Chapưr One

The Easy Come Bar 1

Chapter Two

Spying Has One Purpose 11

Chapter Three

The Basic Principles of Spying 17

Chapter Four

Who Is a Spy and Who Is Not 23

Chapter Five

The Making of a Traitor 35

Chapter Six

The Art of Deception 49

Chapter Seven

Exercises in Deception and Intelligence Collection 65 

Chapter Eighí

It's More Than Telling Lies 75

Chapter Xine

The Case Officer at Work 97

Chapter Ten

When a Private Citizen Recruits 105

Chapter Eleven

Surveillance 119

Chapter Twelve

The Basic Steps: Phase One 125

Chapter Thirteen

The Basic Steps: Phase Two 143

Chapter Fourteen

The Security Aspect 157

Chapter Fifteen

Case Studies 181

Conclusion

The Successful spy 201

Chapter Oĩie

The Easy Come Bar

T

he Easy Come bar wasn't the favorite spot of the thousands of GIs who took their R&R in Bangkok in 1969. Most Viet vets who spent time in Thailand will remember such places as the Hollywood. 1'hai Heaven, the Miami, the Green Dragon, and the California.

The Easy Come sat by itself, almost at the end of New Phetburi Road. For a GI bar in the R&R years, it was a small place, just a bar with six stools and four booths along one wall. I walked into the place one afternoon looking for possible spouts-the water taps of information in the business of for¬eign intelligence collection. I was working for one of a dozen different agencies in the alphabet soup of spies and diplomats that stalked the streets of Bangkok while war raged a few hun¬dred miles to the east.

I sat in a booth, ordered a beer, and pretended for the moment that I didn't understand a word of Thai as three pret¬ty girls slid into the booth with me, one beside me and two on the sear across from me. I fended off questions about where I was from and how many hours I had been in Bangkok while I slowly sipped a Singha beer. As the girls chattered on, I looked the place over while I listened to what they were celling each other whenever they spoke their own language. 

I also rook a good look ai the Mamasan-the woman who managed the girls and cook (he money when a customer decided 10 buy a girl out for the evening. A (all. picrty Eurasian woman in her early thirties, the Mamasnn sal behind the bar, watching with dark brown eyes everything rhat hap¬pened around her.

The Mamasid caught me looking ac hei and she smikđ. Ĩ decided insunily that I wa gning ro do my r)ff・ducy drinking in the Easy Come until 1 got to know her d whole lor better. I've always had a thing for smart, compcrcnt, strong, good¬looking women. I lefr the girls sirring in the booth and walked over TO the bar. carrying my bonlc of Singha.

She looked up and focused on me ÍIS I asked her what her name was.

uConnic, with no last name," she told rnc and went back to working on (he account book.

1( took another four visits before she sraned ulking enough ro tell me her father had been a Dutchman who had lived in T hailand. He had taken Connies Thai morher as his wife a few months before che Japanese captured and killed him during Wuild Wax II. She had grown up poor and claimed she had opened the bar with money won in (he lliai lottery.

I told her (hat I was a bright young American soãologisc working with (he Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA> and was trying to discover how the 'ITui government could win the hearts and minds of i($ rural popu¬lation before rhe Comrnics took over.

Maybe it was my suspicious nature, maybe i( was because I was trying to Jeam everything possible about the spy busi¬ness. but the more afternoons and evenings 1 sat in che Easy Come, sipping on a beer in a back booth and watching the parade of GIs on R&R and how well (he girls handled them, the more whac started as a tiny suspicion burning in the back of my mind became an open name.

Counterinrelligence wasn't my game in those days. 50 when I cx>uldn\ fight off the suspicion anymore, 1 cook a lieu-

RCNNING A RING C)P SPTHS 

tenant colonel working in Milirary .Assistance Command, Thailand (MA(71HA1) wirh one of the military inrelligencc surviexs iniu (he Easy Come fur a beer one afrern(x>n.

At first, George concluded there was no way Connie might be what Ỉ was afraid she was. Then, a couple of weeks hicr. an cxciccd George walked into my office and cold me he'd spotted Connie sirring with a group uf American officers and their wives in the officen» club ar che Chao Prava hotel. Wondering what ail R&R bar Mamasan was doing mixing with the Amcriom military elite, George asked one of (hose officers about the bcaunful Thai woman and learned tha( Connie was a good friend of several miliuiry wives whom she had met in one of the Chfisrinn churches in Bangkok. None of che ofiiccrs' wives appeared lu have any idea that Connie was a successful R&R madam on New Phcỉbuíi Road.

'Ihc new information made George as suspicious abolir whac Connie really was M I had been. Because he didn't think il VÚSC (har he go back imo the Easy Come, he asked me to keep dropping in on Connie and playing che dumb govemmenr civilian hoping fc)r an impossible love, l'hai was fine wirh me, and after a while Connie and 1 got (O be very gcxxi friends—to the point where 1 learned chat while all iho$c American wives though] Connie was a devout Christian. a large bronze stame of Buddhaon a pedonai in one coiner of her bedroom.

To this dav George C3n*r prove that Connie was doing uhat we both decided she had (O be doing, but she was prob- ab:y one of die most clever intelligence cnsc officers who ever “Diked rhe busirw*.

George never was sure for whom she was working, either, k could have been (he Russians, Red Chinese, or North Koreans. Of she might even have been an independent intel¬ligence entrepreneur. But whoever she served、che gobs of mfornution Connies girls squeezed, fondled, and drew out of rhe parade of Gl$ who wandered into the Easy Come almost certainly went straight to Hanoi.

The dozen girls who worked in the Easy Come at any one  

time were all a hit prettier, a lor more cnrhusia^lic at love¬making. and a whole lot srnarrer than (he average girl jusc off the farm servicing GIs in rhe other places along the I^etburi strip. Connie's girls all spoke English, dkhougli sometimes heavily accented, bue always well enough to ask questions and listen carefully while a guy fresh from a good orgasm bragged about whac a great soldier he was.

The Easy Come girls were great actors who could sell an illusion of love as quickly as Houdini could slip out uf hand- cuffs. Most of (he time, a grunt who spent a night WKh one of Connie s girls didn't go lewking fór love anywhere else ior rhe remaining days of his R&R. If he did wane a change of vagi¬nas, he wcn( hack 10 (he Easy Come (O find it. Ac least once a week, some soldier left town in desperate iovc with one of the Easy Come girls. Many of rhem kept writing rhe gưl for weeks and nionrhs after rheir R&R, A few signed up fur an extra tuuf in Nam just SU (hey could get a 30 day leave and take IC in Bangkok in (he arms of one of Connie\ girls.

It wasn't ju$r vets from Viccnam whu found the Easy Come. 711CÍC were 40,000 U.S. airmen sutioned in Thailand during rhơsc years, and a couple of thousand members of the other armed ser\ ices worked out of rhe Juim United Succi Miliurv ."\ssisunce Group (JUSMAG) and M.ACl HAI com¬pound located near the U.S. Embassy on Wireless Road. Mu$r of them considered a visit to che R&R bars the worst kind of slumming, bu( if they happened co tumble into rhe Easy Come. Connie made sure they iound something a little extra special that brought (hem back cime and again. I know of fnur different girls from the Easy Come who married Bangkok¬based Gl$ during (he years 1 cracked events in the bar. and at least half a dozen more who did cour-long shack-ups with C.S. military personnel. Every lime a girl left tu take up a full-time love situation» Connie would find another who fit (he special personality of the Easy Come girls.

Probably 99 percent of the grunts who found rhe Easy Come didn't have much worth knowing locked up in their gonad-driven brains. Bur it was a dirx-chcap spy network with the U.S. GIs paying for most of chc cost out of the money they had $nved for months before getting a seal on an R&R flight. Connie was learning details about unit S17C and location, paưol opcíaùonal techniques, ambush mechcxls, unit morale prob¬lems, pending troop movements, beach defenses, river patrol routes. GỈ black market aciiviucs、and damn near anything else □ GI might know about how America v%a$ fighring the war in Vietnam.

As for the guys sweioned in Thailand. cvcr\T secret known m the JCSMAG compound, including planned bombing rar- gc($ in Laos, was at risk any time a soldici stepped into the Easy Conic.

Connie had that knack for spotting 3 poỉcnrial payoff that makes a ease officer a master of rhe trade. ()ncc in a while, one of che R&R cuscomers would kt i( slip That he was work¬ing someplace importani. like maybe the Military Assistance Command. Vietnam (MACV) compound in Saigon Of a brigade headquaners up nonh. Marks like that went back to Mctnain and would soon dicicaftcr meet a little Vicinamele hooch girl, or maybe even 2 European female employee with some international aid 0íganÌ74tion who seemed co know instinctively ju$r exactly what the young man liked when ic came to loving. None of rhe Americans had any reason to sus・ peel ihat cheir sudden good luck m Saigon was difccrly tied to their R&R and rhe girls they left behind in Thailand.

Occasionally, someone would spill something big. George U IS sure thac one of Connie•$ cusromcn lee slip the wrong bit of information back in Saigun to a French secretary working for a trading company, which resulted in a sapper attack that killed an Army of Vietnam (ARV;N) (wo-star generai in an explosion in a Saigon restaurant. ĨÌI always be convinced chat It was another of Connies customers who blew che informa- tiuii about the sufprise attack inco Cambodia (hat allowed the Vietcong command structure to disappear before the troops gut ro rhe urget. 

Connie wasn't ju$( working the R&R trade either. Playing her second role as the devour Christian Eurasian» she was doing all sorts of friendly Things to help the U.S. military and embassy wives she met at church on Sunday survive the expa¬triate life in Bangkok. She arranged up-country crips to old temples, sec up cultural nights where the Americans could watch Thai dancing, and even organized a 'Fhai-American Buddhist study group.

She also helped rhe American ladies find household help. *I*he Thai women whom Connie sene around co work as cooks, maid5. and baby-sicccrs weren't quite as young and prccry as the giil$ sitting al (he bar in (he Easy Come, but (hey were bright, they spoke passable English, rhey worked hard, they Treated ihc faranz (American or European) kids witli lots of love, and they didn't steal. Although none of the wives ever figured it our, or perhaps didn't want tu admit it even to themselves, Connie's maids were also ready and willing co give che man of rbe house a quick lasrc of Thai love in the servants' quarters while his wife was off studying Thai eulnirc with Onnie.

George,s military spooks never told (he Thai government uhat they were sure Connie was doing. They didni issue any warnings co the troops or warn the gaggle “military and embassy uives that their house servants were probably spying for (he Conimunists.

Smarr intelligence officers den、aiiC$r, murder, or destr。y ĩhc public image of good spies. *rhey eithet use them Of neu¬tralize rhem. bur rhey always cry nor ro let the spies know they have been made. In rhe spy game, the devil you know is a thousand times better (han the devil you don'c know. Đcsííoy â spy ring you know about and a new spy nng you know noth¬ing about will soon be watching you.

After I alericd George about my suspicions of Connie and the Easy Come, he SCI up a section in his own organi^ĩìon that did nothing but monitor Connie and her activities. For the next (WO years, every GỈ whn wandered into the Easy (为me was photographed and identified by someone working  

L for George. Those who were nothing but mud grunr$ wenr I back to 'Nam. fought the war. and lived or died without ever I lu5pvciing hou close (hey had come co a nujor spy ring.

Those who did have access to information of porcnrial incelli- I Renee value wtnc back to \ icuiarn to find that new duties I iwaiccd (hem rhac kept rheir hands off classified documenr$ I and their asses much closer to real combat.

The same thing happened wi(h (he Bangkok officers* I wives and their husbands who stepped into Connie's web. Most E of(hen)V^CÍC never iold rhe rrurh about Connie. Ilie wives kept I going on Uf>-countr>- trips and sitting through cultural education classes while dicir housemaids(augỉỉt ỉheií husbands (he $ub(lc differences becueen Asian and American feminine anatomy.

A kw guys did get sudden Uansfers. like one L.s. Air r Force embassy attache I personally knew who suddenly t found himself flying combM missions out of Ubon while his family went back to the States.

Connie kepr collecting a lor of infnrmarion, v>mc of it probably useful tu those whu icceivcd lief product. Wha( else was happening was that George s councerincclligcnce group suíủĩig feeding Connie's gids bits and pieces of false mfor- I mation. Some of the guys filtering into the Easy Come Of I cncouaging their wives tn ukc one of Connie's up-countr\- “ip、knew exactly uhat (hey were doing-paiticipa(ing in what eventually became the single most effective disinforma¬tion campaign we had going in Sourheasr Asia unril rhe rime we pulled out of'Nam.

For example, a rumor once suddenly flashed through the MACÌ HAI compound rhâr enrirc companies in 1 Corps were unable ro climb out of bed because of a new and virulent niuution of pcmcillin-resisunr gonorrhea spreading through the troops. Within da》、・ the officers' wives were all talking abuui it as (hey took one of Connie's up country(np$. A week laccr, a Vietcong battaiion launched a series of surprise attacks in 1 Corps expecting co catch sick troops nor fir for combat. They died on the wire in droves.

On another occasion, one of rhe US Anny's bc$r snipers and his sporrer cook an R&R ac the same time in Bangkok and wenr straight from cheir hotel IO the Easy Come. Five days later, on the last night uf a glorious time, the TWO of them gut skunk dnink with two of Connie's girls and started talking rọ each other abour their plans for taking out a key Nonh Vietnamese battalion commander.

If the twu men had really done what they talked about doing (har night in Bangkok, they would have walked straighc inco an ambush. Instead, B-52s carpet-bombed rhe area, churning into hamburger (WO companies of rhe crack northefn troops committed (O rhe ambush.

This was an especially succe^ful counrerintclligencc operation because George doubled Connie's entire spy ring withouc making any dirccr contact with a single member of rhe enemy ncrwnrk, a real coup in the intelligence game. While ir is almost impossible to estimare rhe actual impact of the clever use of human resources in any spy operation. Connie unknowingly passed on enough false information chat she probably did more ibf (he U.S. war vffon than many of (he inrelligence ease officers working on our side.

Like all good things, it didni last forever. Evcnrually, some general in Hanoi must have begun IO suspect that the information supplied by Connie's spy ring was no longer as valuable as it had once been and that much of it noe only proved to be inaccurate but it somecimes backfired. The more chat happened, the less they could rnist any information she produced for rhem.

In late 1971.1 lefe Bangkok for a cour in another parr of the world. The last time 1 dropped by to see Connie, she looked nervous. dlmo$ĩ like she was frightened about something. I had gone in che Easy Cunic for a last good-bye and to cell her a cover story char I was quitting my government con((acc job and going home to get a hw degree. Weeks before chat, she had started hilling rhac maybe we should get a lot friendlier chan we alfcadv were, which was pretty damn friendly. 

,lust before I gor up from her bed co leave, she asked me why I didn't marry her 3nd rake her with me to wherever 1 was going. It was A serious offer, and I might have taken her lip on it if (here hadn't been a wall of lies between 11$ that neither of US could ever bleak down.

1 saw Connie once more: in 1984 when I spoued her in 3 shopping ccnccr in Cnstal Ciry, Virginia, just a few miles Rom (he Pentagon. She was hanging onto rhe sleeve of a guy Ỉ rec¬ognized as someone who had been assigned ro 卜[ACTHAl t>ack in the war years as an army major in the dvilian contract t office. Tuo kids just shon of (hcii teens were Mgging along I behind Mama and Daddy as they looked al new refrigerators.

Its nut hard to figure 0U( how Connie ended up in the I niccd Stares, manied with children. Georges counterespi¬onage opciaiion was so highly classified that Connie's name [would have never been pul into any visa lookout files, nor the Elcx>kour files of other agencies. The guy she married had no Idea what his wife had done during the war years or how his own government wa5 using her wirhouc hvf knowing ic.

As 1 stood watching her rhai day in Cryqrd Ciry, Ỉ envied I the guy jusc a bit. Then she turned and rne sunding there. She iCvugnized me, bue she neither smiled nor wrouned. The man said somcihing. and she ruined, gave him 卜 big smile, reached up. and kissed him on die cheek. When I the finished the kiss, she turned and looked back ai me fbi ■u«r a second, making sure 1 had seen rhe kis>. Then she Rurned and walked auay. her arm locked with the arm of her Amcncan husband. 3 Norman Rockwell picture of (he perfect ■ross*cuhurjl marriage.

Like dll guvd intelligence case officers, Connie could Ibuild a great illusion and make it seem $0 real that it reaily

The son of a bitch looked a$ happy as any married man tr^c ever seen who was caking the family on a shopping trip. 

Chapter Two

Spying Has One Purpose

,丁 nowing the enemy s defense plans, the secrets of a new wenpon sysrcin, or rhe munsi state of a

JLXk. political leader Can co$( or save thousands of vcs. depending un who has the knowledge and huw they ut it to use.

(iood'spies can keep a government our of war. and incom- tent spies can get a government inro a war that can*r be >n Governments doni just spy on enemies ĩhreatening war. Í1C Cold War is over, but both che CIA and the KGB are still business, and (he intelligence case officers of dozens of din rent enun cries recruit and run rings of spies trying ro uncov¬er trade secrets, political plots, and military plans, as well as :plans of (Cirorisc groups scattered around rhe world.

Government also spy on theif own ciĩizcns. The FBI tries infiltrare (he Mafia and dozens of ocher organized criminal >ups, and the IRS not only colicela and examines (he finan- 1 documents of most major corporations as well as millions privare citizens, but also actively recruits and pays snitches ling to rar on their friends and employers for profit. 

I rs NOT JUST GOVERNMENTS

THAT HAVE REASON TO SPY

?\lmost all of us will ac some lime know something tliat will give u$ an đdvanrage over someone else. Jubl a$ likely, we will sooner or later lose something deaf and important to US because someone else found OIK something we thùufthc only uc knew 3txmt. Even, one uf u$ spies on someone else at one time or another.

♦ A mother rna> listen in on a teenage son\ call to a giil- ffiend. hoping she will learn that (he girl i$ not pregnane

♦ A man will drive by a girlfriends house to make sure she fcally is home with a cold.

♦ A wife u ill carefully examine the dirty clothes her husband brought hack from a trip vul of town, looking for signs of lipstick vf strands of blond hair.

♦ An employee will sneak a look in rhe boss, file cabinet, try¬ing co find nut who will get the next piuiiioiion.

♦ A father will cheek out hi$ daughrers boyfriend with a crcdir bureau.

ALMOST ANYONE CAN HAVE A

GÍX)Đ R1ÍASON TO RECRUIT SPIES

We can ill face a situation in which someone has informa¬tion MC mu$( have in order to survive or live well, and che only wav we can get i( is to stcdl ir. Yet, most actions involved in stealing information—burglary, phone tapping, and bribery一 are illegal acl、with heavy punishments.

The safest way to steal information is ro recruit someone who has access (0 che information who can steal it Ibi US with linlc risk. Here arc ju乂 a few examples of how ordinar%- peo¬ple might (cervi( someone cn spy on someone else.

♦ A professional gambler wants an extra edge so he can bet the  

odds char ochcis sex lie reenms as spies trainers, assibUnc coaches, sccrcurics» bus drivers, office managers, and even custodians and janitors who uork for pn>fessiorwl and college Sports teams. His recruited spi= provide bits and pieces of informaiiun on team morale, injuries, personality clashes, drug abuse, mining practices, and any ocher informacion that might have an impact on (he outcome of a game.

• The American Cancer Socicn- recently discovered iu pri¬vate papers, dating ro Oewber 1979, in Philip Morris docu¬ments unveiled by Th Azar Ỵộrk Tim” and accused the tobacco industry of spying on the socicry in the 197()5 co learn how il planned to address the idea of safer cigarettes.

• Tom White is 3 successful buyer who has spies working

I for him in three of the majoi insurance companies that handle many of rhe claims of injured panics rIbm repre¬sents in coufC. As a result of (he insider knowledge his spies provide. Tom almost never goes to COU1Ỉ. When he , docs, he wins because he knows rhe suengths and weak¬nesses of the ocher side $ ease.

p Dan Cocker has made several million buck5 in the stock marker using insider informnrion he collects from a h" [dozen spies working in majuf investment firms.

WHAT (ÍOVERNMENT

SECRETS SHOULD YOU KNOW?

Americans deni just have good reasons for spying on each l^hcr Just as an intmsivc government spies un its own cici- Mns. so cirizcns often have good reason to spy on rheii gov- bnmciK. The Mafia has been doing it for years.

Various action groups across the political specrnim, rang* k from kftist radicals try ing lú discover CIA covert opera- ibns in Larin America co the new cirizcn militia groups WOÍ- irted about (he Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco and F irearms, are Ipying on govemmenc agencies.

Persons who are called investigative reporters arc often  

intelligence opcranves trying to recruit government employ¬ees n$ spies so thev can make money and fame by revealing the government^ dirty sccrccs in headline stories.

Many of your fellow citizens as well as citizens in other countries have been spying on governmenr officials for a long time. For instance：

• No one knứu$ how many real estate speculators around the enuTury have tapped into [he sccrcc planning meetings of county commissioners. $race highway deparcmenu. and ciry and planning commissions.

• Any executive ufiker of any big coloration who isn't col- leering daily information from a ring of spies Uúíking in rhe federal agcncie-s dial control and rcgiilace every 35pecc of his business could be heading down a fast Hack co failure.

• One uf (lie untold secrets of the business of lobbying Congress and state legislatures is char many lobbyists are more inreresred in intelligence than vote buying. U.S. con¬gressmen and senators would be horrified if they knew how many people on their staffs are regularly passing informa¬tion on to people represenring businesses and industries that they are earned ng for more rcscriccivc rcgulanon.

• Employees of the IRS, the Security Exchange Com¬mission, the Patent Office、(he Food and Dnig .'\dmin- isrracinn. the Federal Trade Commission, (he Office of Safvtv and Hcakh Administration, and on through (he alphabet soup of bureaucracy* all have tons of commercial information chat ebey arc supposed to keep secret. Yer each of those agencies has hundreds of unhappy, angry, in・ debr employees who can be recruited (O provide such con- fìdentiai inforrnalivn.

• A recent Associated Press report described how (he Cali drug caKcl has been spying on top government officials in Colombia. The operation gathered intelligence chai when leaked co (he press embarrassed rhe Colombian president and threatened the stability of the govern mene.

WHO IS SPYING (.)!N YOU?

Even if you live a life in which you c<»n'( imagine that you [Would ever have to spy on someone else, you may be rhe sub- jett of someone else'5 spying. If you arc the leader in a com¬petitive industry, ever get involved in politics、rake a public toosition on any divisive issue, or have a nice home and posi¬tion in your community and people envy you. you know Kỉrncĩhing rhac someone else can use against you—if he can Bnd out what it is. It may be a manuiaccufing ccchniquc OÍ process, a special recipe used in a restaurant you own, a guard- fed list of clients, an idea for a new invcnrion, your credit card pd Pl、numbci^ a secret love affair. 3 past you've overcome. * bit of extra income you doni rcpofc on youí ỈRS fonn. Of a vice chai you keep hidden from the world.

If you want to prorecr your own sccrcrs, you musr know (bow successful spies operate so that you have some chance 3t HXXting the person who you think is a loyal friend, 3 lover, a irusted employee, or a harmless, casual acquaintance, but Itho. in fact, is out to steal your secrets and give them co zhe Herson who will use them tn do you rhe most harm.

Prorccring yourself from ths匕 who would Stea] your ftcrctb is as much a part of a personal defense srratcg\T as arm- Bg yourself and guarding your fence lines.

Before we gu any iurlhcr. a note on semantics is in order. Hi AD effort at brevity and clarit%; I will use (he pronouns he ln<l as nongender specific, facher than using the more Bkkwajd phrases ỉư or $ỉư 01 Ais or her. This does not mean that •males do not make excellent spies and ease agents. In fact, .me of rhe most dangerous spies and effective spy masters have been female, as the examples thfoughouc (his book make abucdanrly clear. 

ìpỉer Three

rrhe Basic

Principles of Spying

There are several diffcrcnr ways to steal scercu. Among khc most effective of these means arc rhe following three:

Observation and Sur^^ilỉance： A spy sneaking into rhe emy camp to enunr (he sick and wounded, or hiding in the see while others talk outside rhe door, is engaging in obscr- :»on and surveillance. Modem coverr suiveillancc includes

ing satellite phorography, planting secret microphones, ercepting Telephone calls, surreptitiously reading mail, and

ny nrhci techniques.

The many technical advances in radar, sonar, spy 皿eHites, g-disrancc and high-alcinidc photography, high-tech eleerron- inrerccpu. laser and parabolic mike audio collecxion, minia"

zed microphones and video cameras, electronic signal intcr-

and coinpucer-ba/vcd deciphering of encrypted ses arc M designed ro improve methods of coven obien acion

id suncilhncc. Modem narional intelligence agencies spend c great majority of their budgets on high-tech surveillance.

The/t and Burglar)： This is a frequent plot in spy movies id spy literature. "I'hc hero burglarizes an embassy, cracks e M化、takes picture of the secret documents, and (hen  

sneaks away with no one the wiser. Despite cheir popuhficy with authors nf «ipy scorics. burglar%- and rhefr arc seldom used in rhe real world of spying. They are t<x> high risk with too lit¬tle chance of success. It was such an ACtempt at burglary rhac eventually brought down President Richard Nixon.

The Inside spy： This means using 3 human being who has direct ncccs^ to valuable secret knowledge to steal chat knowl¬edge. Some examples are the confidential inibiniant in a dnig gang who is under the control of DEA agents, rhe FBI plant driving a group of bombers around town while they plan ro blnw up (he World Trade Center, the Soviet colonel passing UII KGB secrets co a CIA contact, the U.S. Marine embassy guard entrapped into spying by a pretty girl he met in a Moscow cafe, or Aldrich (Rick) Ames, rhe CIA officer who made millions passing secrers ro rhe Soviets while he drew his U.S. government paycheck. I'his is what iniclligence officers are talking about when thev u$c rhe word Hl*\ÍĨNT when discussing intelligence collecting activirics. (HLM1NT stands for human intelligence, char is, inĩCliigcnce collected bv □ human being rather rhan by capturing an clcccconic sig¬nal or uking pictures frotn a sacellice.)

Despire the fact that human spies siili operare in much the s*mc way they have for the 加st several hundred years, the spy van often obtain inlbrmation and intelligence that cannot be discovered by other means. The inside spy nor only can gâin access to documents and plans locked up in 义fes, he can provide informatiun on what people arc talking abolir in pri¬vate, rhe perwnalic^' srrengrhs and weaknesses of enemy leaders, internal strife within an enemy organization, and the espionage techniques che enemy is using to steal secrets.

Sometimes rhe human spy can be an incredibly cheap source of intelligence, even though the prod oct is extremely valuable. Such a / may not even know that he is providing information €O the enemy. Thai was the ease wi(h all those guys on R&R who walked into the Easy Come in Bangkok.

SPIES CAN DO MORK

THAN JUST STEAL SECRETS

Once an intelligence officer fccruirs a spy inside an enemy ip. he has someone ar hi$ command who is not only able to li 5CCÍCÍS but who can also engage in a variety of coven ions char Will cause rhe enemy problems. A spy inside an my camp can engage in sabotage and spread rumors and (hat mislead the enemy jnd may even destroy the reputa* IS of leaders. The lemprarion to use spies for more rhan iling secrets is 3 problem every national intelligence agenev' :S・ Even intelligence agency and rhe^e who hire the inreh nee officers must always balance the demand for intelli-

Since against the demands for using a spy for covert action.

Whereas【his book uill focus Ofi the recruitment of spies the intention of stealing secrcw, anyone can use the ■me methods Ĩ0 recruit a spy who will destroy properry, lose Bk>. tell lies, spread rumors, play dircy【ricks that dcmoral- ■ the enemy, and engage in other destructive activities. Kiso, a spy who has been stealing secrets can often be redi- Acted IIHU sabotage.

SPY RECRUITMENT FACTS

;Pick up any catalog of books on espionage and invcsiiga- Bon techniques and you will find lots of titles explaining »2 tu search chrough public records, even more rides ■escribing surveillance cccliniqucs as well as the high-tech kuipment available for surveillance and how to use i(. They 3g also lou of books telling a potential spy how tu ■kk locks and open safes. You can learn how to make bombs Ind dozens of diflerent kinds of gadgets and cools that can be for Sabouge, how to tail a Suspect, how co spo( someone Kling you. and how to use computer encryption programs $0 心1 can send messages that no one except the person you Bild them co can read. 

In all those ifistruccions on how(0 spv, you will find almost noching explaining how ro iccruit 3 spy who will repon scab infcrmaiiun from inside che enemy s camp.

The secrets of how to recruu spies arc dscly guarded by (how who have learned how to use them. Such ^jvemnwnt intelligence agencies 35 rhe CIA, KGB. British MI6. and che Mossad go 10 incredible effom ro ensure chat (heir methods of recruiting spies axe noe exposed co public view Anyone who works fo€ any of those agencies must sign a contract agreeing co never reveal rhe spycrafr secrets learned while working 3s an intelligence cullecror.

ITie inrclligence agencies of powerful world guvernmenu don't keep these trade secrets ro chemselvcs. The secrets of spy recruitment are anything but scciel berween agencies. l,he KGB knows evers thing rhe CIA knows about rhe differ- enr ways to recruit a spy. Noching in this book is going to tell che KGB, PLO. Mafia, drug cancls, or even the inick ligcncc Services of Such countries as Peru. Bolivia, Cuba, and Uganda anyrhing thev doift already know.

Government inielli^encc agencies keep their recruiting techniques hidden from rhe public because they don't want the general population knowing how they recruit and spies. Illis sccrcọ serves rwo purposes. First, it makes it ESy for government agencies lu reernir oidinan* ãlkens as spies because such people don't spor (he warning signals iliat they arc being recniKcd. Second, the sccrccs helps a government ensure char its citizens don't start spying on 1( and finding out just how incompetent, and sometimes cnminaL it can be.

A SPY IS ALWAYS A TRAITOR

A spy steals information from people who trust him and to whom he owes loyalty and then gives or sells〔hai valuable information to rhcii enemies. Mose people don*r want to become traitors, and, just as imponant. those who would willingly become craitOf^ arc almost never in positions where ihcy have access tu secret infoimation cha( an enemy might mne co SCCAI. Therefore» rhe incelligence collector must Wecruit spies who will do his work in such a way that 1) the :recruits don't realize char (hey arc spies, 2) he fools them jliuo chinking they are not really doing anything so terrible, or 3) he traps ilicin in a situation in which (hey have no choice bur co give rhe enemy intelligence officer the infor¬mation he demands.

This i$ rhe primary craft of the intelligence cx)llcctor who must rely on human resources—(he art of convincing people 10 commie rrcason againsr chcir counny, cheir employer, their political associates, their friends, and even thciĩ loved ones.

Once a citizen understands rhe means nf convincing peo¬ple ro spy on chose who trust them, he has the tools he can use to learn che sccrcrs of an inrnnive government, the big corpo¬ration. the labor union, law Innis, a criminal organization, or any other powerful group that wants to control his life and ukc his money and wealth. Just like che armed citizen is the primary defense against both the criminal and an unjust gov¬ernment. so too is the citizen who knows and understands the crate of recruiting spies prepared to defend himself against che criminal as well as a government intent on limiting the free¬doms of its own citizens.

Poliricians and bureaucrats don't wane you to icain che sccrtu of spying for the same reasons they don't want you to keep vour arms or your right (0 self-defense. ,rhc craft of spy¬ing can be a$ important a weapon in the defense of yuur free。 dem as any yuu van load and lock.

Despite the secrecy under which they arc bulled, (he principles and secrets of spying arc rchrivcly simple co learn and practice. Anyone who wants to discover informarion someone else is holding can recruit and organize a ring of spie and put them co work ferreting out the fcquircd infor¬mation. Il need not be char expensive: a successful intelli¬gence-collection operation may consist of as few as wo or three people. 

Chapter Four

Who Is a Spy and Who Is Not

、employees of the CIA, KGB, M16. Mossad, Qf íỉny other inrcrnarional spy agency consider 丄 、themselves spies. 1 hey will insist (har they are loyal employees of their government, whose job it is tu recruit spies. Often liicy work in (he embassies of rheif counrn- and arc idenrified as diplomats or other government employees. Sometimes they work undercover as businessmen, journalists, students, or tourists, and sometimes they 2>ncak into (he coun¬try as dl电ak、(hat is, someone pretending co he a national or a kgal TCMdent of (he(aígci country.

Regardless of what cover they work under, they not only don': consider themselves to be spies, they almost always hold in contempt the people llicy recruit as spies and consider them (O be low-life traitors co their own counưy and culture.

Intelligence officers who recruit and run spies co spy for (hem are called case officers, or case agents. The spy、OÍ (he a^ni. as he is called in more police(alk( is (he crairor who sclis Of gives away secrets he has been entrusted to keep safe. I bis book explains how (he ease officer does his work and how any ordinary citizen can practice the same skills in (he private collection of incclJigcncc. The case officer is the keystone of all HUMINT i n te 11Ỉ ge ncc-col lection opera* cions. Every ring of spies has a case officer who recruited each spy and who controls and manages rhe activities of each link in che ring.

THE AÌTRIBUTES OF A CASE OBFICER

In his book The Craft ộf InkllÌỊẸtn^ ,Alien Dulles listed rhe personal acuibutes of a good case oflker as someone who pos- assess the foliouing characreristics:

♦ i$ perceptive about people

• works with orher» under difficult conditions

• is able co distinguish bciwecn fact and fiction

• is able to disringuish between the essentials and the non- essentials

• poss-cs inquisiuveness

• pays attention to deuil

• has good oral communicadnn skills

• knows when co keep hi$ nwuth shut

♦ undersunds other points of view, and

, is highly morivated and does not depend on public recognition

Dill心 also claimed chat lie preferred to recruit the good, honest citizen and train him co be an inrclligence officer rather than to seek Out people who arc naĩurally devious, con¬spiratorial. or wily.

If Dulles actually t>elicvcd chau it explains why v.s. intel¬ligence has so often failed、especially in the recruitment of human resources. “Bo、Seen心”who respect and obey the rules of honesty, cru^tworrhincss. loyalcy and friendship don,( do well as ease officers, who necessarily have to be devious, conspiratorial, and dishonesc

My experience with U.S. coven intelligence officers who did produce gcxxỉ intelligence by reenncing spies successfully is (hat they were indeed naturally devious and chat they cook  

to the career they chose like wolves to the hunt. rhey con- ndcrcd ihc ability (O deceive 10 be a major pare of a ganw (hey enjoyed playing, and they developed greac pndc in their abil¬ities lu deceive.

DIFFERENT WAYS TO FIND A SPY

The person who wants to recruit and manage a ring of spies has several different types of pcfsonalitics he might recruit tn do the dirty work of spying. Each different type becomes a spy for a variety of diffcicnc reasons and cmoiion- al morivarions.

UÌÌC Inadvertent Spy

Illese aie people like all these Gls who walked into (he Easy (2ome while on R&R in Bangkok. They don't deliberate¬ly become spies, buĩ inscoid give away secrets wirhour know¬ing what they are doing. ,ITicy are men and uonicn with loose lips, bad judgment, and careless securicy actinides, who talk business with colleagues in bare and restaurants and who brag about cheir work co their lovers, their friends, and sometimes to pcctccx $(rangci$. They arc (he sources of informarion that intelligence officers like most of all. They cost little or nothing VO culcivarc, and rhev presene few risks tn rhe ease officer.

For the private citizen who is crying co gc( information on a competitor, a local government agency, a businessman with whom he is having 3 dispute. Of a bad neighbor nr personal enemy, the inadvertent spy can often be the only source one needs ro cultivate. The trick is to figure out how to get such a ptrwn talking about what he knows withoin letting him guess that he is making a big mistake ĩhac may cost dearly

1Ĩ1C Defector as a Spy

Much of (he intelligence information cha( (he Uniced States collected from human resources during the Cold \Vâr came from people who fled the Soviet Union or one of the other communist countries. Most were anxious to share any secrets they biờughc out wi(h them in exchange for new iden-tities and a chance to live in suburban America. Although most refugees fleeing the communist paudises had lidie or no intelligence informacion, occasionally a defector would come from the KGB, che 5ỈOVÌCC military-, or some impondnt min¬istry. That didn't happen all that often, however, because though life in che 5ỈOVÌCC Union was hard and bmial. those who successfully built careers in the government bureaucracy or military command snucturc enjoyed a living standard far above (hat of most citizens.

When defections from rhe upper ranks did occur, the intelligence usually had value for a limircd time. The Soviet security apparatus, knowing that the defector had (led ro the West, would immediately initiate a damdge-conirol o(Kratinn by changing code books, withdrawing case agents and spies rhe defector might know about, and sometimes even moving critioil plants and weapons Icx^rions.

A good ease officer can encourage someone (O dcfecc by using many of the Same techniques used ro rccniir spies. However, it makes much more sense to reciuit a spy chan to encourage someone to defect. A spy will continue to provide intelligence for many years: a defector is a O!ie-timc intelli" gen ve source.

High-ranking Soviet defectors would sometimes contact Wes(em intelligence officers pfiur co their defection and anempr co make a deal for resettlement in renirn for incelli- gcncc information. When that happened. Western intelli¬gence officers would cry to ulk the potenrul defector into remaining in place for 3 few months or vcaf5 and servili* as a spy. There is no evidence that many porcntial dcfeccor^ bought into such a deal.

The Soviets benefited from very few defectors from (he Western ranks. In most cases ill which Western citizens wkh incel- ligcnce infommion defected, they were lung-cin>c spies such as Kim Philby, who fled to avoid capture after being exposed as a spy. 

*l*hc Walk-In Spy

Peupie sornetinies walk in and volunteer to spy. That's BMhac John Walker, a U・S. Navy petty officer working as a [code clerk, did when he walked into the Soviet Embassy in Washington. D.C.. carrying with him a collection of stolen Hocumenrs as evidence of what he could provide. Walker Iwas motivated purely by a desire to make money, and he ;eventually proved to be one of the most valuable spies che KGB ever ran.

CIA agent Rick Ames did the same thing, although he didn't have to walk into the Soviet Embassy. His job put him [dirccdy in contact with Soviet inrclligcncc ofiiccfS, and all he had to do was drop a few hints that he was looking for new sources of income. Ames did his narivc country even more damage than Walker.

One reason why so few Americans ever dcfccrcd co the Soviets is that the American who was willing to sell out his country could live very well by suying in place for years, enjoy¬ing che advantages all of US in (his coun(i> enjoy, plus the extra luxuries paid for with the money they earned 35 traitors.

Despire (he ÙCI rhac u-alk-ins can be very valuable, most covert intelligence agencies don't crust them. Oliere is always the suspicion that the walk-in might be a plant (rhat is, a deliberate auempi by (he enemy to spread disinfoiiliaiion and fake intelligence) Uf d tucul fraud-someone trying to sell inrelligencc he doesn't have and can,t gee.

Everxune knows(ha( (he CIA, KGB. M16, and every other incelligence agency around the world will pay good money lur sccfcr intelligence. A surprising number of people chink they can cash in 31 that by pretending to have access to secrets when rhey don't. Sometimes fraudulent walk-ins arc psychotics who believe they are getting secret iniormatiun from psychic vibrations, foreign spaceships, or a tooth filling that picks up radio waves from distant countries. Niorc often, the frauds arc deliberate crooks hoping to make an easy buck. If they also happen to hold real government jobs, they may

actually culiecc money for a while before (hey arc found out.

IT1C stories chat such frauds try to sell as intelligence information often follow the headlines. For years after (he fall of Vietnam, every L .s. Embassy in Southeast Asia $aw a string of people walking in and claiming they had intelligence on U.S. GI$ still missing in action. The more clever frauds would tell complicated stories. carr>' detailed maps, and sometimes even photos of supposed prisoners who were still alive. All of those frauds shared une common thread: they claimed that (here was one piece still missing, but thar (hey oouid find that piece if they only had 3 bit of money—say, a million dollan or 50—to pay off rhe right prison guard. Vietnamese military offi¬cer, local mcrchanr, or other source.

