Making friends, making inroads

吀栀e CCP's in昀氀uence activities in Estonia

Frank Jüris 25th August 2023

Executive summary

吀栀e People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) interests in NATO’s northeast frontier are being challenged by Estonia, a country increasingly aware of the risks these interests pose to national and European security. In recent years, Estonia has rejected the PRC’s involvement in port infrastructure, blocked PRC companies’ plans to build an underwater tunnel to Finland and publicly abandoned Beijing’s “16 + 1” bloc of Central and Eastern European countries.

In public reports published since 2018, Estonian security services have re- peatedly named China as a threat to both national security and the international rules-based order. As one of a handful of states to openly reject China’s a琀琀empts to build a pliable new Eastern Bloc, Estonia is a crucial arena for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political in昀氀uence operations.

吀栀is report presents the 昀椀rst-ever overview of CCP in昀氀uence agencies’ e昀昀orts to cultivate Estonia’s policymakers over the last two decades. Away from public a琀琀ention, actors linked to the CCP’s foreign a昀昀airs, propaganda and united front systems have used outwardly uno昀케cial exchanges to try to co-opt Estonian politi- cians, national and local government o昀케cials, academics and business leaders into supporting CCP goals that o昀琀en con昀氀ict with Estonia’s long-term strategic interests. For instance, three former ministers have been employed by a lobbying company representing Huawei, a PRC-owned telecommunications company, in its bid to build Estonia’s 5G network.

While punishing the Estonian government when it crosses Beijing’s so-called red lines  such as hosting the Dalai Lama  the PRC has built ties to Estonian cities and municipalities, seeking to undermine national policies from within.

One signi昀椀cant success in this regard involves a group of municipalities in northern Estonia that wanted to proceed with a Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel project potentially 昀椀nanced and built by Chinese companies despite the central government’s concerns. Another example involves a former minister of culture and current member of parliament who has advocated for the li昀琀ing of China’s

non-market status  a position that is at odds with Estonian and EU interests.

If the CCP’s in昀氀uence operations in Estonia continue to be ignored by local authorities, the PRC will build on its limited successes to undo the principled stance against totalitarianism that has de昀椀ned independent Estonia’s history. 吀栀e “no-limits” partnership between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping has much to gain if Estonian decision makers are quietly cajoled into alignment with the PRC party- state’s geopolitics.

1

 

0 Introduction: 吀栀e CCP's blueprint for the Baltic 挀栀al- lenge

吀栀e People’s Republic of China has demonstrated a disproportionate interest in in昀氀u- encing Estonia’s policymaking. While being one of the smallest members of NATO and the European Union, Estonia o昀昀ers China a geopolitical prize with its strategic assets: ports, transportation networks and digital infrastructure.

In 2017, without public discussion, the backbone of Estonia’s internet infrastructure was sold to CITIC Group, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) linked company.1 吀栀is poses a direct threat to the security of Estonia, the EU and NATO, especially if China were to share intelligence with Russia or use its ownership to disrupt essential ser- vices. In this regard it is worth noting that the European Union Agency for the Op- erational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCDCOE) are both based in Tallinn.2

As one of Europe’s most outspoken critics of authoritarian regimes, Estonia presents a challenge to China’s interests in the region. For several years, Estonia’s intelligence agencies have openly listed China as a threat to Estonia, citing such areas of con- cern as recruitment and intelligence gathering, economic security and investments in infrastructure.3

In 2022, Estonia and Latvia publicly joined Lithuania in its abandonment of the PRC’s “16 + 1” geopolitical scheme, thus dealing a potentially fatal blow to the increasingly discredited analogue of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central and East- ern Europe. One of the reasons behind the decision could have been China’s increas- ingly intimate relations with Russia   the primary security threat to Estonia and its

joint statement issued by Moscow and Beijing noted at the time, “friendship” between Russia and China “has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation.”5

Estonian intelligence services have also raised concerns about China’s stance on the war in Ukraine. In particular, the 2022 Estonian Internal Security Service report states that

[t]he Chinese Embassy in Tallinn closely monitors the development of the Ukrainian issue in the Estonian media, uses the Kremlin’s rhetoric in its statements, but avoids openly taking sides.6

1Cain Nunns, “China’s Poly Group: 吀栀e most important company you’ve never heard of”, 吀栀e World, 25 Feb. 2013; “Corporate Identity”, Poly Group.

2Frank Jüris, “Estonia’s Evolving 吀栀reat Perception of China”, 吀栀e Prospect Foundation, 28 Apr. 2022.

3

Klemm, Estonian Internal Security Service Annual Review 2020–2021, KAPO, 2021; idem, Estonian Internal

amet, 2020; International Security and Estonia 2021, Välisluureamet, 2021; International Security and Estonia 2022, Välisluureamet, 2022; International Security and Estonia 2023, Välisluureamet, 2023.

4“Foreign a昀昀airs undersecretary discusses Russia with Chinese ambassador”, ERR, 4 Mar. 2022.

5“ ”, Xinhua, 4

Feb. 2022; “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, Kremlin, 4 Feb. 2022.

6Klemm, Annual Review 2021 2022, p. 23.

 

吀栀e Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s 2023 report added that

[s]ince the beginning of the war, the Chinese media has clearly sided with Russia, spreading Russian narratives and calling the US the real culprit of the war while painting Ukraine and the countries that support it, includ- ing the Baltic states, as puppets of the US.7

吀栀e PRC party-state copied Moscow’s Soviet-era methodology and adapted it for its own political in昀氀uence operations. Acting outside o昀케cial state-to-state relations, the CCP uses a variety of agencies and front organisations to cultivate politicians, business 昀椀gures, national and local government o昀케cials and academics in order to bring them into alignment with the party-state’s goals. Recent studies have shown the global impact of CCP in昀氀uence operations in Australia, New Zealand, Europe, the United States and elsewhere.8

A昀琀er Estonia had regained its independence from Soviet occupation in 1991, CCP in-昀氀uence activities began targeting the political elite, seeking to coerce the country into the orbit of the world’s remaining Leninist power. Although China’s success has been partial, its in昀氀uence activities have reached the highest levels of Estonian politics. For example, Powerhouse, a company that has lobbied on behalf of Huawei, employs three former Estonian ministers, which demonstrates that lucrative contacts can provide access to the corridors of power.9

吀栀is study is the 昀椀rst comprehensive a琀琀empt to investigate the CCP’s in昀氀uence activ- ities in Estonia.10

吀栀e starting point and focus of this report are not the in昀氀uence operations’ targets in Estonian society but rather CCP in昀氀uence actors themselves, their institutional links, working principles and methods. Drawing from Chinese-language sources, this report will describe CCP actors as precisely as possible, with the goal of increasing public understanding of the Chinese party-state and its exchanges with Estonian counter- parts.

吀栀e CCP chooses di昀昀erent approaches to in昀氀uence foreign countries depending on the resources it has at its disposal. While Chinese diaspora organisations co-opted by the CCP’s united front system have been central to in昀氀uence activities in, e.g., Aus- tralia, their role in Estonia where the Chinese community is small has been rather limited. 吀栀is report only brie昀氀y discusses the united front and propaganda work, fo-

7International Security and Estonia 2023, p. 65.

8Anne-Marie Brady, “Magic Weapons: China’s political in昀氀uence activities under Xi Jinping”, Wilson Center, Sep. 2017; Clive Hamilton, Silent Invasion: China’s in昀氀uence in Australia, Hardie Grant, 2018; Clive Hamilton and Mareike Ohlberg, Hidden hand: exposing how the Chinese Communist Party is reshaping the world, Hardie Grant, 2020; Hsu Szu-chien and J. Michael Cole (eds.), Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy, Eastbridge, 2020; Ralph Weber, “Uni昀椀ed message, rhizomatic delivery: A preliminary analysis of PRC/CCP in昀氀uence and the united front in Switzerland”, Sinopsis, 18 Dec. 2020; Livia Codarin, Laura Harth and Jichang Lulu, “Hijacking the mainstream: CCP in昀氀uence agencies and their operations in Italian parliamentary and local politics”, Sinopsis, 20 Nov. 2021.

9Holger Roonemaa, “Huawei tagauks Eestis. Appi palgati valitsusele lähedased eksministrid”, EPL, 13

Feb. 2020; Andres Einmann, “Isamaa Huawei-ohu koosolekul osales Huawei lobist”, Postimees, 21 Feb. 2020. 10A 2020 series in Postimees, one of Estonia’s largest-circulation newspapers, brie昀氀y examined China’s in昀氀uence in Estonia, but with far less detail and granularity. See: Holger Roonemaa, Mari Eesmaa and Sabīne Bērziņa, “Trojan panda. 吀栀e heavy hand of Chinese so昀琀power”, Postimees, 4 Sep. 2019; Holger Roonemaa, Mari Eesmaa and Inese Liepiņa, “Chinese intelligence increasingly se琀琀ing sights on Estonia”, Postimees, 5

Sep. 2019; eidem, “Chinese investments come with golden handcu昀昀s”, Postimees, 6 Sep. 2019.

 

cusing instead on the CCP foreign a昀昀airs system’s in昀氀uence work and the multitude of forms it takes in its interactions with di昀昀erent target groups.

吀栀e 昀椀rst section of the report describes key agencies of the Chinese party-state active in in昀氀uence operations in Estonia.

吀栀e second section discusses in昀氀uence operations targeting Estonian political parties, particularly the actions carried out by the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD).

吀栀e third section explores how CCP in昀氀uence agencies — such as the Chinese People’s

governments and business leaders to cultivate positive sentiment for Chinese interests while bypassing the country’s national policy.

吀栀e fourth section investigates a CCP-linked Chinese university administrator’s suc- cess in aligning personal career development with the Party’s goals while holding high-level positions in Estonian academia, including as head of the Chinese student association in the Baltics.

Sino-Estonian relations have mostly been analysed from the vantage point of eco- nomic cooperation. China’s aggressive foreign policy has accentuated the security dimension. Since economic relations are minuscule, the security aspect is expected to dominate the bilateral agenda for the foreseeable future. 吀栀is preliminary study tries to tackle this challenge by answering some basic questions about the CCP’s in-昀氀uence activities in the Baltic country. Who are the CCP actors carrying out in昀氀uence activities in Estonia? What are party-state actors doing? How do they describe their work? Who do they target?

吀栀e analysis in this paper is based on open sources in Chinese and other languages.吀栀e views and opinions presented are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position of his employer or any other organisation. No allegations of impropriety are made about any organisations or individuals mentioned.

 

1 Bypassing foreign policy: Some key CCP political in-昀氀uence agencies

吀栀e CCP’s in昀氀uence activities are not carried out by a single entity. Organs across the party-state employ some of the classic Leninist methods of in昀氀uence work to manip- ulate foreign societies. 吀栀is chapter introduces some of the party-state bureaucracy active in Estonia.11

CCP propaganda is designed to create a positive image and challenge criticism. It is carried out by a dedicated group of party-state organs coordinated by the CCP Central Propaganda Department and includes state media and multiple cultural exchange or- ganisations.12 At the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, the so-called mask diplomacy vividly illustrated the CCP’s propaganda e昀昀orts, which involved mobilising vast re- sources in an a琀琀empt to create an image of China as a responsible partner.

