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PAKISTAN. Officially the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan dates back to 1951, a shared border, and a mutual antagonism toward India. Pakistan supported the PRC during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict and received military support from Beijing during and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, including T-59 tanks and F-6 jet fighters, when Islamabad was the subject of an international embargo.

Pakistan is the world’s sixth most populous country, with a population exceeding 220 million, and it shares a border with China in the northeast. While a strong ally to China, Pakistan also remains a major ally of the United States in its war against terrorism. There is a long history of good relations with the United States, and Islamabad helped facilitate President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, which is also Pakistan’s largest trading partner. In 2016 Beijing announced an anti-terrorism alliance with Pakistan, along with Afghanistan and Tajikistan. In 2018, Pakistan publicly defended China’s “reeducation” camps for Uighur Muslims.

In the nuclear field, the PRC has supported Pakistan’s civil and military development program, and in 1983 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that Beijing had transferred the design of a nuclear weapon with sufficient uranium to build two of them. By an agreement signed by both countries in 1986, the PRC assisted in the construction of three atomic reactors and provided the advanced technology for a uranium-enrichment plant. Since then the PRC has confirmed its participation in the building of two further reactors. The U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) coordinated the intelligence collection on the PRC’s collaboration with Pakistan and in Au- gust 1998 reported that “imagery analysis reveals the reprocessing plant in the New Labs area of the Rawalpindi Nuclear Research Center near Islama- bad is being expanded and modified to handle irradiated fuel from the un- safeguarded plutonium production center at Khushab.”

The most prominent member of Pakistan’s nuclear program has been Ab-

dul Qadee “A. Q.” Khan, a controversial figure who is lionized by some scientists and considered by others a self-promoter with few sound scientific

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credentials. In the early 1970s Khan worked for URENCO, a consortium of European companies established in 1971 to research and develop uranium enrichment through the use of ultracentrifuges. Khan stole blueprints while at URENCO and became a major proliferator of nuclear weapons, providing information to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. He also visited China to give technical support to China’s nuclear program during the construction of a highly enriched uranium plant in Hanzhong, Shaanxi Province.

The DoE predicted that Khushab would have produced sufficient pluto- nium for one weapon by 2000 and thereafter would recover enough fissile fuel for another each year. However, by December 1994, the PRC was de- livering to Khan’s Kahuta Research Laboratory components for gas centri- fuges, required to speed up the development of weapons-grade fuel, and in 1998 the indigenous Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) was tested, followed on 28 May by the first in a series of nuclear tests.

According to Gordon Oehler, then heading the CIA’s Counterproliferation Center, “in 1990 the intelligence community detected the transfer to Pakistan of a training M-11 ballistic missile and associated transporter erector launch- er, indicating that operational missiles were not far behind. The intelligence community had evidence that the M-11 was covered by the so-called guide- lines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime.” Indeed, two years later, 34 road-mobile Dong Fang-11 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) were delivered to Pakistan and caught by overhead imagery at Sar- godha. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) circulated in 1996 noted that Pakistan had been supplied with an entire M-11 assembly plant that had been built outside Rawalpindi in 1995:

At least some of the M-11s that have been dispersed to military locations throughout Pakistan are now being stored at Sargodha. But we have yet to see operational missiles on imagery. April imagery showed canisters at Sargodha similar to ones seen at the M-11 production facility in China. But a missile-handling exercise was under way at Sargodha at that time, and the canisters were assessed to be mock-ups for use in that exercise.

The PRC also assisted in the construction of the plant at Rawalpindi that manufactures the Shaheen-1 solid-fuel SRBMs, and sold Pakistan JF-27 air- craft, F-22P frigates equipped with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, and F-7 fighters. The Shaheen-1, followed by the Shaheen-2, are the local variants of the DF-11 export version, the M-11.

Stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan is an important strategic objective for Beijing, which remains sensitive to the threat of Muslim extremism and separatists in Xinjiang Province. Accordingly, the Ministry of State Secur- ity (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, maintains a strong representation in Islama- bad, which is the site of the PRC’s largest embassy, collaborating with the

 

Inter-Service Intelligence organization to protect China’s investment in Paki- stan, which includes oil and gas exploration, and to prevent Islamic radical- ism from contaminating the Uighurs.

As well as being Pakistan’s principal source of defense equipment, China has made a substantial investment in the country’s infrastructure. Among the major Chinese-backed projects has been the construction of the port of Gwa- dar in Balochistan by the China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), Zhongguo Gangkou Gongcheng Youxian Gongsi, a subsidiary of the huge China Communications Construction Company Ltd. (CCCC), Zhongguo Ji- aotong Jianshe Gugen Youxian Gongsi, which became operational in 2008; the $70 million Gwadar international airport, which operates under Pakistani military control; and a $12.5 billion oil refinery funded by the Great United Petroleum Holding Company. In strategic terms the development at Gwadar provides access to the Arabian Sea and to a major regional airport.

The PRC’s investment in Pakistan’s infrastructure includes the acquisition in 2007 by the China Mobile Communications Corporation, Zhongguo Yidong Tongxin Gongsi, of Paktel for $460 million and the control and ownership by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, Zhongguo Chang- cheng Shiye Zong Gongsi, of a Pakistani telecommunications satellite, sched- uled to be put into orbit from Sichuan Province in 2011. In 2014 the China Mobile Communications Corporation (now the China Mobile Communica- tions Group Company Ltd., Zhongguo Yidong Tongxin Jituan Gongsi) an- nounced a $1 billion investment in Pakistan’s infrastructure. This was fol- lowed in 2015 by China’s first investment project under its Belt and Road Initiative, Yidai Yilu Changyi (officially the Silk Road Belt and the 21st- Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Dai He 21 Shiji Di Haishangsi- chou Zhi Lu, or “One Belt, One Road,” Yidai Yilu) by committing to build a hydropower station near Jhelam. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAP- ONS; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA).

PAN HANNIAN. Born in January 1906, Pan Hannian began his work with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a propagandist with the magazine Huanzhou (Oazo) and later with Shizi Jietou (Crossroads) and became a member of the CCP in 1927. He then was promoted to managing editor of the Gemingjun Ribao (Revolutionary Army Daily) in Nanchang but was recalled to Shanghai just before the “Shanghai Massacre” on 12 April 1927 of Com- munists by Chiang Kai-shek and elements of the Kuomintang (KMT) that ended the years of nominal cooperation between the KMT and CCP. Initially escaping to Wuhan along with Zhou Enlai, Pan later returned to Shanghai, where he began his participation in intelligence matters. He was named to a leadership position in the CCP Central Committee Special Branch (CCSB), Zhongyang Teke, and after Gu Shunzhang’s betrayal in 1931, Zhou Enlai was faced with rebuilding the CCP’s intelligence apparatus, Tewu, and

 

turned to Pan, along with Chen Yun, Ke Qingshi, and Kang Sheng, seasoned operatives who were capable of reorganizing the Party’s espionage and infil- tration networks. He was able to remain in Shanghai after much of the leader- ship abandoned the city, occupying positions of authority in the CCSB’s Second Section (intelligence) and later the Third Section (Red Squads). In 1933, he was forced to leave Shanghai for Mao Zedong’s Red Army, where he participated in the Long March, Changzheng.

In 1936 Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by two of his own generals, Zhang Xueliang and Yan Hucheng, who hoped to force Chiang into an alliance with the Communists and present a united front against the invading Japanese. Mao Zedong did not agree, for he perceived an opportunity to dispose of his archenemy Chiang, but Zhou dissented as he was more famil- iar with the KMT generals’ thinking, so the negotiations continued. After his arrival in Shanghai to meet the KMT representatives, Zhou designated Pan to conduct the talks. His negotiating position, where he appeared to adopt the position of the KMT government, would result in criticism. While it is un- clear why Pan took this strategy, it may have been a ploy by Zhou to keep the KMT and the Comintern, represented by Pan, busy talking while he plotted against Chiang. At any rate, in December, Chiang was abducted, and later in the month the sides reached an agreement on four points: the cessation of hostilities between the sides, the release of political prisoners, collaboration between the two armies, and a united front against the Japanese. Essentially the agreement served as a pause in the open hostilities between Kang Sheng and his KMT adversary, Dai Li.

In 1938, after Kang Sheng had renamed the Political Security Bureau the

Department of Social Affairs, Shehuibu, Pan was sent to Hong Kong, where he coordinated relations with expatriates sympathetic to the CCP. Pan main- tained clandestine communications between the Comintern and the CCP throughout the Japanese occupation and later during the Chinese Civil War.

In 1949, Pan was named deputy mayor of Shanghai, and in December 1950 Mao remarked, “In the repression of counterrevolutionaries, take care to strike with sureness, precision, and severity.” Pan, as deputy mayor, orga- nized the repression and was especially ruthless in pursuing Mao’s edict.

In 1955 Pan was purged, and though he was a former associate of Kang Sheng and Zhou Enlai, he was charged with “counterrevolutionary crimes,” in part due to his negotiating position with the KMT back in 1936. He was imprisoned until his death in 1977.

PARLOR MAID. Code-named PARLOR MAID by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 1997 Katrina Leung removed and copied clas- sified documents from the briefcase of her FBI handler, James “J. J.” Smith. When her home was searched in 2002, several classified documents were discovered, including an FBI transcript of a telephone conversation with her

 

contact at the Chinese consulate in San Francisco. Also recovered were docu- ments relating to the FBI’s royal tourist investigation of Dr. Peter Lee. Although neither Leung nor Smith were charged with espionage, the case demonstrated that Leung had been working on behalf of the People’s Repub- lic of China’s (PRC) intelligence agencies for a very long time.

While virtually nothing in her background in the PRC can be verified, she is believed to have been born Chan Man Ying in Guangzhou on 1 May 1954 and to have moved to Hong Kong at the age of three, where she was brought up by Susan Chin, her ostensible aunt. They emigrated to the United States in 1970 using Taiwanese passports, and Chin married an American citizen eight days after their arrival in New York, where Leung entered high school. Leung became a permanent resident in August 1972 and obtained an under- graduate degree from Cornell University, where she met her husband, Kam Leung, who was preparing for his doctorate in biochemistry.

Leung had initially studied engineering before switching to economics and was to be awarded a master’s degree in business administration from the University of Chicago while working in the city as a bank teller. Apparently her first contact with PRC officials occurred in New York in 1972 when she worked as a volunteer at the PRC’s mission to the United Nations. There she joined the Diaoyutai movement, a pro-Communist organization, and partici- pated in demonstrations in support of the PRC’s claim to the Diaoyutai Islands. In New York and in Chicago she had contact with Lu Ping, an identified intelligence officer who headed the New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua, in Washington, D.C.

Leung, later code-named POETIC FIT while under investigation as a spy, became the general manager of Sida International, an import-export firm in Los Angeles that was suspected of engaging in the illegal transfer of technol- ogy to China, and thereby came to the FBI’s attention. Apparently the FBI never concluded the Sida investigation, but in 1982, after Leung had left the company, she became a highly paid informant, maintaining a high profile in Los Angeles and providing information about local Chinese officials and the émigré community. In 1983 she began a sexual relationship with her FBI handler, J. J. Smith, and then started her own business consulting firm in California, where she was a director of the Los Angeles World Affairs Coun- cil, as well as being a major contributor to the Republican Party. She was recorded as having made 71 overseas trips during the 20 years she worked as a source for the FBI, although she failed to declare 15 of them.

On those trips she was said to have been in contact with Ministry of State

Security (MSS), Guoji Anquanbu, officers on many occasions, and she was given a gift of $100,000 by the PRC president, Yang Shangkun. Certainly, Leung was well connected in Beijing, and the Indonesian Chinese tycoon Ted Sioeng, whose family was investigated by the FBI for illegal donations to the Democrat Party, was a friend. She also had business-related contacts

 

with companies such as Northern Telecom (Canada). Apparently Smith made little effort to conceal his relationship with Leung, and she accompa- nied him to his retirement party, which she videotaped, and to President George W. Bush’s inaugural parade in Washington, D.C. She also lectured classes at the FBI’s academy at Quantico on the management of double agents, while simultaneously carrying on an affair with another former FBI special agent, Bill Cleveland Jr., who had led the TIGER TRAP investiga- tion involving Min Gwo Bao. Early in that case the FBI had learned that Leung was in contact with Min and had frequently traveled to San Francisco to participate in that operation.

Smith, who met Leung for trysts in London, Hawaii, and Hong Kong, would invariably leave his briefcase, containing highly classified FBI docu- ments, unlocked at her home or in her hotel room. He would also leave her alone with the briefcase, allowing her access to the contents, which she copied. Even after he discovered that Leung was a double agent working for the MSS, he continued to provide her with secret information. When chal- lenged by the FBI, he denied the affair, but he was contradicted by video- tapes that had recorded the pair engaging in sex in a hotel room. It was not until his fourth interview that he admitted that their affair had lasted eight years. When questions were raised at headquarters by analysts about Leung, Smith declared, untruthfully, that she had taken a polygraph test and passed it. Indeed, Smith had filed no fewer than 19 evaluation reports describing Leung as “reliable.”

After his retirement in 1993, Bill Cleveland was appointed the head of

security at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory nuclear weapons research facility in California. He admitted having had a sexual relationship with Leung from 1988 until his retirement, and he had resumed the relation- ship in 1997 and 1999. He had continued this liaison even after discovering that Leung had unauthorized contacts with the MSS in 1991, when she had told her MSS handler that Cleveland was to accompany a U.S. State Depart- ment inspection tour in the PRC.

Apparently Leung worked for the MSS and China’s General Ji Shengde to obtain political access in the United States, a manifestation of an influence operation rather than traditional espionage. Reportedly she also provided information on advanced technology transfers and access to classified docu- ments to China. Her MSS contact at the San Francisco consulate was code- named MAO, later identified as Mao Guohua, and she had been assigned the code name LUO ZHONGSHAN.

Leung’s involvement in obtaining influence is mirrored by another similar operation run by Charlie Trie and Johnny Chung, directed at the Democratic Party, and both were supervised by General Ji. Leung was also responsible for compromising CAMPCON, a major FBI investigation of illegal cam- paign finance donations made to the Democratic Party. J. J. Smith had partic-

 

ipated in CAMPCON, perceived as the PRC’s attempt to funnel money into the 1996 U.S. election in an effort to gain influence inside President Bill Clinton’s White House. Smith was also the primary contact for Johnny Chung, allowing Smith access to the detailed account records of money passed by General Ji through Chung into the Democratic National Commit- tee. A prolific fund-raiser, Chung cooperated with the FBI and pleaded guilty to charges stemming from his admission that he received $300,000 from PRC intelligence officials to influence U.S. elections.

It is likely that it was a source inside the FBI in Los Angeles who was responsible for compromising a covert operation to install listening devices aboard a Boeing 767 aircraft that was to be used by the president of China while it was in the United States for a refit. The equipment was quickly discovered, and the PRC government disclosed the incident early in 2002, claiming to have found 27 bugs, including some placed in the bathroom and in the headboard of the Chinese president’s bed.

When Smith, code-named rich foliage, underwent an FBI interrogation about his relationship with Leung, the Chinese plane incident was one of several issues raised, and in May 2004 Smith, then aged 60, pleaded guilty to a single charge of making false statements on a personnel security form as part of a background investigation, an offense for which he received three years’ probation and a $10,000 fine. However, he was allowed to retain his FBI pension.

In 2005 the original charge against Leung of the unauthorized copying of national defense information was dismissed due to prosecutorial misconduct after the prosecution denied the defense the opportunity to interview Smith, who was to be a prosecution witness. Thereafter her lawyers negotiated a plea on charges of lying to FBI investigators and a single count of filing a false income tax return for the $1.7 million she had received from the FBI, the $100,000 she had received from the PRC, and some mortgage-related issues. She was sentenced to three years’ probation, fined $10,000, and re- quired to perform 100 hours of community service. See also COX REPORT.

PATTEN, CHRISTOPHER. The last British governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten was alleged by ministers in the Labour government elected in May 1997 to have included in his memoirs classified information about the negotiations conducted with China prior to the withdrawal from the colony. The claim proved groundless but drew attention to the role played by senior intelligence personnel, such as Sir Percy Cradock, in the tense discussions held in Beijing during Margaret Thatcher’s administration to reach agree- ment over the future of the leased island and the New Territories. Cradock had been appointed chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in 1985 and for the next eight and a half years, until June 1992, was the prime minister’s principal Sinologist and foreign policy adviser.

 

PENG XUEHUA. Peng Xuehua, alias Edward Peng, was born September 1963 in China and entered the United States on a B-1 business visa before he petitioned to have his status changed to that of L-1A, nonimmigrant worker, in June 2001. He became a lawful permanent resident in February 2006 following his marriage to his then wife, by whom he had two children, and was naturalized on 27 September 2012. Peng’s immigration file notes that he claimed to have a degree in mechanical engineering and that he is trained in traditional Chinese medicine. He was the registered president of

U.S. Tour and Travel in San Francisco, a company that focused on Chinese visitors and students in the Bay Area.

On September 2019 Peng was living in Hayward, California, when he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on charges of acting in the United States as an agent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), specifically the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, after a four-year sting operation in which he had been incriminated.

The FBI’s sting operation had commenced in March 2015 when a double- agent source had traveled to the PRC to deliver to three MSS contacts what was purported to be classified material. In reality, the information had been cleared for the purpose. At the meeting the source was instructed to transfer data to a secure digital card, which was to be concealed in a book and left with a hotel receptionist in Newark, New Jersey. As directed, the source deposited the package, and FBI surveillance identified the person who col- lected it as Peng. This procedure was repeated an additional five times, including travel to Columbus, Georgia, in 2017 and 2018, until the FBI intervened and obtained a full confession from Peng, who admitted that he had been recruited by the MSS in 2015 while on a business trip to Beijing where he maintained a mistress and an apartment.

On each occasion the double agent made a delivery to a hotel room in

which covert video recording equipment had been installed by the FBI. The double agent made the delivery, collecting $20,000, and Peng later checked in to collect the material. Subsequently, Peng would hold several opaque telephone conversations with Beijing to discuss his travel itinerary and then catch a flight to China, all a departure from previous MSS tradecraft. By June 2019 Peng and the MSS had paid the double agent $191,141.71.

In November 2019, in part in recognition of his candor with the FBI, Peng pleaded guilty in a plea agreement to a fine of $30,000 and a prison sentence of four years.

PENG YEN-CHIN. In August 2008, following his arrest the previous De- cember, Peng Yen-chin was extradited from Hong Kong to Manhattan to face charges of money laundering and conspiring to smuggle military equip- ment to Taiwan. A mechanical engineer employed by UNU Engineering in Taiwan, “Alex” Peng had been caught by an undercover Immigration and

 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent whom he had solicited to buy a fighter pilot’s helmet that was equipped with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, an item on the U.S. Munitions List, in a sting operation involving advanced aiming devices and thermal sights. Over the internet, Peng had already purchased infrared laser aiming devices and thermal weapons sights, all of which had been shipped by undercover ICE agents to Taiwan as “toys.” While in Taiwan, Peng had paid an additional fee to ensure that the lasers would be exported without the required license.

Peng had intended to declare the helmet as a toy and then have it delivered to Taipei by Peter Liu, a Continental Airlines flight attendant, and on 6 December 2007, following Peng’s instructions, part of the dismantled helmet was handed to Liu in New York, with the agent telling Liu that it had been stolen. Undeterred by this news, Liu still took possession of the helmet.

According to court evidence, Peng’s expertise lay in reverse engineering military equipment. A U.S. citizen from Taiwan who lived in Queens, New York, Liu had only known Peng because he had allowed Peng to purchase various military gadgetry from his eBay account for a relatively small fee. Liu pleaded guilty and was imprisoned for 30 months, and on 15 December 2008, Peng also pleaded guilty and received the same sentence. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA). With the largest standing army in the world, amounting to over 3.2 million personnel, the People’s Libera- tion Army, Renmin Jiefangjun, is a unified organization that includes the Ground Forces, the PLA Air Force, the Strategic Rocket Force, and the PLA Navy, all of which are under the control of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchangdong Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui. The PLA’s large intelligence organization incorporates the Military Intelligence Department, or Qingbao Bu, also known as the Second Department or 2/PLA.

Founded on 1 August 1927, the PLA’s principal purpose is to give support to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) seven military districts through the deployment of the 1.5 million strong Chinese People’s Armed Police (PAP), Zhongguo Renmin Wu Zhuang Jingcha Budui, a paramilitary force created in June 1982, also under the PLA, which fulfills an internal security role and is to provide support for the PLA’s ground forces in wartime. This PAP is separate from the People’s Police of the Ministry of Public Security, Gonganbu Renmin Jingcha, under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu. Apart from temporary deployments abroad in the Korean War, in North Vietnam be- tween 1965 and 1970, in the invasion of Tibet in 1950, and in border clashes with the Soviet Union and India, the PLA maintains a defensive posture when not conducting exercises to threaten Taiwan. See also ALBANIA;

 

ANUBIS; ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY (AFSA); AUTUMN ORCHID; BLACKBIRD; CAMPCON; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); CENTRAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT (CID); CHARBATIA; CHINA ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING PHYSICS (CAEP); CHINA INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES (CIISS); CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH; CHINESE NUCLE- AR WEAPONS; CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH; COMMISSION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DE- FENSE (COSTIND); COX REPORT; CULTURAL REVOLUTION; DENG XIAOPING; DIXIE MISSION; EIGHTH BUREAU; ENGELMANN, LAR- RY; FIRST BUREAU; FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTITUTE (FLI); FOURTH DEPARTMENT; GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT (GSD), PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; GH0STNET; HARBIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY; INFORMATION WARFARE; INFORMATION WAR- FARE MILITIA; INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT (ILD); LI KENONG; LILLEY, JAMES; LIN BIAO; LOVELL, JOHN S; MACKIER- NAN, DOUGLAS; MALAYA EMERGENCY; MI5; MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY (MEI); MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS); MOO, KO-SUEN; PIRACY; PROJECT 863; PRINCELINGS; SHADOW NETWORK; SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO); SHU QUANSHENG; SINO-VIETNAMESE WAR; SIXTH RE- SEARCH INSTITUTE; SOVIET UNION; THIRD DEPARTMENT; TITAN RAIN; U-2; XIONG XIANGHUI; YU JUNGPING.

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF). The People’s

Liberation Army Air Force, Jiefangjian Kongjun, was formed on 11 Novem- ber 1949 in the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Kuomintang (KMT) forces and the declaration of the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Ill equipped to defend the mainland from air attacks mounted from Taiwan, the PLAAF was dependent on Soviet support in the form of General Pavel F. Batitsky’s 106th Fighter Aviation Division (IAD) to protect Shang- hai and, from July 1950 on, the 151st Guards IAD at Shenyang to train the MiG-9 and MiG-15 novice pilots of the Fourth Air Division and to provide cover for the 13th Chinese People’s Volunteer Army during the Korean War. At least one Taiwanese P-51 Mustang was shot down, on 2 April 1950, by Soviet interceptors based in Shanghai, which four months later, on 9 August, accidentally destroyed a Tupolov-2 Bat, mistaken for a B-25 Mitch- ell. The Chinese pilots, later part of the Joint Air Army formed with the North Koreans, were no match for the more experienced American aircrew and suffered heavy casualties when they ventured out of PRC airspace, which was the limit of Soviet combat operations.

 

Even before the Korean cease-fire in July 1953, the PLAAF was engaged continuously in challenging KMT aircraft that routinely entered PRC air- space, usually on reconnaissance missions. On 14 March 1950, an F-10, the photoreconnaissance version of the B-25 Mitchell bomber, was shot down by the PLAAF. Then two days later a P-51 Mustang was hit by ground fire, killing the pilot. On 2 April another Mustang was shot down by Soviet fighters over Shanghai; on 29 July a P-57N Thunderbird was destroyed by ground fire near Xiamen. On 18 November 1951 a P-47N Thunderbolt failed to return from a flight over Guangdong. On 16 June 1953 a P-47N Thunder- bolt pilot was killed by ground fire over Dongshan Island. After the Korean cease-fire in July 1953, the air conflict over the PRC continued, and between December 1953 and August 1966 each side lost approximately 40 aircraft.

On 17 December a Thunderbolt pilot was lost to ground fire over Jejiang,

with another on 9 February 1954 and another on 18 March, shot down by a PLAAF MiG-15. There was a dogfight between a pair of Thunderbolts and two MiG-15s on 11 May, and five days later a B-17 was downed by ground fire over Fujian, killing all four crew. On 3 June a Thunderbolt was shot down by a PLAAF La-11 Fang, and on 16 July another Thunderbolt pilot was killed by a MiG-15. On 12 September a PBY4 was shot down near Xiamen, killing the crew of nine. On 15 October a Thunderbolt failed to return from a mission over the mainland, and on 1 November a Thunderbolt crashed while on a mission to Fujian, killing the pilot. On 17 November an RT-33A crashed into mountains near Fujian while attempting to evade a MiG-15. On 19 January 1954 an F-84G Thunderjet was shot down by ground fire. Two days later a Thunderbolt was also lost to ground fire, followed by another on 20 February. On 22 June an RT-33A pilot was killed over Jiangxi by a MiG-17 Fresco. On 4 July four MiG-15s were engaged by four Thun- derjets, and one Fagot was shot down. On 16 July a Thunderjet was shot down by ground fire over Kinmen. On 15 October an F-86 Sabre was shot down by a MiG-15. On 14 April 1956 four Thunderjets engaged four MiG- 15s and shot one down. On 22 June a B-17 was shot down at night by a MiG- 17, killing the crew of 11. On 20 July four Thunderjets engaged four MiG- 15s and shot one down, and on the next day four more F-84Gs engaged three MiG-15s and shot down two. Later the same day, four Sabres engaged three MiG-15s and shot down two of them. On 4 October over Shantou an F-84 was shot down by the PLAAF. On 10 November a C-46 Commando on an airdrop mission was shot down by the PLAAF over Jejigxi, killing the crew of nine. On 15 April 1957 an RF-84F Thunderflash pilot was killed as he tried to evade a PLAAF MiG. On 1 July a P-47 pilot was killed by ground fire. On 5 November a B-26 Invader was shot down and the crew of three captured, to be released the following July. On 18 February 1958 an RB-57D was shot down over Shandong by a MiG-17. On 17 June an RF-83F Thun- derflash crashed killing the pilot near Fujian while evading MiG-15s. On 29

 

July one of four F-84s was shot down by four F-17s near Nan Ao Island. On 14 August three MiG-17s were shot down by F-86 Sabres. On 25 August another two MiG-17s were shot down by Sabres. On 18 September seven MiG-17s were shot down for the loss of one Sabre. On 24 September, 11 MiG-17s were downed by Sabres. Five days later a C-46 Commando was shot down, killing two of the crew. The two survivors were captured and released on 30 June 1959. On 2 October 1958 another C-46 was shot down by ground fire over Kinmen, killing the crew of five. On 10 October four MiG-17s were shot down by Sabres, and one Nationalist pilot was captured after his plane was damaged by debris. On 19 May 1959 a B-17 was de- stroyed and the crew of 14 killed by a MiG-17 near Guangdong. On 5 July Sabres shot down two MiG-17s over the Straits of Taiwan. On 7 October an RB-57D was shot down by an SA-2 near Beijing, killing the pilot. On 16 February 1960 one MiG-17 was shot down by a Sabre over the Straits of Taiwan. On 25 March an RB-69A was shot down at night, killing all 13 crew, and another was destroyed on 6 November over Shantung Province by an SA-2 Guideline missile. On 1 August 1962 an RB-69A was shot down killing all 13 crew, and later in the same month an R-101A Voodoo was lost near Fujian. On 14 June 1963 an RB-69A was shot down near Nanchang, killing all 14 crew, and on 11 June 1964 another RB-69-A was shot down near Yantai, over the Shantung Peninsula, by a MiG-17. On 18 December a Voodoo was shot down by a PLA Naval Air Force J-6 over Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province, but the pilot was captured and released in July 1985. On 18 March 1965 a Voodoo was shot down by a MiG-19 Farmer. On 10 January 1966 an HU-16 was shot down by a MiG-17 over Matsu. On 13 January 1967 four F-104G Starfighters were engaged by 12 MiG-19s over the Straits of Taiwan, with the loss of one Starfighter and one MiG. On 22 August a C-123B Provider was shot down over the South China Sea. After 1967 no further incidents involving Nationalist aircraft attributable to the PLAAF were reported.

Throughout the Cold War, Chinese ground forces and the PLAAF also

confronted United States aircraft, sometimes inside PRC airspace, and often with deadly results. The missions varied from signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, photoreconnaissance, agent insertions, leaflet drops, and “ferret” flights intended to test an adversary’s response and provoke the Chinese ground defenses to activate their radars. These tactics, deployed between about April 1952 and June 1957, resulted in a loss of aircraft and lives. On 4 April 1952 a member of a U.S. Navy bomber’s aircrew was wounded by gunfire from a trawler 100 miles south of Shanghai but survived the flight back to Taiwan. On 31 July two U.S. Navy aircrew were killed and two wounded when their PBM-5S2 Mariner was attacked by two MiG-15s, but the seaplane was able to limp to Pangyong-do in Korea. On 23 November a

U.S. Navy PBS4Y-2S Privateer from VP-28 Squadron was attacked by a

 

single Fagot off Shanghai but was unscathed. On 12 January 1953 a U.S. Air Force B-29 Superfortress on a leaflet drop over Manchuria was shot down by PLAAF fighters. Three of the crew were killed and 11 were captured, to be released in 1956. On 6 March a U.S. Navy F4U Corsair reportedly was shot down over Qianlidao. On 23 April a U.S. Navy P4M-1Q Mercator was attacked by a pair of MiG-15s off the coast of Shanghai but escaped undam- aged, as did a U.S. Navy PB-5S2 Mariner of VP-26 Squadron fired on by a PLA Navy vessel in the Formosa Straits (present-day Taiwan Straits) on 28 June. On 8 July a U.S. Navy P2V-5 from VP-1 Squadron escaped anti- aircraft fire near Nantien. On 21 July a U.S. Navy PBM-5 Mariner was attacked and damaged over the Yellow Sea by a pair of MiG-15s; another PBM-5 Mariner from VP-50 was attacked by two MiG-15s 30 miles east of Tsingtao (present-day Qingdao) on 2 October. On 18 November a further Mariner was attacked by two MiG-15s but returned to VP-50 safely. On 27 January 1954 a U.S. Air Force RB-45 Tornado with an escort of F-86 Sabres was attacked over the Yellow Sea by eight MiG-15s, an engagement that resulted in the loss of one Fagot. On 9 April a U.S. Navy P2V Neptune from VP-1 Squadron was attacked over the Yellow Sea by MiG-15s but escaped unscathed. In February 1955 the wing of a U.S. Navy P2V was hit by anti- aircraft fire while over the Formosa Strait but survived. Later, on 5 February, an RB-45 Tornado of the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron was at- tacked over the Yellow Sea by MiG-15s. A dogfight with eight F-86 Sabre escorts ensued, and two Fagots were shot down. Four days later, on 9 Febru- ary, a U.S. Navy AD-5W Skyraider off the USS Wasp was shot down, but the crew was rescued by the Taiwanese. On 17 April a U.S. Air Force RB- 47E Stratojet from the Fourth Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron from Eiel- son was shot down near the Soviet-owned Kamchatka Peninsula by two MiG-15s, killing two of the crew. On 10 May eight F-86 Sabres were at- tacked off Simuiju in North Korea by 12 PLAAF MiGs, with the loss of two MiGs and one Sabre. On 15 October a U.S. Air Force F-86 Sabre was shot down by a MiG-15. On 12 June 1957 four AD-6 Skyraiders from VA-145 Squadron off the USS Hornet penetrated Chinese airspace over the coast and experienced anti-aircraft ground fire, but suffered no losses. This incident was effectively the last encounter between the two antagonists, although on 14 February 1968 a U.S. Navy A1-H Skyraider on a ferry flight from VA-25 Squadron in the Philippines was shot down over Hainan Island when it accidentally strayed into Chinese airspace, killing the pilot.

On 1 April 2011, a U.S. Navy EP-3E Aries II signals intelligence aircraft

collided with a PLA Navy J-811 fighter jet, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and the forced landing of the U.S. aircraft in an episode known as the Hainan incident.

 

The PLAAF has suffered the defection of several pilots, such as Gao Youzong, and then Sun Tianqin, a 46-year-old test pilot, originally from Fengxiang, who flew his J-711 experimental aircraft from Dalian to Seoul, South Korea, in August 1983. An airman since graduating from an ad- vanced training course at the 11th Aviation School, Sun revealed that he had undergone reeducation during the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wen- hua Dageming, before being allowed to fly again in 1975. His plane was found to be equipped with the very latest avionics, including a Marconi head- up display and weapon aiming computer and Skyranger airborne radar. Sun joined the Taiwanese air force and, having married a musician, emigrated to Canada.

Others who have flown their aircraft to safety, eventually seeking refuge in Taiwan to collect a well-advertised bounty, include Liu Zhiyuan in Novem- ber 1987. Disaffection caused by the suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations were cited as motives for some escapes, principal among being Lieutenant Jiang Wenhao, a 23-year-old graduate of the 13th Aviation School and officer of the 145th Regiment of the 49th Division who flew his Shenyang J-6 from Longxi airport in Zhangzhou to Shangyi airport on Kin- men Island in September 1989. On the following day he was moved by ship to the Pescadores and then flown to Taipei, where he enrolled in the Taiwa- nese air force. Examination of Jiang’s plane revealed the existence of an anti- defection device, designed to cut the fuel supply if the aircraft strayed from its designated mission, which had been installed following the defection of another pilot, Liu Zhiuan, in November 1987. After his retirement, Jiang became a celebrated underwater photographer.

Currently the PLAAF’s strength is assessed at about 400,000 personnel

with over 5,000 aircraft. As China’s economic growth continues, it is ex- pected that the PLAAF will continue to modernize, with modern Chengdu J- 10 and Shenyang J-11 aircraft. J-16 and JH-7A fighters will be incorporated as precision strike fighters, and planned stealth fighters such as the Chengdu J-20 will come into service. Since its inception, the PLAAF has had limited actual combat experience in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. The PLAAF is considered to have modest but im- proving capability as China increasingly seeks to expand both its regional and global influence, but principally it remains a defensive organization. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA).

PIQUET, JOSEPH. On 14 May 2009 Joseph Piquet was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release. The owner and president of AlphaTronX, a company in Port Lucie, Florida, that produced electronic components, Piquet had been convicted on 5 May of seven federal charges arising from a conspiracy to purchase electronic com-

 

ponents for military equipment from the Northrop Grumman Corporation and ship them without the required export licenses to Hong Kong and to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The items included high-power amplifi- ers designed for use in early-warning radar and missile target acquisition systems, as well as low-noise amplifiers that have both commercial and military applications.

Piquet was indicted on 5 June 2008 with his company and with Thompson Tam, a director of Ontime Electronics Technology Ltd., an electronics com- pany based in the PRC. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

PIRACY. China’s burgeoning economic expansion has placed pressure on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Jiefangjun Haijun, which rationally undertook a limited maritime role patrolling the Taiwan Straits and protecting China’s regional interests. However, in 2008 seven Chinese mer- chantmen were seized by Somalian pirates off the Gulf of Aden. These incidents prompted the deployment to the Indian Ocean of a PLAN task force of three surface vessels on an escort mission carrying 70 special forces to protect the 1,265 Chinese commercial vessels that transit the area annually. The first task force, which began patrols in December 2008, consisted of the modern guided missile destroyers Haiku and Wuhan, supported by a replen- ishment auxiliary, the Weishanhu. In April 2009 the warships were replaced by a destroyer, the Shenzen, and a frigate, Huanshan. Then, in July 2009, two frigates, the Zhoushan and the Xuzhou, took over the duty supported by the Qiandaohu. This participation in a multinational naval operation represented a radical departure from the PLAN’s doctrine and demonstrated a capability of deploying for extended periods more than 3,400 miles from its home port of Hainan Island.

In 2014 Beijing released a video of a confrontation between PLAN aircraft

and Somalian pirates in the Gulf of Aden that was said to have occurred four years earlier. In May 2017 the PLAN handed over three captured Somalian pirates to the Somalian government, and in December 2018 the New China News Agency, Xinhua, claimed that the PLAN had escorted 6,595 ships through the area, having rescued or aided more than 60 Chinese and foreign ships while engaged in counterterrorism operations.

An estimated 80 percent of the PRC’s imported oil is shipped through the dangerous Straits of Malacca, and a greater reliance on energy imports and foreign trade make sea-lane security an increasing preoccupation for PLAN’s intelligence analysts, who acknowledge a vulnerability to pirates and to the possible threat of a naval blockade.

 

The PLAN’s increased activity in the region has fueled suspicions, articu- lated in the United States, India, and Japan, that purported counterterrorism operations have provided a convenient pretext to deploy submarines in the area and extend China’s influence. See also CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH.

PLANESMAN. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name assigned by I. C. Smith for Yu Qiangsheng, a defector from the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. See also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

POLITICAL WORK DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL MILI-

TARY COMMISSION. The Political Work Department of the Central Mil- itary Commission, Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui Zhengzhi Gongzuo Bu, was established in 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s reforms, replacing the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) General Political Department, Jiefangjun Zong Zhengzhi Bu. The department is headed by People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Jiefangjun Haijun, admiral Miao Hua. It is responsible for all political activities by the PLA. Among its identified activities outside China itself is the front organization, the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), Zhongguo Guoji Youhao Lianluo Hui.

POLLARD, ANNE HENDERSON. In August 1985 Anne Henderson mar- ried Jonathan J. Pollard, an analyst based at the Naval Investigative Service’s (NIS) counterterrorism center, and spent her honeymoon in Venice, a holiday paid for by Israeli intelligence officers to whom her husband was selling vast quantities of classified information. Anne Pollard, who worked in public relations for the National Rifle Association (NRA), actively supported her husband’s espionage, and when he was arrested in November 1985 as they attempted to seek refuge at the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., she was also charged. She was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and served three, while her husband was sentenced to life.

During the NIS investigation of the Pollards, evidence emerged that Pol- lard had approached South African embassy staff in an attempt to sell clas- sified information, while his wife had planned to make the same offer to PRC diplomats. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

POSEIDON, HMS. On 9 June 1931, the HMS Poseidon, a Parthian-class submarine built in 1929, sank in 130 feet of water while exercising with its tender, the HMS Marazion, in the South China Sea after colliding with a Chinese freighter, the SS Yuta, some 20 miles north of the British naval base

 

at Weihaiwei on the island of Liugong. All but 18 of the crew were rescued by the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, and two who escaped using a Davis diving apparatus died, but in late 2005 the PLA Navy (PLAN) publication Modern Ships reported that the wreck had been salvaged during the early 1970s. A further reference on the Shanghai Salvage Bureau’s website ap- peared to confirm that a recovery operation had been undertaken, although the precise reason for raising it remains unclear, as the submarine was obvi- ously obsolete and could not have contained any equipment of current value.

PRICE, MILDRED. Identified by Elizabeth Bentley in her autobiography Out of Bondage as a Soviet spy, Mildred Price was accused of having pro- vided an apartment in which an underground Communist Party cell could meet. Married to Harold Coy, her sister was Mary Price, and she was the executive head of the China Aid Council, a Communist front. Bentley said that at first she had “regarded Mildred merely as an intermediary with Mary, but soon we discovered she would be a valuable adjunct to our apparatus in her own right.” She was the organizer of the Communist unit that functioned in the Institute of Pacific Relations—a foundation for Far Eastern studies that had originally been set up by well-meaning philanthropists but which had long since fallen under the domination of the Communists. The organization, because of its respectable past and high-sounding title, had been able to enroll in its ranks a vast number of “innocents,” among them professors and businessmen who were interested in Pacific affairs. Hence it had become the center of all Communist activity in the Far Eastern field, offering a protective covering to a number of smaller, more obviously pro-Communist enterprises that clustered around it. Among these were the China Aid Council, of which Mildred was executive secretary, and their magazines China Today and Ame- rasia.

Mildred Price used the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) as a pool from

which suitable prospects could be talent-spotted, but apart from Duncan Lee, Bentley could only recall her rejecting Philip Jaffe, Amerasia’s editor, as a candidate because he was too well known as “a red.” Another contact was Michael Greenberg, a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain and graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, who had been awarded a PhD from Harvard in 1941 and had worked as Lauchlin Currie’s administrative assist- ant at the Foreign Economic Administration before he succeeded Owen Lat- timore as chairman of the IPR.

Of these, only Philip Jaffe was pursued by the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation (FBI) as an espionage suspect. Originally he had been investigated as a key figure in the Amerasia investigation, and although indicted in August 1945 with Andrew Roth and Emmanuel S. Larsen, the charges were dropped because the FBI’s copious evidence had come from illegal wiretaps and searches, which could not be used in court. He was later cited for contempt,

 

having pleaded the Fifth Amendment more than a hundred times before the Tydings Committee, but he was acquitted in April 1951 and thereafter sought an immunity from prosecution, apparently anxious to avoid prosecution for wartime espionage, for which the statute of limitations did not apply. Follow- ing his acquittal, the FBI conducted four lengthy interviews with Jaffe, which remain classified, but he did implicate Joseph M. Bernstein as a courier, and he was to emerge in a VENONA text under the cover name MARQUIS. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

PRINCELINGS. Intelligence operations and illicit procurement programs conducted from Hong Kong on behalf of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by members of the families of senior PLA and Chinese Communist Party staff, known as “princelings,” are a characteristic of clandestine activ- ities based in the Special Administrative Region since the British withdrawal in July 1997. The princelings typically are enriched by participating in low- risk enterprises that buy equipment in the West that would otherwise require export licenses and then divert the matériel to the mainland. As commercial transactions, these purchases enjoy high profit margins and the protection of the PLA once the goods have reached Hong Kong for transshipment to their ultimate destination. With substantial funds at their disposal, the princelings have no difficulty in recruiting intermediaries in the West willing to engage in the “gray market.” In the few cases that have come to light by customs and enforcement interdiction, tracing the chain of responsibility beyond Hong Kong invariably proves fruitless but certainly reveals high-level sponsorship and close family ties to PLA cadres.

The princelings are occasionally the subject of investigation by the Cen-

tral Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gangchandang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, the Party’s secret anticorruption unit, but in Beijing they enjoy much of the immunity acquired by the Hong Erdai, the privileged elite sometimes re- ferred to as the “Red Second Generation” or the “Red Successors,” who have family links to the Party’s past and present leadership.

PROJECT 863. A venture capital company based in Hongzhou, in Zhejiang Province, sponsored by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia An- quanbu, Project 863, 863 Jihua, provided financial backing for entrepreneurs in the United States who developed businesses in the high-technology field, often with military or valuable commercial applications. Several investiga- tions of illicit technology transfer in the United States implicated Project 863 as the original source of funding for individuals implicated in the illegal export of embargoed equipment and software, among them Ye Fie, Zhong Ming, Yuefie Ge, and Lee Lan. Originally initiated with political support

 

from Deng Xiaoping in March 1983 following public announcements in the West concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the 1985 Euro- pean Eureka, Project 863 is managed by People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui, and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Kexue Jiahubu, formerly the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), Guojia Kexue Jishu Weiyuan- hui, which was established to supervise research in the six key areas of laser technology, automation, biotechnology, information systems, energy, and new materials. Altogether 17 major studies were undertaken and funded by 863 independently from the COSTIND and SSTC budgets.

One of Project 863’s successes is in the field of integrated circuits, the

microelectronic chips upon which all computers depend. In 1993 the Peo- ple’s Republic of China (PRC) was reliant on foreign sources for up to 80 percent of its supply, but by the end of the Eighth Five-Year Plan in 1995, China was able to meet half of its total demand for circuitry with domestical- ly produced chips. Since then, production of integrated circuits has increased at a rate greater than 20 percent per year, with a focus on reducing the cost and weight of microelectronics while increasing reliability and survivability. Project 863 has also made great progress in the development of very large- scale integrated circuits (VLSIC), which have many military applications, including advanced phased array radars and space systems.

The PRC’s capacity to manufacture sophisticated circuitry has raised the specter of the adoption of altered specifications, and close inspection of some circuit boards integral to the F-16’s avionics has revealed potentially damag- ing alien interference during the production process. This has created the suspicion that the aircraft’s electronic systems could be vulnerable to sabo- tage originating from within its own components.

Another 863 objective was the Shuguang 1000 parallel computer system, an 863-funded scheme that achieved 2.5 billion operations per second in 1985. A more sophisticated parallel supercomputer system, the Dawn series, followed, capable of speeds of up to 300 billion calculations per second, with miniaturized versions designed for microcomputers installed in missiles, launch vehicles, and satellites. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

 

 

Q

QIAN XUESEN. Sent to the United States as a student in 1936, Qian Xuesen (formerly known as Tsien Hsue-shen under the former Wade-Giles romanization of Chinese names) received his doctorate in physics from Cal- tech three years later and then moved to Paris to study under Fredéric Joliot- Curie. During World War II, he served in the U.S. Army working on rocket technology and reached the rank of colonel. At the end of hostilities, he played a key role in debriefing captured German rocket experts, including Werner von Braun, but upon the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 his security clearance was suspended, and he remained restricted to his home at Caltech until he was deported to China in 1955 in exchange for 11 American airmen captured during the Korean War.

Qian was received as a hero in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and began to assemble a team of foreign-trained engineers and established an aerospace research and development organization. In 1956 he drafted a plan closely resembling the U.S. Air Force’s Toward New Horizons to promote a weapons development program that concentrated on atomic energy, missiles, computer science, semiconductors, electronics, and automation, and which favored missile research over aircraft production. In February 1956 Zhou Enlai approved the establishment of the Ministry of National Defense’s Fifth Research Academy, Guofang Bu Di Wu Yanjiu Suo, and allowed Qian to head a military delegation to Moscow to gain Soviet technical support. He also traveled to Dresden to meet Klaus Fuchs, recently released from prison in England, to receive a briefing on the Fat Man uranium bomb. As a result, hundreds of experienced Soviet engineers were posted to China, and a num- ber of Chinese students were sent to study in the Soviet Union. Eventually 343 contracts and 257 technical projects were sponsored during the period of Sino-Soviet friendship, but the relationship was terminated by Nikita Khrushchev in August 1960.

For the next 20 years, Qian personally supervised research on ballistic and

cruise missiles, aerodynamic testing facilities, and satellites, and he pressed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to adopt nuclear power. He was the subject of harassment during the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua

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Dageming, but survived when the Central Committee ruled that the space and missile industry was a priority. Later he would be associated with the CCP’s conservative wing, and in 1977 Qian denounced Deng Xiaoping and his faction, which included Zhang Aiping, director of the People’s Libera- tion Army’s (PLA) Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui. Qian’s hostility to Deng undermined his authority, but when he changed his stance and supported Deng’s suppression of anti-regime protest- ers in 1989, he recovered his status and saw his protégé, Song Jian, appointed as chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission, Guojia Kexue Jishu Weiyuanhui. As director of the Fifth Academy, he masterminded the programs that produced the Silkworm anti-ship missile, the Dong Fang bal- listic missile, and the first successful launch of a PRC satellite in April 1970.

Qian was appointed to the CCP’s Central Committee, and in 1979 Caltech

awarded him its distinguished alumni award for his pioneering work in rock- et science. In March 1994 Qian persuaded COSTIND to participate in re- search projects that included remote-sensing satellites, hypersonic aerospace planes, adaptive optics, and high-tech communications systems.

In the 1999 Cox Report issued by the U.S. Congress, Qian was labeled as a spy. Widely acknowledged as the father of China’s space and missile programs, he died on 31 October 2009 at the age of 98 in China, never having returned to the United States. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

QIAN ZHUANGFEI. A physician by training and film director by trade, Qian Zhuangfei joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. He gained the confidence of a high-ranking Kuomintang (KMT) official and enabled both Li Kenong and Hu Di to penetrate the organization’s inner circle in 1930 where they reported extensively on the KMT’s plans, includ- ing its military intentions. They were later termed by Zhou Enlai as the “Three Heroes of the Dragon’s Lair,” Longtan Sanjie, and it was Qian who intercepted a telegram that reported the arrest and defection of Zhou’s chief of security, Gu Shunzhang. He quickly notified Li, who warned Zhou of Gu’s cooperation with the KMT and allowed Zhou, Kang Sheng, and other senior CCP officials to escape Shanghai. He joined Mao Zedong’s forces in Jiangxi and was killed during the Red Army’s “Long March,” Changzheng, in 1935.

QINGBAO BU. See MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (MID).

 

QINGBAO SUO • 305

QINGBAO SUO. In the Chinese language, qingbao essentially has two meanings: “information” and “intelligence,” with no real distinction between the two words. There are no clear words for “intelligence gathering.” A New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua, correspondent may be caught snoop- ing around a classified military facility near Washington, D.C., and can argue he was simply gathering information for an article, while a Western corre- spondent caught interviewing a Chinese dissident in Beijing can be arrested for spying. Qingbao suo refers to “information gathering,” an essential ingre- dient of the mammoth intelligence-gathering effort directed at Western coun- tries. See also MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS).

 

 

R

RB-45C. On 27 January 1954 an RB-45C reconnaissance aircraft escorted by F-86 Sabres was attacked by eight Chinese MiG-15s over the Yellow Sea. One MiG was shot down. Just over a year later, on 5 February 1955, the incident was repeated, but with the loss of two MiG fighters. See also AIR- BORNE COLLECTION; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); UNITED STATES OF AMER- ICA (USA).

REDBERRY. In 2006 China Unicom began to market a version of the BlackBerry personal computer, which had been developed by Research in Motion, a Canadian company based in Ontario. Known as the RedBerry, the Chinese device appeared to be an almost exact facsimile of the original system.

REDMOND, HUGH F. On 26 April 1951 a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer under nonofficial cover (NOC) was arrested in Shanghai, mas- querading as a representative of Henningsen & Company, a food import and export company based in Hong Kong. A former D-Day paratrooper with the 101st Airborne Division, Redmond’s cover was backstopped in the British colony, and it was the responsibility of the local British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station to ensure that it was maintained without revealing his true role. Nineteen years later, Redmond died in a Chinese prison, still pro- testing his innocence.

