaa Krai. The four aircrew were taken into custody but were released with their aircraft in December 1975. See also SOVIET UNION.

 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (MIB). Taiwan’s Military Intel- ligence Bureau (Chunch’ingchu in the Wade-Giles romanization used by Taiwan, or Junqingju in the Pinyin romanization) was formed from Tai Li’s wartime Investigation and Statistics Bureau, and although placed under the chief of the General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense, it was widely assumed to be under the control of the Kuomintang (KMT).

During the 1980s, when Taiwan began to allow visits to the mainland, the MIB recruited numerous individuals to work as agents, initially businessmen who cultivated high-ranking military and civilian leaders in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and provided reports to the MIB. These agents were paid as much as $1,500 per month, with a bonus to reward especially important information, which was usually military in nature. There were taught very little tradecraft, but occasionally some were taught to decipher encrypted messages and use invisible ink.

These amateur spies were often caught by the PRC’s security apparatus, which suggested that the MIB had been penetrated. Those arrested were sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment, but usually no announcements were made by either side, unless an incident was publicized by the PRC media, as there were no official ties between the two countries. Many MIB agents have died in mainland prisons, and although neither country has ever published any official figures, it is reliably estimated that there are, at any given time, several dozen Taiwanese incarcerated in the PRC.

In 2005 Wo Weihan, a 59-year-old owner of a medical research company in Beijing, was convicted of selling military secrets to Taiwan, having been accused of working on behalf of Taiwan’s Grand Alliance for the Reunifica- tion of China, an organization described as a KMT front. Also arrested, and later executed, was Guo Wanjun, a PRC missile scientist who was alleged to be a member of the spy ring headed by Wo.

The PRC tends to publicize the arrest of Taiwanese spies as a means of influencing elections held in Taiwan, and in 2004 Beijing announced the arrest of 24 spies in the run-up to the election held that year. According to a former Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, officer, the MIB and the National Security Bureau (NSB) are considered “amateurish.”

 

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (MID). The Military In-

telligence Department of the People’s Liberation Army, Qingbao Bu, is also known as the Second Department or 2/PLA. The PLA’s major intelli- gence branch, it runs the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu Suo, in Beijing and a training branch, the Beijing Institute of International Relations (BIIR), Beijing Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan, in Nanjing, The MID collects mainly military intelligence in parallel with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, through regional offices across the country and coordinates some of its activ- ities with the MSS, which does not have military targets as a priority but is generally quite separate. However, when the MSS acquires intelligence of a military nature or significance, it is shared with the MID, and the MSS also conducts military counterespionage operations and has a role in the protec- tion of important military secrets, such as China’s advanced submarine pro- gram. In addition, the MID selects and trains staff to be posted overseas as defense attachés.

The MID’s internal structure reflects the organization’s responsibilities,

with the First Bureau developing human sources, and during the Cold War it ran training schools in Angola, Afghanistan, and Thailand to support local guerrillas; the Third Bureau concentrating on Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao; and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Bureaus covering specific world regions and undertaking analytical work. The Seventh Bureau, focused on science and technology, mirrors the MSS by being closely associated with various research institutes, computer centers, and research establishments.

 

MIN GWO BAO. An aeronautical engineer from Taiwan who had worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory since 1975, Min Gwo Bao was placed under surveillance by Special Agent Bill Cleveland of the Feder- al Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in an operation code-named TIGER TRAP and searched when in 1981 he attempted to catch a flight to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He was found to be carrying an index card bearing answers to five questions, one of which concerned the miniatur- ization of nuclear weapons.

Although Min was not charged, his telephone calls were monitored, and in 1982 he was recorded as he conversed with Wen Ho Lee of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. During that conversation, Lee, who later was the sub-

ject of the FBI’s KINDRED SPIRIT investigation, offered to attempt to determine how the FBI had been tipped off about Min. Later, when con- fronted by Cleveland, Min appeared to be on the verge of making a confes- sion; but he never made any admissions that justified prosecution, so his employment at Lawrence Livermore was terminated. Additionally, a wider FBI investigation, code-named TIGER SPRINGE, was launched to gauge the extent of the PRC’s nuclear espionage.

Min also played some unresolved role in the PARLOR MAID investiga- tion. In December 1990, I. C. Smith, who was then seconded to the Depart- ment of State’s Diplomatic Security as chief of Investigations, Counterintel- ligence Programs, arranged for Cleveland, who was assigned to the FBI’s San Francisco field office, to accompany a counterintelligence survey team to China. Cleveland encountered Min in the lobby of a hotel in Shenyang where Smith had led a team to conduct a survey of the local U.S. consulate. In conversation with Min, Cleveland learned that they were scheduled to be on the same return flight to Beijing, but Min did not catch the flight and was not spotted again. The coincidence, if that was what it was, remains unex- plained, but Cleveland recalled that he had told Katrina Leung of his travel plans. Cleveland later commented to Smith, “They knew we were coming before we even left.” See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

 

MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY (MEI). Originally the

Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, Di Si Jixie Gongye Bu, established in 1963, the Ministry of Electronics Industry, Dianzi Gongye Bu, became part of the Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industries, Jixie Zhizao He Dianzi Gongye Bu. In March, 1998, it became an independent Ministry of Electronics Industry, Dianzi Gongye Bu, which was absorbed by the Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China (MII), Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xinxi Chanye Bu. In 2008, the MII was merged into the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongya He Xinxihuabu. See also MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLO- GY (MIIT).

 

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

(MIIT). The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China, Zhonghua enmin Gongheguo Gongye He Xinxihua- bu, is a state agency that was established in March 2008, superseding the former Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xinxi Xhanye Bu, which had absorbed the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), Dianzi Gongye Bu. Agencies subor- dinate to the MIIT include the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration,

Guojia Yancao Zhuanmai Ju; the State Administration for Science, Technol- ogy, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), Guojia Guofang Keji Gongye Ju; the China National Space Administration (CNSA), Guojia Hang- tian Zong Gongsi; the China Atomic Energy Authority, Guojia Yuanzineng Guanli Ju; and at least seven universities. In 2013, MIIT’s Made in China 2025, Zhongguo Zhizao Erling Erwu, plan was approved by the State Coun- cil with the goal of improving the efficiency and quality of industrial facil- ities.

Regardless of the name and parent organizational changes, beginning with the MEI’s establishment in 1963 as the Fourth Ministry of Machine Building, Di Si Jixie Gongye Bu, the organization has worked in close parallel with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including the PLA’s Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Jie- fangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui. It has sponsored the Chi- na Academy of Electronics and Information Technology (CAEIT), Zhong- guo Dianzi Xinxi Jishu Yan Hiu Yuan, and works closely with COSTIND’s Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE), Beijing Xitong Gongcheng Yanjiu Suo, to build the electronic industry’s research infrastructure, and it is fully integrated into the country’s intelligence architecture.

The MIIT has a large network of research facilities, including such insti- tutes as the Southwest Institute of Electronics Technology (SWIET), Xinan Dianzi Jishu Xueyuan; the Tianjin Institute of Power Sources, Tianjin Di- anyuan Yanjiu Suo; the China Research Institute of Radiowave Propagation, Zhongguo Wuxiandian Bo Chuanbo Yanjiu Suo; the Southwest Institute of Electronic Engineering (SWIEE), Xinan Dianzi Gongcheng Xueyuan; and the East China Institute of Electronic Engineering, Huadong Dianzi Gong- cheng Xueyuan.

As an important conduit for technical intelligence, the MEI maintains a network of an estimated 40 research facilities, including the 2nd Research Institute at Taiyuan; the 5th Research Institute; the 6th Research Institute, which concentrates on computer systems engineering and is also known as the Huasun Computer Company; the 7th Research Institute, or Guangzhou Communications Research Institute, which works on mobile digital commu- nications systems; the 8th Research Institute, or Anhui Fiber Optical Re- search Institute; the 10th Research Institute, or Southwest Institute of Elec- tronics Technology at Chengdu, focused on UHF, microwave, and millimeter communications and radar equipment; the 11th Research Institute, which conducts research into solid-state laser systems; the 12th Research Institute, working on TACAN systems; the 13th Research Institute in Shijiazhuang, pursuing integrated circuits and solid-state lasers, using imported French technology; the 14th Research Institute in Nanjing, developing early-warn- ing, phased array, and space-tracking radars; the 15th Research Institute, or North China Computer Institute, in Beijing, also known as Taiji; the 18th