China’s in昀氀uence activities also employ united front work ( ), a strategy that was 昀椀rst successfully implemented by the Bolsheviks, who created temporary strategic alliances with other political parties and movements in order to consolidate power in Russia and trigger a global communist revolution. 吀栀e CCP used the same tactic to take power in China by alternately allying with and against the Nationalist Party (KMT).13 Today, the united front’s foreign activities largely consist of employing the Chinese diaspora and elites in foreign countries for the bene昀椀t of the CCP. 吀栀is has been thoroughly studied in New Zealand, Australia and the Czech Republic.14 In Estonia’s neighbourhood, examples of united front work can be found in Finland and Sweden, where united front agencies have organised the Chinese diaspora to defend China’s interests on foreign policy issues, such as China’s claims on Taiwan, the South and East China Seas and the Hong Kong protests.15

Besides the propaganda and united front systems, the CCP’s in昀氀uence network in- volves foreign a昀昀airs agencies, whose e昀昀orts to cultivate Estonia’s national and local politics are the main topic of this study.

In contrast to many Western countries, China’s Ministry of Foreign A昀昀airs is not the most important institution that formulates foreign policy. 吀栀e la琀琀er is coordinated on a higher level and involves di昀昀erent institutions. 吀栀e work of China’s foreign a昀昀airs system is guided by the party’s Central Foreign A昀昀airs Work Commission (FAWC,

11Parts of this report, especially those on the International Liaison Department, previously appeared in Frank Jüris, “China’s in昀氀uence activities in Estonia”, ICDS, 25 Sep. 2020.

12See also: Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in contemporary

China, Rowman & Li琀琀le昀椀eld, 2016; David Shambaugh, “China’s Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and E昀케cacy”, 吀栀e China Journal 57, Jan. 2007; James Farley and Ma琀琀hew D Johnson, Rede昀椀ning Propaganda in Modern China: 吀栀e Mao Era and Its Legacies, Routledge, 2020; Mareike Svea Ohlberg, “Creating a favorable international public opinion environment: External propaganda (Duiwai Xuanchuan) as a global concept with Chinese characteristics”, PhD thesis, Heidelberg, 2014.

13Jichang Lulu, “United Frontlings Always Win”, China Heritage, 25 Sep. 2017.

14Brady, “Magic Weapons”; Alex Joske, “吀栀e Party speaks for you”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Policy Brief Report 32, 2020; Martin Hála, “United Front Work by Other Means: China’s ‘Economic Dip- lomacy’ in Central and Eastern Europe”, China Brief 19.9, 9 May 2019.

15Päivi Koskinen and Kirsi Skön, “Kiinan „taika-ase” tähtää Suomeenkin”, YLE, 15 Mar. 2020; eidem,

“Kokoomus ero琀琀i Kiinan kontrolliverkostoon sotkeutuneen kaupunginvaltuute琀琀unsa Vantaalla „Päätös oli yksimielinen”, YLE, 23 Mar. 2020; Kirsi Skön, “Perussuomalainen Kiina-ilmiö: käsikirjoitus”, YLE, 16 Mar. 2020; Pär Nyrén, “Kinesiska Kommunistpartiets enhetsfront”, Stockholm Free World Forum, 29 May 2020.

 

), while its everyday work is managed by its o昀케ce, whose current head is PRC foreign minister Wang Yi.

吀栀e People’s Republic of China, contrary to its name, is a CCP-led dictatorship “people” being but a euphemism for “party”. In its external messaging and interactions with foreign dignitaries, the CCP likes to downplay the role of the party and emphas- ise the role of the people in its political system. For this same reason, China’s foreign a昀昀airs work is a combination of governmental and non-governmental diplomacy. 吀栀e guiding ideology of Chinese non-governmental diplomacy is people’s diplomacy (

), which is meant to “uphold the party’s leadership” through “simultaneously

friendships that “lay the foundation for [favourable] public opinion” (

). 吀栀ese relationships are meant to transcend national boundaries, time, space and

吀栀e PRC exploits knowledge asymmetries to its advantage. Many of China’s foreign a昀昀airs interactions are with unprepared foreign dignitaries, bypassing traditional state-to-state diplomacy. Instead of o昀케cial diplomatic representations, these interac- tions use so-called people’s organisations. Despite their name, these have nothing in common with civil society, but are an embodiment of the Leninist party-state.

People-to-people diplomacy ( ) activities are meant to in昀氀uence foreign so- cieties outside state-to-state channels. 吀栀e most active institutions in the PRC foreign a昀昀airs system that carry out non-governmental diplomacy are the International Li-

ship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, 中国人民对外友好协会).17

吀栀e Shanghai branch of the CPAFFC provides a standard explanation of the di昀昀erence between governmental and non-governmental diplomacy: the former involves only o昀케cial channels of communication, while the la琀琀er is more complex and dates back to the PRC’s early years, when China had to use uno昀케cial channels of communications to receive international recognition.18

Non-governmental diplomacy consists of public diplomacy ( ), which is prac- tised by many governments, and people-to-people diplomacy, which is unique to China. People-to-people diplomacy  de昀椀ned as “watering down the government’s

ship groups — aims to shape foreign public opinion of China independent from the

吀栀eir naming notwithstanding, People’s Associations for Friendship with Foreign Countries (PAFFCs) are in fact party-state entities that coordinate foreign a昀昀airs work at the central and subnational levels. PAFFCs are managed as units or nameplates of their respective local Foreign A昀昀airs O昀케ces (FAOs, ). 吀栀e central-level CPAFFC is managed by the Ministry of Foreign A昀昀airs. At the sub-national level, FAOs serve as o昀케ces of the Central Foreign A昀昀airs Work Commission under local party commi琀琀ees.20

16陈啸, “人民外交、公共外交和民间外交，这三者有啥区别与联系？”, Shanghai PAFFC via Wechat,

17Codarin et al., op. cit., p. 9.

18 , op. cit.

19Ibid.

20Codarin et al., op. cit.

 

2 吀栀e CCP International Liaison Department’s grip on Estonian politics

What the CCP terms foreign a昀昀airs work, encompassing broader activities than tra- ditional diplomacy, is central to the PRC’s in昀氀uence activities in Estonia. Song Tao

, a former head of the CCP Central Commi琀琀ee’s International Liaison Department, has described foreign a昀昀airs work as a symbiosis of party, public and people-to-people

), research (  ), contacts (  ) and image (  ). 吀栀ese elements can be used to promote foreign relations and a positive image of the party to the international com- munity, as well as help central authorities learn from foreign experiences.21

One of the most important institutions in China’s foreign a昀昀airs system — responsible

history of the ILD is closely linked to that of the CCP’s foreign relations. It was created in 1951 and 昀椀rst led by Wang Jiaxiang , who studied in Moscow and served as China’s 昀椀rst ambassador to the Soviet Union. It is understood that the predecessor of the ILD was the CCP Communications O昀케ce ( ); formed in 1927, it was responsible for communicating with the Communist International (Comintern) and other partners and a琀琀empted to export the revolution to other parts of Asia through the Chinese diaspora.22

In January 2011, before Xi Jinping became CCP general secretary, he spoke at a meet- ing dedicated to the 90th anniversary of foreign a昀昀airs work (as old as the CCP) and the 60th anniversary of the ILD, saying that the la琀琀er was established to be in charge of the CCP’s relations with foreign parties. Xi stressed that the party’s foreign a昀昀airs work had an important role in governmental and non-governmental diplomacy

a positive image on the international stage, gather information and support central authorities in their decision-making.23

Today, the ILD is interested not in exporting the communist revolution but in estab- lishing contacts with foreign political elites who will support the CCP’s policies in their countries and help to create an international consensus on issues important to China.24 When it comes to Taiwan, for example, inter-party relations are particularly useful with countries that do not have formal relations with Beijing.25 吀栀e biggest a挀栀ievement for the ILD is the widespread support for Beijing’s position on the South China Sea, reportedly endorsed by more than 240 parties and 280 think tanks and NGOs.26

In addition, the ILD collects information and fosters long-term relationships with for- eign elites.27 In a 2015 report, the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) said that

21 , “ ”, , 28 Sep. 2019.

22David Shambaugh, “China’s ‘quiet diplomacy’: 吀栀e International Department of the Chinese Commun- ist Party”, China: An International Journal 5.1, 2007.

23“ : ”, china.com, 15 Apr. 2011.

24Julia Bowie, “International Liaison Work for the New Era: Generating Global Consensus?”, in Julia Bowie and David Gi琀琀er, Party Watch Annual Report 2018, Center for Advanced China Research, 18 Oct. 2018. 25David Gi琀琀er and Julia Bowie, “吀栀e Chinese Communist Party International Department: Advancing

”One China” Behind the Scenes”, Global Taiwan Brief 1.2, 28 Sep. 2016.

26Bowie, “International Liaison Work for the New Era”.

27Shambaugh, op. cit.; Brady, “Magic Weapons”, p. 5.

 

 

Figure 1: Kalev Kallo, former chairman of the Estonia-China parliamentary group, shaking hands with ILD deputy had Qian Hongshan in Beijing. Source: ILD.

the ILD supports Chinese military intelligence in its activities. 28 吀栀e ILD is par- ticularly active in Central and Eastern European countries, where the CCP does not have at its disposal enough united front groups or large Chinese communit- ies to help it rea挀栀 mainstream politics. Czech politicians used to meet with ILD cadres during their visits to China and hosted them at the China Investment Forum in Prague.29

For instance, a昀琀er a Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) report criticising Huawei, the leader of the local communist party, Vojtěch Filip, went on a fact-昀椀nding mission to China, where he met ILD deputy head Guo Yezhou

. A昀琀er his return in January 2019, Filip defended Huawei in the media, contradicting the NÚKIB threat assessment.30

A similar scenario played out in Estonia following an October 2019 visit to China by Kalev Kallo, the former chairman of the Estonia-China parliamentary group. During his visit, Kallo met with ILD deputy head Qian Hongshan . A few months later, Kallo gave an interview to Estonian media, stating that the “security concerns” over Huawei “have become a ma琀琀er of faith.” As in Filip’s case, Kallo’s comments were counter to the conclusions drawn by Estonia’s security agencies.31

吀栀e ILD is also active in the Nordics. 吀栀e ILD’s discourse power came to light when a delegation led by ILD deputy head Wang Yajun visited Iceland in 2018. Local politicians participated in what they interpreted as a “courtesy visit”. In China, the

28Jichang Lulu and Martin Hála, “A new Comintern for the New Era: 吀栀e CCP International Department from Bucharest to Reykjavík”, Sinopsis, 16 Aug. 2018; Annual Report of the Security Information Service for 2015, BIS, 1 Sep. 2016, p. 9.

29Martin Hála, “Between the European Union and Eurasia: 16+1 and China’s Reenactment of Eastern

Europe”, in Hsu Szu-chien and J. Michael Cole (eds.), Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Demo- cracy, Eastbridge, 2020; Janek Kroupa and Zdislava Pokorná, “Čína lovila české poslance před klíčovým summitem. Byli za tím její zpravodajci”, Seznam zprávy, 26 Feb. 2020.