Redmond enlisted in the U.S. Army in July 1941 and fought in Normandy and Arnhem in 1944 before being wounded during the Battle of the Bulge in January 1945. When he was discharged in October 1945, he had been deco- rated with the Silver Star, a Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Clusters, and a Purple Heart. In July 1946 he had been enrolled in the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit (SSU), a clandestine organization headed by Colonel John Magruder, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) veteran, and posted to Shanghai, where he had married a White Russian piano teacher named Lydia. Having arranged for her to leave China, Redmond was arrested as he at-

307

 

tempted to board a troopship, the USS General W. H. Gordon, one of dozens of Americans, mainly missionaries, who were detained during the early years of the Communist revolution.

By then the SSU had been absorbed into the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which had been created in January 1946 and later became the founda- tion of the CIA in 1947, but nothing was heard about Redmond’s incarcera- tion until a fellow inmate at the notorious Ward Road Gaol was released to Hong Kong in July 1952. Further news emerged in March 1953 when a German prisoner was interviewed, and in April 1954 a French priest, Alberto Palacios, reported having shared a cell with Redmond in Shanghai’s rue Massenet prison. Then, five months later, in September 1954, Shanghai’s Military Control Committee announced that Redmond, having been linked to a spy ring that had been set up by OSS, had been convicted of espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment. Allegedly the Chinese authorities had seized a large amount of incriminating material, including 16 codebooks, six bottles of an ingredient for developing secret ink, hundreds of compromising docu- ments, and a suitcase with a hidden compartment. Also convicted were five other men and two women, of whom Wang Ko-yi and Lo Shih-hsiang were executed in front of Redmond.

By the end of 1955, 28 of the 41 Americans in Chinese custody had been

released, but the State Department seemed reluctant to make representations on behalf of Redmond’s family. In January 1958, his mother, Ruth, was allowed a brief visit to his prison, a meeting arranged by the Red Cross and reported by the New York Times. Thereafter they exchanged letters each month, and she made two further visits, in October 1962 and October 1963, but failing health prevented her from making further journeys. In 1968 the CIA, while maintaining the pretense that Redmond was simply an innocent businessman, arranged for an intermediary to pretend that a fund of $1 mil- lion had been accumulated from donations made by well-wishers and at- tempted to open ransom negotiations with Chinese diplomats, but nothing happened. Finally, in July 1970, Beijing announced that on 13 April 1970 Redmond had died after having severed an artery in his arm with a razor. His body was cremated, and his ashes were handed over to the American Red Cross for burial in his native town of Yonkers, New York. See also TROPIC; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

REGAN, BRIAN P. A year after taking up his post as a contractor for the National Reconnaissance Office, former U.S. Air Force sergeant Brian P. Regan was arrested at Dulles Airport as he attempted to board a Swissair flight for Zurich. The 40-year-old Regan had left the air force in August 2000, but the father of four had accumulated debts of $116,000 at the time he approached diplomats representing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iraq, and Libya with an offer to sell them classified information for $13

 

million. He was arrested in August 2001 and was sentenced to life imprison- ment without parole in February 2003 after some 10,000 documents and a collection of CDs had been recovered from caches buried in Virginia and Maryland. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ROC). See TAIWAN.

RESHETIN, IGOR. In October 2005 a Russian academic, Igor Reshetin, was arrested by the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnotsi (FSB) security ser- vice and charged with two other members of TsNIIMASh-Export, Sergei Tverdokhlebov and Aleksandr Rozhkin, with evading export regulations and smuggling dual-use technology to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Based near the Korolyov cosmodrome, TsNIIMASh is a state-owned aero- space technology company. In December 2007 all three defendants were sentenced to between 5 and 11 years’ imprisonment. See also TECHNOLO- GY ACQUISITION.

REVOLUTIONARY UNION. A doctrinal split within the Communist Par- ty of the United States of America in 1966 led to the expulsion of a radical Maoist, Leibel Bergman, who then spent two years in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and returned to found a new organization, the Revolutionary Union (RU), which according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in September 1970 would ultimately recruit an estimated 350 members, mainly from the Weather Underground and the Black Panthers, and be com- mitted to urban guerrilla warfare and the violent overthrow of the United States government. Using his son Lincoln and daughter-in-law Arlene, a leader of the notorious Venceremos Brigade, Bergman drew adherents from Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the Progressive Labor Party, the Worker-Student Alliance, and the Third World Liberation Front, all New Left extremist groups, and maintained contact with Chinese intelligence per- sonnel through the PRC embassy in Paris and the new diplomatic mission in Ottawa, which opened in October 1971. Bergman’s clandestine network, with headquarters in San Francisco, was penetrated by a pair of FBI under- cover agents, Betty and Lawrence Goff, who joined in San Jose, California, in 1969 but testified before Congress in October 1971.

Other American political radicals known to have been supported by the

PRC included Chris Milton of the SDS, whose father had been a missionary in Shanghai, and Robert F. Williams, the self-styled president of the “Re- public of New Africa,” who sought asylum in Beijing for three years from 1966 when he was a fugitive facing kidnapping charges but continued to distribute the Maoist propaganda tract The Crusader. According to the FBI,

 

China’s covert support for the black revolutionary movement lapsed soon after a monthlong visit to Beijing in March 1972 by the Black Panthers Raymond Hewitt and Emory Douglas, who were accompanied by Dr. Tolbert Small and National Lawyers Guild members Allen Brotsky and Charles Gar- ry. See also SINO-SOVIET SPLIT.

RIO TINTO ZINC. In July 2009 Stern Hu, the Australian head of Rio Tinto Zinc’s (RTZ) iron ore sales, and three of his colleagues were taken into custody in Beijing and accused of bribery and economic espionage. Accord- ing to the prosecutors, the mining company had bribed the directors of 16 of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) steel mills, and its computers had been found to contain confidential information concerning annual commer- cial negotiations that were described as “state secrets.” Also arrested were Wang Hongjiu, the director of shipping at the Laigang Group, and Tan Yixin, an executive of the Shougang Group, both accused of leaking classified material to Stern Hu.

The episode followed the conviction of Chen Tonghai, the former chair- man of Sinopec, the PRC’s second-largest oil company, who was given a death sentence for corruption. Aged 60, Chen’s sentence was suspended for two years to enable him to appeal and to cooperate with investigators. In March 2010 Stern Hu pleaded guilty to charges of bribery and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.

ROTH, JOHN REECE. On 3 September 2008, a federal jury convicted a 72-year-old retired University of Tennessee professor, Dr. John Reece Roth, of illegally exporting military technical information, acquired from a U.S. Air Force research contract, to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The data related to plasma technology designed for the wings of drones operating as weapons or surveillance systems, and he was charged with conspiring with the Atmospheric Glow Company, a technology company based in Knoxville, Tennessee, to unlawfully export 15 different “defense articles” to a PRC citizen in 2005 and 2006.

According to the prosecution, Dr. Roth used Chinese graduate research assistants and wire transmissions to pass the information, and in 2006 he made a lecture tour in the PRC where he also delivered more sensitive technical data controlled by the Arms Export Control Act. Roth was sen- tenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and died in London in 2010. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

ROYAL HONG KONG POLICE (RHKP). Granted its royal status fol- lowing exceptional bravery shown by officers of all ranks during the 1967 Communist-inspired rioting, the Hong Kong Police was staffed by a British officer corps but trod a delicate line between the interests of the governor and the colonial authorities, accommodating a tolerable level of crime and cor- ruption among the local Chinese. Well aware that the mainland exercised control over most of the territory by possession of its food and water supply, the police managed to maintain order but took precautions not to offend Beijing.

The Special Branch represented an elite division of the Criminal Investi- gation Division and was transformed in 1949 by the arrival of a large group of British police officers who were recruited by director Special Branch (DSB), Deputy Commissioner Peter Erwin, to replace veterans of the prewar Shanghai Settlements police. Because of endemic low-level corruption with- in the rest of the force, the Special Branch undertook anticorruption and anti- triad investigations, as well as running more conventional intelligence and counter-subversion operations. The Special Branch became a highly profes- sional security apparatus when (Sir) Jack Prendergast was appointed DSB in 1960. Hitherto, successive DSBs had rotated through other HKP divisions, but Prendergast retained key personnel, so some officers spent much of their career inside the Special Branch. With previous Special Branch experience in Palestine, the Suez Canal zone, Kenya, and Cyprus, Prendergast transformed the organization, employed external contractors to undertake sensitive sur- veillance duties, established a large analytical section, and accepted tempo- rary personnel on secondment from military intelligence, MI5, and the Se- cret Intelligence Service (SIS).

On Prendergast’s initiative, subsequent DSBs, who included Brian Slevin

(1966–1969), Christopher Dawson (1970–1971), Richard Richardson (1972–1978), James Morrin (1979–1984), and finally John Thorpe (1992–1997), liaised closely with the local representatives of the Allied liai- son services, both formally and informally, by hosting meetings each fort- night, one attended by the MI5 security liaison officer (SLO), the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) legal attaché, the Australian Security In- telligence Organisation officer, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Security Service officer. The alternate event was for the SIS station commander, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station chief, and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service representative. Other liaison relationships included rep- resentatives of the Malaysian Special Branch, the Singapore Intelligence Service, the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the Indonesians.

The Special Branch’s targets, apart from the Chinese Communists, were

the Nationalists and the Soviets. Although the latter were never allowed to establish formal diplomatic representation in the colony, the KGB and GRU operated under journalistic and trade covers. As for the Kuomintang (KMT),

 

their involvement in the destruction of an Air India Constellation, the Kash- mir Princess, on 11 April 1955, en route for the Bandung Conference, re- sulted in a major and very successful Special Branch investigation using accurate information supplied by the Communists, who in Honk Kong Police Special Branch (HKPSB) parlance were known as CHIS, an acronym for the Chinese Intelligence Service. The KMT was known as KIS, or the Kuomin- tang Intelligence Service.

Other targets were groups of saboteurs, thought to have been trained by the CIA in Okinawa, although usually they showed no interest in crossing the frontier, and those that were not betrayed by moles dropped from sight to spend their funds.

Accommodated on three floors of the police headquarters, the DSB’s staff also occupied numerous other buildings and safe houses across the colony and ran technical and human penetration operations against the Federation of Trade Unions, a Communist front controlled from Beijing. Their premises were raided by the Special Branch at the height of the 1967 riots, and the information recovered resulted in an accurate prediction that the unrest would cease by the end of the year. Because of the unique nature of the British administration of Hong Kong, which was essentially an autocracy headed by the governor, the DSB enjoyed very wide powers and was only accountable to His Excellency. Accordingly, the DSB was free to exercise considerable discretion in running operations and invariably deported or re- fused entry to individuals considered undesirable by the Special Branch. When Michael Hanley, a former SLO, was appointed MI5’s director-general in 1971, he authorized the DSB to attend the Commonwealth Security con- ference, the first time that a colonial Special Branch had attended such a gathering, and in spite of objections from SIS.

The RHKP eventually fell prey to internal corruption and in 1973 became

the target for a new institution, the Independent Commission Against Cor- ruption, which, led by Jack Prendergast, recently returned from heading the security apparatus in Aden, pursued some of the abuses, perhaps the most serious of which was the case of Chief Superintendent Peter Godber, a for- mer Special Branch officer who had been decorated for bravery during the 1967 riots.

The RHKP’s Special Branch gained more experience of Chinese espion- age than any other Allied intelligence service but limited its activities to maintaining surveillance on suspects rather than running offensive operations that might embarrass Beijing. As the 1997 handover date approached, the organization became less aggressive as a counterintelligence apparatus, and eventually the entire structure was dismantled, its large civilian staff resettled across the British Commonwealth and its files removed beyond the reach of the new Chinese administration. See also GREAT BRITAIN; TSANG, JOHN.

 

ROYAL TOURIST. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for the Los Alamos physicist Dr. Peter Lee. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

RUAN CHONGWU. Born in Hebei in 1933, Ruan Chongwu joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1952 and in 1957 graduated from the Moscow Institute of Mechanical Engineering, after which he worked for the first Ministry of Mechanical Engineering Industries Research Institute of Casting, Jixie Gongcheng Bu Zhuzao Yanjiu, in Shenyang. In 1962, he was named deputy director of the Shanghai Research Institute of Materials, Shanghai Cailiao Yanjiu Suo, and in 1971 he was appointed deputy secretary of Shanghai’s Association of Scientific Workers, Shanghai Shi Kexue Gong- zuo Zhe Xiehui. Later he served as the scientific and technical attaché, Keji Zhuanyuan, at the Chinese embassy in Bonn.

In 1983 Ruan was named deputy mayor of Shanghai, and in May that year he intervened in a hijacking incident when five men and a woman hijacked a Civil Aviation Administration of China, Zhongguo Minyong Hangkong Ju, airliner, forcing it to land in South Korea. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations or contacts since the Korean War, the PRC sent a three-strong delegation to Seoul to negotiate the repatriation of the aircraft, passengers, and crew. The subsequent agreement resulted in China, effectively granting de facto recognition to South Korea, and Ruan gave an elaborate reception for the returned hostages, at which he demanded that the hijackers be re- turned to China where they would face the death penalty for their crimes.

In September 1985, Ruan, aged 55, was named as the seventh minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu. While he lacked any background related to the MPS, he favored Deng Xiaoping’s modernization initiatives. He also reportedly enjoyed tennis, reading, and music.

Ruan’s appointment was among several relatively youthful nominees an- nounced by Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, including Jia Chunwang as head of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. Ruan’s tenure at the MPS was unremarkable, and in March 1987, after less than two years, his post was filled by a security professional, Wang Fang. After his replace- ment, Ruan held a number of important positions, including, from 1985 to 1987, serving as vice minister of the State Science and Technology Commis- sion (SSTC), Guojia Kexue Jishu Weiyuanhui, now the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui, and from 1987 to 1992, he was a member of the 13th CCP’s Central Committee. Then, from 1992 to 1993, he was minister at the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong He Shehui Baozhang Bu, now the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China,

 

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renli Ziyuan He Shehui Baozhangbu, and from 1992 to 1997 he was a member of the 14th CCP Central Committee. In 1992 he was appointed as governor of the People’s Government in Hainan Province, where in 1993 he involved himself in the Spratly Island dispute, claiming the islands for the PRC, noting a 1960s geological survey that had indicated oil deposits in the area.

From 1997 to 2002 Ruan served as a delegate to the 15th CCP National Congress, and from 1998 to 2003 as a member of the Ninth Standing Com- mittee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dii Jiu Jie Quanguo Renmin Duabuai Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui.

RUSSIA. While little is known of the operations conducted by the Sluzhba Vnezhney Razvedki (SVR) against Chinese targets, there have been several cases publicized by the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnotsi (FSB) of Russians accused of spying for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In December 2007, Igor Reshetin was convicted of espionage for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and in September 2010 two scientists at the Baltic State Technical University in St. Petersburg were charged with passing information to China.

While personal relations between China’s president, Xi Jinping, and Rus- sian president Vladimir Putin appear to be warm, they reflect a reversal of the past position now that China’s economy is eight times larger than that of Russia. Since 2014 the bilateral relationship has resulted in an agreement to link the PRC, under China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR), Yidai Yilu (the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Jingi Dai 21 Shiji Di Haishangsichou Zhi Lu), with the Rus- sian-led Eurasian Economic Union.

Russia is China’s largest supplier of oil, and shortly after Russia’s annexa- tion of Crimea, the countries signed a 30-year, $400 billion gas deal. Russia also sells military equipment to China, and the two countries have conducted joint military exercises. In the intelligence field, both countries share a com- mon concern about Islamic terrorism and pro-democracy groups, so it is assumed that there are arrangements for the exchange of information in those areas, if not others too. See also SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGAN- IZATION (SCO); SOVIET UNION.

 

S

SAN BU. See THIRD DEPARTMENT.

SEA DRAGON. In 2012, the Pentagon introduced a highly classified project code-named SEA DRAGON that has cost, or is in the process of costing,

$300 million since 2015. The budget is handled by the Pentagon’s secretive Strategic Capabilities Office and is listed under the category “Advanced Innovative Technologies.” The Department of Defense has only acknowl- edged the project publicly as a “disruptive offensive capability” that will involve “integrating an existing weapon system with an existing Navy plat- form.” It was expected that underwater testing would begin in September 2018, with an operational target date of 2020. SEA DRAGON is believed to be a supersonic anti-ship missile designed for U.S. Navy submarines, report- edly under development to counter a perceived increased naval threat from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Jiefangjun Haijun.

Between February and March 2018, the computers of a U.S. Navy contrac- tor were compromised, stealing a large amount of critically sensitive infor- mation relating to undersea warfare, including plans to equip U.S. subma- rines with supersonic anti-ship missiles. The hacked computers belonged to a contractor working for the Navy Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island, where submarine and underwater weapons research is con- ducted. In total, 614 gigabytes of SEA DRAGON material were stolen, as well as the navy submarine development unit’s electronic library, submarine radio room information, the navy’s cryptographic systems, and signal and sensor data. All these classified files had been stored on the contractor’s unclassified network, and in a multiagency investigation the culprits were traced to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), specifically the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, located in Guangdong Province.

The SEA DRAGON hacking is a further indication of the concerted effort

by the Chinese to siphon off defense-related information from U.S. defense contractors, a tactic that has been highly successful in saving the costs of research and development. Among the other advanced weapons systems known to have been compromised are the Lockheed Martin stealth, multipur-

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pose F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; the U.S. Army’s Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, designed to shoot down ballistic missiles; the navy’s littoral combat ship; and the advanced Patriot PAC-3 missile system.

SECOND DEPARTMENT (DI ER BU). The principal organization within the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) General Staff Department (GSD), Second Bureau, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu, the Second Department, Di Er Bu, is also known as the Military Intelligence Department of the People’s Liberation Army and is responsible for the collection of intelligence. The Second Department deploys military attachés abroad to embassies, conducts human intelligence and signals intelligence operations, and includes an Anal- ysis Bureau that runs the National Watch Center and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Zhongguo Xindai Guijia Guanxi Yanjiuyuan. Second Department personnel are posted overseas under various covers, including correspondents for the New China News Agency, Xinhua; the People’s Daily, Renmin Ribao; and the China Youth Daily, Zhongguo Qingnian Bao.

Subordinate to the Second Department is the First Bureau, Di Yi Ju,

focused on Taiwan and Hong Kong. See also AUTUMN ORCHID; MINIS- TRY OF STATE SECURITY (MSS).

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS). Not considered an intelli- gence priority by SIS until the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance lapsed in 1923, collection operations in the Far East region were left largely to the Admiral- ty’s Naval Intelligence Division, especially during the period of financial stringency that followed the British government’s 1920 budget that cut SIS’s expenditure in the region to £18,200, out of a total of £90,000 for the entire organization, and by 1934 the amount devoted to Japan and China amounted to £6,460. The local regional SIS chief, based in Shanghai, was Godfrey C. Denham, formerly the deputy director of the Delhi Intelligence Bureau, who had been appointed in December 1920 and remained in the post until he was replaced in 1923 by the local consul, Harry Steptoe.

Code-numbered 28000 within SIS, Steptoe was in poor health but pulled off a considerable coup in June 1931, following the arrest of Hilaire Nou- lens, by gaining access to the records of the Comintern’s Far East Bureau, but his failure to satisfy London’s demand for information about Japan, where there was no SIS post, led to the creation of the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) in Hong Kong, where Lieutenant Commander Charles Drage, a retired Royal Navy officer who had served on the China Station aboard HMS Bluebell, was established. When in April 1938 the Admiralty complained about the quality of SIS’s information from the Far East, the chief, Admiral Hugh Sinclair, retorted that there were 72 agents on SIS’s

 

payroll in the Far East, of whom 29 supplied data on the Imperial Japanese Navy. In addition, another SIS officer, Alex Summers, was based in the colony, with responsibility for an area that covered southern China, Formosa, and French Indochina. In 1939 the FECB was transferred to Singapore, where the SIS station was headed by Major J. H. Green, who liaised closely with his French and Dutch colonial counterparts and was joined in the sum- mer of 1940 by Drage. In February 1941 Godfrey Denham returned to SIS as regional director with the code number 69000.

Supported only by a subordinate station in Peking headed by Frank Liot Hill working on military activity in northern China, Steptoe continued to concentrate on Chinese political intelligence until 1940, when W. Gordon Harmon was established under press attaché cover at the embassy in Chong- qing. However, SIS operations in the north of the country effectively ceased in early 1942 following the fall of Singapore in February, when Steptoe and Hill were interned by the Japanese, later in October to be repatriated in an exchange of diplomats in Mombasa. Fortunately for both men, the Japanese did not appear to realize their significance and missed the opportunity to interrogate them. Summers was not so lucky and remained in captivity in Stanley Camp for the remainder of the war.

Meanwhile, Gordon Harmon in Chongqing established a link with Zhou Enlai, who authorized the release of some valuable Japanese signals intelli- gence, but an attempt to reinsert Frank Hill into Xi’an in 1942 failed and the Kuomintang (KMT) only allowed him to reach Shengdu, whence he was evacuated before he died of illness in October 1943. Harmon came to rely on the KMT for information, not all of which was reliable, and a review of reporting from China during the first 10 months of 1943 revealed that of a total of 119 reports, 34 had originated with the Special Operations Executive (SOE), which had developed a relationship with the KMT’s Resources Inves- tigation Institute, and 21 from American diplomats. SIS’s principal indepen- dent source appeared to be from an Estonian, Colonel Maasing, who was in contact with the Japanese military attaché in Stockholm, Lieutenant General Makoto Onodera. Only seven reports came from Harmon, of which two had been dismissed as simply expressions of opinion. However, by 1944 the situation had improved dramatically, with 566 reports delivered from 10 stations, of which the largest were at Kunming, Nanping, and Changping, employing a staff of 41. Twenty of these personnel were case officers who handled more than 400 separate sources, some of them in the Maritime Customs and the Salt Gabelle tax authority. A coast-watching service was based at Wenzhou, keeping an eye on Japanese shipping in Amoy, and SIS ran a junk equipped with a transmitter in December 1944 from Fuchou.

During the war, SIS conducted clandestine intelligence collection opera-

tions from Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and then Delhi under Inter-Services Liaison Department (ISLD) cover, a semitransparent organization that

 

stretched across the Far East. Its second director was briefly ISLD’s repre- sentative in Hong Kong, succeeded by Godfrey Denham. During the war ISLD’s principal contribution was to infiltrate teams equipped with wireless transmitters into Japanese-occupied territory, as exemplified by Sergeant John Cross, but in strategic terms they accomplished little, at considerable cost in human and technical resources. Cross later described his experiences, for which he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal, in Red Jungle.

By the end of hostilities, SIS had expanded its presence on mainland China, with stations at Tientsin, Ürümchi, Shanghai, and Nanking, but it was heavily dependent on the Nationalists for liaison reporting. No stay-behind networks had been created in anticipation of the Communist takeover, and the stations that were overrun were not allowed to transmit or send encrypted cables. The KMT’s offer to supply SIS with all it required, for £3,000 a month, was accepted, and a collaboration, code-named SALVAGE, began from headquarters in Hong Kong and Taiwan, which supposedly were in radio contact with a clandestine Nationalist network across southern China. Doubts soon emerged about the authenticity of the SALVAGE product, and the arrangement was terminated.

In the postwar era, SIS established a headquarters in Singapore under Combined Intelligence Far East cover to conduct operations against Com- munist influence in the region, concentrating on Malaya, Hong Kong, and Indonesia, supervised by the Far East Controllerate at headquarters in Lon- don. SIS personnel in Hong Kong operated under military liaison cover, and they included Andrew King, Ellis Morgan, Barrie Gane, Jimmie James, Brian Stewart, Stephen Longrigg, Nigel Inkster, and Gordon Barrass.

Within SIS, which has traditionally been staffed by generalists rather than specialists, there has always been an element of separation between the So- viet watchers and the Far East hands. As an example of the latter group, Richard Evans spent much of his career as a China watcher. See also SILK- WORM.

SECURITY LIAISON OFFICER (SLO). Overseas representatives of the British Security Service (MI5) are known as security liaison officers and traditionally have been attached with diplomatic status to high commissions in Commonwealth countries, but in Hong Kong the SLO was assigned to the governor’s staff and acted as an adviser to the Special Branch and as a conduit to MI5’s headquarters in London, working closely with the local Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) station, which operated under military cover. The first postwar SLO was Major H. E. Wilson, who temporarily headed the SIS station under Inter-Service Liaison Department cover. Two SLOs in Hong Kong, (Sir) Michael Hanley and (Sir) John Jones, would later become MI5’s director-general.

 

SENIOR BOWL. The code name of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation to monitor activity at the Lop Nor test site by deploying D-21 drones dropped from B-52H bombers outside the PRC’s airspace west of the Philippines. The unmanned, ramjet-powered 44-foot aircraft overflew the target area at Mach 3.3 at 80,000 feet and then returned over the ocean, where the waterproof camera and film capsule would be ejected with a para- chute, to be snagged by a specially adapted C-130 in a complex airborne procedure code-named TAGBOARD. At a predetermined height, an explo- sive charge would then destroy the D-21, leaving no trace of the incursion. Although Chinese radar did detect some of the SENIOR BOWL incursions, which began in November 1969, they mistook them for SR-71 Blackbird missions and issued diplomatic protests. In 1972 President Richard Nixon undertook to terminate what were described inaccurately as SR-71 over- flights, and the remaining D-21s were consigned permanently to David- Montham Air Force Base in Arizona. By the time SENIOR BOWL was terminated, 50 drones had been built by Lockheed. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

SERVICE, JOHN S. Born in Chengtu, Szechwan Province, in 1909, Jack Service attended a school in Shanghai until 1924 when he went to the University of California at Berkeley. He joined the State Department in 1935 before being appointed a political officer in Chongqing in 1941, then served in Beijing and then Shanghai, where he lived with his wife Caroline and their two children. During World War II, Service advocated support for the Com- munists, condemning Chiang Kai-shek as a corrupt warlord. He also at- tended the first Chinese Communist Party (CCP) congress in March 1945 but was recalled to Washington, D.C., where he would be arrested and ac- cused of leaking classified information to a leftist journal, Amerasia. He gave evidence to a federal grand jury in August 1945 and was later appointed to a consular post in India.

However, in March 1950, he was summoned before a Loyalty Security

Board to be cross-examined about his alleged Communist sympathies and evidence from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that he had passed secrets to Amerasia. He was dismissed in December 1951 following an adverse report by the Tydings Committee published in July 1950, together with other “China hands,” among them John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies, and Oliver Edmond Clubb.

In 1957, following an application to the U.S. Supreme Court, Service was reinstated by the State Department but was denied a security clearance. He then became an academic, being appointed curator of the Center for China Studies Library at Berkeley, and in 1971 he published The Amerasia Papers,

 

followed three years later by a collection of his dispatches, Last Chance in China. He died in 1999, aged 89. See also DIXIE MISSION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

SHADOW NETWORK. In April 2010 U.S. and Canadian computer secur- ity researchers at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto published details of how a spy-ring in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), termed the Shadow Network, systematically hacked into per- sonal computers in government offices in several continents and in particu- lar, the highest levels of India’s Ministry of Defense. The intruders accessed restricted documents that included classified security assessments of the states of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Tripura as well as the Naxalite and Maoist opposition groups. There was also personal information about a member of the Indian Directorate of General Military Intelligence and evi- dence that computers at the Indian embassy in Kabul, Moscow, and Dubai, and, at the High Commission in Abuja, Nigeria had been compromised. Confidential embassy documents about India’s relationships in West Africa, Russia and the Middle East, reports on several Indian missile systems and copies of the Dalai Lama’s personal emails were also accessed over a period of a year. Furthermore, computer systems used by the Indian Military Engi- neer Services in Bengduby, Calcutta, Bangalore, and Jalandhar; the 21 Mountain Artillery Brigade in Assam; three Indian Air Force bases; and two Indian military colleges were also penetrated.

Other compromised material included details of North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) movements in Afghanistan, and during a study lasting eight months, the researchers monitored the PRC intruders hacking into the computers of various Indian government agencies and then alerted the au- thorities in New Delhi. The Shadow Network was believed to be an offshoot of the Gh0stNet operation but was considered much more sophisticated and difficult to detect. Although it gave the appearance of being conducted by criminals based in Sichuan Province, researchers noted the ease with which the origins of such attacks can be masked, and that Chengdu was the site of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) technical reconnaissance bureau that fi- nanced the University of Electronic Science and Technology’s research on computer network defense. Specifically, the researchers recovered docu- ments classified at the “Secret,” “Restricted,” and “Confidential” levels and included information from a member of the National Security Council Secre- tariat concerning Indian security situations.

Ye Lao, a PRC official in Chengdu, said that “it’s ridiculous” to suggest

that the Chinese government had a hand in the hacking of the Indian comput- ers and added, “The Chinese government considers hacking a cancer to the whole society.”

 

SHAN YANMING. In September 2002 the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion (FBI) arrested 32-year-old Shan Yanming of Daqing as he attempted to board a flight to the PRC and charged him with gaining unauthorized access to the computers of a Silicon Valley business where he was employed.

Shan also worked for Daqing Oil, Daqing Shiyou, a division of PetroChina Company Ltd., Zhongguo Shiyou Tianranqi Gufen Youxian Gongsi, a subsid- iary of the mammoth state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Zhongguo Shiyou Tianranqi Jituan Gongsi, which arranged for Shan to travel to Mountain View, California, for training with 3DGeo Devel- opment on software used to support oil and natural gas surveys. Shan was learning to operate the company’s seismic imaging software, which de- pended on proprietary algorithms to sift through seismic data and locate oil deposits. A company official later stated that his employees were “keeping an eye on” Shan because, two years earlier, another PetroChina employee had been found to have entered the company’s offices on a weekend and accessed its computer network without permission.

Earlier in September 2002 another 3DGeo employee had discovered that

Shan had transferred the company’s most precious software source code from the network to his own computer, and these data were later found on Shan’s laptop. He was confronted about the illicit transfers and arrested a week later as he tried to flee the country. When the FBI examined his laptop, a password-breaking program was found named Crack, which was designed to gain unauthorized access to computer networks. The FBI also established that when a group of company officials from the PRC had visited Shan several weeks earlier, one of them had brought him a detachable data storage device.

PetroChina subsequently assured 3DGeo that the company had no knowl- edge of Shan’s attempt to steal secrets, but on 7 July 2004 Shan pleaded guilty in federal court to a one-count indictment charging him with gaining unauthorized access to 3DGeo computers to fraudulently obtain proprietary software programs and source code. See also UNITED STATES OF AMER- ICA (USA).

SHANGHAI. The International Settlement of Shanghai, created in 1854 following the 1844 Treaty of Nanking that ended the First Opium War, established British and French enclaves, known as concessions, outside the city walls, which came under the control of a municipal council run by international businessmen, with its own Shanghai Municipal Police, super- vised by the British. The Municipal Police’s counterespionage branch was the Special Branch headed by Harry Steptoe, a Japanese-speaking British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officer.

 

Following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, an increasing number of Rus- sian refugees settled in Harbin and Shanghai, and they were followed during the 1930s by a large flow of Jews fleeing persecution in Germany. The International Settlements also attracted numerous intelligence professionals, such as Richard Sorge, Ursula Kaczynski, and Agnes Smedley, and ac- commodated the Comintern’s Far East Bureau. As German influence waned after 1916, the Japanese exercised increasing local influence until Imperial troops invaded Manchuria in 1937 and then occupied the whole of Shanghai in December 1941.

In April 1938, General Chang Tso-lin, chief of the Second Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Military Committee, suggested di- rect liaison with the NKVD, and an agreement was made for the exchange of information, with the Chinese providing details of White emigrants, foreign- ers, and Trotskyites in return for lists of known Japanese agents. The Chinese were also to share captured Japanese codes so communications could be decoded in Moscow and the contents shared. The result of this collaboration was the establishment of a joint office linking the NKVD’s local rezidentura with one legal and one illegal Chinese counterpart.

The new joint office consisted of a First Department, engaged in the man- agement of an intelligence network, personnel training, and the study of operational techniques; the Second Department was the intelligence branch that processed agent reports; and the Third Department was administrative. According to the NKVD’s official history, the joint office’s annual cost of

$20,000 was met equally by the two parties.

In May 1938, the Seventh Department of the NKVD’s Foreign Intelli- gence Directorate appointed two GRU officers, and by the end of the year the relationship had flourished to the point that the Chinese had created seven illegal rezidenturas, linked to each other by radio and couriers, operating actively in Ningsia, Hangchou, Tientsin, and Hong Kong, with some addi- tional information coming from rezidenturas in Peking, Tsingtao, and Tsi- nan. The priorities were details of Japanese troop movements, mobilization plans, and threats of air raids on Chinese cities.

The NKVD came to take a poor view of Chinese organization, agent training, and operational security and complained that the Chinese had at- tempted to recruit Soviet joint office personnel. Nevertheless, the Soviets provided training in secret writing methods, cipher systems, direction-finding equipment, and other technical support, and in return received a flow of military, political, and economic intelligence.

As well as intensive Soviet activity in Shanghai, the city also accommo- dated the U.S. Navy’s first signals intelligence collection site on foreign shores. A clandestine intercept facility was established in 1924 to monitor Japanese Imperial Navy wireless traffic in tandem with another station aboard the cruiser USS Huron, but further sites were opened at Wailupe,

 

Hawaii, in 1925 and then in Peking in 1927. The Shanghai station was reinforced in 1927 by the arrival of a cargo ship, the USS General Alava, which was withdrawn in March 1929, and then was designated Station A and linked to Office of Naval Intelligence facilities at Cavite and Guam. After much success, including with Japan’s diplomatic traffic, Station A was closed in December 1940 and transferred to the Philippines.

During World War II, Shanghai retained its reputation as a center of espi- onage, and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) came across several cases in 1941 where Nazi spies on missions to the United States had been supplied with cover addresses in Shanghai as a means of communicat- ing with their Abwehr controllers in Hamburg. More recently, with the city’s transformation as a major hub of global commerce, Western tourists and businessmen have reported incidents that indicate the presence of an active and vigilant Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, apparatus. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; ANUBIS; ARMED FORCES SECUR- ITY AGENCY (AFSA); BANNER, USS; BLACKBIRD; CENTRAL BU- REAU 610; CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR DISCIPLINE INSPECTION (CCDI); CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); CHIANG CHING- KUO; CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI; CHINA ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING PHYSICS (CAEP); CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY CORPORATION (CASIC); CHINESE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE; COL- LECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION (CSTO); DENG; EWERT, ARTHUR; FARRELL, FRANK; FOURTH DEPARTMENT; GREAT BRITAIN; HALPERN, ERIC; HANSON, HAROLD DEWITT; HINTON, JOAN; HONEYTRAP; HUTCHINSON, MILTON; ILLEGALS; INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; KAZAKHSTAN; KOREAN WAR; KYR- GYZSTAN; LEE, DAVID YEN; LEE, SAM CHING SHENG; MALAYAN PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA); MAO ZEDONG; MASK; MI5; MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY (MEI); NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB); NEEDHAM, JOSEPH; NOULENS, HI- LAIRE; PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF); POSEI- DON, HMS; REDMOND, HUGH F; REVOLUTIONARY UNION; ROY- AL HONG KONG POLICE (RHKP); SERVICE, JOHN S; SHRIVER, GLENN D; SOONG, CHARLIE; SOUTH KOREA; SOVIET UNION; SPE- CIAL BRANCH; WORTON, WILLIAM A; WU SHU-TUNG; XIONG XIANGHUI; YU QIANGSHENG; ZHU CHENZHI.

SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO). Created in

1996 by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyr- gyzstan, and Tajikistan, and originally known as the “Shanghai Five,” the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai Shi Hezuo Zuzhi, established a 100-kilometer border zone in the member states in which military informa- tion and intelligence would be exchanged freely in an effort to reduce region-

 

al tension. Three years later, further protocols were added to the SCO to embrace counterterrorism operations, measures for the suppression of separ- atist movements, and mutual anti–drug smuggling operations. Then, in June 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, with Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongo- lia accepting observer status. Although intended as a forum for the exchange of intelligence and the mounting of joint military exercises, the SCO is thought by Western analysts to have strengthened bilateral relations among the member states, but to have failed to eliminate mutual Sino-Russian suspi- cions or provide a reliable channel for passing intelligence on sensitive issues such as nuclear installations.

Attempts by the PRC to develop the SCO into a free-trade area have been opposed by Russia, which has also declined to participate in joint military exercises conducted with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Further- more, the Kremlin remains suspicious that the SCO has been manipulated by the PRC to improve its access to regional oil and gas reserves, citing Chinese investment in two major pipelines. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline, con- trolled by the China National Petroleum Corporation, pumps oil 3,000 kilom- eters, from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang, and the Central Asia Gas Pipeline, a joint project with Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGaz, sends natural gas on a route from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to the PRC. Where- as the old pipelines were aligned on a north–south axis, sending energy into Soviet Russia, the new alignment is intended to benefit Beijing.

In 2004 the SCO adopted a special counterterrorism center, the Regional

Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headed by a deputy director of the Russian Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnotsi (FSB) security apparatus, to simplify the detention and extradition of terrorist suspects between participating states. Hitherto the RATS system had been used by the FSB to facilitate access to suspects deemed extremists who had been granted refugee status in a neigh- boring country, their names having been added to a common database. Under the terms of the SCO’s convention on privileges and immunities, RATS personnel and their bases are given diplomatic status, and these rights were exercised in 2008 when a Uighur imam, Huseyincan Celil, who held a Cana- dian passport, was deported from Uzbekistan to the PRC. Similarly, using the RATS in 2007, Russia began to deport Falun Gong supporters to the PRC, among them Ma Hui, a United Nations–mandated refugee, and Gao Chuman, who were escorted across the border in March and May respectively.

In 2005 the SCO applied Chinese-inspired pressure on the Uzbek and

Kyrgyz governments to terminate U.S. Air Force leases on local bases, which led to the closure of the American facility in Uzbekistan.

In June 2017 the organization expanded to eight members when India and Pakistan joined the SCO as full members. With the addition of those coun- tries, the SCO represents about half the world’s population, a quarter of the

 

world’s gross national product (GNP), and over 80 percent of Eurasia’s landmass. See also COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZA- TION (CSTO).

SHEN JIAN. One of Kang Sheng’s most trusted subordinates, Shen Jian was based in Havana in October 1962 and was entrusted by the Cubans with an unexploded U.S. Air Force missile so that the PRC could reverse engineer it. Highly regarded in Beijing, Shen was consulted by Zhou Enlai in 1973 when Mao Zedong was suspicious of Henry Kissinger’s discreet approach to normalize Sino-American relations. Reportedly Shen was able to verify that the approach was real enough by checking with Larry Wu-tai Chin.

Shen’s wife, Xiong Xianghui, was a former head of the English Depart- ment at the Institute of International Relations, Guojia Guanxi Yanjiu Suo (now the University of International Relations, Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan), and had been responsible for monitoring Kissinger when he first went to China. She spoke excellent English, having attended Smith College in the United States before the revolution.

SHENZHEN DONJIN COMMUNICATION COMPANY. In August

2007 the Intel Corporation filed a lawsuit against the Shenzhen Donjin Com- munication Tech Company Ltd., Shenzhen Shi Tong Jin Tongxin Jishu Youx- ian Gongsi, claiming that the Chinese firm had stolen its proprietary technol- ogy. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

SHESU LO, ROLAND. In 1986 a Chinese American from Los Angeles, Roland Shesu Lo, was arrested in China and sentenced to 12 years’ imprison- ment for espionage allegedly conducted between 1984 and 1985. A former Taiwanese intelligence officer who had emigrated to the United States in 1980, Shesu Lo was the first American citizen to be charged with espionage since full diplomatic relations had been established. See also TAIWAN; NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB).

SHIH YI-CHI. On 19 January 2018 an adjunct professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, Shih Yi-chi, was arrested with Mai Kiet Ahn on federal charges of illegally obtaining technology and integrated circuits with military applications for export to a Chinese company without obtaining the required export license. It was charged that Shih and Mai had conspired to provide Shih with unauthorized access to a protected computer from an un- named U.S. company that manufactured a specialized high-speed chip, the monolithic microwave integrated circuits (MMIC). Mai had posed as a do- mestic customer through his company, MicroEx Engineering, and the deal was financed by funds paid from China to Shih’s company, Pullman Lane

 

Productions LLC. The chips were sent to Shih’s company, the Chengdu GaStone Technology Company, Chengdu Jia Shi Keji Gongsi, where a facto- ry was to be established. In 2014 the Chengdu GaStone Technology Compa- ny had been placed on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, a govern- ment watchlist, “due to its involvement in activities contrary to the national security and foreign policy interest of the United States—specifically, that it had been involved in the illicit procurement of commodities and technologies for unauthorized military use in China.”

Also indicted was Shih’s brother, Shih Ishiang, a retired professor at Mon- treal’s McGill University. Shih Ishiang was Chengdu GaStone Technology’s technical director, while Shih Yi-chi was listed as the company’s president. Money was also funneled from Mai’s firm to the Canadian company run by Shih Ishiang, JYS Technologies, and an application was made in Canada to extradite Shih Ishiang.

In December 2018 Mai pleaded guilty to a single count of smuggling and faced a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. In July 2019 Shih Yi-chi was convicted on all 18 charges and faces a maximum sentence of 219 years in prison.

SHIMRAY, ANTHONY. An international arms dealer based in Bangkok, Anthony Shimray was arrested in Bihar in September 2010 when he strayed across Nepal’s border while visiting Kathmandu. Under interrogation, Shim- ray revealed that he had acted as an intermediary for the state-owned defense corporation China North Industries Group Corporation Ltd. (Norinco), Zhongguo Beifang Gongye Jituan Youxian Gongsi, and the state-owned Chi- na Xinshidai Company, Zhongguo Xinshidai Gongsi, both weapons manu- facturers in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He claimed they had supplied rifles, explosives, and rocket launchers to various insurgent groups in India, including the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, usually smuggling them from the Chinese port of Beihai through Bangladesh. He also revealed that since 2008 the PRC had sponsored an NSCN veteran, Kholose Swu Sumi, as the organization’s permanent representative at Kunming, in Yunnan Province. Reportedly several senior PRC intelligence officers had told Shimray that their strategy was to subsidize the NSCM as a means of undermining New Delhi’s authority to conduct border negotiations and to collect intelligence about the deployment of Indian military forces in what the NSCM claimed was an autonomous “Greater Nagaland.”

SHRIVER, GLENN D. In June 2010, 28-year-old Glenn Duffie Shriver, who had applied to join the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) three years earlier, was arrested as he attempted to board a plane in Detroit bound for

 

South Korea. He was charged with having failed to disclose that when visiting the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where he had studied in Shanghai as an undergraduate, he had met Chinese intelligence personnel and had been paid $70,000 by them in three installments. In October 2010 Shriver, from Grand Rapids, Michigan, pleaded guilty to a charge of conspir- acy to communicate national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.

Fluent in Mandarin, Shriver was befriended by three PRC intelligence officers while living in Shanghai in October 2004, having recently graduated from Grand Valley State University in Michigan, and he agreed to return to the United States and apply for a job in the American intelligence commu- nity. In court he admitted that he had intended to gain access to classified information and then pass it to the PRC. According to his confession, he had met a woman named “Amanda” after he had answered an advertisement in a local English-language newspaper seeking scholars of East Asian studies to write articles. He had been paid $120 for his first contribution, a paper on Sino-U.S. relating to North Korea and Taiwan, and then had been introduced to a “Mr. Tang” and a “Mr. Wu,” whom he would meet more than 20 times over the following years. Even after he had moved to Korea to teach English and had gotten engaged to a girl named “Yumi,” he continued to maintain contact with Amanda.

Between 2005 and his arrest, Shriver applied to join the U.S. State Depart-

ment and the CIA, and he admitted to having made false statements in De- cember 2009 on a CIA questionnaire when he claimed not to have had any contact with a foreign government or its representatives during the last seven years. He also failed to mention his travel to the PRC in 2007 when he received a $40,000 cash payment for having submitted his job application.

SHU QUANSHENG. On 7 April 2009, Dr. Shu Quansheng, a 68-year-old naturalized American citizen, was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment for illegally exporting space-launch technical data to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and for offering bribes to Chinese government officials. The scientist was also ordered to pay $387,000 in restitution.

Shu, the president, secretary, and treasurer of AMAC International, a high- tech company located in Newport News, Virginia, with a representative of- fice in Beijing, was arrested on 24 September 2008 and on 17 November pleaded guilty to three charges concerning the export of a defense service in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the export of a defense article, and attempting to bribe a foreign government official in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

 

According to the prosecution, Shu helped the PRC with the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for space-launch vehicles based at the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site, Wenchang Hangtian Fashe Chang, on Hainan.

Shu, who had conducted cryogenic research for the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and had written six books and 100 academic papers, also illegally exported technical data related to the design and manufacture of a Standard 100M3 Liquid Hydrogen (LH) 2 Tank and offered $189,300 in bribes to officials at the 101 Institute in January 2007 to win a $4 million hydrogen liquefier contract for a French company he represented.

According to the Department of Justice, Shu was associated with the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) General Armaments Department, Jiefang- jun Zong Zhuangbei Bu; the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technolo- gy’s 101st Research Institute, Zhongguo Yunzai Huojian Jishu Yan Jiu Yuan Di 101 Yanjiu Suo; the Beijing Special Engineering Design Research Insti- tute, Beijing Shi Tezhong Gongcheng Sheji Yan Jiu Yuan; and the PLA’s Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for the National De- fense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui. The prosecution also alleged that in 2003 Shu had supplied the PRC with a document titled “Commercial Information, Technical Proposal and Budge- tary Officer: Design, Supply, Engineering, Fabrication, Testing & Commis- sioning of 100M3 Liquid Hydrogen Tank and Various Special Cryogenic Pumps, Valves, Filters and Instruments,” which contained controlled military technical data. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

SIDEWINDER. In May 1996 a joint Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) task force code-named SIDEWINDER conducted a study of Chinese organized crime and intelligence operations and compiled a report titled Chinese Intelligence Services and Triad Financial Links in Canada, which proved highly contro- versial and was replaced by a document code-named ECHO. This too was criticized by the Parliamentary Security Intelligence Review Committee, which noted in its 1999–2000 annual report that, “as to the first draft of the SIDEWINDER report, we find it very faulty in almost all respects. It de- parted from standards of professionalism and lacked the most basic analy- sis.”

SILKWORM. In 1987 the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) ac- quired a Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missile from an Iranian intermediary, Jamshid Hashemi. Based on the Soviet-built Styx naval weapon, the Silk-

 

worm was considered a potent threat, especially when it was bought by Iran and deployed in the Persian Gulf as a threat to oil tankers. Hashemi had been backed financially by SIS since his arrival in London on a U.S. passport in July 1984 when he started to purchase arms from China for the regime in Tehran. However, in August 1997, Hashemi, aged 63, was arrested on fraud charges as he attempted to fly to the United States from Dublin on a false passport. Eventually Hashemi pleaded guilty to three charges of fraud in December, and in February 1999 he was sentenced to three years’ imprison- ment. Described by the judge as a “ruthless international conman,” the Seri- ous Fraud Office alleged that he had set up numerous companies to dupe suppliers of commodities, such as Vietnamese rice, German gas masks, and American satellite telephones, for bogus sales to Iran valued at around £3 million, which was laundered through a network of 40 bank accounts.

Hashemi’s SIS handlers, whom he met at his flat in Victoria every Tues-

day, were unaware of his other activities, although in court he claimed that they had been known to them. His principal vehicle, Tagell Ltd., was used to provide a £250,000 deposit for a false end-user certificate and the purchase of Silkworm missiles to the value of £350 million. He also negotiated the sale of Portuguese-manufactured 155 mm artillery shells, which were the subject of an international embargo. According to Hashemi, he was accompanied by an SIS secretary for a visit to China in October 1985 to buy the weapons, which were to be paid for through an account of the Hong Kong branch of Iran’s Melli Bank. The Silkworms were shipped to Bandar Abbas in 1987, but one was diverted to SIS for examination by British technicians. Alleged- ly, SIS also arranged to supply the Iranians with 15 British-made motorboats reinforced to carry heavy machine guns. The boats, exported through Greece, were later deployed against shipping during the “tanker war” in the Gulf.

Hashemi severed his links to SIS in 1993 when he was refused a British

passport, at a time when he was under police investigation after a criminal complaint had been made by a dissatisfied client over a £50 million business deal involving 100,000 South African–made biological protection suits.

Hashemi, who with his brother Cyrus had played a murky role in the Iran- Contra scandal in 1980, was a controversial figure who had gained notoriety when he had falsely alleged that the U.S. director of central intelligence (DCI) Bill Casey had attempted to delay the release of the American hos- tages seized in Tehran in 1979 so as to assist Ronald Reagan’s election campaign. According to a contemporaneous Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment, Cyrus Hashemi was considered “only slightly less sleazy than his notorious brother Jamshid, who is con artist par excellence and is a candidate for the scam of the month championship.” Jamshid Hashemi died in August 2013.

 

SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION (SACO). Es-

tablished in 1942 by a U.S. Navy officer, Commander Milton E. Miles, following the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor, SACO was headed by the Kuomintang (KMT) intelligence chief Tai Li and staffed by some 3,000 American personnel centered on Chongqing. SACO was intended to coordi- nate Chinese operations against the Japanese and built a signals intercept and direction-finding station outside the city that was linked by radio to San Diego, although much of the traffic was sent encrypted over commercial cable carriers directly to Washington, D.C. Known as Happy Valley and Station F, the site was the first U.S. Navy intercept facility in China and drafted operators from Australia and from Cavite in the Philippines. One of their tasks was to monitor Japanese transmissions from spies reporting on Flying Tiger aircraft taking off from Kunming, and the identification and elimination of these clandestine sets prompted the creation in November 1943 of a new station at Ningsha in Mongolia. Later new sites were opened at Kwelin and Nanning, but plans to expand SACO’s activities to a further 17 forward bases were abandoned in August 1945 following the detonation of the two atomic bombs on Japan. See also OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SER- VICES (OSS).

