The first truly important character, tie,7 is composed from the classifier or radical for "words" or "speech" and a right hand component for the foliage of a tree, prompting speculation (but no historical evidence) that it first referred to someone concealed in a tree covertly listening to or observing others: 

Although tie does not appear in the Ch'un Ch'iu itself, it functions both as a noun, referring to "spies," and a verb, meaning "to spy upon," in the Tso Chuan. In addition, tie also designates reconnaissance scouts inconspicuously observing the enemy, much like such ordinary terms as "observe," "watch," or even "investigate."

 

The first of seven usages in the Tso Chuan occurs in a passage chronicling events that occurred in 700 B.C.: "In invading Chiao, Ch'u's armies divided up to ford the P'ang River. The forces from Luo, wanting to attack, sent Po Chia to spy on them. Three times he went round their encampment, counting them." 8 Based upon this account, Po Chia obviously passed among Ch'u's forces in some sort of disguise in order to estimate their total numbers, part of the essential information needed for the process of assessing battlefield options under China's classic approach to warfare.

 

The next entry, for 666 B.C., sees the term being employed for a reconnaissance scout that Cheng dispatched to determine Ch'u's position after having successfully repelled their assault but remaining undecided about retreating themselves. 9 When Cheng's scout (tie) observed birds about Ch'u's encampment, in a very basic piece of military intelligence codified later, he concluded that it was empty, sufficient evidence to deduce that Ch'u's forces were in retreat. (The possibility that they had been deliberately feeding the birds to attract them seems not to have arisen. 10) However, the nature of his report implies he did not actually enter the enemy encampment to verify his deduction and, although presumably making his observations early in the morning--the troops having dispersed during the night--offers no confirmatory indication of the equally important absence of cookfires.

 

 

(The records for 484 B.C. right at the end of the Spring and Autumn period similarly indicate a spy from Lu reported one night that Ch'i's forces had withdrawn following a disordered battlefield retreat at the end of the day. 11)

 

Records of the famous episode of approximately 635 B.C. that established Duke Wen of Chin's great credibility indicate that after he besieged the city of Yüan for three days and was visibly prepared to abandon the siege in accord with his earlier public proclamation, a spy (tie) came out and reported the city was about to fall. (Because sieges were difficult, expensive, and uncertain, employing subversives to both undermine the city's defenses and provide information about weak points in the fortifications, the defenders, and provisions was of paramount importance. This accounts for the presence of a Chin agent within Yüan.)

 

In the Tso Chuan the term tie also appears in Wu Tzu-hsü's diatribe (already mentioned in the section on early history) directed against granting a peace treaty to the just vanquished state of Yüeh, and again in a story related to Ch'u and Wu Tzu-hsü's difficulties. In the latter Ch'u's exiled former heir apparent, then dwelling in Cheng, foolishly agreed to assist Chin in assaulting Cheng's capital by mounting a coordinated internal response, even though he had been welcomed and well treated there. 12 In 477 B.C., needing to fix the exact date, Chin dispatched a covert agent, a tie, to Cheng, but this clandestine courier was caught in the first recorded example of Chinese counterintelligence because a staff member bitter over ill treatment had betrayed the heir apparent, resulting in the latter being secretly watched by local Cheng agents. 13

Finally, an entry for 601 B.C. illustrates the working alliances that occurred between indigenous Chinese states and so-called barbarian steppe peoples even in antiquity. As the Tso Chuan concludes with a puzzling remark, it is worth quoting: "In the spring the White Ti and the state of Chin concluded a peace treaty, and in the summer they mounted a joint attack against Ch'in. Chin's forces captured a spy (tie) from Ch'in and executed him in Chiang's marketplace, but after six days he revived."14 (Some commentators have suggested that the ill-fated spy was a Ch'in general, an appropriate choice for a military intelligence mission. 15) Although long considered a dubious passage because of the bizarre conclusion, which no doubt stems from a corruption of the original text, it still provides important evidence of covert agents and countermeasures in the Spring and Autumn period.