30Sinopsis and Jichang Lulu, “吀栀e importance of Friendly Contacts: 吀栀e New Comintern to Huawei’s

rescue”, Sinopsis, 24 Jan. 2019; “„V kauze Huawei nejde o konkurenční boj,“ míní poslanec Pirátů Lipavský.

„Je to ideologický hlupák,“ reagoval šéf KSČM Filip”, Česká televize, 22 Jan. 2019.

31“ ”, ILD, 28 Oct. 2019; Hannes Sarv, “Kallo: ohud

seoses Huaweiga on usu küsimus”, ERR, 13 Feb. 2020.

 

visit was described as introducing “Xi Jinping 吀栀ought” to Icelandic political parties.吀栀e meetings, which included discussions on the Belt and Road Initiative and human rights, gave China an opportunity to explain to a then-member state of the UN Human Rights Council that, in Beijing’s view, economic development is more important than fundamental rights.32

吀栀e four grips

吀栀is section investigates the ILD’s exchanges with major Estonian political parties, beginning with the ILD’s e昀昀orts in 2008 to establish a cooperation agreement with the Estonian Social Democratic Party, when public sentiment towards the PRC and its ruling party was considerably less critical than a decade later.

Exchanges between the ILD and Estonian politicians enable the CCP to follow closely domestic, regional and EU-wide developments and provide Chinese solutions to local issues that, with the help of local interlocutors, consider social and cultural sensitiv- ities. 吀栀e ILD has organised forums aimed at generating positive sentiment towards the CCP, while its policy goals target rising, active and fading stars from the le昀琀, right and centre of the Estonian political landscape. 吀栀e objective of these forums is to build personal ties that facilitate continued support regardless of who is in power.

吀栀e ILD website describes the department’s work in terms of four “grips”, with one of them being a grip on political parties. To date, the CCP claims to have established relations with more than 600 political parties and organisations in 160 countries.33 Former ILD head and former vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Con- sultative Conference Wang Jiarui has said that high-level exchanges with foreign parties, whose members are a source for policy planning and shaping public o略p性ini沟on通, represent preventive diplomacy ( 34  ), strategic communication (

吀栀e ILD established relations with the Estonian Social Democratic Party (SDE) in December 2008.35 According to Randel Länts, the SDE’s then-general secretary, the exchanges began when he visited China with the European Socialists and received an invitation for the SDE to visit.36 Länts was probably referring to the delegation of young politicians led by Philip Cordery, secretary general of the Party of European Socialists, that met with Uyunqimg ( ), vice chair of the Standing Com- mi琀琀ee of the National People’s Congress, and Wang Jiarui.37

In April 2009, ILD deputy chair Chen Fengxiang met with the speaker of the Estonian Parliament, the Estonian foreign minister and representatives of the SDE and the Centre Party in Tallinn.38 In December of that year, an SDE delegation led by the party’s deputy leader, Indrek Saar, paid a return visit to China, where they met Politburo member and vice chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Wang Gang   , ILD head Wang Jiarui and deputy head Liu Hongcai

.39

32Lulu and Hála, op. cit.

33

34王家瑞, “努力开创党的对外工作新局面”, 人民日报, 3 June 2014.

36Argo Ideon, “Eesti sotside delegatsioon kohtub Hiina kompartei juhtidega”, Postimees, 27 Nov. 2009.

37“ (2008  )”, china.com, 13 Apr. 2011.

39“王刚会见爱沙尼亚客人”, 人民网, 1 Dec. 2009.

 

 

Figure 2: SDE deputy head Indrek Saar shakes hands with CPPCC vice chairman Wang Gang in Beijing, December 2009. Source: via Sogou.

According to Peeter Kreitzberg, a member of the delegation, the Chinese had previ- ously expressed a desire to sign a cooperation agreement between the CCP and the SDE, but the delegation to China did not have the party’s authority to do so.40 Signing a cooperation agreement with the CCP li琀琀le over a year a昀琀er it had violently repressed a Tibetan uprising might have been too much for SDE voters to accept.41 In the SDE’s defence, human rights issues in China were allegedly raised in the meetings, probably in the spirit of changing China through trade and dialogue.42

In addition to bilateral meetings, the ILD organises forums for foreign political parties, where it can present the CCP’s policies and governance principles to create a positive international image of the party. 吀栀e ILD calls this activity its “image” grip.43

吀栀e ILD organised the “Meeting of Political Parties from China and CEE” (

) in Budapest in 2016 and Bucharest in 2017. 吀栀e la琀琀er was inaugurated by Liu Yunshan , the 昀椀昀琀h highest-ranking o昀케cial on the Politburo Standing Commi琀琀ee at the time, who oversaw the party’s ideological machinery. 吀栀is was a prelude to the ILD’s global political party dialogue, which was a琀琀ended by 300 parties from 120 countries. 吀栀e dialogue culminated with an adoption of the Beijing Initiative that outlined a China-centric new world order.44

In May 2010, Estonia’s then-minister of justice Rein Lang (Reform Party), and former prime minister Mart Laar (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, IRL), participated in the昀椀rst China-Europe High Level Political Parties Forum.45 吀栀ere, according to the State Council Information O昀케ce (SCIO) at the time a government nameplate for the CCP O昀케ce of External Propaganda, later absorbed into the Central Propaganda De-

40Ideon, op. cit.

41Tenzin Younten, “When Olympics Come, Tibetans Su昀昀er”, Bi琀琀er Winter, 25 Jan. 2022.

42“Länts: sotsid arutasid Hiinas majandus- ja kultuurisuhteid”, BNS, 6 Dec. 2009.

43

44

45“出席中欧政党高层论坛的政党及政党组织”, 人民网,; Kalev Kallo, “Hiina töötaks koos Euroopa

 

partment  the leader of the Party of the European Le昀琀and the European United Le昀琀 Nordic Green Le昀琀 (EUL/NGL), Lothar Bisky, criticised selective coverage of China in Western media. 吀栀e then-prime minister of Latvia, now a European Commissioner, Valdis Dombrovskis, said that Europe and China should work together to create a new global 昀椀nancial system and learn from each other how to strengthen the supervision of 昀椀nancial markets.46

On the one hand, the visit to China seems to have had no impact on Laar’s stance on the regime, as he uno昀케cially met with Dalai Lama as prime minister and defence minister in 2001 and 2011, respectively.47 On the other hand, Rein Lang in an opinion piece over a decade later still remembered fondly that visit to China. Lang argued that Estonia should maintain a positive stance towards China and advocated greater co- operation with the PRC’s private owners’ class and the Chinese diaspora to in昀氀uence

48

however insu昀케cient it had proved with Russia — remained a琀琀ractive when it came

embassy sta昀昀and Chinese diaspora participation in 2019 turned into a brawl shows how it is China’s in昀氀uence that grows in Europe, rather than Europe’s imagined abil- ity to in昀氀uence PRC politics from the outside.49

吀栀e ILD’s third grip on “contacts” involves developing people-to-people relations and creating a network for China’s healthy and stable external relations.50 Former ILD head Wang Jiarui explained this as informal exchanges with China-friendly rul- ing and opposition parties, political organisations, think tanks, journalists, NGOs and countries with which China has no diplomatic or party-level relations. 吀栀is strategy involves consistently cultivating people who know China and are friendly towards China, with the aim of 昀椀nding a common language and mutual understanding.51

Among Estonian politicians, Kalev Kallo participated in the China-Europe High-Level Political Parties Forum in 2011 and 2013.52 In 2016, Randel Länts of the SDE, the former head of government relations for the consultancy company Mil琀琀on, also took part in the forum. Mil琀琀on has been known to provide public relations services to the PRC embassy in Tallinn.53 吀栀e 2013 forum was also a琀琀ended by Charles Michel, leader of the Belgian Reformist Movement (Michel was prime minister of Belgium from 2014 until he became president of the European Council in 2019).54

吀栀e Forum of Young Political Leaders of Central and Eastern Europe, held in Beijing at the end of October 2015, was a琀琀ended by Mailis Reps, a council member of the Es- tonian Centre Party. Reps served as the country’s minister of education and research,昀椀rst from 2005 to 2007 and again from 2016 to 2020.55 In September 2016, before as- suming the post of minister of education for the second time, Reps, as chair of the

46“ ”, SCIO, 26 May 2010.

47Berit-Helena Lamp, “Mart Laar kirjutas dalai-laamale raamatu”, Postimees, 19 Aug. 2011.

48Rein Lang, “Hiina üle otsustamiseks on veel vara”, Postimees, 1 Mar. 2023.

49“Hong Kong solidarity rally in Vilnius met with Chinese counter-protesters”, LRT, 23 Aug. 2019; “Lithuania hands note to China over incident during Hong Kong support rally in Vilnius”, LRT, 2 Sep. 2019.

50

51 , op. cit.

52Indrek Veiserik, “Sorry, USA! Aga Hiinast sai just maailma suurim majandus!”, Kesknädal, 22 Oct. 2014; “ ”, ILD, 23 Apr. 2013.

”, ILD, 12 May 2016; “Randel Länts”, Mil琀琀on; Roonemaa

et al., “Trojan panda”.

54“China and Belgium”, MFA.

55“Mailis Reps”, ILD, 24 Oct. 2015.

 

 

Figure 3: Centre Party MP Mailis Reps interviewed at the Forum of Young Political Leaders of Central and Eastern Europe in Beijing, October 2015. Source: ILD.

Estonia-China parliamentary friendship group, received a China Tibet Cultural Ex- change Group dispatched by the SCIO and led by the director of the Information Of-昀椀ce of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Jigme Wangtso. At the meeting, Reps expressed interest in the developments in and a desire to travel to Tibet (there is no evidence of the trip taking place).56

In 2017, Urve Tiidus, a member of the Riigikogu and Estonia’s former minister of culture, a琀琀ended the Forum of Young Political Leaders of Central and Eastern Europe in Bucharest, which was dedicated to the BRI.57

It is important to highlight that the ILD seeks contacts from all sides of the political spectrum  le昀琀, right and centre  and not only with well-established politicians but also with those no longer in o昀케ce. Retired politicians and former ministers are valuable targets. Stepping out of the limelight in most cases negatively impacts their

in the public and private sectors alike  that they keep. In addition, the ILD targets junior or relatively unknown local-level politicians for talent prospecting, with the goal of grooming future cabinet members to ensure that Chinese interests are represented at the highest levels of government  regardless of the outcome of elec- tions.

Finally, the ILD’s “research” grip” refers to the need to supply the PRC central govern- ment with information on international relations and regional developments, party politics and changes in societies.58 In May 2014, a delegation from the Estonian par- liament’s Foreign A昀昀airs Commi琀琀ee, led by then-chairman Marko Mihkelson, met in Beijing with ILD deputy head Zhou Li to discuss, among other things, the situation in Ukraine.59 China wanted to understand how the US and its allies were responding to Russia’s aggression in Europe  i.e., they sought to gain information

56

57“Riigikogu eelinfo reedest pühapäevani, 14. –16. Juulini”, Riigikogu, 13 July 2017.