SINO-SOVIET SPLIT. Although Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ana- lysts detected and reported the apparent ideological differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties, wider acceptance of a Sino-Soviet split took several years to be fully acknowledged by United States policy makers. The monitoring of public statements and broadcasts from both Beij- ing and Moscow allowed some interpreters, such as the CIA Directorate of Intelligence’s Donald Zagoria, to discern the subtle nuances in policy com- mentaries that suggested the denunciation in Moscow of Joseph Stalin in the February 1956 secret speech at the 20th Party Congress by Nikita Khrush- chev had been viewed by Mao Zedong as revisionism. In July 1958 Morris Childs, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) asset inside the Commu- nist Party of the United States of America, code-named SOLO, returned from Moscow with the first hard intelligence that a serious breach had devel- oped between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Some in the CIA were quite ready to accept the assertion of the KGB

defector Anatoli Golitsyn, who, following his departure from the rezidentura in Helsinki in December 1960, had alleged that the supposed split was part of a wider Kremlin deception intended to mislead the West about the true nature of the Soviet relationship with Mao, and even with Josip Broz Tito. Although many of Golitsyn’s theories were later discredited, the fact that CIA analysts debated the issue at all is an indication of the paucity of accurate information available from Beijing during that era. Nevertheless, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued the CIA with a secret directive to exploit and exacerbate

 

internal Communist tensions, encouraging the agency to “create and exploit troublesome problems for International Communism, impair relations be- tween the USSR and Communist China and between them and their satel- lites, complicate control within the USSR, Communist China and their satel- lites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet Bloc.”

Proof of the policy schism between Beijing and the Kremlin only emerged following Khrushchev’s visit to China in October 1960 when divergent re- ports circulated concerning nuclear weapons and doctrine relating to the promotion of international communism rather than peaceful coexistence. Dismayed by Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinism and committed to a strategy of opposing Western colonialism, Mao invited him to Beijing at the end of July 1958 for an unexpected visit lasting three days. Ostensibly the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a crisis in the Middle East, where the United States had landed troops in Lebanon, and Great Britain had intervened in Jordan, at a moment when Mao sought to apply pressure on the Quemoy garrison. Although a routine joint communiqué was issued at the visit’s conclusion, the ambiguous language employed apparently betrayed a growing division between Soviet and Chinese strategy.

On a further visit, in September 1959, to attend the celebration of the 10th

anniversary of the Chinese revolution, Khrushchev made an overt commit- ment to world peace, rejecting Mao’s militancy in favor of trade and aid, and failed to issue the expected bland joint communiqué. Mao had been offended by Khrushchev’s trip, without prior consultation, to President Eisenhower in Washington, D.C., earlier in the month and by his lack of support for Chinese pressure on the Nationalists in the Taiwan Straits. An incident on the Indian border with Kashmir was engineered to demonstrate China’s displeasure, and Khrushchev responded with an oblique attack on Beijing in a speech de- livered in Novosibirsk on 10 October confirming the Soviet Union’s commit- ment to an ideological rather than military struggle with the West, declaring Soviet neutrality on border disputes with India and cautioning against “ad- venturism” in Laos and Korea. When in December 1959, on the centenary of Stalin’s birth, Pravda reported on his failures while Renmin Ribao described his virtues, the scale of the doctrinal differences between the two parties became more apparent.

The vote taken by the 81 international delegates attending the 22nd Con-

gress on a motion criticizing Albania, but actually aimed at Beijing, demon- strated the Kremlin’s relative strength, with the Soviets receiving support from virtually all the Communist parties in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, whereas the Chinese were backed by all the Asian parties, with the sole exception of Ceylon. Of the 68 speeches reported to have been made by foreign delegates, those from Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Nor- way, Iceland, Northern Ireland, Luxemburg, Belgium, Denmark, Algeria,

 

Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, the Dominican Republic, Martinique, and Guadeloupe opposed Albania. Altogether 44 delegates took Moscow’s line, with only 24 refraining.

The CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence monitored the deterioration in the relationship between Mao and Khrushchev by careful analysis of the broad- cast and print media, study of public speeches, and monitoring subtle changes of nuance in joint communiqués, combined with reporting from clandestine sources, including some in the Polish Communist Party. See also REVOLUTIONARY UNION.

SINO-SOVIET TREATY. Formally known as the Pact of Friendship, Alli- ance, and Mutual Assistance, the treaty was signed in Moscow on 14 Febru- ary 1950. The agreement formed the basis of economic aid for Beijing in return for a 10-year lease on the Soviet naval base in Manchuria, the Man- churian railway, and mining rights in Xinjiang Province, where there were deposits of valuable minerals, including uranium. However, following his visit to Beijing in June 1959, Nikita Khrushchev terminated the agreement and withdrew all Soviet technicians from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), thus handicapping many infrastructure projects, including Beijing’s secret nuclear weapons research program. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SINO-VIETNAMESE WAR. In October 1978 the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) detected the movement of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from garrisons in Kunming toward the Vietnamese border, and within the month analysts reported that the PLA had accumulated 320,000 troops and 350 aircraft in the area and had instituted a special communications link from Beijing to Duyun. When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia on 4 Janu- ary 1979, the NSA and the Australian Defence Signals Directorate moni- tored the brief conflict, which eliminated Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime in Phnom Penh, and anticipated a Chinese response, which followed at dawn on 17 February when the PLA overwhelmed Vietnam’s northern province and remained in occupation for 29 days. During that occupation, the PLA report- edly completely dismantled a Vietnamese cement factory and transported it back to China. An NSA review of the conflict concluded that radio silence, imposed by both the Vietnamese and the Chinese, had handicapped the agen- cy’s ability to provide Washington, D.C., with accurate assessments of the deteriorating military situation in the frontier region. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

SIXTH RESEARCH INSTITUTE. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Sixth Research Institute, Jiefangjun Di Liu Yanjiu Suo, managed by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Jiefangjun Kongjun, is the principal Chinese signals intelligence (SIGINT) organization, based in Beijing.

SK-5. One of these aircraft, the U.S. Navy’s designation for the Ryan 147SK unmanned drone, malfunctioned on 10 February 1970 while on a damage assessment mission to North Vietnam. The plane’s controller on a Navy E-2 Hawkeye lost contact with the SK-5, which continued to fly until it ran out of fuel and then automatically deployed a parachute to land on Hainan Island. The PLA later claimed to have shot down the aircraft, identifying Qi Deqi and Zhou Zingcheng of the Fourth Regiment, Division 8, as the Naval Air Force officers responsible. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; CEN- TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA); NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

SMEDLEY, AGNES. Always a firebrand revolutionary, Agnes Smedley was from a poor family in Missouri, and she committed herself to anti- colonialism when she met Laipat Rai, an Indian nationalist, at Columbia University in New York in March 1917. Thereafter she was constantly in the vanguard of campaigns for radical and feminist causes, in particular, schemes to undermine the British Empire. She was indicted on espionage charges in March 1918 after the arrest of a group of Indian nationalists who had estab- lished contact with the German government and had planned to smuggle home weapons and propaganda. She was an active member of the Socialist Party and a regular contributor to its newspaper, the Call. After her release from prison, she moved to Berlin, where she continued her close association with Indian nationalists.

In November 1928 she traveled to China as a correspondent for the Frank-

furter Zeitung and immersed herself in the Chinese revolutionary movement. In her absence she was tried in the marathon Meerut conspiracy trial, which began in March 1929 following the arrest of the leading members of the outlawed Indian Communist Party. Later the same year, she moved to Shanghai, and soon afterward she became the mistress of Richard Sorge, the famous Soviet GRU agent. She introduced Sorge to a Japanese journalist, Ozaki Hotsumi, who was translating her best-selling autobiography, Daugh- ter of the Earth, and in 1941 both men were arrested in Japan on espionage charges and executed in 1944. While in Shanghai, Smedley contributed to the Comintern-backed English-language newspaper, the Voice of China, using the pseudonym “R. Knailes,” standing for “Rusty Nails.”

 

Between June 1933 and April 1934 Smedley was in the Soviet Union, recovering her health and working on her journalism, but by October 1934, following a brief return to the United States, she was reporting for the Manchester Guardian from the Sino-Japanese front. For 18 months, she lived among the Communist guerrillas and became close to their leader, Mao Zedong. In August 1940 her health failed, and she was evacuated by air to Hong Kong, where she was placed under house arrest by the British author- ities. Having obtained her release, she became a vocal critic of the colony’s administration, and in May 1941 she arrived by ship in California. Her ac- count of the war against the Japanese, Battle Hymn of China, was published in 1943 and is still regarded as a masterpiece of war reporting, even if the political bias is strident. In July of that year, she entered an artists’ retreat, the Yaddo Foundation near Saratoga Springs, New York, but continued her po- litical campaigning in support of the Chinese Communists.

By August 1944 Smedley had attracted the attention of the Federal Bu-

reau of Investigation (FBI), although her political views had been well known for many years, not least because they had been noted in the report issued in 1938 by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA), chaired by Martin Dies. In March 1948 she was obliged to leave Yaddo, and early the following year she was named as a Soviet spy by General Charles Willoughby, the former director of military intelligence in Japan who had edited a report on the Sorge case based on the interrogation of his Japanese captors. Willoughby’s allegations were given additional weight by testimony of Hede Massing and Whittaker Chambers, who both identified Smedley as a Soviet agent, as well as the confession written for the Japanese by Richard Sorge. Smedley indignantly denied the charges but experienced considerable difficulty obtaining a renewal of her American passport because the HCUA intended to subpoena her as a witness. Smedley settled for a travel document limiting her movement to Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in December 1949 she arrived in London, where she moved in with friends she had made in Hong Kong.

In April 1950 Smedley was admitted to a hospital in Oxford for surgery on

the duodenal ulcer that had been responsible for her poor health, but she died on 6 May, the day after her operation.

SNOWDEN, EDWARD JOSEPH. On 20 May 2013, Edward Snowden,

born on 21 June 1983, flew to Hong Kong with a large cache of documents he had stolen while working as a contractor for the National Security Agen- cy (NSA) at the newly opened Wahiawa facility on Oahu, Hawaii. Within two weeks, a Guardian journalist, Glenn Greenwald, began to publish the leaked material, estimating that Snowden had offered between 50,000 and

 

200,000 documents. Other publications followed with similar disclosures, including the Washington Post and the New York Times in the United States, Le Monde in France, and Der Spiegel in Germany.

Snowden came from a service family, with a grandfather who retired from the U.S. Coast Guard with the rank of admiral and later occupied a senior position within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). His father too had been a Coast Guard officer, and his mother was a clerk employed at the

U.S. District Court in Maryland. A sister was an attorney in Washington, D.C., and Snowden later said that he too had been expected to work for the

U.S. government.

After failing to graduate from high school, in part due to a bout of mono- nucleosis, Snowden passed a General Education Development high school equivalency test and started classes at a community college in Maryland. In 2011, while working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Mary- land, he enrolled in an online master’s program at the University of Liver- pool in England. He studied Japanese, with an interest in Japanese culture, and gained a basic understanding of Mandarin Chinese. He scored above 145 on separate IQ tests.

In May 2004 Snowden enlisted in the U.S. Army, broke both legs in a training accident as a candidate for the special forces, and was discharged in September of that same year. He then worked as a security guard at the NSA- sponsored University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language. He later said that while the site was not a classified facility, he was required to have a security clearance that involved a polygraph and stringent back- ground investigation.

In 2006 Snowden attended a job fair involving intelligence agencies, which resulted in a position with the CIA’s global communications division at the organization’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia. He distinguished himself in the CIA computer division and was selected for a six-month intensive program in a secret school for technology specialists. Upon com- pletion of the course, he was posted to the Geneva station under diplomatic cover attached to the U.S. consulate. It was during this assignment, Snowden claimed, that he initially began to harbor doubts about his work.

In 2009 Snowden began work for Dell as a contract employee, assigned to the Yokota Air Base near Tokyo, managing computer systems for the NSA facility, where his duties included a requirement to brief senior civilian and military personnel on how to defend their computer networks from Chinese hackers. His expertise grew, and he described himself as an “expert in cyber counterintelligence.” In 2011 he returned to Maryland in a senior position with Dell, where he consulted with the CIA’s technology branch. It was during this period, in April 2012, that Snowden began to download docu- ments outlining U.S. electronic collection programs. Adopting the cover name “Cincinnatus,” Snowden contacted Glenn Greenwald and then, in early

 

2013, Laura Poitras, a documentary film producer. In May 2013 the Wash- ington Post’s Barton Gellman was contacted by Snowden and received docu- ments relating to the NSA’s highly secret PRISM electronic mining pro- gram, which allows for court-approved access to Google and Yahoo! ac- counts. It has been estimated that of the 50,000 to 200,000 documents Snow- den gave to Greenwald and Poitras, most were passed while he worked for Dell.

In March 2012, Dell assigned Snowden to Wahiawa, an NSA facility on Oahu, as the leading technologist in the information-sharing office, and a year later he was employed in the same capacity by the consultancy firm Booz Allen Hamilton. That NSA site is reported to monitor the internal communications of China and North Korea.

Snowden claims he quit Dell after seeing Director of National Intelligence James Clapper lie to Congress, and he took a reduction in salary when he moved to work for Booz Allen Hamilton. He allegedly transferred to the firm so he could access additional data with the intention of exposing the NSA’s global spying. Snowden was later described by one former colleague as a “genius among geniuses,” and he was able to gain virtually unlimited access to NSA systems. Although Booz Allen Hamilton reportedly found some discrepancies when he underwent a background security review, he was hired anyway. Later Snowden would assert that the NSA subsequently had attempted to diminish his status, responsibilities, and access.

Snowden’s intention in Hong Kong, so he claimed, was to find somewhere safe where he could release the large number of highly classified stolen documents he had gathered over the previous several years. When the United States requested Snowden’s detention, the Hong Kong authorities declined, but Snowden said he seldom left his room at the Mira Hotel. In an interview with the South China Morning Post, Snowden asserted that he wanted to remain in the territory and accused the NSA of having “committed tremen- dous crimes” against Hong Kong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He then proceeded to identify Chinese internet protocol (IP) addresses that he said the NSA monitored. “NSA does all kinds of things like hack Chinese cell phone companies to steal all of your SMS data,” he said, and he de- scribed how the NSA had hacked university computers in the PRC and systems managed by Pacnet, a large telecommunications company.

Among Snowden’s many disclosures were documents referring to NSA

operations conducted against President Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Minis- try, banks, and telecommunications companies such as Huawei. Some of his material mentioned SHOTGIANT, an effort initiated in January 2009 to access the company’s internal communications, which extended to 1,400 customers; engineering training manuals; and emails exchanged between the founder Ren Zhengfei and Chairwoman Sun Yafang. According to Snowden, the NSA cracked two of China’s biggest cell phone networks, thus allowing

 

it to monitor some Chinese military units. It also deployed to the Beijing embassy a team of technicians from the Special Collection Service code- named MUSKETEER, which intercepted wi-fi signals from “the embassies of India, Singapore, Pakistan, Colombia, and Mongolia.” Allegedly, when studying the Indian embassy’s traffic, it was discovered that a local hacker had penetrated the embassy’s computers and was downloading “approxi- mately 10 sensitive diplomatic documents” every day and often uploaded “Microsoft Office–compatible files or Adobe PDF documents” to drop boxes on the “public internet.” Reportedly the NSA then began copying the infor- mation from these drop boxes for itself and began “analyzing the Indian embassy’s diplomatic communications.” This coup led the MUSKETEER experts to study “how the Chinese conduct computer-to-computer [C2C] operations against foreign targets” and find more Chinese hacking “in several other locations.”

The New China News Agency (NCNA), Xinhua, commented, “These,

along with previous allegations, are clearly troubling signs. They demon- strate that the United States, which has long been trying to play innocent as a victim of cyber attacks, has turned out to be the biggest villain in our age.”

Allied counterintelligence analysts have concluded that it is very likely the Chinese accessed the four laptops Snowden arrived with in Hong Kong, all loaded with stolen data. Having obtained all the material in Snowden’s pos- session, they probably had no further use for him and therefore allowed him to leave.

After the Mira Hotel, Snowden stayed in a cramped apartment with other refugees seeking asylum in Hong Kong, though the Russian newspaper Kom- mersant reported that Snowden was living at the Russian consulate shortly before his departure from Hong Kong. On 23 June 2013 he boarded Aeroflot flight SU213 to Moscow, carrying his canceled U.S. passport and accompa- nied by a WikiLeaks journalist, Sarah Harrison. On 24 June the WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange confirmed that WikiLeaks had paid for Snowden’s accommodation in Hong Kong and his flight to Moscow.

Snowden has given conflicting accounts of what he did with the docu- ments in his possession. In October 2013 he confirmed that he had given all the classified documents he took to Hong Kong to various journalists he met while there, but in May the following year he alleged, somewhat improbably, that he had protected himself from Russian leverage by destroying the mate- rial in his possession before landing in Moscow.

Initially Snowden said he only intended to transit Moscow and hoped to travel to Cuba, but he was detained by the Russian authorities for not holding a valid passport. Simultaneously, Russian president Vladimir Putin averred that his intelligence agencies had not worked with Snowden, but four months later he was granted a temporary visa to be able to remain in Russia. In 2015 he was joined by his longtime girlfriend, Lindsay Mills, a pole dancer whom

 

he married in 2017. In September 2019 Snowden published his memoirs, Permanent Record, in which he described how in 2012 he had copied files onto a fingernail-sized micro SD card that he concealed in a Rubik’s Cube and that he openly left the files on his desk at his home.

Snowden denies that he shared classified information with either the Chi- nese or the Russians, claiming he had cleaned his four laptops of all such information and destroyed the cryptographic key. Following the release of his book, the Department of Justice initiated a lawsuit seeking confiscation of the proceeds from the publisher Macmillan. In September 2019 Snowden’s application for political asylum in France was denied.

SONG XINNING. In October 2019 Song Xinning, the head of the Confu- cius Institute, Kongzi Xueyuan, in Brussels, was the subject of a ban issued by the government and supported by Belgium’s State Security Service (VSSE), Veiligheld van de Staaat (Dutch), Sûreté de l’État (French), which accused Song of facilitating Chinese intelligence activities and acting as a recruiter for Chinese intelligence. Song was the former director of the Vrije Universteit Brussel (VUB) and held the post of professor at the Renmin University of China, Zhongguo Renmin Daxue, in Beijing. The eight-year ban extends across the entire Schengen Area of 26 European countries.

Song has claimed he was approached in April 2019 at the VUB Institute by an American envoy who asked him to cooperate with him but that he refused. Allegedly the American had “warned at the meeting that if I did not cooperate, there would be serious consequences.”

Song has admitted that he is acquainted with Geng Huichang, a former head of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, whom he had met at Renmin University. Another VUB academic, Professor Jonathan Holslag, commented, “Song is a nice, polite gentleman but the Institute is clearly an instrument of propaganda and shouldn’t be part of the academic community.”

SOONG, CHARLIE. In 1879 a 13-year-old stowaway named Han Chao- sun was discovered aboard a U.S. Coast Guard cutter. He was promptly renamed Charlie Soong and turned over to a Methodist minister who spon- sored his education in the United States. Upon his return to China, Soong married into a wealthy Shanghai family with underworld connections and within a few years acquired a considerable fortune. In 1911 he met the young radical Sun Yat-sen, and in 1915 Sun married the second of the Soong daughters, Ching-ling. After Charlie’s death in 1919, the youngest daughter, Mei-ling, took up with Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang’s marriage into the Soong family smoothed the way for Chiang’s taking control of the Kuomin- tang Party and of China itself. The oldest daughter, Ai-ling, married one of

 

China’s richest men, H. H. Kung. There was a popular Chinese saying about the sisters that “one loved money, one loved power, and one loved China,” alluding to Ai-ling, Mei-ling, and Ching-ling, respectively. A brother, T. V. Soong, served as premier, foreign minister, and economic minister. The Soong sisters were known not only for their remarkable beauty but also for being intimate participants in the history of China in the 20th Century. The longest-surviving sister, Mei-ling, lived to the age of 105, dying in New York in 2003.

SORGE, RICHARD. A charismatic Soviet intelligence officer, Richard Sorge was born in Germany in 1895 and graduated from the University of Hamburg. Having served in the Kaiser’s army during World War I and married the wife of his economics professor at Aachen, Christiane Gerlach, Sorge moved with her to Moscow in 1924 and thereafter undertook numer- ous military intelligence operations for the GRU, working under his own name as a foreign correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung. However, Sorge’s clandestine life and his many affairs did not suit Christiane, who divorced him and emigrated to the United States.

While in Shanghai for three years from 1930, Sorge built a spy ring and exercised his considerable personal charm over Ursula Kuczynsky and the American journalist Agnes Smedley, both members of his organization. His activities were placed in jeopardy in 1931 by the arrest of the local Comin- tern representative, Hilaire Noulens, who had been informed of Sorge’s true role. Sorge was obliged to temporarily suspend operations, and later he would return to Moscow where he moved in with the beautiful Katchka Maximova, with whom he remained until his next assignment overseas.

In September 1933 Sorge moved to Tokyo and created a large network that collected valuable information about Japanese intentions and transmit- ted it to Moscow. Sorge himself penetrated the local German embassy and, after the outbreak of war, having gained the trust of the ambassador, was appointed the press attaché. He also acquired a pair of mistresses, Kiyomi, an exotic dancer at a notorious nightclub, the Fuji Club, and Miyake Hanako, a waitress working at the same establishment, but this led to Kiyomi denounc- ing her lover to the Kempeitai. When the police went to his home early on the morning of 18 October 1941, they waited for an hour so as to allow the unidentified owner of a vehicle with diplomatic plates to leave.

Sorge was taken into custody with some 40 other spies and after a lengthy interrogation was hanged in November 1944, leaving Hanako to tend his grave. After the war, Kiyumi was shot dead in the street, and her murder went unsolved, but in Moscow rumors had circulated that at the moment of his arrest Sorge had been in bed with Helma, the wife of his friend Eugen Ott, the German ambassador, and under interrogation Sorge had betrayed his entire network.

 

SOUTH KOREA. The Republic of South Korea has been, and remains, a priority target for the collection of political and military intelligence con- ducted by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, which also seeks to exercise influence among Seoul’s policy makers. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has attempted to penetrate Seoul’s government, including an MSS operation run against South Korea’s consulate in Shang- hai and an attempt, in June 2010, to illegally access a computer system to acquire details of a plan to purchase Global Hawk drones from Northrop Grumman. In October 2016, South Korea filed a formal complaint that a Chinese fishing boat had rammed and sunk a South Korean Coast Guard vessel in the Yellow Sea when the ship had attempted to stop about 40 Chinese fishing boats from fishing in South Korean waters.

Diplomatic relations between the countries were established in August

1992, making South Korea the last Asian country to recognize the PRC, having previously recognized Taiwan, while the PRC recognized only North Korea. Official contacts started in May 1983 when a hijacked Chinese civil- ian aircraft landed in South Korea and a 33-strong delegation negotiated its return. This was followed by an exchange of sports teams and quiet visits by Chinese officials to tour South Korean industries while South Korean offi- cials attended a number of international conferences in China. The relation- ship has been uneven, characterized by periods of warmth followed by icy exchanges. When Seoul decided in 2017 to deploy the Terminal High-Alti- tude Area Defense (THAAD) missile and the United States assured China that the missile system was to protect South Korea from North Korea, Beij- ing remained unconvinced. At a meeting in Hangzhou in 2016 between Pres- ident Xi Jinping and South Korean president Park Geun-hye, Xi noted that the deployment would serve to “intensify” disputes, but in the end they agreed that both countries would benefit from a healthy bilateral relationship. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner, and it is estimated that well over 500,000 PRC citizens live in South Korea, mainly ethnic Koreans from China’s Jilin Province, while an equal number of South Koreans live in China.

One area of common agreement between the two countries concerns atti-

tudes toward Japan. Both view Japan’s response to its atrocities during World War II as insufficient. Japan abused Chinese and Koreans as “comfort women,” wei’an fu. Further, in 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies should pay compensation for their use of South Korean forced labor during the years of Japan’s occupation of Korea. See also KOREAN WAR; LILLEY, JAMES.

SOVIET UNION. In 1921 the foreign intelligence branch of the Soviet Cheka established a rezidentura in Peking headed by Aristarkh Rigin using the alias Rilsky, and during his year in China he organized sub-rezidenturas

 

in 10 other cities. He was replaced by Yakov K. Davtyan, the Cheka’s first foreign intelligence chief, and in 1925 he was succeeded by his assistant chief, Sergei Velezhev, alias Vedernikov.

Operating independently, but in parallel with the Cheka, was the Soviet military intelligence service, the Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie (GRU), or Fourth Department of the Red Army’s main intelligence directo- rate, which in 1923 established a commercial cover in Tientsin, the Far Eastern Trading Company, headed by Abraham Ehrenlieb, who later became such a respected figure in the local émigré community that he was elected president of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce. He would be succeeded by a Latvian, Adam Purpis, who traveled on a passport issued in Honduras.

In 1923 the Kuomintang (KMT) leader Sun Yat-sen and the Soviet Un- ion’s representative, Adolf Ioffe, signed the first Sino-Soviet agreement, and a group of advisers led by Mikhail Borodin traveled to Canton (Guangzhou) while a KMT delegation headed by Chiang Kai-shek visited Moscow. How- ever, a year later, in September 1924, the Soviets made a separate treaty in Peking, which included a loan of 10 million yuan, the supply of weapons for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the provision for three years of 135 military advisers, among them Pavel Pavlov, Vasili Blyukher, and Niko- lai Kuibyshev. The Soviets were primarily interested in the White Guards, who had fought the Red Army and then taken refuge in Manchuria, territory then controlled by the pro-Japanese general Zhang Zuolin, and their organ- izations, the monarchist Bogoyavlensk Brotherhood, the Committee for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Emigrants, the Musketeers, the Black Ring, and the Blue Ring.

By 1925 the Cheka, now transformed into the Obyeddinenoye Gosudarst-

vennoye Politischekoye Upravlenie (OGPU), operated a rezidentura in the Shanghai consulate headed by Yakov Minsky, supported by Rudolf I. Abel and a deputy rezident, Leonid Eitingon, alias Leonid A. Naumov. Later, Eitingon would be appointed rezident in Harbin in 1927, succeeding Fedor Karin and Vasili Zarubin, and then in Peking. In March 1927 Mikhail Boro- din, representing the Comintern in Shanghai, attempted to organize a coup against Chiang Kai-shek, but the uprising was crushed on 12 April, and within a fortnight 25 of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership had been executed. The KMT also seized the Soviet consulate in Peking, confiscating a large quantity of incriminating material, including codebooks, lists of agents, and documents listing recent deliveries of arms to the CCP.

Eitingon’s principal source in Harbin was a former Tsarist naval officer, Vyacheslav I. Penkovsky, of the Amur Flotilla, who, with his wife, had been a spy for the Soviets since 1924. Fluent in Mandarin and a graduate of the Petrograd Practical Eastern Academy and the university’s legal faculty, Pen- kovsky had obtained Chinese citizenship and worked in Harbin’s high court, where he picked up useful information. Another agent, code-named OSI-

 

POV, was recruited in 1928 and was a chauffeur in the Japanese gendarme- rie before he joined the organization’s special political section that worked against the Soviets. In 1929 OSIPOV, who remained in touch with the rezidentura until 1938, planted documents on the Japanese that suggested 20 of their agents had applied to restore their Soviet citizenship, resulting in their immediate elimination by the Japanese.

Another Soviet source was a former kappelevets officer, a Chinese Army colonel, who was linked to various Russian émigré groups including the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, the Squad of Russian Falcons, and Braun. He was responsible for tipping off the rezidentura to a bid by Ataman Semenov to form a Cossack division for a future war against the Soviets. According to a report from Karin in 1925 addressed to his OGPU chief Mikhail Trilisser,

The OGPU rezidentura in Northern Manchuria with the center in Har- bin . . . is working regularly and systematically on the secret opening of diplomatic and other classified mail of a whole series of Japanese institu- tions. The Japanese General Staff, Japanese military missions in China, Japanese armies in Kwangtong province (Port Arthur), Korea (Seoul), China (Tianzin), and others entered into the sphere of action of our intelli- gence.

While Eitingon was the Harbin rezident, he learned that Zhang Xielian, one of Zhang Zuolin’s allies and the leader of the Mukden group of “provincial militarists,” was collaborating with the Japanese to create an independent Manchurian republic in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, which was intended to be a Japanese protectorate aligned with Outer Mongolia.

Such plans threatened Soviet interests. Accordingly, Moscow decided in June 1928 to eliminate Zhang Zuolin by blowing up his private railway carriage, an assassination undertaken by Eitingon and the local illegal rezi- dent, Khristofor Salnyn, code-named GRYSHKA, a crime that resulted in the deaths of 17 other passengers, including General Wu Jiangsheng, and was blamed on the Japanese because they had been responsible for guarding the viaduct on the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden (now Shenyan) that was sabotaged with explosives. Eitingon’s role as rezident ended with his withdrawal following a raid conducted by the Chinese police on 27 May 1929. Exactly two months later, diplomatic relations with the KMT were severed by the Kremlin, forcing a closure of all the illegal rezidenturas except Boris Bogdanov’s, which survived in Manchuria until 1931.

After Eitingon’s recall, he was appointed rezident in Istanbul but was

compromised by a defector, Georges Agabekov, in June 1930. He was then placed in charge of a specialist unit recruiting long-term agents in the West and traveled twice to California to cultivate Chinese immigrants. After World War II, in late 1946, Eitingon returned to China, to Xinjiang Prov- ince, to advise the CCP on the suppression of the Uighur separatist move-

 

ment, which was believed to be funded and armed by the KMT and British intelligence. Under Eitingon’s supervision, an experienced NKVD officer, Colonel Nikolai Prokopyuk, organized an armed response to the rebels, and by 1949 the Uighurs had been defeated.

Having collaborated closely with Moscow until the Sino-Soviet split, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) modeled its internal security apparatus on the Soviet NKVD (and later KGB), becoming a pervasive, oppressive instrument of the CCP that included the laogai, the equivalent of the gulag, a huge system of penal colonies and reeducation camps into which millions of suspected counterrevolutionaries, spies, and reactionaries disappeared during periodic purges and campaigns. However, whereas the Soviet intelligence structure maintained a substantial presence overseas and established legal rezidenturas in diplomatic premises and illegal networks to support espion- age, Mao Zedong opted for domestic repression and isolationism, with foreign intelligence collection apparently limited to operations conducted against Taiwan and military reconnaissance along the Indian and Soviet borders.

The Soviet border, some 2,700 miles long, was a constant source of ten-

sion over disputed territory, one focus being Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri River, where in March 1969 there was a major clash between Soviet border guards and the PLA. The issues over the frontier were eventually settled in 2004.

Having participated in the creation of a mirror-image totalitarian state, Soviet intelligence personnel would themselves be victims of hostile surveil- lance and harassment in Beijing, with Stanislas Lunev, who defected from the GRU rezidentura in Washington, D.C., in May 1992, providing the West with a compelling account of Soviet attempts to cultivate sources in the PRC. According to Colonel Konstantin Preobrazhensky, who was an adviser to the KGB’s scientific and technical directorate until his retirement in 1991, he attempted to recruit Chinese scholars while he was based at the Tokyo rezi- dentura between 1980 and 1985 under TASS journalistic cover but achieved little success. He claimed that most of the KGB’s operations directed against the PRC were conducted from Mongolia where the local Ministry of Security was under the KGB’s control, even though most of its personnel were of Chinese origin and considered of doubtful loyalty. The KGB also ran opera- tions from Burma, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, usually involving the re- cruitment of refugees who were sent back across the frontier. Indeed, the Kazakh KGB’s chairman was later promoted to Moscow to head the First Chief Directorate’s Sixth Department.

Preobrazhensky is the only KGB retiree to have given an account of his

experiences of working against Chinese targets, but his career in Tokyo was terminated when he was compromised by Guan Fuhua in July 1985. See also MIL-4; RESHETIN, IGOR; RUSSIA; ZHOU HSINGPU.

 

SPECIAL BRANCH. The principal security organization in British con- trolled territories, the Special Branch usually consisted of local Criminal Investigation Department detectives supervised by British personnel who received intelligence and technical support from MI5. Prior to World War II, security in the International Settlements of Shanghai was controlled by a Special Branch headed by a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) offi- cer, Harry Steptoe, and Chinese Communist-inspired subversion was moni- tored by similar bodies in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur. See also ROYAL HONG KONG POLICE (RHKP).

STATE ADMINISTRATION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (SASTIND). The State Ad-

ministration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, Guojia Guofang Keji Gongye Ju, was formed in 2008 as part of the Plan for Restructuring the State Council passed by the First Session of the 11th Na- tional People’s Conference. It is a civilian ministry under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyu- an, and is subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and Information Tech- nology (MIIT) of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonguo Renmin Gonghe- guo Gongye He Xinxihuabu. It superseded the People’s Liberation Army’s Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui. It is as- sumed that SASTIND took control over those agencies that were subordinate to COSTIND, including the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), Zhongguo Yuanzineng Jigou; the China National Space Administration (CNSA), Guojia Hangtian Ju; and such universities as the Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing Ligong Daxue; the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing Hongkong Hangtiaan Daxue; Harbin Engineering University, Harbin Gongcheng Daxue; the Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Gongye Daxue; Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xibei Gon- gye Daxue; the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing Hangkaong Hangtian Daxue; and the Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing Ligong Daxue.

One of SASTIND’s goals is to foster agreements on an international scale,

such as that signed in 2018 with Kuwait to increase cooperation in the de- fense industry.

STEINBERG, MAX. The Comintern representative in Harbin, Max Stein- berg used the alias “Charles Emile Martin,” but his alias was exposed in January 1956 when he and his wife Elsa were arrested in Switzerland and deported after serving three months’ imprisonment for passport offenses.

 

Originally from Belgorod-Dnestrovsky and born in 1889, Steinberg worked from November 1935 under commercial cover in Harbin as a director of Charles Martin & Company, using a Swiss passport issued by the Swiss legation in Warsaw. His declared business was the import and sale of Fiat motorcars and Italian aircraft in partnership with an elderly Milanese lawyer, Dr. Eugenio Carutti. While in Harbin, Steinberg also worked with a Comin- tern agent, Isaiah Oggins, but moved to Chailly, near Lausanne in Switzer- land, in 1939. During World War II, Steinberg was connected to the GRU spy ring known as the Rote Drei and was also known as “George Wilmer.”

STENNES, WALTER. Formerly a leading Nazi in Germany, and the Ber- lin commandant of the Sturmabteilung (SA), Walter Stennes was appointed a liaison officer with the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1934 and became Chiang Kai-shek’s principal intelligence adviser. Born in 1895, Stennes fell out with Adolf Hitler in 1931 and made two unsuccessful attempts to remove him from power, which resulted in his own lengthy exile in Shanghai.

He remained in China until 1949 and then returned to Germany, where he died in 1989. After his death it was alleged that while working for the KMT he had also acted as a source for the NKVD, code-named DRUG (friend), until 1952. According to a report published in Trud in March 2000, Stennes had been in contact with Richard Sorge in Shanghai, and he had warned Joseph Stalin that the Nazis would attack the Soviet Union in May or June 1941. The KGB’s official history confirmed that in 1941 Vasili Zarubin had been sent to Shanghai to make contact with Stennes.

STEPTOE, HARRY. The head of the Special Branch of the International Settlement Police in Shanghai, Harry Steptoe was also the local representa- tive of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) between the wars. He was interned by the Japanese in 1942 and then exchanged at Mombasa with other diplomatic and consular personnel. Steptoe never recovered from his detention and was given early retirement from SIS in 1945.

SU BIN. On 28 June 2014, Su Bin, aliases Stephen Su and Stephen Subin, aged 49, was arrested in Richmond, British Colombia, based on a provisional warrant filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the previous day in Los Angeles, California.

Su owned Lode Technologies Co. (Lode-Tech), a Chinese aviation compa- ny with 80 employees and an office in Canada. He had a $2 million home in Richmond and two children, both born in Canada, where he was a permanent resident. His wife was said to have been a gynecologist, and his eldest son studied in Switzerland. He claimed to have been the son of an officer in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and to have made millions as an aero-

 

space entrepreneur. During a 2012 interview with the Wall Street Journal, for an article dealing with wealthy Chinese moving to the West, Su was quoted as saying, “Regulations [in China] mean that businessmen have to do a lot of illegal things.”

In the criminal complaint filed in 2014 and subsequent indictments filed in Los Angeles, Su was charged for his role in the criminal conspiracy to steal military technical information, including data relating to the C-17 strategic transport aircraft manufactured by Boeing, as well as the F-22 and F-35 fighter jets.

The C-17 Globemaster III is a high-wing, four-engine, T-tail transport last manufactured by Boeing in 2015. The aircraft was of particular interest to China, as the country possessed nothing comparable. The F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation single-seat, twin-engine all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft. The F-35 Lightning is a single-seat, single-engine all-weather multi- role stealth fighter.

An investigation revealed that in 2009 Su had begun working with two individuals in the PRC, neither identified by name but characterized as mem- bers of the PLA who had penetrated Boeing’s computer system. Allegedly the details of the files accessed were passed to Su, who advised which mate- rials should be stolen and then translated the data.

According to sentencing documents and Su’s own admissions, Su and his PLA co-conspirators would write, revise, and email reports to the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), Second Department, Jiefangjun Zong Can- mou Bu Di Er Bu (now, since President Xi Jinping’s 2016 reforms of the PLA, the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, Zhoun- gyang Junshi Weiyuanhui Canmou Bu,), concerning the information and technology that had been acquired by hacking. In his confession Su acknowl- edged having been motivated by his intention to sell the stolen data.

The investigation revealed that some of the file directories the hackers accessed contained thousands of pages. One such file contained nearly 1,500 pages, of which Su went through and identified 142 files that he considered to be most useful for his co-conspirators. From another directory, containing 6,000 pages, Su chose 22 files, which later were found to contain more than 2,000 files relating to the C-17 aircraft. All told, Su and his two PLA co- conspirators stole 630,000 files relating to the C-17, totaling about 65 GB of data.

The FBI estimated that some 220 MB of data related to the F-22 Raptor had been stolen, as well as files about the F-35 Lightning, including test flight protocols, all of which Su translated into Chinese. It was estimated that the conspiracy had cost about $1 million for the PLA, whereas the F-35’s development costs had been $11 billion.

 

In February 2016 Su waived extradition and was transferred to Los An- geles in an FBI jet. During the flight Su was asked, “What is your favorite jet?” Su responded, “Not the C-17!” He pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiring to gain unauthorized access to a protected computer and to violat- ing the Arms Export Control Act by exporting defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List contained in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. On 13 July 2016, Su was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment and fined

$10,000.

Soon after Sun Bin’s arrest in Vancouver, a pair of Canadian teachers, Kevin and Julia Garratt, were detained in Dandong, a border town located across the Yalu River from North Korea, where they had owned Peter’s Coffee House. On 4 August 2014, they were invited to dine with Chinese acquaintances to advise on how their daughter should apply for college in Canada. As they left the dinner, the couple, who had spent most of their adult lives in China, were escorted to a police station and interrogated. Final- ly, they were charged with offenses that essentially mirrored those against Su Bin. The Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that the Garratts were being investigated for stealing intelligence “about Chinese military targets and im- portant defense research projects and engaging in activities threatening to Chinese national security,” and the evidence mainly consisted of Kevin Gar- ratt’s photos of soldiers in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

When Su decided to waive extradition, Julia Garratt, who had been re-

leased on bail, was able to leave China in May 2016. Kevin Garratt, who had remained in prison for the duration, was able to leave China in September of that year, but only after paying $20,000 in fines.

In November 2014 the annual air show in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province, revealed a new military cargo plane, the Xian Y-20, literally, “Transport-20.” The United States was also a participant in the air show, which included the C-17, and observers noted the similarities of the two aircraft, even down to the design of the tail fins.

Su Bin was released from prison in October 2017.

SU LIYING. On 7 June 2013, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Wisconsin returned an indictment charging Su Liying, Zhao Haichun, Dejan Karabasevic, the Sinovel Wind Group Company Ltd., and the Sinovel Wind Group (USA) Company Ltd. with multiple counts of theft of trade secrets.

The Sinovel Wind Group Company Ltd., Hua Rui Fengdian Jituan Youx- ian Gongsi, headquartered in Beijing, with offices in Houston, Texas, is the world’s second-largest wind turbine manufacturer, and Su Liying was the deputy director of the company’s research and development department. Zhao Haichun was a technology manager of the company, and both are Chinese citizens living in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Dejan Karabasevic was a former employee of AMSC Windtec GmbH, a wholly

 

owned subsidiary of AMSC, a company formerly known as American Semi- conductor Inc. Karabasevic was a Serb employed by AMSC Windtec GmbH in Klagenfurt, Austria, where he headed the Automation Engineering Depart- ment. He submitted his resignation to AMSC on 10 March 2011 but retained access to AMSC’s computer systems until May 2011.

AMSC was a United States–based company with its corporate office in Massachusetts, but other offices in Middleton and New Berlin, Wisconsin, and Klagenfurt, Austria. Its primary business was the development, support, and production of equipment and software for wind turbines and electrical grids. Two products developed and sold by AMSC were software to regulate the flow of electricity from wind turbines to electrical grids, the Power Mod- ule 3000 (PM3000), and the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Both were used in conjunction with AMSC’s low-voltage ride through (LVTR) software.

Sinovel legitimately purchased software and equipment from AMSC until March 2011, by which time Sinovel owed AMSC in excess of $100 million and had contracted to purchase an additional $700 million in software, prod- ucts, and services from AMSC in the future. The indictment charged that Sinovel, through Su, Zhao, and Karabasevic, had conspired to obtain MSC’s copyrighted information and trade secrets to be able to produce LVRT-relat- ed compliant wind turbines without having to pay AMSC for previously delivered AMSC software, products, and services, as well as AMSC’s trade secrets and intellectual property. Thus, it was alleged that the defendants had cheated AMSC out of more than $800 million.

Part of the conspiracy involved Su and Zhao, who recruited Karabasevic, who left AMSC to join Sinovel, and from 1 March to 30 June 2011 Karaba- sevic secretly copied intellectual property from the AMSC computers, in- cluding the PM3000 source code. Further, Sinovel provided Karabasevic with a one-year employment contract that made it appear he would be work- ing for another Chinese turbine company so as to conceal his actual employ- ment by Sinovel, which also provided him with a laptop that could be adapted to AMSC’s intellectual property for Sinovel’s unrestricted use. He was also given an apartment in Beijing, and between 7 March and 24 June 2011, Karabasevic adapted the AMSC programs he had downloaded so they could be used unlicensed within Sinovel’s wind turbines. On 11 June 2011 Karabasevic emailed Su with a modified version of the software compiled from AMSC’s PM3000 source code, and subsequently this was used in more than 10 Sinovel wind turbines between 11 June and 11 December 2011.

Between October 2011 and May 2012, Sinovel, managed by Zhao, was

commissioned to build wind turbines in Charlestown, Scituate, and Fairha- ven, Massachusetts, all of which used the stolen PM3000 source code. Dur-

 

ing this time, Zhao emailed Karabasevic a contract to work for Sinovel with a salary of $1.7 million from May 2011 to June 2017, essentially doubling Karabasevic’s salary.

The examination of communications exchanged between Karabasevic and both Yu and Zhao revealed Karabasevic discussing his efforts to obtain AMSC technology and his instructions for its use. On 26 May 2011 Karaba- sevic traveled to China to personally adapt AMSC’s proprietary and trade secret information for use in Sinovel’s wind turbines, and further emails showed the conspirators boasting about their success in exploiting the stolen material.

In January 2018, following an 11-day trial in Wisconsin, all the conspira- tors were convicted of conspiracy to commit trade secret theft, theft of trade secrets, and wire fraud, and on 6 July 2018 a federal court judge found that AMSC’s losses from the thefts exceeded $550 million, and imposed the maximum fine of $1.5 million on Sinovel.

Sinovel and AMSC had reached a restitution settlement amount, but the judge imposed a year of probation until Sinovel paid that full amount. Sino- vel was ordered to pay AMSC $32.5 million the week of the sentencing, and another $25 million within the following year. Sinovel was also to pay an- other $850,000 within the probationary period. During the trial it was dis- closed that AMSC had suffered severe financial hardship, losing more than

$1 billion in shareholder equity and almost 700 jobs, which amounted to over half its global workforce.

SUCCOR DELIGHT. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for Wu Bin, a 33-year-old former pro-Western professor of philosophy from Hohai University, Hehai Daxue, in Nanjing, a graduate of Shanghai’s Fudan University, Fudan Daxue, and Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, agent who was tasked in November 1990 to collect tech- nology in the United States and pass it back to China through a front compa- ny in Hong Kong. The MSS recruited Wu because his cousin was known to run a computer business in Norfolk, Virginia.

Wu was told by MSS officers that his choice was to cooperate with the MSS or go to prison for his pro-Western activities, but the offer was sweet- ened by a promise that Wu could personally make money and, further, that his girlfriend, Wang Jieyang, could join him in the United States once he was settled in and was producing technology.

Wu, who had been extensively interrogated while at his university, agreed to cooperate with the MSS, conscious that he had seen colleagues severely beaten for their pro-Western activities, and he was instructed to memorize a three-page list of desired technological items. Wu, who had no technological training, was told to simply become a successful businessman in the United States and that his value was for the long term. Evidently the MSS had

 

discovered that he had a cousin in the Norfolk, Virginia, area, and Wu was given a handler named Shen who, once Wu had settled in Norfolk, sent postcards as “reminders” of his family remaining in China.

Always reluctant to undertake his MSS mission, he approached the FBI through an intermediary, Jing Pingli, in April 1991 and was enrolled as source 422 by a Mandarin-speaking special agent, Bruce Carlson. He pro- vided information about his handler, a Mr. Chen, from whom he received

$2,000 at a safe house in Washington, D.C., in August 1991, and about a group of Yugoslavs who were attempting to procure Chinese rocket launch- ers. SUCCOR DELIGHT was regarded as a valuable source by his FBI case officer, Blake Lewis, who paid him $700 a month and established him and Jing, who changed his name to Robert E. Li, in a small office in Virginia Beach above a McDonald’s restaurant. In November the MSS indicated its approval of Wu’s performance by allowing his wife, Wang Jiyang, to join him, and she brought him more cash. Soon thereafter, the MSS asked Wu to order 44 vision-intensifier tubes, and he opened negotiations with a manufac- turer, Varo Inc., of Garland, Texas. He also acquired a new partner, Zhang Pizhe, a 35-year-old graduate student at Old Dominion University who had previously been employed by the U.S. embassy in Beijing.

However, in October 1992, Wu was arrested by U.S. Customs and con-

victed of breaches of the Arms Control Export Act relating to a consignment of 1,000 night-vision goggles worth $2 million, and in September 1993 he was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. Li and Zhang received five years each. The customs operation, initiated after a tip from Varo Inc., was una- ware that Wu was an FBI informant, and although the FBI knew he was engaged in procuring matériel, they did not realize that the items were the subject of an export embargo. The prosecution’s star witness turned out to be Wu’s wife, Wang Jiyang, who had discovered her husband’s mistress and had been caught while attempting to remove $50,000 from one of his frozen bank accounts. Although apparently offered the opportunity to be deported to China, after PRC embassy officials intervened, Wu preferred to serve his sentence at Loretto, Pennsylvania, declaring that he intended to live in Paris after his release. Wu served his sentence and successfully fought off attempts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deport him, but ultimately, claiming harassment, he returned to China. See also TECHNOLOGY AC- QUISITION.

SUN BO. An engineer by trade, Sun Bo spent decades working for the state- owned Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company, Dalian Chuanbo Gongye Gongsi, before being promoted general manager of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), Zhongguo Chuanbo Gongye Zong Gongsi. However, on 16 June 2018, Sun was arrested and charged by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the Chinese Communist

 

Party (CCP), Zhongguo Gongchangdang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuan- hui, the CCP’s anticorruption agency. In announcing his arrest, the commis- sion claimed that Sun “is suspected of serious violations of the law. As a senior cadre and responsible leader of a state-owned enterprise, Sun Bo has abused his authority and was disloyal to the Communist Party.” The media later reported that “investigations have found that Sun was approached by foreign agents several years before he was promoted to the helm of CSIC and put in charge of the Liaoning project.”

When arrested, Sun was stripped of his Party membership. According to speculation in the South China Morning Post, Sun may have been providing information to “foreign agents.” See also PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA).

SUN FUNYI. On 13 April 2016, Sun Fuyi, alias Frank Sun, aged 52, was arrested by federal investigators in connection with a scheme to illegally export to China, without a license, high-grade carbon fiber that is primarily used in aerospace and military applications. Sun is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The commodity sought by Sun was Toray type M60JB-3000-50B carbon fiber (M60 Carbon Fiber), which is classified under the International Emer- gency Economic Powers Act and is restricted from export for both nuclear nonproliferation and anti-terrorism reasons. Specifically, M60 Carbon Fiber has applications in aerospace, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and other government defense applications, so its export requires a license from the Department of Commerce.

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) had established a website that purported to be a United States–based company dealing in high-technology items. The online “showroom” included carbon fiber, and two HSI agents monitored the website, one of whom spoke fluent Mandarin Chinese. On 7 April 2011 the website received an inquiry for a price quote involving carbon fiber sought for export to China, and on the 25th a Skype video conference was held in which a potential client in China asked, if the carbon fiber “can’t be exported directly to China, can, can you transfer it to another place first or something?” He suggested he could provide “other countries” and, further, that he would set up an offshore account. At one point, the undercover agents asked the client if he wanted to apply for an export license, and the individual responded that he wished to apply for an export license “all the time.” It was then that Sun entered the picture and communicated with the undercover agents.

On 23 September 2011, Sun was notified that the Commerce Department

had rejected the request for an export license, and on 6 May 2013 the original individual in China renewed contact, asking that the undercover agents apply for an export license for carbon fiber. On 21 May, Sun stated, “TORAY

 

M55JB-6K is closely associated with the military, we can’t apply for export license.” He continued that he had “a friend in the United States, he might be able to buy” the carbon fiber from him. He later proposed that he would travel to the United States, purchase 100 kilograms of carbon fiber from the undercover company, and return to China with the carbon fiber in his lug- gage. Sun also expressed concern that their communicating via email was not safe and later adopted the prearranged term “bananas” for carbon fiber. He complimented the undercover agent for his “courage” in his willingness to sell the carbon fiber without a license and discussed the size of the shipping containers, saying that they would “carry a small amount of banana every time, this way is safe.”

When the price was discussed, Sun revealed that his associate suspected that one of the undercover agents was U.S. law enforcement, mentioning in his email news reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrest- ing individuals for exporting carbon fiber to Iran, and a recent case in which the FBI had defeated a Chinese attempt to illegally obtain carbon fiber for their new fighter jets, noted in the article to be “an essential component in China’s stealth fighters.”