Research Institute, or Tianjin Institute of Power Sources; the 20th Research Institute in Xi’an, researching navigation systems; the 21st Research Institu- tion Shanghai; the 22nd Research Institute, also known as the China Institute of Radiowave Propagation and associated with the Shaanxi Astronautical Observatory Timing Station; the 25th Research Institute, researching long- wave infrared imaging seeking; the 26th Research Institute in Chongqing, working on surface acoustic wave devices, piezoelectronics, acousto-optics, electronic ceramics, and crystals; the 28th Research Institute, or Nanjing Research Institute of Electrical Engineering, producing air defense and air traffic control systems; the 29th Research Institute, or Southwest Institute of Electronic Engineering, in Chengdu, working on radar reconnaissance and electronic countermeasures; the 30th Research Institute focused on R&D on advanced common channel signaling software; the 33rd Research Institute Located in Taiyuan; the 34th Research Institute, or Guilin Institute of Optical Communications, which cooperates with Nokia on fiber optics; the 36th Research Institute, producing electronic countermeasures; the 38th Research Institute, or East China Institute of Electronic Engineering (ECRIEE), at Hefei, specializing in early-warning and artillery radar; the 39th Research Institute, or Northwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (NWIEE), develop- ing satellite ground stations and microwave relays; the 40th Research Insti- tute in Bengbu, producing connectors and relays; the 41st Research Institute, developing signal generators and test equipment for infrared focal plane arrays; the 43rd Research Institute, or Hengli Electronics Development Cor- poration, in Hefei; the 44th Research Institute, or Chongqing Institute of Optoelectronics, researching charged couple devices, infrared focal plane arrays, and fiber optics; the 45th Research Institute in Pinhang, Gansu Prov- ince, working on integrated circuit production technology; the 46th Research Institute located in Tianjin, researching the testing of silicon and gallium arsenide materials; the 47th Research Institute, researching advanced inte- grated circuits; the 49th Research Institute, or Northeast Institute of Sensor Technology, in Harbin, developing vibration and other sensors; the 50th Research Institute, or Shanghai Institute of Microwave Technology, working on automated surface-to-air (SAM) command systems; the 51st Research Institute, developing radar reconnaissance and jamming equipment; the 53rd Research Institute, or Institute of Applied Infrared Technology, in Liaoning, researching passive jamming and optoelectronic techniques; the 54th Re- search Institute, or Communications Technology Institute, in Shijiazhuang, working on military systems; and the 55th Research Institute, researching semiconductors.

The MIIT also controls in excess of 40 manufacturing plants that are

involved in a wide range of products, including radios, airborne UHF sys- tems, radar, optic cables, computers, electronic countermeasures, navigation equipment, and infrared systems.

The MEI runs a large network of more than 40 manufacturing plants, including the 605th Factory, producing fiber-optic cable; the 701 Factory, producing radios; the 707 Factory, or Chenxing Radio Factory; the 710 Fac- tory, or Zhongyuan Radio Factory, in Wuhan; the 711 Factory, producing maritime UHF systems; the 712 Factory, making airborne UHF systems in Tianjin; the 713 Factory; the 714 Factory, or Panda Electronics Factory, making HF and airborne UHF systems; the 716 Factory Digital, producing communications equipment; the 719 Factory, assembling airborne navigation equipment; the 720 Factory, China’s principal radar manufacturer, which is closely associated with the 14th Research Institute in Nanjing; the 722 Facto- ry, producing electronic countermeasures and associated with the 29th Re- search Institute; the 730 Factory, producing submarine cable; the 734 Facto- ry, making fiber-optic cable and wireless equipment; the 738 Factory, assem- bling computers and closely associated with the 15th Research Institute; the 741 Factory, producing optoelectronics and infrared systems; the 750 Facto- ry, or Guangdong Radio Group Telecommunications Company; the 754 Fac- tory in Tianjin; the 756 Factory, making navigation equipment; the 760 Fac- tory, making troposcatter systems; the 761 Factory, or Beijing Broadcast Factory, producing VLF systems; the 764 Factory, or Tianjin Broadcasting Equipment Company, making aviation navigation equipment; the 765 Facto- ry in Baoji, making aviation navigation equipment; the 769 Factory, produc- ing airborne UHF systems; the 780 Factory, making airborne radar counter- measures; the 781 Factory, making electronic countermeasures equipment; the 782 Factory in Baoji, making airborne radars and transponders; the 783 Factory, or Fujian Machinery Factory, also known as the Sichuan Jinzhou Electronic Factory, in Mianyang, which produces radars and identification friend or foe equipment; the 784 Factory, or Jinjiang Electronic Machinery Factory, in Chengdu, which produces surveillance radars; the 785 Factory, making optoelectronics equipment, SAM guidance radars, and anti-aircraft artillery computers; the 786 Factory, making SAM guidance radars in Xi’an; the 789 Factory, making anti-aircraft artillery computers; the 834 Factory, making tactical communications equipment; the 913 Factory, producing electronic countermeasures equipment and closely associated with the 36th Research Institute; the 914 Factory, or Lanxin Radio Factory, in Lanzhou; the 924 Factory, making radar reconnaissance and jamming equipment, closely associated with the 29th Research Institute; the 4500 Factory, assem- bling computers; the 4508 Factory in Tianjin; and the 6909 Factory, making electronic countermeasures equipment. See also MINISTRY OF ELEC- TRONICS INDUSTRY (MEI).

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY (MPS). Known in Chinese as the Gonganbu, the MPS was established upon the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and served as the country’s principal

intelligence and security service until the creation in 1983 of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, but the MPS remains the PRC’s primary internal security service. Rather more than half of the MSS’s staff was drawn from the MPS and related organizations, such as research insti- tutes.

The MPS’s sole role was, and remains, to serve the interests of the Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP), and it became notorious for having adopted the brutality of its founder, Kang Sheng, as well as that of Mao Zedong himself. Its headquarters in Beijing are located at 14 Dong Chang An Street in a compound that includes a branch of the MSS.

While the MSS is dominant in the field of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, the MPS is virtually ubiquitous and thus has much more influence over the lives of ordinary Chinese. The MPS has a much wider presence than the MSS, and its activities are almost entirely domestic, preoc- cupied with social stability. While the MSS will share information about criminal cases and other matters involving foreigners or technical surveil- lance, the MPS’s contribution is largely in support of MSS operations, pro- viding facilities, documents, and cover upon request. Both organizations reg- ularly exchange personnel at all levels, and although the MPS is an intrinsic part of the Communist Party and exercises considerable influence, it is com- plemented by the MSS’s more sophisticated analytical resources. See also ALBANIA; CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION (CCDI); CULTURAL REVOLUTION; DENG XIAOPING; HAN GUANG- SHENG; HAO FENGUNG; HONEYTRAP; INDIA; INFORMATION WARFARE MILITIA; OU QIMING; OVERSEAS CHINESE; PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA); SHANGHAI; TECHNOLOGY COUNTER- FEITING; WAISHIJU; XIONG XIANGHUI; XUE FENG; YU QIANG- SHENG.

 

MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS). The Ministry of State Secur- ity, Guojia Anquanbu, is the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) govern- ment’s intelligence arm, headed since 2016 by Chen Wenqing and respon- sible for foreign intelligence collection and counterintelligence. It is located in Beijing in a large compound in Xiyuan on Eastern Chang’an Avenue, close to Tiananmen Square. Within the security perimeter is an apartment block, Qian Men, where many of the MSS staff and their families live. The MSS operates independently from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), General Staff Department (GSD), Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu, Second, Di Er Ju, and Third, Di San Ju, Bureaus, which also conduct military intelli- gence and counterintelligence operations. There have been documented in- stances of cooperation between the disparate agencies.

The MSS was created in 1983 and staffed with personnel drawn largely from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, which hitherto had fulfilled a counterespionage role, and with intelligence cadres from the Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP). The new MSS was also funded in part by the MPS and established provincial offices that operated under cover names, such as Unit 8475, Danwei 8475. At the time of the transfer, which was considered controversial because of the political nature of the new organiza- tion, there was some reluctance on the MPS’s part to hand over some net- works to the MSS. In later years some of the old MPS professionals came to regret having opted to move to the MSS because, although there were greater opportunities for foreign travel, the financial side benefits of working closely with industry were no longer available to them. The MSS’s policy of expan- sion with representative offices in most major towns and cities was reversed in 1997.

The PRC’s intelligence establishment is the third largest after the United

States and Russia and originally reflected the structure of the old Soviet KGB. The MSS is responsible to the premier; the State Council of the PRC, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan; and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CCP, Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengfa Weiyuanhui, referred to as the Central Poli-Legal Commission, Zhongyang Zhengfewi, that oversees ministry activities. In personnel, the MSS prefers nonprofessional intelligence agents such as travelers, businessmen, and aca- demics, with a special emphasis on overseas Chinese, Huaqiao, students and Chinese professionals working abroad with access to sensitive technological material. Like conventional intelligence agencies, MSS case officers han- dling sources assign code names to their sources, although their system in- volves a combination of English letters and numbers, such as “LRAX100189” and “NetworkSYproject2.”