59“周力会见爱沙尼亚议会外委会代表团”, ILD, 7 May 2014.

 

 

Figure 4: Former Estonian foreign minister Keit Pentus-Rosimannus meeting with ILD vice head Zhou Li in Beijing, 2015 Source: ILD.

that could help Beijing to anticipate the international response to its actions in Hong Kong, the South China Sea and Taiwan.

According to Wang Jiarui, researching and monitoring international developments allows China to take the initiative on global issues that are vital to Beijing, as well as to propose a palatable “China Solution” ( ).60 In 2015, at a meeting in Beijing with then-Estonian foreign minister Keit Pentus-Rosimannus (until recently the 昀椀n- ance minister), Zhou Li said that he wanted to deepen contacts with the Reform Party and share governance experiences. Zhou Li also introduced the Belt and Road Initiat- ive, which the foreign minister found useful for all participating countries.61

Party-to-party exchanges with major parties in Estonia enable the ILD to collect in- formation not only about party politics but also about domestic, regional and EU-level developments. 吀栀is improves the CCP’s decision-making and gives Party leaders the opportunity to propose “Chinese solutions” to both domestic, regional and EU issues. Once “Chinese solutions” have been adopted by local politicians, local audiences can be inculcated with them.

吀栀e ILD and a former culture minister

An example of non-governmental diplomacy in action was an all-expenses-paid trip to China for political and academic representatives from the Baltic states and Ro- mania. In exchanges with PRC actors, the Estonian minister of culture was given the impression that her “China expertise” was increasing when, in reality, she was be- ing groomed to advocate for Chinese interests particularly, the li昀琀ing of the EU’s non-market status.

吀栀e Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU,

) is an ILD front organisation that supplements its diplomacy.62 Nominally a non- pro昀椀t group, the CAFIU was established in 1981 and gained international recognition

60

61“周力会见爱沙尼亚外长、改革党副主席彭图斯•罗西曼努斯”, ILD, 22 Jan. 2015.

 

in 2003 when it acquired consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Coun- cil (ECOSOC). 吀栀e CAFIU’s stated goal is to improve international understanding of China through interaction with political entities, research institutes, NGOs and inter- national organisations.63

In May 2016, a delegation of 19 representatives from political parties, NGOs, think tanks, media and industry from the Baltic states and Romania, led by Estonian parlia- mentarian and former minister of culture Urve Tiidus, met in Beijing with ILD deputy head and CAFIU advisor Liu Hongcai and CAFIU’s deputy secretary-general

During their stay in China, the delegation visited several government-a昀케liated think tanks, research institutes and provincial level foreign a昀昀airs o昀케ces, where they listened to presentations about the CCP’s policy interests in what appeared to be non-govern- mental se琀琀ings. For instance, the delegation listened to the presentations by experts from the China Institute of International Studies and the Development Research Cen- ter of the State Council on the Belt and Road initiative, the Maritime Silk Road, the 13th Five-Year Plan and the 16 + 1 cooperation format. During a trip to Fujian province, they met separately with the vice president of the Fujian People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Li Lin and the vice chairman of 儀甀anzhou

According to CAFIU, the delegation understood that the depiction of China in Western media is one-sided. Tiidus, who had visited China before, said that every visit helps to improve the understanding of the country and its people. A University of Tartu senior researcher in international relations, Maria Mälksoo, was surprised that China is willing to discuss the BRI with such a small country as Estonia. Viljar Veebel, from the Baltic Defence College, stressed the importance of Estonia’s geographical location on the east-west axis, while parliamentarian Andrei Novikov hoped that China and Central and Eastern European countries would join forces in international capacity cooperation ( ).66 According to the foreign visit’s expenditure declara- tion, the 10-day trip to China cost Tiidus 36 euros, while Novikov declared a cost of 500 euros, which included daily allowances.67

No less important than funding the trips was China’s engagement with representat- ives of small EU states. Indeed, it is o昀琀en the recognition and not the remuneration that 昀氀a琀琀ers. In a separate case, unrelated to the delegation’s visit to China, Estonian marine scientist Tarmo Kõuts, holding both Estonian and NATO security clearances, was arrested in September 2020 on charges of spying for Chinese military intelligence. He was paid a meagre 17,000 euros for his betrayal.68

According to the deputy director of the Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO), Aleksander Toots, Kõuts “was motivated by traditional human weaknesses, such as

63“吀栀e Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU)”, CAFIU; “简介”, CAFIU.

65 , “ ”, CAFIU; Xiao Lan, “吀栀e Joint NGO Delegation from CEEC Visited China”, CAFIU.

66 , op. cit.; Tristan Kenderdine, “China’s Trade Policy Shi昀琀 as International Capacity Cooperation

Policy Rebranded”, Russian International A昀昀airs Council, 25 Feb. 2020.

67Anneli Ammas, Tuuli Koch and Cätriin Vuks, “Lähetused Uus Meremaast Helsingi ja Riiani”, Postimees,

24 July 2016.

68Holger Roonemaa and Michael Weiss, “Top NATO Scientist With Security Clearance Busted Spying for China”, 吀栀e Daily Beast, 19 Mar. 2021.

 

 

Figure 5: Urve Tiidus, chair of the Estonia-China parliamentary group, giving a speech at a united front group's trade conference in Tallinn. Source: via WeChat.

money and a need for recognition.” 吀栀e package of pampering included trips to vari- ous Asian countries, stays in luxury hotels and meals at Michelin-starred restaur- ants.69

Tiidus re昀氀ected on the 2016 trip by writing on her blog that she admired China’s willingness to interact with small countries and share its vision of the BRI with all who show interest. She explained that China’s non-governmental diplomacy included昀氀a琀琀ery; presentations were punctuated with claims that “Eastern Europe is the future of the European Union.” 吀栀e BRI was depicted in a positive light with an emphasis on improving international trade and providing win-win solutions for participants but without mentioning any potential threats. Importantly, discussing China’s desire to be li昀琀ed from its non-market status, Tiidus concluded that the e昀昀ort would have no signi昀椀cant e昀昀ect on Estonia or other Northern European countries.70

In 2019, Tiidus, together with Aivar Paidla, head of the Estonian translation unit at the European Economic and Social Commi琀琀ee, a琀琀ended an Estonia-China Investment and Trade Exchange Conference in Tallinn. 吀栀e event was also a琀琀ended by represent- atives from the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC,

) and the China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs

( ).71 吀栀e ACFROC is an o昀케cial part of the CPPCC, while the China Federation of Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs is registered under the ACFROC.72 Ac- cording to Joske, “the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese is a peak united front body for ethnic Chinese with overseas links.”73

吀栀e CPPCC is the highest-level national consultative body comprised of non-CCP parties, mass organisations and elites. It is subservient to the CCP and serves the purpose of consolidating opinions in the 昀椀elds of politics, economy, society and cul-

69Ibid.

70Urve Tiidus, “Kuidas hoomata tuhat korda suuremat rahvast?”, Urve Tiidus blog, June 2016. 71“ - ”, via WeChat, 19 Oct. 2019. 72Joske, op. cit., p. 38.

73Ibid., p. 7.

 

ture.74 吀栀is is possible due to the participation of all the relevant decision-makers inside and outside the party such as CCP elders, intelligence o昀케cers, propagand- ists, academics and businesspeople. In addition to providing a platform for di昀昀erent interest groups to develop messages and distribute them domestically, it also enables the CPPCC to shape the perception of China and the CCP abroad by tapping into its members’ contacts with businesspeople and cultural 昀椀gures without raising suspi- cion about hidden agendas among foreign targets.75

吀栀e Estonia-China Investment and Trade Exchange Conference, where the united front bodies were targeting Tiidus and Paidla, was a signi昀椀cant event for China. Paidla’s employer, the European Economic and Social Commi琀琀ee (EESC), has a say in grant- ing China market status. Paidla’s a琀琀endance at the conference was a symbolic victory for the CCP even if his position as translator likely had no bearing on the EESC’s decision-making. (Despite this, in 2020, China lost its bid to force the EU to recognise it as a market economy.)76 Similarly, Tiidus’s role and involvement in formulating Estonia’s policies towards the PRC has been and continues to be insigni昀椀cant.

Parliamentary friendship with the CCP

吀栀e Estonia-China parliamentary group, established in 1997, currently has 14 mem- bers representing parties in power and in opposition.77 Fully funded trips (like the one discussed above) could be the reason why the group is still popular among Estonians. At its peak in 2011, the friendship group had 51 members out of the 101-member Par- liament.78 Yet, despite such popularity, China is not even among Estonia’s top-ten trading partners.

Over the years, Chinese in昀氀uence has grown disproportionally to its economic in- signi昀椀cance. In 2011, despite the parliamentary group’s large membership, the Dalai Lama still visited Estonia and even met with Estonian politicians in Parliament.79 In 2019, the head of Parliament’s foreign a昀昀airs commi琀琀ee approached the chairman of the Parliament’s Tibet support group on behalf of the Chinese ambassador to inquire about her plan to meet members of the Tibetan government and parliament in exile in Riga. In the end, she did not go to the meeting due to the European Parliament election campaign.80 吀栀at same year, former Estonian interior minister Marko Pom- erants a琀琀ended a closed-door security brie昀椀ng in the Parliament on the threat posed by Huawei. At the time, Pomerants was working for Powerhouse, a communications company that was lobbying for Huawei in Estonia.81

In state visits, the Estonia-China parliamentary group has served as a host; in the early 2000s, its members met with Jiang Zemin, the former CCP’s general secretary and former premier and chairman of the National People’s Congress Li Peng.82 吀栀e

74Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, 吀栀e People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics, Project 2049 Institute, 14 Oct. 2013, p. 33.

75

76“爱沙尼亚-中国投资…”; “China loses landmark WTO dispute against EU”, 吀栀e Japan Times, 16 June

77“Estonia-China parliamentary friendship group”, Riigikogu.

78Merje Pors, “Hiina ja USA parlamendirühmad on riigikogus kõige menukamad”, Postimees, 7 Apr. 2011.

79“Dalai-laama jõudis Eestisse”, Del昀椀, 16 Aug. 2011.

80Roonemaa et al., “Trojan panda”.

81Andres Einmann, “Isamaa Huawei-ohu koosolekul osales Huawei lobist”, Postimees, 21 Feb. 2020.

82

June 2002; Argo Ideon, “Jiang Zemin kutsus Eestit avastama Hiina turgu”, Postimees, 13 June 2002; “李鹏

 

Estonia-China parliamentary group regularly interacts with representatives from the NPC, the CPPCC, the ILD, Chinese companies and the Chinese embassy in Tallinn and has hosted a CCP Propaganda Department delegation on Tibet.83 Each of these institutions represents the CCP and promotes its interests in the region, with a recent focus on the BRI and China’s 16 + 1 cooperation format.