So many walk-ins do indeed prove to be either frauds or persons delibcracely attempcing co spiead disinformation that its easy (O understand why incclligence officers have been known to dismiss legilimate walk-ins as frauds.

One of che mo$l productive spies the CIA ever ran inside the Soviet Union was Oleg Viadirnirovicii Penkovsky, 3 highly placed Soviet milirjQ officer who was apparently moĩivated by a policical conviction chat he was prevencing a disastrous world war by passing un secret defense inforniacion co the West. Yéf rhe first rime Penkovsky approached the Americans» the CIA rejected his offer tu spy because it was convinced that he was a Soviet plant (ning ro spread disinformation. It wa$ only after British M16 look up Penkovsky's offer and starred verifying what he was providing that the Ajncncafis realized (hey had made a serious mistake in not grabbing him the first time he tried to volunteer. Penkovsky provided a huge amount of infbr- marion for rhe next several years. Eventually (he KGB calighi Oil. probably because of【heir own intelligence penctranons of the CIA and British intelligence, and i^nkovsky was arrested. Ciied. and executed.

Walk-in$ dun'c happen just ar (he inccrnatiunal political level. Jusi about anyone with a grudge against a commercial company, government agency, or political organization with

I

jhich he works can dexide to take revenge by talking co someone willing to pay good money for good information.

The Planted Spy

One way for an intelligence agency 10 gel a spy in the right place 1$ (O have someone seek cmploymenr with rhe govern¬ment. business, or agency rhar the intelligence officer wants to spy on. This is called insertion, plarment. or going Urt/ieaw€r. This should not be confu^d with (ỈK： lilial case officer, who is a ease office] whu sneaks into a country with a false identify with the intention of recruiting spies once he is there.

Although it is a popular fiction plot, nnrional spy agencies almost never atrempr co plant one of their own employees inside A foreign government. The CIA would noe, for exam plc. attempt co inferrare a trained CIA intelligence officer into Cuba with (he expectation that he would seek employment with che Cuban Miniscry of Defense by using a false identity. The risks of such an operation are too great, and the difficul¬ties of establishing a credible cover arc almost in$uimoun(. able. Even if rhe cflbn succeeded, the spy might have to remain ill place for years, living a constane lie, before he ever uon the promotions necessary to 卽VC him access to secrets rhar would be worth stealing. Also, there is always a chance that as the person stayed in place, he would make friends and eventually grow so close co those with whom he worked that he uould refuse co spy, or worse, that he would become a dou¬ble agent

Such law cnforccmcm agencies as the DEA and che FBI Wil] wmetimes insert a spy into some criminal organization. Although a police officer may go undercover, it will almost always be for a short period of time, generally no more chan a few days. Instead, police agencies will usually try to plant a spy inside a criminal organization by making a deal with a criminal they have caught promising him a lesser sentence if he can produce evidence on a suspected criminal organizacion hy working as 3 member of the gang.

Ic is almost always e&hier to recruit someone who is already in place than it is co insert a spy as a new employee. Anyone intending to engage in a bit of don心lie spying should first attempt to rcciuit 3 spy in place and should only consider rhe possibility of plancing a spy when recniirmenc efforts have proved (0 be impraccioil or impossible.

The Recruited Spy

If an intelligence officer can find no one with loose lips noi anyone wants to defect to his side, and he knows that planting a Spy is unlikely (O work, then his only option is to recruit someone who is already working for (he governmenr agency, business, or political organization he wants ro spy on. Such a person will probably have 1>V intention uf spying on chose who liuùt him and would immediaccly reject 3n un$o* licitcd offer that he spy for money. Therefore, the ca>e officer will have to figure out a way (O trick, bribe, or blackmail such 3 person into agreeing co become a spy.

The Doubled Spy

rhe final way to find a spy i$ (O catch someone spying on you. As we learned in the first chapter, most spies aren't shot when they are caught; they arc doubled. Either (hey are used without knowing they are being used-like what happened ro Connie and her girls—Of they arc forced to Cixiperacc. rhose who catch che spy give him a choice of cither being shot, spending a major portion of his life in prison, or working for the people he has been spying on while pretending (O still be loyal co those v%hu recruiccd him as a spy.

Generally, like in Connie's ease, doubled spies arc ubcd to pass fake inrclligcncc co the enemy, hopefully intelligence char will convince rhe enemy chac one is stronger, beaci pre- paicd militarily, and readier TO fighi than the enemy previous¬ly estimated. Doubled spies can also provide information on the enefnyTs intelligence methods. They can explain how they were recruited, how (hey made drops, how they were  

handled, who rheif handlers were, and all the other details of running spies. The spy who is caught, and then doubled, will also have ỈỜ come clean about whac damage he has already done. He will have to provide all the derails on uhat kind of intelligence information he passed on co rhe people he was spying for.

This kind of information is so imporrxinr That even when a spy can't be doubled, ir sdii pays to get him to talk. That s why intelligence aRenuies are always willing to plea bargain when chcy arch one of【heir own spying fbf the enemy.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF AGEN1S

RECRUITED BY CASE OFFICERS

Depending on the cype of incclligcnce opcrarion he is running, a good ease officer may recruit three diỉĩerent types of agents: primary, access, and support. Ali of them will be traitors in char they will be working fbi (he enemy while pre- (ending to remain loyal to their country, employer, political group, or family.

A primary 〃额ư is sonieoiie who is working in a position in a government, militan force, or political group where he has dirccr access ro secret documents, (he 8nbemions of senior ollkcrs. or. better still, sorncunc who directly participates in policy-making or operational activities.

A pfimacy agenr Cún also be a misue$s, secretary, driven messenger, or anyone else who has access to documents, com- municarions, and personnel who deal with secret iiiíbímacion. Hiv giri$ a( (he Easy Come were working as primary agents for Connie, their case officer.

An agtnt is a recruit whu docs not have any direct access co useful intelligence or any personal reheion to such people* bur who may know someone who does. An access agent may also have access to places where pọrcnĩial primary agents work or play. The access agent can then report on peo¬ple who might be recruited as primary agcnc$ and help arrange for the case officer to make an approach. .'\n access agent rnay even do some iccruiling under the close supeni- sion of rhe case officer.

Access agents can also be u^ed tu place hidden micro¬phones. cameras, and orher technical surveillance devices. For example, 3 case officer might recruit 3 janitor working in an embassy and have him plant a miciophone in the ambas¬sadors office while cleaning it out.

A iuppon a^nt is also recruited by a ease officer, who will usually have a number of these agents. A support agent pcr- iurms services ỉbr die ease officer such as doing surveillance dnry, managing safe houses, clipping news series, renring can making and picking up drops, purchasing supplies, and $0 nn. Often rhey arc openly employed by government inccl- ligcncc agencies and repon 10 work the case officer's embassy. Most ease officers will employ more support agents (han accudì spies. The same basic techniques ait used for recruiting each kind of agent.

A ring of spies is noe 消 spons ream in which each player knows how he relates to every other player on the team. In most cases, the spies in a ring of spies went knew who rhe ocher spies arc. They operaie under (he security principle of companmen- calization, which requires that each player in a spy ring be given only rhar information rhnr he needs ro know co do his job.

'[he urasuns ibr【his are obvious. First, if one spy is iden¬tified (compromised), the enemy cannot use him ro identify Other spies Of verify (hat chcy exist. Indeed, (he best scenario is one in which the captured spy believes he is the only per¬son spying on rhe operation. Second, the case ofticcc can use each one of his spies to verify informacion collected from his other spies.

An intelligence agency like the CIA can achieve even more effective companmentalization by using different ease UÍĨĨCCIS (u recruit and run diilcrcut spies working within the snmc target organization.

Soiiietinics is necessary (O have two or more recruited  

spies working together in what is usually called a cell. Ihc primary agcnr might be reporring ro an access agent to pass on the information to the case officer, while also depending on a service agone co develop exposed camera film. The Soviets made very effective use of such a cell structure in the early years of the Cold Wai. Whinaker Chambers and Alger Hi$s were members of one such cell wirhin rhe U.S. Department of State. Many intelligence experts bdieve that other such cells existed bill were never discovered. Because of Soviet com- partmenulization. Chambers had no inibrniatiun on the exis¬tence of such cells.

Even though the spits or the cells of spies will not know about each orher, the ease officer must manage each individ¬ual in the ring so that the work of each spy coniplemcnu the work of rhe orhers.

WHAT THE (X)V1£RNMEI\TCA5J DO.

ANYONE CAN DO

Anyone who knows rhe techniques rhar ease officers working for the CIA. KGB. M16. and Mssad use to recruic spies can use chose same techniques to operate an incelli- gence-collectiufi operation against any business, govern mene agency, political organization, or individual.

• First, you must derermme what information i( is cha( you must have, who probably has it, and who has access to those who have rhe information.

• Second, you muse determine what the best way of getting that iulbinunon is, what it will cost co ger such informarion, what the chances aie of gening «Ughi ill the process» and what diflcrcncc having che infònnarion might make in success or failure.

• Third, you musi make a plan for gelling the infoimacion and chcn implement that plan.

• Fourth, if you are successful, you musi determine whether or nor che stolen information is erne.

• Finally, after concluding that die information is valid, you must act on it, even if you musi change your mind about reality (che cruth of che situation, regardless of whether it is what you want to hear, or noe).

Jusr as the Mossad i$ much smaller rhan the KCỈB. (he pri¬vate citizen working as a private intelligence ofliccr on down・ size hi$ effort to meet che limitations of his needs, budgec. and rime. Just one person may fill all the intelligence functions involved in a lawsuit, a $mall-businc$S labor problem, a dis¬pute with some local tax or licensing official. 01 an argument with a neighbor over a fence line, neighborhood nuisance, or bic of vandalism.

Even so, the private citizen who sets our co rccniit and run A ring of spies Sĩill faces the same problem confronting every intelligence case officer: how dues he convince someone to xurn traitor and Stan spying on people who ƯUSI him? 

Chapter Five

The Making of a rfraitor

XX Thy would anyone turn traitor? How does an %/%/ inrclligcncc case officer make ic happen? There ▼ ▼ arc only four basic wnys ro get sonieunc to do “hai you want them ro do: 1) offer mutual conperarion(0 reach n common goal、2) suggest a bargained exchange. 3) use fraud, and 4) use force.

• Mutual coộỊ^rúĩiởn occurs when rwo Of more people want the same thing and agree co work together to achieve ihai goal. A whole rown turns out to fighr 3 fire and save the town. A man and a woman marry and raise children togeth¬er. X band of rcvolucionaric^» risk life, limb, and íộĩiunc because they all want a new form of government.

• The bargained exchange i$ (he basis of the free market h is h。、、we get strangers to do something we want or give US something we need. We do ic by agreeing ro give (hem something we have that they wane As Adam Smith point¬ed one, che baker cares not a whit for my happiness, bu( he  

supplici» me with bread tn return for the money I pay him. ♦ fraud occurs when one person convinces another per¬son to do something with a false promise char he will get somerhing he wants in rccurn. A politician promises the voter good government and low eaxes when he inrends to use government for his own enrichment and expeers co raise taxes to make char possible. A television evan¬gelist promises eternal life and the love of God to all who will send him money; even chough he knows he cannot guarantee either. Whac we call manipulation is almost always fraud. We manipuhre someone into doing our bidding by convincing him thar he will get some reward (hat we can't deliver.

• With力g we threaten to injure, kill, or physically resrrain someone unless he does exactly what we want him (O do. His life or his niuney! Pay hk raxes or go to jail! Sign rhe rrcaty or go tu war!

Often, this process of winning ccx>pcration lakes place with liede Of no thoughc Tuo men agree to gu fishing and help Ciich other through the day because (hey both wane ĨỞ catch as many fish 35 possible, or maybe they just wanr (he pleasure of each others company. We walk into che drugstore, pick up a package of razoi blades, and take it to (he cash reg. i&rcr to pay fur it. We drive che speed limit chai is posted and pay our (axes without complainL

Sometimes someone musr fint convince US that it is in our own best inccicst to participate in a deal by selling US on the benefits we will receive by using a certain kind of soap, giving to a charity; or enlisting tu fight in a war. Salesmanship thus becomes an integral part of (he equation. A good sales technique can he merely educational, bue most often ir includes a large dose of fraud and nianipiilaúon.

The person who wants to rccruir a spy muse convince the potential recruit that it is in his own best interest to spy on those who crust him.

'I11C Spy Who Believes in the Cause

The easiest spy to recruit is one who wanes what he thinks Ills spying will produce. Julius and Ethyl Rosenberg and Kim philby became íỉovict spies because they wan red a Socialist 'World, and they thought【hai spying for tilt Soviets was die best way (O ger ic. Soviet citizens sometimes became spies for the rnited States because they saw the failures of commu¬nism wirhin their own sociery and (he human misery ir pro¬duced. or they feared that the Soviet leaders were risking a disastrous nuclear war.

Usually, when someone is driven to treason by ideology; he still loves his coumry bue believes dial (he country's lead¬ers have failed the nation and arc leading the society down the ioad to ruin. Such people rationalize (reason by insisring (har they are not betraying their nation, their birthright, or their cukurc, but instead arc opposing the evil people who have taken control of the government.

Phying on Chis natural human tendency、U.S. inrelligencc officers assigned to recruit Soviet agents would never say any¬thing negarive about Russia, the culnirc, or che people, but would instead try co separate (he Cvinmuni$c Parry appararus from the Russian nation. They acted toward their recruits as (hougli (hey were nor recmiring rrairors, bur rather patriots willing to risk all b> opposing the criminals who had taken conrrol of rhe Motherland.

Spies iur Pay

“Give me the secrets I want ro know and rii make you a rich man.r, Many spies do il for die money. This is the easiest motivation to undersund and, indeed, to put to use. We don't like to admit it, but greed diives every human being. Aimo$( everyone has a price, and once an intelligence officer knows the price of any individual, the process of feciuicing is reduced to bargaining the exchange: how much will it cost me for each 5CQCC you steal?

Traditionally, intelligence officers, especially those who  

have previously worked with erne believers, have distrusted the spy motivated by greed. A greedy person is often difficuk to control and manipulate because his loyalties only extend co rhe next higher offer for his services. Yet in the modern world, money has played an increasingly imponanr role in rhe fccniirmcnr of spies. This has been especially true in the recruitment of Americans willing to spy for (he “Communi义 bloc* countries. Aldrich Ames, John Walker, and FBI agent Richard Miller were all in il ibi the money.

Once che KGB and ics allies learned how easy ic was to buy some .'Xmericans, their recruitment CÍÌỒÍIS in the last years of the Cold War focused increasingly nn rhose mosr likely to be enticed by financial reward-young, low-paid personnel such as code clerks, sccrcrarics, and similar government employees, who did not belong to the privileged class of (he uppcr-cchclon burcaucrar.

Crass spies willing to turn traitor for a profit arc easy co rccniic, once they have been identified. They are often walk- ins. In other eases, a potential rccmir may be initially hesitant co cum traitor for money, and the case officer will first have co do a selling job. Like any good salesman, he will have to psy¬chologically manipuiatv the prospccc(0 ovcfcoine initial rcsis- uncc co the idea cf selling nue for money.

WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU QXNT FIND A

TRUE BELIEVER OR A GREEDY BASTARD

Mose of the time, an intelligence case officer is not going to find enher a (rue believer or someone anxious ro make money who has access to the sccrcrs (he ease officer wants. Most people believe in rhe cause or the company fhr which they work. They not only believe in i【，they chink of then»- selves a$ che kind of people who cannot be bought no matter how much money might be uliered.

Convincing a Rccmit That He Is Doing the Ri曲t Tiling

This means that the case officer will have to use fraud and manipulation in Older to iccruic chc great majority of spies who have access ro the wanted secrets. The case officer must make the potential recruit believe chat hi$ own personal inrer- esis will be best served if he becomes a rrairor.

One way to do this is to convince the recruit tiiac the ease ufficci is actually on hi$ side; char is, that they both share the same ideals and goals. Another way is to manipulate the recruit intu believing ihai by spying, he will earn rewards chat arc rightfully his and, therefore, justif\r his turning traitor.

lb do this the ease oiTieef uses rhe same techniques a good salesman uses co convince someone to buy an insurance policy that doesn't make good economic sense or n car much too expensive for his budget. In the case of the car, the wilcsman might fi皿 suggest 由訳 the evsromer really deserves such a %ncy piece of iron and then manipulate him in(o concluding that he can handle rhe payments.

In convincing a potential recruit(0 spy, (he ease officer, like (he car salesman, must play to the target's emotional needs, greed, and icars. The cmoúonal needs can be based in ideology or personal desires, which can include revenge, anger, idealism, loneliness, or recognition by someone, even 3n enemy.

Anger

A common emotion that motivates many a person to nirn traitor is anger ac how his government, employer, or associates have treated hirn. Ilie potential ưaitor may feel cheated because he has been passed over for promotion, unjustly accused of something, or simply ignored. rrhc anger may be diiccccd against either an individual, perhaps a supervisor. OÍ the entire system. Other emotions ihaỉ may inspire someone (0 aim crai(or can range from despair or depression (O a sim¬ple desire to be loved and appieciatcd.

There arc always people who believe that their leaders arc  

misguided and incompcrcnr Of (hat they are unappreciared by bosses and co-workers and have been rrcaccd unfairly, causing them to lose chcif failh in the goals of the organizacion. but they doni know what to do nexr. However, even though the subject may have lots of anger bubbling lip inside him. he will probably not be chinking about lurning traitor when first approached by a case officer. It is up ro rhe recruiter to figure out how co manipulate rhac anger or other cmorion in a way rhar will convince the subject that turning traitor is the best way to get his revenge Of nuke the world righe again.

Sex

Sexual desire is an emotion on which intelligence case officers ofren play. Sùnictimcs the potential recruit 15 delibcr- aicty bailed with a potential lover. Once love breaks cue. che case officer an make ir appear that the lover is in serious (rou¬ble» which can only be resolved if the carget turns ưaitor. This was the case with U.S. Marine Clayton Lonctrcc, who was a securiry guard in the Soviet Union in the 1980s and was caught spying for sex, coun-marrialcd. and imprisoned.

Ecar

Hear is another powerful force that can be used ĨO manip¬ulate people into doing whac they don'r wane to do. Case ofli- CCf$ can biackmail some people into spying. “Do me this favor, and I won'r cell that yuu are a homosexual.** Intelligence agencies are especially interested in poĩcnúal recruits with such secret vices a$ drug addiction. Mixual perversion, a gam。 bling habir, or any past history they would prefer not be exposed. Also, once a person has been recruited by manipu- bring either his emotions or his greed, the Oise oflicer may use blackmail as a means of ensuring (hat the traitor remains loyal CO his new master.

Using Force as Persuasion

People can be forced ro spy. h's a technique that law enfoiccnicnt agencies use all die lime, 'llìcy arrese a low-level drug dealer, prosrirurc, bookie, or some other putty criminal, then they threaten to put him in jail for many year^ unless he agrees (O spy on more imponanr Ciiminals.

The Gestapo, the KGB, and ocher police intelligence agencies often used die threat of violence to recruit spies, if no( by dirccr chrcnrs ro rhe porcnrial spy rhen his family: "Remember, you have a wife and 3 child still living in the old country.”

Criminal organiwrions in rhe Unired States and other countries also use threats of violence to recruit spies. Often (he thrciir will be sweetened wirh some kind of financial reward. It?s what the Mafia calls uan offer you can't refuse.**

Although such ihrca【s do work with criminals and some¬times with people who have family living in police stales, they seldom succeed in rhe inccmariondl spy game or in cases of private spying. You can never predict how someone else will respond co rhe chrcar of violence, bur many will choose to fight back. They will gu to the police or their seen fi cy officer. The risks of exposure for threatening violence are simply too great.

i he smart ease officer who needs a spy、and who can't find snmeone willing co sell out for payment, very prubably won't vven consider the idea of rhrearening ro commit violence. Instead, he will look for someone he can manipuhre into spy¬ing by phving on his emotions co the point where the target blips into spying wirhour realizing whar is happening.

REAL 1JFE IS ALWAYS COMPLICATED

Most successful recruitments involve a combination of induccnivnis and rhrears, which phy on several different motives rhat might be driving the person targeted for ÍCCÍUÌC- meni. 1ÌIC poccnrial rccruir could be a closet homosexual who recently lost a promotion for reasons that had nothing (0 do with his $cxual choices, who i$ deep in debt, and who just had a long-time lover drop him.

The clever ease officer wjJI use each of these emotional distresses to manipulate the target into turning (iaicof. He  

might first find a new lover for (he(aígcc, have (he lover help build the hate toward the company that refused to promote the UigCL add a touch of blackmail, and then throw in an after of easy money TO clinch the deal.

LEARNING THROUGH CASE STUDIES

Mose govcimncni iniclligcncc collccdon agencies ust the case-study meth(xiolog>> in training programs for their case oifìccrs. Like most of the case studies in this book, the follow¬ing ease is taken from a real-life sicuation, bue background information and names have been chaiigcd for all the usual reasons. The serious scudenc who is trying to learn rhe an and science of Spying should nut spend a Jut of time attempting tu figure out whether any case study is the real story behind rhe headlines, bue instead should look for uhat the example teach¬es about espionage.

Knowing How die Game Is Played

Doesn't Make Someone Immune

led Brennan joined the CIA light out of college in the early 1960s. convinced chat he was taking up a macho career char would be exciting and rcwaiding ai (he 湖nc (line he helped protect America from the communist conspiracy. Things went well 第 first, but over the years he became increasingly disillusioned wiih (he niuy-gritty deception that makes up the daily grind of the intelligence case officer work¬ing in a foreign counify The promotions didn't come as fase as he expected, and he had several per^unalit%' clashes with senior officers whom he considered incompcrcni doks anx¬ious (O report whatever the national polilival leadership want¬ed ro hear, no manor what (he emrh might be.

rhe job alR took 3 coli on his personal life. His wife, Millie, grew rired of rhe problems and isohrion of living in foreign countlies and frequently fought with him over the long hours of unpaid overtime cha( Ted pur in. Eventually they divorced, and Millie rook the children back home to Indiana. Ted found himself paying alimony and child supporr ior three children he 31mosI never saw while his ex-wife went back ro college, led was left with no money for (he simple luxuries bachelor men axe Supposed co enjoy. When a mucual- fund invesinitnt he had purchased on (he advice of a l；.s. businessman nirned SỜUĨ. he added cn hi$ list of mtsciics an anger ai die entire American corporate world.

Then, while on an assign mene in Buenos Aires, he met Linda, a Peruvian who was working in Buenos Aires with an international nongovernmental charitable organization. Linda brought some excitcmcnr back into led's life, not just on a sexual plane, bue intellectually as well. While Ted had gone llnough college as a jock with link interest in political theo¬ry. Linda inrroduccd him to bonks on inrcrnaùon<ìl politics and a world of ideas they discussed with a collection of Argentine and expatriate intellectuals living in Buenos Aires.

Totally disenchanted with his career and anxious to marry Linda. Ted began looking for new employment nutside of gov¬ernicene. He discovered that such oppoaunicics were piacti- idly nonexistent for disenchíinccd CIA case officer in midca¬reer. Feeling trapped and iìusưated by the system, Ted found himsetf increasingly fascinated with (he socialist philosophy that Linda nnd her friends argued as solutions for everything Ted saw going wrong with his personal piece of (he world.

Thu one thing going right was (hat Linda held a U.S. immi¬grant green card and would $0un be eligible co apply for U.S. ekizenship. a necessary step before led could marry her and stili keep his security clearance, i hree weeks before she was ro lake ihM step, d man handed Ted an envelope on a busy screen in Buenos Aires, then jumped into a waiting car and sped away Ted opened (he envelope co find documentary evidence that Linda, while a student in Peru, had belonged to a Peruvian polincal group associated with the Scndcro Luminoso Of 'Shining Path/' the Maoist narcoterrorist insurgency in Peru with deep (ics 10 the coca trade and a long history of graphic  

terrorism. The package conuined no messages 0Í any Threat of blackmail, but Tèd was sure that would soon <x)mc.

led assumed thac whoever had passed on the information intended to blackmail him, probably in an tfFon co enlisr him as a spy. Nevertheless, instead of immediaicly going co his security officer, he told Linda about che package. She admit¬ted (hat she had belonged to the political organization for a short period of lime several years earlier but insisted (hat she had dropped out once she discovered the connection to (he Violent Sondero Luminoso.

Although 'led believed Linda $ claims of innocence of any intenrional involvement with violent rcvulucionary activities, he also knew that if (he CIA Sexuriry personnel learned of (he information, they would never approve of hi$ marriage to a person with such 3 history. Indeed, even continuing co dale Linda would be a serious breach of security due would COSC led his security clearance, ied also worried chat his own security people might have passed him rhe documenution as some kind of【est to see if he would handle the revelations according co reguhrion.

Linda tearfully announced (hdt che only course of action was for them to immediately stop seeing each other. She insisted chat Ted should gu straight to his security officer, report (he incident, and give (he embassy (he evidence of Linda's past pulideal activi(ic$. That would save Ted's career, but the exposure of Lindas pasr political indiscretions uould cost Linda her job and make her ineligible for Ư.S. citizen¬ship. Unemployed and unable to travel to the United States, she would have no choice bue co return to Peru where she might face charges of sedition by the Peruvian government.

led angrily replied that he would instead resign immedi¬ately. A'hcy could (hen ge( married as soon as possible and scan over ill some other country. Linda pointed ouc chat nei¬ther would have a job or any prospects for finding employ¬ment. Linda would still have to go back ỈO Lima, and it would take months 0Í even years for led co find some kind of work  

char would allow him to support Linda in 3 councry other (han the United Swrcs.

As they discussed rhe problem through Che night with time out for a couple of intense sessions of lovemaking, Ted became more and more vociferous in his disdain fot his career with the government. He repeatedly insisted rhar he would do anything to protect chcir love and keep Linda safe from harm. Near dawn. Linda tearfully proposed one possible solution, provided Ted really was convinced (hat die CIA was not the protector of freedom that led had once choughc ir ro be. Ted agreed imme¬diately co meet with "a friend" that Linda had met through her charity work who “Eight" be able (0 help.

Ted knew exactly what he was doing when Linda's friend turned out to be a known KGB dgent woiking uul of die local Soviet Embassy. The KGB ufliccr cheerfully admitted to Ted (ha( it had been his side that had slipped him (he documen¬tation. He assured Ted dial CIA security officers knew noth¬ing about Linda's past and chat they would noe find OUC» regardless nf what Ted might decide to do. However, if eIcd chose to cooperate with the KGB, then led and Linda mighc live a very happy and well-rewarded life, one in which neither would have to keep secrets hidden from the other, as Linda had been forced to do because of her fear that she would lose “Rd if he knew abouc her past.

Already convinced (hat socialism W35 the hope of the future, led compared himself cn che Gernun who opposed Hitler and the Nazis hut not (he German homeland, and he agreed to tile KGB man's proposal co make a deal in which Ted would be well paid for infornurion he would pass tu the KGB.

led might have gone on to become another Rick Ames, working his way into promotions chat would have nude him a valuable mole for (he Soviets. But lcdfs bad luck held, and for once the CIA's counterespionage system worked like it was supposed co. A year after he started spying, an alcn polygraph technician decided Ted was lying during his regularly sched¬uled polygraph session. At about the same rime, one of Tcd*s  

colleagues in Peru successfully recruited 3 spy inside the Sendero Luminoso, and Linda,s name turned up in some of his icporting. CIA security officers put Ted under close sur¬veillance and soon arranged a trip back to (he United Stales for what led was told would he 3 training assignment. Once they had Ted and Linda back in che States, the CIA counter- intelligence officers planned to arrest Ted and Linda and charge rhem with spying.

Iwo nights before Ted and Linda were scheduled co fly 10 Washington, neither of them apparently aware that they were under suspicion, a truck slammed inco chcir vehicle while (hey were driving home from an embassy cocktail píircy. The driver of the stolen truck fled rhe scene and was never appre¬hended. Linda was killed instantly. Ted survived for three days of interrogation in 3 drug-fogged» semiconscious slate.

The CIA damage rcpvn concluded that Ted had not been spying for the KGB long enough to pass on anything more than tactical intelligence information. I he same report also concluded that Linda had been working wirh (he KGB from the very beginning, thill Ted had been identified by KGB mrclligcnce officers as a potential recruit, and rhac IJnda had been specifically charged with the rccfuicmcnt of led. lf$ possible rhar (he KGB M>nwhow learned that Ted was under suspicion and arranged the auto accidenc ro prcvcnc che pub¬lic exposure of led as a Soviet spy. perhaps in order to protect a more important mole already working for the Soviets inside the CIA—no doubt the same person who alerted the KGB chat CIA security was oil to led. Its also possible chat it was nothing but a drunk driver causing an accident

Even when he was disenchanted and discouraged about his career in the CIA. Ted Brennan never considered (he pos¬sibility of turning crairoi until (he niglit Linda suggested that might be (he only way they could stay cogcrhcr. If rhe KGB had not deliberately $cr our ro recruit him, led probably would have eventually quit the CIA and raken up a new career. It's possible rhat he might have turned renegade like  

Philip Agee, who al$o decided chat socialism was rhe hope of the new world and who wrorc Inside the Company: CIA Diary, an expose in which he named numerous CIA oliicers working m Latin America. Bur ir is ju$i as likely that Ted would have faded inco (he night and spent (he rest of his life just as unhappy with a career tn business nr the inrcrnarional charily industry as he had been with inrciligcjice.

Long before rhai night when Linda suggested a way for them co be together. KGB inrclligcncc oíĩìcers had devel¬oped an elaborare plan (hat played on rhe character weak¬nesses chcy had identified in led. Linda had probably been on the KGB payroll as an access 3gcnc for yCxifs and may have been the person who firsc identified led as 3 potential recruit. No doubc she received considerable rfaining on how to manipulate a man like Ted, and as she led him from C3SU- 屋 friendship ro a serious romance, a KGB case officer close ly moni101 cd her progress.

One might 35k why a woman like Linda would agree ro play rhe seducer of a man she neirher liked HOf respected, even to the point of marrying him and perhaps bearing his chil¬dren. The answer might be found in the general plighc of inicl- Hgcnr but poor women bom in any chifd-world country. The KGB offered a young female university student a way our of poverry. a chance 10 enjoy an American lifc-srylc. and the cnio- íional reward of believing she was on the right side of history. Linda s scory 1$ as old a$ rhat of Delilah. She may even have eventually convinced herself chat she truly loved rled.

Intelligence case officers consider recruitments like Ted Brennan rhe epitome of success in rhe incclligcnce game, especially since such people already know the way the game is played. As Vicror OsifOvsky, the ex-Mos$ad ease otĩiccí. explained, uThc idea of rccfuiimcnt is like rolling a rock down a hill .. . you cake somebody and ger him gradually co do something illegal or immoral. You push him down the hill. \Vu didn't blackmail people. We didn't have to. We manipu- larcd (hem/ 

Employing techniques like those used on Ted is consid¬ered the best possible way tn gee a spy in che right place at the righe time. Such iccruinncnts allow the intelligence officer to focus on rhe specific agency Oi installation where the best information can be found and Chen to identify someone already in place who might be approached and recruited.

Revruiring someone who is in the right place M (he right lime is is the preferred method of obtaining spies, but in (he real world it i$ not always possible, indeed, most government security and counienncelhgcnce agencies arc well aware uf how spies arc iccmiccd and spend a lot of (ime and effort cdu. eating people with securiiy clearanccb about the methods u瞇d by other incelligcnce agencies, as well as watching for hostile recruitment efforts.

On the other hand, the general public is. for the msi part, ignorant of the methods used by ease iigents co itcruic spies. Therefore, che citizen who secs out Cu recmic spies working for a business Cvrnperiror. union organizjrion. ciuzcns political action group, or even govcininenc agency chat would normally nor be the rarget of a fbieign inrclligence efibrt will find much easier targets. 

Chapter Six

The Art of Deception

uRr Way ộj Decepĩiorĩ Thou Shah Do War. ”

—Morto of (he Mossad

"TX ccruicing spies is all about deccprion. The person 卜( who spies on his country, employer, friend. Of lover JL、engager in 3 constant deception, pretending to be something he is noe—a loyal, honest, (ruswonhy individual.

The dcccpnon doesn't end or even begin with the spy tr>-- ing (Ớ $tcal secrets. The spy may be as thoroughly deceived by the person who recniited him as die victim of the spy is deceived by (he spy.

The spy, the case officer who recruited him, and (lie case officer'^ employer may be deceived by the intended victim who 1$ deliberately supplying false information that will lead the enemy into a deadly crap.

The person who wins the game of spying will be the per- who is best ar deceiving others while at thetime being brutally frank with himself in order co avoid self- deception. Those who practice self-deception will be the biggest losers uf ail.

ENCCHJR AGING SELF-DECEl*TION：

THE KEY TO RECRUITING SPIES

Everyone wanes ro rhink chai he is a good person, doing whatever ir is he does for the noblcsr of ideals. Some of the HiOSt notorious rrai(0f$ in history—Benedict Arnold. Simon Girry, Vidkuu Quisling, Tokyo Rose, and the Rosenbergs—ứll thought they were doing noble things. Others, such d5 the Walker family. Rick Ames, and Richard w. Miller, knew chat what they were doing was treason, bue rhey $dll deceived themselves into believing rhar (hey were not doing such a ICC nble thing and rhac their sins were justified by (heir own cir- enmsranecs and the failure of (heir supervisors and colleagues <0 recognize and reward their worth.

The professional intelligence ease uflicer or any private ckizcn who would rccfuic a spy muse understand che human need for sclf-jusdiication and be ready (O offer believable excuses that the recmir can use for self-deception.

The successful vase officer understands the human need for love, friendship, self-respect, and honor. and he will feed (hose needs as he coaxes a potential recruir inro turning trai- 15. 1k also understands and plays co all the human weak- nc$$c$—giCed, anger, envy sexual desire, and even rhe fear of God. Like a clever Con artist, he will offer ro satisfy the human weaknesses while providing rhe sclf-jusiification chat Mows rhe rcciuit to delude himself into believing he is nor giving up self-respect and liOnor.

A good intelligence 34 officer is someone who would u】akc a good con anist. the kind of person who can call an old •adv on rhe phone and convince her (hac he is a nice person wh。wants to be her friend: that she has jusr won a big prize, but rhM she must first pay rhe “gif【lax； Hu will have no remorse or pity for (he victim. 3 person he considers to be a fool, crearcd by God to be cheated.

Most people musr be conned into becoming spies. The ease officer may have 10 convince 3 reewie (hat he will be spying ro  

bring about world peace when, in fact, the purloined infbrnia- (ion will be used (O win a war. Aiiothcr recruit nuy be conned into thinking he is giving secrets ro the CIA when they will be going ÍO (he KGB.

Those who reervir and manage spies musr convince oth¬ers chat they arc honest, sincere friends who are only interest¬ed in helping (he potential recruit solve some problem in his life or win some unexpected reward.

The ease officer who intends co rccniic and manage spies must practice deception as an art form and a way of life. He must learn to convince others he is something very different from whar he really is. He muse be able co assume a new iden¬tity. spin calc5 that sound believable, and create an jmagina^ world chat rhe porcnrial rccniit will accept as realitv,.

Learning to tdl believable lies i$ nor something chat eversane can do. But anyone who wishes to engage in espi¬onage must learn co (Cll lies in a way rhar makes others nor only believe them to be Uue. bui to believe them $0 locally that they will willingly srnkc their reputations and even their lives on the perceived truth.

Noe all people can puli the same con. A good con alwa>Ti wurks because it Hu che personalities of the con arrisi and rhe “mark.” Anyone directing an intelligence-collection operation must recognize rhe differences in personalities that can he played against each other. A good ease office] musi not only be good ar deception, he muse also be matched to his target and play the role (hat best iits the targets expectations of whom he can rrusr.

Good deception, as practiced by the clever intelligence ease officer iriusr combine the skills of a ficrion writer with chose of an actor. l*he crafty deceiver must be able to think up n clever lie and then aci out the lie as if it were realics; He must be able to adopt and fit into a culture much different from his native culcurc and play the role as if it were his real life. This is a skill that must be continually praciiccd. Inccl- hgcncc agencies dedicate much of the training of the prospec¬tive case officer to lying.

How It Works in the Real World

Lct\ rake a look at an example of what we mean wjien we say chai deception is (he key to recruiting spies.

Irvin Silverman was a Brirish citizen working as a young bureaucrat in the British Adfniralry office (hat reviewed satel¬lite. signal, and human rewuice intelligence on (he Middle Ease. Inin was Jewish, and at one (ime during his college days he had seriously considered immigration co Israel. He and his wife. Rachel, often talked abolir this po$$ibiliry. perhaps after he retired.

Irvin saw no confi ice in his sworn loyalty to the crown and his emotional loyalry to kracl. because British foreign pdicy was generally favorable to Israel. Even so. Irvin was occasional¬ly troubled when he saw inrclligencc documents with informa¬tion he thought should be shared with (he Israeli Embassy but which earned rhe restriction chat the inf<)rmation could n(H be shared with any ocher government

Several years after starting work fur the British govern¬ment, irvin and Rachel mer Haim Hammer while attending 3 charity dinner to raise funds to suppon resenlcmenc projects in Israel. I him Hammer was a likable Israeli hu5inessnun about the same age 34 Irvin and Rachel, and they soon became gởud friends. Haim would call the Silvermans every lime he visited London. Irvin and Rachel especially enjoyed listening to Haim's descriptions of life in Israel.

One evening Haim complained that while (he British gov¬ernment talked 3 good line, the British Foreign Office often took a less friendly stance at the working level and sometimes failed (O pass on critical intelligence ro the Israeli government. When Irvin asked Haim how a businessman could know what (he Israeli government was getting. Haim answered that besides his business duties, he was 3 represenutive of a pri* vate group of Jewish citizens spread around the world who helped Jews and Israel in (he conrinucd fight for national sur¬vival. He assured the Silvermans that he indeed would know whether or not the Israeli government was seeing any specif¬ 

ic piece of intelligence, especially m(clligcncc on Arab terror¬ism and Palestinian plans for action. He then suggested cha( Irvin might want (Ở put (he claim to a challenge by describing wrne bit of sensitive intelligence $0 char Haim could dcicr- minc whcdicr or not the information had been passed co rhe Israeli government

The Silvermans, fascinated wich the new informacion on their friend, had lots of questions, and the three of them talked hie into the night about Israeli hopes and rhe continued com- mirmcnr of many Arab political gioup5 to the total destruction of the Jewish nation. The more they talked, rhe more Irvin was inclined (0 accept the challenge to test Ihims claim that much of the intelligence information In in saw cross his desk was not being passed ỜIÌ lu the hiacli guvcmnient. apparently because uf anti-Jewish sentiment in che Bntish Foreign Office.

Over rhe next several weeks. Irvin picked out several bits of intelligence that crossed his desk and discussed them with Haim. He was horrified when Haim infbinKd him (hat the isiacli government had not seen a couple of the reports that did indeed conuin criricâl intelligence informarion

Angry about the duplicity of his own government neither Irvin nor his wife Rachel even considered the fact char what Haim next proposed would be crcason—(hat Irvin regularly pass copies of secret messages to Haim, who would then pass them on co appropriate officers in rhe Israeli govcrnincnt. indeed. Irvin and Rachel would have argued that che never named anti-Israeli bureaucracs in rhe Foreign Office were (he ones commining creason b、refusing to support what was supposed to be a prolsracli foreign policy'.

In the months following Irvins iCCiuitmciH. Irvin and Rachel would tell each other in their private conversations that Haim's offer co pay for rhe srolcn infbiinacion had played no rule in their decision to help Israel. Even SU. the payments quickly builc a nest egg thac made ir possible for Kachcl (Ờ Mart the next generation of Silvermans. Once the new baby came, chcy found themselves increasingly de pen dem on Haim s cash payments for whac they had come co consider necessities.