 

Unfortunately the appearance of terms such as tie and chien in the Tso Chuan accounts for these early dates does not equate with their existence and use then because the Tso Chuan was compiled and edited in the Warring States period--presumably from earlier, possibly contemporary records and oral recensions--by which time the character tie had become commonplace. (Its appearance in the Ch'un Ch'iu, clearly a close chronicle of early events, would be more conclusive.) However, whatever the term, without doubt "covert agents" were employed and the concept of spying was already well developed in the Spring and Autumn period.

 

A second character frequently found in the Tso Chuan and even the Ch'un Ch'iu, hsien encompasses several meanings, only one of which designates secret activities and would then be pronounced chien. Visually interesting, the character is composed of a radical or signifier depicting the leaves of a traditional Chinese double door (or possibly a gate around the outside) and essentially a pictograph of a half moon between them:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hsien's (chien's) meaning evolved over the subsequent centuries, with a variant character that substitutes the sun for the moon assuming most of the original senses:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Both characters immediately suggest the moon or sun seen through a crack between closed double doors, resulting in meanings such as "crevice" and "the space between" and, by abstraction, "interval in time." As a verb it came to signify "to estrange," "separate," or "put space between," and thus designate the common, though covert, activities of sowing dissension within the court, estranging rulers from their ministers, and besmirching successful generals and meritorious officials. 16 From this basic image also derives the extended usage of "peering into a crevice"--discerning the moon through the crack and otherwise learning what lies inside closed doors--and thus to spy on from without. Eventually hsien, the primary pronunciation of the character with moon, came to mean "leisure," "idleness," or "spare time," shedding the earlier meanings except in arcane language. However, perhaps in response to this shift an even more complex

character evolved, redundantly placing the signifier for "eye" to the left of the original character: 17

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Also pronounced hsien, meaning "to watch" or "spy on," it appears in the famous Mencius.

 

In some eighty occurrences of the original character hsien in the Tso Chuan (and virtually none in the other commentaries), only four unequivocally carry the meaning of "to spy on" or "secretly observe," two of which are particularly interesting. In the first, disaffected members among the nobility and extended royal family employed one member's cousin, a spurned concubine in the marquis of Ch'i's harem, to "spy on the marquis" with a promise of marriage if their rebellious plot should prove successful. 18 In the second case the minor state of Tun, subserviently dependent upon Ch'u for its continued existence, was compelled by the latter to clandestinely observe (chien) the nearby state of Ch'en in order to identify invasion opportunities. However, Ch'en's forces struck first by besieging Tun's capital. 19 Although the remaining two occurrences of chien are essentially matters of mounting observation, discreetly and unsuspected, the term became the common one for "spy" from the Warring States on, eventually coupled with such words as "turned," fan, and with tie to form compound words designating different types of agents from the Han dynasty onward. 20 In fact, its use became quite indiscriminate, with writers since the Sung even terming the merchant in the following episode a chien:

 

Duke Mu of Ch'in mobilized his army and was about to mount a sudden strike against Cheng. Chien Shu said: "You cannot. I have heard that to mount a surprise attack, the chariots should not travel over a hundred kilometers or the infantry march more than thirty kilometers in order that the plans not leak out. Moreover, in this way the ardor of the mailed soldiers will not have been exhausted, the foodstuffs and provisions not yet depleted, and the people not yet weakened and sickened. All of these are done so that their ch'i [spirit] will be at its highest and their strength flourishing when they confront the enemy and thus be awesome. Now you want to traverse several thousand kilometers and even cross through the territories of several feudal lords in order to launch a surprise attack. I do not see how it can succeed. My lord should rethink this plan." Duke Mu did not heed him, so Chien Shu saw the army off in his mourning clothes and wept for them.

 

While marching forward, the army passed by Chou and went east. A merchant from Cheng named Hsüan Kao, pretending it was the Earl of Cheng's order, feasted Ch'in's forces with twelve cattle. Ch'in's Three Armies were then afraid and muttered among themselves: "We have traveled several thousand kilometers in order to suddenly attack an enemy, but before we reach our objective they already know it. Their preparations will certainly be complete, so we will not be able to make a surprise attack." The army turned about and returned to Ch'in. 21

 

This incident was subsequently cited as an example of clear thinking insofar as Hsüan Kao mounted a ruse that convincingly deceived an enemy that clearly did not have forward scouts reporting on the actual situation in Cheng.