In a 2019 interview, Kalev Kallo, the long-time chair and vice chair of the group (he served in the role from 1999 until 2019, when he was convicted for corruption and forced to leave Parliament), described the platforms and exchanges as necessary for improving mutual understanding and deepening cooperation. But Kallo, who has trav- elled to China 14 times since 1988, failed to concede in the interview that his support

struction of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel — became indistinguishable from those of the

Similarly to the Estonian Parliament, the European Parliament had its own European Parliament EU-China Friendship Group (EUCFG), which counted Estonian MEP Yana Toom as a member. 吀栀e EUCFG was formed between 2005 and 2006 at the initiative of Gai Lin  , who in 2015 became a member of the overseas council of Liaoning province’s PAFFC.85 吀栀e EUCFG was suspended at the end of 2020 following a report on Chinese in昀氀uence activities by Sinopsis.86

Yana Toom’s EUCFG membership paid o昀昀when her travel bill to Beijing and Lhasa in August 2016 was picked up by the CPAFFC.87 Toom returned the favour in May 2017 when she appeared on the Russian TV show Sunday Night with Vladimir Solovyov, which is popular with Estonia’s Russian-speaking audience. On the show, Toom pro- moted the BRI and said that Chinese projects were by nature apolitical and that the development model China o昀昀ered to the world was based on pragmatism.88 Unfor- tunately, Estonia’s own experience with China tells a di昀昀erent story. A昀琀er Estonian politicians had gone ahead with their uno昀케cial meetings with the Dalai Lama in 2011, the Chinese market was closed for several years to Estonian dairy products.

In November 2019, Toom visited Beijing and Shanghai to a琀琀end a China-Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) roundtable and the China-CEEC subnational co-

会”见, 爱沙,尼8 S亚ep议. 2会00爱0. 中友好小组成员”, 人民网, 9 Sep. 2000; “李鹏会见爱沙尼亚议会爱中友好小组成 83Dmitri Dmitrijev, “Eesti-Hiina parlamendirühm külastab koos Balti kolleegidega Hiinat”, blog of Dmitri PRC in Estonia, 27 Sep. 2019; “李超大使举行爱沙尼亚议会爱中友好小组招待会”, Embassy of the PRC

via Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 23 Nov. 2017; “ ”, Embassy of the PRC in Estonia via Sina,

via NPC, 25 May 2010; “ ”,   , 21 Sep. 2019; “

”, Embassy of the PRC in Estonia, 10 July 2018.

85Jichang Lulu, “Repurposing democracy: 吀栀e European Parliament China Friendship Cluster”, Sinopsis, 26 Nov. 2019.

86Ibid.

87Ibid.; Yana Toom, “Deklaratsioon parlamendiliikmete osalemise kohta kutse alusel kolmandate osa- poolte korraldatud üritusel”, European Parliament, 9 Sep. 2016; Laurens Cerulus, “Beijing’s in昀氀uence in European Parliament draws fresh scrutiny”, Politico, 26 Nov. 2020.

88Yana Toom, “Яна Тоом  о том, как в программе Соловьева обсудили новую инициативу Китая”,

Yana Toom’s Bureau, 14 May 2017.

 

operation promotion symposium. 吀栀is time, her travel was paid for by the ILD.89 On 12 May 2020, the Estonian parliament passed two amendments to the Electronic Com- munications Act concerning the regulation of technology used in Estonia’s telecom- munications networks. On 17 May, Toom defended Huawei with whataboutism that blamed the US for crimes Huawei would not have a chance to commit.90

89Cerulus, op. cit.; Yana Toom, “Declarations of participation by Members in events organised by third parties”, European Parliament, 11 Dec. 2019.

90“Yana Toom: Bad Huawei and good America”, ERR, 17 May 2020.

 

3 No city too small: CCP in昀氀uence operations at the local level

吀栀e CCP values subnational relations as an alternative channel to in昀氀uence foreign audiences, especially when national-level relationships are in 昀氀ux.91 For almost 30 years, the CCP has had some success cultivating local-level interlocutors through party-controlled agencies devoted to what it calls “people-to-people diplomacy”. By watering down and obscuring the connections to the party-state, the CCP can estab- lish relations with partners who might not even be aware that they are dealing with the CCP or promoting its interests, which may sometimes con昀氀ict with the national government’s policies or the country’s long-term interests.92 吀栀rough local-level in- teractions, the CCP has sought access to strategic infrastructure in Estonia, whi挀栀 has created opposition and pressure at the local level towards the national gov- ernment’s reluctance to embrace Chinese involvement. 吀栀ese developments should concern not Estonia but also the EU and NATO. In an increasingly interconnected world, the CCP’s access to member states’ strategic infrastructure impacts all mem- ber states and allies.

CPAFFC’s inroads: From the Soviet to the democratic era

吀栀e Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (

) is a key CCP in昀氀uence agency targeting subnational governments. In Estonia, the CPAFFC has spent nearly two decades cultivating local leaders, a strategy that has at times resulted in the endorsement of PRC initiatives at the subnational level that clash with the interests and policies of the Estonian government.

吀栀e CPAFFC portrays itself as a non-government entity, while in fact, it is a “people’s diplomacy” organisation in China’s foreign a昀昀airs system that receives guidance from the Ministry of Foreign A昀昀airs on policy and working principles. CPAFFC-overseen exchanges between sister cities are meant to target local governments, politicians and NGOs through uno昀케cial channels to gather support for CCP policy goals, such as the BRI and the “One-China principle”. 吀栀ey also work to establish a foothold for future in昀氀uence work.93 Previous research has studied aspects of CPAFFC in昀氀uence activities in the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Poland, the UK, New Zealand and the US.94

91Toshi Yoshihara and Jack Bianchi, “Uncovering China’s In昀氀uence in Europe: How Friendship Groups Coopt European Elites”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020, p. 12; Jichang Lulu, “Con昀椀ned discourse management and the PRC’s localised interactions in the Nordics”, Sinopsis, 22 Oct. 2018.

92 , op. cit.

93Lulu, “Repurposing democracy”.

94Codarin et al., op. cit.; Olga Lomová, Jichang Lulu and Martin Hála, “Bilateral dialogue with the PRC at both ends: Czech-Chinese ‘friendship’ extends to social credit”, Sinopsis, 28 July 2019; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Mapping China-in Germany”, Sinopsis, 2 Oct. 2019; Lucrezia Pogge琀琀i, “China’s growing political in昀氀u- ence in Italy: a case study of Beijing’s in昀氀uencing tactics in Europe”, in 吀栀e art of deceit: How China and Russia use sharp power to subvert the West, ed. by Andrew Foxall and John Hemmings, Henry Jackson Society, Dec. 2019; Weber, op. cit.; Łukasz Sarek, “吀栀e CPAFFC as the party-state’s guardian of Polish re- gions’ relations with China”, Asia Explained, 7 Dec. 2020; Hamilton and Ohlberg, op. cit.; Brady, “Magic Weapons”, p. 34; John Dotson, “China Explores Economic Outreach to U.S. States Via United Front Entities”, China Brief 19.12, 26 June 2019; Emily de La Bruyère and Nathan Picarsic, “All Over the Map: 吀栀e Chinese Communist Party’s Subnational Interests in the United States”, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 15 Nov. 2021.

 

Traditionally, the CPAFFC’s local partners are “China friendship associations”, 昀椀rst established in the 1950s and modelled a昀琀er Moscow-led friendship societies.95 吀栀e昀椀rst record of a Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA, ) visit to Tallinn dates back to 1959 and led to the establishment of the association’s Estonian branch.96

According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign A昀昀airs, then-CPAFFC chief Chen Haosu visited Tallinn and Tartu in April 2008 at the invitation of the post-Soviet-

Friendship, a CPAFFC publication, Chen visited Norway and Estonia following invit- ations from the Norway-China Association and the ECA. In Estonia, Chen met with local leaders of Tallinn, Tartu, Rakvere, Viljandi and Kuresaare. Chen’s visit to Esto- nia facilitated early direct exchanges between the CPAFFC and the ECA, which was established in 2007 to “enhance friendly exchanges […] and strives to become an ac- complished friendship-with-China organisation.”98

吀栀e following month, ECA’s head, the Social Democratic Party politician Peeter Kreit- zberg, le昀琀on a ten-day visit to China where he met Chen Haosu.99 吀栀e trip exempli昀椀ed the CPAFFC’s role in the CCP’s use of non-governmental and local-level exchanges to seek access to critical infrastructure. During the trip, the ECA delegation met a deputy chair of the Zhejiang province’s branch of the CPAFFC. At that meeting, Kreitzberg announced that Tallinn and Hangzhou were developing exchange activities, while the ports of Tallinn and Ningbo had signed a freight agreement.100

Although Estonia’s national government was never convinced of the feasibility of the Muuga terminal project in Maardu (and China eventually pulled out of the project),101 it is, nevertheless, signi昀椀cant that such a collaboration has ever been considered for a port that has both commercial and military value for Estonia. Muuga is Estonia’s deep- est commercial port and it has been used by NATO vessels.102 Today, China has access

95Codarin et al., op. cit.

96Nikolai Dolinski, “Hiina-Nõukogude Sõprusühingu delegatsioon Tallinnas”, Ringvaade „Nõukogude Eesti“ nr 47, Nov. 1959, Estonian Film Database.

97“ ”, MFA, May 2020. 吀栀e PRC Ministry of Foreign A昀昀airs website appears to give incorrect dates for the visit. According to both CPAFFC publication Voice of Friendship and Xinhua, the visit took place on 20 24 April, not in May. See: “ ”,

, 22 Apr. 2008.

98Xu Fenghua, “CPAFFC President Chen Haosu and his party visit Norway and Estonia”, Voice of Friend-

99“中国同爱沙尼亚的关系”;; “5 月 21 日爱沙尼亚社会各界人士、驻爱使团及旅爱华人、华侨和

”, Voice of Friendship, 19 May 2008, p. 8; for the English-language translation, see Geng Zifeng, “International Friendship Organization and Personages Send Le琀琀ers of Sympathy to People in Earthquake-it Areas”, Voice of Friendship 150, Aug. 2008, p. 12:

It is likely that the Estonia-China Association, Estonia-China Friendship Association and Estonian- Chinese Union all represent a CPAFFC partner organisation, the Eesti-Hiina Selts (Estonia-China Asso- ciation) registered in 2007 in Tallinn. See “Peeter Kreitzbergi mälestuseks”, Kesknädal, 9 Nov. 2011; “e- business Register”, RIK Registrite ja Infosüsteemide Keskus, accessed in July 2023.

100“ ”, Zhejiang FAO.

101Roonemaa et al., “Chinese investments come with golden handcu昀昀s”; “Ansip ei vaimustu Muuga kon- teinerterminalist”, Del昀椀, 14 Feb. 2008. In 2003, Andrus Ansip as the mayor of Tartu met during a visit to China with CPAFFC head Chen Haosu. See: “ ”.

102“Eestit külastavad NATO laevad”, Estonian Defence Forces, 25 July 2022; “NATO tunnustus Tallinna

Sadamale”, Tallinna Sadam, 20 Apr. 2016.