MSS intelligence officers are usually recruited before or during their uni-

versity education, and a large proportion are graduates of the China Insti- tutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Zhongguo Dang- dai Quanxi Yanjiu Suo; the Beijing Institute of International Relations (BIIR), Beijing Guoji Quanxi Xueyuan; the Jiangnan Social University, Ji- angnan Shehui Daxue; or the Zhejiang Police College, Zhejiang Jingcha Xueyuan. Those requiring technical skills usually attend the Beijing Elec- tronic Specialist School, Beijing Dianzi Zhuanye Xuexiao. These establish- ments provide training for MSS recruits, who usually come from families with MSS links or are otherwise influential and beneficiaries of guanxi. Nevertheless, however well connected the candidates are, they have to be dedicated and disciplined, although not yet necessarily Party members. Guanxi is often exercised to facilitate entry into the MSS, and it also plays an unspoken part in future promotion. The MSS’s provincial branches are often staffed with PLA and government retirees.

Unlike the KGB, the MSS is not highly centralized and has a regional and provincial presence, recruiting its personnel from local communities. While branch offices receive directives from headquarters in Beijing and are fi- nanced by National Security Special Funds, they are largely autonomous, acting as essential adjuncts to the local administration, although only theoret- ically accountable to it despite receiving what are termed administrative expenses. In reality, the annual MSS reports submitted to the local govern- ment are generally vague, do not contain sensitive material, and are uncon- troversial. In contrast, annual branch reports to headquarters contain consid- erable detail.

Employment on the MSS staff holds considerable social status and is considered a desirable career, with promotions endorsed at both branch and headquarters levels. Senior branch positions require the approval of the local administration, although in practice the will of headquarters usually goes unchallenged, and branch personnel are regarded as employees of the local government. Indeed, more than half of the MSS’s staff recruitment takes place in the regions where they will remain for the rest of their careers and where they have local and family links, which are considered important. This structure has no equivalent in the West but enables the MSS to fulfill the increasingly large responsibility of ensuring social stability, considered a significant operational priority. Furthermore, internal transfers and second- ments, mainly from the law and political departments of local government, are routine, and training takes place in the branches. There are no centralized formal training academies, and new personnel are expected to learn their profession by reading old and current operational files, working with men- tors, and attending occasional lectures and conferences. A heavy emphasis is placed on political indoctrination, and although probably less than 15 percent of MSS staff are women, they tend to be almost entirely Party members.

MSS personnel are posted overseas under diplomatic cover, from both

headquarters and provincial branches, but they do not form separate units based on Russian rezidenturas or stations on the British and American mod- els. However, they are instantly recognizable to regular diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wai- jiaobu, who keep their distance. MSS officers attached to diplomatic and consular premises use their own communications channels, and their mes- sages to headquarters are not read by the ambassador. They also have consid- erable latitude in conducting collection operations and tend not to discrimi- nate in favor of particular targets. Often they are posted overseas to gain experience rather than to run specific operations or collect intelligence, al- though they are expected to report anything of potential value relating to the MSS’s priority targets of dissidents, separatists, religious activists, and Tai-

wan. In particular, all MSS personnel are acutely aware that anyone from Taiwan could have hostile intelligence connections and might be of value to headquarters.

Domestically, the MSS exercises responsibility for the surveillance and recruitment of foreign businessmen, researchers, and officials visiting from abroad. The MSS’s surveillance on dissidents and foreign journalists is often quite obvious, but it is supported by more clandestine measures taken by state ministries, academic institutions, and the military-industrial complex. Covert audio and video monitoring is often employed in hotels frequented by foreigners, and such operations may be used to eavesdrop on conversations with visiting scholars or to obtain information to assist in the recruitment of agents. The MSS is also responsible for running a program called “Educa- tion” for briefing Chinese traveling abroad and warning them of the likeli- hood of being approached by hostile Western intelligence agencies.

During the civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang prior to 1949, the CCP’s principal intelligence institution was the Central Depart- ment of Social Affairs (CDSA), Zhongyang Shehui Shiwu Bu, which subse- quently became the Central Investigation Department (CID), Zhongyag Di- aocha Bu, and was later replaced by the Ministry of State Security in 1983.

During the 1950s, most PRC diplomatic missions abroad accommodated an Investigation and Research Office for intelligence collection staffed by CID personnel, with analysis undertaken by the CID’s Eighth Bureau, Di Ba Ju, publicly known since 1978 as the China Institute of Contemporary Inter- national Relations (CICIR), Zhongguo Xiandai Guijia Guanxi Yanjiuyuan.

Li Kenong, the first director of the CID, died in 1962 and was succeeded by Luo Qingchang, while Kang Sheng, who had once headed the CDSA and was by that time a member of the CCP’s Political Bureau, assumed respon- sibility for the CID. During the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, the CID was abolished, and most of its senior leadership was sent to the countryside for reeducation. Its activities and assets were absorbed by the Second Department, while a new organization, the Central Case Exam- ination Group, Zhongayang Anjian Shencha Zu, composed of CID cadres under Kang Sheng, was instrumental in the removal from power of Deng Xiaoping and others.

Following the death of Lin Biao in 1971, the CID was reestablished, and when Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing assumed power in 1977, they sought to enlarge the CID and expand the CCP’s intelligence work as part of their more general effort to consolidate their leadership positions. However, they were resisted by Deng Xiaoping upon his restoration, his argument being that the intelligence system should not use PRC embassies to provide cover and that intelligence personnel should be sent abroad under business

and journalistic cover. His view prevailed, and consequently the CID with- drew from Chinese embassies abroad, leaving only a small number of secret intelligence agents.

A CID veteran, Zhou Shaozheng, became head of the CID’s General Of- fice in 1976, but during the CCP’s 12th National Congress in 1982, a bureau chief in the Central Taiwan Affairs Office denounced him and alleged that during the mourning period following Premier Zhou Enlai’s death, Zhou Shouzheng had plotted against the premier. An investigation proved Zhou to be innocent, but this incident cost him the chance to be considered for the post of minister of state security.

Early in 1983, Liu Fuzhi, secretary-general of the CCP Central Commit- tee’s Politburo and minister of public security, proposed the establishment of a Ministry of State Security that would merge the CID with the Ministry of Public Security’s counterintelligence branch, and this was approved in June 1983 by the National People’s Congress, which had perceived a growing threat of subversion and sabotage. Thus, the Ministry of State Security was established under the State Council and charged with ensuring “the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China’s socialist system.” At its inception, the ministry pledged to abide by the state constitution and law and called upon the citizenry for cooperation, reminding them of their constitutional obligations to “keep state secrets” and “safeguard the security” of the country.

Lin Yun, deputy minister of public security, was appointed the MSS’s first

minister, but in 1985 Yu Qiangsheng, a department head of the Anti-Espion- age Bureau code-named PLANESMAN, defected to the United States, caus- ing Lin and the Anti-Espionage Bureau chief to be removed from their posts. Lin was to be replaced by a well-connected English-speaking physicist, Jia Chunwang, but both the ministry’s public security and central investigation elements insisted that Lin should be succeeded by one of their own cadres. To settle the conflict, the CCP leadership appointed Jia Chunwang, an out- sider with ties to neither side, and under him the MSS achieved measurable success in gathering nuclear and other sensitive technological information from the United States.

In 1998 Jia was appointed to head the MPS to replace Tao Siju, while also serving as the first political commissar and first secretary of the Chinese People’s Armed Police, Zhongguo Renmin Wuzhuang Jingcha Budui. In De- cember 2002, he was named deputy procurator-general, and in March 2003 he was elected China’s supreme people’s procurator, Zhongguo Zuigao Ren- min Jiachayuan, by the 10th National People’s Congress, Di Shi Jie Quan- guo Renmin Diabiao Dahui.

In 1998, Xu Yongyue, originally from Zhenping in Henan Province, was appointed minister of the MSS in succession to Jia, and under his leadership the MSS concentrated on the illicit transfer of sensitive technology. In evi- dence given to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, it was reported that half of the 900 investigations conducted on the West Coast into such crimes involved China, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated that Chinese espionage in Silicon Valley had risen by 20 to 30 percent each year. In addition, Chinese agents had been detected undertaking similar activities in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In August 2007, Xu was succeeded by his 56-year-old deputy, Geng Huich- ang.

According to information gleaned from defectors, MSS personnel are usu- ally assigned overseas for up to six years, with a few remaining in post for 10 years if required. In most countries, the local MSS office is accommodated by the embassy, but in the United States, there are seven permanent PRC diplomatic missions staffed with intelligence personnel.

In mid-September 1996, in anticipation of the British withdrawal from Hong Kong, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Junshi Wieiyuanhui, and the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gonghe- guo Guowuyuan, approved the report of the plan drawn up by the MSS and the GSD to reorganize operations. In consequence, an estimated 120 intelli- gence agents operating in the United States, Canada, Europe, and Japan under industrial, business, bank, academic, and journalistic cover were re- called.