 

Another character sometimes associated with the ancient period is chan, composed of the left and right components, respectively, of the radical or signifier for "prognostication" (chan) and that for "to see" (chien):

 

In at least one Tso Chuan passage it clearly means "to clandestinely observe," 22 but the definitive use appears in the famous Warring States text on the nature, practice, and psychology of the rites or normative forms of behavior, the li, known as the Li Chi, in connection with a story about Tzu Han:

 

When an armed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City Magistrate, Tzu Han, entered his house and wept tears of grief. An agent from Chin, having secretly observed [chan] this, reported back to the marquis of Chin: "When an armed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City Magistrate, Tzu Han, entered his house and wept tears of grief, which pleased the populace. It appears they probably cannot be attacked yet." When Confucius heard about this entire incident, he exclaimed: "Excellent, this spying upon a foreign state. The Odes state: 'Whenever the people experience mourning, he exerts every effort to assist them.' Even though this is only a minute matter for Chin, who under Heaven is capable of opposing them?"23

 

 

Diplomatic Missions

Diplomatic missions doubtlessly provided a major, comparatively reliable source of information about other states, even though important emissaries would probably have been denied extensive freedom. However, merely being present in a foreign state would immediately permit the emissaries to observe the general conditions, provide an opportunity to acquire information through conversations and bribery, and perhaps allow staff members and retainers to learn much from their counterparts and local servants. An early example of a deliberate evaluative mission occurred in 661 B.C.:

 

In the winter Chung-sun Ch'iu went from Ch'i on a mission to observe Lu's difficulties [following the ruler's assassination]. After he returned, he reported, "Unless they get rid of Ch'ing Fu [the murderer], Lu's difficulties will never end."

 

"How can he be eliminated?" the Duke asked.

 

Chung-sun replied: "Since the difficulties are unending, he will perish by himself. Can you not wait for it?"

 

"Can we seize Lu?" the duke inquired.

 

Chung-sun Ch'iu replied: "We cannot. They still firmly adhere to the rites of Chou, the very foundation of a state. I have heard that when a state is about to perish, only after the foundation has first been overturned will the leaves and branches follow. Since Lu has not yet abandoned the practice of the rites, it cannot yet be moved. My lord should concentrate upon bringing about tranquillity in Lu's difficulties and maintaining close relations with it. Being close to states that practice the rites, thereby reinforcing solidity, and keeping distant from the disaffected, thereby overturning confusion and chaos, are the practices of a hegemon." 24

 

The dialogue suggests this mission was undertaken with a view to launching a punitive expedition to either extinguish or annex the state, and the emissary's reply reflects the parameters by which he judged the government's adherence to virtuous standards of behavior. The term employed to characterize his mission merits note: hsing, a variant pronunciation of the character sheng, meaning to investigate or observe, rather than chien, the character for acting as a clandestine agent.

 

A second example illustrates the criteria an astute observer might employ to evaluate the conditions in a subject state. Although the following episode is probably an imaginative reconstruction dating from the Warring States period, it is firmly rooted in historical events that took place in 603 B.C. when Duke Tan Hsiang apparently undertook a mission to ascertain the conditions in Sung. Upon his return he made a highly negative report based upon the contiguous state of Ch'en's disregard of proper diplomatic protocol and their neglect of agriculture and public works, fundamental activities that would have to be organized and administered by the state if it was to survive. Duke Ling, whose debauched demise is retold in this section of our study as well, was another sorry example of the myopic rulers who fervently destroyed the glorious heritage entrusted to them. The detailed criteria that Duke Tan systematically applied in making his political assessment, although illuminating in themselves, subsequently functioned as a virtual textbook example:

 