 

to about a dozen ports in Europe; yet at the time, Beijing was interested in expanding this network to service its own naval ships and project power abroad.103

In 1995, Kreitzberg served brie昀氀y as minister of education and culture (Centre Party), but his political career took o昀昀in Tallinn, where he served as vice mayor (from 1996 to 1999) until being elected to Parliament. A昀琀er an unsuccessful presidential run in 2001, he served as vice president of the Parliament from 2001 to 2005. In 2003, Kreitzberg became the Estonia-China parliamentary group’s chairman; in 2005, he joined the Social Democratic Party.104

吀栀e ECA’s activity ceased with Kreitzberg’s death in 2011.105 A昀琀er a four-year hiatus, a similarly named association was established in 2015. Although no direct links with the old association are known, members of the new Estonia-China Friendship Association (ECFA, ) also have ties to the CPAFFC. One member of ECFA’s board, Marika Katarina Arendia Elita von Wolsky, was previously an entrepreneurship advisor at the Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ECCI), which interacted with the CPAFFC at least since 2003.106

吀栀e ECFA’s networks also overlapped with PRC interests in Estonian infrastructure. Von Wolsky’s partner in an NGO promoting pan-European and pan-Eurasian cooper- ation is the businessman Martin Napa, who declared bankruptcy in 2016.107 In 2015, Napa and a former Reform Party parliamentarian, Tõnis Kõiv (currently chairman of Rae Parish council), acted as representatives for the Hong Kong businessman 吀栀omas Fok ( ), who unsuccessfully sought to acquire the Estonian gas company Eesti Gaas to start exports to China.108 According to Kõiv, Fok was also interested in devel- oping a Baltic logistics centre in Tallinn and se琀琀ing up manufacturing of high-tech goods.109

吀栀e late Henry Fok (霍英東), Henry Fok’s father, was — according to the former

tycoon”, who had allegedly proven his loyalty to the CCP during the Korean War by smuggling weapons and medicine to China.110 Henry Fok reached the upper strata of Chinese politics by serving as vice chairman of the leading united front body, the CPPCC, between 1993 and 2006.111

In 1992, 吀栀omas Fok was arrested at JFK International Airport in New York for con- spiring to smuggle weapons through the United States to Croatia. He was charged with illegal import of weapons into the US and with conspiring to launder cash from

103Frank Jüris, “吀栀e Talsinki Tunnel: Channelling Chinese interests into the Baltic Sea”, International Centre for Defence and Security, 3 Dec. 2019.

104Madis Filippov, “Peeter Kreitzberg suri Hiinas”, Postimees, 3 Nov. 2011; “Peeter Kreitzberg saadeti

viimsele teekonnale”, Del昀椀, 18 Nov. 2011.

105“Peeter Kreitzberg suri Hiinas”, ERR, 3 Nov. 2011. 吀栀e association was deregistered in 2012. See: “e- business Register”, RIK Registrite ja Infosüsteemide Keskus, accessed in July 2023.

106“MTÜ Eesti Hiina Sõprusselts” teatmik.ee, accessed in July 2023; “Eesti Kaubandus-Tööstuskoda”, Es-

tonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

107“Concordia asutamine (2010)”, Conventus Terra Mariana, 11 Jan. 2010; “Martin Napa”, Conventus Terra Mariana, 4 Dec. 2019.

108Andres Reimer, “Chinese billionaire plans to buy Eesti Gaas”, Postimees, 14 May 2015; “„Pealtnägija“:

kohtus areneb ülisuur eraisiku pankrot”, ER¸R 17 Feb. 2016.

109Tõnis Kõiv, “Talinnasse Hiina merevärav?”, Tõnis Kõiv blog, 4 June 2015.

110Christine Loh, Underground Front: 吀栀e Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong, Hongkong University Press, 2019, p. 207.

111Jonathan Cheng, “A life that re昀氀ected change”, 吀栀e Standard, 30 Oct. 2006.

 

 

Figure 6: Tõnis Kõiv and Hong Kong businessman 吀栀omas Fok in 2014 in the Estonian parliament. Source: Tõnis Kõiv's blog.

the transaction.112 In 2016, Fok’s business partners were arrested in China under sus- picion of “illegally acquiring public savings”. 吀栀eir Liubao (Beijing) Investment Fund Management ( ) company had been selling investments in fake energy-sector projects.

Although it has not reached the older friendship association’s level of prominence in national politics, the ECFA has been more active disseminating Chinese propaganda on social media. Posts on the ECFA’s Facebook page have virulently a琀琀acked local criticism of China. At one point, they demanded an o昀케cial apology from the Esto- nian government by saying it “should 昀椀rst pray in front of God, a昀琀er that pray in front of the Chinese embassy in Tallinn and then ask for forgiveness from the PRC’s ambassador His Excellency Mr Li Chao.”114

吀栀e ECFA argued that failing to cooperate with China would jeopardise Estonia’s ability to purchase protective gear from China during the 昀椀rst wave of the COVID- 19 pandemic. 吀栀e friendship association likely took this approach because Estonia’s economic relationship with China was statistically insigni昀椀cant. In 2022, for example, exports to China accounted for about 1% of the country’s total exports, while imports from China were li琀琀le more than 3.8% of the total.115

112Jim Mann, “Hong Kong Is a Top Gun in Arms Tra昀케c”, Los Angeles Times, 18 Jan. 1992.

113

示之子第涉九批20失亿联基私金募黑机幕构银的行公行告长”,参A与sset 飞Ma单nagem搜e狐nt财As经so《cia潜ti望on》of China, 2 Sep. 2香01港6; 霍张氏婷旗婷下, “霍私英募东基

 

 

金1无14 法联系”, 全球金融网, 11 Jan. 2016.

 

””,

 

, 21 June 2016; “

 

“Selle asemel et amokki joosta, võiks palvetada kõigepealt Jumala ees, seejärel Tallinna Hiina Suursaatkonna ees ja paluda vabandust Hiina RV suursaadik T. E. Mr Li Chao ees”, Estonia-China Friend- ship Association via Facebook, 21 Mar. 2020.

115“Visualizations”, Statistics Estonia, accessed in July 2023; “Kahepalgeline Eesti! Kui õues lillepidu, siis

vaename riigi tasandil EU ja USA tuules Hiinat, kui kõik pekkis, siis põlvitame Hiina ees”, Estonia-China Friendship Association via Facebook, 21 Mar. 2020.

 

Another aspect of CCP propaganda that the ECFA ardently promotes is China’s role in the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel.116 In this regard, the ECFA is no di昀昀erent than its pre- decessor. Both actively campaigned for China’s access to Estonian strategic infra- structure  from ports to energy to logistical hubs, projects that are o昀琀en dependent on local leaders who are not obliged or accustomed to thinking in national security terms.

吀栀e CPAFFC’s 挀栀arm o昀昀ensive

吀栀e CPAFFC’s cultivation of the Estonian political landscape began at the subnational level and has been going on for nearly two decades, thus spanning more than half of the country’s post-Soviet independent history. In 2003, years before the establish- ment of the Estonia-China Association, exchanges began between the CPAFFC and the Association of Estonian Cities and Municipalities (AECM) on the initiative of the Chinese ambassador. For the AECM, the goal was to deepen economic and cultural cooperation with China. “For China, Estonia is a new and additional channel for com- munication with the EU”, said the AECM’s then chairman, Jaanus Tamkivi.117

It was an unequal relationship from the very beginning. 吀栀e AECM, a voluntary union of Estonian urban and rural municipalities, was created to represent the common interests and development goals of local governments.118 吀栀e AECM’s counterpart, the CPAFFC, despite portraying itself as a non-government entity, is a key CCP in-昀氀uence agency in the foreign a昀昀airs system targeting subnational governments. To some extent, such targeting has succeeded where three consecutive AECM activity plans between 2010 and 2021 prioritises cooperation with the CPAFFC.119

For the CCP, the CPAFFC’s relationship with Estonian cities and municipalities provided a 挀栀annel to continue cultivating local politics while punishing the coun- try for its national policy. Estonia’s relationship with China reached a low point in 2011 when Estonian politicians uno昀케cially met the Dalai Lama despite the Chinese embassy’s protests. Shortly a昀琀er, China changed gears in its local-level interactions: in 2012, the CPAFFC and the Xiamen PAFFC (a city-level equivalent) separately signed cooperation agreements with the AECM.120

Besides bilateral meetings, the CPAFFC organises the China International Friendship Cities Conferences ( ), with a stated goal of promoting the establishment of sister cities that the CCP perceives as an in昀氀uence channel. 吀栀e AECM and its member cities have been invited to and have a琀琀ended several editions of these conferences.121 Multiple Estonian cities have established coopera-

116“Kas Brüssel võib keelata Hiinal Helsingi-Tallinna tunneli rahastamise? Kas seljuhul rahastab Brüs- sel ise Finest Bay Area Development Oy sajandi suurprojekti?”, Estonia-China Friendship Association via Facebook, 19 Mar. 2019. For additional reading on the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel project and potential security risks, see: Jüris, op. cit.

117“ ”; 2003. aasta tegevusaruanne, Association of Estonian Cities and Municip-

alities, 2003; Oliver Rand, “Linnapea Jaanus Tamkivi sõidab Hiinasse”, Saarlane, 7 Nov. 2003. In 2018 the Association of Estonian Cities changed its name to Association of Estonian Cities and Municipalities.

118“English”, Association of Estonian Cities and Municipalities, accessed in July 2023.

119“Tegevussuunad 2018-2021”, Association of Estonian Cities, 27 Feb. 2018; “Eesti Linnade Liidu tegevus- suunad 2014-2018”, Association of Estonian Cities, 4 Feb. 2014; “Eesti Linnade Liidu tegevussuunad aastateks 2010-2013, Association of Estonian Cities, 2013.

120 , “ ”, CPAFFC, 13 Nov. 2012; “

 

与1的21 民间对外交往活动”, Xiamen PAFFC, 11 July 2019.

斯、爱沙尼亚、立陶宛”, CPAFFC, 30 Sep. 2015.

 

张敏, “友城联合会工作组访问俄罗

 

tion agreements with Chinese counterparts, including Tallinn (with Beijing, Hang- zhou and Chengdu), Maardu (Changchun), Tartu (Ningbo) and Narva (Xiamen).122 In 2019, Pärnu was on the verge of signing a cooperation agreement with Qingdao, but in the 昀椀rst half of 2023, Qingdao was still missing from Pärnu’s friendship cit- ies list.123 While most of these partnerships are purely symbolic, some might be de- signed to match China’s interests in Estonia. Maardu, with a population of just over 15,000, signed its second sister-city agreement with one of China’s most populous cit- ies, Guangzhou, in September 2021. 吀栀e Muuga port in Maardu has been working to develop ties with China since at least 2008.124

Comments from a leading o昀케cial of one of the AECM’s partners in China illustrate the political nature of these relationships. Qiu Yongcai , a former deputy chairman of the Xiamen PAFFC, explained in an interview that the role of “people’s diplomacy” in China’s foreign policy is to expand China’s “circle of friends” by establishing friend- ships with cities, ports and schools. 吀栀e cities’ foreign exchanges help to promote the central government’s proposed strategies, such as the “community of shared destiny”,

BRICS and the BRI.125

吀栀e political focus goes beyond words. In 2016 18, the CPAFFC and its provincial branches promoted the BRI and 16+1 cooperation as important platforms for enhan- cing economic relations with China to Estonian policymakers, o昀케cials, subnational leaders, business owners and the public. It did so by organising events such as an anniversary reception, a business and culture exhibition and a folk concert.126

Since 2019, Chinese companies have shown interest in 昀椀nancing and building the

127

mayor of Tallinn and a former culture minister  supported the project by stressing its local signi昀椀cance. “What is important is that this tunnel will bene昀椀t both Tallinn and its neighbouring municipalities, as well as all of Estonia”, Terik said.128

吀栀e central government turned down the project due to economic, security and envir- onmental concerns. However, the Union of Harju County Municipalities (represent- ing municipalities from Northern Estonia) wanted the central government to proceed

122“ ”, City of Tallinn; “Tiiu Kirsipuu skulptuur Hiinas”, Eesti Kun- stnike Liit, 17 Oct. 2019; Toomas Raag, “Hiinas Chengdus avati Eesti kunstniku skulptuur”, Pealinn, 8 Oct. 2019; “Kohalike omavalitsuste koostöö”, Embassy of Estonia in China; “Pekingi suhted”, City of Tallinn; “Maardu sõpruslinn Changchun”, Maardu panoraam 7, July 2014; “ ”, Changchun Municipal People’s Government; “Sõpruslinnad”, City of Maardu, accessed in July 2023; “Narva sõprus- ja partnerlinnad”, Narva city government.