When Rachel expressed concern about whai would hap¬pen if Irvin waw caught stealing dcxrumencs, Haim assured them that the Israeli government would help them avoid prosecution. To ease Rachel's fears, he gave them detailed instruction on how they should go to the Israeli Embassy in London ac che first indication char anyone was suspicious of them. Haim guaranteed chat, if necessary, the Israeli govern- ment would smuggle rhe whole family out of England and into Israel where they would be relocated as heroes of the Jewish nàilon.

Soon after Irvin entered his fourth year of spying for Israel, he arrived ai work co discover (WO MI5 sccurir>- officers waiting to intenjew him about their suspicions that Irvin was making illegal copies of Brirish intelligence documents and passing them on tu a third party. Irvin denied the accusation and then insisted that he wanted to seek legal advice bcf()rc answering any more questions, 1'hc security O11ĨCCÍS agreed thac might be a good idea and scheduled a second meeting for later in the day.

As soon as the counterintelligence olliccrs left his OÍ1ÌCC, Irvin left the building, found a public telephone, and called home. Hysicricaily, Rachel related (twe four unitormed police¬men and two men carrying MIS identification had arrived at rheir door carrying search warrants while Irvin was being inter¬viewed in his office, it had been pure luck rha【(he policemen found nothing in cheir search. The evening before, Irvin had left a load of materials 氟 a drop sight for laccr pickup by Haim. Otherwise, the policemen would have found the material that Irvin had been hiding in his home for the past several days.

Convinced that his arrest was imminent, Irvin instructed Rachel (O cake rheir rwo-ycarold daughter and mccr him on the steps of the Israeli Embassy where they would activate rhe escape plan char Haim had laid our for them so many months before. 

Smiling ar each other and looking forward ro a new life in Israel, the Silveimaiis were holding hands and Irvin was carrying (he baby as chey approached the embassy rcccp- (ionisr and Irvin spoke the code phrase rhar Haim had given him to memorize.

Irvin and Rachel thus began a IOUÍ chrough hell. The memorized phrase not only broughr no response from the receptiofiisu (he embassy security officer who finally ap¬peared to talk to them insisted rhar rhe embassy had no record of In in performing any service for the Israeli government and then ordered the Silvermans ro immediately leave the embassy compound.

Back at their home. Irvin worked rhe telephone while Rachel sat holding rhe baby, trying not to cry herself as the baby bawled. First, Irvin cried ÍO ger Through by telephone tú someone ai (he Israeli Embassy who might be more sympa- rheric co chcir plight: then he rried calling rhe different num- buis listed on Hammer's business cards as his home and place of business in Israel. In Ciich case the person wlio answered identified himself as an employee of Mr. Hammer. explained chat Mr. Hainmei wasn't in che city and promised ro pass a message co him as suon as possible. Finally, in dspuaiion, Irvin called (he emergen^ number in Jerusalem chat Haim had once written down and handed to Inin along wirh insưuccions that Irvin use che number only in the direst of cir-cumstances. 4 hc person who answered on (he orher end chimed to be 3 refrigcracor repairman who knew nothing about whai Irvin was talking about. When Irvin cried che other numbers agailh no one answered the phones.

Not knowing what else co do, Inin called a solicitor and went back to (he office for the scheduled second interview with (he counterintelligence officers. Irvin realized for the firsc time just how much trouble he was in when one of (he officers showed Irvin and his soliciiOf a picture of Haim Hammer and asked if Irvin knew (he man in the picture. When Irvin hesi- larcd in answering, the examiner again asked the question. Illis  

(in>€ giving che picture a name, Rashid Yasin, and identifying him as a suspccccd Syrian intelligence agent.

All che years that Inin thought he was spying for a private Jewish organization supporting Israel, he wa$ instead pacing documents to an intelligence case officer working for a Syrian miclligencc agency.

The British government, which doesn't like admining its failures, opted nor co prosecurc (he Silvermans rhfuugh the conns or make any public accusations. (It probably would have done so if the ofiicen had found the secret documents thar (hey had hoped to find ac (he Silvcrnians* home.) However, livin was dismissed from government service. Irvin and Rachel did tty to immigrate to Ismet bur (he British had shared the informanon on what Inin had probably passed (O the Syrians with kraeli intciligence, and an I$íáeli Embassy employee cold Irvin chat the kracli government might decide to prosecute Irvin for ưeason if he ever cncered Israel.

The False Flag

The man whom the Silverman s knew as Haim Hammer wa5 a Syrian intelligence case ofliccr who had been using a false flag, one of rhe most imporunt tricks of the intelligence trade used in recruiting spies. Rashid Yasin had been bom in Israel bur ro Arab parents. Rccniiled as a young man into the Syrian security service, he had spent years perfecting che act châi entrapped the Silvermans.

When using a false flag in espionage work, the case officer claims to hold a natiomg oc be a person whom the target for fccruicmenr will expect lu be friendly to the targets own inter- CS0 Every intelligence agency in the world uses false flag dcccp- rion in recruiting spies. A Chinese businessman in Singapore thinks he、working for the Republic of China when he is really spying for Taiwan. A swdent in Lima thinks he's passing docu¬ments ro a man from the Cuban Embassy，who k actually â CIA case officer, who was born and raided in Laredo, lexas.

Occasionally, inrclligence case officers du identify them¬selves ưuthíully to prospective recruits. Oliere arc lots of peo¬ple around the world who would love co work for rhe Americans and others who would do che sanie for che Soviets, Cubans, or Israelis. However, even in those $iniation^ in which a recruiting officer flies the flag of his cnic nationalicy the ini¬tial approach will usually be made by a ease officer working under a false idenciry of some kind. Then, if something goes wrong, the ease officer can disappear without a (race.

Although no one collects any statistics on this, the major¬ity nf all spies think they arc reporting to a different govern¬ment, polirical group, or commercial enrerprisc than che one really reading the information chcy steal. In most Slich eases, they would have never agreed to spy for the CIA, KGB, or whoever trapped rhem into spying. Without che use of the false flag, ver>* little spying would ever gee dune. The only spies available for recruitmenr would be political true believ¬ers and crass ưaiiors willing to sell out co the highesr bidder, no matter who that might be.

The false flag serves tw。pufpow. First, as wich the case of Inin Silverman, it wins che cooperation of a target who might well prefer death ro woridng for the real spy master who will benefit from his ưaicorous acL Second, it protects the S3 offi¬cer in the event che urger refuses to cooperare and repufts (he attempt co his superiors or i$ later caught in the act of spying.

Oftentimes, spies who are captured continue to insist that they were working for (he organization they chought recruited them long after che false flag has been exposed as a fraud. (The Silvermans still believe chat they were spying for Israel and that the claim that Haiin was a Syrian spy was a Mossad- inspired ruse co hide (heir activities in Great Britain from rhe British. They considered themselves as Jewish citizens whose repuutions and economic futures were sacrificed Oil (he bat- defield of imclligcnce collection.)

Because of the security advantages of working a rccmic- ment under the cover of a fake identity, almost all case OÍĨÌCCÍS claim a false identity and earn1 the credentials to supporr chat  

idencicy when they approach an individual with rhe intent of recruiting him as a spy.

Ch(HKsing the False FlaR

Even, attempt (O recruit a spy is different, depending on the personality of the spy. the organization or person co be spied on, and rhe situation under which rhe spy will operate. A key step in every iCCiuitment is deciding what fahe flag should be used 0Í. indeed, if any false flag is needed M all.

The false flag must be designed to ÍĨC the pcrsonaliry of rhe person targeted for recruitment and rhe situation in which the rccruitmenc takes place. The recruiting case officer should represent himself as a person che(argec will 心peer, love, or fear.

Sometimes, a false flag character can include all of those Chings. For example, che recruiting case officer working for Á womens rights activist group approaches a devout Catholic working in a govemmcnr agency char was targered by che group. The recruiter piCtends TO be a priest, perhaps a repre¬sentative of the bishop or a papal agency The fake priest mighr ciaim char (he churchs interest in the agency is the result of (he agency's active support for international birth-control programs using U.S. funds. In fact, rhe private ease officer hopes to gain informarion that can be used in a publicity campaign criticizing Catholic influence un public policy on birth-control issues.

Pretending to be an authority figure, preferably a feared one, often works well. The rccniiring officer might claim (O be a special agent of the IRS or the sure tax board when approaching the employee of a private company. Another ploy is co claim co be a private investigator or private conuactor working for a police or regulatory agency.

On the other hand, if che subject targeted for recruit- ment is someone who doesn't like authorin; (hen a case officer might choose the cover of being an investigative reporter ouc to reveal che secrets rhe agency is trying co hide from the public.

One successful cnrrcpicncuf who collected coiporatc inrelligcnce claimed to he the invenror of an arcane rechnical improvement in telecommunications equipment. He explained ro anyone who listened rhat che invencion had made him so rich that he no longer had co work at a full-time job. bue instead traveled around (he world looking for inter- cscing invesemenr oppommities.

The recruiter should not only pick a ĩiủbc identity that will appeal to che personality of che urger, bue one chat will justify some interest in the subject of that intelligtncc- collcccion effon. The homely secretary of a corporate presi¬dent might get suspicious if her brand-new boyfriend, whu claimed to be an interior decorator, suddenly Stans asking about 3 construction project in Liberia, but not if he had told her soon after they met that he is a civil engineer (as he talks about the bridge he once helped construct in Ecuador).

Remember that che false flag is only one part of the "cry. A prcccy young blonde who meets an embassy official in Paris tells the lonely man she is employed by a German industrial¬ist to look for foreign investment opportunities. As she and the embassy official become lovers, he never suspects that she is really working for che KGB. Vee both the die of her search for investment uppvrtunicics and rhe lovemaking were pan of a carefully choughc-out plan designed to recruit the diplomat as a spy.

Deception can even be beneficial when an attempt 10 recruit a spy fails. If the target goes straight to his security offi¬cer to report an acccmpr ac recruiting him co be a spy, he will also carry che cale of the fake flag and thus divert attention away from (he eroe identity and intentions of (he ease officer.

For example, an in(elligencc officer working for a private business approaches a prospective rcciuir and claims co be working for the IRS, which would pay a large reward for cer¬tain information about che rccaiic's employer. Instead, the honest employee tells the bo。about the attempt. a re$ul(. (he target may no longer be such a strong compcricor because 

hes worried roo much about an ĨRS investigatiun into his financial affairs.

THREE STEPS TO TELLING

BELIEVABLE LIES

Everyone lies. It is chc most human of all human traits. But some people lie better than others, and the person who rccruics spies had better be rhe best. There are three Steps to telling believable lies.

1 ) Create a wcll-rhough(-ouc story. 2) fici up rhe necessary props to make (he story appear rnic. 3) Step on the stage and pcfforii) the part so well thac 111050 listening wdn( tờ believe the story is true.

Creatiiìổ a Gx>d Story

Professional case officers call a cover story the lead. Like all good stories, a legend must have several elements.

1) ) it must contain a lot of truth. Rashid Yasin/Haim Hammer knew even-thing there was 10 know about che operations of various internarionaJ Jewish groups. He knew how they oper¬ated, and he knew that they often recruited Jews in place, including such publicized instances as the Jonathan J. Polhrd ease in che United States, in which a Jewish organization did indeed recruit an American Jeu; whu then stole and passed on a collection of inrclligcnce documents.

Keep the lying part of the story ro rhe absolute minimum necessary to achieve rhe dcccpiion. Don't add unnecessary detail that will be diflkuk to remember and don't elaborate when not required. When someone intrcxluccs himself as 3 doctor at a cocktail party, he doesn't lise his qualifiorions, educacion. and experience. Indeed, he may be extremely reluctant to talk about his specialty, having too often been approached by strangers who want a little free mediali advice.

Nevcnhclcss, rhe liar must be ready (O add additional details if questioned by someone who is curious, or maybe naturally suspicious. When challenged, (he uaincd liar keeps the answers to such challenges as short and to rhe point as possible. Ra(hcr chan talking about himself, he asks questions and tries to ger others co Elik about themselves, (heif cxpcfi- ences. and their thoughts. 'rhu con artist gives rhe impression of lisrcning symparhcncallv.

2) Tht liar mus/ be familiar BÌth ứií back^Tĩund ỉuppộrting the

He shouldn't pretend ro be a brain surgeon if he doesn't knew the difference between a hemoscat and hemoglobin. Rashid Yasin knew as much abour Israel as any sabru (a Jew bom in Israel) born and raised near Jcnisalcm. He also was chofoughlv fomiliaf with Jewish religious practices, and he had practiced his deception in dozens of different synagogues in England. When he talked about liie in Israel, he sprinkled his conversniùons with details of streets, scores, markets, cheaters, and holy spors rhar any resident of Israel would recognize. He dropped names of politicians and movie stars and talked about family days cclc- brarìng che Fcasr of rhe Passover.

3) Tht story must 加e the target same reason to Hatư to lisĩtn /inẳMừvẻ. The lie might appeal TO rhe rargcr's prejudices OÍ his curiosity, oficr solutions to his fears and personal problems or suggest the possibility, of profit.

4) Tìư lies in ĩtư story must be both mentally and externally consistent and ll ihouỵht out, I'hc teller can't talk at one point abolir an old car he owns and then later menrion rhe new Ford he driven. In (he Sĩìmc way, he should check weather records before talking about getting caught in rhe rain on rhe second Saturday la$r May.

5) Good lies takt údvứnkiỊỉỹ ụf mmt events. When mobs raid¬ed rhe U.S. Embassy in Taipei, Taiwan, the Soviccs soon there afltr released several documents through front organizations thar chimed to he U.S. sccrcr communic4cions stolen by che mob. documents discussed the U.S. government's inten¬tion to abandon Chiang Kai-shek, a total prevarication.

When running a deception, a ease uflicer must plan for ever%- possible reaction by che larger. He muse know exactly,  

what he will do no marrcr how che target rcact5. He identifies the wor$[ possible caM： scenario, then plans out 3 response for cvcy objection» question, or doubt that the rargee mifthi rabie. Once he has the details planned our, he goes over them numcp OUS rimes before meeting with the target. The belter he knows the part he will play; the less likely lie will make a mistake.

Ar rhe same lime, a deceiver musi not get so committed to a ston* that he can nor lake advantage of new developments er incidents. A good deception phn amicipays almost every chaotic event chat might happen. A good lie always $un$ with a prepared script, but unlike the stage, che liar must be pre¬pared to rewrite rhe script ai each point in che (cliing.

Setting Up the Props

Every actor needs costumes, background scenery; props, and people who will supporr his iole. It s true Thar a good actor can sound almost believable just by rhe way he reads a script, bur in espionage, almost is never good enough. The basic props chat every ease otĩiccr needs include such things as doc- umenrs iha【support various idenncics； lentcd offices with computers, faxes, and phones (hat will be answered as if they were in a legirimacc business office; rhe righi kind of car co go wi〔h che story: and che clothes, luggage, briefcases, and per-sonal items chat fir rhe character being played.

The documentation that supports rhe fake identity can be as complex as a passporr, a Social Security curd» a drivers license, credit cards, and a compiete see of supporting papers such as graduation degrees and professional licenses. In other situations it need nor be anytliing mure elaborate than a few business cards and a wallet with a couple of fake ID cards.

I here are a number of books un the marker detailing the intricacies of false identities, and che would-be case officer should familiarize himself wilh the literature and Chen do whacevcr is necessary to build a collection ởl' identities chat fir rhe pCisonality of the case officer and will stand up co exami¬nation. A commercial printer can print a collection of business cards, stacioncn; envelopes, and invoices wiih any logo and name the customer rcqucscs. Computers with scanners and color prinrers make ir child's play to copy or produce IctlCi- heads. company ID cards, club memberships, business licens¬es. union cards, and jusr abolir any other document that will pass cursory inspection.

The person who sees our ro rccniir a spy in the local union will nor need the same kinds of documents that a ease officer actrmpting to cross a border with a fake passport would need. For inosc privare intelligence officers, a gcxxi coiỉipulCí and a color printer should suffice for producing all che documenta¬tion needed ro convince a target chat a person is really wh氟 he claims to be.

Americans generally accept people foi whai they ^ay they 3ĨC. provided the\ look rhe parr and speak the lan¬guage. The only time anyone shows idcncifioicion is when he writes a check, uses a credit card, or is stopped by a traf¬fic cop. Even when someone flashes che credentials of a polke ùỉĩiccr. a hcakh inspector, or an IRS agent, the target of rhe investigation seldom takes rhe rime ro examine the badge and (he ID card closely. Documents chai will pass such scrutiny are easily fiiked and will do the job for must intelligcncc-recniicmcnt activities.

The background scenerx- and the support actors should be as weli-prepared as the costume nnd rhe props. Rashid Yaiin/Haim Hammer didn, just carry a fake Israeli pa$5pon and a driver's license listing an address in Jerusalem: if some¬one had called at the address, a woman claiming to be rhe maid left in charge of rhe house while Mr. Hammer era2cd in England would have opened (he door. A call ro one of rhe tele¬phone numbers listed on IIammer*s business card was answered by an office 5ccíCíâf>' anxious (O help out 3 possible customer. There was even a pmpman ready to pull the cuíĩíìin closed: the refrigerator repairman on rhe other end of the emcigency number knew as soon 3S Silverman idem而cd him¬self that something had gone seriously wrong. He immediate¬ 

ly norificd Rashid Yasin and his supporring cast thai ihe oper¬ation had been blown and chat they should all disappear.

Performing the Part

The 3n of deception is $0 important to successful espi¬onage (hac anyone who intends to recruit Spies must study and practice deception with che same dedication rhM an accoi demonstrates in his chosen profession. Indeed, rve known several very successful ease oflìcen» who took parr in amaicur drama productions so that they could gee practice in playing a role with conviccion. One of the reasons why Rick Ames may have avoided detection for so long, even passing CIA poly-graph exams, is rhac he studied drama in college and even considered a career as an actor before joining the CIA.

All actors arc liars. They are not really in love with the women； they don't really want ro kill rhe other guy; they arc not real cops or robbers. In rhe same way, all successful liars arc good acrofS. If they claim to be cops, they as and talk like cops would act. The acting is often even more imporanr 10 a good lie chan rhe other props.

The case officer is always on rhe siage when he meets with any* recruit or porenrial fccruil. As with any acror» (he case officer may be playing more chan one role as he moves from meeting one recmic to another. He must be able co switch roles with che ease he changes shirts. He ca» never allow a recruit to catch him out of characrcr, in spite of che face that he may be ninning an cnrirc ring of spies, and each spy knows him n$ a diilerent person.

Chapter Seven

Exercises in Deception and Intelligence Collection

Tk To actor memorizes his lines and rhen speaks them I on the suge for the first time on the night the 丄 、play opens. Just like rhe acror rehearses on suge while there is no audience in the cheater to boo him. the per sun who in(cnd$ 10 commie serious deception muse first prac- TICC in situations in which there arc no personal risks. However unlike rhe actor who rehearses with other actors, the person who wants to recruit spies should pfacrice his dcccpcivc skills in che real world with real people.

The gua] of (he exercises described below is rn learn how ro approach a perfect sưaiigcc inưoduce yourself with a plausi¬ble explanation for why you want to meet him. present yourself 3S someone the stranger would wane co know bccccf, and Then set (he scene so that you meet the sưanger in a situation in which you have control. ĩr must all be done while you prcccnd ro be an eniirely different character than who you really arc.

lb practice doing rhis, approach $rrangcr$ in such places 34 hotel lobbies, restaurants, ban», airporu. churches, mcccing lOums. libraries» grocery scores, roadside rese areas, and any other public places. Initiate a convcn>ation or set a scene where (he stfangCf tniciaccs a conversation and then cell the Hunger 3 ston- that he believes to be true. The ultimale goal  

of the exercise is to presenr yourself with a believable false idcruicy and then ro use that idenriB* in a way chat gets the subject ro reveal something personal, to perform some service for you. or to agree to a second meeting. A【rhe end of the exercise, (he stranger should be convinced that he has just met someone who is interesting, honest, and Worth getting ro know better.

PRACTICING DECEPTION

IN LOW-RISK SITUATIONS

Finding unsuspecting people co practice deception on is an easy〔ask in our society. Mose Americans ulk to Strangers every day; provided they appear to be honest citizens going abolir their legicimarc business or engaging in a popular recre¬ation. We talk ro (he guy and (he gal standing beside US at a bus stop, che person sining next co US on a plane, rhe lady waiting un US in a score, people siccing around u$ at a fcx>tball game, patrons in the bar where we drink, skiers funding in line ar (he lift and in hundreds of orhei situations. Such con¬versations may stall with some inane comment on the weath¬er but often result in a lot of information being exchanged, especially if nne piưty deliberately leads the conversation in ihat direction.

Engaging in 3 harmless deception wirh a stranger makes it easier from a psychological point of view because you don\ have to worr> about being found out and then charged with a crime. If a stranger you meet on an airplane accu义s you of lying when you tell him you arc a writer from some râbloid sold ac the chrckour stand in grocery stores, it co$r$ you noth¬ing in grief. All you have to do is stup the conversation and think a bit about what made him suspect you were lying.

Don't worry about taking up a strangers cime. Most peo¬ple live deadly dull lives, and they arc usually enthralled when given a chance to experience a vicarious adventure. They will love your tale of how you spent 10 yean as a mis- sionar>- in the Amazon, how you nanowly escaped being con¬victed uf inuidcn or how much you expect 10 earn from the sale of your firsr novel.

Travel Opportunities

When traveling on a plane, train, or bus, board with sev¬eral diiĩèrent versions of who you are and what you do fur a living nr a good rime. The stories should he worked out in detail, and you should have answers ibr any questions (he lar¬ger might ask. Indeed, ix is a good idea co wrirc down che details of each ewer story. SỉOỉies might include a claim (hat you ÍIÍC employed in the movie industry, perhaps as a makeup artist or an assistant to a famous director; that you arc a crimi¬nal-defense arcorncy with a long hisrory of getting people off on technicalities; an investor who has made a iortunc in a cou pie of stock deal% and you now spend your time traveling aruund looking for deserving people ro help; a private detec¬tive searching for evidence to clear a young woman falsely accused of murder； 0Í a U.S. diplomar on ICNVC after an assign-ment in some country that has been in the newb.

Once you have your stories ready, pick a different one each time you start a new convcrsarion with a new person and teli ir as if ir were che truth. Start each conversation by asking your seatznaic (he usual polite queries dbout his desrinarion, why he is going, ctu. If possible, get tile other person to talk abou【himself. Th心 usually easy co do. Talk about yourself (yvur legend) only when asked, and then somewhat ÍCỈUC- ranrly. The more the perwn talks, the more you will learn about him.

When you do talk about younelf, tailor your story 1。what you have already learned about rhe other person. If your scat- mate is a pretty; young, wriuus woman who is a business major a small universiry, you might say char you work for a famous movie director. This could lead to questions about whether she has ever wken drama lessons or appeared in any phys. Ask for 3 name and an address uhcre you might contact her for a  

possible screen rest for a movie you will soon be wofking un in which (he director is looking for new, natural faces.

Ifyourscacmaie works fc)r a large inrcrnacional corporation, tell (he diplomat-on-leavc s〔ory lalk about a number of busi- ness opponunilics in the country of your assignment, which no American seems interested in.

If rhe scannate turns out co be a religious minister, des¬cribe your experiences as a defense attorney who Successfully defends Cfiminah you know arc guiles* and often commit rerri- blc crimes afreward. Pretend to be disillusioned and looking for a way (O change your life. Throw in a few comments (hat suggest yon*VC had $orne major personal problems too-per¬haps marital strife or a teenager who has run away from home.

If you are talking (0 a middle-aged school teacher, pull the derccrivc scory. molding it inro something that would appeal 10 the teacher, perhaps (hai you arc cm ng(Ở clear a high school principal accused of molescing a teenaged boy or ro track down a school teacher who travels during the summer as a secret serial killer. If you use this last scenario, try re build che story so that you might use someone like rhe rargee as a source. This means you will have co place rhe investigation somewhere near where your searmarc lives and build it inco something that might【ouch his life. Invent evidence llut sug¬gests that the killer might be teaching in a school in his area or that rhe teenaged boy once wenc (u a nearby school. .Ask advice on how you mighr find out whac teachers do during summer vacation. See if you can ger the target to agree ro do some investigation for you-for good paymenr, of course.

Other possible idcndlics could include a stock trader if you meet a small businessman； a iachcr searching for a lost child taken by rhe moihcr 12 years ago, if you meet some grandmotherly type; a world rravclcr who's lived abroad foi many years, including (ime spent in a Thai jail iùr drug traf¬ficking, if you sic next to a college srudcnc.

Whatever the cover, (he goal should be to gee (he target interested in what you are doing $0 chat he might agree to help if you asked. You want the target to willingly give you his name, address, and a cclcphonc number where you could con¬tact him for a follnw-iip. The srrangcr may a$k for rhe same iniormacion ửom you; give him a false name, address, and phone number. Ir works even bcKCi if you carry several sets of business cards supponi ng each of the false identities you intend to use.

I lowcvcr the conversation goes, as soon you arc alone, sir down and write out all the details of how the deception played one 3nd everything you learned about che cargec of rhe deception. Make special noie of uhat went right and what went wrong.

Lying in Church

Go to church in a nearby city where IIO one knows >uu. Be friendly and polite to those sitting near you, but sort of shy Sooner OÍ later, (he minisiCf or someone in (he congregation will want to talk. Explain how you havenk been in church for many years, bue char you had a rcccnc religious experience chat made you question your previous agnostic beliefs and senr you looking for answers. Don*t volunteer ict bur have a detailed story you can relate if asked, perhaps the death of a child, a serious illness, or an experience as a victim of crime or a survivor of some natural disaster. Don'i make ihc experi¬ence something miraculous； ir should be more psychological in nature. As you talk co various people in rhe congregation, learn as much as you Cđn abolir them： where they work, how happy they seem to be with their lives, what different social cliques exist within rhe congrcgarion, and SO on.

How many invitations to social functions, group meetings, er private discussion groups did you gee? Whom might you approach if you were an insurance salesman, a man looking for romance, or someone looking for 3 source ro fccmic in rhe lucal city government? Look ibr individual quirks and poten- rial character weaknesses chat might be exploiccd should you decide to recruit someone as a spy.

Looking for Business Information

Go to a business office I exrated in a building that overlooks a busy intersection. Tell (he secretary chai you arc an insur¬ance investigator looking for someone who might iiave seen a fenderbender that occurred several weeks earlier. Mention the possibility of a reward that will be paid ĨO anyone who pro¬vides information leading to 3 witness. Give a$ feu deuils about the accident as possible in your initial query. It、proba¬ble someone will have witnessed some kind of accident dur¬ing the previous several weeks. If that person KÌVCS the dcuils first, you can prerend that whar he saw is the accident that you arc investigating. Gee as much personal information as possi¬ble Oli the people CO whom you calk.

If you find someone who is especially interested in the possibility of earning a witness fee. change stories, claiming that ynu arc really inve$(iga(ing the high rate of workman's compensation claims filed by the company and suggest that if (he target can provide chat kind of informauon. he might make even more money.

ADVANCED DECEPTION TRAINING

The person who incends co engage in any serious espi¬onage acúvity. regardless of the urgee, will want additional coining in deccpriofi before acnially beginning an intelligence operation. These advanced rcchniques arc not innocent fun. as the practice situations above suggested. Even when they do not cross the line of Icgalicy, they invite retaliation should the urger be able to idennfy* the tormenmr. "I*he wise person who u$cs practice exercises similar to (hose described below will travel ro a distant ciry where no one knows him, use public phones, and make any long-di«swncc calls by châíging che cost to one of (he phone credit cards that can be purchased from machines in supermarkets and similar places. He will be train* ing not jusc in deception but in security as well.

Because these practice deceptions require taking legal risks, they should not be engaged in by anyone who docs nor intend to take up spy reenjitment 3$ 3 profession or a per¬sona] necessity.

Some of these advanced rraining exercises require some supporting false d(x;umcntation. How much ID is needed and how good it must be depends on (he level of deception and che sophistication of the person being deceived. The follow¬ing exercises assume thai you will be carry ing whatever docu¬mentation might be nccessar>' to hack up the deception.

Get Politically Acrivc

C&H on the manager of a local political campaign-the more imponanr the office, the berrer. Using A false identity, claim to be a wealthy volunteer with lots of time on your hands and a sudden inreresr in politics. Drop hints that there might be quite a bit of money available-if the campaign manager can suggest ways to put the money into the cam-paign fund without violating federal clcccion campaign laws. Put in several days of work at the headquarters, meeting as many other campaign workers as possible and perhaps even che candidate. The goal is tu learn as much iniormation about che candidare's behavior as you can while working with the campaign.

Call a Newsman

Contact a newspaper reporter and claim to be a midlcvcl government official who has information on a major corrup¬tion scheme. (Use rhe currcnr political $ituation (O COOK up with a scenario that will make the reporter think he may have the next potential "Deep Throar** on rhe hook.) Describe the «【cry in detail, providifig “evidence" to convince your listen¬er Suggest a secret mccring in which he will conrrol rhe secu- ricy scene. Ask how much the newspaper reporter will pay for (he full package of evidence you have. 

A Hotel Visit

Check into a hotel with □ fake identity, pay cash, and talk to as many people as possible in the lobby, at the desk, in rhe dining room, even where you can. lell them nil (he same tall tale_say, for example, that you are visiting the United States on your iin»c vacation in several years after working for 3 long while as a missionary in 3 foreign rountry. During the stay, find out if arrangements can be made with any of the hotel staff for a pro$(i(ute to come co your room and how much it will C81, If it's nor roo expensive, order one. and when she appears, pay her fee (you don*c have to aerially have sex, unless you want tn). Then try to get ihc prostitute to agree co spy cm 3n important businessman or politician who lives in that ci(y lor you.

Using the phone in the hotel ÍOOII1. pick several different businesses, professionals, and government agencies from che yellow pages and call them. With the businesses, pretend to be a cusromcr with a porcncial big order. With ĩhc profession¬als, cry to find one if lawyers will quote fees over the phone, how ea^ ic is to make an emergency appoincment with a doctor, or how much free advice you can ger by telling a good story. If you arc a serious student of deception, you might pre¬tend co he an IRS special agenr initiating an investigation of the professional you arc calling, or a policeman checking on recent patients who have been ưeaced for a specific kind nf injury (RVè know the assailant suffered such an injury- while attempting co 8mmil rape*5). When calling a government agency, report that the business you work for might be in violation of what¬ever laws and rrguEions that panicuhr agency enforces; you might also pretend to be a salesman irying to gee an appoinc- mcni with the purchasing agent or a customer asking for a eax identification number in order to file 1099s with rhe IRS.

Getting into a Stranger's Apartment

Gain entry into a large apartment building by pretending to be a package-delivery service. Carrying a real package.  

invent a scory rhar will convince a suspicious apanmcnc dweller you are delivering a delivery from an unknown per¬son. Possibilities include flowers sent anonymously or a pack¬age containing a small, inexpensive appliance along with a Icr- l€i on business letterhead explaining that the addressee has been chosen ar random for a promoúonal scheme. (If queried, the deliveryman can explain that he has delivered several such packages around rhe ciry.) Whaccvci the stury. you musi leave behind someone who believes that he has received a Icgirimarc delivery and will have no reason IO call the police or building security officer.

Once inside (he building, figure out a way to gain entry into another apartment on a different floor. The cover story must pro¬vide you a Icgilimaic reason to be in the building and to request help from someone else inside the building. Cover stories might include 3 claim ĩhar you arc a private dcicccivc invc$(iga(ing an insurance claim and looking for possible witnesses. 3 mainte¬nance worker crying ro find Olir who has a ccnain kind of plumb¬ing or heating problem, or someone who just accidentally dropped a small honk of wine or soda pop and who would like 10 clean up the mess bclbic leaving (he building.

Gaining Entry to a Private Home

Pick a private home in a middle-class neighborhood and anempt to gain admittance. ÙOU mighr prerend ro have car (rouble and ask ro use the phone. In this scenario, you should have a friend Blanding by a phone in case the homeowner docs rhe smart thing and leaves you outside while he calls the cincfgeiicy number you provide, ùbur accomplice will answer che phone by identifying the number as rhe Acc Tow Service and (hen ask (he expected qucscions about the address.

Ocher intrixluctions chac mighr help you co be iidmirtcd into a $(iangCf $ house arc pretending to be a miss沁nary (remember to carry 3 Bible and a briefcase full of religious uaccs), a federal invcscigatOi doing a security clearance on someone who once lived in rhe neighborhood, a polirical  

work" rr\ing to ger out the vote. Someone collecting fnr a charity, or 3 person who once lived in rhe house as a child and warns co indulge in a bit of nostalgia. The more original (he legend, and the better rhe legend firs (he probable prejudices cf che homeowner, the better your chance of getting in. Once in, learn as much about the family as you can from your observations and the casual conversacions char follow.

All of the above excruises arc only suggestions. Each pci* 50n wishing ro practice che art of decepcion should think up a series of exercises to maximize his strong points. The goal IS (O gel comforablc in the art of lying while in low-risk Situations and rhen move a seep at a rime into highef-iisk situarions until you arc ready 10 use your deception capabilities co full advan¬tage CO recruit ochers to steal valuable information for you. 

Chapter Eight

It's More

Than "felling Lies

J _、cccption is not enougli when ir comes to recruit- 1 tng and managing 3 spy. The gcxxj case officer must be a student of p<;ycholog\; who under¬stands the human psyche and has the ability to interpret the emotions of another individual and respond to them with apparent sympachy.

BE THE BIĨST NEW

FRIEND THE TARGET HAS

When victims of con men arc interviewed by a police offi¬cer they always say something like, "He was such a nice man.** Successful con artists and intelligence S4U ofTicers must learn to act like nice people. They pretend to be sin¬cere ly inccrcsrcd in their target, they almost never ger angry, and when they do. it's a cold-blooded, well-thought-out action designed TO produce a specific behavioral response from the recruit. They ask lots of personal questions (including a few the recruit can answer with a bit of bragging), are sympathet¬ic (never judgmental), and always willing 10 li$(cn.

A good case officer will use every personal advantage he brings to the contese. People with the physical advantages of youth and good 100ks will use their sexual acrracdvcncss as an intelligence tool in a manipulation that is as old as the srory of Samson and Delilah. .An older, educated person will play on the iundcncy of mo$i people co respect both age and learning. A i»elf-confidcnt? military-$rx1c personality will use his charis¬matic ability to command obedience.

The most effective false flag of all is a beautiful woman or 9 handsome man who has ufallen madly in love* with (he potential recniir. As with ihc girls of the Easy dome, such a rccmirci can often learn the secrets of rhe rccmic without (lie recruit ever knowing he has become a spy.

ĩn rhe same way. someone looking like the wise old man may remind the target of an old giandiather. A person who looks like a TV lawyer can offer help and advice, and rbc moĩhcrly woman can win rhe rrusr of【he young lady who wor¬ries about her rwo-yc<ii-old^ tantrums or her teenagers fasci¬nation with drugs.

PERFECTING THE ART OB CONVERSATION

The intelligence ease officer must underscand how to ger people to calk while he listens. This skill is especially impor- Utìl when using people as inadvcncnc spies, but it is also a critical skill in che process of recruiting those who will cvcn- luaJly spy knowingly for the ease officer. The more the other person calks during any conversation, the more anyone rrying Ĩ0 gachcr iniorniation will learn and rhe less likely it is that the target will learn something that the intelligence collector doc$n*c want him to know. (A good ease officer will never allow the target co icain anything about his true personality real hopes, fears, or despairs» cxccpc when such inforniation fits the false flag he is flying.)

Gctcing people co talk is much easier than most people realize. Almost everyone wnuld rather calk than listen. Because of char human trait, most social conversations arc games in which 匕ach side (ties re maximize ĩhc percentage of time in which he or she dnes the calking. Few people really listen ỈỞ whac other people arc saying. They are instead think¬ing ahead to what they will say when they next get a chance to lake control of the conversation.

As a result, mo$( people MC hungry for somenne who will listen to (hem. Both con artists and good intelligence officers know rhis, and they deliberately feed that hunger. They not only listen, bue pay rapt attention and ask questions chac encourage the target tu keep talking. The best intelligence officer is one who makes the target believe that both of them arc important, smart, experienced, and eleven and that the target has M>nic(hing ĨỠ say that is worch listening to.

Mose people so enjoy an intelligent, aitentive listener, that they will do everything possible (O keep the conversation going. Time and again. l\c goncn people (0 tell me valuable intelligence information by paying (hem the compliment of li^rcning to every word (hey say, even when what they aiC say¬ing is of no interest to mr. Even rhongh they may start out wirh che intention of keeping certain secrciS to themselves, as they glors, in rhe experience of having a listener hang on every word, they will $(ar( leering slip more and mnre information in an eflbir ro get the listener ro continue to listen to them. People will literally give you their M：crc(s in exchange for con¬tinuing ro listen to them talk.

I can't count【he rimes I've been in long meetings in which I lisrencd intently as my inrclligencc source talked about his family, personal experiences, ihcory of warfare, or political beliefs. /Mrhoiigh 1 learned nothing new. I listened wirh rapt attention, with my only responses being questions or murmured agfccmcnrs co deniuiiscracc chat I was listening and (hat I shared his conclusions. Then, when I finally curl¬ed co apologize for taking so much of (he important man's time and suggested it was time for me to go, ht would in$i$( that 1 stay a little longer. When I reluctantly serried back in my chain he would launch into another monologue in which he did Stan telling me the decree information I had hoped co ger out of him.

One rime in Vietnam when I was working as a U.S. civil¬ian official, I interviewed an ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) lieutenant general on how the war was going in his sector. After spending more than wo hours lisrcning to him discuss his theories on the bc$( way to fighi (he Maoisc insur¬gency—theories that were in total disagreemenr with those of his l：.S・ military advisors-I apologized for taking 4c much of his valuable time and started to stand up co say gcxxi-hvc. Apparently, I was che first American who had ever rd ken the rime to listen (0 him wichout trying to shout him down. He reached a hand one» grabbed my wrist, and pulled me back down to my chaii. Then he hunched into a long description of a secret cadre a^assination program that he and his men were tmplemenring withour informing his U.S. military advi¬sors. but which he claimed was decimating the Vietcong cadre in the area.

As he described the program, what most fascinated me was the reaction of his staff who had sat silently through (he long meeting, but who were suddenly hofrificd co hear their general let an American in vn their dirry secrets. One captain, the brightest young oíĩĩcer in rhe group, managed to catch the generals eye TO give him one of chose glances that attempted co remind rhe general that he should perhaps be a bir more discreet. ITic poor captain got back an imperial glare ihat not only put him in his place, but warned him thar he mighc soon be back in the jungles patrolling ibr Vietcong ambushes.

What' funny is thac when I reponed back co my superiors what I had learned, I was told ĩhat the general had been feed¬ing me a bunch of lies because whar he was celling me was connadictcd by the intelligence collected by both army in(el- iigence and CIA case officers, it WT only three or four months  

laĩcr chat the intelligence experts learned from cheir well-paid spies what I had learned from the general by paying him noth¬ing more rhan a few compiimene，By〔hen, rhe ARV N gener¬al had been transferred to a dead-end job in Saigon at the instigation of a Miing knockci" (a West Point graduare) advi¬sor who complained co the U.S. command structure that the general was noi following U.S. advice on how to fighe the war.

THE RULES OF FRIENDLY INTERROGATION

1. Never criticize the other person 5 religion* country, family» intelligence, cducacion, or personal conduct. If he criti¬cizes himself in any of those areas, be sympathetic to his concerns and confessions, bur don't agree with coo much enthusiasm.

2. If you disagree wirh something rhe other person says and conclude that you must make that point co keep your own credibility; ask questions that give him an opportunity (0 belief explain his belie代 while lening him understand there may be a difference of opinion. Let him know by【he way you ask rhe question rhar, although yon may have doubts about his conclusions, you respect his opinion and wane to undersund why he believes as he docs. Never attempt to use logic (O argue him inro admining he was wrong.

3. Answer the ocher person's questions quickly, simply, and directly. Don\ add details and don*c anticipate or answer questions he doesni ask. You wane to get back Ĩ0 leering him do the talking as soon as possible.