King Ting of Chou dispatched Duke Tan Hsing on a friendly mission of inquiry to Sung. Thereafter the duke requested permission from Ch'en to cross their state in order to visit Ch'u. Mars was visible in the early morning, but the roads were impassable due to heavy vegetation. The protocol officer did not appear at the border. The Director of Works did not inspect the roads, the marshes were not diked or the rivers bridged. The work of threshing was not yet finished. The roads lacked rows of border trees, newly reclaimed lands still had brush. The master of ceremonies did not bring in the sacrificial meats; the attendant of guests did not provide a dwelling; the state lacked lodging places; the districts lacked way stations. The people were about to erect a pleasure tower for the Hsia clan. When Duke Tan reached the capital of Ch'en, Duke Ling, K'ung Ning, and Yi Hsing-fu had gone to the Hsia family's mansions garbed in rustic clothes, where they remained, so Duke Tan never interviewed them.

 

On his return to Chou the duke reported, "Unless Duke Ling of Ch'en experiences a great awakening, his state will certainly perish." The king inquired why this should be so, to which Duke Tan replied: "When chen-chiao is visible in the Heavens, the rainy season is over. When T'ien-ken is visible, water begins to dry up; when pen is seen, the season for shrubs and grass is at an end; when ssu becomes visible, frost appears; when Mars is visible, clear winds warn the people of oncoming cold.

"According to the instructions of the former kings, when the rainy season ends, the roads should be cleared; when water dries up, the dikes are completed; when the season for trees and grass is ended, they are prepared for storage; when frost appears, winter clothes are readied. When clear winds blow, the city's inner and outer walls and its palaces are repaired. Thus the regulations of the Hsia dynasty [employed even today] state, 'In the ninth month clear the roads, in the tenth complete the bridges.' The seasonal rescripts state: 'After harvesting, winnow the wheat. When the year star is in the ying constellation, earth works are undertaken. When mars is first seen, assemble under the directors of villages.' This was the way the former kings bespread their Virtue throughout the realm without making fiscal expenditures. Now mars was visible when I was in Ch'en, but the roads were almost blocked with vegetation; the fields seem to have been abandoned; the marshes were not yet banked; and the rivers lacked pontoon bridges. They are neglecting the instructions of the former kings.

 

"The regulations of Chou include: 'Array rows of trees in order to mark the roads, establish way stations in order to watch the roads.' Cities had pastures in the outer suburbs, the borders had permanent lookouts. Dried marshes provided tall grass, state gardens had trees and pools in order to prepare against disaster. All the remaining land was planted in grain, and the people never hung up their hoes. The fields did not have weeds. The people's agricultural seasons were not interfered with, nor did the state seek the people's labor. There was abundance without lack, ease without exhaustion. The states were ordered, the districts disciplined. Now in the state of Ch'en the roads cannot be recognized, the fields are covered with grass. Their grains, although mature, remain unharvested, while the people exhaust themselves in ease and pleasure. Thus they have abandoned the laws and regulations of the former kings.

 

"The Royal Offices of Chou state: 'When a high-ranking envoy from an enemy state arrives, the captain of the customs barrier informs the ruler about it. The director of guests greets him with his credentials. An usher guides them to the capital, a high minister comes forth to inquire after them at the suburbs. The city gatekeeper clears out the gate; the clan priest takes charge of the tablets; the director of villages assigns them a residence; the director of labor prepares the way; the minister of works checks the roads; the minister of justice suppresses evildoers; the master of marshes sees to the materials; the warden gathers firewood; the master of fire supervises the heating; the master of water supervises bathing water; the chief of provisions arrays the food; the chef prepares the rice; the stable master spreads the fodder; the mechanic attends to the carriages; and the hundred officials all attend to their affairs appropriately.' The guest enters as if going home, so all the members of his party embrace loving feelings.

 

"If a guest from an honored state arrives, all the representatives handling these affairs are increased by one grade and marked by augmented sincerity. When it is an officer of the king, all the office heads personally take charge of the affair and the chief chancellor oversees them. When the king conducts a tour of inspection and preservation [every twelve years], the ruler personally supervises.