123Eno-Gerrit Link, “Linn küsib volikogult aktsepti Hiina miljonilinnaga sõbrustamiseks”, Pärnu Pos-

timees, 13 June 2019; “Välissuhted: sõpruslinnad”, City of Pärnu government.

124

94 城”, China News Service, 3 Sep. 2021; “广州市与爱沙尼亚马尔都市结为国际友好合作交流城市”,

125

126徐玖男, “中国与爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛建交 25 周年招待会在京举行”, CPAFFC, 13 Sep. 2016;

”, China-Central and Eastern European Countries Economic and Trade Cooperation Network, 18 Sep. 2017; “

“, Liaoning PAFFC, 16 July 2018.

127Built quietly over the years, these local-level contacts can become useful to China’s foreign policy at strategic junctures. 吀栀e Tallinn-Helsinki private sector’s lead project, which seeks to build a tunnel connecting the capitals of Estonia and Finland, is an excellent example. Jüris, op. cit.

128“Tallinn council chair: Tunnel with Finland would bene昀椀t all of Estonia”, BNS via ERR, 14 June 2019.

 

with preliminary studies despite those concerns.129 In April 2021, the governments of Estonia and Finland signed a protocol of common intent pu琀琀ing the project under the management of both countries, thereby making it part of the planned Trans-European Transport Network.130 Estonia’s Reform Party (in power at the time of writing this re- port) is supportive of the tunnel project. Its 2023 election platform says that the project is in

Estonia’s national interests and the government should 昀椀nd ways to sup- port the project. Tallinn-Helsinki potential tunnel should be economic- ally feasible, and in cooperation with trustworthy private capital trans- parently 昀椀nanced.131

吀栀e CPAFFC’s interactions with Estonian policymakers and political leaders at the EU, national and subnational levels help the CCP to promote its interests in Estonia and create positive sentiment toward its BRI projects. Even when these projects are not in Estonia’s long-term strategic interests or fully supported by the central government (as is the case of the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel), these relationships enable the CCP to pressure the central government to implement policies that the CCP favours.

CCP propaganda funded by Tallinn taxpayers

Partnerships that the CPAFFC establishes with local governments can then be used by other party-state agencies involved in in昀氀uence activities. A propaganda o昀昀ensive in Tallinn o昀昀ers one example.

吀栀e capital’s sister-city agreement with Beijing has provided a framework for holding annual Chinese New Year celebrations. Ostensibly apolitical, the events are produced by a PRC government agency within the propaganda system. Local authorities are unlikely to understand the institutional a昀케liation and motives of their Chinese counterparts. 吀栀is is even less likely among common citizens, making the partner- ship a convenient vehicle for CCP propaganda.

Tallinn’s exchanges with Beijing began in 1992 and a sister-city agreement was signed in 1998. In 2008, Tallinn-Beijing relations reached a new high when mayor Edgar Sav- isaar led a delegation to China and met with CPAFFC head Chen Haosu and Beijing Mayor Guo Jinlong. Before that visit, only multilateral-level exchanges had occurred under the auspices of the Association of Estonian Cities or during business delega- tions’ interactions with Chinese counterparts.132

During Mayor Savisaar’s trip, Tallinn agreed to follow Helsinki’s lead and start or- ganising the Chinese New Year celebrations, promising to provide 昀椀nancing and hu- man resources for the events.133 Despite the local Chinese community being minus- cule, Chinese New Year has been celebrated in Estonia since 2009 and every year since 2011.134 In 2021, the celebrations cost Tallinn around 60,000 euros. In 2022, a vir-

129Joakim Klementi, “Harjumaa Omavalitsuste Liit tahab Helsingi tunneli eriplaneeringu algatamist”, ERR, 14 Aug. 2020.

130“Estonia to sign intent agreement to build tunnel with Finland”, ERR, 23 Apr. 2021; “Economic a昀昀airs

minister: Tallinn-Helsinki can only be state project”, ERR, 23 Apr. 2021.

131Reformierahonna valimisiprogram 2023 Kindlates kätes Eesti, Reformierakond, 14 Jan. 2023, p. 25.

132“Pekingi suhted”, City of Tallinn, 16 July 2018.

133“Visiit Hiina Rahvavabariiki Pekingisse, Ningbosse ja Hangzhousse”, City of Tallinn, 12 Nov. 2008.

134“Hiina uusaasta”, City of Tallinn, 3 June 2021.

 

tual program was held due to COVID-19 restrictions. 吀栀at program cost an estimated 10,400 euros.135

吀栀e partnership’s propaganda potential was made clear during the Tallinn mayor’s 2008 visit when the delegation a琀琀ended the 2008 Hangzhou international friendship cities mayors’ summit. According to the Hangzhou Foreign A昀昀airs O昀케ce, organising mayors’ summit was part of the city’s “external propaganda o昀昀ensive” that reached a foreign audience of 11 million.136

吀栀e institutional background of the PRC organiser of the Chinese New Year celebra- tions, presented to the Estonian side as apolitical cultural events, indicates that the party-state sees these events as a vehicle for propaganda. 吀栀e Beijing Culture and Tourism Bureau ( ) provides both experts and content for these festivities. In the Chinese political system, the domain of culture belongs to the pro- paganda machinery. 吀栀e bureau’s head, Chen Dong  , was previously an assistant inspector at the Beijing Propaganda Department.137 吀栀e vice head of the bureau, Pang Wei  , is also a career propaganda cadre, with previous postings as vice head of the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Press and Publication and the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Radio and Television. She currently oversees the work of the bureau’s subordinate unit  the Beijing Overseas Cultural Exchange Centre (BJOCEC,

). 138

吀栀e BJOCEC states on its website that it has organised “Happy Chinese New Year” celebrations and cultural events in 30 countries, including Estonia.139 According to the BJOCEC, the celebrations in Finland and Estonia have already become “a highly anticipated local winter holiday and an important social welfare project for the local governments.” In the eyes of propaganda workers, the localised and market-orientated approach has enabled Chinese culture to take root by cultivating understanding, rais- ing awareness and promoting love towards China.140

Propaganda cadres have been directly involved in the Tallinn events. Pang Wei at- tended the 2019 edition.141 In 2021 and 2022, the BJOCEC provided a virtual program for the celebrations that were shared on the Tallinn city government’s social media platforms. 吀栀e closing credits of the 2022 virtual show listed Chen Dong, the bureau’s chief, as the producer and Pang Wei as the executive producer.142

135Johannes Tralla, “Analüütik Hiina uusaasta üritusest: Peking loodab draakonite abil mõjujõudu suurendada”, ERR, 12 Feb. 2021.

136“ : ”, Hangzhou FAO, 26 Apr. 2009; “Visiit Hiina

Rahvavabariiki Pekingisse, Ningbosse ja Hangzhousse”, City of Tallinn, 13 Nov. 2008.

137“ ”, [Chen Dong will replace Song Yu as the director

via Baidu. In 2018, the Beijing Culture Bureau and the Beijing Municipal Commission of Tourism Development were integrated into one entity with the name of Beijing Culture and Tourism Bureau. See 138“,”庞微任  文化局副局长晋秋红接任“, 石景山,区16委N组ov织. 2部018长. ”, 中国经济网, 11 Dec. 2014; “政府

139

140“发布会实录：北京努力打造具有世界影响力的国际文化节庆活动，助力国际交往中心建设发

141

爱1沙42 尼亚大使李超出席 ” 欢乐春节 ” 室内演出专场”, MFA, 14 Feb. 2019.

via Wechat, 10 Feb. 2021; “Hiina uusaasta 2021”, City of Tallinn via Facebook, 12 Feb. 2021; “Hiina uusaasta tervitusprogramm 2022”, Tallinn Culture & Sports Department via YouTube, 31 Jan. 2022.

 

吀栀rough these super昀椀cially apolitical events, the CCP’s propaganda organs work to improve the PRC’s image by engaging sceptical audiences. In 2021, media coverage of the celebrations quoted one audience member: “Of course, I have heard that China is not that democratic, and about the issues with Tibet and the Dalai Lama, but here in the pictures it sure looks pre琀琀y.”143

143Tralla, op. cit.

 

4  CCP united front work and Estonian academia

In 2022, the Estonian Internal Security Service’s annual report devoted a paragraph to the activities of the CCP’s united front agencies, noting that their objective was “to control members of the Chinese communities living abroad and to ensure their ideo- logical purity and loyalty.” 吀栀e report added that the CCP United Front Work Depart- ment (UFWD) and its subordinate agencies coordinate “the activities required by the CCP concerning Chinese communities abroad and their organizations, including in Estonia.” 吀栀e picture accompanying this chapter of the report shows a UFWD deputy head posing with a group of overseas Chinese community leaders, including a senior university administrator who has been active in Estonia and Australia.144

Academia’s role in united front work

United front work is a political model for consolidating power by forging alliances to support the CCP’s policy goals. Its overseas functions include political in昀氀uence and interference, intelligence gathering and technology transfer (a topic that has been researched extensively in Australia).145 According to a 2021 report, the united front work system

comprises an array of agencies, led from the party centre by a leading small group chaired by a Politburo Standing Commi琀琀ee member and co- ordinated by the United Front Work Department ( ,

UFWD) under the Central Commi琀琀ee.146

吀栀e Chinese diaspora is one of the main targets of the CCP’s united front work. Agen-

for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reuni昀椀cation  guide or control networks of nominally independent diaspora organisations around the world. In countries with large Chinese communities, such as Australia, united front-linked organisations o昀琀en vocally support PRC policy and have at times served as vehicles for in昀氀uencing local politicians.

Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) are o昀琀en explicitly guided by education o昀케cials at PRC diplomatic missions and maintain exchanges with the united front agencies in China. As Joske notes:

Numerous Chinese students and scholars’ associations, which are united front groups for Chinese international students, have been involved in suppressing academic freedom and mobilising students for nationalistic activities.147

吀栀e Baltic Chinese Association

Estonia, with a tiny Chinese community of around 400 people, lacks the networks of the united front-linked diaspora groups found in countries like Australia.148 How- ever, one Estonian organisation that shares some of the characteristics of these global

144Klemm, Estonian Internal Security Service Annual Review 2020 2021, p. 24.