The MSS routinely co-opts low-profile Chinese nationals or Chinese American civilians, especially first-generation immigrants to the United States, to engage in the acquisition of mid-level technology and data. Travel- ers, businessmen, students, and researchers are often approached to under- take intelligence tasks, and the MSS maintained control of them through inducements and personal connections (guanxi) and by the potential threat of alienation from the homeland. Sometimes referred to as the “mosaic meth- od,” these sources gather random information in a disorganized manner that, when assembled later, can be of high value, such as the acquisition of the W- 88 nuclear warhead, which, according to evidence given in 1999 to the U.S. Congress, took two decades to gather. The fact that the W-88’s design had been compromised led the FBI to initiate a lengthy investigation, code- named SEGO PALM, and narrow its focus to several scientists based at Los Alamos.

Economic espionage conducted by the MSS tends to conform to three

patterns. The first is the recruitment of agents, often scholars and scientists, before they depart overseas, who are tasked to purchase information. The second uses Chinese firms to buy up entire companies that already possess

the desired technology. And the third, most common method is the illicit procurement of specific technology through Chinese front companies, often through Chinese companies established by naturalized Chinese-Americans with the approval of the PRC. See also HONEYTRAP; MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS); NINTH BUREAU.

 

MO HAILUNG. On 3 May 2011 a field manager for the Pioneer Hi-Bred Corporation was driving near Tama, Iowa, when he observed someone kneel- ing amid the crops in a field. He stopped to investigate, noticing a second man sitting in a car nearby. The field manager confronted the person in the field, later identified as Mo Hailong, alias Robert Mo, who said he was attending a nearby conference and that he worked for the University of Iowa. Mo and his companion, later identified as Wang Lei, then fled the scene, driving erratically. Sometime later the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) heard of the incident, and the local sheriff was alerted to reports of “Asian men” acting suspiciously near a farm close to Bondurant, Iowa. Fur- ther inquiries revealed that the crop grown locally was genetically modified corn developed by Monsanto for cultivation by Hi-Bred. FBI inquiries showed that in September 2011, Mo had shipped 15 packages, weighing almost 350 pounds, to his home in Boca Raton, Florida, and it was suspected that the material involved was probably stolen crop samples. Accordingly, in early 2012, Mo and his accomplices were placed under surveillance, and on 15 February 2012, using the alias “Hougang Wu,” he toured a Pioneer’s Carver Campus facility in Johnston, Iowa, and later was observed touring a Monsanto research facility in Ankeny, Iowa. That evening, Mo attended a state dinner, hosted by Iowa’s governor, for a visitor from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In April 2012 Mo was seen at a farm at Monee, Illinois, owned by a Chinese firm, Kings Nower Seed, Guowang Nuo’er Zhongzi, which had been purchased the previous month for $600,000. Mo had been employed by Kings Nower Seed’s parent company, Beijing Dabei- nong Technology Group (DBN), Beijing Du Bei Nong Keji Jituan Gongsi. Over a period of months, Mo and his accomplices were watched as they made large cash purchases of seed corn containing small amounts of the valuable inbred corn mixed in among the hybrid seeds and then kept the bags of corn seed and corn stalks in storage lockers. In September 2012 the FBI fitted an electronic surveillance device to a car rented by Mo accomplices Ye Jian and Lin Yong, and they were heard to comment that their actions, if detected, could have serious consequences for them. “They would treat us like spies.” Ye noted that, if caught, “you can forget about ever coming to the

U.S. again, assuming things go wrong.” Lin stated at one point, “These are

actually very serious offenses.”

Later that same month, when Ye Jian and Li Shaoming were flying back to China from Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, they were found to be carrying two “bulk sized microwave popcorn boxes, each appearing to be factory sealed.” When opened, the boxes were found to contain popcorn on top, but underneath were 100 small envelopes with seeds inside. Other seeds were wrapped in Subway sandwich napkins, hidden among packed clothing.

On 17 December 2013, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Iowa announced the indictment of Hailong, described as the director of interna- tional business for DBN. He was married with two children, both of whom are U.S. citizens; Li Shaoming was the chief operating officer of Beijing Kings Nower Seeds S & T. Ltd., a subsidiary of DBN, headquartered in Beijing; Wang Lei was the vice chairman of Kings Nower Seed; Wang Hongwei, a resident of Quebec, Canada, was a dual national who had been seen moving boxes from the farm purchased by the Kings Nower Seed Com- pany and was caught at the U.S.-Canada border with 44 bags containing corn kernels hidden in a vehicle, as well as a digital camera with photographs of Monsanto and Pioneer production facilities; Ye Jian, a research manager for Kings Nower Seed; and Lin Yong, a Kings Nower Seed employee.

The indictment described how the defendants conspired to steal genetical-

ly modified corn seed from DuPont Pioneer, Monsanto, and LG Seeds, said to constitute valuable intellectual property. After stealing the corn seed, the conspirators had attempted to covertly transfer the seed to China, and Mo had shipped more than 1,000 pounds of U.S. corn seed to China, where it had been counterfeited by DBN scientists. The indictment included an estimated loss of between five and eight years of research and development, with an estimated loss of $30 to $40 million sustained by U.S. companies.

Mo was a Chinese national who had become a permanent resident, having arrived in the United States in 1998. He was arrested on 12 December 2012, but his associates escaped to China, where there is no extradition treaty. On 2 July 2014, Mo’s sister Mo Yun was arrested when she visited the United States with her two children, after she had been indicted for conspiracy to steal trade secrets. She had been employed by DBN from August 2001 to March 2009 and had been in charge of the company’s research project man- agement, and her husband was the founder and chairman of DBN, Dr. Shao Genhuo. Her charges were later dropped after a federal judge disallowed evidence from electronic surveillance.

Mo Yun’s husband, Shao Genhuo, had been born in 1965 in Zhejiang Province and had received his doctorate in agriculture from China Agricultu- ral University, Zhongguo Nongue Daxue, and after working as an educator for a couple of years, he started DBN in 1994. His net worth is estimated to be $1 billion.

On 27 January 2016, Mo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to steal trade secrets from DuPont Pioneer and Monsanto and on 5 October was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with an additional three years of supervised release. In addition, two farms located in Iowa and Illinois that were purchased and used by Mo and others in their conspiracy were forfeited. Mo, who had been experiencing medical problems, tearfully told the judge that it had been his dream to spend the rest of his life in the United States and declared, “I have destroyed everything that I worked for.”

 

MONTAPERTO, RONALD N. A 68-year-old former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst, Ronald Montaperto pleaded guilty in September 2006 to retaining classified documents and passing secrets to his People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC) intelligence contacts, and he was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment.

Montaperto, who had held a security clearance as a China specialist at a

U.S. Pacific Command research center until 2004, admitted having orally briefed two PRC military attachés, Colonel Yang Qiming and Colonel Yu Zhenghe, among others, during his career, which spanned 22 years. He had originally come under suspicion in 1991 when, after eight years in the DIA, he made an unsuccessful application to join the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). An inconclusive investigation was conducted, but it was reopened in July 2003 following information from a defector when he was dean of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii. Although Montaperto had been authorized to have contact with Chinese diplomats, he failed to report all his meetings, and while undergoing a polygraph examination con- ducted on the pretext of a consultancy post in the intelligence community by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation (FBI), he made several incriminating admissions. After leaving the DIA, he worked at the National Defense University, but he was in Hawaii at the time of his arrest. According to his plea bargain, which required his full cooperation, Montaperto acknowledged having revealed details of American knowledge of clandestine Chinese weapons deliveries to Iran, Syria, and Pakistan.

Montaperto never attempted to conceal his pro-Beijing views and was

regarded as a member of an influential pro-China lobby group in Washing- ton, D.C., active in influencing U.S. foreign policy, sometimes referred to disparagingly as the “Red Team.” See also MINISTRY OF STATE SECUR- ITY (MSS); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

MOO, KO-SUEN. In November 2005 a Korean, Ko-suen “Bill” Moo, who was employed as an international sales consultant for Lockheed Martin in Taiwan, traveled to Florida to meet undercover U.S. Immigration and Cus- toms Enforcement (ICE) agents who for the past two years had posed as arms dealers.

The ICE investigation had been initiated when two arms dealers, both paid informants, introduced agents to a French intermediary, Maurice Serge Vo- ros, who in early 2004 had asked for help in obtaining engines for the Black Hawk combat helicopter. The General Electric engines were on the muni- tions list of restricted technology, and over the following year ICE learned that Voros was representing Moo and that Moo was retained by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In an email dated December 2004, Moo acknowl- edged that China did not want its name on any of the contracts, and in March 2005 he extended his requirements to an engine for the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Other items included nuclear missiles, jet engines, nuclear submarine tech- nology, and a complete nuclear submarine equipped with its nuclear weapons systems.

After a series of meetings in London and Orlando, Florida, Moo, Voros,

and the undercover agents agreed to a price of $3.9 million for one F-16 engine, and in October 2005 Moo transferred the money into a Swiss bank account he controlled. A month later, having chartered a plane for $140,000 to carry the engine, an F110-GE-129 afterburning turbofan jet capable of giving the F-16 speeds in excess of Mach 2, Moo flew from Taipei to Miami via San Francisco, with his flight’s declared destination as the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation in Shenyang, China.