In 2015 Sun renewed contact with the undercover agents via Skype video- conference and was joined by a woman who claimed to be a senior employee of a global company in China. The agent told Sun he needed to know who Sun’s customers were, as he, the vendor, was taking quite a risk in selling carbon fiber without a license. Sun initially stated that the carbon fiber was for a university laboratory in China, but when he was challenged by the undercover agent that no such lab would need the amount Sun was attempt- ing to purchase, Sun responded that they had “many agencies.” However, his companion refused to specifically identify her other customers. Two weeks later, in another Skype conversation, the undercover agents expressed con- cern that the carbon fiber could be traced back to them, so Sun recommended they should destroy the bar codes, making identification impossible, and finally, on 8 October 2015, Sun agreed to meet the undercover agents in Brussels to complete the transaction. In December Sun wired $500 from a bank in China as a down payment for the purchase of 10–15 kilograms of M60 Carbon Fiber for approximately $18,000–$21,000, with the final quan- tity and price to be determined in person. In February 2016, Sun suggested he would travel to New York instead of Brussels and said he would pay for the carbon fiber in cash. In a subsequent email, Sun suggested that the carbon fiber be repackaged in an “ordinary packing box” as he intended to return to China with the carbon fiber as personal luggage. He flew to New York on 11 April 2016 and shortly after his arrival met the undercover agents in a restau- rant, where Sun mentioned his intention to sell the carbon fiber for civilian use, but then admitted that he might sell some of the product to a military

 

research laboratory. Sun emphasized that the undercover agents should just be concerned with the civilian market, saying, “You don’t have to deal with the [Chinese] military.”

Sun also discussed shipping the carbon fiber to Australia, where an asso- ciate would then ship it to China, claiming that this route would be easier for escaping detection. He also explained that he had arranged for a shipment of carbon fiber from South Korea, which had been labeled “acrylic fiber,” and proposed they do the same. In response to a question as to the volume of carbon fiber Sun intended to buy in the future, he replied, “We have great understanding relations with the [Chinese] military unit,” but they should start small so as to avoid suspicion. When asked why the Chinese military would purchase carbon fiber from Sun rather than others, Sun replied, “be- cause they can’t get it anywhere else.” At one point, Sun claimed to have been employed by the China National Space Administration, Zhongguo Hangtian Zong Gongsi, in Shanghai.

When told that the labels of the M60 Carbon Fiber had been removed, Sun

responded that it was “a good idea,” and in a discussion of the price, the agent explained that there would be an additional $2,000 fee for taking off the identifying labels and for the risk involved, to which Sun agreed and pulled $30,000 cash from his jacket pocket and gave the agents $25,000. They then inspected the boxes the carbon fiber was to be shipped in, and Sun said that, since it was now labeled as acrylic fiber, it should be sent directly to China instead of going through Australia, handing over an additional $500 to ship the carbon fiber directly to Shanghai.

In April 2017 Sun pleaded guilty to violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and in August 2017 he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment; but as he had already spent 16 months in prison, he was given credit for time served.

SUN TZU. In the fourth century B.C., General Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War, Ssunzi Bingfa, in which he expounded on the advantages of conducting efficient intelligence operations. Having commanded the army of the Wu state at the estuary of the Yellow River, Sun Tzu had much to say on the topic of espionage networks and defined the role of double agents, defectors, and penetration operations. He remains an iconic figure in modern China, although the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, does not regard him as offering any guidance relating to the conduct of intelligence operations.

SUN WEIGUO. In September 1966, 25-year-old Sun Weiguo, an assistant information officer at the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, defected and was granted political asylum in India.

 

SUN YAT-SEN. The leader of the Tung Wo Triad Society in Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen was born into an agricultural family near Canton in November 1866 but received a Christian education in Honolulu, where his elder brother had emigrated. He gained a medical degree from the Alice Memorial Hospi- tal in Hong Kong and practiced in Macao before becoming involved in politics in 1894, founding the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) and combining with the triads to oppose the corrupt Manchu administration and mount a coup in Canton in October 1895. Sun’s Young China movement failed to seize the city, and he went on the run, finally seeking refuge in Macao with a price of £100,000 on his head. From the Portuguese colony Sun traveled to Hong Kong, Kobe, and Hawaii before reaching San Francis- co, where a plot to abduct him was foiled. Finally, in October 1896, Sun arrived in London but was kidnapped and detained in the Chinese legation in Portland Place for 12 days until news of his incarceration leaked and the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, intervened to have Sun released.

Sun’s campaign among Chinese émigrés continued until December 1911,

when he returned to China after the emperor was deposed in a coup, and he was elected provisional president of the republic of China in Nanking in January 1912. Hailed as the first leader of nationalist China, Sun was forced into exile in 1913 in Japan, where he reorganized the Kuomintang (KMT) and then declared himself president of a military government in Canton in 1917. He established the Whampoa Military Academy near Canton, appoint- ing his protégé Chiang Kai-shek as commandant, and with support from the Communists he fought numerous campaigns in the north to unify the country before his death in Peking in March 1925.

 

T

TAI LI. Born in Zhejiang Province in May 1889, the ruthless chief of Chi- ang Kai-shek’s secret police was sometimes referred to as “Chiang’s Himm- ler.” Tai Li Li (Dai Li using the Pinyin Romanization of Chinese names) was commissioned into the Kuomintang’s (KMT), military police and by 1927 was in command of the organization’s branch in Shanghai when Chiang launched a successful coup. His relationship with Chiang prospered on his bloodthirsty reputation and his willingness to hold summary executions to eliminate opponents. Promoted in 1928 to head Chiang’s secret police, in- itially known as the Clandestine Investigation Section of the Chinese Mili- tary Council, but later as the Investigation and Statistics Bureau, General Tai became known as “the Butcher” because of his elimination of thousands of suspected Communists. He also headed the feared Blue Shirt Society, a para- military fascist group that undertook security and intelligence work on the Generalissimo’s behalf. Cruel but efficient and a rigid disciplinarian, in 1938 Tai engineered the defection of Zhang Guotao, a leading Communist, using a beautiful woman, Han Suyin, as an intermediary, and gained such respect and prominence that he was the only officer trusted to wear a weapon in the Generalissimo’s presence.

According to one of the many legends surrounding Tai Li, he refused his

deputy, General Pan Chi-Wu, permission to marry, and then turned down his request to resign. Soon afterward, the girl was found dead, and the grief- stricken General Pan’s plea to join a monastery was also declined, leading him to believe that Tai would never allow him to leave the service alive.

During the war with Japan Tai made an alliance with some of China’s ubiquitous secret societies to foment resistance behind enemy lines and achieved high ranks in one of the triads, the notorious Green Gang, which boasted 400,000 members in Shanghai and another million in the Yangtze valley. Headed by Du Yuesheng, the Greens moved their base to Luchow, leaving their rivals, the Red Circle, to dominate Canton and southern China. Their austere leader, Ming Te, was also cultivated by Tai and participated in guerrilla operations against the Japanese.

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With mainly American support, Tai sought to undermine not only his principal Communist opponent, Kang Sheng, he also challenged some un- cooperative warlords, some recalcitrant triads and, of course, the Japanese. Tai’s great advantage was his ability to dominate and manipulate American policy through the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, to the extent that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was unable to conduct indepen- dent operations without his sanction.

Tai died when his plane crashed in poor weather in March 1946 between Qingdao and Shanghai, also killing three bodyguards and a code clerk. See also CHIANG CHING-KUO; MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (MIB); NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB).

TAI SHEN KUO. Originally from Taiwan and the son of a senior army officer, Tai Shen Kuo became a naturalized U.S. citizen and in August 2008 was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment for passing information acquired from Gregg Bergersen, a retired Pentagon analyst, and from retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel James Fondren, to Beijing.

Aged 58, Kuo owned several businesses in New Orleans and had been employed as a tennis instructor at the U.S. embassy in Taipei before he obtained a student visa in 1973 to attend Nicholls State College at Thibo- daux, Louisiana, on a tennis scholarship. Later he worked as a tennis profes- sional at the Ellendale Country Club. He also worked for the Guangdong Friendship Association, Guangdong Sheng Youyi Xiehui, a voluntary group dedicated to the promotion of Sino-American ties, where he met Lin Hong, the man identified as his handler.

Well known as a restaurateur, the owner of Mr. Tao’s, in New Orleans, Kuo had posed as a Taiwanese agent, in a characteristically Chinese version of a false-flag operation, to extract documents from Bergersen, who was sentenced to nearly five years’ imprisonment. When confronted in February 2008 by the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI), which had detected a link to a separate case in California, Kuo agreed to cooperate and testified against Fondren. Kuo’s sentence, served in Arizona, was later reduced to five years.

Also jailed was “Katie” Yu Xin Kang, a 33-year-old Chinese woman who was employed in Tai’s furniture business but acted as an intermediary with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and lived with him at his home on Wellington Drive, Summerfield, Louisiana. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

TAIWAN. Throughout the existence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Beijing leadership’s principal objective has been the absorption of the Republic of China (ROC), commonly referred to as Taiwan, and the

 

occupation of Taiwan and its neighboring islands of Quemoy, Little Que- moy, and the Pescadore and Matsu Islands. A guarantee of military assis- tance from the United States has been pivotal in preventing a full-scale assault on Taiwan during several periods of high tension, such as August 1958 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Renmin Jiefangjun, shelled the Quemoy garrison and imposed an air and naval blockade. The PRC escalated its propaganda rhetoric in local radio broadcasts, and intelli- gence agencies reported concentrations of aircraft in Fujian and Zhejiang. At Chinese Communist Party (CCP) meetings, citizens pledged to support the liberation of Taiwan “at any time” during a period when the West was distracted by developments in the Middle East. In September of that year, Beijing announced a 12-mile territorial limit but only harassed U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet vessels escorting supply ships to relieve Quemoy and did not prevent the ROC’s Nationalist planes from conducting airdrops. The large Seventh Fleet presence likely prevented a frontal assault. On 24 September, an air battle fought between Nationalist interceptors armed with American- supplied Sidewinder missiles resulted in the loss of 10 PLA Air Force (PLAAF), Jiefangjun Kengjuo, MiG jet fighters.

Overflights of the Chinese mainland had taken place routinely since 1955,

when, between 11 May and 12 June, at the height of fear that Taiwan was about to be invaded, U.S. Marine F2H-2P Banshee photoreconnaissance air- craft, usually based in Korea, were transferred to Tainan airfield in southern Taiwan and conducted a total of 22 missions over Fujian Province escorted by F2H-2 fighters. Although some MiG-15s attempted to intercept these flights, no American aircraft were lost. As well as collecting imagery, some flights were signals intelligence missions to enhance the interception pro- gram conducted by the U.S. Army Security Agency (later merged with the

U.S. Army’s military intelligence component to create the Intelligence and Security Command [INSCOM]) site on the Szu-Pu airfield.

Subsequent reconnaissance flights were made from northwest Taiwan’s Taoyüan Airport by RB-57D aircraft, the American variant of the British Canberra, which had been loaned to the Nationalists by the U.S. Air Force, with the loss of two aircraft.

Until the move toward normalization of relations between Washington, D.C., and Beijing in 1979, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) relied on the Nationalists to act as surrogates to collect information from human sources and to provide support facilities for so-called Third Force guerrilla movements, supposedly operating independently on the mainland and con- ducting anti-Communist campaigns. Initiated during the Korean War, Third Force activities were sponsored from April 1951 by a semitransparent CIA front organization, Western Enterprises, which ran training camps for volun- teers before sending them to Okinawa to practice parachute jumps. These CIA operations, which infiltrated men into Sichuan and dropped supplies to

 

Hui tribesmen and a clandestine movement headed by Ma Pu-fang, were all doomed to collapse, but not before huge amounts of money had been in- vested in them.

Other Nationalist ground operations sponsored by the CIA were run across the Burmese border where General Li Mi commanded two regiments of irregulars, some of whom had undergone CIA training in Thailand. However, Li Mi’s organization was heavily penetrated by agents working for Mao Zedong, including a radio operator based in Bangkok, who was able to alert the Communists to plans to mount raids across the PRC’s frontier until his duplicity was discovered.

In 1979 a Nationalist army officer, Captain Justin Yifu Lin (originally named Lin Zhengy when he was born in Yilan County, Taiwan), a graduate of the ROC’s Military Academy, swam across from the ROC-held Kinmen Island off Fujian to the PRC-held island of Xiamen. He was initially declared “missing” by the ROC, and his wife received $31,000 from the government, but about a year later he was declared alive, and in 2000 Taiwan designated him a deserter and ordered his arrest.

While in China, Lin obtained a master’s degree in 1982 from Peking University, Beijing Daxue, and in 1986 a PhD in economics from the Univer- sity of Chicago. He eventually served as chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank between 2008 and 2012. He also founded the China Center for Economic Research, Zhongguo Jingli Yanjiu Zhongxin, and is considered the foremost PRC economist. He is a former professor at both Peking University and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technolo- gy, Xianggang Keji Daxue.

Although the political climate between Taipei and Beijing has improved in recent years, to the point of allowing regular civil flights and other exchanges between the two countries, the military imbalance has remained, with the PRC having a huge numerical advantage in both aircraft and ships, even if the equipment is not necessarily as technically sophisticated as that of the Taiwanese.

In 2017 the United States authorized increased travel to Taiwan for mili- tary personnel as well as senior government officials, and in June 2019 the

U.S. urged the Taiwanese to purchase the advanced F-16 Viper jet fighters, provoking protests from Beijing.

There is no evidence Taiwan has developed nuclear weapons, though it is thought to possess the technical expertise to do so. It certainly has a uranium- enrichment capability but currently imports that fuel for the country’s three civil nuclear plants, and it is subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

In such a competitive environment, intelligence concerning new equip- ment, recently acquired weapons, and changes in tactics becomes a potential- ly war-winning priority, and accordingly both Taipei and Beijing devote

 

considerable resources to assessing the relative strength of the opposing forces. Almost totally dependent on modern U.S. military equipment, Taiwan is sensitive to fears that the country cannot protect its modern technology from mainland espionage. The PRC also routinely indulges in “false-flag” intelligence collection operations to penetrate Taiwanese security, including the National Security Bureau (NSB), Taiwan’s principal security agency.

In spite of improved political ties fostered by Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, a member of the Kuomintang (KMT) who was elected in 2008, Taiwan remains a key target for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and in 2009 a presidential aide, Wang Jen-ping, was con- victed of having sold more than 100 confidential documents to the MSS over the previous two years. In November 2010 a senior military intelligence officer, Colonel Lo Chi-cheng, was arrested on suspicion of spying for Chi- na, having been recruited by a local businessman, Lo Ping, who was sen- tenced to 42 months’ imprisonment by a civilian court. In April 2011, Colo- nel Lo was given life. Then, in January 2011, General Lo Hsien-che was detained on the same charge.

In May 2017 Major Wang Hung-ju, a retired military police officer as- signed to the NSB, was indicted on charges of spying for the PRC.

In 2016 Tsai Ing-wen, representing the hard-line Democratic Progressive Party, was elected as Taiwan’s president in a landslide. She maintains that there is no need for Taiwan to proclaim its independence from the PRC as it already functions as an independent country. According to the defector Wang Liqiang, the PRC interfered in Taiwan’s 2018 local elections and had similar plans for the January 2020 elections, in which the pro-Beijing opposi- tion lost heavily as President Tsai won over 57 percent of the vote in a three- way race. Evidently the PRC’s immediate goal had been to effect a change to a more conciliatory government in Taiwan, a strategy than won no local support. See also ATOLL AA-2; AUSTRALIA; BERGERSEN, GREGG W; BLACK BAT SQUADRON; BLACK CAT SQUADRON; CAMPCON; CHANG HSIEN-YI; CHANG, THERESA; CHEN YONGLIN; CHIANG CHING-KUO; CHIANG KEWILIN; CHI MAK; CHIN, LARRY WU-TAI; CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH; CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; CHI- NESE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE; CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT); CLINE, RAY; DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ EXTÉ- RIEURE (DGSE); EIGHTH BUREAU; FIRST BUREAU; FONDREN, JAMES W; GE YUEFIE; GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEAD- QUARTERS (GCHQ); GUO WANJUN; HANSON HUANG; HO CHIH- CHIANG; HONG KONG; INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE MINIS- TRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (IBMND); INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT (ILD); JAPAN; KAMISEYA; KASHMIR PRINCESS; KEYSER, DONALD W; LAU YVET-SANG; LEE, PETER; LEE, SAM CHING SHENG; LILLEY, JAMES; LI SHAOMIN; LI JAIQI; LI TSUNG-

 

JEN; MACAO; MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (MIB); MILI- TARY INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT (MID); MIN GWO BAO; MOO, KO-SUEN; OVERSEAS CHINESE; PARLOR MAID; PENG YEN-CHIN; PIRACY; SECOND DEPARTMENT (DI ER BU); SHESU LO, ROLAND; SHRIVER, GLENN D; SINO-SOVIET SPLIT; SOVIET UNION; TAI SHEN KUO; TAKHLI; THIRD DEPARTMENT; TSOU, DOUGLAS; U-2; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA); WANG HSI-LING; WEN HO LEE; XIONG XIANGHUI; YU QIANGSHENG; ZHANG JIYAN; ZHU CHENZHI.

TAJIKISTAN. Officially the Republic of Tajikistan, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) former Soviet neighbor, independent since 1991 and since 1996 a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Xhan- ghai Shi Hezuo Zuzhi, Tajikistan has received considerable infrastructure investment from Beijing. This includes a power-line network installed by China Theban Electric Apparatus Stock, Zhongguo Sai Ban Dianqi Gufen Youxian Gongsi, in 2006, in partnership with Tajikistan’s national power company, Barki Tojik. This $340 million project was principally financed by China’s state-owned Eximbank, officially the Export-Import Bank of China, Zhongguo Shuchu Ru Yinhang, which is chartered to implement the PRC’s interests. In 2012 Tajikistan received a promise from China for $1 billion in grants, technical assistance, and preferential credit terms.

In 2011 China and Tajikistan settled a long-standing border dispute, with

each country compromising on its claims. China quietly competes with Rus- sia for influence within Tajikistan, and since 2016 it has had troops garri- soned in the country, though Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs offi- cially denies their presence. Tajikistan has become a significant target for intelligence collection by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu.

TAKHLI. The U.S. airbase at Takhli in central Thailand was the launch site for a series of overflights conducted by a Taiwanese U-2C and a U-2F of the nuclear test site at Lop Nor in June 1967. See also AIRBORNE COLLEC- TION; BLACK CAT SQUADRON; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

TAO FENG “FRANKLIN”. On 21 August 2019 Tao Feng, alias Franklin Tao, a 47-year-old associate professor at the University of Kansas, was in- dicted on federal charges of concealing his employment with a Chinese uni- versity while conducting research at the University of Kansas funded by the United States government.

 

Tao, who was born in China, was alleged to have signed a five-year contact with Fuzhou University, Fuzhou Daxue, as a Changjiang Scholar Distinguished Professor, Changjiang Xuezhe Tepin Jiaoshou, a full-time po- sition, a relationship he failed to disclose to the University of Kansas, where he had been appointed in August 2014. Simultaneously, Tao was conducting research under two Department of Energy (DoE) contracts and four National Science Foundation contracts.

Tao had been recruited to Fuzhou University under China’s Thousand Talents Program, Qian Ren Jihua, a scheme to attract talent in specific fields, with emphasis on persuading ethnic Chinese to return to China, where they are attracted by high salaries and academic awards.

Specifically, Tao was charged with a single count of wire fraud and three counts of program fraud, with forfeiture consequences if convicted.

TAO SIJU. Born in 1935 in Jiangsu, Tao Siju was admitted to the Shanghai Textiles College in 1950, and a year later he began his studies at the People’s Public Security University of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gong An Daxue. In 1959 he received an associate degree in English from the China Foreign Affairs University, Waijian Xueyuan, which is under the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu. He worked at the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, until 1968 when he was purged during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wen- hua Dageming, probably because he had studied English. He was then sent to a May Seventh Cadre School, where he engaged in hard agricultural work while studying the writings of Chairman Mao Zedong, designed to “reedu- cate” cadres and intellectuals in socialist thought.

In October 1975 Tao returned to work, first at the Chinese Academy of

Sciences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, and then as secretary to General Luo Ruiq- ing, the head of the MPS. In July 1983 Tao was named vice minister of public security, and in that same year he traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France to meet with what he described as his “Western colleagues.” He also visited Yugoslavia, where he met Stane Dolanc, the federal secretary for interior affairs, whose role was to coordinate the Yugoslav security apparatus. In 1987 Tao served as a delegate to the 13th Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) National Congress, and in December 1990 he was named as the ninth minister of the MPS, one year after the crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 1989, replacing Wang Fang. He was also appointed commissioner-general of the Chinese People’s Armed Forces Police, Zhongguo Renmin Wu Zhuang Buchi, a paramilitary police contingent administered by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun. At that time, in an effort to generate income, the Armed Forces Police was allowed to run businesses, a practice that had started under Deng

 

Xiaoping when he had made massive cuts in defense spending so as to concentrate on economic development. The arrangement ended in 1998 when President Jiang Zemin decided the practice fueled corruption.

Tao introduced the “110” hotline to China’s larger cities, where citizens could report crimes, and streamlined the police ranking and promotional systems. In 1993 he visited Hong Kong, where he was quoted as observing, “The mob is not a monolithic whole. Some of them are patriotic and love Hong Kong.” Reportedly he had also invited the triads to establish businesses in China, apparently in an effort to stabilize the colony before the British withdrawal in 1997.

Tao was replaced as MPS minister in March 1998 by Jia Chunwang but continued as a member of the 15th CCP Central Committee, and from 1998 to 2009 he sat on the National People’s Congress Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee, Quanguo Renmin Diabiao Dahui Jiancha He Sifa Weiy- uanhui. He also served, from 1998 to 2003, as a member of the Ninth Stand- ing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Di Jiu Jie Quanguo Renmin Diabi- ao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui.

In 2001 Li Jizhou, an MPS deputy minister, was sentenced to death for concealing a smuggling enterprise led by a Fujian-based businessman, Lai Changxing. Tao may have been tainted by Li’s crimes, but when he died in 2016, President Xi Jinping and former President Hu Jintao sent wreaths to Tao’s memorial, rebutting the rumors and providing evidence of Tao’s status.

TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION. Evidence collected during criminal in- vestigations and intelligence operations conducted in the United States sug- gests that the collection of modern technology is pursued as a priority by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence authorities, which employ both professional agencies to undertake acquisition operations and private individuals who appear to act independently, confident that they can sell sensitive data to the government. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report published in November 2009, “these efforts fall into four broad categories”:

1) “actuarial” intelligence cobbled together from multiple sources; 2) “professional” intelligence-gathering conducted or directly sponsored by PRC intelligence agents; 3) “enterprise-directed” acquisition of controlled technology driven by entities within the Chinese state scientific research and development military-industrial sectors; and 4) “entrepreneurial” in- dustrial espionage and illegal technology exports carried out by private actors seeking rewards from the Chinese government.

 

The “actuarial” approach was described in detail in the January 2000 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Re- port to Congress on Chinese Espionage Activities against the United States, declassified in January 2006, as “grains of sand” collected indiscriminately, often from unrestricted sources, which, when assembled later, could provide valuable information. Sometimes referred to as the “mosaic method,” this system was considered “inefficient but not ineffective.”

Because the Chinese consider themselves to be in a developmental “catch- up” situation, their collection program tends to have a comparatively broad scope. Chinese collectors target information and technology on anything of value to China, which leads them to seek to collect open-source information as well as restricted/proprietary and classified information. Gradually, of course, as the quality of PRC technology improved, this scattergun, piece- meal methodology resulted in a more centralized and focused approach. In- deed, the commission cited the Chi Mak case and the prosecutions of Gregg Bergersen and James Fondren as evidence that Chinese clandestine opera- tional sophistication had improved.

In assessing the more professional methodology, the commission referred to Project 863, 863 Jihua, and quoted a 2008 Defense Security Service report that noted a rise in Chinese commercial firms making “a purposeful attempt to make the contacts seem more innocuous by using non-governmen- tal entities as surrogate collectors for interested government or government- affiliated entities.” This view reflected the earlier CIA and FBI testimony that “China’s commercial entities play a significant role in the pursuit of proprietary/trade secret U.S. technology. The vast majority of Chinese tech- nology entities in the United States are legitimate companies; however, some are a platform for intelligence collection activities.”

As an example of “enterprise-driven” espionage conducted by the PRC or by state-sponsored organizations, the commission cited the conviction of Greg Chung in July 2009 and quoted from the director of national intelli- gence, Dennis C. Blair, when examining “entrepreneurial espionage”:

Non-professional intelligence collectors—including government and com- mercial researchers, students, academics, scientists, business people, dele- gations and visitors, also provide China with a significant amount of sensi- tive U.S. technologies and trade secrets. Some members of this group knowingly or unknowingly collect on behalf of [PRC intelligence agen- cies] or Chinese defense industries, presenting a significant intelligence threat. But in many cases the collection efforts of these private-sector players are driven entirely by the opportunity for commercial or profes- sional gain and have no affiliation with [PRC intelligence].

 

The commission’s examples of “entrepreneurial espionage” included Dr. Shu Quansheng, imprisoned in November 2009, and the FirmSpace indict- ment handed down in Minnesota in October 2008.

In 2015 Premier Li Keqiang introduced China’s Made in China 2025, Zhongguo Zhizao Erling Erwu, a plan to move China away from manufactur- ing cheap goods produced by low-paid labor to higher-value goods and ser- vices. The project concentrates on the aerospace, pharmaceutical, automo- tive, and robotics industries that have been the exclusive domain of foreign companies. China intends to compete globally in the production of those goods and services, and this effort has resulted in the implementation of a massive theft of intellectual property on a scale that amounts to state-spon- sored industrial espionage, encouraging individuals and companies to gain a competitive edge by stealing technology in lieu of conducting research and development. See also AMGEN; CHANG, THERESA; CHAO TAH WEI; CHENG, PHILIP; CHI TONG KUOK; DING, JIAN WEI; DU SHASHAN; FRANK, DESMOND DINESH; GOWADIA, NOSHIR S; HANSON, HAR- OLD DEWITT; INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; IRAN; ITT CORPORA- TION; JIN HANJUAN; KHAN, AMANULLAH; KOVACS, WILLIAM; LAM, WAI LIM WILLIAM; LAU, HING SHING; LEE, SAM CHING SHENG; LIANG XIUWEN; YANG LIAN; LI QING; LIU SIXING; LU FUTIAN; MADE IN CHINA 2025; MENG HONG; MENG, XIAODONG SHELDON; MOO, KO-SUEN; NAHARDANI, AHMAD; ROTH, JOHN REECE; SUCCOR DELIGHT; TAIWAN; TSU, WILLIAM CHAI-WAI; WANG-WOODFORD, LAURA; WAVELAB INC; WEN HO LEE; WU BIN; XU BING; XU WEIBO; YANG FUNG; YU XIANGDONG; ZHANG, DAVID; ZHANG, MICHAEL MING; ZHONG MING; ZHU, PETER; ZHU YAN.

TECHNOLOGY COUNTERFEITING. Between 2002 and 2004 a series of unprecedented computer system failures in the United States linked to substandard equipment prompted a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) study of the appearance of large quantities of counterfeit technology on the international market. One focus was on routers and other hardware, including gigabit interface converters purportedly manufactured by Cisco, a company with 80 percent of the U.S. market. The FBI discovered that bogus Cisco products had closed down a major computer system in Pittsburgh, and in 2004 they had caused the failure of a national weather reporting network that supposedly had been upgraded with new hardware.

The FBI investigation revealed widespread fraud in which subcontractors had acquired counterfeit technology from suppliers in Shenzhen, a special economic zone in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and then peddled the material to clients as the authentic product, using ostensibly legitimate serial numbers, packaging, software, and manuals. However, once installed,

 

the equipment experienced a high failure rate and, of more concern to the intelligence community, included subroutines that allowed access to pro- tected sectors previously thought secure and undermined cryptographic sys- tems.

The counterfeit matériel was traced back to the PRC through intermediar- ies in the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and Great Britain, and investi- gations were launched against two U.S. government contractors, eGlobe So- lutions of Seattle and Syren Technology, based in Laguna Neguil, California. Run by two brothers, Mike and Scott Song, eGlobe’s clients included Raytheon, the U.S. Naval Air Warfare Center, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, and the U.S. Air Force at Springdahlem, Germany, and the proprie- tors were charged with having sold counterfeit Cisco and Sun Microsystems equipment between May 2003 and July 2005 valued at $788,000. In the case of Syren Technology, Robert and Michael Edman, both of Richmond, Texas, were indicted in December 2007 with having sold fake Cisco hardware to the FBI, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the U.S. Air Force. In addi- tion, an investigation conducted by Lockheed Martin revealed that two of its subcontractors, American Data and Gulfcoast Workstation Relational Tech- nology Services, had provided the U.S. Navy with counterfeit Cisco routers.

The FBI concluded at the time that up to 10 percent of technology sales,

estimated at $100 billion annually, involved counterfeit products, and noted that much of the material was exported from the PRC by the Chinese postal service, not by regular shippers, in small consignments, with manuals, hard- ware, and software sent separately. Typically, the equipment was then as- sembled by middlemen, some of them even authorized legitimate suppliers, who offered it at suspiciously low prices. Apart from the security implica- tions for critical infrastructure, the counterfeiters had penetrated the open- market information technology trade and used eBay as a means to distribute fake or substandard computer components.

During the FBI’s criminal investigation, which raised many trademark and other issues, it received assistance from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, in Beijing, but the extent to which the PRC authorities had colluded in the large-scale counterfeiting activities in Shenzhen re- mained unclear. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

TEWU GONGZUO. A term used by the Chinese when referring to clandes- tine activities, tewu gongzuo means literally “secret work activities.”

THIRD DEPARTMENT. The largest of all the People’s Republic of Chi- na’s (PRC) intelligence agencies, reportedly employing in excess of 20,000 staff, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) General Staff Department (GSD), Third Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di San Bu, is re-

 

sponsible for signals intelligence collection and maintains a close relation- ship with the PLA/GSD, Fourth Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Si Bu, which engages in electronic warfare.

The Third Department incorporates the GSD’s Electronic Countermeas- ures and Radar Department, Dianzi Duikang Yu Leida Bu, which conducts the country’s cryptographic operations from numerous ground stations, half a dozen ships, trucks, and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Jiefangjun Kongjun. The Third Department’s headquarters is lo- cated close to the GSD First (Operations) Department complex in the hills northwest of the Summer Palace and is staffed by some 20,000 personnel, which include a large number of linguists trained at the PLA’s Foreign Lan- guage Institute, Jiefangjun Waiguoyu Xueyuan.

Signals collection operations are controlled centrally from Beijing, with subordinate satellite sites spread across the country. A large station in Lan- zhou monitors Russian traffic and also functions as a strategic early-warning facility, while the Shenyang station covers Russia, Japan, and Korea. The Chengdu site covers India, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia, while Nanjing concentrates on Taiwan. Guangzhou covers Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, and smaller stations located along the border at Jilemutu, Erlian, and Hami monitor Russia.

THOUSAND TALENTS PROGRAM. The Thousand Talents Program, Qian Ren Jihua, was implemented in 2008 as an overt means to attract primarily ethnic Chinese, educated or employed in the United States, to return to China to work. The plan was conceived by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Zhonggua Gongchandang Zhon- gyang Weiyuanhui, and the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonggua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan. Those targeted for recruitment include those who have been successful as professionals or researchers and those who have displayed entrepreneurial skills. Many of the best Chinese students who traveled abroad for advanced studies decided to remain abroad after the completion of their studies. Consequently, many educated overseas Chinese, Huaqiao Huaren, have the technical skills required by China. Many were enticed to return to China by offering high salaries and prestigious awards from leading Chinese academic institutions. While the program has been praised for being able to recruit top talent to China, it has also been criticized for not being able to retain that talent.

On 22 June 2018 a House of Representatives Armed Services Committee

hearing included discussion of an analysis produced by the National Intelli- gence Council (NIC), which described the Thousand Talents Program as “China’s flagship talent program and probably the largest in terms of fund- ing.” The assessment noted that the pool of Thousand Talent recruits num- bered 2,629, broken down as follows: 44 percent specializing in medicine,

 

life, or health services; 22 percent in applied industrial technologies; 8 per- cent in computer sciences; and 6 percent each in aviation/aerospace and astronomy. The remainder were in such areas as economics, finance, and mathematics.

One area, perhaps unexpected, has been in the area of biomedical research, as the Chinese have specifically targeted such researchers under the Thou- sand Talents Program. In November 2019, some 71 institutions, including some of the more prestigious medical schools in the United States, were investigating 180 individual examples of theft of intellectual property. This intervention had been prompted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which in 2018 mailed almost 20,000 letters urging institutions in receipt of government grants to remain vigilant. Consequently, the National Institutes of Health has referred 24 cases to its inspector-general’s office.

These investigations have revealed examples where researchers obtained patents in China for work performed in the United States, funded by govern- ment grants and owned by U.S. institutions, while others have actually set up laboratories based on stolen research. More than 10 scientists linked to such behavior have been fired or made to resign.

A Pentagon official testified that the Pentagon was “facing an unprece- dented threat to its technological and industrial base,” while noting that the United States’ “open society” has “offered China access to the same technol- ogy and information that is crucial to the success of our future war-fighting capabilities. We have seen the Chinese target top talent in American univer- sities and research labs of the private sector, including defense contractors and the U.S. government.”

TIBET. Occupied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1950, with intensive oppression from 1959 that forced the Dalai Lama to take refuge in Dharamsala, Tibet has been a focus of domestic unrest and a source of external political pressure from émigrés and their supporters. A resistance army, the Chushi Gangdruk, was created in 1956 after the People’s Libera- tion Army (PLA) bombed several monasteries. Headed by a wealthy Tibetan businessman from Liland, Andrug Gompo Tashi, he was put in touch with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the following year by the Dalai Lama’s two brothers, and arrangements were made for volunteers to undergo training at Saipan and then at Fort Hale, Colorado, in preparation for their reinsertion by parachute and their role in circus. It was a group of Chushi Gangdruk guerrillas that escorted the Dalai Lama over the frontier to safety, a risky exfiltration that the organization would come to regard as one of its major successes.

Thereafter the resistance was based at Mustang, in northern Nepal, mount-

ing occasional raids into Tibet, which from March 1961 were supported with modern weapons supplied by the CIA. Their principal target was traffic on

 

the Lhasa–Xinjiang highway, which the Chinese closed in 1964 because of the number of attacks, but fear of reprisals and a comprehensive network of informers prevented Chushi Gangdruk from penetrating deeper. Three years later the CIA began winding down the operation, and in the summer of 1974 Nepal’s army dismantled the Mustang base after the Dalai Lama ordered the surviving guerrillas to surrender. A few of the guerrillas committed suicide, while others were imprisoned briefly before being resettled in camps in Kath- mandu and at Jampaling, near Pokhara, and found jobs subsidized by the CIA.

Another large group of refugees were concentrated at Dehradun in Raja- stan where, under the sponsorship of the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB), they were trained as guerrillas. Following the Indo-Chinese border conflict in 1962, the Indian government deployed them to Chakrata as part of the paramilitary Special Frontier Force led by Indian Army general Sujan Singh Uban to undertake reconnaissance missions over the border into the PRC, principally to collect information on PLA positions for the Indian foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). In February 1963, training for what became known as Establishment 22 was conducted by CIA personnel headed by Colonel Wayne F. Sanford, a former U.S. Marine.

Émigré Tibetan activists and the separatist movement continue to be re- garded as priority targets for intelligence collection by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, as confirmed by numerous MSS and PRC diplomatic defectors, among them Zhang Jiyan in Ottawa and Chen Yonglin in Sydney. Tibetans, especially supporters of the Tibetan indepen- dence movement, are considered, along with the Uighurs, members of the Falun Gong, the Chinese democracy movement, and the Taiwan indepen- dence movement, as part of the Five Poisons, Wu Du, by the Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) as threats to its continued rule. Additionally, the Dalai Lama and his adherents are the subject of harassment, hostile penetration, and a strategy of disruption orchestrated by the MSS, which has included sophisticated cyber attacks on émigré websites and computer networks, while the MSS has credited the CIA with masterminding internal dissent and undermining the regime by spreading propaganda. See also CYBER ESPI- ONAGE; GH0STNET; MACKIERNAN, DOUGLAS.

TIGER TRAP. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) code name for the surveillance in 1981 of Min Gwo Bao, which was later extended to cover Wen Ho Lee.

 

TITAN RAIN. In 2002 the United States Intelligence Community began monitoring cyber attacks mounted from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but channeled through North Korea. Code-named TITAN RAIN, the operation identified thousands of attempts to penetrate the U.S. Information Systems Engineering Command, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Space and Missile Defense Acquisition Center. In January 2010, the internet company responsible for managing the Google search engine re- vealed that the PRC had been behind a concerted political and corporate espionage program known as Aurora, which had targeted major financial, defense, and technology companies in the United States since 2005, and had also pursued human rights activists and political dissidents within mainland China. Other websites, including the BBC and Wikipedia, also reported interference with access to their services and, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission’s report to Congress, for 18 minutes on 8 April 2010, China Telecom seized control of some 15 percent of the entire World Wide Web by erroneous network routes, which had the effect of channeling routine internet communications involving IBM, Yahoo!, Mis- crosoft, the U.S. Congress, and various U.S. military websites through serv- ers in the PRC.

This unprecedented diversion was brief in duration but was interpreted by

Western analysts as a sophisticated attempt to test Beijing’s ability to manip- ulate the internet and hijack private messaging, perhaps even inserting mal- ware into the traffic and thereby contaminating target computer systems. According to the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team at the Depart- ment of Homeland Security, reports of cyber incursions increased from 5,503 incidents in 2006 to 41,776 four years later, and the U.S. State Department’s BYZANTINE HADES investigation traced many of them to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). See also CYBER ESPIONAGE; GH0STNET.

TONG DANING. On 21 April 2006, Tong Daning, in his mid-fifties, was executed by a Beijing People’s Intermediate Court, Beijing Renmin Zhongi Fayuan, on a charge of espionage. Tong was convicted of spying for Taiwan and was the highest-ranking official of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to be executed for spying since People’s Liberation Army (PLA) lieutenant general Liu Liankun was similarly convicted of spying for Taiwan in 1999.

Tong had long held senior positions in the PRC’s civil service, including a rank comparable to that just below assistant minister of the National Devel- opment and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China, Zhon- ghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Fazhan He Gaige Weiyuanhui, a powerful management agency under the direct control of the PRC’s State Council, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan, which has considerable influ- ence on the management of the country’s economy. Tong had also held high

 

positions in the National Council for Social Security Fund, Quanguo Shehui Baozhang Jijin Lishi Hui, a $26 billion supplementary fund used as social security.

Tong was accused of accepting $250,000 over 15 years for passing clas- sified documents to the Taiwanese. After his execution, thousands of civil servants were required to watch a half-hour video, Tongdaning Touqie Mimi De Jiandie An, literally “The Espionage Case of Tong Daning Stealing Se- crets,” which showed Tong being taken away in a police car, but reportedly did not show his actual execution, and was meant to “strengthen employees’ concept of protecting secrets.”

TOPPER. On 30 March 1960 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) de- ployed U-2 aircraft on a series of missions from Atsugi over the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to drop javelin-like remote sensors calibrated to seismically detect evidence of nuclear tests. The second TOPPER mission, flown a few days later on 5 April, ended in a mechanical failure that required the pilot to make a crash landing in a paddy field in Thailand. The wreckage was recovered to Bangkok’s Don Muang airfield, where a C-124 cargo plane flew it back to Edwards Air Force Base in California.

The use of remote sensors to collect technical intelligence is a highly effective method of monitoring activity in identified locations associated with the testing of warheads and missiles. The equipment, usually a modified geophone or seisometer, is designed to detect events at long distances, meas- ure the intensity of teleseismic waves, and provide data that, when processed with similar information from other sites, will offer an accurate bearing on the source. With a sufficiently sensitive apparatus, a nuclear detonation oc- curring deep under a mountain thousands of miles away can be recorded by a network of devices linked to a central facility. Since the 1996 Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty, the International Monitoring System has been respon- sible for the management from Vienna of 250 stations worldwide that ensure compliance.

However, the challenges posed by the PRC, which has consistently re-

jected participation in international treaties limiting nuclear tests, are consid- erable because much of the country is subject to vibration from naturally occurring earthquakes, the test site at Lop Nor in western Xinjiang Province is far from the nearest neutral territory from which regional wave infrasound monitoring can be conducted, and from 1961 the Soviets conducted their underground nuclear tests south of the known atmospheric test site at Semi- palatinsk in Kazakhstan. Altogether some 340 Soviet tests were registered until 1989. In contrast, a total of 45 tests were conducted at Lop Nor from October 1964, of which 23 were atmospheric, with the first underground test detected in September 1969, and the last atmospheric test was conducted in October 1980. The last underground test at Lop Nor took place in July 1996,

 

and since then the PRC appears to have been in de facto compliance with treaties made since the ban on atmospheric testing in 1963 that it has refused to sign. See also NANDA DEVI; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

TROPIC. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) code name for an opera- tion conducted in 1952 to drop Kuomintang (KMT) agents into eastern Manchuria from a C-47 and a B-17. When the CIA’s unmarked C-47, based in Atsugi but flying missions from Seoul, was shot down near Antu in Jilin Province on 29 November, two crewmen, Robert C. Snoddy and Norman A. Schwartz, were killed, and 24-year-old Richard G. Fecteau and 27-year-old John T. Downey were captured. They had been attempting to “air-snatch” documents from an agent with a Fulton skyhook but had been lured to the area by messages sent by agents who were operating under Chinese control.

Two years later the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the conviction of the pair, and 11 other Americans, aircrew from a B-29 downed over Liaoning, on espionage charges, and they remained in Chinese captivity until 9 December 1971 and March 1973, respectively, when they were re- leased over the Lo Wu Bridge into Hong Kong. Both were newly recruited CIA officers and under interrogation revealed what information they had, Fecteau having had less than five months’ experience in the agency. Downey had joined the CIA from Yale in June 1951 and after three months’ training at Fort Benning, Georgia, had been posted to Atsugi. In 2010, TROPIC was the subject of a documentary film, Extraordinary Fidelity, which was made by the CIA for training purposes and was introduced into the Langley cam- pus “bubble” by the director, Leon Panetta.

Between 1951 and 1953 a total of 212 agents were parachuted into main-

land China, of whom 101 were killed and 111 captured. The initially unex- plained loss of the C-47, which effectively terminated CIA paramilitary oper- ations in the PRC, was a result of the capture of the team of agents, led by Chang Tsai-wen, that had been inserted in July after training on Saipan. The plane had been lured into a trap while attempting to exfiltrate Li Chu-ying, who had been delivered the previous month on an inspection mission. See also CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT); TAIWAN; U-2.

TSANG, JOHN. A senior Hong Kong Police (HKP) officer, Superintendent John Tsang was a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, mole who had joined the Special Branch in 1951 and had also served in the Criminal Investigation Division and in the uniform sections. Much admired by his colleagues, Tsang was a tall, imposing man who had spent a year at Oxford University and had received rapid promotion, most recently from Police Commissioner Henry Heath.

 

Tsang was identified after a routine random search of a visitor at the Lo Woo border bridge had revealed a courier carrying a coded message between his toes. He was detained and replaced by a volunteer from the MI5 security liaison officer’s unit who delivered the item to a house occupied by a single woman who, from a picture on her wall of a police passing-out parade, appeared to be connected to the police. Physical and technical surveillance eventually revealed that she was John Tsang’s mother.

At the time of his arrest in 1959 by his close friends, Peter Law and Richard “Ricky” Richardson, Tsang was deputy commandant at the Police Training School and was considered by colleagues to be a likely candidate as the HKP’s first Chinese commissioner. During five months of interrogation, Tsang revealed that he had been coerced into working for the Chinese after they had learned that during World War II he had spent a year in Japan training to be a Japanese spy. He made a full confession, confirming that he had maintained contact with the Chinese throughout his service in the Spe- cial Branch, which had begun in 1951, and then was deported to China. During the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, he broad- cast from Guangzhou on the radio urging his former compatriots to revolt. A lengthy Special Branch investigation revealed that Tsang had been especially friendly with another Chinese officer at Sau Ki Wan, Superintendent Wong Wing Yin, who had been working for the Kuomintang (KMT) in Tai Wan. He too was arrested, interrogated, and then deported.

When the American author James Clavell visited Hong Kong to research

Noble House, he learned about Tsang’s espionage and included a character in his book based on the case.

TSOU, DOUGLAS. Having fled from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949 when the Communists gained power, Tsou emigrated to the United States 20 years later and became a naturalized U.S. citizen, Between 1980 and 1985 he was employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), first in San Francisco and then in Houston, before he admitted in 1986 that he had written a letter to a representative of the government of Taiwan revealing secret information, this being the identity of an intelligence officer working for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Tsou was fired immediately and in 1988 was indicted. At his trial in 1991 he was found guilty of a single count of espionage and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, prosecutors having claimed that the information contained in that single letter represented only a small amount of the total passed to Taiwan during his six years with the FBI. See also NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU (NSB).

 

TSU, WILLIAM CHAI-WAI. On 10 January 2009 William Chai-wai Tsu, aged 61, was arrested by agents of the Export and Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement Task Force at the Commerce Casino in Hacienda Heights, California, and charged with violations of the International Emergency Eco- nomic Powers Act. Employed by a Beijing-based military contractor, the Dimigit Science & Technology Company, Yimin Keji Gongsi, and vice presi- dent of Cheerway Inc., Tsu exported more than 400 restricted integrated circuits with military applications in radar systems to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over a period of 10 months, having assured several American suppliers that the circuits would not be exported. According to the prosecu- tion, Tsu supplied restricted technology to several customers in China, in- cluding the 704 Research Institute, 704 Yanjiu Suo, also known as the Aerospace Long March Rocket Technology Company, Hangtian Chang- zheng Huojian Jishhu Gongsi, a firm affiliated with the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, Zhongguo Hangtian Keji Jituan Gongsi.

On 3 August 2009 Tsu pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 40 months’

imprisonment. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

TUNG CHI-PENG. Following the assassination of the prime minister of Burundi, Pierre Ngendandumwe, in January 1965, the assistant cultural atta- ché Tung Chi-peng defected to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and revealed that the Chinese embassy had orchestrated the attempted coup and was planning to overthrow the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo so as to gain access to that country’s uranium reserves. The Burundi authorities immediately expelled the entire Chinese diplomatic mis- sion in Bujumbura.

 

 

U

U-2. Reconnaissance flights by the high-altitude Lockheed U-2 over main- land China began in August 1957 with two missions flown from Peshawar in Pakistan. They went undetected, and the absence of any SA-2 Guideline missiles made the incursions relatively risk free.

More regular incursions started on 18 June 1958 when two aircraft of Detachment C of the Fourth Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provision- al) were flown by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pilots from Atsugi in Japan to photograph suspected troop movements. The imagery disclosed none, but two months later a further four missions were completed as Que- moy came under an intensive artillery barrage. More flights took place on 9 September and 22 October, but again the imagery did not reveal any indica- tion that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun, was preparing to invade Taiwan or occupy the vulnerable islands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy.

In March 1960 TOPPER missions were flown to insert remote sensors in China, but the loss of a U-2 in Thailand on the second flight reduced Detach- ment C’s strength to three planes. Clearly the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Jiefangjun Kengjun, was aware of the high-flying air- craft because on one mission flown in March 1960 more than 30 PLAAF fighters attempted interception. The aircraft were withdrawn from Atsugi in August 1960 at the request of the Japanese government and transferred to Edwards Air Force Base in California.

In December 1960 the CIA established Detachment H at Taoyüan, near Taipei, to overfly the mainland. Southern China was covered from Cubi Point in the Philippines, while the north was penetrated from Kunsan on South Korea’s west coast, the dismantled planes having been flown by C- 130 transports to the remote takeoff airfields for reassembly.

Following the decision to equip the Nationalists with the U-2A, flight conversion training began at Laughlin Air Force Base in May 1959 with six candidates led by Colonel Shih Chu Yang. Two of his pilots, Colonel Chen Wi-sheng and Captain Fan Hung-ti, were killed, and Shang Shi-hi was with-

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drawn from the program after he survived two crashes by ejecting, only to be killed later in an F-104. Eventually a total of 26 Nationalist pilots would qualify on the aircraft in the United States.

Upon their return to Taiwan, the pilots were assigned to the 35th Recon- naissance Squadron, known as the “Black Cats” and formally established on 14 December 1960, to fly a pair of Taiwanese U-2Cs supplied by Lockheed under CIA sponsorship in June. Their first overflight of the mainland was accomplished on 13 January 1962, and thereafter they continued regularly, up to three times a month, and by the end of the year they had collected imagery of China’s nuclear plants in northwestern Qinghai and the uranium- enrichment facility at Lanzhou, Gansu, without incident. On one occasion, on 28 May 1962, a U-2 pilot reported that his instruments had indicated that a Chinese radar had locked onto his plane, but he took evasive action and no missile was fired at him. The flights were extremely arduous, and 12-hour round-trip flights were not unusual.

The Chinese soon became aware of the incursions and in July 1962 broad-

cast a reward of $280,000 in gold to any Taiwanese pilot who defected with his plane. On 9 September Colonel Chen Huai-sheng’s U-2A was brought down by an SA-2 Guideline missile nine miles south of Nanchang, and he is thought to have used his parachute and survived, albeit briefly, and died in the hospital. On 1 November 1963, Major Chang Yi-yei’s U-2C was shot down after having been hit by two SA-2s over Jiangxi while on the return journey over the coast during a mission to photograph a nuclear weapons plant at Lanzhou and the Jiayuguan missile test site. He would remain in captivity until he was released in November 1982. On 23 March 1964, Major Teh Pai-jiang was drowned after he suffered an equipment failure and ejected into the sea during a high-altitude signals intelligence (SIGINT) flight along the periphery of Chinese airspace over the Taiwan Straits. Three months later, on 7 July, Colonel Nan-ping Lee was killed when his U-2G was shot down by an SA-2 over Fujian, having overflown southern China from Cubi Point. On 27 November several SA-2s missed a U-2, but one only narrowly, causing the pilot, on a mission to Lanzhou, to experience temporary blind- ness because of the missile’s engine flare.

On 9 January 1965, Major Wang Shi-chuen’s plane, on a mission to photo-

graph the Paotow uranium-enrichment plant with an infrared camera, was shot down southwest of Beijing by an SA-2 and survived the crash with two broken legs. He would be released in Hong Kong in November 1982 with Major Chang Yi Yei. In March 1965, a PLAAF MiG-21 fired two missiles at a U-2, but neither hit.