4. Always follow hi$ question wirh a question of your own chat gets him talking again.

5. If you must inrerrupr rhe other person, do so only to ask a question that further expands what he is saying on a sub¬ject chat interests you.

6. Don't huny t(> reach the point of your inten iew. If possible. Ice him bring up che subject in which you arc most interest¬ed. Learn to lead the conversation by suggestion and casual

references. ĩf you do ask direct questions and he seems relucunt to answer, slip inro another subject and pretend you really wcrenk that interested in the mancr. Lead him back ro the subject after you've softened him up a bi( more. 7. Let him fill the silences. A silent break in the conversa¬tion makes most people nervous, and they feel compelled (O fill ir. Use that (O your advantage. If che other person doesn't respond immediately to some sucemcni or ques¬tion, waic him our. If you don*( really u*an( to respond to a question he has asked, think about it a moment. lie may start talking again co fill the silence.

8. Doni tell lies unless you have alfoidy plotted them our 公 pan of a well-planned deception or as part of a carefully crafted cover story.

Anyone who intends to engage in serious intelligence work should practice these rules in every conversation he has in any ser of circumstances. I recently bought a used car. While we waited for a minor repair on rhe car. che salesman and I sraned calking. By the lime we signed che contracts. I knew a surprising amount of inside information about the used-car business and (he personal life of the salesman.

The clever inrclligence officer does not want co show the world how much he knows or how smart he i$; he wanes (u find out what other people knou. how “man they arc. and uhat makes them tick.

TRADE RESOURCES

There arc three things that every intelligence agency uses to build che spy's tmsc in and dependence on the case officer or ics agents: money, drugs, and sex. The private intelligence officer must also have access to (hose three things in sufficient quantities 10 service the needs of the potential recruit. He must also develop techniques for using each of them in recmiting different personality types. 

Cold. Hard Cash

Money comes first because without money, you can't buy sex or drugs. Rccmiring spies can be a very expensive propo¬sition. Ofren, the unly way a C3SC officer can ger the recruits attention is by spending money. He will have to buy the prop¬er clothes to fir rhe per义maliry he is playing pay for resuu- ranrs, cntcruinmcnc, travel, hotel looms, rental can», clothing, technical equipment. and a variety cf perwnal services.

Sooner or later, che ease officer will want to ofiei some payment for the information rhe recruit is providing. Even when rhe recruit is spying for ideological reasons, the ease officer uill wanr to make payment for services rendered. Gening a recruit to accept money and preferably to sign a receipt stating he has received (he money is the final seep in any rccniitmcnt. Some recruits will agree to spy for che money; some will only accept money as a loan or an inciden- ral reward.

Normally, money will come from those who finance the intelligencc-collccciọn activity. Sometimes those who are col¬lecting intelligence will find that they must self-finance (he opcratiufh This might include anrigovernmenc groups intent on spying on govcfnmcnt 3genuics as pan of revolutionary activity. Bccaine many groups cum to such criminal activities as rheft co finance ĩheir revolutions, collectors will find that the same technique» they use fur rexruicing resources can also be used to con unsu^pccring people out of cold, hard cash. Such activities arc almost always criminal fraud and are beyond (he 4copc of this book.

Drugs

("Candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker.'')

The ease officci can use a wide varicry of drugs in many different ways as a tool for rccniirment. If the target has a drug addiction, the ease officer might be able to use chat knowledge :o blackmail him or he might offer to supply the addict with the drug of hi$ choice as a way of making ftiends or even ” a means of rewarding (he rccniir for services rendered. It may even be possible for the case officer 0Í one of his agents 10 introduce the potential recruit co drugs and then encourage an addicrion which (he ca^c officer can later use co his advantage.

Drugs can also sometimes be used as (he grease ibr developing a social relationship or for conducting a subrlc ime Fregai ion. There is a lot of truth in the old Latin expres¬sion in vino Veritas (**in wine There is ennh**). The list of peo¬ple who have ler slip their darkest secrets after consuming 3 large dose of their favorite mind-altcrci starts before (he dawn of history and totals in the millions.

Alcohol is always the drug uf choice. It is legal in most countries around the world, readily available, and socially acceptable, it relaxes inhibi(ions. makes people careless» loosens tongues, and impairs judgment. Often rhe first approach char a case officer makes to 3 urget will be in a siru- arion in which alcohol is bcinx served. Alcohol can be espe¬cially useful when dealing with an inadvertent spy_someone who will provide information without realizing he IS dealing with the enemy.

Although a ease officer will frequendy use alcohol and other dnig$ in dealing with recniirs. he muse control both his own drinking and the quantity of alcohol consumed by the target during any social occasion. The idea is Co ger (he (argec under the influence while maintaining your sobriety and wichour alerting rhe target(Ỡ what is happening. There arc d number of diflerenr (licks of the trade for limiting onets own consumption while encouraging the recruit to indulge more heavily.

Often, especially when dealing with people who have 3 drinking problem, all you have co do is allow nature (O take i($ course. The drunk will be more inccrcstcd in filling his own glass than in nuking sure his new friend is matching him đnnk for drink. Things ger mere difficult when dealing with someone who expects (hat the person on rhe other side of che ubk will match him round for round. rllie tricks of the (fade  

for ensuring thai you sray sober while the urger gets drunk include the following：

• Prior to a meeting that vili include consumption ofakoio/, Oil a quantify fif fatty food. For example, eat several pieces of bread heavily spread wich huccer or a pint of ice cream.

• Atrangf ĩsith ỉfư bamndtr to control thê drinks, mixing heavy drinks for iht target and ^ll-diluted drinks for you. (This is one argument for doing your heavy drinking in a setting in which you have (he control, say a hotel loom, a private home, a diplomatic residence, or a bar where the owner Of banenders are on your payroll.)

• Lij! ứưgỉass to the13, but don't actually sip thf drink.

• As soon as the tar^fs *$$ is ftnpty, erder anQiha round. I the waiter rake away your still half-full or, beliti yee, almost full drink.

• Paiendiftg tn bf mudi drunker ihan yea art, ^acàdcnlalíy ” iptll a full ỊiỉaiS. You can then miss a round while cleaning up (he mess.

One of che most diíĩĩculr casks associated with The use of alcohol in a social simacion is that you must still remcinbcf all rhe decaih of the mcccing so chat you can record everything (he (diger says once the meeting is done and you have a chance to be alone. While the drinking goes on, you should lise every break in conversation or moment of silence as an oppOituniry to mentally review the previous conversations and actions as a way of memorizing how you will eventually write rhe report of the meeting.

ỉlữgal ỉĩrugs

Illegal drugs offer even greater opponuniries for gaining psxchological conưol of a target chan alcohol can. provided you c4n control (he situation. There arc several ways in which you can use illegal drugs as an aid ro recruitment 

• Build rapport with chc target by supplying drugs to feed his 3ddiclion.

• lake advanwgc of his dmg-induccd state in getring infbr madon.

• Make the Wfgcc's use of illegal drugs a reason for blackmail.

• Gee the target hooked un drugs to make him more depen¬dent on you.

The bcsc situation is one in which the target !$ supplying his own drugs and you simply go along with the situation, rak¬ing advantage of developments as they occur.

However, in some situations you may have to play che role of a supplier. You might even uyt the cover of pfcccnding to be a drug dealer when approaching 2 known drug addicL The fact that the drugs are illegal makes the case officer and the poten¬tial recruit instane co-coiispirators in crime. This, in turn, pre¬sents future opportunities for blackmail.

Illegal drugs are very much a dual-edged sword. Although (hey can make rhe target easier ro conưol. they can also make him more careless as he goes about his spying. A penon who uses illegal drugs is also at constant risk of being arrested and charged wirh drug offense and is notoriously untrustworthy when arrested. Most will immediately sell out their supplier and their friends. Also, an illegal drug user can be fired from any job 3r any time, especially if the employer randomly tests his empiuyecs for drug abuse.

Another major problem with using drugs for reewiting is finding a supply. Case officers working for national spy agen¬cies usually have access to all rhe illegal drugs. Sometimes they arc supplied by rhe intelligence 3gcnc>\ often from Slocks confiscated as part of che governments narcmics-con- trol operaúons. Sometimes a case officer will use a service agent he has recruited as a source for illegal drugs that can be used in recruiting new agents.

The private incclligence entrepreneur who is working without che protection of legiil cover will have co consider the

iisks in dealing in drugs versus the potential rewards char mighĩ result from rhe use of illegal drugs in a recruitment cflorr. Frankly, illegal drug use has became〈neh a comrnuĩi occurrence in modern America that intelligciKC cnliCpfC- neurs and privare collectors should have little trouble in find¬ing a source fbr the illegal diugs chcy may rc<|uire for success¬fully recruiting spies. Even so, individuals who have no expe-rience in purchasing illegal drugs OÍ no with the

areas of the city where drugs are openly sold arc bcucr advised ro look for other ways to subvert a poicnrial spy rather than risk the real pu^ibilicy of arrese that comes with seeking out a drug dealer.

Although government ease officers will drink alcoholic beverages with a urger for recniitmcnt. they will nor share che illegal drug experience. Indeed, using illegal drugs, even as part of a cover s【ory, is considered reason for serious discipli¬nary- action by the CIA and most ocher government intclli- agencies.

With the possible exception of an occasional marijuana joint, private intelligence collectors are advised (0 follow the same practices. This is especially (fUC when it comes to such hi&h-fisk activities as sharing needles. When i( comes to the use of illegal drugs by a |M>tcn(iiil rccruir, rhe most impurunc thing is that (he recruiter appear sympathetic and nonjudg- mcnral of rhe use of drug5. and nor that he might he willing 10 share the drug experience.

Because of the rnajoi dangers of dealing and supplying drugs, or even being present in places where drugs arc used, (he ease officer must always be opcranng under 3 false flag and a well-consciucrcd false identity.

Sex

Sex won't play a role in every rccĩuiuncnỉ, bur ir can make a critical difference in huw successful many recruitrncnis will be. In almost all situations ir should not be the ease officer who personally services rhe sexual desi心 of (he recruit. Indeed.  

mcwt national intcllÌKcncc agencies, including rhe CI.\ pro¬hibit case agents from engaging in sexual relations with any recruit (The exception to that Olle tnay have been rhe old KGB. There are lots of nimoiS about men and women who were specially trained in the art of seduction by the KGB.)

Instead of bedding 3 recruit, the case agent creates and finances a situation in which the f ecru ir finds whar he thinks is tme love or maybe ju$( more sexual pleasure than (he potential recruit knew was possible. if the case agent expects to use sex " pan of hi$ iecruitmcnc. he will have to also recruit a person whn will willingly go to bed with che prospec¬tive recruit.

rrhere are several different options for finding potential sex pareners for (he recniK to enjoy.

Taking Advantage of an Ongoing Affair

pTcrecniicmcnt surveillance win often uncover rhe exis* (Cnee of an illicit sexual arrangement or a budding romance. Almost always, (lie case oiĩìcer can lake advantage of such a sicuation. even when i( is a legitimate romance. In rhe case of an illicit affair by a married target, there are usually insunt opponunicics for blackmail, bur rhe dever case officer may instead choose to become a conspirator in the affair as pan of building a rdM沁nship with the recruit The case officer becomes the good friend who helps íacilitâtc the recmic^ love life by providing excuses fnr rhe targets absence from family duties, perhaps a private place where (he recruit can enjoy the lover's accention. or even an opportunity for a double date in which (he case officer picks up the cost of cnrciiainment.

inhere 1$ always (he pos%ibiliry that a case officer can recruit rhe love interest as his own agent. *rhis is frequently rhe case in long-term aflain» between one married parener and an unmarried colleague. In such situarions the single partner is often dissacisHed with (he hopeless nature of the relation* ship and can sometimes be manipulated into spying on the giiy she realizes is never going to ask his wife for a divorce. She may do ir as a form of revenge, or she might be convinced rhar the final result of her perfidy will be a divorce, with her taking (he old wife's place in the family mansion.

Obviously, homosexual relations, affairs with underage panners, or kinky sex involving sadism or other perversions can oiler considerable opportunities to (he ease oíĩìccr who can figure out how to nunipulacc rhe situation to his own advantage. Remember chat while blackmail is a powerful rool, 1( works best if the ease officer is nor the one making the blackmail (hicat, but rather the one who steps forward ro pro¬vide an escape route ibr the(aígct.

Prostitutes

'1Ì1C easiest way co provide sex co a potential rccruir i$ to hire a professional and then see it up ro make what happens next appear (O be d narural occurrence. A frequenr ploy is one in which the case officer make friends with thetafget and then invites him out for a night on (he town. During the course of the evening, (hey meet a pair of friendly women, who soon agree to go back to the hotel nr safe house where the case uificcr u supposedly living. How the ca>c officer uses rhe incident and where it kad$ will depend on the pcrsunalicy of the potential rccniic, whether or(10( he is married, and, if so, how much he wants (0 keep che marriage a going concern.

In another ploy, the ease officer hires rhe prostitute, briefs her on whai he wants done, and (hen arranges a chance meet¬ing between the pfosrirute and the target, with the intention that (he mrgec will never know (hat (he shy. innocent girl he met one evening was in face an experienced lady OÍ' ihc nighr.

Many higher paid call girls become very adept at acting out rules in situations where the beneficiary of her services is led ro believe she is an innocent lover. Nevertheless, if a ease officer intends(0 u$c a prostitute in this way. lie had better give her several trial runs to make sure she can be trusted tu du what she is being paid to do. For example, the ease officer might set lip a test run with a service agent and then have lliC  

service agent reporr back on how well the Call girl pcilbrmed her role.

Once the porcntial traicor has enjoyed the services of rhe girl, or for rhat maccer a homosexual prostirutc, there arc sev¬eral different ways co take advantage of the siruaiion:

• The prosciruic. who has been briefed by The person paying the bill, can probe for information much like rhe ladies of rhe Easy Come.

• The prostituce can do things that rhe target likes so much chat he wanis to make another date, and anocher, and rhen he becomes a regular customer. *rhe pcxcntial recruit soon dis¬covers that his new pastime iq a very expensive hixvr\' and that he will have to find a new source of income if he is ro keep enjoying the pleasure.

• The prostitute plays on rhe target^ sympathy、perhaps spinning a rale of hnw she is enrrapped by pimps, bur With only a liulc help from the target she might escape ffom her awful life. (This works especially well if (he prosriruie looks very young and innocent and che target ha$ (itele experience wirh professional sex panners.)

• A person claiming to be the pro$titute*s pimp suns to harass the target, perhaps by claiming (hat the Target hun the woman during sex and is demanding payment, nr by atlcmpting blackmail.

• The prostitute fakes an injury, a sudden illness, OĨ even an accidental death during lovemaking, and (he incident (hrearens to expose the target's activities for the evening.

In each of the C3SCS in which the target finds himself facing â problem, rhe case officer will be (he one uho offers a solution.

Anyone who lakes up the career of a professional intelli¬gence officer should arrange to have seven! good prosticutes, both male and female, on tap. How he goes about finding such professionals depends on rhe country and city where he k opcr-

King. Pan of chc reining of any good case officer should be learning che ropes when it comes to finding a willing prosrinne. The case oflicci will, 0Í course, always make any conuccs with professional sex partners under a cover identity.

Using a Service Agent

Every gnod case officer will have scvcial agents he has recruited 10 work Ểbí him, nor for rhe intelligence they can steal bin rather the scn ices they can provide. f*hi$ can include providing sexual services co those Targeted for rccruitrncnl— provided rhe case officer can find some atuaciivc young per¬son who is willing to make (he easy sacrifice for his country, the team, rhe poliricol leader, or whatever other false flag ĩhe case officer is flying when he recruits rhe young person.

Ir s relarively easy m find young men who will seduce a woman fui the good of chcir coumry or jusc 3 gocxl paycheck ibf un ices rendered (even if she mas noe be much of a catch), but 刈“Climes a ease officer can find females just as anxious (0 do their part for their country QI their policicdl ideals.

The ease agent uses rhe same techniques to recruit a vol¬unteer sex partner as he would for recruiting 3 primary agent. For example, a CIA case agent might iCCfuic a young female college student in a nonhem European country by piomising ro help her get a work visa in the United Scares if she will first reduce rhe son of the deputy prime minister. In another sicii- 3tion. the ease officer might convince a pretty tree hugger to bed an executive walking wnh a logging company tn gee evi¬dence that can be used in a lawsuit co halt clearH；utting. (The infnrmarion will really be used by a competitor logger to Ulidcfcuc a bid for 3 Forest Service log sale.)

In the following example of using a sc nice agent as a sex¬ual agcni, Doug Kranz worked as an information specialise for 1 Washington lobbyist doing business with the transportation industry. Kenz was looking foi a good SPY inside the Intersute Commerce Commission and had identified Martha O'Conner, a secretary- working in the cilice of a depury com¬ 

missioncn as a potential fcuruit. Kranz's surveillance had dis¬covered that Martha occasionally went barhopping wilh a few iemale friends in the singles joints of Georgetown, but char the homely and overweight woman always went home alone, though her prettier friends often gor lucky.

Far, 40, and bald, Kranz knew he had lictie chance at building i>ny kind of personal relationship with Ms. OX Conner: however, he had another f ecru ir sitting in the wings, waiting for just this kind of a problem. Dick Ford, a graduare student ac American University, knew Kranz as David Fraser, the executive director of the Air Quality Education Council, an environmental prnrcction political acrion group supposedly based in Denver, Colorado. Kranz/Fiascr explained to Dick Ford that his organisation wanted better access to rhe office where Martha O'Conner worked and would pay a subsrdmial sum of money for such access. Dick, whose serious financial Strairs were about (O force him (u drop out of gfud school, agreed to ukc on the job that che man he knew as David Fraser was offering.

'ITÌU next time 'íarrha O'Conner went along wiĩh her friends Oil a COUÍ of che Georgetown bars, it was Martha who got lucky. /\r Kranz's instmccion. David bedded Manha sev¬eral times over rhe next several weeks before uking the next step. When Martha was toully committed ro him and the pleasure he was giving her, Dick told Marrha he was going to have co drop out of school and return to hi$ home state because of his financial problems. He then mentioned one possibility that might keep him in (Own and in \lartha*$ bed. He had a friend working "ith an envirenmunshst group thar would pay good money for a bit of inside informarion Martha might provide.

Martha was soon hooked, and for the next two years she passed increasingly sensitive executive branch documents on to Dick, who passed them (u the man he knew as David Fraser. Both Manha and Dick believed chat the information that Martha was stealing was helping an environmental group  

íĩghr âtracks on aiiromobilc pollution controls, when, in face, Duug Kranz's boss was using the information in hi、lobbying efibns for less rcstiictivc Icgislauon and in iccruiring new businesses by taring them with insider information on what new regulations Here coming down the pike.

The innocent Amateur

If some siruMions, rhe ease officer mighr idennfy a poren- tial love partner he introduces to the target, or arranges for the target(Ộ mccc, and rhen ÌCỈ nature take 1($ course. Once love develops, the ease officer deliberately creates a situation chat places (he fuluiC of the lovers in jeopardy. Even run Uy he offers a solution, hut the potential recruit must steal a few harmless documents firsi.

In the early 1960s, Czech intelligence officers succeeded in rccmiring a U.S. diplomat srauoned in Prague by using such a technique. The primary case officer. Jaroslav iùnna. had identified the diplomar, Edwin Trickett, as a man with a roving eye for the ladies. Irickett also had a wife with whom he often argued. Jaroslav found 3 pretty, young Czech woman, who had applied for an exir via ro visit a brother liv¬ing in the United States. The Czech government had denied rhe via, rhe usual practice in chose Cold War days.

Jaroslav ananged a situation in which i^tiicic Maccidcnral- ly" overheard TOO strangers talking in a library about how one way co get a Czech exit visa was ro have someone from the U.S. Embassy coniaci (he Czech guvernrnenL One of (he srrangers mentioned that Edwin Trickett, the administrative ufliccr at the embassy, had done scvcid such favors for pfcccy young women. The second stranger said he unđerstcxxỉ that only woikcd if rhe young women were willing to "do any- thing** co gee a visa.

Pallide, who $0 badly wanted co escape life in Oechoslovakia that she would indeed do anything, ackrd oil (he gossip she had overheard. She called che U.S. Embassy and asked for an appointment with Edwin Trickett. Irickttu 

who in truth had never traded intervention on a visa marre，ibr sex, had no way of helping her out but uas still intrigued by the pretty Czech woman who seemed so anxious ro do any¬thing ro get a vi^a. Rather chan simply ceiling her she had bad informarion. he promised he would try ro find a way to help her get the exic visa and suggesred llut they meet in a few days so he could report whar he had found one.

Although he was initially suspicious about Parricie s motives, her innocent demeanor and adamant criticism of rhe Czech socialist guvemment soon convinced him that she real¬ly was what bhc claimed co be, rrhey met several more times onr$ide the embassy and cvennially became lovers. After that. Trickett did seriously Stan looking for ways in which he might help the ynnng woman get out of (he counrrv. As his marriage was floundering he even began considering rhe possibility that he might divorce his wife and marry Patiicie.

Eight weeks later. Edwin was heading for a lirdc afternoon delighr with Parricic when he saw several policemen coming our of Parricic^ apanment building, dragging Patrick with (hem. Tcirified ar wliat he had witnessed and certain chat his illicir romance was abolir (O be exposed. Edwin spent a miser¬able two days waiting for the second shoe (o fall. On the third day he received a call at hi$ embassy office from someone call-ing himself Jiri, who claimed to be Patricic^ uncle and who demanded a meeting with him.

When they met. che uncle told Edwin rhat Patricic had been charged with spying for rhe Americans and (hat Edwin W35 going to be named as rhe intelligence officer who was her concrul officer. Jiri, who chimed ro be an upper-level bureau¬crat in rhe Ministry of Industry, explained he had pulled a few Strings and arranged to meet with his niece in her cell. She had vehemently denied she was a spy but had admitted her affair with the U.S. diplomat. Jiri had pulled more Strings and was hopeful that he could ger the charges against his niece dropped, provided that Edwin was willing to mcer with a Czech security officer and convince him (hat Edwin was not a CIA officer bur a legirimarc diplomar If Edwin failed ro con¬vince the security offker of that, then Paưicie would be cried as a spy. The Czech governmem would also declare Edwin persona non grata and expel him from the country. That, in turiu would expose Edwin's ailair to his employer, co-workers, and family.

Edwin agreed to such a meeting. The security offker with whom he mcr was, of course, Jaroslav Parma. Parma grilled Edwin for several hours about his work as an adminisuative officer in (he U.S. Embassy. Edwins embassy job was. in fact, a dull administrative job that had nothing to do with either policy or (he collcccion of intelligence.

As Parma listened to the diplomat talk about his daily drudgery, Parma became friendlier and friendlier, assuring Edwin that he believed what Edwin was saying. Over the nexr rwo weeks» Parma arranged for three more meetings so that he could gather more details, explaining dial while he was convinced chat Parricie was innocent he still had to con¬vince his superior of that. Parma also warned Edwin (hat he should not tell anyone in the embassy about his problems, because (hai would only make ir more difficuk ro arrange Patricio's eventual freedom-advice that Edwin was only too anxious to follow. Finally, in the third week, Parma arranged to allow Edwin to visic Pallide in che jail.

I .eft alone with Patricic in her cell, Edwin listened to the (Cííitkd woman as she described her inccrrogarion by the Czech security police. Ycc. even (hough near hysteria Paưiâc pleaded in whispers with Edwin that he nor do anyrhing for the Cx<xh government She insisted that Edwin forgee he ever knew her and that he gee out of the country as soon as po^iblc. Pacridc*$ obviously sincere concern for Edwin and her willingness to sacrifice her own life only helped to con¬vince Edwin (hat he must do everything possible (O help rhe woman he loved.

Edwin left the jail absoluccly certain (hat Patiicic was an innocent victim, which in fact was tnie. In his next meeting  

wilh Parma, the Czech «ucuíity officer assured Edwin that things Were moving in the righe dirccrion. The only problem was char he needed somcching extra to convince his superi¬ors that Edwin was sincerely crying ro help rhe young Czech woman. He suggested chat it would be very helpful if Edwin could provide a few embassy docunicncs for Czech intelli¬gence. assured Edwin (hat the documents didn't have to be classified, bue rather could be something as common as personnel and administrative manuals. Parma promised that wich ilisc a bic of cooperation, Edwin Could solve both Patricio 5 legai problems and also avoid the exposure of his litde love sccrcr.

The nexr (irne he met with Parma. Edwin took with him a compiere set of U.S. State Department’s adminisrrative manuals. While they were marked Official u$i Onbf. they were typical biircaucraric rules and regulations of personnel con¬duct and administrative procedures for letting contracts ouc for bid. signing rcnwl agreements, ordering supplies, running the embassy commissary, and hiring local employees.

Two days later, Jaroslav Parma (ữld Edwin that Patrick had been released into her unde's custody. Parma warned Edwin (hat the Case was still noe closed and suggested (hat it might be necessary for Edwin to again demonstrate his will¬ingness ro cooperale with the Czech government. Jaroslav then promised that if Edwin would continue to cooperate until his rour in Prague was up. the Czech government would giant Patrizie an exit visit, which would alluw her to leave the country for rhe United States.

Edwins wife had recently returned co rhe United Sates for a vacactun with her aging parents, so Edwin was able ỈỠ spend Patfides first night out of jail wirh her ar her uncle's house. Once (hey were alone, I^tricic again pleaded with Edwin to do nothing to help the Czech government and to forget about her. advice (hat Edwin refused to accept.

Happy (O have Patricic free, and optimistic that he would succeed in eventually getting her out of Czechoslovakia,  

Edwin was an easy mark for the next step ill his rcciunmcnr. Fur the next several months, each lime Edwin passed Parma a new see of documenrs, rhe security classification stamped on the documents crept a little higher. While Edwin did nor nor- mall> have any reason(0 see ehssified material as part of his job desenprion, his responsibilities as the embassy adminis¬trative officer gave him easy acce» co all sections of the cmba$^\; including the classified document storage aicas.

Who knous how long ir would have gone on if Edwin had been a bir more cainious. But the embassy secuiilv oiTiccf noted that Edwin was spending a lở( of (ime in rhe classificd- documcnĩ storage vault and got suspicious. He did a bit of police work, and Edwin got caught. Edwin was charged, con¬victed of (reason, and $cnrenced to a long prison term ill a fed¬eral penitentiary in the Cnilcd Slates. No one on the r.s. side knows what happened to poor Patricic. 

Chapter Nine

The Case

Officer at Work

c【's lake a look at a successful rccmirmenr from start to finish, using an example (hat dates back to J_/ rhe Cold War when the new Communist govern- Kient in Cuba was expanding ir$ influence in Laún America.

The CĨA policy StaiK with the approval of the National Security Council, determined in the mid_lW>05 【hai more infix- mation was needed on Cuba's subversive activities in Venezuela. ITie policy staff asked chat the CIA station in Caracas identify and recruit someone working inside rhe Cuban Embassy in Gưacas who might provide such information.

The CIA station chief in Caracas assigned a ease officer, Harold Doyle, the responsibility for doing $0. Doyle uas already running a surveillance opcrarion on the Cuban Embassy out of an apanment building across the sircce from (he embassy. rn)c surveillance had identified several Venezuelan nationals who worked in (he embassy, including Tamasina Lopez, who worked 35 a cook in the embassy cafeteria.

Helena Chavez» a Venezuelan national, was working for Doyle as an access agenr. Helena was a middle-class college dropout who had long been fascinated with American movies, fashions, and men. She had been working as ail employee uf (he CIA for four years. Although she considered ic a good job with good pav, (he work also gave her access to the US male diplomats working in the embassy, one of whom she hoped mighĩ cvenutally fall in iovc wi(h her and propose. Helena had once gone co the United States for four months of CIA training and was rcguhfly ufluacred° (polygraphed) to ensure her Invale to her employer.

Helena approached Tnmasina Lopez while the latter was attending mass and made friends with her. Helena learned that lumasma never left che embassy kitchen while she was working and that she kneu almost nothing abolir rhe Cuban ndcionak who worked in rhe embassy. rIbmasina was not a good prospect for recmi(n)enr as either a priman* agent nr an access agenc.

However, Helena also learned that loniasina had an adult son, Jorge, who was desperaccly looking for work. Tbmasina complained in her conversations with Helena that it was too bad chat Jorge wasnV a beerei driver because the Cuban Embassy was looking for a new chauffeur.

A surveillance of Jorge found him (o be in desperate writes indeed. He owed mnncy. his wife was about co produce their second child, and he had been blacklisted by a foreman of a U.S. oil company where he once worked after he had been caught distributing proCasưo propaganda sheers to fel¬low workers. Helena arranged to meet lomasina while she and her son were walking together on rhe sưcct and was thus introduced to Jorge.

A couple of days later. Helena **accidcncallyw bumped imo Jorge in a crowded depanmenc score. Pretending to find Jorge an attractive male who interested her. Helena accepted Jorge's quick inviurion co qhare a cafecito. After sounding him out during several subsequent meetings over coffee and veri- fying that he uas ready to do about anything ro earn money, she introduced Jorge to Harold Doyle, again in whar appeared to be a chance encounter. Harold, using the name Brent Stoker, pretended co be a Canadian journalist who was writing for a leftist news magazine and who was looking for victims of  

U.S. imperialism co write about. Jorge was only too happy to spill his (ale of woe about his misneatment at che hands of an American-owned company.

In appreciation of Jorges contribution to the story he claimed tn be uTÌting, I larold paid for Jorge to take a week- long drivers education course, as the only srvdcnt of a special (ucor. As soon as Jorge finished rhe course, Tc>masina asked her supervisor in the Cuban Embassy co help gee Jorge the job as an embassy driver.

Once Jorge was working in the Cuban Embassy, Harold- OÍ Brent Stoker as Jorge Sĩill knew him_suggested that Jorge could help him with a new story, one trying (0 pu( a human face on che Cuban diplonuĩ working in Venezuela. All Jorge would have co do was report on what diplomats calked about while iidtng around in embassy cars. A promise to pay off Jorge's debts if the information proved useful convinced Jorge (hat he could help the friendly journalist gather that kind of information without compromising his loyalty to his new employer. Joking chat his Cuban employers might gee suspi¬cious ii they saw Joige meeting with a gringo, even a Canadian gnngo, I larold suggested (hac Jorge pass on what¬ever inlbimation he overheard to I lelcna.

One of I laroid s support agents rented an apanment in a lowcrchss housing area, where Helena took up residence. Jorge began visiting Helena once or twice a week for what would appear co anyone following him 10 be ibr iOfnanric pur¬poses. Helena, on her own initiative, began bedding Joige dur¬ing his visits as well as debnefing him while they showered logcchcf on what he had learned while working in the Cuban Embassy. After he left, Helena would write lip the information and pass it nn co the U.S. Embassy case oiTiccr.

Because he was earning two incomes and getting lots of sex on the side while his wife rexovered from (he binh of cheir second child. Jorge didn't spent a whole lot of time worrying about the identity of the mysterious Canadian. While he learned nothing of immediate intelligence value on the job. he was learning a lot about the Cuban diplomaĩs, mơstly by listening to the gossip of embassy wives he often drove on shopping excursions and trips co charity events.

One of those wives. Dora Manincz. was married co a first secretary in (he Cuban Embassy, Silvescrc Muninez. On sev¬eral occasions Jorge drove Silvestre co parks and ocher public places where Silvestre would meet wich Venezuelan suidcnts and Ollier Venezuelans who appeared to be ordinary work¬men. This activity suggested that Silvesrfc was working with student and labor groups. He would have exactly the kind of information that Harold Doyle was hoping to collect.

Jorge ako reported through Helena (hat Silvesrre Martinez Was not gating along with his immediate supervisor and that the embassy gossip was thac Dora Maninez was bleeping with the supervisor.

All this suggested that Silvesuc Manincz might be recruited as a spy. if he was handled the right way. Harold Doyle, (he station chief, and other CIA colleagues began to plan out how (he approach would be made and agreed That Doyle would make che approach u$ing the cover of a Canadian journalist.

Before they could initiate die plan, Jorge overheard (UO senior Cuban Embassy officials, nnc of whom was Silvestre's supervisor, discussing how rhey planned ro transfer Silvestre Manine? back to Havana. One of the careless diplomat alsu let ic slip that Silvestre's wife, who held an embassy position as a secretary, would remain in place in Caracas, at least for several months. Even Jorge could figure out chat Silvestre was getting a career shaft so char rhe supervisor could have easy access ro the wife.

Harold Doyle discussed the situation with (he sucion chief, and after an exchange of telegrams with CIA heddquaf- cers in Langley, \irginia, they decided they did not have enough lime before Martinezs transfer back to Cuba 10 carry our (he usual recnjitmcnc procedures, which can often take weeks or even months. Instead, I lardd would try a cold pitch. 

(Although seldom used as a recruitment technique and almost never successful, a cold pitch is a direct approach with no prior con race Someone walk" up co rhe potential recruit while he is in a public place and makes an offer thau it is hoped, the tar¬get will find (OO good ro turn down.) A cold pitch is used only as a last resort, but this did appear co be the kind of situation in which there was no other choice, especially since none of ihc other diplomats in (he Cuban Embassy offered likely prospects for recruitmen匚

Harold approached Silvestre Maninez while (hey were hath anending a National Day Parry at (he Mexican Embassy in Caracas. Catching Martinez alone for a moment in a room。 fill of people, Harold siarrcd the usual chatter (hat makes up so much of rhe inane conversation AC diplomatic entertain¬ment functions. Halfway through the second sentence, when he was sure no one was lisrening. he dropped his voice to a whisper, moved his face closer to Manincz, and in 3 half¬dozen shon M：n(cnces made an offer. He let Marrinez know how much they knew about him and about his wife's affair with his boss—news thar apparently Maninez suspected but didn't know for sure. Doyle then suggested that the best way Martinez could cake revenge would be co accept an offer of a lump-sum payment of $20.000 and a regular income deposit¬ed in a Swiss bank accounr for passing on informadon to the Americans during che time Martinez still remained in Venezuela.

After Martinet returned co Havana he would become a U.S. mole inside rhe Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While Maaincz spied for the Americans, his Swiss bank account would grow. Harold promised that after 10 years the CIA would smuggle Silvestre ouc of Cuba so he could enjoy his wealth in Miami.

Martinez muse have already figured out whac was hap¬pening to him and his career and had been considering possi¬ble alternatives. He immediately rejected rhe suggestion (hat he return to Havana as a mole and instead proposed (hat he defect, provided rhe Amcrioins made a lump surn payment of $30,000 and set him up with a new idencicy in any American city he mighr choose. In return. Martinez would tell every- thing he knew about Cuban foreign policy and propaganda effbns in Lâún America. Manincz also insisted that there must be no public announcement of his delection. He want¬ed (0 simply disappear.

Doyle was nor surprised at die counteroffer. It was one of the possibilities they had planned for, even down ĨO how much they might offer as payment (Martinez could have gotten $50,000. if be had insisted). Doyle agreed and suggested chat rhe defecrion cake place that very evening. When Manincz nodded his head in agreement, Doyle described a taxi iha( Martinez would find parked on a street near the embassy and suggested chat Manincz might W3nr co go find ir.

The entire convcrsarion had taken less than five minutes. The cwo men walked off in different directions, and nvo min¬utes later, after 3 few brief words with another American col¬league, Harold Doyle was listening to a vacuous explanation of Venezuelan politics offered bv a hulf-drunk Peruvian diplomai.

Martinez didn\ talk IO his wife before he slipped out to find rhe (axi waiting to take him into exile. The cnxi cook Silvestre Martinez to a safe house in ihe Suburbs where he spent rhe next (hrcc months with CIA debriefers. During thac lime、【he Cuban Embassy framically searched for (he missing diplomat. On «several occasions, it$ spokesmen made public demands rhai (he Anwricans cell them what had happened to Martinez, but they had no proof chac (he U.S. Embassy had been involved in Manincz's Sudden disappearance.

Jorge heard dozens of different rumors discussed in (he backseat of the embassy car he drove, including one wife sug- gcsiing co a friend that Silvestre*s supervisor had arranged IO have Silvestre kidnapped and killed because Silvestre had found out about the 5>upcn,isor*s love affair wich his wife and threatened to go public wich a complaint.

CIA inccrrogaton prepared several hundred pages of  

raw data based on the lengthy debriefing of Silvcscrc Martinet. 4 he 31alion repons officer then reduced the data (O several dozen intelligence reports and forwarded them (0 CIA headquarters.

With (he debriefing completed, the station sneaked Silvestre Martinez out of Venezuela on board one of ĩhc U.S. Air Force Boeing 707s in rhe cxccucivc fleer. The aircraft had flown a group of U.S. Congressmen to Caracas for ân inspec¬tion on the progress of U.S. economic assistance programs.

Today Silvestre lives in Miami. lie has a new name, a new wife, a new career, and he avoids anyihing having to do with politico. Everyone who knows him as his new identicy, includ¬ing his new wife, thinks he was once a utility worker who fled Cuba on a fair.

A dozen differeni CIA analysis working under the direc- rion of rhe deputy director for intelligence (DD1) reviewed the intelligence reports on the debriefing of Silvestre Martinez. The information was condensed into a four-page intelligence dissemination report, which was then edited and rewritten a half-do^en limes.

The staffers in the CIA responsible for the final dissemi¬nation of the repon on rhis operation were not happy with (he results. First, they criticized the staùon and Doyle for not con¬vincing Marcincz s remain in place. They also criticized Doyle fc)r allowing Marrincz to defect without a public annoiinccmcnc. But what most bothered the Washington wiz-ards was thât (he information provided by Martinez didn't supporr the l?.s. foreign policymakers' own beliefs about Cuban diplomatic 3CCÌVÍÚCS in Latin America.

Akhough Martinez had confirmed rhac ĩhc Cuban govem- mcnr was commined to spreading rtvdudon in Latin America, he described the Cuban diplomane effort as inept, incompetent and disorganized. He portrayed the Cuban diplomale corps as a col- ỉccdun of 8mpeling careerists who were frightened of their own security invescigacors and incapable uf taking advantage of new opportunities diat occasional^ developed in host counưies.

Because most of the CIA intelligence reponing in that area described rhe Cuban revolution as a major rhrcnr to (he development of democracy in Latin America—a threat ths( required a massive infusion of both economic development assistance and coven political action一(he aguncy'4 bureau¬crats decided chat Silvestre Martinez muse have been a disin- fonnacion plani. They therefore limited the di*i$cmination of the report tv a few top-level policymakers within the intelli¬gence commiimry; with a cavear as a cover sheet, warning that the information mighr not be reliable. In $0 doing, they demonstrated rhe basic principle〔hai ĩ^ữùd intelligence has no value if the rrâpienĩ « nộỉ billing to act on thal which proves 血 ，“ipiaư' pm)iõu$ beliefs ĩữrong. 

Chapter Ten

When a Private

Citizen Recruits

N

ow chat we have $ccn how government espi¬onage agencies work, let's cakê a look at huw a person with no connection to any government or polirteli group can spy successfully. This example involves :he simplest kind of spying: a situation in which one individ¬ual wants co know what anochcf individual is keeping sccrcc.

Janel Thompson suspected thac her husband. Bill, was having an affair with his secretary, Mandy Shumway, and chat he mighr be planning on leaving Jancr and her two teenaged children. Bill was the owner/manager of a real esente invest¬ment firm worth several million dollars. Janet would have happily given Bill a divorce, provided (hat she got half the value of his business (something guaranteed by the communiry-property laws of (he state where rhey lived). She feared, however, chat Bill might be moving funds our of the firm into secret bank accounts and rhac she would wake up one day (O find Bill long gone, leaving her nothing hue a com¬pany stripped of cash and facing bankruptcy. On ihc ocher hand, if Bill was engaged in nothing bue a shon-timc fling. Janet was willing to lee (he flame burn uut-provided the company profits kept rolling in.