145Joske, op. cit.

146Codarin et al., op. cit., p. 27.

147Joske, op. cit., p. 4.

148“Rahvastik kodakondsuse, soo ja elukoha (asustuspiirkond)”, Statistics Estonia, 31 Dec. 2021.

 

networks has gained a high pro昀椀le, with its founder becoming a senior academic ad- ministrator and opinion leader on issues concerning China.

吀栀e Baltic Chinese Association (BCA, 波罗的海华人联合会) — also known as the

) was established in 2013 and claims to have more than 500 members from Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia.149

Yin Jie   , a BCSSA member and former doctoral student at the Estonian Academy of Music and 吀栀eatre, is known for harassing critics of China, including Hong Kong students, on social media and posting personal details about them on pro-China Face- book pages.150 吀栀is is similar to other examples of harassment involving Chinese Stu- dents and Scholars Associations on campuses in Australia, Canada, the UK and the US.151

According to the BCSSA’s website, the chairman of its board is Zhang Xiaotian

, who completed a doctorate at the University of Tartu in 2013. 吀栀e Estonian Research Information System notes that, since 2017, Zhang has held the positions of deputy vice president of Shanghai University (SHU) and director-general of SHU Global in Shanghai.152

A photograph of Zhang and a top UFWD o昀케cial appeared in the 2021 22 Estonian Internal Security Service annual report’s section on united front work.153 吀栀e pic- ture was from an event in April 2016, when Zhang participated in the “39th Overseas Chinese Association leaders study group” (  39

) in Xi’an, together with 53 Chinese leaders from Central and Eastern Europe. 吀栀ey were there to “improve overseas Chinese leaders’ quality, promote team building and simultaneously encourage combining the construction of the BRI and national devel- opment with personal career development.” 吀栀e event was a琀琀ended by Tan Tianxing

, then a deputy head of the UFWD and the secretary-general of the Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reuni昀椀cation of China.154

吀栀e 2016 group photograph featured in the intelligence service’s report was not Zhang Xiaotian’s only participation in united front events. In September 2019, Zhang par- ticipated in SHU’s United Front Symposium dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Zhang gave a speech as SHU’s International Department’s dir- ector, in which he shared his experience studying and working abroad for ten years, expressed gratitude for working at SHU a昀琀er returning to China and discussed his determination to repay the kindness to the motherland.155

149“ ”, Baltic Chinese Students & Scholars Association, 15 Sep. 2013.

150Kertu Liisa Mooste and Ode Maria Punamäe, “Tartu ülikooli Hongkongi tudengid langesid tagakiusu ohvriks”, Postimees, 5 Aug. 2020.

151Laura Mannering, “Hong Kong students in UK call for action over pro-China threats and harassment”,

HKFP, 31 Mar. 2020; Lin Yang, “China-Sensitive Topics at US Universities Draw More Online Harassment”, VOA, 20 Nov. 2020; Gerry Shih and Emily Rauhala, “Angry over campus speech by Uighur activist, Chinese students in Canada contact their consulate, 昀椀lm presentation”, Washington Post, 14 Feb. 2019; Daniel Hurst, “‘吀栀ey’re being watched’: Chinese pro-democracy students in Australia face threats and insults”, 吀栀e Guard- ian, 29 June 2021; Steven Chase, “McMaster student union strips Chinese club’s status amid allegations group is tool of Chinese government”, 吀栀e Globe and Mail, 26 Sep. 2019.

152“Xiaotian Zhang”, Estonian Business School; “Xiaotan Zhang”, Estonian Research Information System.

153Klemm, op. cit., p. 23.

154“  39 ”, 4 Apr. 2016; “ ”, China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reuni昀椀cation, 24 Sep. 2019.

155 , “ 70 ”, SHU, 27 Sep. 2019.

 

 

Figure 7: Participants in the 39th Overseas Chinese Association leaders study group, a琀琀ended by United Front Work Department deputy head Tan Tianxing (昀椀rst row, centre) and BCSSA chairman Zhang Xiaotian (昀椀rst row, 昀椀rst from le昀琀). Source: .

Beyond the Baltic Chinese Association, Zhang has achieved remarkable success as an administrator at some of Estonia’s top universities. Soon a昀琀er 昀椀nishing his doctorate, Zhang was appointed to senior university administration posts in Estonia. In 2014 15, he served as the chief specialist in international cooperation at the University of Tartu rector’s Strategy O昀케ce, which is responsible for relations with Asia.156 In 2020 21, he

owned business university in Estonia. From 2017 to 2022, he also served as vice rector of science at Kazakhstan’s University of International Business.157 As of 2022, Zhang was associate deputy vice chancellor at Curtin University in Australia.158

In Estonia, Zhang has promoted cooperation with China by organising business for- ums. Between 2009 and 2015, his companies Raatuse International Trade and Baltic China Group organised four Baltic-China annual business conferences.159 Conference speakers diversi昀椀ed over the years. In 2010, all speakers were from academia.160 In 2012, the speakers’ list featured local-level leaders from Scandinavia, a Chinese dip- lomat in Tallinn and an Estonian policymaker.161

156“8.juunil toimub Baltic-China Annual Business Conference”, Enterprise Estonia, 20 June 2015; “Member”, Baltic Chinese Association; “Xiaotan Zhang”, Estonian Research Information System.

157Ibid.; Irina Karachun, “Lecture from Xiaotian Zhang ‘E-Commerce Development’”, Belarussian State

University, 6 Sep. 2022; “2017 UIB-Finland Science & Research Week”, University of International Business, 10 Oct. 2017.

158“Professor Xiaotian Zhang”, Curtin University; “Xiaotian Zhang, PhD”, LinkedIn, accessed in July 2023.

159“Baltic-China Business Platform”, Raatuse International Trade; “Baltic China Group”, Yellow.Place; “Estonia”, Statistics Estonia, last modi昀椀ed May 2023.

160“Baltic-China Annual Business Conference”, City of Tallinn, 2 June 2010.

161“Baltic-China Annual Business Conference”, University of Tartu, 19 Sep. 2012.

 

However, one of the most interesting speakers at the conference that year was Tan Hongxin , the president of Coway International TechTrans (

). Coway, a subsidiary of Tsinghua University, was established in 2002 under the Tsinghua International Technology Transfer Centre ( ) with the aim of introducing foreign technology and scienti昀椀c know-how to China.162

吀栀e conferences Zhang co-organised evolved into high-pro昀椀le events, a琀琀racting the participation of senior Estonian 昀椀gures and entities linked to the CCP’s in昀氀uence agencies. By 2015, the conference had gained bipartisan political support. Chinese ambassador 儀甀 Zhe  and the head of the Estonian parliament’s Foreign A昀昀airs Commission, Hannes Hanso, both gave speeches. Another speaker was Mark Hedley of the China-British Business Council, a British lobby group that brings together some of Britain’s largest companies and promotes trade and investment with China.163 吀栀e council was founded in 1991 with the backing of the 48 Group Club, a London-based NGO dedicated to promoting trade between the PRC and the UK.164

In January 2016, Zhang participated in an event organised by the Tallinn University Confucius Institute (CI) to promote BRI. At that gathering, Zhang gave a presentation on the status of China’s development, bilateral economic relations and the implement- ation of BRI.165 吀栀e Confucius Institutes are part of the PRC’s propaganda apparatus. In 2010, Estonia hosted the man overseeing the propaganda system at the time, Li Changchun , at the opening of Estonia’s only CI, at Tallinn University.166 In November 2020, Zhang and Chinese ambassador Li Chao published companion art- icles in the Estonian business daily Äripäev calling for greater economic interaction with China.167

162

际”人, 才港 via 上海国际人才网, 20 Oct. 2020; “Core business”, Coway International TechTrans; “中心简 163“8.juunil toimub Baltic-China Annual Business Conference”, Enterprise Estonia, 20 June 2015; Tõnis Kõiv, “Baltic-China majanduskonverents”, Tõnis Kõiv’s blog, 29 June 2015; “Contact us”, China-Britain

Business Council; “Find an adviser”, China-Britain Business Council.

164

165“吴岩参赞参加孔子学院公共外宣活动”, MOFCOM, 29 Jan. 2016.

167Xiaotian Zhang, “Xiaotian Zhang: Hiina järgmine Suur Plaan, Äripäev, 29 Nov. 2020; Li Chao, “Hiina suursaadik Eestis: Hiina kiiresti taastuva majanduse võimaluste jagamine”, Äripäev, 30 Nov. 2020.

 

5 Conclusion

CCP in昀氀uence activities in Estonia are a multi-system e昀昀ort that involves actors from the CCP’s foreign a昀昀airs, propaganda and united front systems. 吀栀e International Liaison Department actively interacts with several major parties in Estonia through meetings, sponsored trips and organised conferences designed to continue support for PRC interests, regardless of who is in power.

For instance, the ILD has — through sponsored trips to China, e昀昀ectively engaged

status against the best interests of Estonia and the European Union.

At the same time, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Coun- tries, also from the foreign a昀昀airs system, has used cooperation and sister cities agree- ments, sponsored trips and conferences to push Estonian policymakers, the business community and political leaders from European, national and subnational govern- ments to advocate for and implement policies favourable to the PRC.

Target groups unfamiliar with China’s political system and either unaccustomed or not required to think in national security terms have channelled CCP propaganda, supported BRI projects and engaged with a Chinese-backed Hong Kong businessman with a dubious background. O昀케cials in Tallinn, without fully understanding their partner organisation’s ties to the CCP propaganda system, have enabled and funded the dissemination of CCP propaganda for more than a decade through co-organising Chinese New Year celebrations.

吀栀e CCP’s multi-system in昀氀uence activities in Estonia demand a complex response based on rigorous research and reporting using Chinese-language sources. 吀栀is is the spirit in which this report is presented: to raise awareness among di昀昀erent tar- get groups and invite a broad public discussion on Estonia’s long-term foreign and security policy goals.

 

A挀欀nowledgements

I am very grateful to all my colleagues who greatly facilitated this project and thus en- abled this analysis. I would like to thank independent researcher Jichang Lulu for his guidance and comments throughout the research and writing process; Martin Hála, the director of Sinopsis, for his cooperation and continued support; and Indrek Kan- nik, Ivo Juurvee and Tetiana Fedosiuk of the International Centre for Defence and Security for their invaluable contribution throughout the research process.

Sinopsis is a project implemented by the non-pro昀椀t association AcaMedia z.ú., in schol- arly collaboration with the Department of Sinology at Charles University in Prague.

Frank Jüris is a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn, Estonia. His research focuses on China’s domestic and foreign policy, EU-China and Chinese-Russian relations. Jüris studied in Estonia and Taiwan and has lectured at the universities of Tartu and Tallinn. In recent publications for ICDS and Sinopsis, he has exposed the involvement of party-state agencies in Arctic infrastructure projects and Estonian politics.