The fifth and last Taiwanese pilot to be shot down was Captain Lung Pei- hwang, whose U-2C was hit by an SA-2 over Jiaxing on 9 September 1967. As well as these losses, a further six Taiwanese pilots were killed in acci- dents while on operational or training flights: Major Yoa Hia Chih on 9

 

September 1962; Major Chin Wen Wang on 22 October 1965; Captain Tse Chi Wu; Major Ching Chang Yu on 21 June 1966; Colonel Hseih Chang on 3 January 1969; and Major Chi Hsien Huang on 24 November 1970. Reported- ly another unnamed pilot died when his U-2R crashed near Taiwan on 23 November 1973.

One explanation for the heavy casualties suffered by the U-2s flying to or from Taiwan’s Taoyüan airfield, amounting to five planes, was the difficulty in concealing the aircrafts’ movements, especially takeoffs, from an airfield only 90 miles from the Chinese coast and under constant hostile radar and signals surveillance. Various countermeasures and decoy flights were tried, but the Chinese ground defenses received plenty of advance warning to pre- pare their Fan Song acquisition radars, even if the most advanced versions of the MiG-21consistently failed to climb into range. Another complication was the duration of the U-2 flights flown from Taoyüan, which might take up to 12 hours to complete a 3,000-mile round-trip, and the fact that some target areas, such as the nuclear installations in the far northeast, could not be reached from airfields in India or Pakistan.

A total of 102 reconnaissance flights were completed by the U-2 until the

program was terminated by President Richard Nixon following his visit to Beijing in February 1972, and the planes were returned to the United States in 1974. See also AIRBORNE COLLECTION; SENIOR BOWL.

UIGHURS. Formerly the inhabitants of eastern Turkistan, the Uighurs came under Chinese Communist control in 1949, and the province was renamed the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. Speaking their own Turkic dialect and being predominantly Sunni Muslim, the Uighurs campaigned unsuccessfully against the annexation of 2 million square kilometers of their country and against the policy of ethnic Han immigration and settlement.

Uighur separatists are considered a priority target for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and their activities are under con- stant surveillance. During the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, numerous Ui- ghurs were captured by coalition forces, accused of having attended al-Qaida training camps, and detained at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, but in 2004 they were declared eligible for release, although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that they could not be repatriated to China, where they would likely face persecution. Since then, two groups have been released, one to an island in the Pacific and another to Bermuda.

The Uighurs are considered by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to be one of the Five Poisons, Wu Du, along with Tibetans and supporters of the Tibetan independence movement, members of the Falun Gong, members of the Chinese democracy movement, and Taiwanese independence move- ment members, as threats to their continued rule.

 

In November 2019 the China Cables revealed how more than a thousand “reeducation” camps had been established to eradicate Uighur and other Muslim minority cultures, languages, and traditions and force an allegiance to the CCP, at the direction of President Xi Jinping. It is estimated that as many as 1.8 million Uighurs have been detained, out of a population of approximately 11 million. See also FIVE POISONS; GERMANY; NA- TIONAL MINORITIES; UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT (UFWD).

UNIT 61398. Located in a nondescript 12-story building near 208 Datong Road in a public, mixed-use area of Pudong in Shanghai, Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun, or 61398 Bidui, has emerged as a major source of cyber attacks on Western targets. Operating under the Second Bureau of the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), Third Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Er Ju, Di San Ju, PLA Unit 61398 is a signals intelligence (SIGINT) component of the army and is known by a variety of other names, including “Advanced Persistent Threat 1,” the “Comment Group,” and “BYZANTINE CANDOR,” the last pro- vided by U.S. intelligence agencies. The unit has demonstrated both consid- erable skill as well as an aggressive recklessness that suggests little concern about being identified. Li Xiaofei, a political science professor at York Col- lege of Pennsylvania, has noted that PRC-based cyber warriors are more reckless than their counterparts in other countries, most likely because they are confident that can operate with impunity. “They’re not disciplined. They’re very bold,” Li noted. “They can be identified easily, and they don’t care.” The PRC has consistently denied the existence of the unit and even that the PRC itself engaged in cyber warfare until 2013. At that time, the PRC admitted to the possession of secretive military and civilian cyber war- fare units but disclosed no details.

The unit simply compromises internal software on legitimate web pages to

infiltrate target computers. Using a wide range of techniques, such as spear phishing (an email scam that targets businesses, individuals, or organizations by sending what appears to be innocuous emails from trusted sources), mal- ware (malicious codes), beacons (a technique that notifies the unit of the successful penetration of targeted computers), hop points (to access other victims’ computers and research other potential victims), and misleading domain names (to conceal malicious communications), by some estimates the unit has attacked more than 1,000 organizations.

Various investigations have revealed that the unit makes its staff and facil- ities available to other PRC state-owned corporations and will conduct cyber penetrations on their behalf. The fact that some of those client organizations deal with strategic matériel with military applications suggests a close rela- tionship between PRC state-owned entities and the PLA itself.

 

In May 2014 the U.S. attorney in Pennsylvania indicted five members of the unit, thereby compromising its headquarters address in Shanghai, prompting its move to another location.

UNIT 8341. Unit 8341, Danwei 8341, was the Beijing-based Central Secur- ity Bureau of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Anquan Ju, with responsibility for the security of Mao Zedong, principally under the leadership of longtime Mao devotee and bodyguard Wang Dongxing. This regiment was originally established in 1953 and was referred to as the Center Safeguard Division, 1st Regiment, but it underwent several name changes and in 1964 began to use the name Unit 8341.

The unit was much more than just a uniformed security detail, and num- bering around 15,000 members, it also included a vast, nationwide intelli- gence network that was designed to detect conspiracies against Mao and other party leaders. Its staff was drawn from the elite members of the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) and had the best available equipment. Its techniques included undercover activity, physical and electronic surveil- lance, and the detection of electronic surveillance of the Chinese Commu- nist Party (CCP) leadership. On one occasion the unit was said to have found microphones in Mao’s private quarters.

There was also a paramilitary element to Unit 8341, and in the mid-1960s Wang deployed part of his elite force to Cambodia to support Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge army against the pro-U.S. government of General Lon Nol.

Unsubstantiated reports claimed that Unit 8341 was responsible for the assassination of General Lin Biao and his wife, Ye Qun, in a Beijing restau- rant, and that the government’s subsequent statement describing Lin’s death in a plane crash, after a failed coup attempt, was nothing more than a cover- up. In October 1976, soon after the death of Mao in September, it was Unit 8341, acting under the direction of Wang Dongxing, that arrested the Gang of Four, which effectively ended the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming.

In October 2000, after several more name changes, the organization be- came known as Unit 61889.

UNITED ELECTRONICS CORPORATION. On 1 November 2018 the

United States attorney for the Northern District of California announced the indictment of the state-owned Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Company Ltd., Fujian Jinhua Jicheng Dianlu You Xian Gongsi; a Taiwanese company, United Microelectronics Corporation; and three individuals: Chen Zhengkun, alias Stephen Chen, aged 55; He Jianting, alias J. T. Ho, aged 42; and Wang Yungming, alias Kenny Wang, aged 44, all Taiwanese nationals.

 

The indictment described how the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to steal the secrets of Micron Technology Inc., a leading firm in the global semiconductor industry that specialized in the research, development, and manufacture of memory products, including dynamic random access memo- ry (DRAM). A leading-edge memory storage device, DRAM was used in computer electronics, and Micron Technology was a United Sates–based manufacturer of DRAM that, prior to the conspiracy, did not exist in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both the PRC’s central government and the State Council had identified DRAM as a national economic technology need, and Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit was established in February 2016 for the specific purpose of designing, developing, and manufacturing DRAM.

United Microelectronics Corporation was a Taiwanese semiconductor

foundry company with its headquarters in Taipei, but with offices in China, Europe, Singapore, Japan, Korea, and the United States, including Sunny- vale, California. Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co., located in Fujian Prov- ince, was created with $5.65 billion provided by the PRC government and PRC government entities, including Electronics and Information Group Co. Ltd., Dianzi Xinxi Jituan Youxian Gongsi, and Jinjiang Energy Investment Co. Ltd, Jinjiang Nengyuan Touzi Youxian Gongsi, both of which are PRC state-owned entities.

Chen Zhengjun was a general manager and chairman of an electronics corporation in Taiwan that Micron Technology acquired in 2013, and he became the president of a Micron Technology subsidiary in Taiwan, Micron Memory Taiwan, responsible for manufacturing at least one of Micron Tech- nology’s DRAM chips. Chen resigned from Micron Memory Taiwan in July 2015 and immediately went to work for United Microelectronics Corpora- tion, where he arranged a cooperative agreement between United Microelec- tronics and Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit, an arrangement funded by Fu- jian Jinhua. The terms included United Microelectronics transferring DRAM technology to Fujian Jinhua with the intention of mass-producing DRAM components. The technology would be jointly shared by both United Micro- electronics and Fujian Jinhua.

Chen later became the president of Fujian Jinhua and was placed in charge

of its DRAM production facility. While at United Microelectronics, he re- cruited several employees from Micron Memory Taiwan (where he had pre- viously worked), including He Jianting and Wang Yungming. He and Wang both stole and took to United Microelectronics several Micron trade secrets related to the design and manufacture of DRAM. Wang, for instance, was said to have downloaded 900 confidential and proprietary Micron files before he left the company and stored them on USB external hard drives or in personal cloud storage, from where he could access the technology while working at United Microelectronics. Wang communicated with He using

 

personal emails and other methods to share and exchange confidential and proprietary information to further United Microelectronics DRAM technolo- gy design for transfer to Fujian Jinhua.

The investigation was aided by Taiwanese authorities who searched the offices of United Microelectronics and the homes of He and Wang, where they found electronic and hard copies of Micron Technology trade secrets. Specifically, the indictment charged the defendants with the following: one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, one count of economic espionage (theft of trade secrets), two counts of economic espionage (copying and conveying trade secrets), one count of economic espionage (receiving and possessing stolen trade secrets), and one count of theft of trade secrets.

UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT (UFWD). The United Front

Work Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhonggong Gongchandang Zhongyan Tongzhan Bu, was originally formed during the Chinese Civil War and reports directly to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee. After the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, there was a period where its overall importance was deemphasized, but in 1979, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, Deng Xiaoping rees- tablished the UFWD and its importance.

Xi Jinping has greatly expanded the importance of the UFWD as a means of expanding the PRC’s influence worldwide. The UFWD’s principal role is to influence important individuals and groups to support the CCP’s policies. It also stifles dissent by groups opposed to the CCP’s rule, which includes anti-religious campaigns in China, referred to by the CCP as “sinicizing religion.” As a result, the UFWD has a primary role in managing and sup- pressing dissent among Tibet’s religious minorities, adherents to Falun Gong, and the confinement of Uighurs in “reeducation” camps.

Both the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Austra- lian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) have found evidence of UFWD subversion and political interference, and a CSIS analysis described the UFD’s role as “one of compelling overseas Chinese to take part in eco- nomic and technical espionage, whether through patriotic appeals or simple threats.”

The current head of the UFWD is You Quan, who assumed his position in November 2017. He is a graduate of Renmin University, Zhongguo Renmin Daxue, a university founded by the CCP, with a master’s degree in econom- ics. See also AUSTRALIA; CANADA; OVERSEAS CHINESE.

 

UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL. Until the move toward es- tablishing formal diplomatic relations with Beijing began in 1973, the princi- pal U.S. intelligence outpost responsible for monitoring the People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC) was the consulate-general in Hong Kong, which accom- modated a large Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) station under semitrans- parent political section cover and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) legal attaché. The CIA station chief and his staff were declared to the British colonial authorities, and they maintained a close relationship with the local Special Branch. Similarly, the FBI legat held regular meetings with the director of the Special Branch. However, as a base for human source opera- tions into the mainland, Hong Kong fared poorly. Peter Sichel, who headed the CIA station between 1956 and 1959, recalled that “it was a total waste of time and a total death mission for anyone who got involved.”

The consulate-general was itself a target for Chinese intelligence opera-

tions, and as the 1997 handover date approached, the FBI concluded that some of the local staff who were ineligible for foreign passports were vulner- able to recruitment by agents of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. In 1999 FBI senior agent I. C. Smith, while assigned to the Department of State’s Office of Diplomatic Security, led a team that conducted a counterintelligence survey of the consulate-general. He con- cluded that some foreign service nationals, long employed at the consulate, had already reached an accommodation with Chinese intelligence well prior to the transfer of sovereignty. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA). During World War II, the U.S.

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) established liaison missions in China to support the Kuomintang (KMT), although the organization harbored many who supported the Communists and espoused the view that they were more effective in opposing the Japanese. This political debate, promoted by what became known as the “China lobby” in Washington, D.C., would prove controversial, but the administrations of both Harry S. Truman and Dwight

D. Eisenhower supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

During and after the civil war in China, the United States sponsored the Nationalist cause and conducted intelligence operations through surrogates, including Civil Air Transport (CAT), which acted as a clandestine air force, infiltrating agents, dropping supplies, and distributing propaganda leaflets. CAT operations continued after the withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949, and according to news releases in Beijing, some 212 agents were parachuted onto the mainland between 1951 and 1953, of whom most gave themselves up, were captured, or were killed.

In the absence of other sources of intelligence about developments inside the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the Cold War, the United States relied on overhead reconnaissance flights flown since 1948 from Ja-

 

pan, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Thailand. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) collec- tion missions were undertaken by RB-50B aircraft of the 91st Strategic Re- connaissance Wing from Yokota, Japan.

As the PRC began to develop a nuclear weapons program, the test site at Lop Nor in western Xinjiang Province became a priority target, but it is so remote, being 2,000 miles from the coast, that it could only be monitored effectively by overflights and satellite passes. Since its construction in April 1960, the facility has been the subject of continuous surveillance by U-2 aircraft, the SR-71 Blackbird, remotely controlled unmanned drones, and satellites.

Other targets include the missile test center at Shuangchenzi, the subma- rine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test facility in the Bohai Gulf, south of Huludao; the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launch sites at Chiuchuan in Gansu Province and at Changxing; the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanzhou; and the space center at Chongqing. Overflights also concentrated on the First Submarine Flotilla headquarters at Jianggezhuang, near Qingdao, the bomber factory at Harbin, and the laser research laboratories at Chang- chun.

The only human sources emerging from the PRC during the Cold War tended to be refugees crossing into Hong Kong, who were the subject of routine screening in the hope of acquiring useful intelligence. Following the arrest of Hugh Redmond in 1951 in Shanghai, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) abandoned the use of officers working under nonofficial cover and so, without any diplomatic premises on the mainland, was forced to depend almost entirely on technical collection, a relatively risk-free expedi- ent, especially when CIA U-2 missions began flying from Peshawar in 1957. These incursions went unchallenged until May 1960, when the first aircraft was shot down by an SA-2 Guideline over Sverdlovsk. Thereafter Nationalist pilots flew from Taiwan, and this continued without incident until September 1960, when Colonel Chen Huai-sheng’s U-2A was shot down nine miles south of Nanchang. Nevertheless, the U-2 overflights continued, comple- mented by missions flown from Kadena on Okinawa by the SR-71, which flew for the first time in April 1962 but was not announced to the public by President Lyndon Johnson until the autumn of 1964.

Incursions into mainland airspace by the SR-71 were terminated in 1971

as part of Dr. Henry Kissinger’s agreement with Beijing, but flights by pilot- less aircraft continued, despite a heavy rate of attrition. Between 1964 and 1969 the New China News Agency, Xinhua, reported that 19 such drones had been shot down. During the Cold War the most aggressive aerial recon- naissance of the mainland was conducted by Taiwan, which lost up to nine U-2s, three RB-57s, and two RF-101s over the mainland. Their operations, undertaken by the Black Cat Squadron, were pioneered by Dr. Ray S. Cline, the CIA station chief in Taipei between 1957 and 1962 and later the

 

CIA’s director of intelligence. During his posting to Taipei, Cline supervised a program of leaflet drops over the mainland offering rewards for defectors with military information, and this resulted in the unexpected arrival of a People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), Jiefangjun Kongjun, pilot in his obsolete MiG-15 fighter.

After the PRC was established as a nuclear power, the U.S. Intelligence Community concentrated its collection efforts on assessing the country’s military power and on counter-proliferation, seeking to identify Beijing’s sale of weapons and missile technology to nuclear threshold countries, prin- cipally Pakistan, North Korea, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Algeria. With the PRC’s support, Pyongyang became the world’s leading exporter of ballistic missiles, enabling Iran to develop its Shahab-3, an MRBM with a range of 800 miles, test-fired in July 1993.

The PRC has been the subject of numerous National Intelligence Estimates (NIE), analytical papers provided by the members of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which have reported on Beijing’s nuclear weapons development program from the delivery in 1950 of Soviet R-1 rockets, designated the SS-1 Scanner. This SRBM, based on a German V-2 design, formed the basis of the Dong Fang (East Wind) project and would produce the Long March space- launch vehicle.

Because of the difficulties in running human sources in Beijing, regarded as a “denied area” for the management of individual assets, the CIA inevita- bly has come to rely on technical means of collection, although it has ac- quired valuable information from defectors, among them PLANESMAN, in 1985, leaving the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to recruit “interna- tional assets” with access to the PRC’s diplomats stationed in the United States. Inherent in such operations is the danger of hostile penetration, as was demonstrated when the PARLOR MAID investigation collapsed in 2005 with the exposure of Katrina Leung’s double-agent role for the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, and the recruitment of Ronald Montaperto, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst. However, the PRC’s espionage appears to be directed primarily at providing a covert con- duit for embargoed military and commercial technology rather than the col- lection of intelligence through the development of clandestine networks of conventional spies. Indeed, the MSS’s main targets in the United States seem to reflect the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic priorities, being Uighur separatists, the democracy movement, Falun Gong branches, Tibe- tan nationalists, and all issues related to Taiwan.

In early 1995 a “walk-in” at the CIA station in Vientiane, Laos, offered to

sell a collection of secret documents stolen from a classified PRC facility, which he had removed from his office and then couriered to himself overseas by DHL. Included in this material was compelling proof that the designs of the W-88 and W-76 Trident II missile warheads, the Minuteman III’s W-78,

 

the Peacekeeper’s W-87, the Minuteman II’s W-56, and the Minuteman II’s W-62 had all been compromised, suggesting a major leak at Los Alamos. However, after a lengthy counterintelligence analysis, the CIA concluded that the walk-in was not only unreliable but possibly a deliberate MSS plant dispatched to convey misleading data. However, the defector was later inter- viewed extensively by the FBI after he had moved to the United States and judged to be authentic. See also AGEE, PHILLIP; AIRBORNE COLLEC- TION; AMERASIA; ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY (AFSA); ARNOLD, JOHN; BERGERSEN, GREGG W; BOEING 767-300ER; CAMPCON; CATHAY PACIFIC; CHANG FEN; CHANG HSIEN-YI; CHANG, THERESA; CHAO FU; CHAO TAH WEI; CHEN YONGLIN; CHARBATIA; CHENG, PHILIP; CHEUNG, MARK; CHI MAK; CHI TONG KUOK; CHINA AEROSPACE SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY COR- PORATION (CASIC); CHINCOM; CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING; CHINESE NAVAL STRENGTH; CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; CHI- TRON ELECTRONICS; CHUNG, GREG; CIRCUS; COMINTERN; COX REPORT; CYBER ESPIONAGE; DA-CHUAN ZHENG; DEFENSE IN- TELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA); DING, JIAN WEI; DIXIE MISSION; EAST TIMOR; ENGELMANN, LARRY; EWERT, ARTHUR; FIRM- SPACE; FRANK, DESMOND DINESH; GARDELLA, LAWRENCE; GOWADIA, NOSHIR S; GREAT BRITAIN; GUO WANJUN; HAINAN INCIDENT; HALPERN, ERIC; HANSON, HAROLD DEWITT; HANSON HUANG; HAO FENGUNG; HIGH-ALTITUDE SAMPLING PROGRAM (HASP); HINTON, JOAN; HONEYTRAP; HOU DESHENG; HUANG, ANDREW; HUTCHINSON, MILTON; ILLEGALS; IMPECCABLE, USNS; INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; INFORMATION WARFARE; IN- FORMATION WARFARE MILITIA; INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELA- TIONS (IPR); INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF NA- TIONAL DEFENSE (IBMND); INTER-SERVICES LIAISON DEPART- MENT (ISLD); JIN HANJUAN; KAMISEYA; KEYSER, DONALD W; KHAN, AMANULLAH; KIM SOO-IM; KOREAN WAR; KOVACS, WILLIAM; KYRGYZSTAN; LAM, WAI LIM WILLIAM; LAU, HING SHING; LEE, DUNCAN C; LIANG XIUWEN; LIAO HO-SHU; LI QING; LI FENGZHI; LILLEY, JAMES; LIN HAI; LI SHAOMIN; LIU, HENRY; LO CHEN-HSU; LOVELL, JOHN S; LU FUTIAN; LUNEV, STANISLAV; MACKIERNAN, DOUGLAS; MAIHESUTI, BABUR; MENG, XIAO- DONG SHELDON; MIN GWO BAO; MOO, KO-SUEN; NAHARDANI, AHMAD; NANDA DEVI; NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); NEEDHAM, JOSEPH; NEPTUNE; OGGINS, ISAIAH “CY”; OU QIM- ING; OVERSEAS CHINESE; OWENS REPORT; PENG YEN-CHIN; PI- QUET, JOSEPH; POLLARD, ANNE HENDERSON; PRICE, MILDRED; PROJECT 863; QIAN XUESEN; REGAN, BRIAN P; REVOLUTIONARY UNION; ROTH, JOHN REECE; SENIOR BOWL; SERVICE, JOHN S;

 

SHAN YANMING; SHENZHEN DONJIN COMMUNICATION COMPA- NY; SHEN JIAN; SHESU LO, ROLAND; SHRIVER, GLENN D; SHU QUANSHENG; SINO-SOVIET SPLIT; SINO-VIETNAMESE WAR; SK- 5; SMEDLEY, AGNES; SOONG, CHARLIE; SORGE, RICHARD; SUC- COR DELIGHT; TAI SHEN KUO; TAKHLI; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISI- TION; TECHNOLOGY COUNTERFEITING; TITAN RAIN; TOPPER; TSOU, DOUGLAS; TSU, WILLIAM CHAI-WAI; UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL; VELA; WANG HSI-LING; WANG-WOOD- FORD, LAURA; WANG MINCHUAN; WAVELAB INC; WEI LEFANG; WEN HO LEE; WORTON, WILLIAM A; WU BIN; XIAN HONGWEI; XIONG XIANGHUI; XU BING; XU WEIBO; YANG FUNG; YANG LIAN; YARDLEY, HERBERT O; YU, PAUL; YU JUNGPING; ZHANG, MICHAEL MING; ZHONG MING; ZHOU ENLAI; ZHU YAN.

UZBEKISTAN. A member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Shanghai Shi Hezuo Zuzhi, since June 2001, the Republic of Uzbeki- stan has received considerable investment from China in an effort to exercise greater local influence and to diversify the country’s dependence on oil im- ported by sea. The China National Petroleum Company, Zhongguo Shiyou Tianranqi Jituan Gongsi, has partnered the national oil company, Uzbeknef- tegaz, to develop the Mingbulak oil field in Namangan and has begun explo- ration in Ustyurt, Bukhara-Khiva, and Fergana. Additionally, the China Rail- way Tunnel Group, Zhongtie Suidao Jituan, has built the approximately 12- mile-long Kamchiq tunnel at a cost of about $455 million.

After years of warm relations with the United States, as manifested by access to an airbase used for operations in Afghanistan, the event known as the Andijun incident prompted a tilt toward China and Russia. On 13 May 2005, Uzbek troops and interior ministry personnel fired into a crowd of protesters, killing 187, as asserted by the Uzbekistan government, or with 1,500 casualties as estimated by a Uzbek defector. The government’s inter- vention was supported by both China and Russia but was criticized in the West. Under pressure from the SCO, and China in particular, the Uzbek government terminated the U.S. airbase agreement in 2008. Since then there have been several high-profile visits between the two countries, including one made by Uzbekistan’s president to China in 2012 where a $5.3 billion contract was signed, and in 2016 President Xi Jinping visited Uzbekistan where an agreement was signed for China to implement projects worth $15 billion. China and Uzbekistan have pledged cooperation in fighting the “three evils of terrorism, extremism, and separatism.” China has also estab- lished at least two Confucius Institutes, Kongzi Xueyuan, in Uzbekistan. The China-dominated SCO has also established coordination in defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and joint counterterrorism operations, lead- ing to a significant Chinese intelligence presence in the country. However,

 

many Uzbeks resent the Chinese presence, as Chinese workers take jobs away from the local population, and the export of gas to China often leads to local shortages.

 

 

V

VELA. The Spanish word for “watchman,” VELA was the code name for a secret United States Air Force surveillance satellite project operational be- tween October 1963 and April 1970 to monitor Chinese nuclear detonations.

VIETNAM. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is, along with Laos, one of two remaining Communist-governed countries in Southeast Asia. With a population approaching 100 million and an average age of 31, it is the 15th most populous country in the world. After South and North Vietnam were unified in 1976, the country remained something of a pariah until 1986 when the Communist Party initiated reforms resulting in Vietnam establishing rela- tions with almost 200 nations and joining such organizations as the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the World Trade Organization. It is also one of the economically faster growing countries.

Formal relations with the United States were established in 1995, and the arms embargo was lifted in 2016 following a visit by President Barack Oba- ma, events that served to antagonize the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The Sino-Vietnamese relationship is complicated, aggravated by historical attempts by China to dominate Vietnam, which have resulted in continuing suspicion of Beijing’s intentions in the western Pacific. China assisted North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, providing weapons, military training, and supplies, as well as an estimated 300,000 troops consisting of anti-aircraft divisions in combat roles. This aid had less to do with China having a com- passionate change of view of Vietnam than it was simply a case of a shared enemy, the United States and its advocacy for a democratically governed South Vietnam. But the assistance did not quell the lingering centuries-old suspicion of China that persists today, both by the Communist government as well as the populace.

In the post–Vietnam War period, the country became the centerpiece of the ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and China. Vietnam tilted toward the Soviets, influenced by the ancient mistrust of its northern neigh- bor, and by 1978 the PRC had withdrawn all aid. The Cambodian-Vietnam conflict undermined relations further as China supported the Democratic

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Kampuchea. Consequently, on 17 February 1979, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border and did not withdraw until 5 March. The campaign devastated northern Vietnam as the PLA practiced a scorched- earth policy toward its conquered territory, even reportedly completely dis- mantling a cement factory and taking it back to China. Both sides suffered thousands of casualties. Peace talks failed, and Vietnam placed 600,000 troops along its northern border while China countered with 400,000 of its own along its side of the frontier.

After the Soviet Union’s collapse and Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambo- dia, relations with the PRC improved, and the general secretary of the Com- munist Party of Vietnam, Le Kha Phieu, visited Beijing in 1999 and 2002. His Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, traveled to Vietnam where numerous agreements were signed. By some predictions, China will supplant the Unit- ed States as Vietnam’s largest single trading partner by 2030.

Improved relations with the PRC have not been universally popular, and in 2018 protests erupted, almost certainly with the government’s tacit approval if not outright support, when it was announced that a special economic zone would be opened in Quang Ninh, near the Chinese border, allowing for the grant of 99-year land leases to the Chinese.

The end of the arms embargo did not immediately result in large arms sales to Vietnam by the United States, even as Hanoi increased its military budget by 400 percent. Vietnam is uncomfortable that Russia sells arms to China, believing that in the event of a conflict, China would have an advan- tage in countering Vietnamese weapons. In 2017 the United States donated six 45-foot American Metal Shark patrol boats and a Hamilton-class high- endurance cutter to Vietnam, and the following year, another six patrol boats. There have also been sales of Boeing-Insitu Scan Eagle drones for maritime surveillance.

The main area of disagreement between Vietnam and the PRC remains the dispute over the sovereignty of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. At one point, in 2014, during an argument over an oil rig, China deployed 71 ships while Vietnam dispatched 61 in the area. In 2017 the PRC warned Vietnam that it would attack Vietnamese bases on the Spratly Is- lands, where both countries occupy separate islands among the group, if gas drilling continued. In that confrontation, Vietnam backed down.

Vietnam’s somewhat unique capitalistic communism has resulted in great- er access by Western tourists. A thriving travel industry is developing, and in March 2018 the aircraft carrier USS Carl V. Vinson, accompanied by the cruiser USS Lake Champlain and a destroyer, the USS Wayne E. Meyer, made a goodwill visit to Da Nang.

In 2014, a survey of Vietnam citizens revealed that 84 percent believed war with China is inevitable, and there remains an undercurrent of resent- ment of Chinese economic influence becoming more evident. The U.S.

 

VOROBIEV, E. D • 391

Council on Foreign Relations reported in 2015 that the potential for a mili- tary confrontation between Vietnam and China is rising. The South China Sea is both rich in fishing and oil and essential for worldwide shipping. China’s unrealistic claim of almost complete sovereignty over the area is certain to remain a sore point in Vietnam-China relations and a challenge for the United States.

VIETNAM WAR. Interception of Chinese signals by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in 1965 revealed that 80 to 90 percent of U.S. Air Force air raids over North Vietnam’s northeast quadrant were being compro- mised by early-warning alerts supplied from ground radar sites inside China. Furthermore, the Chinese were found to be predicting the reconnaissance flights of Strategic Air Command drones, resulting in the loss of up to 70 percent of the unmanned aircraft. A study concluded in April 1967 code- named PURPLE DRAGON traced the source of the leak to an encrypted single sideband channel that linked Da Nang to Bien Hoa and provided 20 hours’ advance notice of the drone missions. Even without being able to read the messages, and relying solely on traffic analysis, experts were able to predict 18 out of 24 operations. New countermeasures were introduced to improve communications security, and the losses dropped dramatically.

VOROBIEV, E. D. The director of the Soviet atomic weapons production facility at Chelyabinsk-40, E. D. Vorobiev, was a colleague and close friend of Igor Kurchatov, and in April 1956 he was appointed to supervise the transfer of Soviet nuclear technology to China. He moved to Beijing in May 1957 and oversaw the construction of the Northwest Nuclear Weapons De- velopment Establishment near the city of Haiyan in a remote corner of Qin- ghai Province. Also known as the Qinghai Provincial Mining Zone, the Ninth Academy, Factory 221, and Koko Nor, the site was designed as a replica of the Soviet facility at Sarov designated Arzamas-16. Assisted by E. A. Negin, the chief weapons designer from Arzamas-16, together with his engineering team of N. G. Maslov and V. Y. Gavrilov, Vorobiev began construction of a huge uranium-enrichment facility, covering seven acres, at Lanzhou in Gan- su Province and selected Jiuquan as the location for a reactor, designated Plant 404, and a neighboring weapons assembly plant. However, Soviet col- laboration was terminated in August 1958 when Mao Zedong declined Niki- ta Khrushchev’s demand for Soviet military bases in China and control over China’s foreign policy. Accordingly, Vorobiev and his colleagues were with- drawn during the autumn, ostensibly on leave but never to return. In conse- quence, all work on the plutonium production reactor was suspended in August 1960.

 

Concern over Soviet knowledge about every aspect of the Chinese nucle- ar weapons program prompted a decision to relocate the Haiyan establish- ment to several different sites, some of them underground, near Zitong in northwestern Sichuan Province, where it was renamed the Research and Design Academy of Nuclear Weapons. As well as being unknown to the Soviets, the narrow valleys around Zitong had the added advantage of being almost permanently obscured from overhead reconnaissance by dense cloud cover. See also SOVIET UNION.

 

W

WAISHIJU. Within the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, the counterintelligence branch, known as Waishiju, was headed, until his defection in 1985, by Yu Qiangsheng.

WANG DONG. On 19 May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice an- nounced the indictment of five People’s Republic of China (PRC) nationals for computer hacking and economic espionage, directed at six U.S. compa- nies in the nuclear power, metals, and solar products industries. This was the first time that criminal charges involving hacking had been filed against known PRC state actors. In a detailed 48-page indictment, the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania described how the defendants had harmed the competitiveness of the targeted U.S. corporations. Specifically, the 31-count indictment included charges of conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse, damaging a computer, aggravated identity theft, economic espionage, and theft of a trade secret.

The named individuals were Wang Dong, aliases Jack Wang and Ugly Gorilla; Sun Kailang, aliases Sun Kai Liang and Jack Sun; Wen Xinyu, aliases Wen Xin Yu, WinXYHappy, Win_XY, and Lao Wen; Huang Zhen- yu, aliases Huang Zhen Yu and “hzy 1ux”; and Gu Chunhui, aliases Gu Chun Hui and KandyGoo, all of whom were described as being affiliated with Unit 61398, 61398 Budui, of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), General Staff Department (GSD), Second Bureau, Third Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Er Ju, Di San Ju, a signals intelligence component of the PLA. Simultaneously, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued wanted posters that included color photographs of the five individuals.

Since 2006 Unit 61398 had conducted cyber attacks against a broad range of corporations and governments around the world and is known by other names, such as “Advanced Persistent Threat 1,” the “Comment Group,” and “BYZANTINE CANDOR,” the last a code name said to have been applied by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). The principal targets were identified as Westinghouse Electric Company, which in 2007 reached an agreement with a Chinese state-owned corporation, the State Nuclear Power

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Technology Company Ltd. (SNPTC), Guojia Hedian Jishu Youxian Gongsi, one of three government-owned companies concerned with operating nuclear power plants. Negotiations had centered on limitations of the technology that would be provided to the SNPTC continuing up through 2013. However, Sun Kailang successfully attacked Westinghouse’s computers and stole confiden- tial proprietary technical and design specifications for pipes, pipe supports, and pipe routing within the nuclear power plants Westinghouse was contracted to build. Further, Sun had obtained internal Westinghouse com- munications regarding the company’s strategy for doing business with SNPTC. The indictment indicated that between 2010 and 2012, the group had removed 1.4 gigabytes of information, or approximately 700,000 pages of emails.

SolarWorld AG is a German-owned solar products manufacturing compa-

ny with a production plant in Hillsboro, Oregon, as well as a sales facility in Camarillo, California. From 2012, Wen Xinyu, with at least one unknown co-conspirator, stole thousands of emails from SolarWorld AG that provided the company’s financial position, production capabilities, business strategy, and cost structure, at a time when SolarWorld was litigating trade cases against Chinese solar manufacturers. In May 2012 the U.S. Department of Commerce imposed significant duties on Chinese imports of solar products based on its findings that Chinese manufacturers had received considerable subsidies from the government and that Chinese solar companies had dumped large amounts of solar products into U.S. markets at prices well below fair market value, thereby undercutting its competitors in the United States.

The United States Steel Corporation, headquartered in Pennsylvania, liti-

gated a number of trade cases from 2009 to 2012 against the Chinese steel industry, in particular the China Baowu Steel Group Corporation Ltd., Zhongguo Baowu Gangtie Jituan Youxian Gongsi, a state-owned company headquartered in the Baosteel Tower in Pudong, Shanghai, sometimes re- ferred to as the Baosteel Group Corporation. In 2010, two weeks before a judicial decision would be made in one of those disputes, Sun Kailang tar- geted an employee of U.S. Steel who had worked in the relevant division with a malicious email tactic known as “spear phishing,” an electronic com- munications scam that aims at specific businesses, individuals, or organiza- tions and is designed to dupe the recipient into thinking the message is from a trusted source, leading the addressee to a bogus website filled with malware. This technique gave Sun access to the employee’s computer and enabled Wang Dong to steal hostnames; descriptions for almost 2,000 servers, includ- ing those that controlled physical access to U.S. Steel’s facilities; and mobile device access to the company’s networks.

 

From 1995, Allegheny Technologies Inc., a specialty metals manufacturer located in Pennsylvania, had been a partner in a joint venture with Shanghai No. 10 Iron and Steel Works, Shanghai Shi Di Shi Gangtie Chang, now China Baowu Steel Group Corporation Ltd., and conversely, between 2009 and 2012, it had been an adversary of the Chinese company in litigation before the World Trade Organization (WTO). At a board meeting held in Shanghai in April 2012 dealing with the joint venture, Wen Xinyu stole network credentials for virtually every employee of the company, which allowed unrestricted access to Allegheny Technology Inc.’s computers.

A longtime opponent of Chinese trade practices, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW), with headquarters in Pennsylvania, is- sued a “call to action” in a campaign against Chinese policies in 2012. Wen Xinyu stole USW email messages that contained strategic discussions ex- changed within the union leadership just two days after the USW publicly urged the U.S. Congress to pass legislation to impose tariffs on Chinese imports.

In 2008 Alcoa Incorporated, an aluminum manufacturer located in Penn- sylvania, entered into a partnership with a Chinese state-owned aluminum company, the Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco), to purchase 12 percent of the Rio Tinto PLC mining company, a large Anglo-Australian multinational mining company based in London. Within three weeks, Sun Kailang had targeted senior Alcoa executives with spear-phishing messages that were designed to trick managers into providing Sun access to the compa- ny’s computers.

The evidence, forensically recovered, indicates that various PRC state- owned corporations commissioned Unit 61398 to conduct a hacking offen- sive against their U.S. rivals, and this clearly demonstrated the close link between state-owned corporations and the PRC military, particularly where the companies made products with military applications.

After the indictment was published, the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang, asserted, “The Chinese government, the Chinese military and their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft of trade secrets.” However, he was contradicted by Gordon Guthrie Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China, released in 2001, who stated, “There is no such thing as an independent Chinese producer of strategic materials. They all cooperate or are in bed with the Communist government.”

WANG DONGXING. Wang Dongxing was born on 9 January 1916 in Jiangxi Province. Allegedly he was orphaned at the age of 12 and brought up by Mao Zedong’s Red Army. He joined the Communist Youth League of China, Zhongguo Gongchanzhuyi, and in 1933, at the age of 17, acted as Mao’s bodyguard during the Long March, Changzheng, as Mao consolidated

 

his power within the resurgent Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1947, when the Red Army was under siege in Yan’an from Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang army, it was Wang who provided the means of escape for Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, by way of Mount Ansai. This solidified Wang’s already close relationship with Mao, and his own power was later enhanced by Mao, placing him as the head of Unit 8341, Danwei 8341, the organization responsible for Mao’s personal safety, which eventu- ally grew to a strength of about 15,000 members and operated as a nation- wide intelligence network to uncover plots against Mao and threats to the CCP leadership.

In 1949 Mao made his only trip outside China when he traveled to Mos- cow, and it was Wang who accompanied him on the trip. By 1965 Mao was seldom seen in public, but Wang was among the very few who had access to him. Wang had also been named a deputy minister of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and was also close to Kang Sheng, and in 1965, early in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, Wang, acting on the orders of Kang, arrested Luo Ruiqing, the first head of the MPS, with Unit 8341 soldiers. The following year Wang was promoted to the CCP’s General Office, and in 1970 his power base was extended by his appointment as an MPS vice minister in charge of Depart- ment 5, with responsibility for the laogai, the PRC’s vast system of prisons and reeducation camps. He also controlled Qingcheng prison where most political prisoners were held and sometimes tortured. He directed military security and kept a close watch on Red Army officers, in particular those aligned with General Lin Biao, who was perceived as a threat to Mao, even when increasingly he was considered Mao’s heir apparent.

Wang did more than provide personal security for Mao, and in the mid-

1960s, Mao had become enamored of a much younger woman, Zhang Yufeng, whom he had observed when he was traveling by private train dur- ing a trip to the provinces. At the time, Mao was still married to Jiang Qing, though they lived apart, and Wang learned that Zhang was married to an officer in the Red Army, whom Wang had transferred to Beijing. Simultane- ously, Wang gave Zhang tasks that put her in close proximity to Mao, whose infatuation with Zhang continued. Wang resolved the matter by convincing her husband that it was a privilege for Zhang to have Mao’s attentions and persuaded him to accept a sum of money as compensation for the loss of his wife. Zhang later became Mao’s fifth wife, and they had two daughters.

In the early 1960s, Wang dispatched elite elements of Unit 8341 to Cam- bodia to support Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge insurgency against the pro-U.S. government of General Lon Nol.

In September 1971, General Lin Biao disappeared from public view. He had at one time been considered to be Mao’s designated successor and was commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) almost 3-million-

 

strong Red Army. Months later, it was announced that Lin had been killed in the crash of a British-built Trident airliner in the Ondorhaan desert of Outer Mongolia as he had tried to flee China after a failed coup attempt. However, in 1983, another account suggested that Lin and his wife, Ye Qun, had been killed by members of Unit 8341, on Wang’s orders, while sitting in a Beijing restaurant, and the plane-crash story had simply been an attempt to cover up the assassination. Regardless of how Lin was killed, Zhou Enlai established a commission of inquiry, Lin Biao Zhuan’anzu Baomizu, to investigate the matter, with Kang serving as the commission’s head, but Wang was the chief investigator. In reality, the commission had two purposes: to put together the details of the conspiracy and to root out any further followers of Lin.

At one point, Wang was banished by Mao to a labor reform camp for what was termed “excessive protection,” but he was reinstated with no loss of devotion to Mao personally.

In January 1973, it was reported that Wang had found MPS minister Li Zhen dead following his suicide at his home in Beijing, leading to the ap- pointment of Mao’s follower Hua Guofeng as the replacement MPS head. In August of that year, Wang was named to the Politburo along with Kang and Hua. In April 1976, after the Tiananmen Square uprising, Hua and Wang dispatched elements of the MPS to quell the unrest, resulting in at least a hundred deaths and the imprisonment of thousands of demonstrators.

As the Cultural Revolution continued, pushed by Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four, Sirenbang, Kang and Wang realized its potential danger for them both. Kang, who died on 16 December 1975, had enjoyed a long past rela- tionship with Jiang in the early days of the revolution. Reportedly they had been intimate before he introduced her to Mao, and he had used her to keep him informed as to Mao’s inner thoughts. But as the Cultural Revolution became increasingly unpopular, others too realized they had to take action. Mao’s death on 9 September 1976 opened the door to the “Huairentang incident,” the arrest of the Gang of Four by officers of Wang’s Unit 8341. The veteran military leader Ye Jianying went to Wang to sound him out about detaining Jiang and her Gang of Four cronies, and Wang readily agreed to be part of the conspiracy, taking them into custody at the Huairentang, literally “Hall of Cherished Compassion,” located in the Zhongnanhai, the Chinese government compound in Beijing. Jiang was taken into custody. This episode, on 6 October 1976, signaled the beginning of the end of the Cultural Revolution.

Now at the height of his power, Wang retained his position as head of the

Central Committee’s General Office and directed the security office as well as the special investigations department. In November 1978 he traveled to Phnom Penh with Luo Qingchang and Shen Jian, the latter in the role of a roving ambassador for special services, whose cover was that of a Wuhan acrobatic troupe. However, in December 1978, as Deng Xiaoping ascended

 

to power, at the 11th Central Committee gathering, both Wang and Hua were forced to make humiliating self-criticisms. After the deaths of Kang and Mao, Wang’s power base was eroded and he became something of a nonen- tity within the CCP. Though he avoided purges and the treatment he had caused others to endure, he continued to espouse Mao’s brand of commu- nism, but little attention was paid to him, and he died on 21 August 2015.

WANG FANG. Born in 1920 in Shandong, Wang Fang joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1938 and was a participant in the Second Sino- Japanese War (1937–45) and the Chinese Civil War that followed. In 1949 he was the political commissar of the 94th Division, 32nd Army, Third Field Army, before embarking on a career with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, in Zhejiang. In 1955, he was named director of the MPS in Zhejiang, and in 1964 he was appointed vice governor of that province.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, Wang was purged as a “counterrevolutionary” and “capitalist roader.” However, Wang resurfaced in 1977 and served as a prosecutor of the Gang of Four, Sirenbang. In 1979, he was named vice chairman of the People’s Congress in Zhejiang Province as well as deputy director of the CCP. Wang served as a member of the 12th Central Committee of the CCP from April 1982 to November 1987 and as a member of the Central Advisory Commission from 1987 to 1992.

In April 1987, a longtime security professional at 66 years old, Wang was promoted as the eighth head of the MPS. This was in marked contrast to his predecessor, Ruan Chongwu, who was promoted to that position at the age of 55 and without a background in law enforcement. In 1989, during Wang’s tenure as MPS head, there was a crackdown on pro-democracy protests. Wang remained in his MPS post until November 1990 and died in 2009.

WANG HSI-LING. The chief of Taiwan’s National Defense Intelligence Service, Vice Admiral Wang Hsi-ling was an attaché at the Republic of China (ROC) embassy in Washington, D.C., where he was known for throw- ing lavish parties to which he invited individuals from throughout the government, including Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel who were assigned to Taiwan matters. These parties included dozens of young women, with cameras, recording the festivities.

Wang was in Washington in 1984 when the dissident journalist Henry Liu was murdered at this home in Daly City, California. During the trial of Chen Chi-li, a member of the Mafia-like United Bamboo Gang who was convicted of shooting Henry Liu, evidence emerged that implicated Vice Admiral Wang. After some initial resistance from President Chiang Ching-kuo, the FBI interviewed Wang, and while he denied any involvement in the murder,

 

he did admit that he had wanted Chen to “teach Liu a lesson.” However, three polygraph examinations indicated that Wang had been less than truthful in his denials of causing the murder, and he was eventually convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by a military tribunal in April 1985. He served his sentence at Taiwan’s garrison command facility, where political prisoners were normally held, and his family was allowed daily visits to his cell suite, which included a kitchen and a study. Less than six years later Wang was released, together with Chen and another conspirator, Wu Tun. Rumors persist that the order to murder Liu was actually initiated by Chiang Hsiao-wu, president Chiang Ching-kuo’s second son and grandson of Chi- ang Kai-shek, who was linked to Chen Chi-li.

In 2007 while in Washington, Wang negotiated the transfer of two former

U.S. Navy Tench-class submarines to Taiwan, renamed the Hai Shih class, and participated in a ceremony involving the ROC navy’s submarine fleet. See also MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (MIB); NATIONAL SE- CURITY BUREAU (NSB); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WANG LIQIANG. In April 2019, 27-year-old Wang Liqiang left Hong Kong to visit his wife Mia, who was studying in Sydney, and his two-year- old son, using a passport under the name of Wang Qiang, born in Guangdong Province.

In May, Wang was instructed to travel to Taiwan using a false South Korean passport, with orders to interfere in Taiwan’s imminent general elec- tion and forgo his previous assignment of operating against Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. Wang decided to remain in Sydney where, after several months, he was in contact with the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO).

Wang is the son of a regional Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre in Fujian Province. He studied at the Anhui University of Finance and Econom- ics, Anhui Caijing Daxue, a school with over 28,000 students in Bengdu, Anhui Province, majoring in oil painting. While a student, it was suggested that Wang work in Hong Kong for China Limited Innovation Investment (CIIL), Zhongguo Chuangxin Touzi Youxian Gongsi.

Wang moved to Hong Kong in 2014, and when he learned CCIL’s true purpose he maintained his loyalty to China. The following year, CCIL’s chief executive officer, Xin Xiang, asked Wang to teach his wife, Qing Gong, to paint in oils, likely as an excuse to evaluate his loyalty to China. Over a period of time, as the relationship between Xin and Qing grew, Xin took Wang into his confidence, revealing that his true name was Xiang Nianxin and that he had previously worked for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for

 

National Defense (COSTIND), Jiefangjun Guofang Kexue Jishu Gongye Weiyuanhui. Xiang claimed to have worked for a high-ranking CCP official, Zou Jiahua.

Born in 1926 in Shanghai, Zou Jiahua is a former vice premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), serving from 1991 to 1998; vice chair- man of the Ninth National People’s Congress from 1998 to 2003; and a member of the CCP Politburo from 1992 to 1997. He traveled widely, in- cluding to the United States, and played a role in China’s initial efforts in obtaining foreign military technology. His wife, Ye Chunmei, is the daughter of Ye Jianying, a legendary revolutionary leader of China’s establishment of the People’s Republic; one of the “Ten Great Marshals of the People’s Liber- ation Army” (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun Shi Da Yuanshuai; and a supporter of Deng Xiaoping and the end of the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming.

Xiang confided in Wang that he had been posted in Hong Kong to conduct intelligence work and that CIIL had been established under the PLA’s Gener- al Staff Department (GSD), Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu. He had been di- rected to infiltrate Hong Kong’s financial markets as well as to collect mili- tary-related intelligence. CIIL is known to be associated with the state-owned China Ordnance Industries Group Corporation Ltd., Zhongguo Bingqi Gon- gye Jituan Youxian Gongsi, also known as China North Industries Group Corporation Ltd., Zhongguo Beifang Gongye Jituan Youxian Gongsi, both known under the acronym NORINCO, among the world’s largest military weapons companies.

Reportedly Wang advised ASIO of his personal involvement in espionage- related activities, including the Cause Bay Five, Tongluowan Wu Hao, a group of Chinese booksellers who had disappeared in Hong Kong without explanation, only to reappear in October 2015 and claim to have been ab- ducted and tortured for the crime of distributing subversive literature, namely an unflattering book about PRC president Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping and His Six Women (Xi Jinping He Ta De Liu Ge Nuren).

Working from an office located on Hong Kong’s Des Vouex Road West, Wang described how he personally had participated in the abduction and interrogation, an episode that had been officially denied. Wang claimed that his role at CIIL was as something of a middleman, more of a co-optee than an actual member of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquan- bu; Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu; or the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), Second Bureau, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Er Ju. Nevertheless, Wang asserted that Xiang was in direct contact with a senior member of Xi Jinping’s staff. While sworn to secrecy by Xiang, Wang described how he was allowed to talk openly with Qing Gong, who was familiar with her husband’s work and who had studied at the University of South Australia. While in Hong Kong, he had operated from front organiza-

 

tions such as the China Science and Technology Education Foundation, Zhongguo Kexue Jishu Jiaoyu Jijin Hui, a charity recognized by Hong Kong but known to be controlled by Xiang. There he targeted and infiltrated organ- izations associated with universities in Hong Kong in an effort to educate, organize, and guide “their ideology,” appealing to their patriotism, their love of the CCP, and to the fight against pro-independence and pro-democracy students.