Because Bill was well known in the community. Janet didn't wane co discuss che issue with a local buyer or private dcrccuve, fc)r fear rhac Bill might learn about her suspicions and take preemptive action. Janet instead discussed her prob¬lem with her brother, Ted Monee, a career military officer who was assigned as an assistant air force attaché in rhe U.S. Embassy in Singapore 3nd who was visiting the United Stares on home leave.

led. with three more weeks of leave on his hands and already bored wich staring ar the lake in front of hi$ vacation cabin, decided co make It a busman s holiday by practicing a few of the skills he had learned as a military intelligence offi¬cer. He called two old military buddies and invited them and their wives down to share the lakeside house where he was staying» explaining the enttrtainmenr he was setting up for che occasion as an extra enticement. Both the couples arrived two days later, anxious co get on with rhe spy game Ted had promised as a diversion.

led assigned one of (he two couples, Sylvia and Terry Minerà» to a full-time surveillance of Mandy. The other cou- pk Dawn and Craig Wallop, began 3 surveillance of rhe invesrmcnl firm wirh (he intention of identifying possible sources working for the husband who mighỉ report on whar was happening inside the company.

Sylvia and Terry quickly confirmed that Bill and Mandy were engaged in a hot and heavy romance, often taking long lunch hours together as well as spending lots of rime in the office “working late" after che ocher employees went home. They continued the surveillance while looking for a possi- biliry of a chanci meeting with Mandy and Bill when they were together.

Cfaig and Dawn, using informacion provided by Janet, identified three people who worked at the firm who might know something about how Bill was managing che cash flow. One of the employees, Mark Weiss, artended the local Methodist church with his family every Sunday morning. *lTie Wallops also learned that the Weiss couple were avid dupli- cate bridge players. 

The Wallops went to (he same church the next Sunday, celling everyone they mcc that they were planning to n>ovc into the area. They met the Weiss family and quickly "dk・ cove redn a mutual iniCfCSC in duplicare bridge. Mrs. Weiss not only suggesicd rhat the Wallops come 10 their next bridge game, but also invited the new friends home for a Sunday bnmeh.

By the time che four people got to the dessert, Craig had let it slip that he was looking for some investment property and that the planned move to rhe city depended on what properties might be available. Maik readily volunteered the fact rhat he was associated with a real estate investmenc firm and then lee it slip ihar he wasn't very happy in his job. Answering a lew friendly questions, he explained some of rhe reasons why, including vague refcfences to some sưangc investment moves by the company president.

Craig, dropping hints chat he might have 3 lucrative employment opportunity for Mark if things worked out, got Mark ro talk in more detail and learned that what bothered Mark rno$( about his job was chat Bill had reccnrly made a number of business decisions on mortgages and propctcy sales chat didn'r make a lot of sense in rhe cunent market.

Ted spcn( hk cime al the local county courthouse, col¬lecting all the available information on the properties that were owned or managed by Bill's company Ted discovered chat new loans had recently been taken ouc on several pieces of propeny for the maximum amount possible, while the bank loans on three ocher pieces of property had shortly chcreafter been paid off.

Next. Ted spent a few houn» with a desktop computer, a scanner, a color printer, and several packages of plastic identi¬fication card cover material. Anricd with a complete set of fake documents, he called ai rhe escrow company that usual¬ly handled rhe escrow accounts of Bill's company. Announcing himself as a special agent for che IRS and flashing documents to prove it, led was ushered into che manager's office. The manager quickly agreed ro cooperai with the investigation led claimed he was Cỡnduccing on Bill、company

With che manager's evoperation, ,icd learned chat an escrow account had bc<n opened on one of the pieces of prop¬erty on which the oucscanding loan had reccndy been paid in full. The closing date W3.S sec for September 15, jusr (WO weeks away. Ted pulled his same act with ihe two other escrow com¬panies in the area. lie found an escrow accoun( had been opened on another piece of property in one of the companies with the same closure date. 'IT1C manager ac che (hird escrow company refused ro release any iniurmation, insisting rhât led first get either a search warrant or a court subpoena.

Promising he would immediately do $0, led suggested he would rather not go to rhe trouble if (here was nothing to sub* poena. The manager then conGrmed that if che IRS agent presented 3 subpoena, he would ger records of intcresc. led thanked rhe manager and left, now certain chai Bill was going to sell three pieces of mortgage-free property on rhe same day ÍOÍ a combined total of something in the neighborhood of fbur million dollars.

Sylvia and ,lcrr>- followed Bill and Mandy one evening(0 a small French restaurane located in a nearby city. Sylvia and Tern- also ate in (he resuuranu siccing ai a table near Bill and Mandy, bill paying ancniion only(Ở each ocher. The Minetas left the rcsuuranc a few minu(cs before Bill and Mandy and then spent some time necking in rheii car. breaking up rhe session wi(h just enough time to deliberately crash theii car into Bills as he and Mandy drove out of (he parking lot.

Profusely apologizing and accepring full responsibility ior the accident, Tern, offered ro pay all the repair COSTS, provid¬ed Bill didn't call the police or involve the insurance compa¬nies. Playing che frightened nun afraid he $ about to be found ouu lerry confessed chat he and Sylvia were not married to each ocher. While Teny arranged to pay for (he repairs to Bill's car (giving 3 fake address IO which Bill was supposed to send the repair bill), Sylvia starred ulking co Mandy, cricking her  

into admitting that she was in rhe same situation as Sylvia— dating a married man、with ail the troubles chat go with the rerrienn.*. Sylvia suggested to Mandy chac chc cwo of them ought(Ở get together once in a while to keep each othci com¬pany. Like most women dating married men» Mandy spent a lot of lonely evenings while Bill was home with his family. She jumped at (he chance for a new friend who understood and sympathized with her situation.

Sylvia invited Mandy to dinner the next evening char Bill Stayed home with his family. Sylvia monopolized the early part of the conversation by telling a tall tale about her hope¬less sicuation; she knew her lover was never going to divorce his wife. When Sylvia suggested that Mandy's situation was probably just as hopeless, Mandy bragged Thar she was much luckier, adding rha【she and her lover were about to elope. Although not giving all the details, Mandy explained that Bill and she would soon leave for New Zealand, where they were going to start life uver aS a nucried couple under a new iden- (icy. Mandy added a long racionaiixacion for why Bill was jus¬tified in abandoning a bicchy wife and two spoiled cccnagcrs who had no respect for their father.

Putting everything together led knew chat Bill was indeed going to elupc with Mandy. lie planned to take (he payment for the three pieces of mongagc-free property and transfer the fund^ to foreign bank accvunu and (hen jump rhe first plane to New Zealand, where he expected to live out (he rest of his life with Mandy. Janc( would not only be left with nothing but a bankrupt company, she would also probably be stuck with the respunsibilicy of paying off che capital gains taxes on the propenics Bill sold.

When Ted presemed Janet che evidence he and his friends had discovered, she hired a lawyer who look immedi¬ate action. Two days before Bill expected to finalize it all and head for New Zealand, a process server handed him a collec¬tion of subpoenas that would nor only take him into coun for divorce proceedings but prohibited any monetary withdrawals  

from the escrow accounts until after the property sctrlcmcnc.

The first time rhey met in 3 courtroom, Janc( twisted the knife a bir by telling Bill (hat it was his girlfriend who had blown (he escape plan by talking too much co a new friend.

In rhe final settlement. Jans got most of the money from rhe escrow accounts. Bill goc stuck wirh (he heavily mort¬gaged properties in a tailing real estate market, diid Mandy moved to anorher state without giving Bill her new address.

IS SPYING WORTH THE TIME. MONEY.

EFFORT. AND RISK?

Thar's the qucsiion everyone considering spying on someone else must ask. Foi Janet, rhe answer was obviously yes. By spying on her husband, his business, and his girl- friend, Janet was able co enke timely acrion that saved her and her CW。children from Severe economic and cmvcional dis¬tress. Furthermore, sho obrnined the information ar a mini¬mum cose because of her brother^ expertise and his willing¬ness ro not only work for free himself, bur ro recruit four och¬ers to work wi〔h him. Her brother did ĩakc whar $onic would describe as an unacccpcable risk when he pretended to be an IRS special agone, bue even (hat risk was minimal in【hai 4ed made only three calls on three different people on the same day while using the fake ID. He never made any further 8n・ rac( with che people to whom fie showed the computer-gen¬erated fake crcdenxials.

Spying Alone Won't Guarantee V ictory-

Many historians and critics of the 11$. intelligence effort through che Cold War agree that the KGB won rhe spy war in the field of coven informacion collected by using rccaiiccd spies. Over rhe years, the KGB and ir$ allies achieved repeat¬ed success in recrviiing spies like \Vhimkcr Chambers» (he Rosenbergs, Kim Philby, John Walker. Richard \V. Miller, Aldrich Aines, and, of course, U.S, Marine security guard Sgc.

Clay ion J. I.onetrcc. (These and others were all found OUL We must assume there were many more spies for (he Soviet gnvcrnrncnc who were never discovered.)

On the other hand, the CIA was notably unsuccessful in their attempts ro recruit spies inside either the Soviet Union or any of rhe Soviet bloc countries. (The" good spies we did ger were mostly walk-ins. and most of (hose were eventually exposed by rhe spies the KGB rccmired from our side.)

The reasons rhe CIA failed so miserably in recruiting good sources inside the Soviet Lnion and Soviet bloc coun¬tries are many. One obvious impediment was the difficulcy of gaining access to potenciai spies in a úghtly controlled totali" urian system thar puts severe limitations on personal free¬doms. 1'hc Soviet government watched its citizens, especial¬ly cho^c with access to government seciccs, in ways that can never be employed in a free society. For (he Soviet citizen, (he risks uf spying were simply tcx> great and the chances of enjoying any rewaids coo small. Soviets who might have turned to spying were more interested in getting out of (he system than in staying inside (he system while making money on the side by selling secrets.

Ye匚 despite the fact (hat che KGB won the spy war. the Soviet Union is history, and the world now has only one super¬power, the Unired Stales of America. Good intelligence never guarancecs victory» and bad intelligence doesn't necessarily ensure defeat. Knowing the enemy's secret plans won' do much good if his army is bigger, bcncr equipped, belici trained, bener moriva ted. more combat ready； and holding the high ground.

rhfoughout che Cold War the KGB was playing cacch-up. Tr did steal our atomic secrets, bur by the time the Soviet Union had built irs first atomic bomb we were already stock¬piling hydrogen bombs. The Soviccs goc ahead of US jusc once, (he launching of rhe first satellite, bui even after Sputnik we quickly caught up. and we didn't have to secai any of their secrets to do il. 

Soviet 5CCTCCS were things we didn't have to know or things we already knew. Indeed, critics of the CIA insist (hat much of che money spent in arrcmpùng(Ỡ recruit spies inside die Soviet government not only failed to gee good inielligence information, but even if they had succeeded, what rhe CIA would have learned would not have been worth the money spcnc on collecting the intelligence.

Even when we did gee good incclligcnce, it was often ignored because ic suggested【hat the Soviet Union was not the dangerous monster our politicians tried to make it our ro be, but rather a disastrous economic and social experiment that was doomed to failure, regardless of what we did (O oppose it.

The Expected Results of spying Must Justify the Costs

Anyone who decides to take up spying needs co ask che questions the U.S. intelligence community never asked iiwlf before asking Congress ibr lots of money: what exactly does one expect to learn, and will rhe information be valuable enough to justify che co$ỉ and the potcnrial risk?

In rhe ease of Janet Thompson, (he information on what her husband was planning was well worth the small cost and even the risk her brother took. Bue lcf$ look at another exam¬ple of private spying.

Jeflery Zwcibcl was (he chief executive officer at Modem Fashions, which produced and sold economy-priced womens clorhing that pretended to be high fashion. For several yean» Modem Fashions had run a dose second in sales to Parisian Day. Zwcibcl was concerned that Parisian Day was sraning to pull ahead in borh sales and profits, even though both compa¬nies sold similar products at about rhe same price.

While attending a high "hod reunion, Jeffery met an old friend, Terry Daniels, whom he hadn't seen in 25 years. Daniels had just rccifcd at age 50 from a government job in which he had worked overseas in 3 half-dozen different coun¬tries. As the two men renewed their friendship, Terry had lit- (le co 53V about what he did for the gOvernmenL He was much more interested in listening 10 Jeffery talk about his business.

After Jeffery complained about how he was losing our ro (he competition. Tern* suggested (har Jeffery ought ro do sonic spying on (he opposition and learn what secrets might be responsible for Parisian Day\ success. When Jeffery com¬plained that he didn't have any idea how to launch such an effort. Terry offered to help Jefferx- out. bur warned his friend chat a gcxxj iniclligcncc collection effort would be expensive. When Jeffery asked how expensive, 4erẠ' began scribbling on a notepad as he worked out how much he would have to charge to rtxruic several spies inside Parisian Day. The proposed six- figure price slavered Jeffery, and he rejected (he plan.

Four weeks later, one of Modem Fashions1 biftgcsc buyers announced that she was dropping rhe Modern Fashions line and would be buying exclusively from Parisian Day. Convinced (hac Parisian Day had done something dircy in excluding Modern Fashions from a major market, Jeflen, called IciQ* and, ouc of desperation, agreed to the proposed (crms for running a spying operation against Parisian Day.

Over the next several weeks. Icrry, working with severa] service agents, successfully recruited five Parisian Day employees 然 spies.

The first recruit was Tonya Lopez, a cleaning lady. A mid- dic-aged, single mother. Tonya had a 19-year-old son, Eduardo, who had recently been arrested and charged with aggravated assault following 3 street gang fight. While waiting in 山c courtroom for a hearing on the charges. Tonya met ĩmelda Melendez, a young woman who chimed to be work¬ing for one of (he many advocacy groups that serve the city,s poor. Imelda arranged for a lawyer, who got the charges against Eduardo reduced to a misdemeanor with no time in jail. ( lonya never noticed chat Imelda helped only one person in a courtroom full of defendants.)

Several days later. Imelda told Tonya that the advocacy group she re prese need was investigating the abuses of work¬er$ in the garment industry. Using implied threats (hat Ic)nya s son could find himself back in court facing new felony charges combined with che offer of regular cash pay¬ments, Imelda convinced Ibnya thar she should begin spying on her employer.

Ibnya was soon passing on to Imelda the contents of the trash cans in che Parisian Day executive office. She also plant¬ed Several different listening devices in such places as the CEO's office, her conference room, and the ladies* bathroom. Just as imporrane, 'lồnya told Imelda a great deal of informa¬tion about the people who worked at Parisian Day: (heir names, their positions, whar kinds of private (hingb they kept in rheir desks, the rclcphonc numbers in their Rolodcxes. descriptions of chcir cars and (heir license place numbers.

David Misi seo worked as a mid level executive in the Parisian Day sales office. David was angry char a iemale col¬league had gotten a promotion that he had wanted and was con¬vinced that she had gotten the promocion only because of affir¬mative action, David complained bitterly about his situation(0 hk new friend, Joe Killorx； whom he mcc while taking a night course in salesmanship at a city college. A sympathetic Killcry let it slip that he sometimes sold information and suggesred (hat there were people who would pay good money for inside infor¬mation on Parisian Day's sales campaigns. Although Killory wouldn't say who his cuscoiner might be, David assumed it was Modern Fashions. He happily agreed to become a spy inside Parisian Day. David not only enjoyed rhe money char Killory (really Daniels) swned paying him, he also got a major kick our of playing spy with all the dead drops, secrer meetings, and SUÍ- vcillancc-cvasion rraining that Daniels provided.

Regina Mencs. who worked in che Parisian Day executive secrccary pool, mec Donald Snell ar a church social and soon fell hopelessly in love. Snell, who cold Regina he worked on Wall Strccc as an invesror. promised to marry her 35 soon as he cached in on several invesrments he had made based on insid* er information. Then one day Donald appeared M Regina's  

apartment, wearing a terrified expression and telling her that a sưangcr had approached him on the street and handed him an envelope containing evidence of his insider-trading aerivity. 1'hc blackmailer didni wanr a monetary payoff co keep him from passing the information to the Security and Exchange Commission; he wanted Donald to convince Regina that she should begin spying on her bosses at Parisian Day.

At first Regina refused, bue after several nasty levers' spa【s. a Threat of suicide, and a promise (bar she would only have co go along unril Donald could Bsh in the trades and col¬lect the profits, she met with a stranger (Terry Daniels» of course), who uughc her how to pass him information through a dead drop.

Tern* also succeeded in recruiting a delivery driver and unc of rhe Parisian Day bookkeepers. 41\lan Srremple.

This was a casebook study in how to recruit and mn a ring of spies. Each of the spies had been recruited under a differ¬ent false flag、and none of (hem knew about (he others.

Six months after putting 'Ictry on che payroll. Jeffery knew all rhe secrets there were to know about Parisian Day. He had learned (har Parisian Day was contracting our most of i($ sewing work to swearsheps that employed undocumented aliens, that i($ bookkeepers were cooking the books co avoid income taxes, and (hat it was stealing partern designs from the more expensive fashion houses. These, however, were also things that JefTery was doing ac Modern Fashions.

Jeffery also had a foot-high file wi(h the details of Parisian Day s production and sales procedures. I Ie had (he list of cus¬tomers, the (oral sales figures, produccion costs, personal details on buyers, and jusc about every thing else that someone ar Parisian Day had written down over the last five years. He had drawings of Parisian Day's planned fashion designs, its distribution figures, and advance information on i(S advenis- ing campaigns.

Jcffer>- also knew a lot about che people who worked at Parisian Dav, including rhe CEO. Donna Sposato, hie knew char Donna s current lover was Sharon Kaizke. somerhing that David didn't know. Jeffery also knew the ctincnt balance in Ms. Sposar。・$ personal bank account, what medication she was taking, and where Donna and Sharon did rheir social drinking as well as rhe bed and bicakiasc where they often spent week¬ends. He had rhe same kind of personal inibnnarion on every single executive working for Parisian Day

Yet. despite (he stacks of documents and reports from the spies he had working Illude Parisian Day, Jeffery didn't have a single bit of actionable intelligence, (hat is, information he could use to gain an advantage over the competition.

'ITÌC simple fact, which Jeffery refused to consider, was that while Modern Fashions and Parisian Day produced almost idenrieal lines of clothing, Domu a better manâg er and CEO than he sas. Mosr people liked working for her. and (hey worked just 3 bit ỉiardcr 3C Parisian Day than ar Modern Fashions. This influenced the way that Parisian Day employees dealt with cuscomcrs. who. as a result, liked Paiisian Day sales and service personnel more (han they liked those working for Modem Fashions. Therefore, if all other factors such as price, quality, and fashion design were equal, shich they usually were, buyers would give as much business as they could co Parisian Day.

If Jeffery had bothered to ask just about anyone in (he fashion industry why he was losing business to Parisian Day, rhey might have told him rhe ưuth. But he wasni the kind of nun whn would ever admit to himself that anyone knew the fashion business belter chan he did.

Dcsperacc to use rhe intelligence he had paid so much lo obtain, Jeffery finally decided rhe best way to hurt Parisian Day would be to pass on (he information he had on Parisian Days rax avoidance IO the IRS. He did SO. and Parisian Day soon had 3 visit from IRS examiners (hilt would eventually cost the company moie than a hundred thousand dollars.

Even here. Parisian Day was served bv its employees. The head of accounting quickly identified midicvel bookkeeper  

Alan Stremplc as rhe source of the information chat had been passed ro the IRS. Donna immediately fired Strcmplc. and her senior accountants were able co neutralize most of rhe damage hr had done. Although Parisian Day did have ro pay back taxes, (he total amount was a gfCM deal lc«is chan what (he IRS offi¬cers had been led co expect they would collect.

An angry IRS supervisor chcn decided co look closely ac other businesses in rhe garment industry; Slaving with the name he already knew. Jeften.* did nọc have bookkeepers who were as clever or as loyal cn the company as Parisian Day's. Jeffery's bills for back taxes, combined wirh his business loos¬es, forced him into bankruptcy.

Avoiding Intelligence Mistakes

Jeffery's first mistake was forger ci ng the primary mie of business: keep your eye on the customer. Whac he should have asked was, uWhat is Parisian Day giving che customers【hai my company is nor?** The people who had rhe answer to the ques- non were the customers themselves. He needed some good, legitimate market research, not an espionage system managed hy a washed-out CIA ease officer.

JcfTcry's real problem was ^If-deccption. He refused IO admit co himself (hat his declining sales and the loss of old customers were signals that he wasn't meeting the demand of the customers.

The moral of rhis story is simple: before deciding to spy on someone else, you muse first have a very good idea about what information you expect co find, and you should have a clear plan on how you intend (O use chat information to gain an advantage. Too many people, including many in government, spy UH others because they can、figure OIK what else co do. They begin bx deceiving themselves, refusing to recognize chcir own failures KO serve the legitimate needs of their customers or citizens. Instead, they hope to discover an explanation for their personal and insri- cutional failures in (he camp of an enemy, 

Chapter Eleven

Surveillance

A

 successful spy-rccniirment operation begins with successful surveillance. YÒU should surt a sufvciL lance operation 3s soon as you decide to start spy¬ing on someunc else. The quebliun you need to answer before beginning suneillancc is not how much surveillance should he done, bui. rather, how much budget and manpower can be committed co surveillance, and how (O use them most cffcc- livcly tv gather rhe most important information.

Because there are numerous good books describing the skills and techniques of surveillance, including several ou【・ standing works in che Paladin catalog, I won! describe the dcuils of surveillance techniques. Instead, I win focus on what a good incclligcnce case officer hopes co discover chrough surveillance. Nevenhclc$$, ĩhe reader musi under¬stand char sim cillancc skills, including skills in rhe use of sur¬veillance phorography and high-rech listening devices, arc cxucmcly importane for every inteHigsec case officer. Every professional intelligence-collection agency in (he world puls ics case officer (iainccs through long hours of rigorous instruc¬tion and practice in surveillance, Slinxillance avoidance, and Spot5ng others who arc watching or tbllowing the tiaincc.

The ease officer watches the urgec uiganiwcion s office and everyone who works and visits there to idenrify employ¬ees and associates of the target. The surveillance must identi¬fy everyone who might be an important pan of the organiza¬tion. especially chose who might know the secrets of rhe orga¬nize lion or have access to those who will know the secrets the case officci wants co steal.

Employees axe easy to identify because they show up 10 work and leave at rhe end of the day ar roughly the same times. Also, rhey can often be identified as to the type of work rhey do by what they wear to work. Professionals dress in suits; delivery men. cleaning women, and maintenance peo¬ple dress more casually and rnay wear uniforms. Once the ease officer idencifics such people, then the surveillance expands to watching them. The surveillance must discover who they are. where rhey work, where rhey live, what they do in their spare rime, and, most imponant. what they do (hat they wane lo keep sccrcr. Cars, homes, and recreational 3crivicic$ will also provide considerable data on levels of income and how impurtant each employee is to che urger organization.

The most important goal of the preliminary surxxillancc is (O identify possible fCCfuits for spying- (hose who have access to intelligence and who might be conned inro spying. Once poccntial rccruirs arc identified, che surveillance should look closely ai each potential recruit, trying ro learn everything possible about rheir lives, especially uncovering personal problems or moral weaknesses. Illis will include evidence char a poicntial recniit lives above his income, has difficulcy- getting along wi(h other people, has laniiiy prob- 15ns. and any ocher information that might be used in a recniirmcnt attempc.

I-OOK AT WHAT TIIE SURVEILLANCE

TARGET THROWS AWAY

It s amazing what home people throw away—canceled checks, old credit card receipts and their carbon copies, empty medicine bottles, personal Iccccrs, memos and reminder notes, old bills, grocery receipts, shopping lists, loncry and betting rickets, and sometimes things (hey never intended to rhrow away but accidcnudly dropped into a crash can. You can learn (he addresses of friends and business contacts from envelopes, the type of medicine they are taking, all about their personal finances, what kind of legal problems they face, whac unions or professional associacions rhey belong tu. where cheir children go co school, what magazine» (he family reads, how much they drink and 50 on.

Even though (he public has been warned repeatedly about the dangers of throwing away such things as credit card charge copies and bank balance sheets, most people keep tossing such things in the trash and then purring out the trash where anyone can pick it up before the garbage collector comes along.

Governmcnc intelligence and police agencies understand rhe intelligence value of garbage; therefore, rnosl government agencies wilh any security concerns burn ail their paper trash. Most private citi2cn$, public organizations» and business offices arc notoriously lax about controlling trash that leaves the office and even more careietô when il comc$ co disposing of wrinen material while ar home or on the road.

rhe most serious problems in collcccing garbage arc avoid¬ing being observed while picking up the can and doing it in a chac the subject never realizes chat his garbage i$ being examined by an adver5aiv. A pari of (he ongoing surveillance should establish die household or office trash routine 50 chat the garbage can be rcưieved without being observed between (he rime it is placed m a Dumpster or set out for pickup and rhe time K 1$ collected by the garbage truck.

IDENTIFY YOUR TARGE TS ENEMIES

Anyone who is engaged in a dispute of any kind with a rar- get of an iniclligcnce peneưatiun is a poccnrial source of infor¬mation. Thorough surveillance can identic angry cx-!ovcrs, fired employees, political opponents, business compcricors. people owed money by rhe target, rivals for promotion, and anyone uls who might wish harm (O the target, his friends, and his employees. Such people will often know a lor about the one rhey hate and will willingly share rhe din with almost anyone who will lisccn I。them.

LISTEN TO WHAT YOUR

TARGET IS SAYING

Wha( is vour urger saying in public and in private conver¬sations to which you arc privy? If il's a business, read the annual repOiU and advenising copy. If ir*$ a political organiw Tion. read the prc$$ releases and listen co what is put ổn the public record. Gv to public nKClings or send someone to such meetings. Look ar credit reports, public tax records, docu¬ments required by campaign laws, coun records, and every official, semiofficial, and public document you can lay your hands on.

WHAT WILL YOUR TARGET

TELL YOU IF YOU ASK?

The whole idea behind diplomacy is thar both sides assume that it is a better idea to exchange in for f nation than ir is co figlit. Obviously, when two hostile parties talk, both sides will be telling lies about their intentions, their srrengths, and their fears. Even so, rhe masier of dcccprion must also learn to be a master in recognizing deception in others. Sometimes, people celling lies let slip more truth rhan they realize. (Remember, a good lie must have a lở( of truth mixed with it.) If you recognize the lie, then you can guests what truth the lie is trying to cover.

Ofrcniimes. face-tr>-facc, nonchreacening confrontations will reveal more about your target Than YOU can learn chrough  

a sophisticated spy program. This is especially True if you use rhe techniques of friendly imerrogarion as described in Chapter 8 when meeting with yonr enemy in person. Use $uch a meeting to learn as much about your enemy as you c^n while revealing only those things about yourself chac will strengrhen your position with the enemy.

IF IKJSSIBLE. GET AN INVITATION

TO THE TARGETS HOME

This is often easier chan you would suppose, provided rhe intelligence officer or one of his agents is not known to the mrgcL You miglu pferend co be a repairman, salesman, private investigator collecting iniormacion on a neighbor, volunteer for a charity soliciting donations, ur even a policeman or fire¬man offering a free saiccy inspection.

Once inside a home, always have a sudden nature call. It s surprising how much you can learn about someone by gaining access to (he bathroom and (he medicine cabinet.

This is best demonstrated by a recent scam in which 3 tent preacher, who claimed he could heal the sick, would spy an believers who had written IccccfS requesting free front scat tkkecs ro one of 111$ healing revivals. A few days before the revival, a ucll-drcsscd young woman driving a new model car would fake a mechanical breakdown in front of the (urger $ home. The young woman would attempt to fix the car by working under the hood for a bir, making sure she got some dirt and grime on her hands. Then, acting frustrated and angry; she would ring (he bell of rhe targets house and ask to use rhe phone, explaining that she was supposed co be a( an impoftanv meeting and chat she needed (O oil rhe people expecting her and then call an auto club. Once the calls were made, she asked if she could use the bathioom TO wash the grease and grime off her hands.

ỉn (he bathroom, she would open the medicine cabinet. What she learned would be pul 10 good use ac the IICX( revival

niteiing. On the night of the next revival, the preacher walked through The audience, proclaiming〔hai God—through him, of course-was looking for someone co bless with 3 heal¬ing: *'i see a woman named Evelyn who is chained to Valium. Dr. Bemhearr wrires her rhe prescription because he can'r heal her like God can. ,rhe expensive vitamins chat Evelyn buys from rhe NdUircs Way Vitamin Company wont do it either. 1-he double-strength aspirin she buys in rhe 20()-tablet borxlcs helps rhe pain for only a while, but God wants to help her for eternity.w

Evelyn, convinced (hai (he preacher had a direct line to the Almighty, didn't think abolir rhe preny young lady who asked 10 use (he phone several days earlier as the preacher suddenly turned, looked ar her, and asked, "Your name is Evelyn, isn't ic?*

Once you know everything that can be learned through surveillance about rhe wrgee and (hose who wuik lor him or have some personal relationship with him, you are ready to Starr reenjiring people to spy on rhe larger. 

Chapter Twelve

The Basic Steps: Phase One

T

here are seven basic sups in rbc rccniitmcnt and running of a on vert spy, divided into two phases. The first three steps make up phase one. which we'll discuss in (his chapter. The remaining four seeps, phase rwc： will be detailed in Chaprcr 15.

Phase One

• Spoiling

• Evaluation

• Recruiting

Phase Two

• letting

• Training

• Handling

• Termination

siKrrriNG

The major products of gcxxl surxxillancc will be a list of potential recruits for spying.

There arc two primary criteria that must be considered in identifying a potential rccmic. The first criteria is ihai of access： docs (he porcnnal recmic have access co (he inferma- (ion che inrclligcncc collector wants 10 $icd? Potential recruits should be rated in order of (he probability that they will have access co secret intelligence or have a personal reheion with someone who has access.

The second eri re ria is personality assessment: is che potential recruit someone who can be subverted?

Anyone looking for a good spy should focus on (he fol¬lowing classes of eniplovees in the tâígcr organization:

• Angry or de^prrate upper- and midlcvti management person- nd. These arc the people who have lost the trust of (heir colleagues nr have personal secrets that would lose them such trust if (heir sccrcrs were discovered. Stuck on rhe career ladder because of their own incompetence, they fear that (hey arc going to lose cheir jobs and arc looking for both sympathy and someone ro blame for their fail¬ure (O succeed. The best prospects are those who have been recently passed over for promotion. They uill be angry and may be looking for possible revenge, a way vul of (he dilemma, or some way to remake their world into something more tu their liking.

• CUrks. “catari糕、and Communications persọnrưỉ, *rhc$c peo¬ple see lou of secret information. Although most such employees are surprisingly loyal (O rheir bosses—despite their low position on rhe pay scale—many have personal problems and vices that make (hem potcncial subjects for iCCiuiring. They may have tastes they can*( afford co feed, and they are envious of those who can afford such luxuries, especially among their higher-paid colleagues.

• Janiỉon, drivers、ckantn^ ladies, and other "证"W ptvfik Underpaid and often ignored or even mi$(rca(cd. these work¬ers always need inorc money for the simplest things. Many of (hem have more access co secret infbrniaiion« ỦÍ can ger access, than the movers and shakers in the organization ever imagine. 

The best potential spies for combining both criteria arc the ungi amorous and sometimes ugly people who ill (heir often dull and always routine jobs have access to SCCÌCW.

Other especially good prospects are antisocial personali¬ties incapable of loyalty to anything. These rypcs of people arc also the most likely 10 have secret vices. They may gam¬ble when they don't have money (0 cover the losses, drink too much, use illegal drugs, engage in high-risk sexual behavior, and have domestic problems. Mose imporunt» they arc look¬ing for easy ways out of their rrnubles.

I <nforrunacely. life is no more fair for the intelligence Oise ofliccr chan it is for anyone else, and the be^t is nor what you usually get. Instead of identifying rhe periccc recruit, most case officers find chcTnselvcs with a lisr of potential recruits, none of whom come close to marching whac the case officer hopes m find. The person with the bn access (O the infor¬mation will be a recently promoted, contented worker. who is happily married with gicar kids, no serious vices, and a high¬ly developed sense of loyalcy

Often, the initial surveillance will discover no one who might have access to valuable iniormation and who fits (he peunalicy profile of a potential spy. Compromises muse then be made, and rhe experienced ease officer will usually choose the person with the personality traits tha( make him an easier Target for rccniitmcnr nver the person who has better access to intormation. k is better to have a lcss>(han-ade<)uate spy than nn spy ac all.

In such situations rhe ease officer will have to settle for an initial rccruitmcnr of an access agent, someone who has dirtcc access 10 ochers who may evencually prove co have potential ，> a primary agent. At the ven, least, a good access agent can provide the access necessary (0 plant electronic bugs, cake pieni res of physical plants, or report on officer gossip. 

EVALUATION

Once che ease officer has identified púicnual recruits, each one muse be thoroughly evaluated in order rr> identify (he possi¬ble motives fbr why the targee would he induced to nirn traitor and to dcrermine what type of approach will mosr likely succeed. The case officer muse then decide whn will make rhe inirial approach» what cover story rhe recruiting BSC officer will use, what cnticemcnrs will be offered(0 cement their friendship and create anriciparion tor more rewards, and how rhe recruit will be managed through che reenjitment process.

The case officer musi also decide if he will attempt to use rhe target as an unintentional sp\. or if the recruic will be manipulated into a position where he volunrarily agrees (0 spy perhaps a$ a gver co his new fliend nr because (he friend oilers ro solve the targee $ personal problems.

RECRUITING

The basic foimuh a case officer uses for recruiting a spy is a simple one.

• The ease officer, or someone controlled by rhe case uỉĩìccr, pretends ro be someone (he target would respeer, desire, admire, or perhaps even fear..

• I hc reennter arranges ro meet and get to know the target.

• Once acquainred. che rccruilCi develops a close personal rela-tionship with die cafgcc based on one or more of the bonds of friendship, Mich as sexual anraction. common interests, sim¬ilar personalities, common political objectives, or munial hates, and offers co help solve personal problems.

• The reuruitCi build" the reiatiunship into one in which rhe target CRIST5 the recruiter and looks to him for advice and help in solving personal problems. Ac the same (ime, the iccfuiccr will subtly encourage and supporr rhe behavior that creates (hose personal problems.

 

• The recruiter asks rhe urgee co do innocent favors and ser¬vices and rewards the target with praise, money, sex. drugs, psychological support, or a combination of (hose things.

• taking advantage of the growing trust and dependence of the urgee, rhe recruiter asks the rarget to provide unim- porcanc hits of information about the organization targeted for intelligence collection. The recruiter treats such harm¬less bits of knowledge as more imponanc than they really are and reward^ the taiger for his service.

• As the urget responds in 3 positive manner, che íccniitcr makes additional requests rhat step progressively closer ro rreason. The recruiter increases rhe rewards given ro the poinr that the Target comes to expect and, perhaps, becomes dependent on chern. Ar che same time, the rccniiccr helps (he target CO find psychological juscificacion for betraying those who trust him.

• The recruiter takes the final step, asking thv target to pro¬vide important information that will be a clear bccraval of his earlier loyakies to his government, employer, trusted confederates OÍ lover.

Choosing the Recmitcr

The ease officer may either handle the iniriai contact him・ self or use a surrogate he controls. A surrogate iccniiter can he an a<xc$$ agent, some third parry who doc^n*t realise he is being used, or another case officer picked because he has che specific personality craits needed. It i$ aỉso possible chat a case officer from a different territory will be brought in to handle the rccruitmcnr in caM： (he operation aims sour. In such an event, the recruiting officer can go home after rhe failure, and (he primary case officer can look for another recruit, wichout having(Ọ fear exposure by the carget of (he failed atcempt.

If another professional case officer is used, he should be fully informed abuuc rhe reasons for reciuirmcnt and what the operations officer expects to get from che recruit. On the ocher hand, an access agenr may know little or nothing about why the urger is being recruieed or. ibi chit matter, who will real¬ly benefit from the spying.

Picfcrably, such an access agent will not know who he k really working for. For example, a case officer may hire a pros- rinite who approaches a poicnúal recruK knnwn to be ripe for a love experience. The ease officer tells the prơsritute ihiir the wrget is a business customer he wants(0 get relaxed and ready rn deal with when, in fact, (he case officer is a KGB 3gent who wants to see up the wrget fur a blackmail recruit- merit. The prostinitc. at (he insưuCỉion of the case oỉĩiccr, may then pretend to be a college student looking for work or a recently divorced woman looking for love when she nieces che target for rhe first (ime.

Once the access agent gers rn know rhe targee and earns his love Ui miqj he will lead the target m(0 an inuoducnon with (he ease uỉĩỉccr, who will then take nver direct control of rhe target. For example, the prosrirute might first develop a romantic relationship with che larger and then introduce rhe target to rhe case officer at a social function as an old friend Of ichrivc. ỉn other situations the access agent or the contact case ofticcr may introduce (he primary case officei ro the lar¬ger during a chance meeting in a restaurane, on a golf course, at church, or in a bar.

It may be impossible to make direct contact with the bcs( porcncial Icernir. Perhaps he never goes out in public. Of he hides behind a secretary who screens all his appointment and is extremely suspicious of any approach by a stranger who has not been properly introduced. In such a ease, the case officer may enlist rhe help of an innocent third parry who is close to the target, perhaps a relacivc, an old friend, a business associ¬ate. or even his wife or child. The case officer first makes friends with the associale or family member, and then when he gains that person*5 crust, he manipulates the unwitting accomplice into introducing che target to him.

Whether he makes rhe initial canuct Of ug a surrogate, die case officer arranges a inccnng vúih rhe potential recruit that  

appears to be a normal occurrence in rhe daily life of the recruit. In mo$( C3MÌS. i( should cake place in a nonchrcarcning social sic- uauon, prtfciably when the potential recruit is relaxing 3U-3V from the office, ‘rhe targee might be approached while on vaca- rion. ac church, or perhaps traveling in a foreign country

Government agencies ofren approach A urger while he is traveling abroad. Indeed, if he lives in a repressive country in which the government regularly spies on its citizens, recruit¬ment in a foreign counrn* may be the only possibility. The Mossad almost never sutions cax: agents inside Arab coun¬tries. Insread. they focus their rccruicment efforts on Arabs who travel abroad.

The idea is 10 set up 3 social $icuation in which (he uiger remembers (he meeting as one in which hf rook the initincivc. k IS best if a situarion is designed so that the target approach¬es the recruiter and incroduccs himself.

In one counterespionage operation targeted against an intelligence officei working in (he Soviet Embassy, an FBI recruiting team began attending mccrings of a technical soci¬ety where the suspected Soviet case officer often hung out. One of rhe members of che EBI team always arrived alone and remained aloof from die other participants during rhe meet¬ing. bue occasionally asked probing questions that suggested (hat he was a highly qualified technical expen. The Soviet Embassy case officer, obviously curious, started asking other guests ar the meeting about the stranger, but no one seemed I。know anything about him. Evenwally. the Soviet agent asked one member of the FBI rccmitmcnr team, who cold the Soviet a cover story that idcnTificd (he stranger as a scientist working for a government contiactor in che missile industry- an obvious target for Soviet recruitment.

Soon, rhe Soviet agent approached the planted FBI agent, uhu arrfully managed co turn the cables and rccruir the Soviet 10 spy for the FBI. Whar sarted out as an attempt ar rcưuir- ing an American to spy for the Soviets ended up in the sue- ccs^ful iccruitmcnc of a Soviet inceliigencc office, who pro¬vided extremely valuable informarion for several years. (This particular spy became one of che first victims after Rick Aines swned spying for (he KGB. Ames exposed the man ĨO the KGB, and he was then suddenly transferred back to the Soviet Union. aírcẨled, and eventually executed.)

ĩn some circiimswncc$ rhe intelligence【cam mighr want to create a situation in which the target, nr a lover or family member of rhe UKgen is placed in danger. ĩhcn (he iCCfuircf appean» on the scene and rescues the target. Tuo support agents might arrack a porcncial iccruic on a dark scrccc. As she is about co be raped, a passing motorise scops and scares che fapiscs away. The ÍCSCUCÍ. pretending to be a good Sanuriun. then cakes the woman co a police srarian ar wherever she wants co go.