 

"Now today, although I am not talented, I am still a collateral member of the Chou royal family and in accord with regal order was crossing Ch'en as an official guest, but none of the officials came forth. This is an insult to the office of our former kings. Their edict states: 'It is the Tao of Heaven to reward the good and punish the licentious. Therefore we have established states. Those who do not follow the precepts are dissolute, those who do not complete them are arrogant and licentious. Every one should preserve their foundations in order to receive Heaven's blessings.' Now Duke Ling of Ch'en has not thought about his role in continuing their line, has abandoned his consorts and concubines, and leads his ministers to assist in licentious relations with Hsia Chi. Ch'en's royal family is of the great surname Chi. To abandon regal robes and don a southern cap to go out, isn't this simply dissolute? So they have again offended against the laws of the former kings.

 

"The former kings exerted themselves to lead the people with Virtue, yet they still feared nearly committing transgressions. How can anyone who abandons their instructions and casts aside their regulations, insults their offices and contravenes their edicts, preserve their state? Dwelling amid four great states and yet lacking these four, how can Ch'en long endure?"

 

In the 601 B.C. year Duke Tan went to Ch'en; two years later Duke Ling was killed at the Hsia mansion; the following year the king of Ch'u exterminated Ch'en.

 

Agriculturally based societies such as China in the early sixth century B.C. were much subject to the vagaries of weather and climate and therefore relied for their very existence upon carefully prepared calendrical materials that included detailed instructions for initiating seasonally appropriate actions correlated with celestial phenomena. Failure to observe the admonitions and prohibitions, even without unexpected rains or drought, could result in crops damaged by frost in the spring or grains insufficiently mature for harvesting in the fall. Thus, in his report Tan Hsiang was very precise in describing Ch'en's failure to meet autumn's progressive responsibilities and therefore concluded that the government could not survive. 25

 

 

The Hsing-jen

Theoreticians writing in the T'ang observed that the first administrative official operationally responsible for undertaking intelligence activities in China was the Hsing-jen of the Chou dynasty. A title composed of the characters for hsing, meaning "to travel" or "perform some action," and jen, "man" or "human being," the post and its duties seemed to have varied from state to state and the circumstances of the moment rather than systematically evolving over time. Every state that modeled on Chou bureaucratic organization employed Hsing-jen, sometimes several, and while ranking in power and prestige below the prime minister, they still resided at the apex of power, often as functionally significant as the early specialized ministers for war and works. As with many Chinese terms, no simple English equivalent suitably translates it in all its varied usages, but their primary responsibilities seem to have encompassed everything from simple messenger, in which case it was not a titled position, through diplomatic courier, protocol director, secretary of state, and foreign minister.

 

The Chou Li (Rites of Chou), an idealized reconstruction of Chou administrative offices and practices probably composed late in the Warring States period, enumerates several critical responsibilities for both the Great Hsing-jen and Minor Hsing-jen:

 

The Ta Hsing-jen [Great Hsing-jen] administers the rites for important visitors and the formal ceremonies for major guests designed to gain the intimacy of the feudal lords. [Through his auspices], in the spring the king of Chou assembles the feudal lords at court to plan the affairs of the realm and in the autumn holds audiences to compare the achievements of the various states. In the summer he holds court to display the plans of the realm, and in winter convenes them in order to harmonize their thoughts. Seasonal assemblies are held in order to publicize the prohibitions applicable throughout the four quarters and audiences held in order to implement governmental measures throughout the realm.

 

From time to time [the Ta Hsing-jen] conducts friendly missions of inquiry to unite the feudal lords, at other times imperial audiences are employed to eliminate hidden evil among the feudal states. On an annual basis the Ta Hsing-jen makes inquiries among the feudal lords in order to fathom their intentions. Through him the king has sacrificial meats sent back to the feudal lords in order to invoke good fortune, deputes missions of congratulations in order to augment their happiness and missions of condolence in order to assist them during times of disaster. The Ta Hsing-jen discriminates among the edicts applicable to the feudal lords with the nine ceremonies and sets out the various ministerial ranks in order to unify the rites of the feudal states and attend to their honored guests.