Wang also related how CIIL sought to influence Hong Kong’s media by persuading senior media staff to downplay dissent and support the CCP. He also spoke of the relationship between CIIL and the vicious criminal triads in Hong Kong, who have reached an accommodation with the CCP and have physically attacked pro-democracy demonstrators in the Hong Kong protests. During Taiwan’s 2018 election campaign, Wang assisted in directing ef- forts to elect local officials that were ultimately aimed at removing President Tsai Ing-wen in favor of a more pro-PRC candidate. CIIL was at the fore- front of investing in Taiwan media companies, establishing clandestine alli- ances with television stations, and suppressing anti-PRC news. One such company was Want Want China Holdings Ltd., Zhongguo Wangwang Kong- gu Youxiang Gongsi. Want Want is located in Taiwan, is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, and is headquartered in Shanghai. According to Wang, its principal owner, Tsai Eng-meng, has a close relationship with Xiang and has invested heavily in Taiwan’s media outlets. Wang’s success in Taiwan’s 2017 election campaign resulted in his assignment to interfere in Taiwan’s

2020 election.

The Chinese government has described Wang as a criminal and denies his role in interfering in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement or Taiwan’s elections. Wang remains in hiding in Australia pending a resolution of his request for political asylum and an ongoing assessment of his bona fides.

WANG MINCHUAN. The director of Chinese studies at Baghdad Univer- sity since October 1959, 40-year-old Professor Wang Minchuan defected to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in June 1961 while on a visit to Greece. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WANG-WOODFORD, LAURA. On 24 December 2007 Laura Wang- Woodford, a U.S. citizen and director of Monarch Aviation, a company based in Singapore that for 20 years had imported and exported components for military and commercial aircraft, was arrested at San Francisco Interna- tional Airport, having arrived on a flight from Hong Kong, and was charged with the illegal export of embargoed aircraft parts to Iran. Also indicted was her British husband, Brian Woodford, who was the company’s chairman, although he was never arrested.

 

In a 20-count indictment issued in New York in 2003, Wang-Woodford had been charged with operating Junga International Ptd. Ltd., a Singapore- based successor to Monarch, and accused of supplying restricted aircraft parts to Iran. At the time of her arrest, Wang-Woodford was carrying cata- logs from the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, Zhongguo Jingmi Jixie Jin Chukou Gongsi, a firm identified by the U.S. Treasury as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.

In March 2009 Wang-Woodford pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges, was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, and agreed to forfeit $500,000. An investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) con- cluded that Monarch Aviation was a front company sponsored by the Minis- try of State Security (MSS). See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WATT, GEORGE. In 1967 George Watt, an engineer with the British com- pany Vickers-Zimmer, was convicted of espionage in Lanzhou and served three years’ imprisonment in Beijing. After his return to London he pub- lished an account of his ordeal, China Spy.

WAVELAB INC. On 6 June 2008, WaveLab Inc. of Reston, Virginia, was sentenced to one year of supervised probation, a $15,000 fine, and forfeiture of $85,000 for the unlawful export of hundreds of controlled power amplifi- ers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The prosecution was brought by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry after WaveLab pur- chased the amplifiers with an assurance that the equipment would not be exported. The undertaking had been signed by Walter Zheng as WaveLab’s chief executive officer on 5 March 2008. Walter Zheng was also known as “Zheng Guobao” and was a graduate of the University of Science and Tech- nology of China (USTC), Zhongguo Kexue Jishu Daxue, in Hefei where he obtained bachelor’s and master’s degrees in electrical engineering. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WEI LEFANG. A Chinese financier who peddled nuclear weapons compo- nents to Iran, Wei Lefang was indicted in April 2009 for laundering tens of millions of dollars through half a dozen New York banks. According to the Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau, Wei had duped the banks with an assortment of aliases and phony businesses in spite of having a federal banking ban against him, and he was charged with conspiracy and falsifying records.

 

Wei had been barred from conducting business with U.S. banks in 2006 because of his involvement in Iran’s program to develop weapons of mass destruction. To circumvent the ban, Wei had adopted the expedient of using false names and nonexistent companies to collect funds channeled through unsuspecting banks, including Citibank, Wachovia/Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Standard Charter Bank, and JPMorgan Chase. The shipments of illegal matériel had been made from Wei’s China-based company, Limmt Economic and Trade Company. When Morgenthau announced his intention to apply for Wei’s extradition from China and was asked about Chinese cooperation, he replied, “We’re always optimists.” See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WEIQI. A popular Chinese game of warfare where the goal is to slowly surround the enemy, taking a little territory while even giving away some, as part of an overall strategy until the adversary is forced into a corner and surrenders. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policy, in many respects, can be said to mirror this game.

WEN HO LEE. Originally from Taiwan, where he was born in 1939, Wen Ho Lee had been one of the three best suspects on a list compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that contained 70 others at Los Alamos known to have traveled to China between 1984 and 1988. Of the three, one was Sylvia Lee, Wen Ho’s wife, who worked at Los Alamos as a data entry clerk with a Top Secret clearance.

Lee first attracted the FBI’s attention in December 1982 when he con- tacted Min Gwo Bao by telephone to offer his support and suggested that he could find out “who had squealed” on the scientist. As Min Gwo Bao was already the subject of a surveillance operation code-named TIGER TRAP, it was extended to cover Dr. Lee.

The KINDRED SPIRIT investigation turned out to be a nightmare for all concerned, not least because of the complicated background of the case. Stymied over the original theft from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, on which the FBI had failed to gather enough evidence to mount a prosecution, it did lead the mole hunters to Wen Ho Lee, who had been recorded in December 1982 making the telephone call to Min Gwo Bao. Although he initially denied the conversation, Lee admitted it when confronted with the evidence. He then acted as an agent for the FBI, attempting to entrap the suspect in telephone calls and a personal meeting in California, during which he wore a wire. This attempt failed, although during the course of the opera- tion the FBI learned, through a polygraph examination, that Wen Ho had been passing information to Taiwan since 1978. This aspect of the investiga- tion was abandoned in March 1984, but when his name appeared as a suspect

 

in the KINDRED SPIRIT case, the FBI initially concealed the fact that between 1985 and 1991 both Wen Ho and Sylvia had been used as the FBI’s informants who had submitted regular reports on potential breaches of secur- ity at Los Alamos and on details of official visitors from the People’s Repub- lic of China (PRC). In the years 1986 and 1987, America’s nuclear weapons laboratories received an average of 500 visitors from countries listed as “sen- sitive” by the Department of Energy (DoE), and this figure was to rise within 10 years to 1,700, including 785 from republics of the former Soviet Union, so there had been plenty for Sylvia to report on. The official statistic for visitors from China rose from 67 to 410.

In February 1994, Lee again attracted attention when he was greeted warmly by Dr. Hu Side, a senior academic at the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), Zhongguo Gongcheng Wuli Yan JiuYuan, who was on an official visit to Los Alamos. The CAEP is responsible for the research, development, and testing of China’s nuclear weapons and related matters. The encounter was strange because Lee had never reported meeting Dr. Hu.

The embarrassment for the FBI in May 1996, after an inquiry lasting eight months and the pursuit of 12 possible leads, was that their own informant, Wen Ho Lee, was identified as the “only individual with the opportunity, motivation, and legitimate access” to information on both W88 weapons systems known to have been betrayed to China. For reasons that have never been fully explained, no action was taken against Wen Ho Lee, not even to limit his access to classified material, and he was not questioned by the FBI until he was polygraphed in December 1998. In the meantime, the FBI at- tempted to entrap Lee with a telephone call from a Cantonese-speaking spe- cial agent who introduced himself as a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, official and inquired if there was any material to go back to the PRC. He also asked when Lee was intending to visit the PRC again, but Lee was very circumspect and noncommittal. However, as the FBI noted, Lee did not report the strange call as he should have done, and it was consid- ered odd that Lee did not remark on the request for material to go back to the PRC, unless of course previous consignments had already been sent.

The charade was inconclusive and certainly did not prove Lee had been

engaged in espionage. As a counterintelligence strategy, it was altogether futile. The FBI agent had spoken Cantonese, not the Mandarin usually used in Beijing, so his approach may not have been entirely convincing, and naturally he could not use any pre-agreed recognition signals or passwords. Nevertheless, the FBI felt it was significant that Lee had failed to declare the call and then, when challenged, equivocated about precisely what had hap- pened. A search of his office and computer failed to reveal what had hap- pened to thousands of deleted and copied files, and at least seven computer tapes had disappeared.

 

Lee was interviewed formally by the FBI in January 1999 and again in March, and he was finally arrested in December 1999, but the entire case was compromised by the premature front-page publication of one version of the story by the New York Times on 6 March 1999 based on leaked evidence that had been given to a congressional committee. According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, who previously had severely reduced the number of personnel assigned to counterintelligence in general and to Chinese counterintelligence in particular, “the reporting was unconscionable,” but his determination to have the matter go to trial was undermined by Attorney General Janet Reno, who, under political pressure from “several Asian-American groups” that claimed “the FBI was persecuting Lee based on his ethnicity,” decided to abandon the indictment and reach a plea agreement based on a single rela- tively minor charge of mishandling classified documents. Freeh was out- raged by this interference, recalling that Lee

had gone to extraordinary lengths to download, copy, and remove from a secure national laboratory forty hours of work stretching over seventy days. Even after Lee’s security clearances were stripped at Los Alamos, he made attempts to reenter the weapons design area, including one try at 3:30 a.m. on Christmas Eve of 1998, not exactly a normal work hour.

Lee was kept in solitary confinement, supposedly to prevent him from com- promising any further information and from fleeing the country, and al- though the FBI did not prescribe the conditions in which he was held, it was hoped that, in custody without bail, the scientist would crack and confess. But after 227 days of solitary confinement in the Santa Fe County Detention Center, in what Judge James Parker described as “demeaning, unnecessarily punitive conditions,” he was released in September 2000 after accepting Reno’s plea bargain. The prosecution dropped 58 of the 59 charges in return for information on the whereabouts of the seven crucial missing tapes. With the promise of immunity, Lee admitted that there had been more like 17 or 20 tapes, but he insisted that he had discarded them in a trash dump. None were ever recovered, despite testimony that the missing data could “in the wrong hands change the global strategic balance.” Thus Lee was convicted of a single felony and sentenced to time already served. In 2006 he received a

$1.6 million settlement of his claim for breaches of his Privacy Act rights.

A counterintelligence assessment of Wen Ho Lee made a convincing argu- ment for him having been recruited by an academic, Li Deyuan, at a confer- ence held at Hilton Head, South Carolina, in 1985. This had heralded his first known trip to Beijing the following year, to address the 10th International Conference on Numerical Methods in Fluid Dynamics, Di Shi Jie Liuti Dongli Xue Shuzi Fang Fa Guoji Huiyi, in June 1986. The FBI had briefed Lee before his attendance and also approved a second trip, in 1988, where he

 

met Hu Side and the director of the Institute of Applied Physics and Compu- tational Mathematics (IAPCM), Yingyong Wuli Yu Jisuan Shuxue Yanjiu Suo, Zheng Shaotang, in his hotel room. Upon his return from each trip, when he listed the names of the scientists he had met, he denied having been asked about any classified information. Years later he would admit that he had helped the Chinese with hydrodynamic nuclear codes on both occasions. A third invitation, to both Wen Ho and Sylvia in early 1989, to attend an international conference on experimental fluid mechanics in Chengdu that was to be held in 1991 was declined on instructions from the increasingly anxious head of security at Los Alamos. Although the Lees could no longer travel to the PRC, there were no restrictions placed on trips to Taiwan or Hong Kong, which they visited in March and December 1998 and again in 1992. The FBI suspected that at least on the trip to Hong Kong, Lee had taken the opportunity to slip across the border to meet his contacts, having traced a purchase with American Express of some illicit travel. The FBI was also suspicious about Lee’s employment of a PRC national, who was a graduate student, as his assistant in Los Alamos, and of his later attempts to conceal the nature of the work they had shared.

Lee had been caught in numerous security violations at Los Alamos, but

none amounted to proof of espionage, a charge Lee consistently denied. Concerned about the apparent disappearance of seven computer tapes onto which Lee had downloaded huge quantities of classified information, the prosecution plea-bargained a disastrous deal, which left it with almost noth- ing and certainly not the missing computer files. Why had Lee transferred thousands of classified computer files onto an unclassified, unprotected sys- tem? Why had he deleted hundreds of files after he lost his security clear- ance? What had driven him to make numerous attempts to gain access to his office within the Los Alamos secure area after he had been barred from it? Was he a spy? If so, for whom had he worked, the PRC or Taiwan? Or both?

The case wrecked the career of former Department of Energy (DoE) direc- tor of intelligence Notra Trulock, who had tried and failed to impose some discipline and cohesion within the DoE’s counterintelligence division. Tru- lock was falsely accused of having racially profiled Wen Ho Lee and recom- mended him for investigation on racial grounds, but although this baseless charge was taken up in the media with enthusiasm, there was no substance to it. Lee had been an obvious candidate from KINDRED SPIRIT’s outset, but the FBI appeared curiously lacking in drive to take the necessary steps until Congress began to take evidence about technology transfers to China and was tipped off about DoE security lapses. Trulock’s testimony in 1998, pub- lished in what became the Cox Report, released in May 1999, proved devas- tating, highlighting a political reluctance to undermine the White House’s determination to improve Sino-American relations. Incredibly, when the sheepish DoE officials were actually presenting their evidence, Lee himself

 

was in Taiwan, on a trip for which he had been refused permission. He had gone anyway, on an undeclared consultancy contract to the Chungshan Insti- tute of Science and Technology, an academic body known to be engaged in military research. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WENCHANG SPACECRAFT LAUNCH SITE. Located on the island of Hainan, the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site, Wenchang Hangtian Fashe Chang, is closer to the equator than any other similar site in China and is intended to accommodate launch vehicles designed to send space stations and satellites into orbit and provide support for manned spaceflight and fu- ture lunar missions. In 2013 it will replace the Xichang Satellite Launch Center, Xichang Weixing Fashe Zhong Xin, as China’s primary launch facil- ity and operate in parallel with the Shuang-Cheng-Tzu Missile Test Center, Shuang Changzi Daodan Ceshi Zongxin, in Jiuquan and the Wuzhai Missile and Test Center, Wu Zhai Daodan Shiyuan Zhongxin, in Taiyuan. Mission control for lunar and manned flights is conducted by the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, Beijing Hangtian Feixing Kongzhi Zhongxin, with the Xi’an Satellite Monitor and Control Center, Xi’an Weixing Cekong Zhong- xin, also known as Base 26, Jidi 26, tracking the vehicles. Further coverage is supplied by four PLA space-tracking ships and by one overseas site at Swa- kopmund in Namibia. See also CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; LONG MARCH; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

WO WEIHAN. See MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (MIB).

WON CHONG-HWA. Aged 34, Won Chong-hwa was a North Korean intelligence officer thought to have been responsible for the abduction of more than 100 people from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and South Korea. She also operated in Seoul, seducing South Korean officers to gather information for the North Korean State Security Department (SSD), and when she was arrested, one of her victims was also taken into custody, as was Kim Tong-sun, who had acted as her courier, carrying information across the border.

Born in Chongjin City, in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Hamgyong Province, Chong-hwa’s father had died when she was a child, and she was recruited as an agent when she was just 15. She attended the Kim Il-sung Political and Military University sponsored by the Alliance of Socialist Working Youths and in 1989 joined a special unit where she received espionage training, learned South Korean geography, and adopted a southern accent. In 1992, after signing a confidentiality agreement, she sus- tained a head injury, forcing her withdrawal from the course, but then in

 

1996 she was imprisoned for theft at Pyongyang’s Paradise Department Store. She was also convicted of stealing five tons of zinc, but to avoid a death sentence, she fled across the Yalu River to China.

In 1998 she started a small business in Jilin Province but was traced by the North Korean authorities and invited, aged 25, to join the SSD. A file later compiled by South Korea’s Joint Public Security Affairs Investigations Headquarters concluded that she began her espionage in China by tracing other North Korean refugees or “renegades” in the cities of Yanji and Huich- un in Jilin.

In March 2001, as Won Chong-hwa prepared for a mission to South Ko- rea, she became pregnant by a South Korean businessman named Choe who had visited China to meet a prospective wife through an international match- making service. The North Koreans encouraged her to keep the baby and marry the father. Once established in South Korea, she divorced her husband and, posing as a refugee from the North, offered herself to the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS). Meanwhile she founded an import busi- ness in Gyeonggi Province and traveled to China frequently to buy aquatic products, although on each visit she reported to her SSD handlers. Between October 2002 and December 2006, she made 14 trips to China, and her principal role appears to have been the seduction of Korean businessmen linked to the South Korean NIS. She also submitted reports on leading politi- cal figures, including Hwang Jang-yop, former secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim Sung-min, representative of Radio Free North Ko- rea, who was a leader of the North Korean refugees in South Korea. She was paid $34,000 in cash and was told that her operation had been assigned a budget of $60,000.

One part of her assignment was the assassination of refugees, and she was

issued needles and a quantity of poison to perform her task. From 2005 she registered with a matchmaking service, identifying herself as a “military officer on active duty,” expressing a preference for men in her category. She made contact with dozens of lovesick officers, including a Major Kim, and passed their personal details to her handlers.

Eventually Won Chong-hwa fell in love with Lieutenant Hwang, an offi- cer based in Kangwon Province, who was seven years her junior, and even after he realized his lover was a spy, he stayed with her and planned to stow away on a ship to Japan. Assisted by him, between September 2006 and May 2007 Won Chong-hwa gave more than 50 talks on military security topics to personnel at South Korean bases, but in them she often lauded North Korea and supported Pyongyang’s nuclear program. She also visited Japan three times, claiming to be meeting prospective husbands, but in real- ity she was tracing North Korean refugees.

 

According to the South Korean dossier on Won Chong-hwa, who was arrested on 15 July 2007, her father had been killed in 1974 as he attempted to cross to the South as a spy, and Kim Tong-sun, her 63-year-old foster father, was a North Korean refugee who entered South Korea from Cambo- dia in 2006. He too had been trained by the SSD, and Won’s younger half sister, with the same father but a different mother, was also a spy, and her younger brother was an SSD driver. At her trial in Suiwon in September 2008, Won Chong-hwa made a full confession.

WORTON, WILLIAM A. In 1935 a U.S. Marine Corps officer, Major William A. Worton, joined the Far East Section of the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). A World War I veteran of the Aisne-Marne offen- sive, and having undertaken three assignments over 10 years in China and fluent in Mandarin, Worton attended an ONI conference and recommended that a fleet intelligence officer based in Shanghai or Hong Kong should develop a network inside and outside Japan to report on Japanese fleet movements. The proposal, later rejected by ONI as there was a reluctance to share intelligence with the British, was initially accepted, as was Worton’s offer to volunteer for the mission.

By 1935 the ONI had already developed a group of coast watchers in China to monitor Japanese shipping and had established an espionage net- work that included a Harvard exchange scholar at the Imperial University in Tokyo and a member of the Asiatic Primate Expedition.

In the late summer of 1935, Worton, accompanied by his wife and carry- ing three passports, traveled to China via France and the Suez Canal to avoid being detected by Japanese agents. One passport identified him as an attaché in Peking, another as a U.S. government employee conducting official busi- ness, and the third as “Archibald Robertson.” Having settled in Shanghai, he moved to Nanking, where he met Tai Lai, an old acquaintance from his previous assignments in China. Worton believed he had to trust someone, and since Tai “knew the war was coming,” he agreed to steer potential agents, both Chinese and European, to Worton, who was under no illusion that these same agents would also be reporting to Tai. His agents, who were to operate in Sasebo, Nagasaki, and Shimonoseki, included the Austrian artist Fritz Schief; another Austrian, Franzi von Sternberg; and various ethnic Chinese who achieved some success.

In 1936, Worton was replaced by another U.S. Marine Corps officer, Cap-

tain Charles C. Brown, and returned to the United States on a ship that stopped briefly at Yokohoma, where, he later reported, he did not leave his stateroom. He later claimed, in an oral history contributed in 1969, that his mission had “opened the eyes” of the navy to the fact that there were marines “who were capable of making decisions affecting the navy,” and that his contacts with Tai Li paved the way for his subsequent assistance to the

 

Americans during World War II, which included the establishment of a weather station in Mongolia. In 1946 Tai was also instrumental in freeing some marines who were prisoners of the Communists.

No official records survive of Worton’s ONI mission, which was revealed 10 years after his death in 1973. After his retirement, Major General Worton was appointed chief of the Los Angeles Police Department.

WU BIN. A Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, agent code-named SUCCOR DELIGHT by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Wu Bin was arrested by U.S. Customs in October 1992. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

WU SHU-TUNG. In October 1967 Wu Shu-tung traveled from Hong Kong to Taipei to defect and was greeted as the most senior mainland Chinese Communist ever to have switched sides. He had headed the Chunghwa Book Company in Shanghai and the office in Hong Kong but was also well con- nected to the leadership in Beijing, which he had visited twice a year since 1950, consulting with Zhou Enlai and Shen Yupin. As a member of the Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, he played a significant role in the 1967 riots in Hong Kong, and in his debriefing he gave a detailed account of the operations conducted by the committee’s subordinate sections, which included the smuggling of weapons, the distribution of propaganda, and the development of measures intended to intimidate the local population.

 

X

XIAN HONGWEI. In April 2011 two People’s Republic of China (PRC) businessmen, 32-year-old Xian Hongwei, president of the Beijing Starcreates Space Science and Technology Development Company Ltd., Beijing Xing Chuang Kongjian Keji Fuzhan Youxian Gongsi, and his 33-year-old vice president, Lin Li, were indicted in Alexandria, Virginia, on charges of at- tempting to purchase thousands of radiation-hardened microchips in viola- tion of the Arms Export Control Act, having been arrested in Hungary in September 2010 and extradited.

Beijing Starcreates had been engaged in the import and sale of program- mable read-only memory microchips to the government-controlled China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Zhongguo Hang- tian Keji Jituan Gongsi, which designs and produces strategic and tactical missile systems and launch vehicles. When the two men approached a com- pany in Virginia and offered to pay $64,500 for 40 of the hardened micro- chips and inquired about purchasing 1,000 chips, apparently in staggered purchases they hoped would avoid suspicion, the vendor contacted U.S. Im- migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which mounted a sting opera- tion. In June 2011 both men pleaded guilty, and in September 2011, each received a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

XIANG HAITAO. On 21 November 2019, Xiang Haitao was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of conspiracy to commit economic espion- age, three counts of economic espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, and three counts of theft of trade secrets.

Xiang had been employed by Monsanto Corporation and its subsidiary, the Climate Corporation, from 2008 to 2017 as an imaging scientist. Monsanto and the Climate Corporation developed a digital online farming software platform that was used by farmers to collect, store, and visualize critical agricultural field data to improve and increase agricultural productivity. The

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critical component of the software was a proprietary predictive algorithm referred to as the Nutrient Optimizer, considered by the companies as a valuable trade secret and their exclusive intellectual property.

In June 2017, the day after he left his employment with the companies, Xiang purchased a one-way airline ticket to China, but before he could board his flight, he was intercepted, and copies of the Nutrient Optimizer were seized. An assistant U.S. attorney noted that the indictment “alleges another example of the Chinese government using Talent Plans to encourage employ- ees to steal intellectual property from their United States employers.” Xiang had been selected as a Talent Plans recruit the previous year. “Talent Plans” refers to China’s Thousand Talents Program, Qian Ren Jihua, a plan to attract scientists, principally ethnic Chinese, with needed skills to China, with offers of high salaries and academic honors.

XIE QIMEI. The first Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquan- bu, station chief posted to Washington, D.C., under first secretary diplomatic cover in the cultural section, Xie Qimei was Jim Lilley’s counterpart as China’s “designated spy” at the PRC embassy, although his position was never publicly acknowledged in the same way.

Little was known about Xie’s career, and some believed he was working under alias, but clearly he must have had a relationship with Deng Xiaoping to have been entrusted with the assignment. A cold, hard individual, taller than most of the other members of the embassy staff, he was often perceived as being aloof and detached from his colleagues. Between 1984 and 1985 he was the second-ranking Chinese official at the PRC’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations, a post often filled by intelligence officers. He then moved to a United Nations Secretariat position as undersecretary-general of the Technical Development Department. In 1995 he was identified as a “spe- cially invited editor” of a Chinese book, China and the United Nations: Commemorating Fifty Years of the United Nations.

XIN PEIWEN. A member of an army cultural troupe, Xin Peiwen was the leader of three entertainers who were convicted in 1988 of plotting to per- suade pilots to defect from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

XINHUA. The New China News Agency, Xinhua, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) state domestic news agency, posts correspondents overseas and routinely provides the Second Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu Di Er Ju, personnel with journalistic cover. It provides the Chinese leadership with classified reports on domestic and inter- national events and demonstrates many of the characteristics of a regular intelligence agency. However, it also has a reputation for engaging in propa-

 

ganda, and some of its staff have been corrupt, with China Youth Daily (Zhongguo Qingnian Bao) reporting the imprisonment of two journalists who accepted gold ingots as bribes in return for not reporting coal mining acci- dents.

The Washington, D.C., office of Xinhua was headed by Lu Ping when he first met Katrina Leung, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) asset code-named PARLOR MAID. In July 2010 it was reported that Wan Wuyi, the 58-year-old head of propaganda at Xinhua, where he had worked for the past eight years, had defected while attending a course at Oxford University. See also NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY (NCNA).

XINJIANG. Decades of ethnic conflict in Xinjiang between the Turkic- speaking Muslim Uighurs and the transplanted Han migrants, who now amount to 40 percent of the population, has left the province a source of great concern to Beijing, where attempts to suppress local separatists and jihadists influenced by Afghan and Pakistani religious extremists have been consid- ered a strategic priority for the security and intelligence apparatus.

The East Turkistan Islamic Movement is considered a terrorist organiza- tion, and since the 2001 Coalition invasion, militant Uighurs have been de- tained in Afghanistan while fighting alongside the Taliban. The separatists have conducted an increasingly violent campaign in Xinjiang, where an esti- mated 197 people were killed and 1,000 injured in rioting in July 2009, and they were blamed for the assassination of a Chinese diplomat in Kyrgyzstan the previous year. In October 2009 an al-Qaida leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi, called on the Uighurs to prepare for a “holy war.” The Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, intervened prior to the opening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics to arrest activists to prevent an alleged atrocity planned to disrupt the event, and it maintains a close watch on Uighurs who have been linked to al-Qaida and on cross-border smugglers, whose trade in heroin has created a local HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Evidence that MSS personnel in Germany were targeting local Uighur

refugees in Munich emerged in December 2009 when a Chinese consular officer was expelled, having been accused of spying on the expatriate com- munity. In a similar case in April 2011, a 64-year-old Uighur identified only as “L” was charged with having passed information about the local Uighur émigrés to the MSS between April 2008 and December 2009.

Disaffection in Xinjiang has been exacerbated by official corruption, one complaint both the Han and Uighur communities agree on. Their target was Wang Lequan, the powerful regional Party chief since 1994 who was ac- cused of channeling lucrative investment to his hometown of Chandong. Although considered immune even from the Central Commission for Disci-

 

pline Inspection (CCDI) of the Communist Party of China (CCP), Zhong- guo Gonchangdang Zhongyang Jiu Jiancha Weiyuanhui, eventually Wang was dismissed in April 2010.

Uighurs captured in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay have been among the groups declared safe for release from American custody, although the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that they are not eligible for return to China, where they could expect persecution, arrest, and execution. Accordingly, a few have been granted asylum by some Pacific island nations and by Bermuda. See also CHINA CABLES; SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO).

XIONG GUANGKAI. Born in Shanghai in 1939, Xiong Guangkai joined the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1956 and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1959. This provided him with access to the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), Second Department, Jiefangjun Zong Canmou Bu Di Er Bu, and enrollment in a PLA language school where he studied English. His official biography records that he was assigned to the PRC embassy in Bonn from 1960 to 1982, first as an English translator, then as vice military attaché, and from 1974 to 1982 as a “military officer.”

There are unsubstantiated reports that Xiong was in Beijing at the time of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989, where some claim he con- ducted provocation operations to justify the harsh response to quelling the uprising.

Between 1981 and 1982, Xiong was a student at the PLA Academy of Military Science, Jiefangjun Junshi Kexueyuan, in Beijing. He was then transferred to the PLA General Staff Headquarters, Second Department, where he rose through the ranks, first as a deputy section head and then as deputy director, before being replaced by Ji Shengde as head of the Second Department. He was also promoted to the rank of major general.

Initially there was some speculation that Xiong had been demoted when he was replaced by Ji, one of China’s princelings, a child of the CCP elite. However, he was promoted to lieutenant general in 1994 after leaving the Second Department, and in 2000 to the rank of general of the PLA. Ji was later implicated in a corruption scandal in which he was found to have taken bribes and siphoned off funds from PLA-run corporations, which led to a lengthy prison sentence. Xiong was not caught up in the investigation.

From 1992 to 1997 Xiong was an alternate member of the 14th CCP’s Central Committee, Zhongguo Gongchandong, and from 1992 to 1996 he was the assistant to the chief at the PLA headquarters of the General Staff. In 1996 he was nominated to the position of deputy chief of the General Staff headquarters, and he continued as an alternate member of the 15th and 16th CCP Central Committees.

 

In December 1999 Xiong traveled to the United States as part of a high- level PLA delegation but received adverse comment because of reports that in 1995 he had claimed that the Chinese would “incinerate” Los Angeles in the event that the United States went to the aid of Taiwan if China attempted to retake the island by force. However, the person to whom he was alleged to have addressed his offensive remark, the longtime China hand Chas Free- man, denied that Xiong had made the statement.

XIONG XIANGHUI. Like many of his revolutionary colleagues, Xiong Xianghui came from the educated elite that ruled prerevolutionary China. Born in Shandong on 12 April 1919, the son of a country magistrate, he began his revolutionary career in 1936 as a student, where he was spotted by Zhou Enlai, who assigned him the task of infiltrating the Kuomintang (KMT). At a meeting of potential staff members, Xiong impressed Hu Tsung-nan, one of the KMT’s ablest generals, and by the next year, Xiong was appointed to Hu’s personal staff, a position he retained for the next decade. As Xiong was told by another early Chinese Communist, “ni shi Zhou Enlai chouhua de yige leng qizi” (you are one of the dormant chess pieces planned and placed by Zhou Enlai).

Xiong’s greatest coup was achieved in 1947, at the height of the Chinese Civil War, when he was about to leave Shanghai to attend university and was intercepted by Chiang Kai-shek’s secret police to be escorted back to General Hu. Xiong feared that his links to the Communists had been ex- posed, but he was met with broad smiles from Hu, who explained that his army was about to attack Mao Zedong’s base in Yan’an in northwest China. He instructed Xiong to study the plans in a locked room and advise on the assault strategy, thereby allowing Xiong the opportunity to warn the Com- munists and give Mao and Zhou time to evacuate the city. Although Hu claimed to have captured Yan’an, trumpeting a great victory, the city had been abandoned, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) escaping to the hills. Mao later said Hu’s information had been worth “several divisions.” The episode proved to be a turning point in the war, and two years later a triumphant PLA entered Beijing.

After the attack on Yan’an, Hu allowed Xiong to take an interrupted study

leave, and he later graduated with a degree in political science from Western Reserve University. Upon his return, Xiong startled his former KMT asso- ciates by joining the new diplomatic service of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where he became one of Zhou’s most trusted aides, attending the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina when the PRC and Great Britain agreed to exchange chargés d’affaires. In 1962, Xiong himself was appointed to the post in London.

 

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, Xiong was denounced as a revisionist by the Red Guards, Hong Weibing, but Mao authorized Zhou to intercede, and while many of Xiong’s colleagues were exiled to the Chinese hinterland, Xiong remained in Beijing. On Mao’s instructions, Xiong sat in on discussions with four of the PLA’s most senior generals, who were examining the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the United States, and he subsequently wrote a paper that advo- cated playing the “American card” against the Soviets. This strategy paved the way for the 1971 talks with Henry Kissinger, which Xiong attended as Zhou’s assistant, and these talks prepared for President Richard Nixon’s visit to China the following year. Xiong was also a member of the delegation that took over the United Nations seat formerly occupied by Taiwan. Then in 1991 he published his autobiography in China, Twelve Years Underground with Zhou Enlai (Yu Zhou Enlai Yiqi Dixia Shi’er Nian), in which he re- vealed his espionage role. Though not considered a founder of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, or the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, his considerable contributions to Chinese Com- munist Party’s (CCP) success in the Chinese Civil War are often cited within the MSS, but as an example of one’s revolutionary spirit, not as a practitioner of intelligence operations. He died on 9 September 2005, having

completed his diplomatic career as an ambassador to Mexico.

XU BING. A manager at the Everbright Science and Technology Company, Guangda Keji Gongsi, based in Nanjing, Xu Bing was sentenced on 1 July 2009 to 22 months’ imprisonment after attempting to export military-grade night-vision technology to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Xu admit- ted that, after first attempting to obtain an export license for the technology, he and others at Everbright had tried to obtain the equipment illegally. The company sent $14,000 to an undercover agent in New Jersey, but when Xu arrived to discuss the transaction in October 2007, he was arrested. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

XU JIAQIANG. On 7 December 2015 Xu Jiaqiang, aged 30, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in a sting operation in White Plains, New York, and charged with theft of trade secrets from his former employer, IBM.

Xu, according to his LinkedIn posting, is a Chinese national who attended the Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Huazhong Keji Daxue, between 2003 and 2007, graduating with a bachelor’s degree in computer science. He then attended the University of Delaware from 2007 to 2009, graduating with a master’s of science degree in computer science. On Linke-

 

dIn, he indicated he was a system software developer, working in IBM’s office in the Haidian District of Beijing, where he was assigned to IBM’s General Parallel File System.

In 2014 the FBI learned that an individual in China, subsequently iden- tified as Xu, claimed to have access to the proprietary source code and was using it in business ventures unrelated to IBM’s clients. Xu had been em- ployed by IBM from November 2010 until his resignation in May 2014. While at IBM, Xu had access to IBM’s proprietary software, including a clustered file system developed and marketed by IBM that facilitates faster computer performance by coordinating work among several servers. In an undercover operation designed to build a prosecutable case and to lure Xu back to the United States, an FBI undercover agent contacted Xu by email, posing as a financial investor who planned to start a large data storage tech- nology company. A second undercover agent was described as a project manager, and an email to Xu explained that he was “investing in and working with a new technology company which is seeking to develop improved and more secure data storage systems.” Xu responded soon afterward, saying he was “very interested in opportunities working over the architecture and code development,” mentioning that he had several years of experience in data storage while working for IBM. On 19 February 2015 Xu provided the undercover agents with his résumé, and a month later he described his past experience with proprietary software, boasting that he had “attached some sample code of previous work in IBM.” He also pasted a “short (Proprietary Software) +NFS related patch” directly into the source code email for the purpose of showing his “coding style.”

When examined by IBM, the computer code was shown to include pro-

prietary IBM material. On 12 April 2015, the second undercover agent re- corded a conversation with Xu during which he acknowledged that the pro- prietary software was not “open source,” at which time the undercover agent responded, “No, I know it isn’t.” He then asked Xu if he was allowed to have the material since it belonged to IBM and if he should be discreet as to whom it was shown to. Xu responded, “Yes, we signed some, you know, signed some files there but actually I can, um, I . . . I have all the code.” The undercover agent asked if Xu had all the code, and Xu replied, “Yeah, I have all the . . . code.” He also asserted that he had already used a portion of the code as part of his then employment with a start-up technology company.

In a further recorded conversation, held on 11 May 2015, Xu repeated that he had used some of the code in his work after he left IBM and that he was willing to consider providing the undercover agents’ company with the code. He suggested that if several computers were set up as a small network, he would remotely install the proprietary software so it could be tested. The FBI set up computers to Xu’s specifications, and in early August 2015 files were remotely uploaded to the client computer network. A digital copy of the files

 

was uploaded and shown to IBM employees who confirmed that it contained a functioning copy of the code and was not the official software package provided to licensed customers. Further, the software appeared to have been built by a computer system that was not part of IBM’s network, and the “build date” was inconsistent with the date on IBM’s licensed edition of the software. However, according to IBM experts, Xu’s version of the software appeared to have been built using coding practices IBM developers used for internal developmental purposes.

On the morning of 7 December 2015, Xu and the second undercover agent met at a hotel in White Plains, New York, and during the recorded conversa- tion, Xu explained how he had used the IBM code material to make software to sell to his customers, saying he knew the code was the product of two decades of development by IBM engineers and that he had used the code to build a copy of the proprietary software he had installed in the client comput- er network. He also claimed that he could take measures to prevent detection. That same afternoon at another meeting, Xu showed the FBI agent a copy of what Xu described as the code on a laptop, the copyright date indicating that it had originated with IBM. He also identified several customers he had previously provided with the stolen technology, among them China’s Nation- al Health and Family Planning Commission, a PRC government agency.

On 19 May 2017 Xu pleaded guilty to six charges of economic espionage,

theft, and possession and distribution of trade secrets, and on 18 January 2018 he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.

XU JUNPING. In December 2000 Xu Junping, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior colonel, jiefangjun guoji shangzxiao, defected while traveling with a disarmament delegation touring the United States and Can- ada.

Xu was described as an expert specializing in American affairs, having studied at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, as well as at the University of Bath in Great Britain. At the time of his defection, Xu was director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Affairs Bureau, American and Oceanic Office, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guofangbu Waijiao Shi Wu Ju Meiguo Haiyang Ju. Reportedly Xu was affiliated with the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), Sec- ond Department, Renmin Junbui Zong Canmou Bu, Di Er Bu, the PLA’s intelligence arm.

Contradictory reporting of Xu’s defection suggested it was a well-planned act with arrangements made beforehand, allowing him to walk away from his delegation with U.S. intelligence support, while others characterized his de- fection as his simply walking away from his group and contacting U.S. intelligence. He was also said to have left his wife in China and that he had a longtime mistress in the United States. Secretary of State Colin Powell re-

 

fused to provide details of the defection beyond acknowledging that it had occurred. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhonggua Renmin Gon- ghego Waijaibu, admitted Xu had defected and demanded his return.

XU LIN. In May 1990 Xu Lin, a 32-year-old consular official at the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) embassy in Washington, D.C., defected and an- nounced his decision at a press conference sponsored by a student group, the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars. Xu, who had worked in the embassy’s education section, had been assigned to work with Chinese student organizations, but he had become increasingly disenchanted with official Chinese policy, especially after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Xu stated that he had arrived in the United States in 1988 and so had not been a firsthand witness to the violent crackdown on the democracy movement, but he had persuaded 14 Chinese diplomats in the United States to defect, including five in Washington, four in San Francisco, four in Chicago, and one in New York.

Xu described how, after this episode, he was told by senior embassy offi-

cials that the ideological training given to students in the United States should be strengthened and that they must be discouraged from attending pro-democracy meetings. However, he also claimed that many embassy staff exercised a quiet resistance to the repression.

Xu revealed that he personally had held letters from students describing the unauthorized activities of their fellow students or student groups. When Xu testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he described how the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, had taken an active role in recruiting embassy personnel to monitor and harass students with suspected reformist or pro-democracy sympathies.

XU WEIBO. The president of Manten Electronics in Mount Laurel, New Jersey, Xu Weibo was arrested in July 2004 and charged with violating export laws. Also arrested was his wife and purchasing agent, Xiu Lingchen; her brother and company vice president, Hao Lichen; and Hao’s wife and the company comptroller, Kwan Chun Chan, who were all naturalized U.S. citi- zens. In May 2006, they admitted to sending restricted electronic items that had a military application and were valued at $400,000 to China at the request of the 20th and 41st Research Institutes, Di Ershi Yanjiu Suo and Di 41 Yanjiu Suo, respectively; lying to American distributors; and concealing the nature of the shipments.

According to documents filed in court, the two Chinese research facilities were part of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xinxi Chanye Bu (since March, 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

 

[MIIT] of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Gongye He Xinxihuabu) and were involved in developing military and civil- ian communications technology. The 20th Research Institute was described as specializing in aircraft landing systems and military radio navigation tech- nology, and the 41st Research Institute works on military amplifiers and testing devices for military instruments. It was alleged that the 20th Research Institute “poses an unacceptable risk in the development of weapons of mass destruction or the missiles used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.”

The four defendants agreed to forfeit $391,337, which represented profits from the company for the two years prior to their arrests, and Xu was sen- tenced to 44 months in prison, Xiu received an 18-month sentence, Hao received a 30-month sentence, and Kwan was sentenced to six months’ house arrest. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

XU YANJUN. On 1 April 2018 Xu Yanjun, aliases Qu Hui and Zhang Hui, a deputy division director of Jiangsu Province’s Ministry of State Security, Sixth Bureau, Jiangsu Sheng Guojia Anquanbu, Di Liu Ju, was arrested in Belgium on a warrant filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio. The four-count indictment included a single count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, conspiracy to commit trade secret theft, at- tempted economic espionage by theft or fraud, and attempted theft of trade secrets by taking or deception.

Xu’s arrest was the result of an elaborate sting that dated back to 2013, when Xu had targeted specific companies in the aviation field, including GE Aviation located in Evandale, Ohio, and GE Aviation, a subsidiary of the General Electric Corporation, which for years had invested in and developed jet engine blades. Xu had contacted a GE Aviation employee claiming to be associated with the prestigious the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronomics (NUAA), Nanjing Hangkong Hangtian Daxue. This institution was founded in 1952 as the Nanjing College of Aviation Industry, Nanjing Hangkong Gongye Xueyuan, and in 1956 had changed its name to the Nanj- ing Aeronautical Institute, Nanjing Hangkong Xueyuan. In 1993 it adopted its current name and has around 20,000 graduate and undergraduate students studying at 18 distinct colleges. The university has considerable influence within China’s aviation industry and enjoys a close collaboration with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. It also liaises with the state-owned Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, Zhongguo Shan- gyong Feji Youxian Zeren Gongsi, and the huge state-owned Aviation Indus- try Corporation of China, Zhongguo Hangkong Gongye Jituan Gongsi, as they host both academic and commercial seminars and symposiums.

 

In December 2013 Xu discussed an expert “exchange” with a fellow mem- ber of the MSS, noting that the target individual was unaware of his true identity and affiliation. Xu explained how he had approached the expert using the alias Qu Hui, and his MSS colleague had said he would “make sure everybody knows you are from the Nanjing Science and Technology Associ- ation.” In April 2014, Xu sent a message to another MSS colleague remind- ing him that “1. The expert does not know my true identity, I approached him with the name under Jiangsu Science and Technology Association; 2. Do not mention the materials.”

By March 2017 another individual, believed to be the NUAA’s deputy director, had begun corresponding with the GE Aviation engineer, suggesting he travel to China to discuss an exchange. On 10 May he received an invita- tion from the “Institute of Energy and Power” offering an expenses-paid opportunity to give a presentation on GE Aviation’s material design and manufacturing technology. In particular, the employee was urged to concen- trate on highly technical topics, including late developments in GE Avia- tion’s materials used in aeroengines, engine structure design analysis tech- nology, and manufacturing technology developments. Significantly, on 15 May, the invitee received an email from one of Xu’s accounts, though it was signed by the NUAA deputy director.

The engineer duly traveled to China where his NUAA host introduced him to Xu, who adopted the alias “Qu Hui,” claiming to be from the Jiangsu Science and Technology Promotion Association, Jiangsu Sheng Kexue Jishu Cujin Hui, and proffered a business card. The presentation was delivered on 2 June, for which the engineer was paid $3,500.

Xu continued his contact with the engineer and invited him to return to China to exchange ideas and make another presentation, and on 21 Novem- ber the NUAA deputy director told him that he had spoken to “Qu Hui” and that he would again assist with travel expenses and the exchange of ideas.

In early January 2018 Xu wrote to the engineer saying he would “touch base with the scientific research department here to see what technology is desired and I will let you know what to prepare. For your end, please prepare the plane ticket and date as soon as possible.” This was followed on 23 January with, “Try your best to collect and we can talk by then. Domestical- ly, there is more focused [sic] on the system code,” and later he explained that he was interested in “system specification, design process.” This is the application of research data to actual production. Xu also provided him with an email address to send the information to, but the engineer responded that such an email might be blocked by GE Aviation’s computers. Xu replied, “It might be inappropriate to send directly from the company, right?” This was followed by a 3 February request from Xu asking that the employee send an excerpt of his proposed presentation pertaining to “containment analysis” for a fan blade encasement. The document provided by the employee contained a

 

label warning that the presentation contained proprietary information from GE Aviation. The following day Xu acknowledged receipt of the information and said that he wanted the employee to spend time talking with experts in China and proposed a date for the travel. He also sent a list of technical topics relating to composite materials for fan blades and blade encasements. There was also a list of questions about the manufacture of fan blades.

When the engineer mentioned that some of what Xu had requested in- volved GE Aviation’s commercial secrets, Xu replied that they would dis- cuss that issue when they met in person. Also, in February, Xu raised the prospect of meeting in Europe during one of the engineer’s business trips, and Xu also asked him to create a directory of the files on his computer and send it to him, giving specific instructions for how the directory should be sorted and saved. This file was sent to Xu on 14 February from the engineer’s company computer.

On 28 February Xu telephoned the engineer and said the file directory was “‘pretty good stuff” and asked if he would be able to take it to Europe when they met. Xu asked, “The computer you will bring along is the company computer, right?” He also asked if the material could be exported out of the computer. Xu was told that it could be exported on a portable hard drive, to which Xu replied, “Good, good, good,” and said, “So, if possible, we will look over the stuff. Can we do that?” The employee agreed that could be done, and Xu said, “Do you understand? Carry the stuff along.” Later, Xu added, “All right, we really, we really don’t need to rush to do everything at one time, because, if we are going to do business together, this won’t be the last time, right?”

On 4 March the engineer told Xu that some of the documents on the company directory he had created could only be viewed and backed up when connected to GE Aviation’s network. Xu asked, “Does that mean I will not be able to view these documents after I bring them back?” The following day, Xu asked, “Is it possible to dump it to a portable hard drive or USB drive from a work computer in advance?” On 19 March Xu sent a message stating, “Since there’s still time, download more data and bring them back. Anything design related would work.”

When on 1 April 2018 Xu traveled to Belgium to meet his contact, he was arrested by Belgium authorities and on 10 October was extradited to the United States, where it is speculated he has agreed to cooperate with the FBI.

XU YONGYUE. Born in July 1942 in Henan Province, Xu Yongyue was a cadre member and secretary at the Beijing People’s Public Security School from 1961 to 1973. He joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1972.

 

The People’s Public Security University of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gong An Daxue, located in Beijing and established in 1948, is affiliated with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and trains the best aspir- ing police officers. It is considered to be China’s foremost police academy. Its disciplines include a law school, foreign languages, criminal investiga- tions, and forensic science, and it offers both bachelor’s and master’s degree programs.

Xu served as secretary of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhonggua Kexueyuan, and of the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu, from 1973 to 1976. From 1976 until 1983, he was secretary of the Ministry of Culture of the PRC, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Weihuabu.

Between 1983 and 1993 Xu worked in the office of Chen Yun, first as director of Chen’s office, then as political secretary. Chen was one of the more powerful leaders of the CCP during the 1980s and 1990s, and in earlier years he had acted against many of Mao Zedong’s worst impulses. He is considered one of the “Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China,” Zhongguo Gongechandang De Ba Wei Chang Laoi, and served as first secre- tary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Zhong- guo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui, the CCP’s highest control insti- tution, with responsibility for enforcing regulations and combating corrup- tion and malfeasance within the Party. Chen was also the first vice chairman of the CCP, a position that was phased out in 1992 in order to remove “chairman” from the title, reserving it solely for Mao. Chen retained influ- ence within the CCP until his death in 1995 at the age of 89.

From 1988 to 1993, Xue was deputy secretary-general of the CCP’s Cen-

tral Advisory Commission, Zhongyang Guwen Weiyuanhui. Between 1993 and 1998 he served in Hebei Province as a member of the CCP’s Provincial Committee of the Standing Committee, as secretary of the Policy and Law Committee, and as deputy secretary of the Provincial Committee. In 1997 he became an alternate member of the 15th Central Committee of the Commu- nist Party of the PRC, Zhonggua Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanahui, a position he retained until 2002. In 1998, Xu was named as the third minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu. He was also a member of the CCP’s 16th Central Committee. Xu replaced Jia Chunwang and was considered to be close to President Jiang Zemin. He advocated cleaning up corruption within the MSS, but during his tenure, he monitored the relatives of participants in and victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, including Ding Zilin, the mother of a Tiananmen Square victim who had submitted video testimony to the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Xu also took punitive actions against Falun Gong dissi- dents.

 

In 2004, Xu met with Nartai Dutbaeve, chairman of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee, to discuss cooperation against international terrorism, organized crime, drugs, and extremism. In 2006, he led a delegation to Sin- gapore and met with Singapore’s minister of defense. In August 2007, Xu was replaced as minister of the MSS by his deputy, Geng Huichang.

XUE FENG. In December 2011 a Chinese-born American geologist, Xue Feng, was convicted of espionage and sentenced to eight years’ imprison- ment after a secret trial held in Beijing. Xue, who received his doctorate from the University of Chicago, had been working in China for IHS Inc., a Colora- do-based energy firm, when he was arrested in November 2007 by the Min- istry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, and accused of collecting secret data on China’s oil industry. While interrogating Xue, MPS officers stubbed burning cigarettes out on his arms and hit him with an ashtray.

During his trial, Xue was accused of selling a database that contained information relating to the coordinates and volumes of reserves for 30,000 Chinese oil wells. Also convicted were Chen Mengin and Li Dongxu, both Xue’s former classmates at a Chinese university, who were later employed by PetroChina Limited Company, Zhonguo Shiyou Tianranqi Gufen Youxian Gongsi, and were sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. A fourth defen- dant, Li Yongbo, a manager at the Beijing Licheng Zhongyou Oil Technolo- gy Development Company, Beijing Li Cheng Zhongyou Shiyou Jishu Kaifa Gongsi, received eight years. In supporting Xue, IHS maintained that the data gathered by him was not classified and was readily available from open sources.

XUE YU. On 20 January 2016 the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania announced the indictment of five individuals in a scheme to steal biopharmaceutical trade secrets from GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). Those charged in the scheme were Xue Yu, aliases Yu Xue and Joyce, aged 45 of Wayne, Pennsylvania; Li Tao, alias Tao Li, aged 42 of Nanjing; Mei Yan, alias Yan Mei, aged 36 of Nanjing; Xue Tian, alias Tian Xue, aged 45 of Charlotte, North Carolina; and Xi Lu, aliases Lu Xi and Lucy Xi, aged 38 of West Lake Village, California. The 66-page indictment described GSK as a “science-led global healthcare company with more than 90,000 employees” and alleged that its advanced anticancer drug research had been compro- mised.