On 8 November Moo, having been driven to a hangar in Homestead, Florida, to view the engine, told undercover agents that after he had delivered it to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), he would like to purchase a complete F-16 and an AGM-129 cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 2,300 miles. However, Moo was arrested the next day, and after six months in jail, where he attempted to bribe a judge and an assistant U.S. attorney, he pleaded guilty to multiple offenses and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment with three years’ supervised released, was fined $1 million, and forfeited his share of the $350,000 seized in the investigation.

Although Lockheed Martin later insisted that Moo had passed a “rigorous” vetting process, the prosecution asserted that he may have transferred tech- nology well before the investigation had begun and that he had acted as an agent for the PLA for 20 years. After Moo was detained, an international arrest warrant was issued for Maurice Serge Voros, but he was never caught. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

N

NAHARDANI, AHMAD. In February 2003 the owners of Mexpar Interna- tional Inc. and Pasadena Aerospace, Ahmad Nahardani, aged 55, and Gabrie- la De Brea, aged 62, were indicted on charges relating to their attempts to export parts of an F-4 Phantom valued at $128,000, the Hawk and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, to China. Also arrested in the undercover operation was David Menashe of Tel Aviv, who was charged with making false statements to U.S. Customs agents concerning an attempt to smuggle Hawk and Side- winder parts into the United States, an investigation that implicated Liang Xiuwen and her husband, Zhuang Jinghua.

In September 2003, Nahardani and De Brea pleaded guilty, and later Mex- par International was placed on three years’ probation and fined $75,000. A year later De Brea was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, and Nahardani received 21 months. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

NANDA DEVI. Following the detonation of the first atomic weapon at Lop Nor in October 1964, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored a mountaineering expedition to Nanda Devi in the Himalayas to place a pluto- nium-powered remote sensor near the summit of India’s second-highest mountain. The climbers, led by M. H. Kohli, Tom Frost, and Dr. Robert Schaller, made their first attempt in October 1965 but were forced by poor weather conditions to abandon the device and return the following spring. Another CIA sensor, weighing an estimated 40 pounds and dependent on a generator with six plutonium cells, was installed on a neighboring peak, Nanda Kot.

In 1978 the discovery of the two atomic-powered remote sensors provoked a brief diplomatic row between New Delhi and Washington over allegations of plutonium contamination. See also TOPPER; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. Just as the Japanese occupation forces during World War II encouraged drug use by the local population under their control, intelligence analysts have concluded that during much of the Cold

 

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War, Beijing regarded the cultivation and export of narcotics as a useful source of foreign currency and a means of undermining the reliability of American troops deployed in Southeast Asia. According to President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, boasted to him during a visit to Cairo in June 1965, “We are planting the best kind of opium especially for American soldiers in Vietnam.” Evidence accumulated by the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and its successor organization, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), indicated that Hong Kong and Burma provided a large proportion of the world’s heroin and that during the Cold War the trade was sponsored by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities.

 

NATIONAL MINORITIES. Within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), several distinctive ethnic minorities are regarded by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, as potential threats to internal stability, and the organization categorizes all separatists, religious groups, and anti- Communist political activists as counterrevolutionaries, foreign spies, and terrorists. While the overwhelming majority of the PRC is Han at over 90 percent, there are sizeable Muslim Hui and Uighur populations, and the Khampa tribe in Tibet and the Mongols have a long history of hostility to Beijing’s policies of transplanting and integrating Han Chinese into target territories to dilute local majorities and establish Mandarin as the PRC’s national language. The Chinese government has identified five such groups as threats to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its rule. Those groups, termed the “Five Poisons,” Wu Du, include the Uighurs, especially supporters of the East Turkestan independence movement; Tibetans, espe- cially supporters of the Tibetan independence movement; the Falun Gong; members of the Chinese democracy movement; and advocates of the Taiwan independence movement.

From an internal security standpoint, these national minorities are consid-

ered susceptible to external influence, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) having supported the Tibetan resistance to the PRC’s occupation. Sim- ilarly, some Uighurs have adopted radical Islam and have undergone training across the frontier in Afghanistan. The PRC’s constitution recognizes 56 specific ethnic groups and affords them rights, including religious freedom, whereas from an intelligence perspective, there is a reluctance to acknowl- edge any distinction between opponents of the regime and of the CCP. See also SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO).

 

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA). Created in November 1952 as a result of perceived poor cryptographic support during the Korean War, the NSA replaced the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), responsible for

global monitoring, collection, analysis, and processing of information for both foreign and domestic intelligence and counterintelligence, with its spe- cialty of signals intelligence. Upon its formation, NSA became the principal source of American intelligence about China. However, the NSA’s coverage of China was poor because, in contrast to the Soviet target, it was not consid- ered a priority, and on 10 February 1954 the NSA reported to the National Security Council (NSC) that little had been achieved in developing a window into what was essentially a closed country. The NSA’s own Intelligence Advisory Committee noted that “the picture for the major target area in Asia,

i.e. Communist China, is very dark.”

Part of the normalization agreement made by Dr. Henry Kissinger in 1979, following the loss of NSA facilities in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Af- ghanistan, was the establishment of intercept sites in northwest China at existing seismic monitoring installations at Korla and Qitai, in Xinjiang Province, with a third station at Pamir, for the collection of Soviet signals, close to the Afghan “finger” that extends into China. The facilities were staffed by the NSA, with German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and Chi- nese personnel, and were first disclosed by the New York Times in June 1981 in a report asserting that the sites had become operational in 1980 and were concentrated on Soviet missile telemetry signals transmitted from Soviet missile bases at Leninsk, near the Aral Sea, and at Sary-Shagan, near Lake Balkhash. Congressional approval for the project was organized by Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. as a measure to improve verification of compliance with arms control treaties with the Soviet Union. The NSA withdrew from these sites following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1979 and relocated to Out- er Mongolia, although the BND presence continued.

In November 2009, on the 30th anniversary of the opening of the NSA

stations, the director of national intelligence (DNI), Admiral Dennis C. Blair, visited Beijing to participate in a secret ceremony to celebrate the relation- ship.

The NSA’s budget is classified, but informed estimates place its annual budget at well over $10 billion per year, easily the highest single item in the

U.S. intelligence community. The organization, currently headed by General Paul M. Nakasone, employs an estimated 40,000 staff, with a headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland; manages a substantial number of sites across the world; and shares collection tasks with the Five Eyes partners. The NSA is under the control of the DNI and is headed by career military officers, with a civilian as the second in command.

While the NSA provides information to agencies throughout the intelli- gence community, its principal consumer of domestic intelligence is the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), a relationship that originated from 1945 when, as the U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service, it supported the inves- tigation of Soviet spies identified by the VENONA program.

Following evidence presented to Congress in 1975 that the NSA had col- lected intelligence against U.S. citizens, the Foreign Intelligence Surveil- lance Act (FISA) was passed in 1978 to limit the NSA’s ability to monitor activities of U.S. persons (USPERS). Thereafter the NSA would not share communications intelligence without specific evidence that the material did not involve a USPERS, even if it clearly involved, for instance, a Chinese national. That standard was relaxed on the authority of President George W. Bush following the 9/11 attack in 2001.

In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor, began the system- atic release of internal NSA material that revealed the extent of NSA’s spy- ing, both foreign and domestic. Snowden revealed, for instance, that between February and March, 2013, the NSA collected well over 120 billion tele- phone data items and almost 100 billion computer items. In 2015 WikiLeaks published documents revealing that the NSA had spied on French companies and on German government ministries, which included interception of the cell phone of German chancellor Angela Merkel and her predecessors.

The NSA is also engaged in its own hacking program. Reportedly the Office of Tailored Access Operations successfully penetrated Chinese com- puter and telecommunications systems for years, providing some of the most reliable information inside China. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB). Created on 1 March 1955 by a Republic of China (ROC) presidential directive from Chiang Kai-shek, the NSB of Taiwan (Kuo-chia An-ch’uan-chu in the Wade-Giles system of ro- manization used by Taiwan, or Guojia Anquanbu in the Mandarin Pinyin romanization), amalgamated the civilian Police Administration Office, the Bureau of Exit and Entry Control, and the Justice Department’s Investigation Bureau with the military Taiwan Government Command Headquarters, the General Political Combat Unit, the Military Intelligence Headquarters, and the Military Police Headquarters. The NSB also absorbed the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Social Work Committee and the Overseas Maneuvers Committee. The NSB’s first director-general, appointed by President Chiang Kai-shek, was General Cheng Jie-min, who had a military intelligence background, had served as deputy to Tai Li in the controversial Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (Juntong), and had succeeded him after Tai Li’s death in 1946. Accordingly, the NSB is often considered to have been derived from the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics.