The Hsiao Hsing-jen [Minor Hsing-jen] administers the rites of tribute for the submissive states and thus attends to the emissaries from the four quarters. He orders the feudal lords to submit their offerings in the spring and contribute their labor in the autumn. The king personally receives them and treats them according to their respective tributes. Whenever the feudal lords come to submit these tributes, the Hsiao Hsing-jen meets them at the border.

 

If a state is in mourning, the Hsiao Hsing-jen orders the other states to contribute to its funeral expenses. If a state suffers from famine, he orders them to distribute stores of grain as aid. If a state has suffered from military engagements, he orders the other states to provide material assistance. If a state enjoys some auspicious affair, he orders them to send presents in congratulation. If a state suffers some disaster, he orders the other states to condole with them in their grief. Now these five things, their causes, profits, and harm to the myriad people are all recorded in a book. The customs and ceremonies, government affairs, instructions, administrative measures, as well as adherence to and violation of instructions and prohibitions, are to make up another book. Those among the feudal lords who are contrary, perverse, brutal, chaotic, conceal hidden plots, or violate edicts are to compose one book; deaths and mourning, famines and impoverishment, another book; and health, happiness, harmony, and tranquillity, another book. Now all these five things should be discriminated by states in order to fulfill the king's mandate and thereby thoroughly know the causes and affairs throughout the realm.

 

Although the Chou Li elaborates a coherent vision of Chou government that was realized only in part, the Hsing-jen was clearly entrusted with supervising the major rites of state, an activity that obviously brought him into close contact with foreign dignitaries on a daily basis. Moreover, the Hsiao Hsing-jen's responsibility for not only collecting basic information about all the activities occurring in the feudal states, but also seeing that it was properly recorded (and thus provide an objective basis for analyzing affairs and making judgments) indicates that apart from his basic role as an observant emissary, intelligence gathering was a dedicated function. Therefore, it might be concluded that China's first official staff position with intelligence responsibilities was the Hsiao Hsing-jen, operating within the purview of the Ta Hsing-jen. 26

 

Records preserved in the Ch'un Ch'iu and Tso Chuan, while providing a more historically grounded portrait of Hsing-jen activities, essentially substantiate the claim that they should be considered not only China's first official covert agents, but also its first intelligence directors. However, their primary role was simply and probably originally that of a messenger, whether between states or enemies on a battlefield. 27 Accordingly, in such situations the title might be translated as "messenger" or "courier," although when deputed with full state sanctification "envoy," "emissary," or "ambassador" is more appropriate and even explicitly justified by the Tso Chuan. In fact, the Kung Yang commentary to the Ch'un Ch'iu emphasizes that one is termed a Hsing-jen only when acting on official business, not private concerns. 28 However, the three titles just mentioned imply discretionary powers within the parameters of a defined mission rather than a mere verbatim presentation of a message from a ruler or prime minister to foreign counterparts. Presumably the messenger would not only return with a reply or in the company of someone bearing a reply, but also carefully scrutinize the reactions of those receiving the message, note the situational context, and mark other relevant facts for subsequent analysis. In short, couriers and envoys did not simply convey messages with blind eyes and deaf ears.

 

Messengers were frequently employed preceding battles as part of the ancient ritual of issuing noble challenges and demands that the enemy surrender while no doubt undertaking a perceptive survey of their camp. For example, following the first day's clash at the battle of Yen-ling a messenger sent to pique Ch'u was evaluated as being fearful because his eyes kept moving, looking about apprehensively, prompting Ch'u to incorrectly deduce that Chin's forces would surreptitiously withdraw. 29 While the messenger, being in the midst of an enemy encampment, might naturally have been frightened, protocol should have dictated that he be returned unharmed, suggesting he was actually observing their preparations and evaluating their ability to sustain renewed combat. 30

 