Instead of being the primary target, the woman might be che dnughrer of rhe primary rargcc. The heroic ease officer then accepts an invitation to meet with the father who wants to extend his thanks.

Another ploy is 10 arrange a minor traffic accident that allows che opportunity to exchange names and addresses. The fccruitci docsn'i have co be in (he other car; he could be the witness who got a description and license number of a hit- and-run driver.

1 he plot for such threatening situations might be rewrit¬ten so that ic is the recniirer who appears to he in dnngcr and rhe porcnrial rccruic saves the day. l*hi$ works especially well if the initial contact agent is a pretty woman and the potential recruit scares off rhe criminals who arc dragging her into an alley or arc running away with her purse.

In a previous ehnprer we SAW how 3 case agent firsc $cr up a love match, put the love in danger, and then introduced himself to the target, offering a solurion that saved rhe girl and protected (he (argci fforn exposure.

Wherever rhe inicial approach is made, ir should be a sit¬uation in which the ca此 officer has control and can retreat quickly if something goes wrong. Akhough the rccmiting  

operation should be Cdfcfully planned out in dcuiil, rhe case officer mưSĩ be ready to flow with the events and situations and be prepared to take advantage of sudden opportunities.

Throughouc (he recruitment process, intelligence officers should inrensih, rhe surveillance of (he prospect. /Ml meetings bcruecn the recruiter and subject should be monitored by a surveillance (cam. If possible, buth sound and videotape recordings should be nude. The intelligence yam should gather any evidence that might be used (0 incriminate the subject-fingerprints, phoros, wpe recordings, and eyewit-nesses-in the event rhe recruitment effort fails.

Once rhe target (he ease officer, the latter, who will almost always prcccnd rn be something he is not begins to build a nonchrcatcning friendship with the rargee At the same cime, every thing (he ease officer says or docs must be designed to put the target at ease and make him or her enjoy the new friendship; the QtóC oificcf should do nothing chai puts the target off guard about che possible dangers of such a friendship.

Ilie cnsc officer must du whatever is necessary to become a crusted friend on whom the prospective rccniir believes he CJIÌ rely. To do this, the ca>c officer will do the following:

• Listen co the target talk

• Sympathize with the taigee s problems

• Offer easy solutions co the target's problems and lend a helping hand in solving such problems

• Feed the target's prejudices and play co his vanity, fears. 3nd hopes

• Grane rhe target absoiuiion (no maucr what terrible things he admits to having done)

• A$k the target for simple favors and be graceful when they arc granted but Rfaàous when the target cannot help

• Never cnricize what the larger holds dear

A$ rhe friendship develops, the ease officer or his con¬trolled surrogate leads rhe urget into spying by making it appear to be a natural outcome of the friendship. Often, rhe ciever C35C officer will creare 3 siluarion in which information becomes 3 commodity rhe target can use to help solve 3 pĩừb- lem faced by the rarget or (he case officer himself.

The first request for informacion will be for something (har appears to be harmless and perhaps even legitimate. It may be something as simple as a request for a company tele¬phone book, rraining manual, or list of salesmen Of company employees. The next step toward treason will be a request for somethin* a bit more sensitive, bur this time it will be accom¬panied by an offer of some kind of reward.

Gradually, the new friend dds rhe targee into increasing¬ly illegal and immoral behavior, all the while making it appear tha( rhe traitorous acts arc furthei cementing rhe friendship Of love affair. The indneemenc ro treason may be psychological inorivacion. sex, money, or a combination of all three.

In some siiuarions, the case officer mav aiiange secretly to create problems that threaten the targets peace of mind, employment, marriage, or even hi$ life or the life of someone he loves. For example, a vase officer may use an access agent tv phnt evidence thar will RC( rhe urger in trouble with his boss or the law. The case officer (hen sympathizes with rhe aggrieved employee or loyal citizen while subtly suggesting chai rhe target owes no real loyalty ro such an unfair employ-er or government.

If blackmail is used as an inducement co crcasun. rhe case officer will usually not be the one making che blackmail threat. A emde encrapment followed by blackmail threats from che ease officer can easily backfire, and if it docs, the case officer will have to withdraw and the rccruiimcnt efl'on abandoned. A clever case officer will arrange for someone else to make〔he blackmail approach, and then he win offer a way to gee out of (he blackmail situation or collect the funds nec¬essary to pay che blackmail demands, '[he recruiter may even pretend to be another victim of (he same blackmailer. This was the method used in the following example. 

The Manila Blackmail Recruitment

The taigcr of this reviuicment operation, Carl Larson, was in Manila on a business trip when he overheard two Americans talking in a hotel bar about their home town of San Jose. California. Carl inccfHipted and introduced himself as someone who called San José home, TOO. The two men asked Carl to join【hem for a drink and introduced chemsclves as Bob French and Bill Lee.

Bob told Ori ihac he and Bill had ju$( met and joked about wha( a long way the (hree had come ro meet a couple of neigh¬bors. The three men exchanged business cards, had a few more drink、、and then Bilk who had bragged about hi$ frequent (rav¬el ro che Philippine suggested That he take rhe other rwo men on a tour of the infamous Manila nighr life.

/Xfeer numerous drinks and stops at a hnlf-dozen different girly bars featuring full nudity, rhe three men took (hree Filipino women they had met along the way tú a short-tifne hotel rhat Bill leeoni mended. Inhere, the three men split com¬pany. and each c(x)k his date to a separate room.

The next morning, Cail woke up with a terrible hangover and a heavy load uf guile, compounded by (he fear chac che woman, who didn't look dll chat precry or young in che morn¬ing light, might have given him something he didn't wane to rake home co his wife. Carl paid (he lady and then took a taxi back to his hotel with a quick stop al a pharmacy where he bought enough annbiotics co ensure that he wouldn't come down with iny of the less deadly diseases of love. He saw nei¬ther Bob nor Bill during (he remainder of hi$ stay in Manila.

Three wcck^ laccr, when he was back home in San Jo5C. Carl opened an envelope delivered by a messenger and dis¬covered 3 videotaped recording of his activities with the Filipino prosrinnc. The accompanying no(e made (he usual blackmail rhreau about sending copies co his wife, the press, 3nd his employer unless Corl paid $50.000. There were also instrucrions for making the payment to a numbered bank □oenunt in Panama.

As Carl sat there, stunned and frightened, he received an angry phone call i'ioni Bob French* who accused Carl of set¬ting him lip for blackmail. French rold Carl rhar because he was a bachelor and the owner of his own consulting company; he was blackmail proof. He noi only refused to pay the black. mail, he threatened to go after both Carl and Bill I.ee. who French ua$ sure IHU51 have conspired to blackmail him. Carl, bv now almost hysrerieal, vchcmcnrly denied rhe accusacion and cold Bob he was also being blackmailed—and chat he wasn,t blackmail-proof. Bob, cooling down, suggesred uhar rhe cuo of them gel evgether co discuss what to do next.

When they mcr. Bob starred off by apologizing for accus¬ing Carl of netting up the blackmail operation. He reported that since rhe morning convcísanon» he had tried to cal】 Bill, bue (he nuinbci and address listed on Bill's business card were phony. Obviously, it had been Bill who scr up borh of rhem. Whereas Carl, who didn't have $50,000 in available cash, was terrified. Bob. although angry, apparently was nor worried a hour himself. Bob poi need our chac even if Carl found the money and paid it. that would just be the first installmenr. Going to rhe police wouldn't de any good either, bccau义 Bill was opcraiing out of a foreign country.

Bob wanted co put the blackmailer out of business, pcr- manendy; and suggested (hat was Carls bc$( hope as well, piOvided that in the process they could get hold of che black¬mail material. He rold Cnrl he hnd some Philippine contact he choughc could do il ibi him. bui he didn't uant to make a move unless he knew that he had Carl's support. When Cad 於ked whiir rhM would cose. Bob rold him nor to worry, that his friends owed him 3 favor and that he felt partially responsible for Cui's problems because he hadni spoiled Bill for the blackmailer he was. Bob suggested that Carl keep hi$ mouth shnr and nor pay any blackmail for (he rime being. Ilie lunger they discussed the action, the more Bob made it sound like he was going co solve che problem more as a tavor lu Carl than because of any concern about himself. 

A week later, during uhich (inw Carl received two more teưcrs demanding immediate payment. Bob called and sug¬gested that the ewe of them meet for lunt h. As soon as (hey had ordered tiiC diinks. Bob explained (hat his comers in Manila had found Bills place of operation as well as evidence that he regularly enticed visiting Americans into blackmail $iruations. They also had learned iha【Lee kept his blackmail evidence in 3 safe in a small apartment where he lived in Manila. Bob's friends had i【set up with a crooked Filipino police colonel to break into rhe apartment, open the safe, collect (he evidence, and (hen “put Bill OƯC of business, permanendy.n

There was just one hitch: the payoff to the police colonel for his help (to ensure (hac no one who engaged in the break- in would he caught and anested) was going to COSC more than either Bob 0Í his friends had expected. Bob's friends ill Manila had proposed a deal, rhey uanccd a complete repon on Carfs business acriviries during his visit to Manilá. whom he met. what deals were arranged, and what kinds of profits Carl,s company expected to make in Manila.

When Carl asked. Bob admitted that the information would go to 3 European cornpctilùí who wanted ro make the deal with [he Filipino corporation that Carl had been wooing. Bob added that his own opinion was char che competitor would ger rhe deal anyway and that the Filipino firm had been stringing Cad s company along to DSC as leverage to get G better deal out of che European company.

In fact, Carls nip to Manila had been a business bust. The proposed partner for the Filipino-American venture wan red too big a share uf the stock, and unless rhe Filipino changed his mind and lowered hi$ demands, there would be no deal, even without anotliCi compciiror bidding for che business. Because Carl dicin' wane IO go back to Manila ever again, he could have eared IBS if his company Josr rhe market in che Philippines. He quickly agreed to do what Bob asked. A day later he gave Bob all the informaiion he had requested.

A week larcr, Bob met with Carl again and handed him a  

package conraining rhe original ncgiUivcs and videotape of Carls Manila night. Bob also assured Carl char he didn't have s worry about Bilk who had "disapptaicd."

Bob had another surprise for Carl. His friends in Manila had found the inloniiation that (2arl had provided so useful that they were paying a bonus. Bob (hen handed Carl an envelope containing SI.000. I Ie asked that Carl sign A receipt for the money so Bob could prove 10 his iiiends that he had passed il on to the intended party. Boh assured Carl ihar no further record would be made of the transaction and that he could consider the money tax-free income ĩhar neirhef Carl s employer nor rhe IRS would ever know about

As SVVĨ1 as he signed rhnr rcceipr, Ori was hooked. I hc next rime, Bob asked ior a bit of commercial intelligence on Cai! s company s plans for a pending deni in Singapore. Cail made Si.5()0. exacrly whiH he needed to pay for the uncx- pccrcd onhoduntic work his daughter required. During rhe next several vears. Carl passed increasingly sensitive intelli¬gence about his company's overseas deals on to the man he knew as Bob French.

Bob and Bill had wofked together in setting up the fCCfuidncnt that entrapped Carl into becoming a corporate spy. Bills disappearance wasn'c murder； he just dropped the take idunriry he'd used for one operation.

When the Case Officer Can

Openly Blackmail the Recruit

Although rhe ease officer is iKiially nor (he one who actually bliickniaik the recruit during (he initial process, once the recruit is working as a spy, the ease office: may use blackmail, if necessary, to keep (he spy in line. The ease officer should always collccr rhe nuccssary evidence that he can use to blackmail a recruit who decides he doesn't want (O Spy any longer.

In rhe previous example, for as long Bub concroHcd Carl, he kept in 3 safe his own copies of rhe pho(o$ and【apes of 

Carl\ night on the town along with the glowing pile of receipts for the money he paid Carl for canipnny secrets. But he never had to use chat material to conưol Cari.

Creativity Is Always the Order of the Day

There are an infinite number of ways in which a ease offi¬cer can deceive 3 rargcr into aiming tra iron The best method is one specifically designed to fit the Cfiioliunal, psychoiogi- cal. and moncrary needs of rhe target while subtly offering the target a justification for what he is going to do—steal infbima- (ton and give ir co rhe new friend, who has suddenly become an important part of his life.

Somccimcs, honesty-Of bener said, sotnf honest—is the bcsc policy in a recruitment effijrL If surveillance and investi¬ga lion uncover that a porcnrial recruit k already angry at his boss, he might jump at the chance to du a linlc spying for rhe conìpcúcion, especially if he can make money doing it. Intelligence experts who engage in commercial espionage are always on rhe lookout for disgmntled employees who arc lucking fbr new employment.

In such a ease, the direct approach, in which (he ease offi¬cer offers borh immediate rewards and the possibility of future employment, may be (he easiest» quickest rourc ro rccniirmcnr. That s why the cold pitch described in Chapter 9(Ớ rcciuic Silvestre Martinez worked. Manincz was in a career bind and he knew il, and he also knew chat (he only incclligcncc agency that would he interested in the informa¬tion he had (O sell was the C1A. When you have a porcnrial recruit who will jump at the chance to work for the CIA. IRS. or FBI. or a business compcciror who wants ro put a recruits mean boss out of business, a false flag is not only unnecessary, il may aaually ger in rhe way of rccruicmcnc.

I lowever. even in those case ill which the ease officer honestly admirs whar organization or agency he represents, some deception is still in order. I hc smart Case officer will nor use his real idcniicy or give the recruit any information that 

would allow (he rccmit to him or learn anything

about his personal life. Its always possible chat the potential spy who appears SO nnxious co start spying tor (he ease officer is. in face» rhe bait set as a ưap. Ir$ also possible that the potential recruit will suddenly change his mind. In any ease, the less [har rhe recruit knows about the real person doing the rccniiring, the better.

When the Recmitment Hails

Thsc arc no guaranrees in life, and even (he best-hid plans somecimes end disastrously. The recruit may recognize what is happening and immediately react tu protect himself and chose to whom he owes his loyalty The target may break off contact. OÍ he may go ro his security officer, counccrinrclli- gcnce people, or the police. The wor$r-casc scenario is one in which he connnues ro lead the recruiting ease officer on, either co entrap him or (0 feed him false information.

The posMhility chat the target will be doubled in an attempt to spread disinformnrion is che reason why close sur- vcilhnce of che target should continue rhroughoiir rhe recruit¬ment eflbit. if the porcnrial recruit starts meeting sccrcdy with ocher people, the recruiting officer must be among the first (0 know.

Failed, abuned. and doubled recruitments always pose a serious threat to the intelligence agenev, rhe private intelli- genve c<i$c officer, nr rhe private citizen who iniiiatcs an espi¬onage operation. I'hcicfbrc, recruitment plans must always include procedures co follow in rhe event of failure or even betrayal. Ulie espionage officer must assume that the subject who rejeers Í1 reenjitment attempt will reporr rhe arrempc to his governinone, employer, or agency.

As soon as there is good reason (Ộ believe rhar rhe attempt at rccruilnicfK has failed、or will fail, che case officer and any others engaged in the recruitment muse break nff all contact with the subject. Any Conner points, such as “lice phone numbers or safe houses, must be shut down. The target must  

have no way to contact anyone associated with rhe recruit¬ment once (he recruitTnent efTort is abandoned. This is why it is so imponant to use a false identity when recruiting, even when the reciUHCf i$ honest about what government or orga- nizarion rhe spy will be serving. Those responsible for espi¬onage activity muse be able to make a credible denial if the target goes public er attempts to make a criminal charge.

If future attertipis arc made co recruit new subjects in che same larger organization, the case officef must assume the tar¬get officers will be warned. The same false flag or cover story should not be used, and the same ease officer should not arrempt to contact anoihcr potential source in that rafger orga¬nization. This is why the CIA and other spy agencies often rcmporarily bring in a ease officer assigned in another coiincrỵ for some cxcra duty whenever they miriare a recruitnwnt. If the recruitment fails* che exposed case office，can immediate¬ly leave rhe enuntn,; and there will be no chance that (he SOUÍ recruit will bump imo che failed rcciuiccr accidentally while walking through a shopping mall.

A clever rccniitment efTon using a false flag may cause che enemy problems even when it fails by spreading misin- funnarion. Say, for example, a KGB case officer pretends (0 be an American interested in a relationship in order to recruit a young bin homely woman working in a French atomic weapons production facility. When (he woman s new lover suns asking questions about weapon production, she goes co hvi security officer like she is supposed co. The French coun- terintciligencc agency attempts to trap the ease officer, but he spor$ rhe tail on the larger recruic and disappears iotcvcf. The rrcnch government then commits a giCUC deal of time and effnrr trying to discover why the Americans arc rccniiting spies within the French nuderai production industry.

In a similar example from the world of private espionage, a ease officer working for a large corporation attempted tu recruit a spy inside a competitors bookkeeping depanmenc by claiming ro be working for che IRS and offering a sizable reward for the information he wan red che rargcr to steal. The hớncsi employee instead told his boss about the attempt 10 rccniit him. The boss was no longer such a ihrcaicning com-petitor because he was worried TOO much about a possible government invesrigation into his financial affairs.

Whenever abandoning a rcciuiring effon, rhe case officer should do everything possible to embarrass or discredit the lincGoperativc target. I Ie should expose any blackmail marcr¬ial. (ell (he tailed recruit's wife about the girlfriend, anony¬mously report crimes to local police, and so on. The more trouble the failed recruit suddenly discovers in his life, the less likely he will he to spend time and efloit irying 10 idenri- fy the man or u onwn who (fied ro mrn him into 3 spy. If a case officer can，recruit an onumy's loyal employee 10 spy for him, h匕 can make SUÍC (hat rhe employee isn*r the happy worker he once was. 

Chapter Thirteen

The Basic Steps: Phase Two

''I~very new spy must he tested as SOUI1 as he starts H passing intelligence 10 rhe ca^e officer co make sure JI_J ibM che spy is delivering reliable informadon.

TESTING THE RECRUIT

The ccsring will continue for as long as rhe rccniited spy provides intelligence information. The best way to(es([he new spy*s reliability is to check his information against known facts. '1Ò do this, the case officer tasks (he spy with finding out specific information without lening him know diat the ease officer already has that ififormarion.

For example, the CIA may already have idenufied a mis¬sile site by surveillance photography. So the ease officer asks the new spy to steal a list uf missile sites and chcn checks to make sure (lie known site is on the list provided by the spy. If what che spy provides doesn't jibe with whir the case officer knows to be (ÍUC» che new agent may be a liar, a plain. Of ju$r n poor source of information. Regardless of rhe reason for his inaccuracy, he is nor credible, and if the situation can noe be corrected through chrtats Of the ccrmination of promised rewards, the spy should be dropped as a source.

Although stolen intormacion can almost always be veri¬fied during the early scn ice of rhe recruited spy. as the spy provides more sensitive and unique infermarion、it will be moie difficult to tese informaiion provided by rhe agent againsr orhei reliable sources.

If possible, any espionage Operation should recruit more [han one spy inside the Larger organization. By operating a ring of spies, rhe ease OiTicer can check each spy's inloiniation 3gain$c (hv information provided by ocher spi匕工 Each spy should have no clue about which of his colleagues is also spy： mg fof the entmy. It s besr TO rccruic diftcicnt spies under dif¬ferent false flags using different case officers a$ che control for sch Spy.

EvencnalK; rhe bcs【and most useful spy may be provid¬ing intclligciice informacinn rhM 1$ not available from nny Other source. This is (he very leasun why someone $C($ out tô rccniir 3 spy - to learn something rhar cannot be learned any Other way. On che other hand, Such single source information can be cxrrcmciy dangerous if it,s misinforniation.

Somutinies the informarion 6n be easily verified by (he results. For example, the spy repons rhar che enemy will attack Oriagcna on Tuesday, and rhe enemy docs just that. However, careful records must be kept of all informatio» pro¬vided by rhe spy, and these muse be cheeked against future events and other sources of information.

A rigorous scicnciíìc method muse be followed in checking on the veracity of the information provided. If (he information is indeed ƯUC, then all predictions of future evenrs based on the stolen infàmia【沁n will prove true. Even one prediction based on an agents informarion (hat dwsnk check OUI must raise serious double about the ruliabiliry of the agent. Hou even sometimes false predictions can he explained: “Thu prime minister changed his mind ar rhe last minute and canceled the attack on Canagena because he discovered (hat the enemy had been alerted to the arrack/* Often, when an inrclligcnce report proves false, (he excuses offered by rhe  

spy can be checked out. If rhe explanation cannot be verified, the intelligence operations officer musi exercise even greater care in (cscing future informarion che agent provides.

In ail intelligence-collection efforts (hat rely on recruited spies, lying is a constant considcracion. In one case in the 19505, che CIA paid millions of dollars to a Chinese agent who claimed he was running a network of spies char he had requir¬ed inside China. lit claimed his agents were reporting on social conditions, anti-government accivicies, and economic developments. The agents inside China supposedly delivered chcir reports to (he U.S. agent by secret correspondence and radio transmissions.

In fact, the self-described private mcclligence entrepre¬neur was lying. He based hi$ reportt on newspaper stories, public governinone documents, and propaganda broadcasts, all of which he collected outside mainland China. He had no ring of spies, no clandestine radio net, and no sources inside the Peopled Republic of China.

Because he was using many of che same sources chai the CIA was-intcrccpỉion of radio and TV news programs and newspaper clipping services-che bogus spy $ information generally tracked with what ihc CIA analyses already knew about Red China. By (he rime che CIA discovered the nature of the information, the agency faced a massive task in clean¬ing one the thousands of files based on (he faked information provided by the bogus spy The "spy" disappeared-along with the millions he had col leered—and was never heard from a^din. Even worse» rhere is good evidence that the spy was working for rhe Republic of China in Taiwan; that is, he was felling U.S. intelligence what the Nationalist Chinese wanted the Americans to believe.

The fact that some information docs check out is nor irrefutable evidence thai rhe source is reliable. Disinfonna- rion operations, such as when a spy is doubled and then used to pa5s false information (0 an enemy, always include factual information a5 a cover for the misinformaiion.

TliC three most dangerous mistakes an intelligence officer can make arc a$ follows：

• To conrinuc co accept unverified intelligence provided by a recruited spy after a piece of iiưbíination has been proven false. (This is especially dangerous if previous information from che source made the intelligence officer look good with his superiors.)

• To refuse co accept information provided by a reliable agent-one whose previous informarion has aluays checked OUT—because【he nCM inl'unnation doesn'r fit rhe officer $ beliefs about whar rhe enemy i$ doing Of planning.

• To pressure che spy to provide intelligence that will verify the officers unsubstantiaced conclusions, which will likely just rempr rhe spy 10 scale false intelligence ro keep rhe paynwiiu coming in. (The worsr sin a ease officer can com¬mit is to offer a spy a bonus if he produces intelligence confirming hh own favorite theory: Never give a spy a rea- snn to lie to keep the ease OÍÌÌCCÍ happy.)

The whole purpose of spying i$ 10 learn information that changes our understanding of what the enemy is planning and will likely (Jo.

WHEN INDEPENDENT

VERIFICATION ISN'T POSSIBLE

All too ufeen, it's impossible to verify information inde¬pendently before deciding what accion (O take based on that information. Sometimes intelligence collection evolves to the point that there is no way ro verify a report, but if that infor- marion i$ acted upon, and it proves erne, vicĩory is guaran¬teed:. but if it proves false, disaster ensues. This dilemma is why so many intelligence agencies have turned(Ở che poly- giaph examination 3S 3 way of ccsnng reciuited spies. 

biuttering the Recruit

The CIA and other government spy agencies often include the polygraph a$ one part of their testing process. I'he recruic will usually only subrnir co a polygraph examination after the recruiting process is completed and he realizes that he is indeed spying on his own govcrnmcor» employer, or friends. Once he realizes his predicament, however, che spy usually ha$ no choice other than agreeing co be fluttered, pro¬vided rhe ease officer can arrange a way co set it up. (The spy who is being paid co supply secrets and refuses co he fluttered is most likely lying.)

Some polygraph experts, the honest ones, will admit that the polygraph is really a psychological tool rather cban a machine that measures emth. Anyone who understands what a polygraph will or will not do can often beat the machine. It doesn't work much bcaer than 3 coin flip as a lie detector ÍỒÍ many people, including (ho$c who have the most experience telling lic5. When rhe machine docs work, it works 3s often as noe because the subject doesn\ dare tell a lie out of fear that the machine will catch hirn.

There arc several books that describe rcchniqucs on how tv bear rhe machine, and many inrelligence agencies inscrucc their employees and ^ometime6 even rheir agents an these tech¬niques. Rick Ames passed two polygraph tests while he was nuking millions of dollars selling nue U.S. spies to the KGB.

Polygraph examinations arc expensive； rhey require (Mined personnel, and rhe rccniic muse go to some secret loca¬tion. such as a safe house, or even lake a ưip to another cuun- rry so he can be flurccred. Even so, if the ease oíĩĩccr has che means of flintcring a recruit, i( is worthwhile doing so. as long as the ease officer understands that the polygraph examina¬tion is one part of che diama of fccmiring and evaluating (he source, a tenario designed to make the reCiuit believe that his lies will be discovered and he will he punished.

This drama can affect a recruit so much (hat 3 private incclligcnce operator jnay wane ro arrange a fake polygraph  

examinarion if he doesn't have the budget and rrained pep Mjnnel for the real thing. Mosr people have never seen a poly¬graph machine, so it’s a simple exercise TO sec up something that looks like 3 polygraph session does on television, hook up the subject, and let someone ask him a bunch of questions. In such a con ir i$ surprising liuw often the subjeer will [ell (he truth because he thinks he can' lie without getting caught, or he will gei SỮ nervous that an interrngaror wonk need a lie detector to spot the lies he rcIJs.

What (he intelligence officer should never do is accept the word of the rccmic based on (he Supposed results of a poly¬graph examination. The truth can only be dccennintd by examining wherher rhe inforilialiun provided proves rnic. If nou (hen the iccruit was lying or someone lied to him. IIO mat¬ter whac che machine rold rhe polygraph examiner.

Verification by Friendly Interrogation

ĩnrclligcncc officcis who understand rhe fallacy of depending on the polygraph rely more on iht techniques of friendly inrerrogacion ro tesi their recruits. Each cime a case oỉìiccr meets with a recruit in a sitnarion chai permits a frank exchange of information, he iniCfiogatcs the recruit in grear derail about liis coilcctiun of intelligence informarion.

When 3 friendly interrogation i$ done right, the subject may nor even realize chai he is being interrogated, hue in$ccdd conclude that the conversation demonstrates (he case officer's interest in and concern about rhe subject $ daily activities and rhe risks he is taking by spying.

A Rood sourcc-verificarion inrerrogarion will take several hours (Of even several days), with the ease officer (or bcncc a tiaincd interrogation officer) encouraging (he recruit to talk 3bolK anything and everythin* dealing with hi$ daily life and his spy activities.

If ar all possible, che entire conversation should be record¬ed without the spy's knowledge. Ic*$ even belter if the inter¬view can be sccfcriy videotaped. *rhe more detail rhe recruit  

provides in answering questions, rhe becccr. The case officer wants co learn such things as tu whom the iCCfui( has been talking, the dates and time of day such meetings took place, where rhe meetings took place, who else attended, and what they ate. Every question should be asked in several different ways、bu( (hey should interspersed rhroughouc the dialogue and noe be sequential.

Alter such an inicrrognnon, rhe sse officer, the inccrroga- cor, and the support intelligence staff must go over (he entire conversation, word for word, looking for possible contradic¬tions and making specific comparisons with the answers to rhe same question asked in diffcrcnc ways.

Telling lies is a lot harder than telling the truth, and only the clevercbl of deceivers can remember all the details neccs- sarx* co make a lie hold together over a long inicrrogarion. Most liars donk plan a srory rhoroughly, so they muse create the dcuils on the fly, which makes it even harder co remember che little lie chcy void TOO days ago. Most often it will be the iildc details that alert the ou>e oilkci【hai the recruir is lying.

Perhaps rhe recmit describes a visit co a nuclear plant, and when asked a question abour rhe weather, he reports it was a sunny day. When the ease OÍỈÌCCÍ checks a weather report, he dÌ5>cuvciS【hai the day was heavily overcast. Maybe the iccfui( mentions that one of his sources was drinking a martini dur¬ing one meeting. When die fticndly interrogator asks several hours later whar drinks were served at the meeting, the rccrnic who has ahcady forgoucn whac he said earlier, repons that everyone was drinking scotch.

Give a suspected liar a chance ro ulk> act as if you believe scry word he says, and ask lots of questions. Sooner Of later the liar will trip himself up.

TRAINING THE RECRUIT

Evers' recruit will cvcmually require some training in the cratr of spying-such things as the use of miniacufC and spe- cializcd cameras、coded writing, computer encryption pro¬grams. radio transmissions, surveillanec-dcccciion techniques, dead drops, and escape and evasion tactics. How much train¬ing is ncccssan- will depend on the sophistication of the rar- gcccd organisation, how rhe spy is collecting rhe infurmacion he steals, and whai personal experience and technical infor- macion he brings to rhe【able when he agrees to spy.

Obviously, if the recruited spy is an employee of anoth. Cf Spy agency, he will need to exercise cxireme caution in avoiding (he counterintelligence security apparatus that routinely searches for evidence of rrcason among ics own employees. On the other hand, the secreta^ iCCfuited to Spy un a small business executive may have iiede reason co fear exposure and thus need only minimal instruction on (he practical aspects of spying.

The training may range from no more thân a couple of hours of instruccion in a safe house co an extended trip ro a neutral third country with long days of specialized insrruction. Ihining also provides opporcunity to ccmcnr (he relationship betueen the recruited agent and the control appararvs, (Ữ tempi rhe recruit with future rewards, and to make him fed like he now belongs TO a close-knit ergs ni za lion that will pro¬tect him in rhe event things go wrong.

Special emphasis should be given in the rraining session on (he techniques used (0 pays both inscnicrions to the spy and che intelligence collected by the recruited spy back s che ài义 officer.

Arrangements should also be made for handling pay¬ments, and rhe【raining officer musr emphasize rhe nerd for discretion in how the money earned from spying is spent. The training session should address the question of how ro explain sudden wealth—or. better, how to hide it. Rick Arnes cold his colleagues in che C1A that he had married a Colombian woman who had inherited a great deal nf money from her faiher. (The mid) was that Rick's fachcr-in-law left no wealth when he died and Rick spent a good share of his income from Spying on the support of the morher-in-Jaw in Colombia J 

Often, people who arc reervired 3$ spies discover they enjoy the secrecy and the excitement of showing up ochers, especially those whum they thiiik have underestimated their abilities or taken advanmge of them. Gond ease officers play on this. There may well be no need for secret drops, complicated plans fbi spot¬ting surveillance. 0Í secret passwords, bur dramatics in both the trainine and use of such skills on a regular basis will serve to keep (he recruited spy interested in the game、

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDLING

OF A RECRUITED SPY

Evcnnially, che recruit will realize that he is spying on chose who uubt hirn. Al this point, tlic Surrogate rccfuircr should pass full connol of the recruit to che case officer, if that has nui already been done. This passing of conrrol should appear to be a natural result of the recruitment process. In most eases, the rccruircr should set lip a meeting with the per¬son who will serve as the regular ease oiTiccr. "This is my uncle» who is going re help US solve our problem.*' or "This is the man I told you abuuG (he one who will be paying you from now on.** If the recruit has a dependent rchtionship with the original reciuiicn especially if ic involves 9 sexual relationship, che ease officer may want co keep (hat relationship alive, a【 lease for a shon period or until the case officer can manipulate the recruit into a new dependency on (he esc officer.

.•\r some point the ease officer should guarantee the safe- ex of the rccniit and his family. It is net imporram whether the guarantee is valid; whai is impOitant is dui che fCCfuir believer rhe guarantees is valid. (A gond case officer will engage in any deception -no matrer how cruel or false it may be-if The deception ensures the cooperation of the recruit.) The more convinced che recruit is that his spying will noe result in personal tragedy for himself or his family, if he docs uhat the cast officer donando, rhe bener spy he will be. (There is nnrhing wrong with letting the spy believe that if he fails to 

do what the case officer demands, he will be nostril-dccp in rising water.)

Each rccniired agent requires personal handling. The spy may want a buddy. 3 confessor, a mother, a leader, a lover. Of a general. Ar rhe same rime, rhe ease officer must keep his nwn emotions under tight control at all times and never allow him¬self (O develop any kind of emotional iircachmcnr (O rhe recruit. The case officer has to play rhe great friend and buddy while nicntdlly building a wall(ha( will allow him ro use (he recruit in an effective manner without worrying about the conse-quences. even if that rcquiics placing che rcciuic in extreme danger. \cr, he miisr keep rhe rccniir from ever recognizing that he is being exploited in the most cynical manner.

The ease officer should watch for signs of stress and be ready IO I Canute the ĩccruit whenever necessary. Praise can be ver%- important, especially for chose who become spies f()r ideological ©sons. The CIA made Oleg Penkovsky a SCCÍCC r.s. citizen and a colonel in the U.S. Anny. The KGB made John Walker ；m admiral in rhe Soviet navy even though Walker's motivation fur spying was pure greed.

Al some point money almost always becomes a parr of the equation. Paying a IVCĨUÌI work、borii as n reward and 3$ n means of control, but determining how much to pay him can be rncky. The pay isn'r bnsed nn what rhe infornidiion is real¬ly worth, but rather whac the iccruil can abs5b intu his liic- srvlu without making it obvious he has a new source of income. No ease officer wan($ a rccniir's sudden wcahh (O (ip off his boss that the employee may be working for someone else. The money should be enough TO be an impnnanr $ourcc of new luxury in the recruit's liỉc. bui nut MJ much that it draws rhe arrenciọn of hi$ friends, relatives, and colleagues.

If at all possible, the case oflkcr should get a signature on rcceiprs for any money passed ro rhe recruir in payment for information. (The case officer can always blame che nccessiry for a receipt on superiors who doni (ruse him.) Such evidence ca» later be used to threaten an agent who 152 

wants to back out of his agreement(0 spy. Once 3 person has turned crai tor, he should always fear the possibiliiy ihai the control officer will betray him if he docsn'l meet rhe demands the control officer makes.

Paymenrs deni have to be made directly to the rccruir. Phillip Agee reports that in Mexico, (he CIA supported the mistresses of government officials, paying for their rent, auto¬mobiles. and shopping bills. The advantages of such a deal are obvious There is no paper money trail leading directly to (he rccnúr. He gets the luxuries he wants wiihoui having ro worry about hiding a rich bank account. In a similar way. a ease offi¬cer might pay off gambling debts, provide vacation accommo¬dations. pay ibi airline lickers, cover rhe expenses of a nursing home for a reenjifs mother, or buy property in a foreign coun¬try and register it in rhe rccmir's name.

Once recruited, a spy may continue providing intelligence matsial for mnny years. Evcr\' intelligence agency has employ¬ees who follow caieef paths char will eventually result in pro¬motions and transfers. That means that a ease officer in most intdlii;encc-collcciion operations will sooner or later have (0 transfer the spies he has been running ro a new ease officer.

Such，change cf case officers presents special problems. Ofrentimes. the agent will have developed a deep emotional a((achmcnc to rhe case OÍĨĨCCÍ and won't like the idea rhac he is being handed off m some stranger.

The original case officer is responsible for preparing the rccruir for his new handler. He should offer credible expiana- tions about why he can no longer handle rhe agent, explana¬tions rhac fit under the false ilag (he ease officCi has been using. Tht old ease officer must brief rhe new C34C officer on every¬thing chore is to know about che spies he will be inheriting.

Sometimes even the best preparation work wonk make the recruit feel comfortable Wi(h his new control officer. Also, ir somcrimcs happens that the recruit no longer wants to con- tinue spying and will look <1( (he change of handlers as his chance co break loose. In this situation, signed receipts, bank 

account records, photographic evidence of meetings, and recorded conversations can be very important. All spies are subject co the ultimate form of blackmail: the knowledge that they can be exposed to those they have betrayed.

Even when a ease officer must openly threaten a spy to keep him producing, the ease officer should try- to shift the blame to some third party. "I'd lee you go, but l,m in the same fix you arc. The people who control me won't let either of US go. Neither of US has any choice, unless we arc willing to go to jail, or suffer something worse.*'

TERMINATION

All things come to an end. and every recruitment plan should include plans for terminating (he arrangement with {he spy. The successful ease officer will always be the one who decides (hat the relationship with a spy should end. Spies don't get to quit on their own. Even so. when a control officer decides co cut a spy loose, it goes much more smoothly if the spy can be convinced that the decision was mutual or even his own. That is easy to arrange if the spy wanted out but didn't dare because of fear of what the ease officer would do if he tried to quit.

Ie gets more difficulc when (he spy enjoys what he is doing and the money he is making. Agents recruited under false flags can usually be terminated with less trouble chan agents who know the true identity of those for whom they are working. The ease officer who terminates an agent recruited under a false flag must make sure that he will not run into the agent in a public place in a situation in which the agent can learn who the ease officer really is. This will be easier to do if the case officer knows a good deal about ihe terminated agent-his life-style, the place he works, and where he hangs out in his free time. If the ease officer should accidentally meet the terminated agent on the street or somewhere else, he must be ready to instantly assume the falsc-flag role he played when he was running the agent. The longer a case offi*  

ccr works in any given area, the more likely such an accidcn« tai exposure becomes. This is one reason why most interna¬tional spy agencies rotate their agents into new territories every cwo co four years.

The ease officer should make the termination as easy as possible. He should not say anything critical of the agent's work, even if he knows the agent has been making up his intelligence. Instead, he should offer excuses that blame someone up the line in the intelligence agency, budget prob¬lems. or even the case officer's own career problems.

Whether it is a faisc-fiag recruitment or the recruited agent knows who he is spying for. if the spy was motivated by greed, he won't be happy with (he sudden loss of income and may even try to fake more important intelligence (O keep the money coming in. When possible, the case officer should pay the terminated agent some kind of lump sum to ease the blow. If the case officer has a file of evidence that (he recruit wouldn't want the people he has been spying on to know about, the case officer can make a few veiled threats at the same time he makes the payoff. It works best if the spy is told how long he will be spying at the outset and what kind of sev¬erance he will be paid when his services arc no longer needed.

If the expectation is (hat the recruit will only be spying for a short time, perhaps only several weeks, then it's best to include an offer of a substantial bonus at the lime of recruit¬ment to be paid once the spy has completed the work.

International spy agencies often employ agents for many years, especially (hose recruited as access and supply agents. The CIA offers such agents retirement benefits and some¬times even an opportunity to immigrate to the United States for (heir retirement years. Government ease agents usually offer the same kinds of benefits to primary agents who are engaged in the direct collection of intelligence under high- risk circumstances, especially (hose who become moles. Unfortunately, few such agents have ever lived long enough to collect their promised retirement benefits. 

rhe worst kind of termination is w hen the recruit is caughc Spying. When ĩhar happens, rhe primary consideration of the case officer must be to protect himself and the intelligence agency【hat employs him. The case oflicer should only iiucmpr ro rescue rhe spy if he can do so wichouc risking his own oper¬ational safety. In many cases, the case ofticer provides the spy art escape phn (har he BÍÌ use if he learns he is about ro he arrested. But almost any escape plan must be initiated before (he $py is arrcsccd. Even chcn. (he discovered spy will be on his own during the initial flight, at least until he crosses a frontier OI makes it co a saie house comrollcd by (he ease officer.

If che recmitment is done under a false flag, ir s quite like¬ly tildi any escape plans previously discussed with〔he rccruir will include promises that cannot be fulfilled. There was no wav (hai Rashid Yasin could have ever arranged for che Silvermans to immigrate co Israel (sec Chapter 6).

Ncvcnhclcss. even uhen a fccruirnicnc is done under Í1 false flag, it is much better if the recruit can avoid capture and prosccurion. Yasin probably did have a bundle of cash and false documents ready to give Irvin Silverman, along with some suggestions on how they could hide our until ”I can arrange (fansponation co Israel." UnfortunauJy for rhe Silvermans, things fell apan too quickly, and Yasin had to save hi$ own $kin.