Currently the NSB, headed since July 2019 by Director-General Chiu

Kuo-cheng, consists of eight intelligence-related divisions: international in- telligence, intelligence within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), intelli- gence within Taiwan itself, analysis of Taiwan’s strategic intelligence, scien- tific and technological intelligence, telecommunications security, control and

development of secret codes and facilities, and Taiwanese armed forces internet security. There are also four specialist centers: the Special Service Command Center, Presidential Security and Protection, the Telecommunica- tion Technology Center (code-named BREEZE GARDEN), and the Train- ing Center. The NSB’s director-general also chairs the Coordination Meeting for National Security Intelligence, which supervises all of Taiwan’s security and intelligence activities.

While the NSB has not publicized its successes, it has suffered several embarrassments, including the fraud committed in 1999 by the organiza- tion’s chief accountant, Liu Kuan-chun, who was suspected of having em- bezzled almost $6 million before he departed for Shanghai. He was later spotted in Bangkok and then in North America and is reportedly still a fugitive.

When Donald Keyser was arrested in Washington, D.C., by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for passing documents to two NSB officers, the NSB director-general Hsueh Shih-ming immediately recalled the pair. Later the same year Hsueh Shih-ming was impeached with eight others after an attempt on the lives of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu, who were wounded while campaigning in Tainan City on the day before the presidential election. Allegedly the NSB had failed to act when warned of a possible attack on the president and had not taken the threat seriously.

The organization’s political neutrality has often been doubted, and in 2004 Colonel Chen Feng-lin of the NSB’s Special Services Center’s logistics de- partment confessed that he had leaked classified information relating to Pres- ident Chen’s residence and itinerary to a retiree, General Peng Tzu-wen, who had once headed the center and was an outspoken critic of the president. Peng was later indicted for leaking national security secrets on Taiwanese television and potentially putting President Chen’s life at risk. See also CHI- ANG CHING-KUO; MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (MIB).

 

NEEDHAM, JOSEPH. Born in 1900, educated at Oundle, and a graduate of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, where he was a Communist sympa- thizer in the 1930s, though never actually a member of the Party, Joseph Needham married a fellow biochemistry student in 1924, but in 1937 he acquired a Chinese mistress, Lu Gwai-djen, a 33-year-old postgraduate from Nanjing who taught him Mandarin. She would later work in the United States, first at Berkeley and then at Birmingham, Alabama, before settling at Columbia University in New York City.

In February 1943, after several requests to visit China, Needham was appointed to the Sino-British Scientific Cooperation Office attached to the British embassy in Chongqing, and after having taken a ship to Calcutta, he was flown to Kunming. There he became close friends with Mao Zedong

and Zhou Enlai, a relationship that continued through correspondence when he returned to Cambridge after the defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT). Over the four years that he remained in China, Needham traveled across much of the country on expeditions to extend British influence and assess the Chinese academic and scientific community, and he met several other diplomats who were actually engaged in espionage, among them Oliver J. Caldwell, work- ing under U.S. Office of War Information cover, and a Glasgow Scot, Mur- ray MacLehose, the British vice consul in the port of Fuzhou who in Novem- ber 1971 would be appointed governor of Hong Kong. In late 1945 Need- ham arranged for Lu Gwai-djen to leave New York and join his staff as a nutritionist.

However, in April 1946 he returned to England, having been nominated to help his Cambridge friend Julian Huxley head the science division of the new United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris. While in Paris, Needham came under investigation by the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and was labeled a far- left radical. Nevertheless, he remained with UNESCO for two years before leaving for Cambridge in March 1948 to work on a multivolume book, Science and Civilization in China.

In 1952 Needham was invited by an old wartime acquaintance, Guo Mo- ruo, then head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, to lead a group of independent scientists investigating claims made by North Korea that the United States had engaged in germ warfare during the Kore- an War. The International Commission began its work in June 1952 and spent two months interviewing villagers who claimed that infected insects, birds, rats, and voles had been dropped by American bombers and that large areas had been sprayed with lethal bacteria. Needham left the analytical work to a staff of 60 Chinese technicians, 23 of whom had doctorates from American universities, and his report, amounting to 665 pages, was pub- lished in French in September 1952. His conclusion, that bacteriological weapons “have been employed by units of the United States of America armed forces, using a great variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army during the Second World War. The Commission reached these conclu- sions, passing from one logical step to another. It did so reluctantly because its members have not been disposed to believe such an inhuman technique could have been put into execution in the face of its universal condemnation by the people of the nations.”

His report proved highly contentious, and upon his return to London he

insisted that the Americans had resorted to infecting their Korean and Chi- nese enemies with anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, and typhus. However, he was instantly accused of “the prostitution of science for propaganda” and

almost lost his Caius fellowship when he returned to Cambridge. His only public supporter, the anthropologist Gene Weltfish, was dismissed from her post at Columbia University.

Four years later, as the controversy subsided, Needham was asked to at- tend the sedition trial in San Francisco of John and Sylva Powell and Julian Schuman, three radicals who wrote in their English-language journal in Shanghai, China Monthly Review, that the United States had made a secret agreement with the Japanese scientists who had worked at the notorious Unit 731, the “water purification camp” at Pingfan in Manchuria, where the most appalling human experiments on live prisoners had been conducted in pursuit of biological weapons. Needham, who had been warned he would not be granted a visa to visit the United States, declined the invitation to appear as a defense witness, and eventually the case was dropped in July 1959.

Needham returned to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) again in 1964, and then in 1972 when he was greeted by Zhou Enlai and Mao at the Zhong- nanhai leadership compound in central Beijing. He retired as master of Caius in 1976, and when his wife Dorothy died in December 1987, he resumed his relationship with Lu Gwai-djen and married her in September 1989. Howev- er, she died in November 1991, aged 87, and he died in March the following year. His life is documented by Simon Winchester in The Man Who Loved China in 2008.

 

NEPTUNE. On 18 January 1953 a U.S. Navy Patrol Squadron 22 Lockheed twin-engine P2V-5 Neptune maritime reconnaissance from Atsugi, flown by Ensign Dwight C. Angell, crash-landed in the sea six miles off the Chinese port of Shantou, formerly Swatow, having been hit by gunfire. A Coast Guard Martin PBM Mariner seaplane attempted to rescue the crew but crashed on takeoff and sank in heavy seas, killing 10 of the 21 men aboard. A destroyer, the USS Halsey Powell, then closed in to rescue the survivors under continuous gunfire from shore batteries. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY (NCNA). Long regarded by Western in- telligence agencies as a semitransparent branch of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the New China News Agency, Xinhua, began in 1931 as the Red China News Agency, Hongse Zhonghua Tongxunshe, and has a long tradition of undertaking clandestine roles in pursuit of Beijing’s foreign policy goals. Employing an estimated staff of well over 10,000, the NCNA is represented in all 30 Chinese provinces and since opening an overseas office in London in 1947 has established over 170 other bureaus. The NCNA pub- lishes 20 newspapers and several magazines in non-Chinese languages. At the time of normalization with the United States, the NCNA opened an office

in Washington, D.C., headed by an old revolutionary, Lu Ping, who had suffered during the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming. The NCNA office in Hong Kong during the era of British rule was regarded as Beijing’s de facto diplomatic presence in the colony.

NCNA bureaus have often been associated with coup plots in Third World countries, and in December 1965 the Chinese ambassador in Cairo was with- drawn when the local Mukhabarat found evidence of an attempt to assassi- nate President Gamal Abdel Nasser linked to the NCNA bureau chief. That regional office, which had covered most of the Middle East, did not reopen until 1985.

The NCNA often conducts subversive operations in isolation from the local diplomatic mission in an apparent effort to shield Beijing and estab- lished regional centers in Damascus and Dar es Salaam from diplomatic embarrassment. Naturally, these premises became the subject of hostile phys- ical and technical surveillance by Western intelligence agencies because of the difficulty of recruiting penetrations. See also KAO LIANG; ROYAL HONG KONG POLICE (RHKP); XINHUA.

 

NINTH BUREAU. The Ninth Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu Di Jiu Ju, fulfills an internal security and counter- intelligence function that includes a countersurveillance capability. Some- times referred to as the anti-defection unit, very little is known outside the MSS about the Ninth Bureau, and even insiders know only of its reputed existence.

 

NINTH INSTITUTE. The original name of the Chinese Academy of Engi- neering Physics, Zhongguo Gongcheng Wuli Yan Jiu Yuan, the Ninth Insti- tute, Di Jiu Yanjiu Suo, was the center of the PRC’s nuclear weapons devel- opment program. A graduate of Purdue University, Deng Jiaxian, was asso- ciated with the Ninth Institute and is considered the father of China’s nuclear weapons program. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

 

NKRUMAH, KWAME. Deposed by the police and the military while he was on a visit to Beijing in February 1966, Kwame Nkrumah’s political opponents claimed that he had been plotting subversion across West Africa and was intending to make Ghana a client state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Following the coup, some 500 Chinese diplomats and New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua, journalists were expelled from the country. The new leadership claimed to have found incriminating Chinese guerrilla warfare handbooks in Nkrumah’s private safe, thus confirming the

widespread suspicion that Nkrumah had not only himself become a key PRC asset but had been engaged in a scheme to use Ghana as an intelligence base from which to extend China’s influence over the region.