The first defendant, Xue Yu, had graduated from Peking University, Beij- ing Daxue, with an undergraduate degree and a PhD in biological chemistry from the University of North Carolina. She was considered to be one of the foremost protein biochemists in the world, and prior to her employment with

 

GSK in June 2006, she had worked for six years at the University of North Carolina as a research assistant. She worked at GSK until January 2016 as a senior-level manager.

Tao Li had a bachelor of science degree in biochemistry from Nankai University, Nankai Daxue, in Tianjin, China; a master of science degree in molecular biology from the Shanghai Institute of Biochemistry, Shanghai Shengwu Huaxue Yanjiu Suo; and a PhD in molecular biology from the University of North Carolina.

Mei Yan received a bachelor of science degree in chemistry and molecular engineering from Peking University, Beijing Daxue, and a PhD in medicinal chemistry from the University of Iowa in 2009. Mei Yan’s wife, Xi Yu, also worked as a scientist at GSK from July 2008 to November 2015 as an information technology specialist.

Xue Tian, Xue Yu’s twin sister, had been awarded a bachelor of science degree in biochemistry from Jilin University, Jilin Daxue, in Changchun, China; a master of science in biochemistry from Tsinghua University, Qin- ghua Daxue, in Beijing; a PhD in immunology from the National Institute for Medical Research in London; and a master of science in computer and infor- mation technology from the University of North Carolina.

In July 2012 Xue Yu created Renopharma as a U.S. corporation, while similar companies, Nanjing RenoPharma Ltd. and Shanghai Renopharma, were created offshore and operated in China by Xue Yu, Li Tao, and Mei Yan. Li Tao commented, “The name of my company is Nanjing RenoPharma Inc. It’s located in Nanjing, a city in Eastern China, about 150 miles away from Shanghai. So far the company is running well. The major funding is from two private investors. We got some support from the government, in- cluding some national awards and extra funding, a tax waiver, and a free 4,000 sqf lab space.”

The indictment identified 24 GSK documents containing trade secrets that had been transmitted illegally to Renopharma in China. Typically, Xue Yu emailed confidential material to her personal email account and then emailed it to Li Tao, Mei Yan, or Xue Tian. Xi Lu usually emailed the data to her husband, Mei Yan, and occasionally they used portable storage devices to send the stolen information to China. Allegedly Xue Yu, Li Tao, and Mei Yan intended to sell the GSK data as Renopharma research and peddle the material as their own. Furthermore, Xue Yu and Li Tao gave gifts to PRC government officials so they would support Renopharma. To conceal the profits generated by Renopharma, Xue Yu diverted her interest in the compa- ny to the names of family members and other associates. Also, Xue Yu, Li Tao, Mei Yan, and Xi Lu created a U.S. corporation, Humanabio Inc., as a subsidiary of Renopharma to conceal their association with Nanjing Reno- pharma Ltd. and Shanghai Renopharma Ltd.

 

On one occasion Xue exchanged messages with Xue Tian and said she expected her annual salary from Renopharma to be $60,000 and that she would split her salary with Xue Tian. She added that she had little concern for her salary but was more interested in the number of shares of Renophar- ma she owned.

Funding for Renopharma was obtained from various entities in China, including $4,500 from the Nanjing Jiangning Science Park for Talents, Nanj- ing Jiangning Rencai Kexue Bu; $37,500 from the 2014 Provincial Medium and Small Science and Technology Business Science Innovation Fund, Sheng Zhong Xiaoxing Qiye Keji Chuangxin Ji Jin; $500 from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renli Ziyuan He Shehui Baozhangbu; and $4,500 in government rent subsi- dies.

In total, the indictment listed 43 counts, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud (1 count), conspiracy to steal trade secrets (1 count), conspiracy to commit money laundering (1 count), wire fraud (16 counts), and theft of trade secrets (24 counts). Xue Yu, Tao Li, Xue Tian, and Xi Lu were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but Mei Yan remained in China. Subsequently Xue Yu pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to steal trade secrets, and on 28 March 2018 she was sentenced to 80 months’ imprisonment. Xue Tian pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, and Li Tao pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to steal trade secrets.

 

Y

YAN SHIWEI. Alias Sheri Yan, Yan Shiwei was born in 1956 in Anhui Province to a privileged family. Her father, Yan Zhen, was a highly regarded poet and artist, but during the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution, Wu- chanjieji Wenhua Dageming, her father and mother were sent to reeducation camps, leaving Yan alone in the artist compound where her family had been living. She eventually joined an entertainment group authorized by the Red Guards, Hong Weibing, and later studied to become a journalist and worked at the Central People’s Broadcasting Station (China National Radio), Zhon- gyang Renmin Guangbo Diantai, a state-owned radio network. She married, but when Deng Xiaoping eased travel restrictions to the West in the immedi- ate wake of the Cultural Revolution, she claimed that her mother sewed $400 into the lining of her jacket and she flew to the United States to work as a journalist and learn English, leaving her husband behind.

While in Washington, D.C., Yan met an Australian diplomat, Roger Uren,

who was researching a book about Kang Sheng, the notorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence chief and architect of the Cultural Revolution. His biography, The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng, the Evil Genius behind Mao and His Legacy of Terror in People’s China, was pub- lished in 1992 with Uren using the pseudonym John Byron, coauthored with Robert Pack. She and Uren married, had a daughter in 1996, and moved to Canberra, where he joined Australia’s Office of National Assessments, an all-source assessment organization that reports directly to the prime minister with analyses of international political, economic, and strategic develop- ments. It also plays a coordinating role with the Australian intelligence com- munity.

In the 1990s Yan became associated with Liu Chaoying, the daughter of the celebrated People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral Liu Huaq- ing. Liu Chaoying, a lieutenant colonel in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was also an executive at China Aerospace International Holdings Ltd., Zhongguo Hangtian Guoji Konggu Youxian, Gongsi, a Hong Kong subsidiary of China’s satellite developer China Aerospace Science and Tech- nology Corporation (CASC), Zhongguo Hangtian Keji Jituan Gongsi, a

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state-owned corporation. Her father was the third commander of the PLAN and a former member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang. Accordingly, Liu Huaqing was a “princeling,” a privileged offspring of one of the CCP’s prominent fami- lies, but she was also embroiled in the 1996 campaign finance controversy in which Chinese money was funneled into the reelection campaigns of Presi- dent Bill Clinton and Senator John Kerry. Johnny Chung, who was convicted of making illegal campaign finance donations, testified that Liu had intro- duced him to Ji Shengde, who was then head of the PLA’s intelligence apparatus, Renmin Jiefangjun Zong Canmoubu Qingbaobu, and arranged to contribute $300,000 to the Clinton campaign. Yan later stated that she was unaware of Liu’s past until he had returned to China.

In 2001 Uren resigned from his position in the Office of National Assess-

ments and moved to Beijing where Yan started a consulting firm that empha- sized government and media relationships between China and Australia. Among her clients was the American software entrepreneur Peter Norton, whom she advised about obtaining business with Chinese state-owned enter- prises. She proved very successful, as the couple acquired homes in Beijing, Canberra, New York, and Washington, D.C.

In 2012 Yan, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, started the Glo- bal Sustainability Foundation, intended to assist United Nations efforts to reduce worldwide poverty but also serving as a conduit to pay bribes, and by 2015 she was the object of both criminal and counterintelligence investiga- tions initiated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The criminal inquiry centered on the payment of bribes to leading UN staff, including John Ashe, a diplomat from Antigua. Yan appointed Ashe as an adviser to her foundation and paid him $20,000 a month, supplemented by larger amounts. She also hired Edith Kutesa, the wife of Ugandan UN diplomat Sam Kutesa, as a foundation adviser. Ashe and Kutesa were named as the presidents of the 68th and 69th UN General Assemblies, respectively.

Yan’s relationship with Ashe had started at a UN-sponsored international conference in Macau in 2011 that had been organized by Ng Lap Seng, a Macau gambling mogul. Ng was attempting to have a UN conference center built in Macau, a plan that never materialized. Ng had been embroiled in the illegal campaign finance matter with Liu Chaoying when he was appointed a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiji, an organization that was part of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Central Committee of the CCP, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Tongzhan Bu. The UFWD’s principal function was to manage relations with influential non-CCP members and ensure their support for CCP objectives. Ng was arrested in October 2015 as part of the FBI’s UN investigation and was

 

initially released on $50 million bail and restricted to his New York apart- ment. He was convicted after a one-month trial in July 2017 for his role in paying bribes to Ashe and received a four-year jail sentence.

In April 2012 Ashe had traveled to Hong Kong to meet Yan and her foundation’s chief financial officer, Heidi Hong Piao, alias Heidi Park. Ashe had assured them that he was virtually certain of being elected president of the UN General Assembly and that he hoped to secure more than $3 million for his presidency. This resulted in Yan and Piao facilitating the payment of

$300,000 from Ye Maoxi, the chairman of the board of directors of the Xijing Group, Xijing Jituan.

Ye had served in the PLA and had been demobilized in the late 1980s when he joined several businesses, including screen printing. Over the years, the Xijing Group diversified into a large conglomerate that encompassed real estate, mining, manufacturing, culture, and media. According to Ye’s indict- ment, he was interested in investing in Antigua, developing offshore banking there, and hoped to obtain Antigua passports for himself and others. On 24 July 2012, Piao sent an email to Ashe, with a copy to Yan, stating, “Just got the notice that the $300,000 will be in your account by tomorrow.   This

$300,000 is from [Xe], 10% of 3M just to show his goodwill.” The following day, Ashe sent an email to Yan and Piao stating that he would travel to Antigua and lobby for Xe’s business interests.

In September 2013 Ashe was duly appointed the 68th president of the UN General Assembly and, flanked by the UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon, hosted a reception to mark the opening of the General Assembly. At Ashe’s request, Yan arranged for Liu Wei, alias William Liu, to provide $100,000, supposedly reimbursement for his half of the cost of the reception.

Liu was affiliated with the China National Software and Security Compa- ny, Zhongguo Ruanjian Anquan Gongsi, a principal subsidiary of the state- owned China Electronics Corporation, Zhongghuo Dianzi Gongsi, an entity with ties to Chinese intelligence, military, and security agencies. On 16 Sep- tember Ashe’s bank account received three wire transfers from a Chinese bank in amounts totaling about $100,000, including $9,985 specifically from Liu, who was acknowledged to be one of the reception’s sponsors. Later, Piao accompanied Liu to Antigua for a series of meetings with local officials, and in a series of email exchanges and a payment of an additional $100,000, ostensibly to pay for Ashe’s staff holiday party, Ashe advised Yan in April 2014 that a memorandum of understanding had been signed between China National Software and Security Company and Antigua’s prime minister Baldwin Spencer, in part for the Chinese to build an internet security system.

At about this time, Yan also introduced Liu to several Kenyan officials and

arranged various meetings. In October 2013 Piao contacted Ashe, stating that “an old friend of Sheri who is extremely wealthy” was organizing an interna- tional conference in Guangzhou and Yan had suggested that Ashe be invited.

 

The individual was later identified as Dr. Chau Chak Wing, who had been born in Guangdong Province but had emigrated to Hong Kong and then to Australia, where he had developed property through his Guangdong-based Kingold Group.

An Australian citizen, Chau’s primary residence was in Guangshou, while his wife and two of his three daughters continued to live in Sydney. Report- edly he had contributed $4 million (Australian) to the Liberal and Labor parties in Australia, and in 2001 he entered into a joint venture with the Guangzhou provincial government’s Yancheng Evening News to publish the New Express Daily in that area. Chau was quoted as saying that the govern- ment in Guangdong has found the newspaper “very commendable because we never have any negative reporting.” In 2004 Chau established the pro- PRC Australian New Express Daily, a Chinese-language newspaper in Syd- ney. When the Sydney Morning Herald published an article referring to Chau’s role in the Ashe bribery scandal, he successfully sued the rival publi- cation, but the Herald has appealed the judgment.

In 2009 Chau contributed about $550,000 (Australian) to a training facility

for the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, in Guangdong and arranged a conference there to which Ashe was invited. Ashe demanded payment to attend, and Yan advised Ashe that she was forwarding his invita- tion, adding, “as you can see that I purposely establish a good platform for you today and tomorrow.” On 4 November 2013 Ashe received $200,000 from one of Chau’s companies in China. Ashe attended the Guangzhou con- ference where he gave a speech and gave media interviews. He was later charged with bribery, but he died in a weight-lifting accident on 22 June 2016 while awaiting trial.

A third suspect under FBI scrutiny was Patrick Ho, originally from Hong Kong, who was also a CPPCC member. He had been appointed by the PRC as Hong Kong’s secretary of home affairs, a senior ministerial post. An FBI wiretap recorded a conversation with Ho, seeking advice from either Yan or Piao, as to how Ho could pay off Ashe. Ho was arrested by the FBI in November 2017 and charged with breaches of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and money laundering. In December 2018 Ho was convicted of seven counts concerning bribes relating to oil rights in Chad, and in March 2019 he was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and fined $400,000.

In October 2015, at the same time Yan and others were being arrested in New York as a result of the bribery investigation, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) conducted a search of Yan and Uren’s home in Canberra. The ASIO operation was not directly related to the bribery scandal but rather to concern about Chinese influence in Australian politics. The search revealed that Uren had removed highly classified documents from the Office of National Assessments at the time of his resignation some years

 

earlier, and some of them included details of what Western intelligence agen- cies had known about Chinese intelligence operations. ASIO, which has no arrest powers, referred the matter to the Australian Federal Police.

On 29 July 2016, Yan was sentenced after her January 2016 plea of guilty to a single count of bribery and received a 21-month sentence. The U.S. attorney Preet Bharara stated, “As she admitted in court at her guilty plea, [Yan] bribed the president of the UN General Assembly with hundreds of thousands of dollars to further private business interests.” It was also noted that Yan (and Piao) had arranged for “bribe payments to Ashe in exchange for official actions by Ashe . . . to benefit several Chinese businessmen.”

In an interview conducted after her release from prison, Yan denied being a Chinese intelligence operative or being part of a United Front attempt to influence the United Nations. She returned to Beijing, where she claims she is financially dependent upon her elderly father. Her daughter works in New York, and Roger Uren is based in Hong Kong, but the couple retain their Australian citizenship.

Ashe’s introductions to Antiguan officials led to the agreement between Liu Wei and the Antiguan government on the internet security contract, and in August 2014 it was followed by a $36 million agreement to finance a deepwater harbor development project, support for climate change measures in Antigua, and financial assistance for the University of Antigua and Barbu- da. Antigua also agreed to a Chinese-language teaching program in secon- dary schools, eliminated the need for visas for Chinese citizens, and pledged to support China’s proposals to reform the UN Security Council. In June of that year, Antigua signed a $740.7 million agreement with Yida International Investment Antigua, led by Chinese investor Zhang Yida, to develop Anti- gua’s Guiana Island as a tourist attraction.

In 2014 Kenyan officials also signed agreements with China, including acceptance of a loan from the Export-Import Bank of China for the Standard Gauge Railway, a multibillion-dollar endeavor. The Export-Import Bank of China, Zhongguo Shuchu Ru Yinhang, is chartered to promote the export of Chinese goods and services and is subordinate to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan.

The confidential contract, the details of which are sketchy, includes a requirement for Kenya to use Chinese goods, technology, and services for the project. Such controversial conditions, and default penalties, are criticized in the West as “dept-trap diplomacy,” that is, forcing countries to relinquish land, minerals, or strategic assets if they fail to comply with loan conditions.

At the United Nations, officials endorsed China’s Belt and Road Initia- tive, Yidi Yilu Changyi (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, Sichou Zhi Lu Jing Dai He 21 Di Haishangsichou Zhi

 

Lu), a plan for infrastructure development and investment in more than 150 countries and international organizations, being the centerpiece of President Xi Jinping’s plan to enhance Chinese influence worldwide.

YANG FUNG. On 31 July 2007 Yang Fung, the president of Excellence Engineering Electronics Inc., was charged in California with illegally export- ing controlled microwave integrated circuits to China without the required authorization from the Department of Commerce. On the following day Yang pleaded guilty. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

YANG LIAN. On 3 December 2010 a former Microsoft engineer, Yang Lian, was arrested in Portland, Oregon, as he attempted to purchase the first five of 300 radiation-hardened programmable semiconductors for $20,000 from undercover Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agents. According to the prosecution, Yang admitted when he pleaded guilty to charges in March 2011 that he intended to drive to Canada and fly the restricted items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) himself. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

YARDLEY, HERBERT O. Born in Worthington, Indiana, in 1889, Herbert Yardley was the most controversial cryptanalyst of his generation, and in 1938 he accepted a conrtact with the Chinese government to solve Japanese diplomatic wireless traffic.

Until October 1929 Yardley had been employed by a secret U.S. State Department cryptographic bureau based in New York and known as the Black Chamber. Unemployed and short of money, Yardley wrote The Secrets of the Black Chamber in 1930 and revealed that confidential Japanese com- munications had been intercepted and read throughout the 1921 Washington Naval Conference. As a result of these disclosures Yardley accepted a con- sultancy role in Tokyo and reconstructed the Japanese cipher systems. This left him in an ideal position, eight years later, to assist the Chinese in break- ing the very same codes. Yardley’s own version of this relationship, The Chinese Black Chamber: An Adventure in Espionage, was not declassified and published until 1983, 24 years after his death. See also NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA); UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

YONG JIEQU. In 1991 Yong Jiequ enrolled in a graduate course at Concor- dia University in Montreal and joined the Chinese Students and Scholars Association (CSSA) where he became an activist, urging the membership not to criticize the Beijing government. Three years later, in 1994, Yong applied

 

for permanent resident status in Canada and was interviewed by the federal immigration authorities and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which challenged him with surveillance evidence that he had made frequent visits to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embassy in Ottawa and had been seen in the company of a suspected Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, officer. Yong denied that he had been recruited as an MSS agent or had collected information on other Chinese students, and an immigration court later ruled that as the CSSA was not a Canadian institu- tion, no espionage had taken place.

YU ARMIN. On 21 April 2016, 53-year-old Yu Amin, alias Amy Yu, was arrested on a superseding indictment charging her with 18 counts of conspir- acy to illegally export systems, components, and documents to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

A citizen of the PRC, Yu moved to the United States in 1998 with her husband, Xu Lijun, and son “Thomas” Hang Xu and became a permanent resident. After initially living in South Carolina from 2002 to 2009, Yu moved to work in Mason, Ohio, where she ran Amin International, an Ohio- registered corporation, from her home. From 2009 until at least 2014 she also controlled another company, IFour International, from her home in Orlando, Florida.

Before emigrating, Yu had been the laboratory manager of the Marine Control Equipment and System Research Division of Harbin Engineering University (HEU), Harbin Gongcheng Daxue. HEU was formerly known as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Military Engineering Institute, Jie- fangjun Junshi Gongcheng Xueyuan, and is considered to be a primary insti- tution for engineering and marine projects and was an original Project 211 University, 211 Gongcheng Daxue. In 1995 the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu, desig- nated certain universities, under Project 211, as the key to raising standards in research and developing strategies for socioeconomic development.

From 2002 and until 2014 Yu cooperated with her former colleagues at HEU by obtaining items from the United States, Canada, and Europe and exporting them to the PRC, many of which were used in the development of marine submersible vehicles, such as remotely operated vehicles (ROV), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV). In exporting those items, Yu ignored the filing requirements of elec- tronic export information (EEI) for items valued over $2,500, as required by the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, which requires the names and address- es of the parties to the transaction, along with a description, the quantity, and the value of the items to be exported. Contracts between Yu’s companies and those in the PRC included not only the cost of the items but also Yu’s fee for managing the exports.

 

In April 2009 a former colleague at HEU, an associate professor who worked on marine submersible systems, gave Yu a list of items to procure on behalf of HEU, which included underwater acoustic locator devices. This was followed by a request in May for underwater cables and connectors. Yu obtained a quote from a U.S. company but was asked about the intended use of the purchases. Yu answered, “The equipment will be used on AUV.” This was followed by Yu sending the HEU professor four signed contracts be- tween Yu’s IFour International and a PRC company. The contracts were for underwater cables and connectors ($19,748); underwater acoustic locator devices ($11,676); and underwater thrusters, actuators, and sensors ($89,184). All this matériel was shipped directly from Yu’s company to the PRC. She then sent the invoice to the PRC for all four contracts, totaling

$107,516, which was followed by payment to Yu’s IFour International bank

account. After receiving the devices at her residence in Orlando, she shipped them to the PRC via United Parcel Service (UPS) but failed to file any other required documentation. Further, she made a false declaration on the UPS export invoice by describing the three items as “power pingers,” with an individual value of $2,499.99, or a total of $7,499.99. She also claimed an exemption for filing an EEI form because she alleged the value of the ship- ments was less than $2,500 each.

In September 2010 the HEU professor sent a request for Yu to obtain computer processing units, followed by another for underwater cables and connectors. Then another former colleague asked her to procure 907 multi- plexers from a Canadian company, and by November 2010 Yu had received the quotes and issued an invoice: PC 104 computer processing chips ($59,934), 907 multiplexers from the Canadian company ($79,700), and underwater cables and connectors ($21,645). Thereafter a wire transfer of

$133,985 from the PRC was sent to Yu’s IFour International bank account, and she shipped the consignment by U.S. Postal Service Express Mail, mis- representing and undervaluing the content on the customs declaration.

In October 2010 Yu was again tasked to procure an additional 907 multi- plexers from the Canadian company, so she sent a purchase order, which was answered with a quote of $82,505. In January 2011 Yu sent an email with an attached invoice issued by Yu’s IFour International company and a PRC company in the amount of $131,530, for which she received an international wire transfer in the amount of $79,393 sent to her IFour International ac- count. After paying the Canadian company, the multiplexers were shipped to her Orlando address.

In January 2011 an HEU employee gave Yu a procurement list that in- cluded side-scan sonar equipment and underwater sensors from a company in Great Britain. Yu contacted the U.S. distributor for the UK company and in mid-January sent an invoice to HEU with four contracts, including one for a “side-scan kit” in the amount of $13,000 and one for an “underwater pres-

 

sure, conductivity, and temperature sensor” in the amount of $20,109. She then sent a purchase order to a Canadian company, which responded with an invoice for $5,877. Yu paid for the purchase with a credit card, and the goods were shipped to her home. On 10 February 2011, she received a wire transfer for $79,393 to her IFour International account, followed on 16 March by another for $112,449. Similarly, the UK company generated an invoice for underwater sensors in the amount of $18,876, which was paid by Yu’s credit card, and all items were shipped to the PRC on 4 May 2011. On 1 August 2011, Yu received an international wire transfer for $26,456 marked as “final payment.”

On 30 March 2011, Yu received a request from a former HEU colleague for control sticks and button strips. The HEU employee provided a link to a

U.S. company and a note for Yu to “find out if we can make purchases from them.” Yu contacted the company, and it generated an invoice in the amount of $6,378. These items were shipped to her residence, and she exported them by FedEx, failing to file an EEI form.

There were numerous other similar transactions, demonstrating that Yu had developed a lucrative method of circumventing U.S. restrictions on the export of sensitive technology to the PRC by turning her home into a trans- shipment center for an illicit procurement operation.

The indictment included the following charges: Foreign Agents Registra- tion Act (FARA), one count; conspiracy, one count; failure to file electronic export information, four counts; smuggling goods out of the United States, five counts; filing false or misleading electronic export information, one count; conspiracy to commit money laundering, one count; international money laundering, four counts; and false statements, one count. The latter charge related to Yu’s interview with the Department of Homeland Security, in which she falsely claimed she had no employment other than a part-time job at the University of Central Florida, thereby concealing her ownership of both Amin International and IFour International.

In June 2016 Yu pleaded guilty to two counts, exporting goods to a foreign country without registering as an agent for a foreign country and conspiring to commit international money laundering on transactions valued at $2.6 million. On 26 September 2016 she was sentenced to 21 months’ imprison- ment and forfeited $620,000, as well as two homes with an assessed value of

$560,000.

YU JUNGPING. Said to be a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior colonel, jiefangjun gouji shangxiao, formerly assigned to the People’s Re- public of China (PRC) embassy in Washington, D.C., Yu Jungping reported- ly defected to the United States in the 1990s, although no public announce- ment was made. See also UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

 

YU LONG. On 19 August 2014, Yu Long returned to the United States from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport, but during a secondary inspection conducted by U.S. Customs he was found to be carrying $10,000 in undeclared cash, having declared only $100 worth of merchandise including “decorations.”

During the customs search, all the documents in Yu’s possession were copied, including a multipage document in Chinese with information about Yu written in English. A subsequent translation indicated it was an applica- tion for employment that included an extensive overview of his employment with the United Technologies Corporation (UTC).

Yu was born on 20 December 1977 in China, he was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, and from August 2008 until May 2014 he worked as a senior engineer and scientist at the United Technologies Re- search Center in Connecticut. His responsibilities included work on the F119 engine, used in the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 Raptor fighter, and the F135 engine used in the Air Force’s F-35 Lightning II fighter.

Further investigation revealed that in 2013 Yu had expressed an interest in returning to China to work on research projects at Chinese state-run univer- sities using the information he had gained as a result of his United Technolo- gies employment. Yu contacted several state-run institutions in China, in- cluding the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, and the Shenyang Institute of Automation, Shenyang Zidonghua Xueyuan.

The Shenyang Institute of Automation is engaged in mechatronic engi- neering, pattern recognition and intelligent system control, theory and control engineering, and computer applied theory. Yu had approached those institu- tions under the auspices of China’s Thousand Talents Program, Qian Ren Jihua, which had originally been established in 2008 by China’s central government principally to recruit international experts in scientific research, innovation, and entrepreneurship. In 2010 the CCP’s Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui, and the State Council, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuy- uan, conceived a plan to upgrade the program by establishing China’s Na- tional Talent Development Plan, Zhongguo De Guojia Rencai Fazhan Jihua. Those accepted into the program received cash bonuses and high salaries in addition to prestigious awards.

After Yu had agreed on principle to join the Shenyang Institute, he was

asked to provide documents relating to his employment at UTC in order to substantiate the information he had made on his application. Yu agreed and in December 2013 emailed several documents relating to his work for his former employer that were classified or proprietary.

While negotiating with the Shenyang Institute, Yu continued to pursue other opportunities among China’s state-run institutions and wrote to one, “I have made my mind to return to China, so have prepared a research plan

 

based on my industry experience and current projects.” He then went on to list several defense-related companies he had been in contact with during his period with UTC employment and concluded, “These unique working expe- riences have provided me a great starting point to perform R&D and further spin off business in China. I believe my efforts will help China to mature its own aircraft engines.”

In May 2014 Yu left UTC and the following month began work at the Shenyang Institute. In July, forensic analysis and digital evidence indicated that Yu had taken a UTC external hard drive to China that he had unlawfully retained and accessed while in China.

In July 2014 Yu was listed as the project leader for a research plan for the Chinese Academy of Sciences that declared, “The three major engine compa- nies in the world, i.e., GE, Pratt &Whitney in the U.S. and Rolls-Royce in the UK, all use this technology.   Our nation lacks the ability to process high

performance components, such as airplane wings, tail hooks on carrier air- crafts, and blisks.   Because of the technology embargo imposed by west-

ern developed countries it is very difficult for us to obtain more advanced design and manufacturing technology.”

Among the documents obtained from Yu at the time of his arrival at JFK was an application dated 20 July 2014 to establish a limited liability compa- ny in China in the name of Yu’s girlfriend, who was a graduate student at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. On 5 November 2014 Yu flew from Ithaca to Newark Liberty International Airport with a final destination of China, but when customs officers inspected Yu’s luggage, they discovered documents from the defense contractor Rolls-Royce. When confronted with them, Yu returned to Ithaca and his girlfriend’s home, claiming that he had downloaded the information from publicly available websites. The following day he contacted the FBI and provided a list of websites where he said he had found the material. However, the documents in Yu’s possession, which dated from March 2010 to October 2011, could not be found on the websites, some of which proved to be inactive. It was later established that during that time frame the U.S. Air Force had convened a consortium of defense contractors to see if they could lower the cost of certain metals used in aircraft construc- tion. The U.S. Air Force Metals Affordability Initiative had been attended by both UTC and Rolls-Royce personnel, and the documents in Yu’s possession included stringent restrictions on their dissemination. Rolls-Royce staff con- firmed that the company had provided the documents to UTC as part of the consortium and insisted that Yu had never been an employee.

The air force’s review of Yu’s documents found that they represented

years of collaborative effort and touched on prior development work with an estimated value of $50 million.

 

On 7 November 2014 Yu was arrested in Ithaca, and an analysis of digital media seized at the time showed that Yu possessed voluminous files relating to information protected by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations, as well as many files containing proprie- tary information belonging to various U.S. companies. On 19 December 2016 Yu waived his right to be indicted and pleaded guilty to the theft of numerous sensitive military program documents from UTC and other compa- nies, and to a charge of transporting them to China. On 22 June 2017 Yu was sentenced to the time he had been incarcerated, over 30 months in total.

YU, PAUL. On 4 April 1973 Dr. Paul Yu, a naturalized American citizen of Chinese origin, hanged himself in the washroom of TWA flight 742 from Taipei shortly before it landed in Honolulu. The immensely successful pro- prietor of Ad-Yu Electronics, based in Passaic, New Jersey, since 1951, Yu had just been refused a visa to enter Hong Kong and was returning to the United States to face questions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) over alleged violation of federal bankruptcy laws. Yu was also sus- pected of illegally exporting missile components, but the mystery surround- ing his death was never cleared up.

YU PINGIAN. Born on 16 December 1980 and living in Shanghai, Yu Pingian was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) when he landed at Los Angeles International Airport on 22 August 2017. He was charged with conspiring with other Chinese nationals to hack the computer networks of several unnamed companies in the United States using the mali- cious software “Sakula” to illegally gain access to their systems. Sakula was the same malicious software that was used to obtain records of millions of

U.S. government employees, such as the one that accessed the confidential files of 22 million Americans who had applied for security clearances at the Office of Personnel Management, and the almost 80 million current and past customers of the health insurance firm Anthem.

The indictment was unsealed on the day Yu’s four victims were identified as Company A, headquartered in San Diego; Company B, based in Massa- chusetts; Company C in Los Angeles; and Company D in Arizona.

Yu, who had traveled to the United States to attend a conference, was described in the indictment as “a malware broker in the People’s Republic of China.” He was an expert in computer network security and computer pro- gramming, and his network nickname was “Goldsun.” The indictment read, “Beginning in or about April 2011, and continuing up and including on or about January 17, 2014, within the Southern District of California and else- where, defendant Yu Pingian did knowingly, intentionally, and willfully agree and conspire with other persons known and unknown, including un-

 

charged co-conspirators (UCC) 1 and 2, to cause the transmission of a pro- gram, information, code, and command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization to a protected computer”

Among the malware linked to Yu and two others was the malicious soft- ware tool Sakula. Allegedly the relationship between Yu and his co-conspira- tors began in April 2011 when Yu exchanged emails with the person who had supplied him with the malicious software, which was designed to exploit vulnerabilities in the Internet Explorer web browser. In that correspondence, the unidentified individual explained that he and a second unidentified co- conspirator had obtained the software at a meeting they had attended in Jiangsu Province.

The FBI recovered several compromised computers that revealed that on 17 April 2011 Yu had said he had an “exploit” for Adobe’s Flash software, meaning a vulnerability in the software’s security. Other messages showed that Yu was warned that he could get in trouble for supplying malicious software, and on 27 July 2011 he discussed the installation of a remote access Trojan, a backdoor access to an unidentified company’s computer. Then, on 7 August 2012, one of the suspects installed malicious files on San Die- go–based Company A’s computer network. This event was followed on 18 September 2012 when malware that took advantage of a “zero-day exploit” was inserted into the Los Angeles–based Company C’s computers. A further breach on the same system was made on 12 December 2012 involving a “watering-hole” attack that used Sakula. A watering-hole attack refers to hackers installing malware on legitimate websites frequently used by the hackers’ actual targets. When employees click on the legitimate websites, malware is installed on the target’s computer and the network the target uses. A third attack, on 1 January 2013, took advantage of a zero-day exploit and caused a Sakula variant to download to the company’s computers.

According to the FBI, more incidents followed, including a Sakula attack

on 7 June 2013 against the Massachusetts-based Company B’s web server; on 3 December 2013, against Company A in San Diego; and on 17 January 2014, when malware was installed on a server assigned to an internet proto- col address that downloaded a Sakula variant to the victim’s computers.

On 6 September 2017 Yu pleaded guilty to a single count of the original indictment, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, and on 25 February 2019 he was sentenced to time served, about 21 months, with an additional three years of probation. He was also ordered to pay restitution of $1,096,602 at

$100 per month to Qualcomm (based in San Diego), $421,197; Pacific Sci- entific, $350,000; Riot Games, $289,658; Edge Web Hosting, $34,642; and Duke Energy, $1,105.

 

YU QIANGSHENG. The son of Yu Qiwei, the head of the clandestine propaganda department in Qingdao, Shandong, who died of a heart attack in 1958 at the age of 47, Yu Qiangsheng was adopted by Kang Sheng and employed in the Ministry of State Security’s (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, foreign espionage branch until he defected in 1985 to the Central Intelli- gence Agency (CIA). At the time, he was on a visit to Hong Kong to see his French girlfriend, reportedly a U.S. State Department employee. Code- named PLANESMAN by I. C. Smith of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion (FBI), he supplied information that led to the identification of Bernard Boursicot and Larry Wu-tai Chin as MSS sources. The defection proved a major setback for the MSS and resulted in the dismissal of Lin Yun, the head of the MSS.

Yu’s father, who adopted the name Huang Jing to escape the Kuomintang

(KMT), was appointed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader in the northern port city of Tianjin. Yu’s mother was Fan Jin, a journalist, who had been closely associated with Premier Zhou Enlai. She had also replaced Jiang Qing in her husband’s affections, thereby creating a problem for her when the latter married Mao Zedong. Yu’s brother was Yu Zhengsheng, the Party chief in Shanghai, while their uncle was Yu Tai Wai, a senior KMT politician in Taiwan, a rocket expert who later became minister of defense.

During the Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, Yu, then a member of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, was banished to the countryside, where he was unable to protect his mother from degradation at the hands of Red Guards, Hong Weibing, directed by her old rival, Jiang Qing. Having failed to prevent her humiliation, Yo would be- come increasingly resentful at her treatment until he finally made contact with the CIA.

Yu’s brother Yu Zhengsheng, a senior CCP official in the central province of Hubei, found his career handicapped by the defection, but he later recov- ered and was recommended as a candidate for the Standing Committee of the Politburo in 2002, and as vice premier. His ability to avoid the dire political consequences usually associated with a family member’s disgrace was attrib- uted to his friendship with Deng Pufang, the eldest son of Deng Xiaoping, who was confined to a wheelchair after he was thrown out of a window by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Instead of being ruined, Yu, who was trained originally as a missile engineer, spent 12 years in the coastal province of Shandong and made a success of his appointment as mayor of Qingdao.

YU XIANGDONG. Also known as Mike Yu, Yu Xiangdong worked for the Ford Motor Company for 10 years until 2007 when he joined the state-owned Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Company Ltd., Beijing Qichegongye Jinchukou Gongsi, in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In November

 

2010 Yu pleaded guilty to two charges of transferring Ford’s proprietary information on electrical power and distribution systems onto a computer hard drive and taking it to the PRC. See also INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE; TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

YUE ZHONGLIE. In 1981 a Chinese citizen, Yue Zhonglie, was convicted of spying for the Soviets and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). According to reports of his trial, he had crossed into the Soviet Union the previous year and was recruited by the KGB to collect economic, military, and political information.

 

 

Z

ZHA RONG. On 30 October 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice an- nounced the indictment of Zha Rong and Chai Meng, both described as members of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquan- bu, and specifically the Jiangsu Province State Security Department in Nanj- ing. In addition to the indictments of Zha, mentioned as a “division director,” and Chai, alias Cobain, described as a “section chief,” others indicted as hackers and co-opted company insiders included Zhang Zhanggui, aliases “leanov” and “leaon”; Liu Chunliang, aliases “sxpdlcl” and “Fangshou”; Gao Hongkun, alias “mer4en7y”; Zhuang Xiaowei, alias “jpxxav”; Ma Zhiqi, alias Le Ma; Gu Gen, alias Sam Gu; and Tian Xi. The 10 were charged with conspiracy to damage protected computers, conspiracy to obtain information, damaging protected computers, and criminal forfeiture.

The group was accused of penetrating, between 2010 and 2015, several

aerospace-related companies worldwide, which were unnamed but referred to as a Massachusetts-based aerospace company; an aerospace company based in the United Kingdom with offices in Pennsylvania; an aerospace company based in the United Kingdom with offices in New York; a multina- tional conglomerate that produces commercial and consumer products and aerospace systems; a French aerospace company; an Oregon-based aerospace supplier; a San Diego-based technology company; and a French aerospace manufacturer with an office in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province. Specifically, the defendant Gu Gun was, according to the indictment, employed in this last company’s Suzhou office as the company’s “information technology (IT) infrastructure and security manager,” and Tian Xi was employed at the same location as the company’s “product manager.” Other companies involved were a critical infrastructure company operating in San Diego and elsewhere; a Wisconsin-based aerospace company; an Australian domain registrar; and Capstone Turbines, a Los Angeles–based gas turbine manufacturer.

This group was alleged to have targeted information concerning a turbofan

engine used in commercial airliners, and at the time of the intrusions, an unidentified Chinese state-owned aerospace company was seeking to devel- op a comparable engine for use in commercial aircraft manufactured in China

443

 

and elsewhere, through a partnership between the French aerospace company in Suzhou and another company based in the United States. Reportedly the group initially hacked the French aerospace company and then attacked other firms engaged in the manufacture of engine parts, including the companies in Massachusetts, Arizona, and Oregon.

The conspiracy started no later than January 2010 and used a variety of computer intrusion tactics, including spear phishing, malware, doppelgänger domain names, dynamic domain service accounts, domain hijacking, water- ing-hole attacks, and co-opting victim company employees. In the case of Capstone Turbine Computers, the group infiltrated the company’s computer network in January 2010 and tested potential spear-phishing techniques, such as fictitious emails embedded with a malicious code that facilitated access to the recipient’s computer and connected network. On 24 May 2012, the group installed malware on Capstone’s web server in a watering-hole attack. Mal- ware, such as Sakula and IsSpace, is a malicious code that facilitates access to a computer. Watering-hole attacks refer to the installation of malware on the legitimate web pages of victim companies, which facilitates the intrusion of computers that visit those pages. Also, on the same day in May, a member of the group installed the Winnti malware on Capstone’s computer systems, which, as programmed, sent “beacons” to domains hosted by a domain name service as well as a blog hosted by Gao Hongkun, alias “mer4en7y.” Six days later a server associated with Zhang Zhangguo in Nanjing was used to gain unauthorized access to Capstone’s web server. This was followed by a mem- ber of the group using the internet protocol address of Zhang’s server to connect to Capstone’s web server using an administrative account that had system administrator privileges. This ensured access to virtually all areas of the Capstone computer network.

On 1 June 2012 a member of the group used this administrative account to

upload malware to Capstone’s web server for use in a watering-hole attack. Again on 22 August 2012, Zhang tested a potential spear-phishing email that used the doppelgänger domain name of capstonetrubine.com (a slightly dif- ferent spelling of “turbine”), which belonged to a domain name service ac- count registered by Liu Chunliang on 25 May 2012. The group was also charged with inserting Sakula malware on Capstone’s computer server in December to send a beacon to an account under the control of the group. The indictment also detailed similar attacks on the supply companies in Arizona, Oregon, and San Diego and revealed that the criminal investigation had been assisted by an unnamed informant, identified only as “JSSD Intelligence Officer A,” who in mid-November 2013 had met at a restaurant with Tian Xi, the product manager of the French aerospace company. Then, on 27 Novem- ber, the informant told Tian, “I’ll bring the horse (i.e., Trojan horse malware)

 

to you tonight. Can you take the Frenchman out to dinner tonight? I’ll pre- tend to bump into you at the restaurant to say hello. This way, we don’t have to meet in Shanghai.”

During December 2013 the intelligence officer was in contact with Tian on three occasions, asking if Tian had “plant[ed] the horse.” On 17 January 2014 the informant met Gu Gen, who was then the French company’s infor- mation technology infrastructure and security manager at the Suzhou offices, at the same restaurant he had previously visited with Tian. Both of these meetings were supervised by Chai Meng, the MSS section chief, who pro- vided daily updates to Zha Rong, the MSS division director, of the attempts to compromise the French company’s computers.

Allegedly the informant told Chia that he had just met with “Xiao Gu” (literally “little” Gu), who had related how the French company was “warn- ing people about a fake email from the company’s top management. Did you guys write the email?” In his reply Chai confirmed that they had “sent a fake email pretending to be from network management.”

On 25 January a laptop belonging to the French company was infected with the Sakula malware through a USB drive installed by Tian, which beaconed to a doppelgänger domain name under the group’s control, and this was the same doppelgänger domain designed to resemble the real domain of the Massachusetts-based aerospace company that members of the group had used when hacking into the San Diego company. On that same date, Tian texted the intelligence officer, “The horse was planted this morning.” This was followed by the intelligence officer texting Chai, “I briefed ZHA about the incident in Suzhou.”

On 19 February 2014 a French company computer beaconed to domain ns24.dnsdojo.com, managed by a domain name service account originally registered by Liu Chunliang in April 2011. Soon afterward the U.S. author- ities alerted their French counterparts to the beacon activity, and on 26 Feb- ruary the FBI informant texted Chai, “The French are asking Little Gu to inspect the record: ns24.dnsdojo.com. Does it concern you guys?” Chai re- sponded, “I’ll ask.” Several hours later, a member of the group logged into the domain name service account and deleted the domain name ns24.dnsdojo.com.

In the absence of an extradition treaty between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States, there is no likelihood of Zha Rong’s group ever answering the indictment, but its publication served to highlight its activities. Although “JSSD Intelligence Officer A” has not been iden- tified, the timing suggests he may be Xu Yanjun, an MSS officer from the Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security who was arrested and extradited from Belgium.

 

ZHANG, DAVID. In October 2010 David Zhang, also known as York Yuan Chang, and his wife Leping Huang, who were the owners of General Tech- nology Systems Integration Inc., were arrested by U.S. Customs agents and charged with illegally exporting dual-use technology to the Sichuan Institute of Solid-State Circuits, Sichuan Sheng Gutai Dianlu Yanjiu Suo. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION.

ZHANG HAO. On 26 May 2015, Zhang Hao, a professor at China’s Tianjin University, Tianjin Daxue, arrived in the United States on a flight from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and was arrested in connection with a superseding indictment, previously sealed, charging him and five other PRC nationals with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets.

Zhang originally came to the United States in May 2003 as a graduate student at the University of Southern California (USC), and after he obtained his PhD in electronic engineering in 2006 he worked for Skyworks Solutions Inc. until May 2009. Skyworks, headquartered in Woburn, Massachusetts, was an innovator of high-performance analog semiconductors with facilities in the United States and around the world, including fabrication plants where Zhang was employed. Skyworks developed bulk acoustic wave technology that it intended to include in products that were to be sold worldwide, but in 2009 Skyworks abandoned that particular business, sold some of its patents and patent applications to Avago Technologies, and retained some of the information as trade secrets. The five were Pang Wei, Zhang Huisui, Chen Jinping, Gang Zhao, and Zhou Chong.

Pang Wei came to the United States as a graduate student at USC in

August 2001 and obtained his PhD in electronics engineering in 2006. He then worked in San Jose, California, at the headquarters of Avago Technolo- gies, a leading designer, developer, and global supplier of a broad range of analog, digital, mixed signal, and optoelectronics components and subsys- tems with a focus in semiconductor design and processing. Pang worked until the end of June 2009 in Fort Collins, Colorado, for Avago, which is the leading U.S. manufacturer of film bulk acoustic resonators (FBAR), which are tunable acoustical resonators. Avago and its predecessor companies spent approximately 20 years and $50 million researching and developing its tech- nology.

Zhang Huisui came to the United States from the PRC in 2002 after receiving his bachelor of science degree from Peking University, Beijing Daxue. After obtaining his master of science degree in 2006 from USC, where he, Pang, and Zhang Hao had been classmates, Zhang worked for Micrel Semiconductor in San Jose, California. He, Pang, and Zhang Hao were classmates.

 

Chen Jinping was an assistant dean at Tianjin University; the deputy gen- eral manager and vice president of Tianjin Micro Nano Manufacturing Tech, Tianjin Wei Na Zhizao Jishu; and a member of the board of directors of ROFS Microsystems, a joint venture between Tianjin Micro Nano Manufac- turing Tech and Pang, Zhang Hao, and others created on 11 September 2011. Gang Zhao was the general manager of ROFS and had graduated from Tianjin University, where he had worked previously. Gang assisted Tianjin University and Chen Jinping in forming Micro Nano Manufacturing Tech, which originated as a micro/nano-engineering facility built with PRC

government funding.

Zhou Chong was a Tianjin University graduate student working as part of Pang and Zhang Hao’s Tianjin University design team. He was familiar with the Cadence design kit and made source code adjustments, contributed to papers and patent applications for FBAR, and altered documents containing Avago’s trade secrets.

Tianjin University is one of China’s oldest and most prestigious univer- sities and encompasses the Tianjin University College of Precision Instru- ment and Opto-Electronic Engineering, Tianjin Daxue Jingmi Yiqi Yu Guangdian Gongcheng Xueyuan, where Zhang Hao, Pang, and Chen held positions as professors. Tianjin University dictated the arrangement by which Zhang Hao and Pang created Novana Inc., a shell company registered in the Cayman Islands. Novana was created in part to appear to be the legitimate source of trade secrets stolen from both Avago and Skyworks.

Another individual, identified only by his initials, J. Y., was an academi- cian of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Zhongguo Kexueyuan, who en- joyed substantial connections within the PRC government and was a chair- man or member of several PRC political committees, including the National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi, and the China Association for Promoting Democracy (CAPD), Zhongguo Minzhu Cujinhui.

In the fall of 2011 Avago became aware that its technology had been stolen when a patent application was made by Pang Wei. Later that year, Pang’s former supervisor at Avago, Dr. Rich Ruby, traveled to Shenzen to attend a conference. While there, Dr. Ruby visited Tianjin University to see Pang and Zhang’s new micro-electronic mechanical systems (MEMS) labor- atory, but while touring the facility he recognized that it was using stolen Avago technology. He confronted Chen Jinping and Pang, but the latter denied the theft of Avago technology or having an FBAR company, or in- deed any company. On 9 December 2011 Ruby gave a version of his encoun- ter in an email to the two men. Later, Chen responded by writing, “Based on our inspection, we can make sure that Tianjin University is not the assignee of any patent you have mentioned, neither U.S. nor Chinese ones.”

 

A subsequent investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation (FBI) revealed than Zhang, Pang, and Chen, in particular, had en- gaged in a complicated scheme to capitalize on Zhang and Pang’s association with both Avago and Skyworks and their access to their trade secrets. In the words of one of the conspirators, the goal was “moving Avago to China.” They had sought to disguise the sources and origins of the trade secrets belonging to Avago and Skyworks and the technology used in the PRC to develop products for both civilian and military use. Another objective had been the acquisition of patents, apparently intended to enhance their status and enhance their ability to be hired as professors at Tianjin University. Zhang’s patent applications in the United States, using technology stolen from Avago and Skyworks, declared Pang as having been employed by Avago so as to conceal Pang’s involvement. Zhang submitted at least six such applications, and Zhang and Pang then jointly applied for at least seven PRC patents while also jointly applying for two U.S. patents with stolen Skyworks technology.

While still employed by their respective companies, Zhang and Pang ap-

plied for grants to the Tianjin Science and Technology Development Zone, Tianjin Shi Keji Yuanbu; the 985 Project Application, 985 Xiangmu Shen- qing; the 211 Project Application, 211 Xiangmu Shenqing; and the Micro Electronics Mechanical Systems Engineering Research Center of the Minis- try of Education, Wei Dianzi Jixie Xitong Jiaoyu Bu Gongcheng Yanjjiu Zhongxin. All of these applications required detailed information regarding plans and personnel and emphasized the benefits of MEMS technology to the PRC, particularly the military benefits. On 8 September 2008, a Tianjin University vice president notified Zhang and Pang that the university would provide full support for the project by obtaining funding, equipment, and space for the facility.

Tianjin University, through its Micro Nano Manufacturing Tech, entered into a joint venture with Pang, Zhang Hao, and others to create ROFS Micro- systems, which served as the vehicle to “launder” the trade secrets used by Tianjin University in setting up its fabrication facility. Tianjin University authorized Pang, Zhang Hao, and the others to incorporate Novana in the Cayman Islands, provided guidance, and approved its ownership structure. Though Pang, Zhang and others provided seed money to Novana, and PRC government entities paid for the equipment and fabrication facility in Tianjin. On 12 February 2009 Zhang emailed a Tianjin University official suggest- ing that because he had not previously had access to the Skyworks technolo- gy he had just recently been assigned, he should delay his resignation from the company. This would allow him to “master the technology” so he could join the university in May. In January 2011 Zhang Hao sent an email to a

 

representative of ZTE, a major PRC telecoms equipment company, attaching a PowerPoint presentation regarding BAW technology that contained specif- ic Avago product information and details of Skyworks product performance.

The 32-count indictment of the six defendants included conspiracy to com- mit economic espionage, conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 15 counts of economic espionage, and 16 counts of theft of trade secrets.

In July 2015 Zhang was released on bail. None of the others charged in the conspiracy have been arrested, and in the absence of an extradition treaty, no prosecution is likely. In October 2015 Zhang commented to a PRC state- backed newspaper, the Global Times, that he and the others had been unfairly accused. “At this time, the U.S. government holds a pervasive, unfair view of ethnic Chinese academics and engineers, always looking at us with the atti- tude of ‘guarding against thieves.’”

ZHANG JIYAN. In early March 2007, Zhang Jiyan, the wife of a diplomat posted at the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embassy in Ottawa, defected and applied for political asylum, having acquired an internal document that revealed the existence of a 10-member unit devoted to blocking the Falun Gong’s New Tang Dynasty Television request for a broadcast license. Zhang said the PRC government had agents in Canada spying on and harassing the Falun Gong and four other dissident groups known as the “Five Poisons,” Wu Du, including Taiwanese, Xinjiang and Tibetan activists, and the pro- democracy movement. Shortly after Zhang’s defection, her husband was recalled.