If a spy recruited under a false flag is captured, every mem¬ber of che inrcllfgcncc reiim should break off all contact with him. All officer telephone numbers, safe houses, drops, and message centers should be immediately closed down, and any evidence pointing ro (he ưuc idcnÚQ- of (he rccruiccf or any of his agents should be cleaned up and dcsưoyed.

Remember» the whole purpose of rccruiring a spy is (O steal information that the enemy doesn't know you have. Every rcrminanon should be designed10 ensure iha〔 rhe theft of the intelligence remains 3 secret. If that can't be achieved, then the goal 1$(0 make sure (hat (he ease office] i$ nor iden¬tified and captured. 

Chapter Fourteen

The Security Aspect

ncc a case OÍĨÌCCÍ has recruited a spy. he muse uke ■ ■ every possible precaution (0 ensure that the pco-

plc who arc (he target of the intelligence collec¬tion do HUI learn chat they have a spy in cheir midst. He must also make sure that should che targel's counccrcspionagc offi¬cers discover that there might be a spy in the organizarion, they cannot trace rhe spy back to the ease officer or even VCÍ- if>' his existence.

THE THREE STEPS TO SECURITY

The case officer must set up procedures for handling che spy char accomplish che following objectives:

• Establish security procedures that the recruit will follow to avoid accracting a((cncion co himself as he steals infor¬mation

• Establish secure methods of communication between the case officer and rhe spy

• Reduce personal contact betueen the ease officer and the spy to the absolute minimum required to maintain disci- plinc, morale, and operational technique 

ESTABLISHING SECURITY PROCEDURES

Most recruits solicit advice from their case officers on how Ĩ0 go about collecting intelligence without getting caught. If at all possible, the case officer should nor simply recommend security procedures for the recruit hue also arrange ưaining for him in merhods ro avoid dcccccion consistent wich (he sccur- icy threat under which he will operate.

The BUMCX of Stealing Secrets

The safest mcchod for stealing SCCÍC($ is one in which the spy participates in or eavesdrops on conversarinns during rhe course of hi$ Icgilimalc wuikday, VI in his ordinary associa¬tions with the targets of the intelligence operation. The spy m3y attend mcccings where intelligence informatiun is dis¬cussed. regularly overhear conversations near the desk where he works, or type lip secret reports for che boss, ỉn addition (O wh須 he hears and the spy on the inside will have regu¬lar access to documents containing sensitive information. He mighr hold such documents in his private office during work hours and perhaps even in an office safe. He may even take documents home ro work Oil.

This is iow-ri5k spying because the spy is doing his job or playing the role that rhe source expects him(Ừ play. This 1$ why Rick Ames was such a dangerous spy. lie went co work every day and did exactly what he was supposed ro do-and then told the KGB whar ic was rhac he had done afid learned while on (he job. i he better such a spy plays the role of the loyal, hardworking (but nor particularly ambitious) employee, er rhe grand but not demanding lover, the more he becomes the invisible person who makes 3 pcrfccc spy

/Mtcrnarivcly» (he spy who has a close or intimate relation¬ship with a primary SQUree of information-perhaps a mistress or a lover—will ger information by listening to the source brag about his work or by eavesdropping and going through docu¬ments rhe source leaves lying around.

The risks of discoven- increase when the spy muse eaves¬drop on conversations he is nor supposed (0 hear, such 3、a secretary listening in on phone convefsarions or a cliauflcur rewiring a connection so dial he can listen to conversations in the backseat (even when rhe passengers have uirned off the intercom). This risky but often necessary behavior includes deliberately gaining access to documents (he spy would nut normally see in (he course of a workday. A secretary mighĩ read documents on (he boss, desk while he's in (he bathroom, a file clerk mighr search through file cabinets that belong ro an ofTicer, or a chaufleur might open 3 briefcase left on the backseat while the employer goes to a meeting.

These kinds of spie will need the most advice from their control officers, not jusr on hou to ssl secrets, but also on how co keep chcir activities hidden, how tu prorccr what they have stolen from discover; and how ro deliver such material safely to rhe con croi officer.

In such siuiarions the spy should never steal documents, bur should instead copy rhem or photograph them. If that is impossible, (he spy should read the documen($ and write a summary from memory as quickly as possible.

The spy should also nlways have a scory ready that explains why he accidentally overheard a conversation or saw a document. "I'm sorry, I didn't realize you were on the Jine. I wa going to call Nancy in security and suggest we do 加neh." If cauglư looking through papers on the boys' desk, a seiciary might say. *Tm looking for the budgee proposal. Did you pick it up?** Any inane cxplanarion is better than no explanation, provided it is given without hesitation.

Remembering What You Have Ixamed

The spy doesn't just have co worry about gening caught while eavesdropping or reading a ducumcnc he is unable co photocopy. He must also remember what he has heard or seen, sometimes ibf up co several hours, before he can find an ớppOítunicy co write the details down. Therefore, it is  

crirical for the spy (O develop che ability to memorize large quanrirics of information.

Memori2aúởn is a ealenr chai can and» indeed, must be practiced. Good spies must develop good memories, and il's the responsibility of rhe ease officer co encourage and help them to do so. Exercises in mcmofizaiion techniques should be included in any training provided ro (he spy. Here's a sim¬ple memorizarion exercise.

Watch and videotape a television news broadcast polit¬ical debate, or a serious discussion of any kind. Wait so minurcs. (hen write OUI a detailed report of everything you can remember. Include descriptions of (he people who spoke, backgrounds, and any action observed, including unintended subconscious acúons (like someone brushing back 3 loose strand of hair). Replay (he tape several (imes noting all the Chings you missed ill your original report. Do the same Ching with addilional programs over and over until your nicinory improves.

As soon as he is alone and can safely do so. the spy should write out compiere, deuiled summaries of any rclcviini con¬versations or documents. Perhaps the best way to do this is to dictate into a tape rccoidcr and then write our rhe report, making the necc5*ry changes as his memory is enhanced by the recording.

If〔here is any chance thac such notes might be discov¬ered. the spy should use some kind of "invisible" or coded writing. This can range fium such old standbys as lemon juice, which is then exposed to hear (O nuke it appear, to a variety of invisible inks that arc commercially available.

Recording Conversations and(3opyùìỂ Documents

Obviously; ir $ better if the spy can record a converttion Of make a copy of a document This is a much higher-risk sic- 皿ion (han eavesdiOpping or sneaking a peck. If someone is Caught taking pictures of documents at work or wearing a wife to 3 confidential meeting, there is IIO story in (he world that will convince the security ofTicer that the suspect is engaging in an innocent activity. Indeed, mosr government agencies ĩhâĩ handle classified information prohibit employees from taking personal cameras co (heii office. Even it's easy to leani(0 use a minidcurc camera; there arc a number of such cameras on the market, and every case officer should supply such a camera(0 his rccmics along with inscructions on its use. There arc also mini-cassette recorders that on be hidden in a pocket and carried imo a meeting.

Nowadays, every office has a photocopying machine. The more securiiy conscious the office environment, the more dif- Gcuk ic will be to use the machine during work hours for spy¬ing. Still, many spies find that (he easiest way to make copies of a document is co copy it at the office.

Smail Spies don't take just the document they wane co copy to the copy machine, lliey hide it in a pile of regular wurk or some personal material, c.g., invitations to a parry OÍ a child's homework. Getting caught using che office equipment for personal work may earn a reprimand, but i( will be a lot less serious than what would happen if the security OÍTĨCCÍ knew aboil] the cop-sccrcc alert list hidden under the child's drawing uf a witch.

When documents Oinvioi be copied in the location they are kcpỉ, (he spy may have to remove the documents co a safe place, copy them, and then rernrn rhem EO their storiigc aica. This is such 3 high-risk behavior that (he ease officer should pcr^unaily approve such action, dcterniining Risi if (he intel¬ligence is worth risking the permanent loss of the spy.

Despite rhe inherent danger in removing documents from an office, the spy can probably ger away with it because most office managers get very relaxed about security. Time and again I've watched government bureaucrats make photo¬copies of secret documents stamped with clear warnings chat nu copies were to be made. They did it not because they were spies but because they wanted every person in a meeting to have a copy of (he document instead of having (0 pass ir  

around. In such a lax M：cvriry siiUíìĩion. a spy might well be observed copying secret documents and still not be chal¬lenged. in his years as a spy, John Walker repeatedly made phtHOCOpics of ccxle books and carried rhem home ill his briefcase and never came close to getting caughc. (Walker was finally enught when his ex-wife, who had known about his spying for years, turned him in co the FBI.)

Computers as Spy Tools

lite use of computers has totally changed the naenre of spying, mostly ro the advantage of the spy. The easiest docu¬ment of all to steal is a document stored in binary format in a uompuccr. provided you have access Ĩ0 the computer nnd know how to access the information. It takes only ihc right kind of floppy disk and a lew seconds alone CO copy rhe desired file to the floppy disk.

Most computer security programs are designed tu keep strangers out of rhe system, but (he whole purpose of recruir- ing a spy 1$ re have someone who has access to a system. The better secuiiry programs have a companmcntaliped network rhat requires passwords tu access the most sensitive informa¬tion. However, a knowledgeable conipurer expen can often hack incn such resened iireas. Bener yet for the spy those who have access tờ (he sensitive areas of the network arc often extremely careless in keeping passwords secret. They may write passwords down in a notebook; use easily discovered passwords such as cheir niochcrs* names, their addresses, or their birth datc$; or gel sloppy about checking to make sure rhat no one, not even their trusted secretaries. i$ looking over their shoulders when they log in.

Anyone who inrends to nm an espionage operation agains【 any modern organization shuuld be thoroughly familiar with computers and should train rheir rccmits in (he use of compui- cf$. A janitor or chauffeur cvcQ'onc assumes is computer illit¬erate may gain access to che organizarions computerà a【times of rhe day when he can browse through hard disks and network diicccories wich minimum risk of discovery I predict that, increasingly, the best spy of all will be the individual who has access to the Oiganization\ computer data disks.

It is nor only easy to steal intelligence documents off a computer, it is also easy co smuggle the stolen documents out of the office. Comparer floppy disks can be hidden in a pock¬et, slipped into rhe lining of a coat, taped to the inner thigh, or put into an envelope and mailed out of (he building. *rhc information can even be encrypted, then sent uur as e-mail co the spy's humc computer.

Computers in the Spy's home or workplace can also be used as hiding places for stolen digital information.

The techniques of using computerà as spy cools and pro¬tecting rhe integrity of rhe files are far beyond the scope of (his book. Any incclligencc agent intending to use a comput¬er a$ part of an intelligence-collecrion operation should go through che following checklist:

• Dunt save OÍ store any documents you wane to keep secret on the hard disk OĨ a floppy disk, with no encryption. Always work on plain text documents in RAM memory and encrypt before scoring the information on disks.

• Always use a total erase program when deleting any sensi¬tive file from a hard or floppy disk that you or your spy controls.

• Keep all sensitive informanon in encrypted format on Hop¬py disks rather than rhe hard disk drive and have a hiding place for such disks that is located as far from the comput¬er as is practical. Take the disks our of hiding only when working on them and return chem 10 their hiding place immediately when you're finished.

• Most tncrypUon systems sold on the market can be easily broken, including many that advertise they can't be bro¬ken. Many of rhe encryption systems bundled with word processor software arc not secure. Know wha( makes an encry ption program tiuscuorchy

• Even if you are sure you have the best encQ'prion program available, doubk-encrypt everything, using (WO dificrent system，

• if you arc sending messages by modem, always UM： an enersption system based on the RSA analog and a public key code. Among (he best of these progjams is Preny Good Privacy, which can be found on many coinpurcr bul¬letin boards for free.

• Change passwords frequently. l,hc great ad\*antage of the RS A cncr^piion system is that rhe public key passwords can be changed daily and given uut in an open message.

• Be aware chat ic is possible to read a computer screen from a distance of up to several hundred feet with equipment thar can be put together in 3 garage. Always rake steps lo ensure yuur cornptirci is isolated and elccưomâgnctic emissions arc minimized.

if you don'r understand what I'm talking abolir in any of ihu above points, don't pur your crubt in Cỡmpurcrs until you de. If you dv underfund uhac I am ulking about you uill nor only be able co use cumputcrb wi(h some degree of confi¬dence, but you will be able to quickly and easily steal com¬puter data off the computers of EC4T people using【hem.

Hiding Stolen Documents. Reports.

and Computer Disks

The spy must have a secure place co hide reports, photos, 行lm. dcKuniencs, computer disks, and anything eke he might Steal until they can be safely delivered to rhe case officer. The spy should idenrify hiding places chat include both places where he can store material for several weeks and quickly sush somerhing in an emergency.

The mure permanent storage place might be a hidden flour safe a( the spy's home, a safe deposit box in a local bank, a rent¬ed storage space, a wMcrtighr box buried in the backyard, a hid¬ing spoi in an attic or a basemenu OÍ a hollowtd-out spot in a wall. 

The spy should idenrih' at least one temporary hideaway in every location where he will be holding maccfial for any period of time, even for a few minutes, in case an unexpected visitor pops in.

The temporars, hiding place may be nothing more than a desk drawer with a false bottom or a picture on the wall with an envelope mounted on the back i( might be a throw nig in a corner, a piece of upholsrcrcd furninire with a small slit in the fabric, an envelope taped co the bottom side of a desk or file drawer» a plastic bag in a toilet rank, a hollowcd-out book on a bookshelf, 3 large vase fìiled with ariificial flowers, or even a piece of outgoing mail, sramped and addressed to a noncxisccnr person. Such quickie hiding places will noe sur¬vive 3 thorough search by a professional investigator, but if a spy is singled out for that kind of Ucatmcnc. his cover has already been blown.

The ability to hide material is $0 imponine chic every intelligence collector should make it a habit to identify such hideaways automalicaily when he enters 2 room, even if he doesn't have anything to hide at the rnument.

ESTABLISHING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS BETW EEN THE CONTROL OFFICER AND SPY

The higher the security threat level, (he gicaccf rhe prob¬lems associated with personal meecings between the ease offi¬cer and the spy. A CIA ease officer working under embassy cover in China assumes that the Chinese cuuntefintelligence □gcncy will have him under surveillance around the clock. 1 he same applies for a KGB officer working 0U( of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. D.c. So in such eases, the ease offi¬cer may personally meet with a spy he controls only once every two or three years.

On (he other hand, a tobacco company intelligence officer uho is gathering information on an ancismoking political action group doesn't have to worry coo much【hat someone mighr spot him meeting with his spy inside the rargel group. Yer, even in this relatively secure situation, (he less rhe peo¬ple being spied on know about the case officer and his con- uccs with rhe spy, the better che security

Fominatcly; when personal contact between rhe two is mosr critical (during the rcciuicmenr phrase), the recruit will not be doing any actual spying and the risks of the operation being discovered nre nor as great a$ they will eventually be. Once the spy starts providing incclligencc, he will roilizc (hat he is engaged in a dangerous activiry and will be anxious to avoid dcrection. Therefore, he will probably concur that he should limit further contact with the case officer to occasional meetings and chat he musi exercise extreme caution in pass¬ing stolen infomiacion on to the case officer.

Although a case officer should handle his spies from as great a disiane七 as is feasible, he must also establish a system for the spy to pass information ro the case officer and for (he spy to receive queries» instructions, and payments. This 1$ when both che spy and lii$ case officer arc most vulnerable to tdentifiexition and capnire. Therefore, case officers working in dangerous circumsranccs, such as someone spying on the CIA for the KGB. go to great lengths to limit the direct contact between a case officer and the spy. (For example, while spy¬ing for the KGB. John Walker met with his Vởnrrol once every wo or three years.)

Communications between conaol and spy in high-risk sit¬uations arc often limited to some variarion of publicly pusred messages and die use of dead drops. Publicly po$(cd messages arc coded and placed in locations chai tell either die ease offi¬cer or the spy chat a certain planned action should be taken. Such mcs$nges might be an advertisement in a newspaper, a poster on a bulletin Ixmrd in a supermarkee, a piece of graflici on a wall, or a chalk mark on something that can be seen from (he sưccc. A dead drop is a place where documents films, money, and other materials can be left by one party and picked up by anothei party with no direct contact between them. 

KGB sse agents operating in the United Sweeb during the Cold War prefeiied public mailboxes as the place to post a coded command. When Rick Ames had documents to pass co his KGB concrol OÍĨĨCCÍ. he would make a chalk mark on one of three different drop boxes si rusted on corners on his route co and from work. The mark would be a cross, a trian¬gle. or some other simple design. TJ1C KGB case officer would drive by each of the le((er boxes once a week or so. Wiicnevcr he saw the coded mark, he would know that Ames had some¬thing to deliver. He would then wipe che mark off the mail¬box as a signal (hat he had seen the mark.

When Ames saw that his message had been received, he would take the packet of material to a dead drop he had already been mid about The KGB case agent handling Ames provided detailed instructions on the locacion of dead drops- including photc» of the spoc marked with a fek or a grease pen. The pictures and the cex( showed where ro find the des¬ignated dead dtop, which might be a hollow tree of a rncul box hidden behind a rock in a wooded area or chick bush.

A similar dead drop arrangement is used by che case offi¬cer TO deliver materials or information to the $pv-e.g.. special inbiructions for seccing up a face-to-face meeting, any pay¬ment owed ro the spy and detailed directions for where che nexr dead drop would be. Naturally, both parties hđve ro exer¬cise cxtreine caution in approaching a dead drop co ensure thac they arc not under surveillance.

There arc hundreds of diflercnt wavs for posting dis¬guised messages in public phees. An advertisernent in a newspapers personal section might read, "John. Marsha still loves you.** bu( mean. "1 have informar沁n for you to collect at the drop." The disguised message could just as easily be something in the lo$t-and-found seccion. *Onc black dog who answers to Red? could really mean -YÓU havu a drop waiting ac pose red/

During World War II, (he British government regularly passed information co agents behind German lines by coded announcement on the BBS short-wave broadcasts. Other ways of posting public messages include arranging (he cur¬tains on a window in a special way, leaving a car parked facing down the driveway instead of up、putting an ircm such as a child's luy in 3 car window while the car is parked in irs usual place during the workday; or even wearing a panicular item of clothing, say a hat Of a topcoat nor worn at ocher rimes.

I x^wcr-TIweat Security Siỉuutions

Rccmiling and managing spies in low-threat siuiations involving privare parties or commercial businesses Hill general¬ly not involve the extreme communicanonb procedures just described. Nevenhcless. there i$ always a chance (hat the urger of the $p\ operation Will identify the recruit as someone whu may be spying against it. If rhar happens, the raiget organiza¬tions couniCJCiipionage officers will attempt to follow rhe spy and identify who is receiving the srolcn material. Thciclbre, in even a low-rhfcat situation, rhe case officer must not allow any¬one ro identify him as sortKrone who has regular conracc with the Spy if he has no good reason ro be meeting with him.

Direct Visual CofHact

When dealing in a security situation in which there 15 lit- tic chance that the intelligence urger could idcnrify- che control officer as an inĩclligence collcc(on the C3SC officer can set up occasional visual conuers under circumswnces in which cither rhe rcciuit or the ease officer can iniĩiacc che contaci when both are in the same area, if there is a need for such con tace. Such approaches should appear to be a pan of the regular life-st>le of tx)th the recruit and the ease oflictr. The (UU people might go s rhe same church every Sunday, cat lunch in che same restaurane once a week, regularlv attend movies ac the same theatre Of rent videos a( the same store, jog in a park at the same time each day. or use rhe same supermarket for weekly shopping. The case officer and the recruit can scop and calk to each ocher for a few moments when they mccG passing verbal  

intồĩmâdỡn back and forth aS required. They might even pick a small bar or a pajk bench as a meeting place.

In more securin--sensitive situaúons, che case OÍÌÌCCÍ might arrange a simple series of visual signals tilde can be com¬municated if coniaci is desired as he and his spy pass 0ch other ur spot one another across a room or 3n open aica. These kinds of signals art limited only by che imagination of rhe case officer and rhe setting of the a5signaHon.

In one example, an intelligence cntrepicncur whn worked for a major manufacturing firm rccfuircd a spy inside rhe regional Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSIIA) office. The spy's sole responsibilin., was to collect any informi!cion on employee complaints filed againsc rhe compa¬ny so that company directors could take corrective action before an OSĨIA inspector showed up at the piane The spy was an avid jogger, so the case agent began jugging on the snmc path as the spy a couple of times a week, bin the agent ran in the opposite direction.、1o4【of the time they would piss each other withour even a nod or a smile of recogiiicion.

Whenever the spy had somerhing to pass on, he would wear a college sweatshirt when he jogged hut would give no indication he knew (he case officer when (hey passed on (he crail. The spy would put the iniofmarion in a dead drop the ext day, hiding ic in a plastic bag that he would toss in d crash can along rhe jogging path. Wirhin minutes» (he ease agent would pick up rhe bag. retrieve (he document as he jogged along, and then put an envelope with the payment in the bag and drop (he bag into a MXond trash can along (he way. The spy would pick up (he payment as he passed the second crash can on his way back huinc.

Each of the joggers had another special sweaeshirc he uuuld wear if he had something to calk about When the jog¬gers saw that signal, they would pull up and stop at a diinking fountain along the way. taking cime for a quick chac. but they would never exchange any material at (hat time.

ỉn ocher siruacinns. wearing a wrktwaich on rhe right hand mighr indicate a request for □ private mecúng or rhe need to deliver infornmtion. Placing specific items in a shopping cart, carrying a magazine under a specified arm. wearing a har 0Í not wearing a har, removing and cleaning a pair of glasses, dropping something and che» picking il up. nr crossing one s kgs while sitting on a park bench can all be arranged signals between rhe agent and his spy. The messages and the codes should be kepr as simple as possible. limned to pretty much (he following kinds of $(atcmcntsi

• 1 have material rn pass to you.

• \\c need to meet so we can uik.

• I am being followed.

• You have a rail.

• Evcrvrhing is okay.

Both rhe circumwanccs and rhe specific codes used should be varied» and whenever lie makes a drnp, (he case officer should pass on new instrucrions to be ibilowed until die next diop.

Making an Exchange

There are many differenr ways to make exchanges in low- thrcai xjeurin- Situadons without allowing anyone to sec rhe spy and the case officer exchange anything» For instance, (he spy might follow rhe control ofticcr into a bathroom, where each unicis a stall. The spy passes a package of stolen secrets under the seal! uall co the case officer. He remains seated until the case officer hab left the bathroom with the package. Or two people, each carrying briefcases board a bus a( two diflercnr Slops. They stand or sk near each other. When one of diem gees off the bus. no one nonces char they have swicclicd suircascs.

Couriers

Some intelligence cfficcN prefer lo use couriers, usually sen ice agents, to C3rr\' informarion back and forth between  

case officers and theii recruits. íỉometimes che courier is someone already inside che social cứclc of rhe recruit, but is a person whom rhe case officer íccruiĩcd separately. Sometimes a courier may be the person who first helped entrap the recruit, such as che woman who scancd sleeping with him or the man who loaned him money. Sometimes a courier will br unfamiliar (O and with the recruit and (he material he is carry¬ing back and forth. A ease officer might even use a profes¬sional me^Mrngcr scn icc. However, all material sent by couri¬er ỜÍ messenger must first be encoded in some way.

Postal Service

Although seldom discussed in the Jiccraairc of spying, (he mailman delivers a good percentage of the Communications between spies and rheir recruits. The case officer will rent a pose office box, a cuniftiCicial mailbox, or sometime、a small apartment or business office chat will also sene as pan of his fal$c-flag cover. This allows the spy to mail whatever he has to the case officer.

It may even be possible for the spy (O use the postal $y$- tetỉỉ di his business, govcrnnicnr, or embassy office. All the spy has to do is drop a letter with a fake recum address into a mailbox. Two da” la(cr, rhe case officer can pick up the inlor- matiun at his post office box. which is rented in a fake name and home address. For additional security； the ease UÍIÌCCÍ Will not pick up his mail personali)； but rather send a service agent who will follow sundard surveillance detection and avoidance pioccdures before and after he has picked up the mail.

’n>c mail can be used both ways. The rexruit can also rent his own post office or commercial mailbox to which the case officei can send him mail.

It may not be necessary- for the iccruic to bother wich pri¬vate mailboxes, especially in che United States. Because of rhe massive amount of junk mail (hat is dumped into every mailbox in the country, it is easy for a case officer co send mes¬sages to a spy (hat are designed (0 look like junk mail. The piece of junk mail could be an inviurion fc)r a “free ihp” co Las \egas, an obvious sweepstakes $cam, a solicitation to buy Stcx'ks ur 3 rimc-sharc apartment, or any of (lie orhci scams used by direct-mail pitch artists. Only rhe recmit will recog¬nize the piece of mail as a message from his control officer Such a scheme may even involve secret writing: parsing an iron over the message or perhaps wiping the page with a chemical solurion will bring our (he secret message Wfincn in the margins.

rdephone Cummunicanons

The number of daily communicariúns during which sen- sirivc commercial, government, and personal informacion is exchanged numbers tn the tens of millions. Business execu¬tives discuss mulribiilion-dollar contracts, police oflicers calk about an upcoming drug bust, and Thousands of men and women ser up rendezvous for adiikcry every day and never have any fears about being tapped. At low-thrcii( sveuriry lev¬els, rhe case úíĩìcer and che iecmic will probably uik frnm rime to rinnr on rhe telephone. However, anyone engaging in any illegal aenvity ekes a great risk discussing such activity OVCÍ an open phone line.

Despite borh the legal and technical difficulties, govern- menrs can inrercepr and listen in on phone lines, and (hey will do so if they have enough reason ro focus on a Single individ¬ual. If a government agency suspects chai one of their employ¬ees is spying, one of the firsi things they will do is request telephone records and put a pen register order ỞIÌ the line. A pen register(U5<d by police) will record all (he numbers that any given telephone dials. Such a technical step, which is dune a【the telephone exchange rather than where the spy is loaned, docs nor require a court order. Therefore, once a spy cumes under suspicion, hw enforcement officers will quickly be able to identify every number he calls in che future and M long-distance numbers he has called in the past. Ac some point, the government will get enough evidence tu obraiii 3  

warranc for a phone tap. Well-financed criminal organizations and large corporations can also usually find a way to up a line, even though rhey will have to break (he law ro do it

Anyone engaging in spying in high-risk situations should use extreme caution whenever rdlking on rhe idephonc and must assume that sonuont is itstening to /附y TSfjrd.

Wherher one is an intelligence officer 0Í just an ordinary gu>； (he following list of telephone security mlcs will keep anyone our of trouble.

• 【Xn、ever discuss any illegal activity over any telephone to which you arc known ro have access. If you must make a call for such a purpose, make il from a public phone 10 a public phone.,ITìis means that arrangements must be made in advance so that (he person receiving rhe phone call will be monitoring (he public phone when il rings.

• Wlicncvcr using a public phone 0Ĩ making sensitive calls from a private line, either pay with coins or with a prepaid iong-discanct card, which can be purchased anonymously in supermarkets, diUgscores, and even the post office and cannot be Traced to you. (Remember that these prepur¬chased (elephone Girds can be used co make local elk、 albeit at long-disunce charges.)

• Remember ihat the easiest way ro intercept and listen in on a telephone call i$ to pick up an extension.

• Don't discuss sensitive inibrmacinn. even your credit card numbers, uver any cellular, cordless, or ocher type of phone rhai transmits a radio signnl.

• Don,c use clever code words ỠÍ (rice phrases, such as calling cocaine "Coca Cola” or talking about going on a Mfishing trip“ when rhe planned activity is a recruiting session with a poccntial spy. If you find it necessary co talk in any kind of code, then you should be sending encr>rpted messages through the mo$( sophisticated encryption systems available.

• If a phone musr be used in an emergency; use a simple code(0 teli che orher pany to go to a prearranged public or safe phone and stand by co receive a call or tv call a prearranged number.

Using Computen» and Modems

i<)r Secure Conmiunicabons

Just as rhe author cannot address all the issues of using computers in data theft, storage, and retrieval, neither can he exphin in Chis book all of the ins nnd ỠUU of using computers ior secure commnnicorions between a case office，and a recruited spy. Nevertheiess, if borh (he case officer and rhe recruit have access 10 a modern compiirer, a modem, and a telephone line, then che ease officer will want ro rnkc advan¬tage of the World Wide Web and e-mail.

Because all modem signals revel through commercial iclcphone lines, they present all the same security problems that the telephone presents. Phone lines can easily be tapped by law enforcement officers 0Í anyone who ha$ access (0 the interior of the building vr the phone connection box. People who lap phones will have computers and modems, roo. Send an open message by modem and they will read it before the addressee sees it.

Even 50. computers and modems can make communica¬tions much more secure than a simple phone call, provided the operators understand rhe rcchnvlogv- and rhe sysccms-as well as their limirarions.

E-Mail

The fir$r advantage of computer communication k e-mail. Anyone with an Incerncr connection or a connection (0 such commercial infonnat沁n services as CompuServe, America Online, or Piodigy can send anyone a message, any place in the world, hy connecting with a local number. Pen registers and phone records will show only (he number of the Internet server or the information service.

No e-mail message is secure unless it is encrypted with a sophisticated encryprion program. It can be intercepted while  

1( ]$ in rhe office network, on the Internet, stored in the hard drives of the computer information service, and in cransmis- siun. Email messages arc also on rhe hard disks of every com- purer rhey pass chrough, often for long pcricxls, even after they have supposedly been erased. Much of che Irangarc scandal char $0 badly damaged the Reagan administration s public image resulted bccauijc people like Lt. Col. Oliver Nonh didn*c realize how public e-mail can be and how com¬plicated it is to erase e-mail $0 ihdt it can never be recovered at any pome along rhe line of transmission. No one should ever write anything in an open e-inâil rnesage that he wouldni write down on a piece of pnper and co$$ OIK rhe win¬dow for anyone to read.

Despite (he mđny security risks, e-mail does provide a quick and C35Ỵ way to past public ”心Mgc$. i.c., messages (hac appeal〔0 be innocent but arc in fact coded insưuctions. Internet newsgroups, discussion gỉỡups on (he commercial services, and rhoinands of private computer bulletin boards provide places where anyone can posr a message as part of an ongoing public discussion. Literally ihuusands of diffcrcni subjects aie continually debared in such open forums with lit¬tle or no limitation on who can posi a message Of whar can be said. Insults arc traded back and forth, and a lot of illogical nonsense floats thỉớUgb rhe discussions.

To ser up a system of public message, both panics have (O do the lollowing three things: 1) know the e-mail address or cover name each will be using. 2) agree on (he public discussion group chcy will use and the coded wording to be used, and 3) know the time frame for checking messgB For example, che CISC officer checks the news group alt.ulk.guns on a daily basis, watching ÍÒÍ a message posted by wcre.dog@siipcrcom.com. When he finds such a message and it includes the word 8匕 he knows that there is a package waiting for him ar che drop site.

This is a much better means of posting public messages chan buying an ad in a newspaper and running â coded message or making marks on mailboxes.

Encrypted E-Mail

Some computer encryption programs make it possible ro send e-maii messages in an cncrsrprcd formar rhac may be SU secure that even rhe National Security Agency's compuicis won' he able co break the encryption. Again, any case officer who doesni know a loc abour encryption should not attempt ro use computer encryption in a high-risk sccuriry simarion. But those who do understand this esoteric subject can send e- mail ro nnvone in the world with a reasonable cxpccrarion rhar the mssag will be read only by rhe recipient.

Encryprcd e-mail messages can be sent chrough (he Internet commercial computer information services, private bulletin Ixsifds, 0< dirccr compurer-ro-computer phone connections.

1 lowever. there is unc serious problem wirh an encrypted message: rhe mere fact chat it is enuryptcd will be seen as evi¬dence that both parries arc engaged in some kind of illegal, immoral, or disloyal behavior, ir a govern mene agency S11S- pcưs that an employee is spying and it ups 3 line and discov¬er» that he is sending envrypicd messages (0 someone, che buíCducrđĩS will rake That as proof of spying.

The way to avoid lhi$ problem is ro rake rhe same pre- canrions chat you do to calk on the telephone. Bulh panics use public phones, and if rhe calls are long-distance, they pay with either coins or. better, the prepaid telephone cards. Besides cncr\*prion, another advantage of computer communication is that both parties doni have ro be on the line ar rhe same time to communicare.

A scenario such a$ rhe fdlouing might work. Earl Harden* a real estate speculator, rrcruito Dennis Powers, an engineer working for rhe Ciry Highway Commission, to copy files cMJt of the com¬missions computer that dexribc future city highway con$m>cnon rourcs. On rhe first Sdtnrday of each month. Harden checks into a hotel under tini name of Craig Bcasily He anaches che modem of his desktop compurer co his room telephone and "ts che cvinpuỉ- er software $0 chai it will answer (he phone when it rings. (Harden doesn't have to wait in the hotel room for the dll.) 

Sometime during the day, Dennis Powers cakes hk note¬book computer co the City airpori where rherc is a couitesy office for business travelers. He connects his modem ro che phone at a coui(c$\r desk and, using his prepaid calling card, calls ihc hotel and asks to be connected co Craig Beasilys room. When the computer in the hotel room answers. Dennis punches che right commands, and his computer downloads the latest stolen data in encrypted format co Harden s computer. Ue then downloads a file from Harden's computer, which passes on insemetions for future contacts. Later in the day. Harden picks up his computer and pa、、his hotel bill in cash.

REDUCING PERSON AI. CONTACTS

Obviously you should avoid personal CỨÍÌUCC as much as possible. Bur even in high-risk situaiions, both the control offi¬cer and the recruit will occasionally have co meet facc-to-face. Sonietiincs. che spy may request such a meeting tu a>k ibi more money or explain why he can,t produce everything the ease offi¬cer expects of him. More often, it will be the ciìứC officer who will request (he meed RR, perhaps ĨO provide some additional training and guidance, administer a polygraph ICSL or do an in¬depth interview to evaluate【he honesty of che spy's iCponing.

The case officer must remain in conưoi when ic comes to arranging mecrinRs. even when it is che spy who 1$ requesting the personal contact. 711C ease officer muse decide where and when co meet and how the recruit will travel co the meeting place. He should pick meeting places where he is loudly famil¬iar wkh the layout and the ordinary traffic through the area.

Government intelligence case officers working in high- risk situations will prefer, if at all possible, co hold meetings with recruited spies in a third counny, preferably one in which the local government is more friendly coward che governmenr who is running the spy. Remember that the Mossad seldom puts its case agcnĩs in a hostile Arab country. It recruits Arabs as spies while they arc traveling in VVc$(Cin countries and holds all meetings with such spies in friendly Western coun¬tries. ill the ease of Rick Ames the KGB control ofticcr would mcer with him in Colombia while Rick and his wife were vis¬iting her mother.

Even chose who are engaged in privare inrclligcnce col¬lection are well advised to nicer wirh che spies they control in another $(acc, anorher region of the country. 0Í even another country. The farther they arc from home territory, the less likely 1( is (he relationship will be accidentally exposed.

If the spy cannot travel co a distant place or a foreign countiv. then che ease officer will have to identify a secure place where the meeting can be held closer ro home. In low- thieat siluâúons» rhe cnsc officer may dexide to meet in some public piace, say a park or teswunnr. However, if rhe session will include rraining or last a long lime, the ease officer will wane to arrange fur a safe house.

Safe Houjics

A safe house is any private place conrrollcd by the case uffivci 01 his agenrs, which has not been identified by any counterespionage or security agency, h may be a rental house on a large piece of property or an apartmtnl. but il works bet¬ter if the apartniunc is nor in a building that has a doorman Of a security system. Hotel rooms can also be used as a safe house. When (he room is rented just before a meeting is scheduled, the ease officer can be reasonably certain that the room is secure, especially if he or one of his agents picks up the spy at another spor and rakes him co the hotel.

It is always best if the recruit doesn't know prior to the nieciing where (he safe house is. He should be picked up at another site and taken to the safe house. If rhe case officer intends(0 concinuc co use the safe house, the spy should be blindfolded or perhaps travel ill the back of a (ruck or van so he cani see the rouic of travel.

Whenever the case oflicer meets one of his spies, the case  

officer must always arrive ar rhe sclccrcd sire before che recruit. Someone working for the case officer should keep the rccruic under sunxillancc from (he lime he departs for the meeting until after he has returned co his home or phee of business. If the ease oiliccr or his agents spat anyone sur- vcilling the recmic, the meeting sire, or che ca$c officer, rhe meeting must be aborted and the ease officer should leave the arca immedia⑹芋

If the meeting includes a training session or a trip to a for¬eign country, rhe spy must have a good cover S10Ạ, (O explain his absence to his employer and family. Although it may never be used, (he cover story should include innocaif explanations for the spy's actions at every point during the trip, from his home OÍ office(0 che location of〔he meeting.

The best cover stories are those that include several differ- enr layers of deception. In one example, a Colombian drug ring had recruited an informant inside the Coast Guard office responsible for dnig interdiction on the high seas. The dnig car¬tel esc oflicer warned three days with the infbmianu a yuung flight ìicucenanụ co train him in the use of a sophisticated com¬porci communication sysrem the spy would be using 10 send his reports to Colombia via the Internet. The drug lords, through a company they controlled in Mexico» set up a rourisr promorion- al content that ollcrcd a week's vacation in CMIKJUII. Mexico.

The lieutenant entered and won the rigged contest and took[he trip. Afrer he cheeked into a hotel in Cancun, he met a pretty Argentinean woman at the hotel bar in what would have appeared co any surveillance ro be a casual pickup. The Argentine was an expensive intcrnaiionai prostitute who had been hired by the drug canel but who had no idea she was working fbr dmg rrafifickcrs. She carried a sealed envelope of instructions that she gave to the Coast Guard officer as scx>n JS they were alone in a horcl room.

After spending the night with the woman, the lieutenant called his office back home and (Old his sccrciary ĩhar he was taking a car excursion to visit the ruins in the Yucatan 

i^ninsula for the day. He then rented a car and asked for a map of (he YucMiin before driving away with the Latin American woman by his side.

Following (he instructions, they drove co a Mexican (OU n on the river across from Belize. The two cheeked into the best hotel in town. The lieutenant then deliberately disabled the rental car and left it in a local repair shop (O be fixed. A van picked him up JS he wulked back co (he hotel and cook him co a ranch several miles outside of toun and on the Belize side of rhe river where the hcuĩcnanc spent (WO days in training. The Argcncincan woman staved in the hotel room in cown. order¬ing room service for two and keeping (he "Do Noe Disturb', 5>ign hung on the door. (The cartel supplied anothei uoman. one who spoke no English, for the lieutenant^ pleasure dur- mg his two nights at the ranch.)

When the lieutenant finally returned to his hotel in Cjncun. he culled his $ccrc【ary and described an unfortunate storx, of his car breaking dou n and his spending uncomfort¬able nights in a smjll Mexican (own. No one c\cr cheeked his story, but if someone had. tliat person would have discoxercd the lieuccnunt s secret sexual escapade, but no evidence thar he had ever entered Belize from Mexico. 

Chapter Fifteen

Case Studies

T

he following studies demonstrate the different techniques and plots that can be used to recruit a spy. Readers should ask themselves how they would have created the scenario, what stage decorations they would have used, how they would have approached the target for recruitment, and how they would have led the target into treason.

CATCHING QADDAFI S FLUNKY

In 1980. Khalid Al-Daraji, a Libyan munitions expert, was working on the Libyan air defense program. His duties some¬times required stays of several weeks in Rome as part of the Libyan effort to buy high-tech air defense weapons from European firms willing IO trade technology for pctro-dollars. Khalid always left his wife and family in Libya when making such trips. The CIA identified Khalid as a possible recruit who might tell it something about Libyan air defenses. CIA intelligence officers working undercover in the U.S. Embassy in Rome designed and implemented a plan to entrap Khalid (he next time he showed up in Rome.