In their role as couriers and envoys several Hsing-jen were seized and even killed, implying the existence of clandestine aspects to their official roles, whatever the ostensible reasons for their detention. A number of nonfatal examples are also recorded, states such as Chin, Ch'u, or Ch'in detaining Hsing-jen and seizing those who violated their territory without permission while crossing to a third state. 31 Commenting on the Ch'un Ch'iu entry that "Ch'u seized Cheng's Hsing-jen, Liang Hsiao," the Tso Chuan notes that Cheng had dispatched emissaries to announce a shift in allegiance from Ch'u to Chin, resulting in the envoys being detained, and adds that the Ch'un Ch'iu refers to them as Hsing-jen because they were official ambassadors. (Woeful were the prospects for bearers of such ill tidings!) After they were held for more than a year, Liang Hsiao and his companion finally persuaded Ch'u's ruler that he was only subverting Ch'u's purposes by frustrating their mission, thereby further estranging Cheng and allowing the remaining lords there a comparatively free hand. 32

 

In another prominent incident the Tso Chuan explains that the "men of Chin seized the Hsing-jen from Wei, Shih Mai," because Wei, under Shih's leadership, had successfully mounted an attack on Ts'ao, Chin's client state, the year before. Although smoldering hatred triggered this precipitous action, of greater interest is the Hsing-jen's qualifications. Not just a faceless bureaucrat, he was an experienced commander and therefore doubtlessly seeking military information as well as fulfilling some innocuous cover mission. 33 Furthermore, Chin also detained a Hsing-jen from Lu who had been sent to investigate a skirmish between their people and those from the minor state of Chu. 34

 

An unfortunate envoy from the peripheral southwestern state of Pa was seized and executed by border peoples in the minor state of Teng while en route there from Ch'u, eventually precipitating a battle between a Pa-Ch'u coalition force and Teng's army. 35 However, cases also arose in which Hsing-jen were the hapless victims of violence directed against them because of strife arising within their home states or some action in the greater diplomatic arena. For example, Ch'u seized and executed Ch'en's envoy even though "the guilt did not lie with the Hsing-jen." 36 A typical Ch'un Ch'iu entry for 501 B.C. that laconically states, "Ch'i seized Wei's Hsing-jen, Pei Kung-chieh, in order to invade Wei" is explicated by the Tso Chuan: "The marquis of Wei wanted to rescind his allegiance to Chin, but the great officers would not permit it. Therefore the marquis dispatched Pei Kung-chieh to Ch'i while privately advising the marquis of Ch'i to seize Pei in order to invade them. The marquis followed his suggestion and they subsequently concluded a covenant at Suo." 37 Whether the Hsing-jen unknowingly carried a written message to have himself seized is unclear but highly likely because travel between states was difficult, particularly for nonofficial travelers. Finally, the small state of Wei, having killed Wu's Hsing-jen, was terrified that powerful Wu would annihilate them and therefore plotted possible courses of action with their own Hsing-jen, thus preserving evidence of the latter's enlarged role in planning of military strategy. 38

 

The Ku Liang defines the Hsing-jen as one "who assists in words between states," 39 and in the simple role of courier he was expected to verbally deliver his message as dictated, without admixing his own views. In fact a court incident arose in the state of Chin when the prime minister designated Tzu Yfin to undertake a mission over another Hsing-jen, the latter having been rejected because he often changed the words of communiqués to interject his own opinions. 40 However, Hsing-jen also acted as envoys with apparently wide discretionary powers, authorized to independently persuade and negotiate with officials in foreign states, and thus became, as the Tso Chuan comments, emissaries or ambassadors entrusted with diplomatic tasks.

 

That states apparently assumed foreign envoys bearing the title of Hsing-jen had hidden purposes may be gleaned from an incident in the autumn of 502 B.C. when Chin detained Sung's Hsing-jen. The Tso Chuan indicates that the envoy in question, Yüeh Hao-li, a minister in Sung, had advised the duke not to neglect the deputation of a submissive mission of allegiance to mighty Chin and was sent himself. Venturing into the state, he was met by Chao Chien, who grandly entertained him, prompting Yüeh to give him sixty willow shields as a present, despite his own steward's protests. Arriving at the capital, he was denounced by a Chin official for giving precedence to personal affairs, neglecting official state business, and delaying the execution of his mission, thereby insulting two rulers, and was accordingly imprisoned. Superficially it appears he simply violated the protocol and procedures appropriate to his task, but more likely, given the internal strife that would soon sunder Chin into three independent states, he was probably suspected of providing aid to one of the factions, including weapons, whether on his own initiative or as part of a Sung effort to politically undermine Chin.