ZHANG, MICHAEL MING. On 20 January 2009, Michael Ming Zhang, aged 49, and Policarpo Coronado Gamboa, aged 40, were arrested in Califor- nia and charged with illegally exporting controlled electronic equipment to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and with the illegal trafficking of counterfeit electronic components from the PRC to the United States. Zhang was the president of J. J. Electronics in Rancho Cucamonga, California, and Gamboa operated Sereton Technology Inc. in Foothill Ranch, California. Zhang was accused of exporting more than 200 computer memory devices with dual-use applications for battle tanks and of handling, in 2008, 4,300 counterfeit Cisco electronic components with an estimated retail value of more than $3.3 million. Zhang and Gamboa were also charged with having tried in 2007 and 2008 to sell 3,500 counterfeit Sony memory sticks made in the PRC. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; TECHNOLOGY COUNTERFEITING.

 

ZHANG, NIKOLAI P. In July 1980 a Soviet intelligence officer, Nikolai Zhang, was convicted of espionage in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with two Chinese companions, and sentenced to seven years’ impris- onment. The two Chinese were ordered to be executed by a firing squad. According to Zhang’s confession, he had undergone three years of training and had tried to photograph the PRC’s northeast border area. See also SO- VIET UNION.

ZHANG WEIQIANG. On 12 December 2013, Zhang Weiqiang, aged 50, and Yan Wengui, aged 58, were charged with a scheme to provide a delega- tion from China with rice seeds from Ventria Bioscience in Junction City, Kansas. During an investigation it was learned that in 2012 Zhang and Yan had traveled to China, where they had visited a research institute. When they returned to the United States, they arranged for a delegation from that re- search institute to arrive in December 2013. Both Zhang and Yan were legal permanent resident aliens from China. Wang had graduated from Shenyang Agricultural University, Shenyang Nongye Daxue, and later had obtained his doctorate from Louisiana State University. He lived in Manhattan, Kansas, and was employed by Ventria Bioscience, where he was one of six scientists who had access to rice seeds that had health research applications and were developed to produce human serum albumin contained in blood or lactofer- rin, an iron-binding protein found in human milk. The trade secret was esti- mated to be valued at $75 million. Yan was employed as a geneticist for the Department of Agriculture at the Dale Bumpers National Research Center in Stuttgart, Arkansas. When the delegation arrived from China, it first traveled to Stuttgart and then was taken to the Dale Bumpers Research Center.

On 26 October 2016, Yan pleaded guilty to lying to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI). He admitted that he knew of the scheme for the delegation to obtain the rice seeds, but he claimed he had refused their request to obtain them from where he was employed. However, he did take them to a rice farm where he knew they would have an opportunity to steal seeds. The delegation toured several facilities that dealt with rice research.

Zhang had taken seeds, without authorization, from his employer and stored them at his home, but when the delegation was catching their return flight to China, U.S. Customs and Border Protection found the seeds in the luggage of the delegation members.

In February 2017 Zhang was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to steal trade secrets, one count of conspiracy to commit interstate transporta- tion of stolen property, and one count of transportation of stolen property, offenses for which he was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment.

 

ZHANG YUJING. On 30 March 2019 a woman approached a security checkpoint at President Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, and presented two People’s Republic of China (PRC) passports showing that her name was Zhang Yujing. She declared her intention to visit the club’s swimming pool, and after a check was made with the club mem- bership list, she was allowed access. However, when she reached the recep- tion desk, she claimed to be an attendee at a United Nations Chinese American Association reception, but no such event was scheduled. When questioned by the U.S. Secret Service, Zhang claimed a Chinese acquain- tance named “Charles” had instructed her to travel from Shanghai to Palm Beach to attend the United Nations Chinese American Association meeting to speak with members of President Trump’s family about Chinese and American economic issues. When searched she was carrying four cell phones, a laptop computer, an external hard drive, and a thumb drive contain- ing malicious software. Accordingly, she was charged with making false statements to a federal officer and entering a restricted building.

In a court appearance on 1 April, Zhang said she was an investor and

consultant for a Shanghai private equity firm, Shanghai Zhirong Asset Man- agement, and that she owned a $3.1 million home and drove a BMW. How- ever, she also said she had made no money in 2019 and claimed to have a Wells Fargo Bank account in the United States that contained a balance of about $5,000.

It turned out that the United Nations Chinese Friendship Association had scheduled an event for 30 March at Mar-a-Lago that had been promoted by Cindy Yang, a Palm Beach–area massage parlor owner who had boasted that she could make introductions to President Trump. However, when the media had identified Yang, who was prominent in the local Republican Party, as the former owner of a massage parlor where clients had been caught paying for sex, the booking was canceled.

On 15 April an assistant U.S. attorney revealed that instant messages re- covered from Zhang’s cell phones proved that she had been told prior to her departure from Shanghai that the event had been canceled. A search of her hotel room at the nearby Colony Hotel revealed a device used to detect hidden cameras, nine jump drives, and five SIM cards, as well as 75 $100 bills and some Chinese currency.

The “Charles” mentioned by Zhang was identified as Li Weitian, alias Dr. Charles Lee, and the United Nations Chinese Friendship Association had no connection with the United Nations. Li was not a qualified physician, and his claim to be the organization’s secretary-general was also bogus. In fact, the organization had been registered in Delaware in 2011. In 2012, in a business- related publication, Li had provided a list of influential individuals whom he

 

claimed to have met, including Anna Chennault on 5 January 2012 and “Ms. You Lan,” described as being a “vice director” of the United Front Work Department.

Although Li had been a frequent visitor to Mar-a-Lago, none of the confer- ences he had supposedly arranged, with such prominent attendees as Warren Buffett and ex-president Barack Obama, had taken place.

After a two-day trial in September 2019, Zhang was found guilty of tres- pass and lying to the Secret Service, and on 25 November she was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. With credit for time served, she served only an additional week and was deported.

ZHAO BO. In March 2019 a 32-year-old car dealer, Bo “Nick” Zhao, was found dead in a motel room in Melbourne, Australia. During the subsequent investigation it was disclosed that earlier in the year Zhao had told the Aus- tralian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) that he had been offered

$670,000 to run for a Parliament seat by an ethnic Chinese businessman with ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

A well-known, flamboyant individual, Zhao was a member of the Liberal Party and had faced criminal charges relating to fraudulent loans for his car business, which owed money to unsavory Chinese investors. Zhao alleged to ASIO that he had been approached by another Chinese businessman and political donor, Chen Chunsheng, alias Brian Chen, who denied the claim. Chen’s firm, Prospect Time International Investment Ltd., was engaged in promoting China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Yidai Yilu, Changyi. Chen, who traveled widely, also appeared on a list of journalists working for a Hong Kong media company, China Press Group Ltd., Zhongguo Bao Ye Jituan Youxian Gongsi, and has been photographed wearing a People’s Lib- eration Army (PLA), Renmin Jiefangjun, uniform. He also had a relation- ship with the PRC’s huge military-affiliated company, Norinco, the China Ordnance Industries Group Corporation Ltd., Zhongguo Gingqi Gongye Jitu- an Youxian Gongsi, also known as China North Industries Group Corpora- tion Ltd., Zhongguo Beifang Gongye Jituan Youxian Gongsi.

Cheng’s codirector at Prospect Time was Wang Zhenhai, who reportedly

was linked to China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhonggong Gongchan- dang Zhongyan Tongzhan Bu. Wang has denied knowing Zhao, but he was associated with another Melbourne businessman, Tommy Jiang, who report- edly has an ongoing relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Former Australian Labor Party prime minister Paul Keating has excoriated both the Australian media and ASIO for heightening the China threat, but Duncan Lewis, a former head of ASIO, asserted that the Chinese government was seeking to “take over” Australia’s political system through an “insidi- ous” foreign interference operation.

 

ZHAO CANGBI. Born in Shaanxi in 1916, Zhao Cangbi joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1935. After 1949 and the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhao spent his professional life in law enforcement, and in 1950 he was appointed the assistant director of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, for the administrative and military committee of Southwest China, and in 1956, the MPS director in Sichuan.

In March 1977, in the immediate aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultu- ral Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Dageming, the acting premier and MPS minister, Hua Guofeng, named Zhao as his successor, a position he held until 1983.

On 13 October 1978 Zhao, as MPS head and vice director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengfa Weiyuanhui, gave a speech advocating a strengthening of the PRC’s legal system. Essentially, he stated that all exist- ing laws and statutes were in urgent need of revision, a tacit admission that few in the Party’s leadership at the time of the establishment of the PRC had legal backgrounds. In March 1982 Zhao announced that the last of the Kuo- mintang’s (KMT) military and civilian prisoners, many of whom had been imprisoned for 32 years, would be released. They totaled 4,237 KMT government and military personnel, as well as an unstated number of “special agents,” not further described. The announcement was made in advance of a session of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Quanggo Renmin Diabiao Changwu Weiyuanhui, indicating that the decision to approve the measure had been made in advance. Zhao commented, “These former Kuomintang personnel in custody have repented and by and large have turned over a new leaf after a long period of education and reform.” He added that the released prisoners would be granted “political rights,” where they would be allowed to join in the PRC’s ongoing peace initiatives with Taiwan. He further noted that “those who still have the ability to work” would be given appropriate jobs, a suggestion that many of the released prisoners were elderly or for other reasons were unable to work. Zhao also stated that those wishing to go to Taiwan would be given the airfare.

In 1983 Zhao was named as a member of the Chinese People’s Legal

Affairs Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xie- sheng Huiyi, and in June 1983 Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang announced the formation of a Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, in advance of the Sixth National People’s Congress, Diliu Jie Quanguo Daibiao Dahui, China’s version of parliament that reviews the work of the govern- ment over the previous five years. There was speculation that the creation of the new agency would also result in Zhao Cangbi being dismissed from his post as the head of the MSS. Zhao was among the very few remaining appointees of Hua Guofeng, Mao Zedong’s chosen successor who had been

 

toppled by Deng Xiaoping who had emerged as the PRC’s paramount leader. Zhao, who was removed as MSS head in April 1983 and replaced by Liu Fuzhi, died in 1993.

ZHAO KEZHI. Born in 1953 in Shandong Province, Zhao Kezhi was a middle school teacher in Laixi before joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1975. He rose through the ranks of the CCP, first in his native Shandong, becoming mayor in 1984, then mayor and deputy CCP chief in Laixi in 1987, mayor and deputy party chief in nearby Jimo, and party chief of Jimo in 1989. In 1997 he was promoted to the position of party chief of Dezhou, and from 2001 to 2006 he served as vice governor of Shandong Province.

In 2006 he was transferred to Jiangsu Province as the executive vice governor until 2010, then was moved to Guizhou Province as deputy party chief and acting governor, after which he was elected by the Guizhou Provin- cial Congress as governor. In 2012 he briefly served as both governor and CCP secretary of Guizhou but gave up the governor’s post later that year.

In 2015 Zhao was named party chief of Hebei Province, where he was involved in the planning of the Xiong’an New Area, Xiong an Xinqu, an ambitious state-run economic development area for the Beij- ing–Tianjin–Hebei economic triangle. Shortly after the 19th Party Congress, Zhao was appointed as the Party Committee secretary of the Ministry of Public Secretary (MPS), Gonganbu, and on 4 November 2017 he was made the 14th minister of the MPS, replacing Guo Shengkun.

In 2018 Zhao was promoted a state counselor, Guowu weiyuan, literally, “counselor for national affairs,” and then appointed deputy secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhongyang Zhengfawei Zhengfa Weiyuanhui. An ardent follower of CCP secretary Xi Jinping, Zhao has fully embraced Xi’s increasingly auto- cratic rule of China, and in October 2018 he commented on the detention of China’s former Interpol head, Meng Hongwei. He made reference to the “toxic residues” left over from Zhou Yongkang, the disgraced former minis- ter of the MPS, serving a life sentence for corruption. He also said Meng’s problems were “entirely the outcome of his sticking to his own ways and he only has himself to blame. It fully shows that there are no special privileges or exceptions before the law.”

In January 2019 Zhao said that the MPS must be on the lookout for any

“color revolutions,” meaning mass political pro-democracy movements, and that the police must “stress the prevention and resistance of color revolutions and firmly fight to protect China’s political security.”

 

ZHAO QIANLI. On 26 September 2018, Zhao Qianli, who gave his age as 20, was arrested by military police at the U.S. Naval Air Station Key West, the Florida headquarters of the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, and charged with trespass and taking illegal photographs of the facility. He had waded into the ocean surrounding the base in order to get around a security fence before entering the base and taking photographs. His photographs in- cluded communications antennas and equipment, all used by various compo- nents of the members of the Joint Interagency Task Force.

The Key West site is at the southernmost point of the United States, where the task force is responsible for the interdiction of drug trafficking and other crimes, but is also responsible for intelligence gathering and other naval and military operations, including training pilots from all services in air combat, conducted by a squadron of McDonnell Douglas F-18 Super Hornet twin- engine, multirole fighters. The base also accommodates the U.S. Army Spe- cial Forces Underwater Operations School.

At the time of his arrest, Zhao, who spoke broken English, said he was a student in musicology from the North University of China and was visiting Florida as a tourist after his music studies were completed and had simply become lost. He also falsely claimed to be employed as a dishwasher in New Jersey. An investigation revealed that Zhao had overstayed his visa by a week, and he was sentenced to 60 days’ imprisonment. Inquiries conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initially focused on Zhao’s background and the North University of China, Zaongguo Beifang Daxue, which is located in Shanxi Province and is one of eight People’s Republic of China (PRC) universities designated as a defense industry college. There is no school associated with music at the university. Zhao told FBI agents that he was in the last year of a four-year music program at North University, though his visa application noted that he had enrolled as a music student in 2017. Examination of Zhao’s cell phone showed that he was enrolled in an engineering course, but Zhao claimed he did not know how that information had gotten on his phone. He also said that he had traveled to Key West to see, among other things, Ernest Hemingway’s home, but neither his Motorola cell phone nor his Canon EOS digital camera contained any relevant images or even any tourist-related photographs.

An FBI search of his hotel room in Miami produced a blue shirt and a belt

buckle associated with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, but Zhao asserted that his father had given him the items so he would have nice clothes during his visit. However, under interrogation Zhao admitted that his father was associated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and that his mother also worked for the Chinese government. At one point, Zhao, whom investigators opined was older than his stated 20 years of age, admit- ted that he too had undergone military training, a detail he had omitted from his visa application.

 

While the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, is the PRC’s civilian agency responsible for conducting operations overseas, MPS personnel have been known to travel to the United States to monitor students, dissidents, and other PRC nationals.

Zhao was arrested by the FBI on 30 November after a federal grand jury indicted him with six counts of photographing and sketching defense installa- tions, and on 5 February 2019, Zhao was sentenced to 12 months’ imprison- ment, followed by a year of supervised release.

ZHEJIANG POLICE COLLEGE. Drawing its students from across the entire country, the Zhejiang Police College, Zhejiang Jingcha Xueyuan, re- cruits many into the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, at an earlier stage than other universities. All MSS personnel are, of course, state security police officers, but only a minority of Zhejiang Police College graduates join the public security police.

ZHENG XIAOQING. On 23 April 2019 Zheng Xiaoqing, aged 56, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at his home in New York and charged with economic espionage and stealing General Electric’s (GE) trade secrets.

Zheng was born in China and studied in the United States, gaining degrees from the Northwestern Polytechnical University and the Massachusetts Insti- tute of Technology in fields associated with turbomachinery. He became a

U.S. citizen in 2001 and seven years later was employed by GE as a senior sealing engineer in the steam turbine design group. In 2010 Zheng worked on various leakage containment technologies in steam turbine engineering, in- cluding advance brush seals, rotating brush seals, and tip brush seals. More recently, Zheng had been engaged in the development of new technology, including rotating brush seals and carbon seals.

In April 2016 Zheng created a manufacturing enterprise, Liaoning Tianyi Aviation Technology Co. Ltd. (LTAT), Liaoning Tian Yi Hangkong Youxian Gongsi, holding 55 percent of the shares, with his wife’s nephew, 46-year- old Zhang Zhaoxi, aged 46, holding the remaining 45 percent. Simultaneous- ly, Zheng established the Nanjing Tianyi Avi Tech Co. Ltd. (NTAT), Nanj- ing Tian Yi Hangkong Keji Youxian Gonsi, to undertake research and devel- opment. Both companies shared the same logo and functioned as separate divisions of an overall organization aimed at developing and manufacturing parts for turbines. By an agreement dated 10 July 2017, signed by Zheng on 4 August 2017 on behalf of NTAT, the company was to develop sample end seals and deliver them with a complete research and development technical report to LTAT.

 

In February 2016 Zheng advised GE that he was operating an aviation parts supply business in China with his brothers and described a plan for the company to become a “supplier of pipe joints [and] bearing oil seals” drawn from his prior experience with another company before being employed by GE. GE agreed to the arrangement, cautioning Zheng that he must “be ex- tremely careful to avoid using GE intellectual property, proprietary informa- tion or proprietary processes.”

In 2015 Premier Li Keqiang announced China’s “Made in China 2025,” Zhongguo Zhizao Erling Erwu, initiative that was essentially an effort by China to move from the manufacture of low-quality goods and services to those of a higher standard, and among the 10 sectors targeted were aero- space, aviation equipment, and power generation. Also, China’s 13th Five- Year Plan, Shisanwu Jihua, for the years 2016–2020, listed aviation engines and gas turbines as major projects.

Two years later, in 2017, GE discovered that numerous encrypted files had been saved on Zheng’s work computer using AxCrypt, a program not pro- vided by GE. Accordingly, monitoring software was installed on Zheng’s computer, and in July 2018 Zheng moved 40 encrypted files involving seal- ing optimizing turbine technology, both proprietary and secret, to a “temp folder” on his work computer. Zheng used steganography, a means of hiding a data file within the code of another data file, to remove the files from GE’s premises. Evidently Zheng had hidden the stolen files in a digital photograph of a sunset and then had emailed the digital photograph of the sunset, with the stolen files, to his personal computer.

In an interview conducted by the FBI in August, 2018, Zheng remarked on the circumvention of GE’s security procedures and commented that his com- panies in China were unprofitable, even though they had received govern- ment funding.

The FBI learned that Zheng and Zhang had initially concentrated on trad- ing with three PRC companies. The Shenyang Aeroengine Research Insti- tute, Shenyang Fadongi Sheji Yanjiu Suo, referred to as the 606 Institute, 606 Yanjiu Suo, was a design institute operating under the auspices of the Shen- yang Aircraft (or Aerospace) Corporation, Shenyang Feiji Gongsi, a 112 Factory, 112 Gongchang, company. The state-owned Shenyang Aircraft Cor- poration focused on the design and manufacture of civilian and military aircraft, including developing China’s stealth fighter jet and jet fighter en- gines. Their second client was Shenyang Aerospace University, Shenyang Hangkong Hangtian Dexue, a state-owned public research university that educates students for supporting military and civilian aviation industries in China. The third was the Huaihai Institute of Technology, Huaihai Gong Xueyuan, a state-run public institute in Jiangsu Province.

 

On 26 August 2016 Zhang, who was a Chinese citizen, sent an encrypted audio file to Zheng stating that the application for $7.4 million was almost completed and that the Liaoning Provincial Committee had already approved the amount. He explained that the government investment was a combination of both interest-free loan and subsidy.

In January 2017 Zheng visited China, and Zhang sent an encrypted mes- sage that included a list of “all kinds of VIPs” Zheng would meet, including the mayor, the municipal Party secretary, the county Party secretary, and other senior functionaries. In continuing exchanges, their discussions cen- tered around their ability to make different turbine-related parts to be shown to prospective clients, such as the 606 Institute. Zheng also forwarded GE proprietary information to Zhang in encrypted format.

In February 2018 Zheng again traveled to China, where he was to meet an executive of the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC), Zhongguo Hangkong Fadongji Zong Gongsi, a state-owned corporation established in 2016 with a focus on aeroengine and related technologies. In the same month there was an exchange of encrypted messages relating to the Thousand Talents Program, Qian Ren Jihua, a program established in 2008 by Chi- na’s central government to recruit leading international experts in scientific research, innovation, and entrepreneurship. The conversation described how large a grant Zheng would be eligible to receive, perhaps up to $880,000.

On 18 July 2018, LTAT entered into a “strategic cooperation agreement” with Shenyang Aerospace University, a state-owned institution controlled and supported by both the People’s Government of Liaoning Province and the PRC State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), Guojia Kexue Keji Gongye Ju. The docu- ment expressed an intention to jointly develop aeroengine and gas turbine sealing products.

The final indictment included charges of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, economic espionage (five counts), theft of trade secrets (six counts), and false statements or en- tries generally.

ZHONG MING. In November 2008 Zhong Ming, also known as Andy Zhong, a permanent resident from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Ye Fei, an American citizen, became the first defendants to be convicted under the Economic Espionage Act, a statute passed in 1996. A computer engineer, Zhong had been arrested with Ye at San Francisco airport in No- vember 2001 with a suitcase filled with chip design documents. Zhong had previously been employed with Ye at Transmeta Corporation and Trident Corporation, and Ye had been employed at NEC Electronics Corporation and Microsystems Inc.

 

An indictment dated 4 December 2002 alleged that both men had ties to a PRC government program in Hangzhou and that the city had funded a joint venture, the Hangzhou Zhingtian Microsystems Company, Hangzhou Zhi Tian Wei Xitong Gongsi, which had been formed to help Zhong and Ye exploit the stolen technology. When they were searched, federal investigators found correspondence between the men and officials at the State High-Tech Development Plan, Guojia Gaoxin Jishu Kaifa Jihua, or Project 863, 863 Jihua (disbanded in 2016). One document translated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) referred to a Chinese government “panel of experts” that had found the venture would have a “positive effect on the development of the PRC’s integrated-circuit industry” and recommended that “every government department implement and provide energetic support.”

According to their plea bargain, Zhong and Ye had incorporated Supervi-

sion, a company financed by Project 863, an organization based in Hang- zhou, Zhejiang Province, although local officials claimed they had never heard of Hangzhou Zhingtian Microsystems or of the two men. Because of their cooperation, Zhong and Ye were sentenced to just one year’s imprison- ment. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

ZHOU ENLAI. Born in 1898 in Jiangsu Province to a relatively privileged family, Zhou Enlai received a good education in literature, poetry, painting, and calligraphy and, due to his grandmother’s peasant background, was later able to qualify as a revolutionary when that pedigree was deemed essential. Zhou studied in Japan and then in France, where he was exposed to Com- munist doctrine. He also traveled to Great Britain, Belgium, and other Euro- pean countries before returning to China, where he was appointed director of the Whampoa Military Academy’s political department when Chiang Kai- shek was the director. The death of Sun Yat-sen hastened the split between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) that ultimately led to the Chinese Civil War and the eventual Communist victory.

At the time of the proclamation of the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Zhou was named as premier and minister of foreign affairs. In that latter capacity, Zhou traveled widely until he relinquished the post in 1958, but he retained the premier’s position until his death in January 1976. He was also responsible in 1954 for developing the five principles of peace- ful coexistence, announced at the Bandung Conference, which were intended to be guides to enhancing links with newly decolonized countries, the basis of which was a declared respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in a country’s internal affairs.

 

Zhou was steeped in clandestine operations and had been the principal CCP intelligence officer in Shanghai throughout the 1930s. He was especial- ly adept at infiltrating agents into the Kuomintang, or “baibu de leng qizi” (putting in place dormant chess pieces), such as Xiong Xianghui, who was appointed KMT general Hu Tsung-nan’s personal aide.

In his In Search of History: A Personal Adventure, Theodore H. White described Zhou as, “along with Joseph Stilwell and John F. Kennedy, one of the three great men I met.” Zhou argued for more conciliatory foreign poli- cies than the distrustful Mao Zedong and, as a result, played a key role in the normalization of relations between China and the United States. When the Chinese first learned of the American initiative, Mao was suspicious, but Zhou, who understood the potential of good intelligence, consulted Shen Jian, the veteran International Liaison Department official and Kang Sheng confidant. Zhou tasked Shen to check on the overture’s authenticity, and he, having contacted Larry Wu-tai Chin, confirmed that the approach was val- id.

Zhou had a profound influence on China’s intelligence community and even today remains a revered figure, often quoted by Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu, personnel. See also SECRET INTELLI- GENCE SERVICE (SIS).

ZHOU HSINGPU. The second secretary at the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embassy in London since 1957, Zhou Hsingpu defected to the Soviet Union with his wife and two children when their ship, the Baltika, docked in Leningrad in October 1963.

ZHOU HUNGCHIN. In October 1963 Zhou Hungchin, a 44-year-old mem- ber of a Chinese delegation of technicians on a visit to Tokyo, defected to the Soviet Union.

ZHOU YONGKANG. Zhou Yongkang was born Zhou Yuangen in Decem- ber 1942 in a small village in Jiangsu Province, China. He came from a poor family who farmed and fished for eels, but with the assistance of family friends he was able to attend school; and in 1954, while at the top middle school in the area, he changed his name to “Yongkang” at the advice of a teacher due to another student having the same given names. Excelling aca- demically, Zhou studied at a prestigious high school, leading to his admis- sion to the Beijing Institute of Petroleum, now the China University of Petro- leum, Zhongguo Shiyou Daxue, and in 1964 he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

 

In 1966, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wuchanjieji Wenhua Deageming, which created havoc among higher education, Zhou joined a geological survey group in northeast China, thus beginning a long and lucrative career in the petroleum field. In 1970, he was promoted to lead a geological survey division charged with an initiative established by the CCP’s leadership, and in 1973 he headed the Geophysical Exploration De- partment of the Liaohe Petroleum Exploration Bureau, which would become one of the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC), Zhongguo Shiyou Tianranqi Jituan Gongsi, largest fields. Zhou would be- come responsible for well over 2,000 employees and married Wang Shuhua, a factory worker from Hebei. Later he was promoted to manage the entirety of the Liaohe oil field, which concurrently meant he became the mayor of the city of Panjin and the city’s deputy CCP secretary.

In 1985 Zhou moved to Beijing to become deputy minister of petroleum

industry, which would be part of the CNPC. By 1996 Zhou had been pro- moted to chief executive, a post that provided him the opportunity to travel abroad in pursuing the company’s “Go Global” initiatives, which won pro- jects in Sudan, Venezuela, and Kazakhstan. He also engaged in the compa- ny’s restructuring and in preparing the initial public offering of a subsidiary, PetroChina. In 1997 Zhou gained a seat on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandong Zhongyang Weiyuan- hui. In 1998, Zhou was elevated to lead the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources of the PRC, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guotu Ziyuanbu, now the Ministry of Natural Resources of the PRC, Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe- guo Ziyuanzi Yuanbu. The following year, he became the Party secretary of Sichuan, the second most populous province. While there, the province’s economic picture improved substantially, and he gained a reputation for deal- ing firmly with any signs of dissent, especially from Falun Gong and Tibe- tan groups.

In 2001 Zhou’s wife, Wang Shuhua, was killed in a car accident, and that

same year he married Jia Xiaoye, a former television reporter and producer 28 years his junior, who was seldom seen in public. In 2002 Zhou was named head of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Gonganbu, as well as taking other powerful posts within the CCP, including membership of the Politburo; deputy of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Commu- nist Party of China, Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengfa Weiyuanhuii; first politi- cal commissar of the Chinese People’s Armed Forces Police, Zhongguo Ren- min Wuzhuang Jingcha Budai; and secretary of the Central Secretariat of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Shujichu. Zhou was the first head of the MPS to also have a seat on the Politburo since Hua Guofeng, and his position gave him extraordinary power as he oversaw

 

all legal enforcement authorities, including the police, throughout the coun- try. He greatly strengthened the MPS, giving it greater authority, building new facilities, and instituting strict discipline for MPS staff.

In 2007 Zhou replaced Luo Gan as head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China, Zhonggang Zhon- gyang Zhenfa Weiyuanhui, and gained a position on the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Zhongguo Gongchandong Zhongyang Zhenzhiju Changwu Weiyuanhui. Though ranked ninth (of nine members) among the group, Zhou’s control over the security apparatus of both the MPS and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission made him one of the most powerful men in China. He oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2009 60th anniversary celebrations for the founding of the PRC, and Shanghai’s Expo 2010. At this time, China em- barked on a severe campaign of suppressing dissent, weiwen, or “ensuring stability.” Surveillance was increased, and separatist movements in Xinjiang and Tibet were met with force. There followed the “Jasmine Revolution” in response to the “Arab Spring” movements in 2011, which was also resisted powerfully, and the national weiwen budget was increased to an estimated

$95 billion, exceeding the military budget.

On 6 February 2012 the former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun en- tered the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, having fallen out with his mentor, Bo Xilai. Wang sought political asylum and detailed information regarding Bo and his wife, Gu Kailai, in the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood, with whom they reportedly had close financial ties.

The son of Bo Yibo, one of China’s “Eight Eminent Elders” (Eight Elders of the Communist Party of China, Zhonggo Gongchandang De Ba Wei Chang Laoi) and considered one of the “princelings” of Chinese politics, Bo Xilai was flamboyant, ambitious, and ruthless, advocating a return to the Cultural Revolution era of “red culture.” Bo had long harbored political aspirations and had become something of a political rival of, among others, Xi Jinping. He had divorced his first wife and married Gu, a prominent lawyer.

Allegedly Heywood had assisted Gu and Bo in moving money out of the PRC and had arranged for their son, Bo Guagua, to be admitted to Harrow School in London. There were also reports that Heywood and Gu, who had enjoyed a close personal relationship, had fallen out over the size of his commission, and Gu eventually poisoned Heywood.

Wang left the U.S. consulate after about 24 hours and was immediately taken into custody by MPS officers dispatched from Beijing. Gu was arrested on 10 April 2012, and in a subsequent one-day trial she admitted she had killed Heywood and received a suspended death sentence, which was com- muted to life imprisonment.

 

On 15 March 2012 Bo was removed from his position as Chongqing party chief after a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee, where Zhou cast the lone vote of support for Bo. Accordingly, Bo was stripped of all his posts, and on 28 September he was expelled from the CCP. Bo was eventually tried on charges of bribery, abuse of power, and embezzlement and found guilty. He was stripped of all his considerable assets and sentenced to life in prison.

Zhou retired at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 at the time that Xi Jinping ascended to the position of secretary general of the CCP. Xi immediately began to advocate a strict anticorruption campaign that took on the appearance of targeting his political rivals. In August 2013, the CCP began an investigation of Zhou that resulted in a number of his close subordi- nates being removed from their posts, and in December Zhou, his son Zhou Bin, and his daughter-in-law were taken into custody and held at a military base in Inner Mongolia. The following year, in 2014, Zhou was expelled from the CCP, the first Politburo Standing Committee member to be expelled since the Gang of Four after the Cultural Revolution. In April 2015 he was formally charged with abuse of power, bribery, and intentionally leaking state secrets. At his trial, which was held in private, Zhou pleaded guilty, and it was announced on 11 June 2015 that Zhou had been sentenced to life imprisonment.

Zhou’s son, Zhou Bin, fled to the United States in early 2013 and, after

negotiations with Chinese officials, returned to China in June 2016. He was found guilty of taking bribes and illegally trading in restricted commodities and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment, while his wife Jia Ziaoyue re- ceived nine years for taking bribes.

ZHU CHENZHI. On 10 June 1950 a Chinese Communist spy, Zhu Chen- zhi, was shot in Taiwan by a firing squad, along with her source, Wu Shi. The Republic of China’s (ROC) deputy minister of defense, Wu had pro- vided her with top-secret information, including the island’s strategic defense plans. Three other senior Kuomintang (KMT) officials were also found guilty of espionage.

Born in 1905, the fourth daughter of a wealthy owner of a fishing company in Ningbo, Zhu was educated at a school where she came under the influence of the principal who was an underground member of the Chinese Commu- nist Party (CCP). At the age of 20 she participated in demonstrations in Shanghai with classmates who were sympathetic to the cause. In 1925 she took part in anti-foreign protests in Shanghai, and two years later she married the chief engineer of a munitions plant who supported the warlord Zhang Zuolin, who controlled most of northeast China.

Following the Japanese occupation in 1931, she moved with her husband and daughter, Zhu Xiaofeng, to Nanking, where her husband succumbed to cholera the following year. In 1937 she married again, to a Communist, and

 

they lived in Wuhan, working for the Party. This involved frequent travel to Hong Kong, Zhejiang, and Guilin to gather intelligence and raise money. However, in 1940 her husband was arrested by the KMT and incarcerated in a camp in Shangrao, Jiangxi Province, where she was able to visit him three times before he organized a mass escape.

Then in 1944 in Shanghai, she was arrested and interrogated by the Kem- peitai, the Japanese military police, but she was released and continued to work in the Communist underground movement until 1948, when she was sent to Shanghai to work for a commercial enterprise and visited Taiwan. This led to her main assignment, to maintain contact with Wu Shi, a longtime Communist sympathizer who, unpaid, had been supplying valuable military information about the KMT since 1947.

In November 1949 Zhu traveled under alias by boat from Victoria Harbour to the north Taiwanese port of Keelung, concealing gold jewelry in her clothes, and stayed at the home of her stepdaughter, who was employed by the KMT’s intelligence service. On Saturdays she would visit Wu, pretend- ing to make deliveries of pharmaceuticals, but in reality she received infor- mation that she then couriered to Cai Jiaogan, the head of the Communist Party in Taiwan. Altogether, Zhu made seven trips, but in January 1950 she was compromised when Cai was detained and questioned. She was arrested on 18 February in the Zhoushan Islands off Zhejiang before she could leave for Hong Kong and was flown to Taipei for interrogation. Having refused to cooperate with her captors, she was executed four months later.

ZHU HUA. On 20 December 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice an- nounced the indictment of two Chinese nationals with conspiracy to commit computer intrusions, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated iden- tity theft. The pair were Zhu Hua, aliases Alayos, Afwar, CVNX, and God- killer, and Zhang Shilong, aliases Baobeilong, Atreexp, and Zhang Jianguo. Both were associated with a computer hacking group in China known within the cybersecurity community as Advanced Persistent Threat 10, or the APT10 Group, and were employed by Huaying Haitai Science and Technol- ogy Development Company, Huaying Haitai Keji Fazhan Gongsi, located in Tianjin, and acting in association with the Tianjin Security Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Guojia Anquanbu Tianjin Shi Anquanbu. Through their association with the APT10 Group between 2006 and 2018, Zhu and Zhang, were responsible for a global effort to target intellectual property and confidential business and technological information at managed service providers, the companies that remotely manage the information tech- nology infrastructures of the world’s businesses and governments. The APT10 Group aimed at a broad array of commercial activities, which in- cluded aviation, satellite and maritime technology, industrial factory automa- tion, automotive supplies, laboratory instruments, banking and finance, tele-

 

communications, consumer electronics, computer processor technology, in- formation technology services, consulting, packaging, medical equipment, health care, biotechnology, pharmaceutical manufacturing, oil and gas explo- ration, and production and mining. Zhu and Zhang registered the IT infra- structure that the APT10 Group used for its intrusions and engaged in illegal hacking operations.

The APT10 Group was also known by other names, such as Red Apollo, CVNX, Stone Panda, Menu Pass, and POTASSIUM. By targeting managed service providers worldwide, the APT10 Group gained unauthorized access to individual computers and computer networks on a global scale. According to the indictment, through their efforts, the group stole hundreds of gigabytes of sensitive data.

APT10’s methodology was to gain unauthorized access to the computers of a managed service provider, whereupon the Group would install multiple variants of malware. To avoid antivirus detection, the malware was installed using malicious files that gave the appearance of being legitimate and asso- ciated with the victim’s computer operating system. This allowed the Group to monitor the victim’s computers remotely and to steal user credentials.

After compromising a victim’s administrative credentials, the group used the stolen passwords to connect to other systems within the victim’s network and access its client’s networks, thereby allowing the group to move laterally through the victim’s and clients’ networks and to compromise computers that were not yet infected. After identifying data and packaging it for exfiltration using encrypted archives, the group used stolen credentials to move data from the victim’s client to other contaminated computers before exfiltrating the data to other computers controlled by the group.

The indictment detailed how Zhu and Zhang, among their other illegal activities, registered malicious domains and infrastructure. Further, Zhu, a penetration tester, engaged in hacking operations on behalf of the APT10 Group and recruited other individuals into the group. Meanwhile Zhang de- veloped and tested malware for the group, and the pair were successful in obtaining unauthorized access to computers providing services to or belong- ing to companies in at least a dozen countries, including Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, India, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, Great Britain, and the United States.

Within the United States, their victims included more than 45 technology companies and U.S. Government agencies in a dozen states, including Arizo- na, California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylva- nia, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Their victims included seven companies involved in aviation, space, or satellite technology; three compa- nies involved in communications technology; three companies involved in manufacturing advanced electronic systems or laboratory analytical instru- ments; one company engaged in maritime technology; an oil and gas drilling,

 

production, and processing company; the NASA Goddard Space Center and Jet Propulsion Laboratory; and the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DoE) Berkeley National Laboratory. The group also compromised more than 40 computers that allowed them to access sensitive data belonging to the U.S. Navy, including names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, salary infor- mation, personal phone numbers, and email addresses of more than 100,000 navy personnel.

Zhu and Zhang were charged with one count of conspiracy computer intrusion, one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and one count of aggravated identity theft. The penalty upon conviction is up to 20 years’ imprisonment, but in the absence of an extradition treaty, prosecution seems unlikely.

ZHU, PETER. On 26 August 2006, Peter Zhu (Zhu Xuliang), purportedly employed by the Shanghai Meuro Electronics Company, Shanghai Mei Luo Dianzi Youxian Gongsi, attempted to buy several restricted products that required export licenses, including amplifiers used in digital radios. These broadband items are three-stage devices designed for use in commercial digital radios and wireless local area networks and are listed in the Interna- tional Traffic in Arms Regulations. Zhu’s request was made to an undercover Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent, and thereafter Ding Zhengxing and Su Yang became involved in the negotiations. Both Ding and Su traveled to Saipan in the Mariana Islands on 25 January 2008 to receive the amplifiers and were arrested. They were later indicted for conspiracy to illegally export defense articles, aiding and abetting the illegal export of defense articles, and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments and were returned to El Paso in Texas, while Peter Zhu became a fugitive. See also TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA).

ZHU YAN. In April 2006 Dr. Zhu Yan, a 29-year-old living in the United States with a work visa, who had received a PhD in geo-environmental engineering from Columbia University, was hired by a computer software company in New Jersey that sold environmental management software to a government agency in China’s Shanxi Province. Zhu worked for a compre- hensive multimedia environmental information management portal that de- veloped a proprietary software program for the Chinese market that allowed users to manage air emissions, ambient water quality, and groundwater qual- ity. Zhu’s employment was terminated in July 2008, and in April 2009 he was arrested and charged with sending his company’s entire database to China’s Shanxi Environmental Protection Administration, Shanxi Sheng

 

Huanjing Baohu ZongJu, thus enabling it to renege on its contracted pay- ments and to pirate the vendor’s propriety software. See also TECHNOLO- GY ACQUISITION.

 

 

Bibliography

CONTENTS

Introduction 469

Reference Works 471

Chinese Espionage: People’s Republic of China 472

Far East 476

Chinese Espionage: Republic of China 476

United States 477

World War II 480

Historical Dictionaries 482

Websites 482

INTRODUCTION

Books on the subject of Chinese intelligence operations are indeed rare, partly because for many decades Beijing’s security apparatus was deeply introspective, scarcely interested in foreign collection operations, and partly because until recently there were few opportunities in the West to study examples of Chinese espionage. The situation was no better on Taipei, or indeed Hong Kong or Macao. Accordingly, the literature is thin in English.

The first author who attempted to tackle the topic was Richard Deacon in 1974. An old newspaper hand and a former wartime British naval intelli- gence officer, Deacon had begun a series of intelligence agency histories in 1969 with his History of the British Secret Service, followed by a History of the Russian Secret Service, and later by similar books on the French and Japanese services. A pioneer in the field of documenting a notoriously diffi- cult subject, Deacon laid the groundwork for many others seeking to lift the veil of secrecy on the international intelligence community, although there would not be another attempt until two French journalists, Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, produced The Chinese Secret Service: Kang Sheng and the Shadow Government in Red China in 1989. Faligot followed with Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, published in France in 2008. An updated English version was published in 2019. Few others have attempted research in this area, with the dearth of material to work with as the likely cause.

469

 

The heads of the British, French, Indian, Israeli, Rhodesian, German, American, Romanian, and Soviet intelligence agencies have been published. So too have their subordinates, with the field being led by American, South African, and British retirees, but with a sprinkling of Canadians, Australians, and Norwegians. In addition, there are the defectors, mainly Soviets, who have released their memoirs having been resettled in Australia, Canada, Nor- way, Great Britain, or the United States. And yet there is not a single member of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) who has ever released an account of their activities. Quite simply, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stands alone as being a major player in the world of espionage without ever having contributed to the literature. There is no tradition of retirees publishing their memoirs, of senior officers recalling their triumphs, of for- mer prisoners writing of their experiences, of journalists chasing cases of espionage, or of government agencies declassifying documents and making archival material available to historians.

Although little has been written on the broad topic of the PRC’s intelli-

gence operations, quite a lot has been published concerning individual exam- ples of Chinese espionage, and these case histories fall into four broad cate- gories. First, there are the books covering espionage conducted during World War II, a collection dominated by accounts of the Office of Strategic Ser- vices (OSS), although this organization was preoccupied with developing a liaison relationship with the Nationalists against the common enemy, the Japanese Empire. Second, there are the case histories of specific examples of PRC espionage, some quite obscure, such as the Chi Mak spy ring, the notorious Wen Ho Lee investigation into the loss of American nuclear se- crets, the Federal Bureau of Investigation prosecutions of the Amerasia de- fendants, and the more recent breach of security that centered on Larry Chin. Third are titles devoted to the Kuomintang (KMT) and Nationalist politics, and finally the more modern, more polemical studies of the threat posed by the PRC’s burgeoning economy.

During World War II, the OSS attempted to develop a relationship with

the Chinese in the overoptimistic hope of challenging the Japanese in the region, but the results were mixed, as several eyewitnesses recorded, among them Colonel Francis B. Mills, Oliver J. Caldwell, Charles Fenn, and Milton Miles. In addition, Dan Pinck, Kermit Roosevelt, and Maochun Yu have documented the OSS’s activities in mainland China, mainly based on declas- sified documents. A useful bibliography of OSS material was published by Dan Pinck in 2000.

In the postwar era the very closed nature of Communist Chinese society was reflected in the paucity of the literature. There was considerable hostility to the “China lobby” in the United States, where advocates of better rela- tions, or indeed any relations with Beijing, were regarded with considerable suspicion as being crypto-Communists. Accordingly, little went into print,

 

and anyone supporting the PRC cause after the Korean War, which technical- ly only ended in a cease-fire, found that their opinions handicapped their careers. In the case of Jack Service, whose fight for reinstatement took him to the U.S. Supreme Court, he was not published until 1971.

Following President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing, there was a profound change in attitude toward the PRC, and the country that hitherto had been isolated from the outside world became the subject of intense interest to some political scientists, even if they found the challenge daunt- ing, with restrictions on research to the point that what would be considered legitimate academic inquiry elsewhere was viewed as tantamount to espion- age by the authorities in Beijing.

In more recent years the PRC’s espionage operations conducted within in the United States have attracted considerable attention, both from the media and from Congress, although only one case, that of the Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Lee, has resulted in more than a single case history. Unusually, Wen Ho Lee wrote his version of events in 2002, then his Department of Energy investigator Notra Trulock wrote his the following year, and in 2007 Dan Stober and Jan Hoffman released A Convenient Spy. The revelation that the PRC had embarked on a lengthy campaign to influence and recruit ethnic Chinese in the United States encouraged Congress and the media to pursue the issue, but even the well-connected Washington Times correspondent Bill Gertz has never interviewed an MSS defector. In 2019, Jim Sciutto, a CNN anchor and national security correspondent who had served at the U.S. em- bassy in Beijing, wrote the well-received and extensively researched Shadow War: Inside Russia and China’s Secret Operations to Defeat America, which brings particular attention to China’s aggressive militarization of outer space. In the absence of these sources, or even original documentation, the em- phasis shifts from intelligence operations conducted from Beijing to books written by those who have made a study of intelligence collected about the PRC, and the first to cover this area from his own experience was probably Dr. Ray Cline, who released Secrets, Spies, and Scholars in 1981. Since then,

David Kaplan has pursued the Kuomintang’s involvement in the notorious

murder of the journalist Henry Liu.

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FAR EAST

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www.dtsa.mil

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U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission www.uscc.gov

 

About the Authors

I. C. Smith was born in Memphis, Tennessee; served in the U.S. Navy; and graduated from the University of Louisiana at Monroe while working as a police officer. He joined the FBI in 1973 and over the next 25 years was assigned to St. Louis, Missouri; Washington, D.C.; Miami, Florida; and Lit- tle Rock, Arkansas. He also served between 1988 and 1990 as the FBI’s legal attaché in Canberra, Australia, with responsibility for liaison with the inde- pendent nations of the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea and New Zealand.

While posted to the FBI’s Washington field office, he was assigned at his request to a Chinese counterintelligence squad, was promoted to supervisor, and led the investigation of Larry Wu-tai Chin, the CIA officer who spied for the People’s Republic of China for over 30 years. He was promoted to FBI headquarters, where he completed the first affidavit and made the presenta- tion before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain approval to conduct electronic surveillance of Chin.

His other duties included a year as an FBI inspector’s aide, where he inspected FBI offices throughout the United States as well as offices in Hong Kong and Tokyo, and as unit chief for the East German counterintelligence squad, where he served in the Federal Republic of Germany to liaise with the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). As assistant special agent in charge of the Miami field office, he handled air force general Rafael del Pino, the most senior Cuban officer ever to defect.

In 1990 he was promoted to the FBI’s elite Senior Executive Service and appointed the State Department’s chief of investigations, Office of Counter- intelligence Programs, Diplomatic Security, and traveled to the Soviet Un- ion, China, and Nicaragua to conduct threat analyses for the high-risk diplo- matic establishments there. Upon his return to the FBI’s National Security Division, he was appointed section chief for analysis, budget, and training, responsible for liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies and representing the bureau within the U.S. intelligence community and on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, where National Intelligence Estimates are prepared for reading by the president of the United States. There he was also designated an inspector-in-place.

In 1995 he was transferred to Little Rock as special agent in charge for the state of Arkansas during the height of the Whitewater campaign finance investigations involving Charlie Trie and John Huang. After retirement in

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1998, he testified before a Senate committee that was investigating Chinese influence in U.S. elections and illegal campaign finance contributions in an FBI investigation code-named CAMPCON.

Since retirement, he has lectured at the Smithsonian Institution, the De- partment of Defense’s Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy, the Of- fice of the Counterintelligence Executive, Mercyhurst College, Arkansas State University, and the Raleigh (North Carolina) International Spy Confer- ence. He has frequently appeared on major television networks including CBS News and ABC News, and his autobiography, Inside, was published in 2004. In 2009, he testified before the U.S.-China Commission in Washing- ton, D.C., on the intelligence threat posed by the People’s Republic of China. In 2011, he lectured at the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. He continues to be a knowledgeable source of information for those writing about the threat posed by China to the national security of the United States and has been quoted by such authors and reporters as Seymour Hersh, Mi- chael Isikoff, Ron Kessler, Chitra Ragavan, Bill Gertz, and David Wise, and he was the principal interviewee for PBS’s Frontline report “From China With Love,” an exposé on the Katrina Leung espionage investigation. He appeared on Japan’s Asahi television network and has been interviewed by Romania’s HotNews, an online newspaper; Poland’s Onet online news or- ganization; and the BBC.

Since 1999, he and his wife Carla have lived in Virginia’s Tidewater area,

where they keep Arabian horses. www.icsmith.com.

Nigel West is a military historian specializing in intelligence and security issues and while still at university he worked as a researcher for two authors: Ronald Seth, who had been parachuted into Silesia by SOE, and Richard Deacon, a former wartime naval intelligence officer and latterly the foreign editor of the Sunday Times. He later joined BBC TV’s General Features department to work on the Spy! and Escape series.

His first book, cowritten with Richard Deacon in 1980 and published by BBC Publications, was the book of the Spy! series and was followed by other nonfiction: British Security Service Operations, 1909–45 (1981); A Matter of Trust: MI5 1945–72 (1982); MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Opera- tions, 1909–45 (1983); The Branch: A History of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (1983); Unreliable Witness: Espionage Myths of the Second World War (1984); Garbo (co-authored with Juan Pujol, 1985); GCHQ: The Secret Wireless War (1986); Molehunt (1987); The Friends: Britain’s Post- war Secret Intelligence Operations (1988); Games of Intelligence (1989); Seven Spies Who Changed the World (1991); Secret War: The Story of SOE (1992); The Faber Book of Espionage (1993); The Illegals (1993); The Faber Book of Treachery (1995); The Secret War for the Falklands (1997); Counterfeit Spies (1998); Crown Jewels (with Oleg Tsarev, 1998); VENO-

 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS • 485

NA: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War (1999); The Third Secret (2000); Mortal Crimes (2004); The Guy Liddell Diaries (2005); MASK (2005); His- torical Dictionary of British Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2005); Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2006); On Her Majesty’s Secret Service (2006); Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counter- intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2007); Historical Dictionary of World War II Intelligence (Scarecrow, 2008); Historical Dictionary of Sexspionage (Scare- crow Press, 2009); TRIPLEX: Secrets from the KGB Archives (2009); His- torical Dictionary of Ian Fleming’s James Bond (Scarecrow Press, 2009); Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2010); SNOW (2011); Historical Dictionary of Signal Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2012); MI5 in the Great War (2014); Historical Dictionary of World War I Intelli- gence (Scarecrow Press, 2014); Double Cross in Cairo (2015); Cold War Counterfeit Spies (2016); Spycraft Secrets (2018); Churchill’s Spy Files (2018); Cold War Spymaster (2018); and Codeword OVERLORD (2019).

In 1989 he was voted the Experts’ Expert by a panel of spy writers se-

lected by the Observer. He is currently the European editor of the Interna- tional Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence and taught the history of postwar intelligence at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies in Alexandria, Virginia. In October 2003 he was awarded the U.S. Association of Former Intelligence Officers first Lifetime Literature Achievement award. www.nigelwest.com.