As was his custom, on his next trip to Rome Khalid stayed 

in a small hotel aparrmcnt and took the bus each day co his office in rhe Libyan Embassy. As he was waiting one morning M (he bus stop, a young Italian woman walked up and stood waiting beside him. She smiled at him, but neither spoke. A few minucc5ĩ laici, a large sedan pulled up ro rhe curb, driven by a middle-aged mon dresud in a business sui匚 rhe woman got into the car. and off they drove.

For the next three days, Khalid found the woman waiting for her ride when he arrived a【the bus scop. She was always the only other person standing there. WJiile she always smiled al him, and a couple of times said good morning, (he shy Khalid never Fried to scan 1 conversa cion. Each day the man in the car came by and picked her up.

On the fifrh day. the car didn't sliow up ar (he usual time, rhe woman didn\ look wofiied about rhe failure of her lide to appeal, and ahour five minutes htcr she boarded a bus thac always passed (he scop just a lew minuccs before Khalid $ bus came by.

Less than 30 seconds after the bus had pulled away, rhe man in rhe car pulled up to the stop. He rolled hi$ window down and asked Khalid if he had seen the woman he usually picked up. Kiulid answered that the woman had just taken a bus. The man thanked Khalid, and ihen. in whai appeared co be an aftenhoughc. asked Khalid where he was going. When Khalid cold him, the mail said he was going rhai way and offered Khalid a ride into the cirx' center, which he accepted.

The driver uf the car, who spoke English with a British pub¬lic school accent, introduced himself U5 Macchew Clark. He explained tha( the woman, Eva、and he worked in rhe same building. He gave her a ride whenever it was convenienL

Fur the next several days, when Clark stopped co pick up Eva, he also offered Khalid a ride. As they code along, Ma((hcw directed the conversation mostly at Khalid, asking him a hour North Africa and Libyan culture. Maichew also talked a little about himself and his business, which was putting together international trade deals fur 3 German trade consoííiurn. By the third day he was asking Khalid questions about che Libyan economy and the possibilities for trade opportunities in Libya.

When (he conversation drifted into a discussion of resuu- rants on rhe founli day, Marchcw asked Khalid's rccommcn- dacion for a good North African resraurani. When Khalid replied that he almost never ate in restaurants, Màithcw insisted that Khalid go to dinner with him that evening. Khalid accepted the invitation but suggested he would prefer 10 try a good French rcsuuranc. Manhew took the suggestion as evidence that while Khalid was enjoying his new tiiend- ship, he did noe want to risk ninning into anyone from the Libyan Embassy while in (he company of a European. Matthew then asked Eva to join them as he planned on cak¬ing Mardia. (It was rhe fii$( time that Manhew had men¬tioned he had a woman in his life.) Ac dinner. Matthew inưo- duced Martha as a business associate, although they acted moie like lovers. Khalid found Eva a very friendly dinner partner, who was obviously inrcrc$(cd in him 3S a man.

Thus began a four-way friendship that quickly became an imporanr pan of Khalid's Roman experience, but one he never mentioned co his Libyan colleagues 3C rhe embassy. Khalid especially wanted to keep his iOinancc with Eva, which had blossomed during rhe Hrst dinner engagement a secret from his Libyan compatriocs. Thne very night. Eva had invited Khalid Ĩ0 her own aparrmenu just down the block from Khalids apartment, and made love to him. After (hat. Khalid and Eva frequently went Oilt ro dinner with Matthew and Martha, wich Matthew always picking up the check.

Increasingly. Maerhew ỉbcuscd the conversation when rhev were together on possible trade opportunities for his firm in Libya. When Khalid talked enthushsdcally about several different possibilities for trade. Matthew asked if Khalid could put some of his thoughts down on paper, promising to pay Khalid if (he rep0rt proved useful in discovering possible Libyan trade opponunilies. 

Khalid prepared such a report, which contained nothing of a sensitive nature. Matthew praised chc information and a day later passed Khalid an envelope scuffed with Italian bank notes, which he claimed was payment from his part¬ners. Khalid used most of the money to buy an expensive present for Eva. who was now sleeping his apdfcmcnc almost every night. Khalid, whose circumcised wife back in Iran found sex a painful experience that she endured as sel¬dom as possible, was getting the best sex of his life and doing a lot of pillow-talk bragging about the important work he was doing for his country*.

On two more occasions, Macchcw asked Khalid to uncc reports on economic and pijlirical developments in Libya, paying him well for each effort. The next time chat Maỉthcu asked for a reporc. he requested that Khalid jot down specific comments on Qaddafi's political future and the possibility of his overthrow.

Khalid's first acccmpc quoted (he ofTicial Libyan line, say¬ing only the nicest ihings possible about Qaddafi. Matthew rejecccd chat attempt and refused to pay foi it. insisting rhar Khalid write the truth as he knew ic. noe Libyan propaganda. Ac the same time. Eva was suggesting that she and Khalid flv co a Mediterranean resort for a weekend gciaway. an expense that Khalid had no uay co pay for unless he could collect another payment from Macchcw.

After a couple of days, Khalid gave Maithcu a report on Qaddafi that criticized rhe dictator and described a number of atrocities he knew Qaddafi had committed. Even so. the report predicted chat Qaddafi had a permanent hold on power and that he uould probably rule until (he day he died of old age. Khalid begged Nfanheu not to divulge co anyone who had prepared the report, and Matthew promised (hat Khalid had nothing to worry 4bout. Matthew paid Khalid enough to splurge in □ big way on his weekend with Eva.

The next rime Matthew asked Khalid for more informa¬tion. he asked for information on the Libyan air defense s\s-  

tcm, explaining that his trade consonium hoped to outbid the current suppliers for the Libyan government purchases. Matthew assured Khalid that he would be serving Libya's best interests because Matthew's consortium would be able co supply better, more modern equipment a( a bargain price. However, in order co make an offer that would impress Khalid s bosses in the Libyan government. Matthew needed details on what kind of equipment the Libyans had already purchased, who had supplied the equipment, how much they had paid for the equipment» and how (he equipment was posi¬tioned co defend Tripoli and Benghazi.

Mau hew promised Khalid that if his informacion made a deal possible, he would make Khalid a secret partner and Khalid might well make a hundred thousand British pounds or more. Matthew suggested thac in anticipation of such wealth, Khalid ought co open a secret Swiss bank account and gave a bit of advice on how Khalid could do that.

Both Eva and Martha liscened as Macchew made his pro¬posal. As soon as she and Khalid were alone. Eva began talk¬ing excitedly about the expected money, and that night. Khalid experienced che best sex ever. In the morning. Eva suggested chat if Khalid earned the expected money, he might set her up in an apartment in Tripoli as a permanent part of his life.

Khalid had to rewrite the report on Libyan air defenses several times, each time adding more detail at Matthews insistence. By the time (he report met Macthcw*s demands, Khalid must have realized that he was selling his nation s closely guarded secrets. He no doubc continued to tell him- scie however, that he was selling those secrets co people who would never use them against Libya.

In fact, the information provided by Khalid played a key iole in che planning for the U.S. air attack on Tripoli on April 14, 1986.

Matthew Clark was a CIA ease officer working under a false flag. He was backed up by a team of a dozen agents. 

Marrha was a CIA expcn on air defenses assigned co the case to provide tcchnioii advice to the CIA case officer. Eva was a very expensive Italian pro$d(urc who had no more idea of the rnie identity of Mailhcw than Khalid did. The original plan was chat Khalid would take the hint ar the bus stop and start lliaing with Eva. which in nirn would lead 10 a dace and then sex. after which she would introduce him ro Matthew. When the shy Khalid didn't take rhe bait Matthew changed che pian and made (he approach by ofltring Khalid a ride. From there» things went according lo plan.

WHO S THE SPY?

Lesrer Srapler got caught up in what is perhaps che most convoluted spy fccmicmcnt involving a false flag ever pu( in place. Stapler had been employed as a civilian intelligence anal>Tit fơí íhe Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for seven years. Then he left (he agency and started his own private internacioniil consulting firm.

Working under conrracc uith a U.S. airline company. Stapler went (O Mexien Cicy on an extended business crip. While there, he was approached by George Brennan and Kenneth Brauer, who identified themselves as CI A intelligence ufliccrs attached tu the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. They said they knew about his previous cmploymcnr with the DIA and asked him for assis¬tance in setting up a "am (Ộ peneirate the KGB opcracion in Mexico, telling him he would be serving his councn* while mak¬ing some good money, llicy explained they wanted Stapler tu pretend co be a financially scrapped U.S. businessman who wanted to cash in on things he knew about (he DIA by selling infbrmacion to the local KGB resident.

The twu CIA agents assured Stapler (hat he would be woiking AS â contract employee of the CIA while peiforming rhe service. He was given a civil service applicâlion form to fill uul. \V・2 forms, and applications for insurance and death ben¬efits, as well as che standard security clearance update forms.

Screwing that iĩ was critically important rhar Stapler con¬vince the Soviet resident【hat he had information wonh sell¬ing. George and Ken (Old Suplcr to give the Sovicc agent a lot of detail about his work at the DIA. When Swplcr expressed some hesicacion in doing chat, fearing he might lee slip some sccrcrs, the three men spent several days in a hotel room going over what Stapler could tell the Soviet agent about his previous employment and what he shouldn't mention.

During chose k>ng sessions the two CIA men had Supler describe in detail what he did during his seven-year career at che ĐĨA. They drafted several dozen diflerenr messages to the CIA hcadquancns asking for specific clearance for what ừìing$ Stapler could release and whac things he should not mcncion.

The (WO CIA men also gave Stapler 3 direct phone num¬ber It the embassy where he could contact them. Stapler called rhe number severai times. The phone was always answered by 3 female sccregry speaking AmCiican-stylc English with a $light Mexican accent and idling che caller he had reached the U.S. Embassy.

During the long sessions in hotel rooms, che tuo incelli- gcncc officers frequently talked on the telephone with some¬one at the embassy while Supier listened co cheir side of the vunvcrsacion. 7*hcy also showed Stapler the answer, to rhe messages they had sene co Washington.

The three men eventually developed a playbook of spe¬cific things chat Sopler could (ell (he Soviet ease agent once contact had been made. The final script ended up being so bland rhac Stapler expressed some concern char it wouldn't be enough co satisfy (he Soviet officer. Nevertheless, che two CIA men insisted that once contact had been made, Swpier would not give the Soviet agent anything he wasn't aulho" rized by Washington to give.

When che two CIA agents were satisfied【hai Stapler was ready, they directed him to make concacr with the Soviet 晔nh prccending ỈO be a walk-in. Stapler walked into (he Soviet Embassy in Mexico and gave (he story about wanting

co sell secrets. He was soon diking co an agcnc who called himself Boris. Stapler followed the script approved by the CIA headquarters and reported back to Brennan and Brauer after rhe meeting. The TOO CIA agents were ecstatic, celling Stapler that he had met with Boris Kornpiektov. one of the (Op KGB ease officers in Mexico.

Stapler met several more times with Boris, who insisted with increasing agitation chac Stapler provide more sensitive information as proof of his sincerity. Boris' demands for mure detailed information resulted m more long discussions wirh the two CĨA men over what Stapler might cell the Soviet agent. zrhe two CIA men drafted more cables and a day later showed Stapler rhe replies, which denied permission to give any more sensitive information 10 (he Soviet intelligence offi¬cer rhan what Langley had already approved.

Stapler mci once more with Boris» who abruptly (crminac- ed the conversation and told Stapler that the information he was crying to peddle was wonhlcss. When Stapler reported back to (Jeorge and Kenneth, they thanked Stapitr Ibi his cooperation, agreeing with Stapler that the ploy hadn't worked because of the CiAs unwillingness to (hrow more truth into the e<]uation.

rl'hc nvo CIA men did insisc char all had nor been lose: they had at least learned a few things about how (he KGB handled a walk-in. They stressed the importa nee of keeping the whole thing secret and showed Scaplcr a requesr they were submitting for a substantia] bonus for Stapler's services. They promised Stapler rhar rhe U.S. Treasun>r Depanmcnc would issue a check, which would be mailed lu his U.S. bank iiccoiinr. Stapler's nexr bank statement showed the money had been deposited as promised.

This might have ended the whole affair, except that sev¬eral weeks later when he was back home in che States. Swplcr read a news arride reporting chat the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City had an office of【he FBI chat monitored Americans seen entering the Soviet Embassy, which was suspected of being a favonte spot for wotild-bc spies ro make contact with Soviet jniclligence officers.

Based on his own cxpeiience working in the U.S. intelli¬gence communio,; Stapler was only roo aware of how inrera- gcncy compeucion sometimes kept the right hand from learn¬ing what the lefr was doing. Increasingly concerned rhac rhe FBI might have seen him talking to the Soviet agent and that the CIA may nor have borhered (O tell die FBI about its iiưỉc atlcmpc to entrap a KGB officer. Stapler cried to contact George Brennan and Kenneth Brauer, using the embassy number they had given him.

A recording m Spanish (old him that number was no lunger in service. Stapler found che listed number for che U.S. Embassy, called il. and was told no one by those names was HUW or ever had worked in the embassy. Stapler then decided to go ro the FBI. describe whac had happened» and make sure lie wasn't on some FBI list of potential spies.

lie immediarcly found himself accused of spying, based on his interview with the FBI in which he admitted having met with Boris in Mexico City. The FBI did have a record of his visits with Boris, and che FBI agents assumed that Staples hdving realized that the FBI muse have been watching, was trying co divert suspicion by claiming he was working for the CiA. Ilic FBI insisted that they had checked with che CIA. which denied having any employees named George Brennan and Kenneth BQUCF.

It took several years ibr the case to work through the court svsrem. The CIA insisted in response co courr summonses (hac they had no employees by the name of George Brennan and Kenneth Brauer, nor did they have any record that Lester Suplcf had every performed any service for (he CIA while in Mexico City A belated check with Staplers bank uncovered rhnr (he payment he had received had been a cashier's check drawn on a Mexican bank and the source could not be traced.

While (he FBI remains convinced ihac Stapler was a walk- in whom the KGB rejected, others in the intelligence game  

have concluded rhac Swplcf was rhe Vicdfìì of a very clever Jal^-flag setup.

The men Stapler knew as George Brennan and Kenneth Brauer may have been Soviet intelligence ease officers. Of (hey could have been ca^c officers working fc)r any of a dozen other inrclligcncc services. They could have even been spy¬ing for one of the several different antigovernment groups rhar arc conscandy crilicizing U.S. imclligcncc agencies.

Whoever they were, they had no doubt targeted Stapler wirh rhe inccnt of learning everything he might tell them about his work with the DIA. When they discovered he was going co Mexico City on a business trip, they baw it as the per¬fect opportunity. Using false ID, chcy had scr up an office where rhey could produce what lucked tu Stapler like official embassy telegrams. The supposed embassy number they gave Stapler was a front manned by some woman uhv had probably never been near the real U.S. Embassy. The long sessions in which Stapler thoughr he and the two CIA han¬dlers WCIC determining what he could and couldn't tell a Soviet intelligence agenr a hour his previous work were really opporrunirics for the twu fake CIA ease officers to learn just about everything about DIA analysts that they could.

WHY RECRUIT A HOTEL MAID?

Somcrimes access agenis en be 於 importane as a primary agent might be in other circumstances. Charlene Brevis was che night housekeeper for a commercial hotel in a major midwcsc- ern ciry. Charlene was also a single mother who had three teenaged children. When her only son died as an innoccnr vic¬tim in a drug shoot-out. Charlene joined a parcncs1 organization that was campaigning for sưiccer enforcement of drug laws.

About six momhs latch a man named Ray Kelleher start¬ed attending the meetings and introduced himself to Charlene. After a couple more meetings. Ray focused the kind of attention on Charlene chat suggc5Ccd a possible  

romance. Ray didn't ralk much about himself bue did listen symparherically as Charlene ulked about her dead son and her hopes for college educations for her two daughlCiS.

The night they became lovers, Ray cold Charlene that he was an undercover agent(ỒÍ (he sure police narcotics squad but a5ked her ro keep that information confidcnrial. As their romance blossomed, Ray often talked about rhe frustrations of his job and how difficulc ir was tn get evidence on kingpin drug dealers. lie confided that he and his colleagues had learned that M^vcral big dnig dealers often checked inro the hotel where Charlene worked. Ray was cerca in chat the deal¬ers were discussing major deals in their hotel rooms. Ray sug¬gested 【hai if there was only some way co sneak into the rooms where the drug dealers suyed, he might be able (O find evi¬dence or plant a microphone to galhcr such evidence. Unfor¬tunately. without doing rhar, he couldnk even gather enough evidence to ask for a legal search Of phone tap warrant.

Because of Charlenes anger about drug dealers. Ray didn't have too much trouble convincing her during che next several weeks chat she could do a real service for the war on drugs if she would provide Ray with pass keys, which would allow him access to any room in (he hotel that he ^uspccrcd was being used by drug dealers.

Although Ray warned Charlene chat she must keep her help a secret, he also told her he had aaanged with his supe¬riors to list Charlene as a confìdencial infòniìànr and she would be well paid for her assistance. Charlene began loaning Ray a set of pass keys almost every night, and she also started putting substantial amounts of money into a special bank accounc〔hat would eventually help ensure her rwo daughters got a chance to go co college.

Several weeks later. Ray showed Charlene a newspaper story reporting (he arresi of a major group of Colombian drug (iafTickcrs engaged in a money-laundcring scheme. Ray claimed the arrese was the direct result of infòrmacion he had collected from the hotel room where one of the conspÌNĩỡrs had stayed. After that, Ray continued tu point out occasional news stories of big drug buses, which he claimed had resuked from (Charlene s cooperation.

Ray Kelleher-S leal name was Steven Kissniaik and he was not a police officer. In facr, he had a police record as a confi¬dence rnan. The only thing he kneu about the drug cases he claimed (O have helped solve was whac he read in (he papers. He and several other colleagues had found a new profession in industrial and commercial inrclligcncc. Whai he really was after was access to the notebook computers so many business executives carry with 山cm whenever they (ravel.

Ray would use the pass keys (Charlene provided co enter the hotel rooms of business travelers while they were dining, taking in the city's entenainment, or even sleeping in rheir hotel rooms in rhe early morning hours. Ray carried his own notebook computer along on his forays, which he would use to download che conrencs of any notebook com-puter he located in a guest's bedroom. On chose occasions when the businessman was sleeping in his bed, Rây would rake rhe computer out of the room (O an empty room where he would cruise through che files and download key data before renirning rhe computer ro rhe owner's room. Ray and his colleagues would then go over the data, identifying information chac could be sold co foreign compccicors of the U.S. business coiporacions.

Eventually. Rays luck ran out: one of his victims woke up while he had her computer in □nochcr room. Finding she couldn't gu back to sleep, the woman decided to do some work and discovered that her computer was missing. The city police investigated the theft, and Charlene's company spent significant amounts of money nn private detectives hue were unable (O recover the computer or discover who had taken iu

(Zharlene. however, immediately figured out who must have srolcn rhe compuíCíí When she confionicd Ray. he admitted that he had taken it but pointed out chat if he were caught she would go down wich him. The sizable bank  

account (Charlene had accumulated would convince any jury that she was parr cf the gang.

Charlene still works for Ray, but no longer shares her bed with the luverturned blackmailer. He still pays her for her services* bur nor nearly aS much as when she dioughc she was working with the nares. She is not the only hotel employee in the city working for Ray and his partners. In each ease, rhe am used a diflerenr scheme in recruiting someone who could give (hem access to the ĩvonis of businessmen traveling wirh norctxx)k coinpuccfS filled with dau.

CATCH A MAN WHEN HE S DOWN

Wilber H. Schutt worked as an engineer for Eden Electronics l^oduction. a large Government weapons conrrac- ror. Schott, whose work involved the design of such high-tech weapons.guidance systems Q those demonstrated during the Gulf War. had a (Op-sccrer U.S. guveinmenr security clear¬ance. After 20 years on the job. Schnn failed to ger che pro¬motion he had expected, mainly because his personal life was falling apart and impacting his work performance.

In his early 50s, Schott swn found himself newly divorced with financial troubles that forced hint 10 file personal bank- luptcy. Reduced cu living in a rented efficiency apartment while he worked at a job with lialc hope of prunioiion, his only recreation wa$ an occasional game of tennis played on the aparcmcnt complex $ tennis court. It was there he met Jerzy Kwasniewski, a Polish businessman. Kwasniewski played ar about the same level as Schott, although Schott reg¬ularly won about n*-o out of three games.

After a couple of weeks, Schott invited Kwasniewski up (O his apartment after a game for a couple of beers. From there, (heir relationship developed into a friendship with lots of tech¬nical talk abour developments in clcccronies and the efforts of Poland co find potential customers for some of rhe new prod¬ucts Polish industn.- was manufacturing. When Kwasniewski asked Schorc to write down a lise of possible U.S. customers ro whom Kwasniewski might try to sell, Wilber agreed co do so.

A couple of weeks lacci, Kwasniewski knocked on Schons door 2nd excitedly announced rhar rhe informarinn Schutt provided had rebuked in a substantial sale. Kwn$nicu-$ki chcn insisted on paying Schorr a finders fee for the information that had made the sale possible.

Schott had been trained as parr of his employment co rec¬ognize hostile intelligence activity, lie chose to ignore the obvious signals and happily acccprcd rhe cash payment, which he spent on back rent and a couple of much-needed new suns. Over che next several monchs. Kuasiliewski paid 5>chon fees for similar kinds of inconseqiicnrial information and icpvru oil six din'erent occasions. Each time the ices increased in size. Initially, Schotc used the money co pay for nccc$$iric$, bui cvcfKually he had a bit left over 10 pay lor lux¬uries, including a return to the dating game.

Shorrly after Schorr began seriously daring a woman with two yuung children. Kwasniewski 心ked to see some unclassi¬fied bue sensitive marcrial on radar fire control for ranks to which Schon had access. Claiming he wanted the information SU he could advise his home office on possible areas in which ir should direct research projects, Kwasniewski promised a $ub$tantial payment 35 a consulting fee for good inforinatiun.

Schoct thought it over for a few days, then copied the mnrcriol from company Illes and passed rhe informaiion on ro Kwasniewski. The payment he earned was enough to allow 5>chon to buy n small engagement ring and propose marriage (0 (he new woman in his life.

From that point, ir was an easy task for Kwasniewski to ask for confidential and cvemually sccrcr infoimacion. Schott knew what he was doing bur kept telling himself that as soon as he gor SCĨ financially, he would cue rhe iclai沁n wi(h Kwasniewski, who was already talking about an expected transfer back co his home office in Poland, a iransfcr chac Schott assumed would end the relationship. 

When Kwasniewski did ger rhe promised transfer, he pro¬posed (hac he give Schott and his new wife a belated honey¬moon trip to Innsbruck. Austria* in appreciation for the great help chat Schorc had given him during his stay in rhe United Stales. In Innsbruck, Kwasniewski spent chrce days showing Schott and his wife (he tourist sites.

On the fourrh day, Kwasniewski invited Schon to a final tennis game at a local club while Schott's wife went shopping. While they were playing on a private court, 3 man whom Kwasniewski introduced as rhe person who would be replacing him as Schoers contact appeared. When Schoct discovered that Kwasniewski expected chai he would continue to turn over classified information on weapons systems (O (he new control. Schotc angrily insisted chat he had no intention of doing $0.

Al that point, the new control oflìccf» who had none of Kwasniewski s subtlety, pulled our of his pocket an envelope and spread our a collection of pictures showing Schott s new stepchildren, rhe fiisr pictures had been taken as the chil¬dren walked away from the home of 9 neighbor where (hey weic staying while their mother and new srepfarher enjoyed che sights of Austria. The series of pictures followed rhe teenaged children co school and to some cxcracurricuiar activ¬ities after school.

The new conưol officer (hen grimly announced that nor only was Schorr going co continue providing information, but chat he was going to spend (he last two days of his Innsbnick vacation undergoing some intensive training co make him a more useful $py. The new control officer suggested that Schon suddenly sufici a Hu a (rack. Kwasniewski would then take the wife on some tours while Schott stayed in the hotel ronm and “nursed his flu" while the training took place.

At (he end of che training session, ihc new control officer rewarded Schott with a $7,000 payment for his good behavior ju$( before (he Schntts boarded the phne co return home. He also provided Schult with detailed requests fur specific infor- maiion he wanted, as well as instructions for how to pass such information on through. Schott continued to pass informarion (O (he Polish intelligence survive for several years. He was paid well for the information he provided, but he was spying more out of fear (han greed.

Schon fie all the classic profile characccriscics of a highly recruitabk spy: marital problems that ended in divorce, finan¬cial problems, job dissatisfaction, an open friendship with 3 Soviet bloc national-all followed by sudden, unexplained wealth and frequent foreign travel. (He、his wife, and some¬times the two teenagers made several more trips to Innsbiuck over (he nexe few years.) Bue no U.S. $py-carcher unearthed him. A Polish defector eventually aimed Schott in.

KNOCK HIM DOWN AND PICK HIM l；p

After 15 years with rhe DEA, Wayne Kramer considered himself ro be a hard-charging special agent on (he promotion fast track. Aligned I。a special money-Jaundering task force in South Florida. Wayne was talked wirh dealing with a number of stale law cntorccmcnr officials as well 35 several high-ranking executives in the banking community who were cuopcraring wirh 13W enforcement to spot tnoncy-hundciing operations.

In his spaic (ime, Wnync and his wife were alM> active in a church group engaged in drug-cducanon aenvincs aimed at high school $rudenrs. While working with die church group. Wayne met Robert Shanklin, who had recently moved ro Florida after retiring from a job as a dcpiiry pro$ccnãng attorney in a northern $u(c. Despite che differences in their ages, che ewe men developed a muỉuđl friendship because of Shanklins strong advocacy of federal drug-cniớícxmcnt programs.

During one of thcrừ conversations. Wayne cvniided in che older Shanklin that he was expecting co be promoted co che posi¬tion of task lurex director when the current difCCtOi got his expected promotion to the DEA?$ Washington headquarters.

A month before (he expected promotion was ro be announced, 3 Florida State Police agency discovered evi-  

dunce while investigating one of rheir cases that implicated Wayne Kramer in a money-laundering scheme. Kramer angri¬ly proclaimed his innocence, but (he investigation into the charges took several monrhs, during which lime Kramer was placed on administrative leave. Anoihef officer got the pro- morion that Kramer thought would be his.

The icderal investigation failed to find enough evidence co convict Kramer, and he was cvcncuallv returned to full duty with no 13s of pay. Kramer and his wife, however, had to take our a second mongage un (heir home to pay for the legal ser¬vices Kramer employed co help prove his innocence.

As i$ $0 often the case in such $i(U3rions, upon his return co duty, Kramer found rhar many of his colleagues still thought he was guiltv*. Although he sóli had 3 job on the cask force, Kramer was working for a supervisor he considered incompetent. Worse, he knew he would never gel another promotion. 1T1C only reason he stuck it our was because he would he eligible for early rcrircment in seven years.

'llirough (he hard times, the one friend who stuck with Kramer was Robert Shanklin. Shanklin not only insisced that he believed Kramer to be innocent, he loaned Kramer money for legal feex and helped him find the attorney who eventual¬ly goc che charges dropped.

Shortly after Kramer returned to duty, Shanklin suggested chat the person who had cried co frame Wayne was probably a jealous colleague who had sold ouc ro rhe drug lords. Shanklin proposed (hat he (Shanklin) begin his own private investiga¬tion, using his considerable experience as a prosecutor ro find out what happened.

Ar Shanklin's suggestion, the tuo men started examining “cry one of Kramers colleagues who had worked on the task force prior to (he discoven* of che evidence Chae seemed to implicare Kramer in a drug deal. Shanklin assured Kramer chat if they kept digging into each person $ caseload, they would cvcnmally discover something that didn't match up— perhaps a sure Oise that suddenly fell apart, an investigation that turned sour, or even some evidence of unexplained wealth by a collwgiie.

Kramer knew chat he was sharing wiih Shanklin a giCM deal of informacion on ĐEA personnel, ongoing investiga¬tions. and even the idcntiiy of confidentiai informants, bu( Kramer was so deicrmincd to discover who had framed him that he fek justified in accepting Shanklin'b help and provid¬ing him all information needed for the investigation.

After several months of such activity, Shanklin told Kramer rhac he was increasingly convinced rhat the colleague who had gotten che promotion Kramer had lost was a dirty cop who had deliberately framed Kramer $0 he could cover his own tracks as well as get the promotion. Shanklin suggested that the dirrv cop was now using his position as che direclOf of rhe cask force (O protect the crooks who paid him off while taking rhe competition our of circulation.

Kranici did not immtdiaccly go to his superiors with Shanklin's evidence； instead Shanklin and he started planning how they would catch the new usk force director with his hand in the till. Looking for 3 scheme【hai would trap the suspected dirty cop, Kramer shared even more cunfidcnrial inforxnacion on active eases, hoping to spot a case where the dirB* colleague had ripped off one of (he drug dealers of a pending arredi.

Suddenly, in a single week, several of che task force $ major cases wenr $onr. Three prime witnesses, including a high-ranking bank uíĩiccr, were gunned down in gang-scyle killings, five suspects targcccd for arresi suddenly left the country, and when (he rask force served a search warn nr that was supposed to catch major evidence based on wiretap iniof- macion, they ibund nothing.

Every agent on the cask force suddenly found himself answering tough questions as the supervisors cried to identify the source of a major information leak. Wayne, assuming rhar somehow his "crooked" supervisor had discovered the plan that Shanklin and he were about to pul into play, tried co con¬tact Shanklin co discuss whar chcy could do nexr Shanklin  

didrũ answer his phone, and when Kiamci checked out the condo where he lived, no one answered che door.

Badly shaken. Wayne found himself once again a primary suspect in rhe investigation. When Wayne failed a lie-detec¬tor test (juestion about whether he had ever revealed confi¬dential information to an unauthorized source, he cried co explain co one of the DEA's incornai affairs investigators exactly what Shanklin and he had been doing. A subsequent investigation discovered that there was no such person a$ Robert Shanklin and certainly no evidence that che new 3k force superx'isor had been dealing with criminals.

The investigators eventually concluded ihai Robert Shanklin was working with a major Colombian drug traffick¬ing group, which had deliberately set out to iníilơacc che DEA money-laundering task force. Shanklin, or someone with whom he WM working had probably ph need the evi¬dence that cost Wayne Kramer his promotion-probably because ai ihar cime Kramer and those under his supervision were all found to be incorniptiblc. Then Shanklin-who already had Kramer convinced of his false identity—moved in, pretending to be che friend in need. ■

Shanklin s skill in pfcccnding cn be a retired prvsccucor suggests that he may well have worked a$ 2 prosecutor at some time under another identirv. He had likely been f ceni ic¬ed by che dnig cartel at that point and had continued to work for them after retirement.

Shanklin didn't share the information he ưickcd ouc of Kramer with everyone, only with a select group of traffickers □nd money launderers who worked for one segment of the Cali Cancl. (The task force scili goc a number of convictions.) In effect, the cartel got a double bonus: they escaped prosc- cucion and put che competition ỠUC of business and in the Gin.

Kramer s supervisor decided chat raihcr ihan go public with whac Kramer had done and prosecute him for leaking confidential informacion, the cask force would take rhe credit for (he drug dealers and money launderers they did oaich and not tell anyone about the bigger fish char got away because 3 clever drug carrel inrclligence agent first knexrked Kramer down and then picked him up.

Kramer W35 even pcrmictcd ro sray on uith the agcncs; although he was transferred to 3 small office along che (Ùlifbrnia/Mexico border. Six months after his transfer, Kramer was killed while working undercover in a buy-bust investigation. 

Conclusiojì

The Successful spy

、7 OU will never read about successful spies in rhe newspaper or watch them being interviewed on JL TV talk shows. Only failure makes a spy famous.

Success guarancces that the public will never know the spy $ name—and neither will the victims who suffered the results of his effons.

Around (he world, every day, rhousand^ of men and women go co work planning to steal the mnsc valued (hing with which chcy arc entrusted： rhe secrets of their employ¬ers, fellow citizens, and friends. Their victims uften believe these rrairors co be exemplary employees, loyal confedcr- aces, and faithful friends. Mo$( of che time, the cmirors will spy for years, even decades, without ever being discovered or even suspected.

The vast majority of chose who become successful spies never planned or cxpccccd co become traicors. They touk (he jobs that positioned them $0 that chcy had acxcss co valuable secrets, expecting co work their careers ouc as loyal and hon¬est employees. Many will even deny che auvusaùon of ưea- son. insisting that they were forced to take the only course of action possible because others bccraycd them, took advantage of chcm, or denied them a fair shake in life. Even those who  

admir rhat they have turned traitor will olici complicared excuses for why their actions arc justified.

rhe case officers who rnmcd them into traitors knew how ro help them find that justification. Behind every successful spy is a successful intelligence case officer who deliberately conned rhe person into becoming a spy. Good ease officers never see their names in the newspaper eirher.

Ycc. rhe key ĨO spying success is nut the spy or the ease officer who recruit» the spy. In che final analysis, every suc¬cessful spy owes his success co the person upon whum he is spying. Just like thieves thrive when people arc careless with how they protect (heif valuables, so, coo, do spies thrive when people are careless with the way (hey protect〔heir secrets.

Musi readers will never have any reason to recruit a spy. Intelligent, strong, scH'-rcliam. courageous, and competent people don*c have to steal secrets to survive and prosper while defending chernbclvcs from aggressors. ĨÍ yon have an enemy on rhe border, che way to make sure J1C ncvci attacks i$ nor to steal his plan of attack. Instead, you must arm and prepare (0 defeat any attack that the aggressor might hunch nnd rhen let him know exactly how strong you are. If you don't piCpnrc that kind of defend, dien sicaling every enu of your enemy's secrets won't save you from disaster.

If a business compcriror is outperforming you, the answer IS not to steal his secrets； if$ to bener serve your customers and keep them coming back. If you want to beat a political opponent, the answer is noe waging dirty tricks, lying cam¬paigns, nr hiring petty criminals co break into your rivals office； its taking a logical stance on issues, offering simple explanations, good advertising, and rhe courage to be honest with (he voters. If you have a personal relationship with a lover or a partner that has degenerated co the point that you muse spy on rhar person-or worse, you fear that he may be spying on you—it has akcady failed and (he best thing you can do i$ end ic as quickly as possible.

The paradox is that the more 8fnpc【cnr, clever, and suc¬ 

cessful you become in business, social relations, government policies» or your personal life, the more likely ic is rhar some¬one will set out to steal your secrets of success and use that information co destroy you. If you arc really good ai what you do, your enemy will not succeed in defeating you, even if he succeeds in stealing your secrets. More likely, you won't have iiny scorers werth stealing. The strongest, most successful people in the world live chcir lives as open books, caring not a whit about keeping secrets. Indeed, they want che world to know how strong they arc.

However, many of you may not have that Sirengxh of char¬acter, and you do have SCCÍCCS you chink you need to keep. If your enemies succeed in learning what you wane co keep hid¬den from the woild, their successful spying will 8S【you money» pain, worry, frustration, and even deicer. It is for you that this bvuk is really written. The more you know about how spies are recruited, the better prepared you will he to rec¬ognize the spies wichin your own ranks and neutralize chcm or even mrn them against (lie people who rccniircd them.

The person who successfully spies on you will not he some funny-looking stranger or someone who openly chal¬lenges your authority 5 makes his dislike for you obvious. The person who spies on you will be someone you trust. Ie may be your secreurj; your mosi faichful employee, your good friend. Of even your lover.

If you have a traitor in your midst, the thing you must understand is that somcching wcn( wrong long before the spy master came along and convinced that person to betray you. Good ease officers muse have human material co work with. The besc way co protect against the spy is to make sure that ĩhc only people who have access to your secrets are people who have as much to gain by keeping those sccfccs as you do.

Whether you arc amning a country, a business, a criminal enterprise, or a political movement, or just living well on your own hard work, here arc a few things you can do to make sure someone you crust doesn't lisyn to (he siren call of treason. 

• 5/tvr aatpi people based on Gat M，or others. say they are. Find out what they have done. Whether you arc hiring an employee, accepting volunteer help in a political action group, or starting a friendship or a love aflair, thoroughly check out (he background of eversone you must trust. Ihc ĩhings rhat count are not leners of rccommeiidacion, rhe praises of peers, Of (he fawning adulaùon of rheir friends, but credit records, school records, coun and criminal records (or, better said, rhe lack of Such records), and past successes or failures in spuns. business, employmtnl. and personal living.

• Pasi behavior is nỏ guarantư of future bfhavior. No malici how sterling someunc s background or past work perfor¬mance. watch for evidence thac doesn't track with what you already know. Decide based on what people do today, no( whac they did yesterday, and ccnainly never whal they say they will do (omorrnw.

• z% not rely on quick fixfi iuch as Ịưtỉy^raf>h examinations, scheduled ưcunty (karanef updates. $orpnư audits, survtil lanee cameras, or Saronic gwdroppm& as a means of rtveaiing spifỉ.

• Be security cvnsàộUS and educate those ỊỮU ĩrusỉ on fi(rx infdli- gena case offiem rrentit Spứs. Offer substantial rewards for anyone who reports a possible approach by an enemy espionage officer.

• Lhn'i ưừnĩify your ơĩsn cọuntenĩSpiỏnage officers. (You donk have a counterespionage officer? If you keep valuable secrets, you want someone on the payroll whose job it is to guard (hose secrets.) Dunk pur those charged with coun¬terespionage in the security office that looks after the physical and personal securicy of rhe building and (he employees. Counicicspionage officers should work under cover as personnel officciS, special assistants, legal aids, morale officers, or any other title that allows (hem co move easily among your employees and gather information with¬out anyone suspecting what they are really doing. 

• ỈMHÌ as much about your Epl5ds 0扁 hứvt acaư g your semis us arn enemy case officer could learn. Ybur counterespi¬onage officers should look at every employee with access co secrets on a regular (but random) basis by using the same techniques that a recruiting case officer would U". That means secret surveillance that neither (he employee nor anyone except you and rhe counrcrcspionage officer knows is going on. (Sure. thatTs expensive, but if the CIA had been doing char instead of crusring in lie detectors. Rick Ames would have been caught in the first year he started spending the extra money he earned by spying for (he KGB.)

• Don't tffp ííỉinỊụ ưcrrt thcỉĩ don't Ĩ0 be kept ưcrrt. Know what is viral incclligence chat must be protected and restrict access to such inibìinaùon only co rhewe who need ro know.

• Dedop sound personnel practices ứuìt regard effort, gưivity. andỈơra/ỉy. Make sure they reach down to (he liede people who arc such an dtrracrivc rargcr for spy recruiters. 4\nvonc with access tu secret material or areas where secret mater¬ial i$ held should be paid extra money for the trust you place in them. Secretaries who rypc up secret documents» should make as much as college-educated company exec¬utives and should be created with the same respect.

• Don't keep disgrvnllư mpl(nm on【ht pay mil、espeàaỉly Etploy蜷 tữĂo fedứạ haven't been rreaĩed fairty. If you can、 promote the man who ĩhinks he deserves 3 promotion, fire him. Don，leave him in place.

• Don't kưp any employee in a position that gives him access tú ^crets if ht develops any IMS or habits such as alcohol or drug abusi, creditprMems. danợrous or offensiva sexual Maviơr, or penoftality disorders. (This flics in (he face of the modern idea of vice as a disease, hut tolerance for bad behavior is one of the primary reasons why American intelligence agencies lost the spy war.)

• Re tolerant of unusual or diỊỊcmt behavior that does not impact on job performance or 血 Etpby/ personal relãti&ns. Don't fire the open homosexual who lives quietly with a pannci. Do fife che married man who cheats on his wife every chance he gets, lies to her and his colleagues about what he is doing, and uses his work as a cover to get away with ir・

Of course, following these rules will noe guarantee that no one will ever steal your secrets. But real life has no giiaran- cets-something thal every good Câse officer knows. He takes rhe human marcrial he finds, and he manipuiaccs ir into some¬thing he can use. You can do rhe same, whether your art try¬ing ĨO fCCiuii a spy or make sure your employees, friends, and lovers stay faithful to you.