Born in September 1909, Nkrumah was appointed Ghana’s prime minister when the country was granted independence by Great Britain in March 1957. A graduate of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania, and the University of Pennsylvania, and having studied at the London School of Economics, he returned to the Gold Coast, as it was then known, in 1947 and campaigned for independence. During his nine years as leader, Nkrumah pursued radical socialist policies and courted the PRC, encouraging Beijing to establish a major presence in Accra.

In 1962 Nkrumah survived an attempt on his life and became convinced, based on his receipt of some documents skillfully forged by the KGB, that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was not only scheming against him but had assassinated Burundi’s prime minister and had plotted a coup in Tanzania. Nkrumah’s response was to draft in KGB and East German per- sonnel to train his National Security Service, but they failed to protect him in January 1964 from a renegade police officer who took a shot at him, killing one of his bodyguards. The KGB again blamed the CIA, persuading Nkru- mah he was the victim of an American conspiracy.

In 1965 Nkrumah declared himself president for life, but he was exiled following the February 1966 coup, which was led by General Joseph Arthur Ankrah, assisted by the head of the local Special Branch, J. W. K. Harley. With British influence restored by the swift return to Accra of MI5’s security liaison officer John Thompson, the Chinese withdrew, leaving Nkrumah to take up residence in Conakry, Guinea. He died in April 1972, aged 62.

 

NORTH KOREA. The rigidly Communist state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), created as a totalitarian dictatorship in 1948 by Kim Il-sung, is the longest-surviving client state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Kim Il-sung’s absolute power was passed to his son, Kim Jong-il, in July 1994 and then to his grandson, Kim Jong-un, who assumed the leader’s role in 2011.

North Korea, with a population of well over 25 million, has an estimated per capita income of less than $2,000. It has over a million active members of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), about 5 percent of the total population, with over 8 million reserve and paramilitary troops, making it the largest military institution in the world. The KPA has the following branches: Ground Force, Navy Air Force, Special Operations Force, and the Rocket Command. It is overseen by the Central Military Commission of the Work- er’s Party of Korea and the independent State Affairs Commission. North Korea has both the largest special forces and the world’s largest, albeit some- what antiquated, submarine fleet.

The Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) maintains most law enforcement and security functions and is one of the most powerful institutions in North Korea. In 1973 the State Security Department (SSD) was separated from the MPS to conduct both domestic and foreign intelligence and counterintelli- gence and to manage the country’s vast prison system. The security appara- tus within North Korea is likely the most draconian in the world, with every aspect of life subject to scrutiny and tight control exercised over all cellular and digital communications.

Encouraged to invade South Korea in June 1950 by Joseph Stalin, the DPRK agreed to an armistice in July 1953, and since then Pyongyang has maintained an uneasy peace with Seoul. With severe restrictions on diplo- mats and tourists enforced by a ubiquitous security apparatus, the DPRK was considered a “denied area” by Western intelligence agencies, which relied on technical collection to monitor the regime. Although routine screening of refugees reaching Japan provided some limited information about the DPRK, most were found to have already been processed by the PRC’s Min- istry of State Security (MSS), so the reporting was not entirely reliable.

North Korea attempted to exploit the Sino-Soviet split and play the two Communist giants off against one another. With the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea’s economy suffered, and in the years 1994–1998, famine caused the death of an estimated 240,000–420,000 people, and even today the popu- lation suffers from malnutrition.

Because of the ruthless reputation of the North Korean State Security Department, the number of escapees was small, and even when the occasion- al diplomat posted abroad defected, their knowledge of the top levels of the regime in Pyongyang proved very limited. Similarly, conventional signals intelligence sources have been unproductive because of the reliance on anti- quated landlines and an absence of investment in modern microwave com- munications, making interception difficult. Nevertheless, the DPRK re- mained a significant intelligence collection target because of the requirement of assessing the threat to South Korea’s security and Kim’s commitment to missile proliferation and developing nuclear weapons.

Evidence in 1965 that Moscow had agreed to build a small experimental nuclear reactor at Nyongbyon was followed in 1983 by proof that Pyongyang had embarked on a nuclear weapons program using plutonium extracted from a second, larger reactor that went critical in April 1986. In spite of ratifying the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, the DPRK acquired weapon technology from Pakistan in return for the delivery of missiles, and in 2005 it conducted an underground test of a warhead that failed to detonate fully.

Apparently unable to obtain nuclear weapon designs directly from Beijing, the DPRK exchanged the required information with Pakistan for missile technology generated during the development of the No Dong-1 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which was test-launched over the Sea of

Japan in 1992. Based on the Soviet Scud-C, originally supplied by the PRC, the No Dong-1 had an estimated range of 1,500 kilometers, and it was fol- lowed by the Taepo Dong-2, a two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, which failed when it was launched in July 2006 at the Musudan-ri test range.

While there is uncertainty as to the exact number, North Korea is estimat- ed to possess from 15 to over 60 nuclear weapons, likely including hydrogen bombs. The country continues to test its delivery systems and is estimated to possess some 1,000 ballistic missiles, with some analysts assessing that they include missiles with a range of over 7,000 miles.

Having proliferated missile technology to Pakistan, which then sold Chi- nese weapon designs to Iran and Libya, the DPRK sold a reactor to Syria. Western efforts to persuade Beijing to curb Pyongyang’s exports of missile and nuclear technology, and to open the Nyongbyon facilities to international inspection, proved futile, making the DPRK a major but frustrating intelli- gence target for the West.

While there have been overtures to Russia, China remains the one country that may have some degree of influence over North Korea, but the relation- ship has been strained by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and China’s con- cern about a large influx of refugees should the regime open its borders. In April 2019, Xi Jinping visited North Korea, indicating a warming of rela- tions, but also countering the direct contact between Kim Jong-un and Presi- dent Donald Trump, contacts that have not led to North Korea’s cessation of developing its nuclear program and long-range missiles. See also HWANG JANG YOP; KIM SOO-IM; NEEDHAM, JOSEPH.

 

NOULENS, HILAIRE. A police raid in Singapore on the home of a French- man named Ducroux, who was a suspected Communist Party member, led to the discovery of an address in Shanghai for Hilaire Noulens, a Belgian who was the Comintern’s regional representative. Noulens worked as a language teacher, but a search of his home revealed identity papers, including Cana- dian and Belgian passports, in nine different names. At first the police be- lieved him to be a Swiss, Paul Ruegg, who had been a prominent Communist Party member until 1924, when he had disappeared to Moscow, but he made no admissions concerning his origins. He and his wife Gertrude were handed over to the Chinese authorities for trial, and at a court-martial in Nanking in October 1931, he was sentenced to death and his wife was given life impris- onment.

After a long campaign for their release conducted by an international

defense committee, in which Agnes Smedley and Richard Sorge played important roles, the couple were released in June 1932 and deported to the Soviet Union. However, during the period they were held in Shanghai, the international police had an unprecedented opportunity to study the contents

of three steel trunks, which proved to be the Comintern’s regional accounts for 1930–1931. Using the Pan-Pacific Trade Union as a convenient front, Noulens had liaised with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), run a clan- destine system of couriers, and maintained contact with a range of political activists in Indochina, Japan, Hong Kong, and Malaya through various subagents, of whom one was Gerhardt Eisler. When Elisabeth Poretsky, the widow of Ignace Reiss, was asked about Noulens, she recalled that he had once been based at the Soviet embassy in Vienna, where he had used the surname Luft. “He was then about thirty-five years old, not unattractive- looking but extremely tense, forever moving about and switching from one to another of his three languages apparently without noticing.” He had married the daughter of a Russian aristocrat in Rome, where she had been working as a secretary at the embassy, and after the birth of their son they had been assigned to the Far East. Although the international campaign to gain their freedom was successful, Poretsky asserted that the story of Noulens/Luft had ended in predictable tragedy:

When he came out Luft learned that the Left opposition had been defeated and that Trotsky had gone into exile. We heard from friends that on his release Luft expressed the desire to return to the USSR but said that he would like to talk to Trotsky first. We were not too surprised, it was just the kind of thing Luft could be expected to say. He did not see Trotsky but returned to the Soviet Union. No doubt he was dealt with immediately, for no one ever heard of him again.