 

Whether at home in his native state or abroad in the fulfillment of a diplomatic mission, the Hsing-jen constantly interacted with foreign officials and therefore had numerous opportunities to clandestinely acquire information for the state. In fact, rulers routinely employed their protocol chiefs to privately query visitors on mystifying actions or behavior, thereby not only sparing everyone embarrassment, but also establishing a convenient precedent and conducive context for the secret exchange of information. For example, when an emissary from Wei did not respond to the performance of the Odes as would be expected, the Hsing-jen was instructed to personally question him. 41

 

In their expanded roles, Hsing-jen also performed functions equivalent to a modern foreign secretary or secretary of state. While frequently defined by traditional commentaries as essentially chief of protocol, an office mainly responsible for supervising the reception and entertainment of foreign emissaries, in many cases they were clearly charged with the task of acquiring knowledge about foreign states, knowing their affairs, planning diplomatic and military strategy, and initiating actions, as indicated by the Chou Li. The position's importance may be seen in three specific historical instances. First, when the Duke of Shen departed from Wu after completing his military mission, he deputed his son to act as Wu's Hsing-jen and thus control all its communications with foreign states. 42 Second, the historically famous Wu Tzu-hsü was appointed as Hsing-jen when he fled to Wu, a post he retained throughout his career "so as to plot against Ch'u." Although this vengeful plotting clearly was confined to the court, he certainly consulted on state affairs in general and may also have traveled, much as he did to Ch'i late in life, on missions he could have subverted to this purpose had Ho-lü not also been in favor of an aggressive, expansionist policy. 43 Yet until the rise of King Fu-ch'ai and machinations of the traitor Po P'i, his influence and power were unequaled as he plotted military actions with Sun-tzu.

 

Third, Tzu Yü, one of Confucius's most successful disciples, prominently served as Hsing-jen in Cheng, a state renowned for a government so effective that it flourished despite being surrounded by mighty neighbors. In the Analects itself Tzu Yü is noted for his ability to finalize or polish the drafts of communications with other states, the commentators frequently citing a Chou Li definition of his duties--"to oversee the rites connected with communicating with other states." 44 Moreover, in an appraisal of Cheng's strength a minister from Wei singled out the state's two Hsing-jen--Tzu Yü and Kung-sun Hui--for their comprehensive knowledge of other states, prompting the Tso Chuan to comment:

 

Tzu Ch'an, in his administration of government, selected the capable and employed them; Feng Chien-tzu was capable of deciding major affairs; Tzu Ta-shu was handsome and refined; Kung- sun Hui was able to know about the activities of the four surrounding states, distinguish the clan and family names of the high officials, their positions, rank, and whether they were capable or not, and moreover was good at drafting orders. P'i Ch'en had planing ability that when exercised in the wilds was successful, but in the city was not. 45

Whenever Cheng had some pending matter with the feudal lords, Tzu Ch'an inquired about the actions of the surrounding states from Tzu Yü and moreover had him draft several versions of the edicts. Then he rode out into the countryside in a carriage with P'i Ch'en to decide whether the plans would work or not, and finally informed Feng Chien-tzu to have the decision rendered. When a decision was reached, he then entrusted it to Tzu Ta-shu to have it transmitted as a response to their honored guests. For this reason they rarely encountered failure. 46

 

From this description Cheng Hsing-jen, while nominally protocol directors, were clearly masters of foreign information, essentially state intelligence directors as detailed in the Chou Li definition of the Hsiao Hsing-jen's duties. Tzu Yü's own fame derived from his superlative performance in executing foreign missions, handling visiting dignitaries, gathering and evaluating information, and planning state affairs, as befits a Ta Hsing-jen. 47