 

As a result of the Settlement Police’s analysis of the Noulens accounts, a Comintern correspondent, Nguyen Ai Quoc, was arrested by the Special Branch in Hong Kong. He had traveled widely, having left Saigon as a ship’s steward, and had worked in restaurants in London and Paris. His arrest prompted another international campaign to prevent his deportation to the French authorities in Saigon, and after his release he dropped from sight, only to emerge eight years later in French Indochina under the nom de guerre Ho Chi Minh.

When word spread that Noulens had been taken into custody, Sorge left Shanghai, but he returned soon afterward, apparently confident that he had not been jeopardized. Although he discouraged Ursula Kuczynsky from helping the Noulens campaign so as to avoid compromising her, many of those who lent their support, including Smedley and Ozaki, were actively engaged in espionage. It is now believed that Hillarie Noulens was a Russian, Yakov Rudnik, and the woman posing as his wife was another Soviet profes- sional intelligence officer, Tatyana Moiseenko.

O

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS). Prior to World War II, the

United States did not have a centralized intelligence organization, but in July 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed General William “Wild Bill” Donovan as coordinator of information. A respected New York lawyer and World War I hero who had been decorated with the Medal of Honor, Donovan drafted a Memorandum of Establishment of Service of Strategic Information and was named head of the Office of Strategic Services in April 1942.

OSS was tasked with the collection and analysis of information as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with conducting operations not assigned to other agencies, but it never enjoyed a monopoly in the intelligence field, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Special Intelligence Service maintained that role across Latin America, and both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Department jealously guarded their own areas of responsibility.

As well as conducting operations in Western Europe, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East, OSS developed a large presence in the Far East, and between 1943 and 1945 it trained Kuomintang troops in China and recruited guides and resistance forces from indigenous tribes to work with regular troops in Burma. OSS also armed and trained resistance groups drawn from the ranks of Mao Zedong’s Red Army as well as the Viet Minh in French Indochina. OSS also engaged in clandestine operations across the region and participated in espionage, subversion, and the preparation and distribution of anti-Japanese propaganda.

OSS was disbanded by President Harry S. Truman’s executive order dated 20 September 1945, and some of its personnel were absorbed by the State Department, which acquired a research and analytical capability, and the War Department. See also MACKIERNAN, DOUGLAS; TIBET.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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OGGINS, ISAIAH “CY”. Born in New York in 1886 to an immigrant Russian Jewish family, “Cy” Oggins joined the Communist Party of the United States of America while an undergraduate at Columbia University and would travel on behalf of the Comintern with his wife Norma to Paris, Berlin, and China.

In 1938 he was arrested in Moscow, and he was interviewed by two State Department officials in prison in 1943. He was murdered by the NKVD in 1947, but his fate only became known in 1992 when his KGB file was declassified and released, revealing that he had been accused and convicted of treason. In reality Oggins and his wife spent two years in a large house in the Berlin suburb of Zehlendorf. The couple then moved to Harbin and were associated with Max Steinberg, another Comintern agent. See also SOVIET UNION.

 

ORIENTAL MISSION. The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) detachment in China, during World War II headed by the Jardine Matheson magnate John Keswick, was known as the Oriental Mission, and it estab- lished a headquarters at Chongqing. He negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek for SOE to develop some training facilities on his territory, and Valentine Killery had flown to complete the arrangements in January 1942. An em- bryonic Special Training School (STS) was opened near Chongqing in March, but thereafter the relationship faltered, principally because of the head of the generalissimo’s intelligence service, General Tai Li,- who, among other demands, insisted that a Chinese officer should head the STS. Instead of finding a compromise, Keswick and his colorful White Russian deputy, Vladimir Petropavlovsky, were ordered to leave the country forth- with. The British ambassador, Sir Alexander Clark Kerr, reported this inci- dent to London, asserting that “SOE got into such bad odor with the Chinese because its personnel were almost exclusively representatives of British interests and their tactless and misguided activities, that Chiang Kai-shek himself ordered them out of China and refused them permission to operate.” Both Keswick and Petropavlovsky were redeployed, the former to London, where he was appointed director of missions, Area C, covering India, the Far East, and the Americas, and the latter to the Balkans.

In Shanghai SOE’s efforts were effectively nullified by the Foreign Of-

fice, which, anxious as ever not to offend local sensibilities, vetoed the only proposal the organization came up with, the sabotage of the Eritrea, an Italian warship anchored just off the International Settlement. W. J. Gande, SOE’s local representative, headed a team of six untrained volunteers, but their ambitions were thwarted by the ambassador, who prohibited any action that would arouse anti-British feeling, provoke a Japanese occupation, or compromise the Settlement’s neutrality. Thus, nothing was undertaken, and the entire group was eventually arrested by the Japanese acting on informa-

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tion from a Kempeitai agent planted in Gande’s office. Gande himself was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment at the Ward Road Gaol, but most of his team was later repatriated in an exchange of prisoners.

In Hong Kong the position was only marginally better. A local resident, F.

W. Kendall, had been recruited by Jim Gavin when he had visited the colony, and Kendall had subsequently gone on an STS 101 course in July 1941. He had returned to form the Reconnaissance Unit, a small stay-behind group in the New Territories. When the Japanese did sweep down into Hong Kong, Kendall’s men continued to harass the enemy and undertook the occasional act of sabotage, but when it became clear that the position was hopeless, they either surrendered or trekked northwest to Chongqing. Kendall managed to escape, as did (Sir) Robert Th—ompson, (Sir) Ronald H—olmes, and E. B. Teesdale.

That SOE’s Oriental Mission was going to be a catastrophe had been widely predicted. In August 1941 Christopher Hudson had been appointed SOE’s first head of the Far East Branch in London, and he had sent Major A.

B. O’Dwyer to Singapore in November to make an inspection. His subse- quent report to SOE’s chief, Sir Frank Nelson, had made dismal reading, almost as depressing as Killery’s final report, submitted after the evacuation of Singapore. When Nelson gave a copy to his minister, Dr. Hugh Dalton, he observed, “It is most tantalizing to see in the report how His Majesty’s representatives have vetoed any preparatory work, cried for help from SOE the moment trouble started, and then complained if we did not deliver the goods.” Dalton was so amazed by the document that he commented that “the story ought to be written at length like a novel and printed for private circula- tion.” See also BRITISH ARMY AID GROUP (BAAG).

 

OU QIMING. During his almost three decades of espionage on behalf of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, Larry Wu-tai Chin was handled exclu- sively by Ou Qiming. See also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

OVERSEAS CHINESE. Overseas Chinese, Haiwai Huaren (Huaqiao in simplified Chinese), is the term used to describe people of Chinese birth or descent who live outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, regardless of citizenship. People of partial Chinese ancestry may consider themselves as overseas Chinese, and it is this specific group that is the principal focus of the mainland and Taiwanese intelligence agencies and other organizations devoted to the acquisition of restricted tech- nology and the exercise of political influence.

The PRC leadership does not just hope that overseas Chinese will cooper- ate with the mother country, nor even expect them to, but simply assumes the cooperation of all overseas Chinese. In the traditional Chinese view, they are considered Chinese first and Americans or British citizens a poor second. This applies particularly to first-generation Chinese immigrants who attract the attention of the PRC, and in many examples they have been compliant.

The Chinese have a long history of migrating overseas, and it is estimated that there are well over 40 million overseas Chinese worldwide, including approximately 5 million in the United States, 1.5 million in Canada, 1.2 million in Australia, over 500,000 in Great Britain, and 175,000 in New Zealand.

The PRC has regularly used the tactic of sponsoring visits from ethnic Chinese to their homeland, and sometimes even to the villages of their fami- lies, and then inviting them to attend, and speak at, scientific symposia where classified issues would be raised. Having been softened up with references to their ancestors and appeals to their ethnic loyalty, the target would then be pitched, and none too subtly. Numerous identical reports have reached the security authorities of flattering behavior, followed by an unmistakable plea to help the PRC’s research. Among those who have acknowledged having succumbed inadvertently to this transparent strategy was George Keyworth, President Ronald Reagan’s chief scientific adviser, who had been tempted to expound on implosion principles as applied to the neutron bomb. The Chi- nese tended to pitch everyone indiscriminately, regardless of stature, which led to suspicion of those scientists who either failed to report an approach or later denied that one had occurred. See also JAPAN.

 

OWENS REPORT. On 8 May 1966 a flight of RB-66s, escorted by F-4Cs, accidentally strayed into Chinese airspace while on a mission over North Vietnam and were intercepted and fired on by four People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) MiG-17s. One of the MiGs was shot down, prompting a protest from Beijing. An investigation into the incident was conducted by a Pentagon panel headed by General Robert G. Owens, who was indoctrinated into the routine surveillance missions flown by U.S. Navy EC-121, which was supposed to relay warnings from a clandestine radar site on Monkey Mountain near Da Nang. Owens learned that there had been a failure of communication and that the EC-121 flight had been aborted. On his recommendation, air control of future flights was transferred to Monkey Mountain, with the National Security Agency (NSA) taking responsibility for all early-warning operations. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; NA- TIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).