IntelligenceTheoryand PracticeinTraditionalChina
RalphD.Sawyerwiththecollaborationof Mei-chünLeeSawyer
Westview Press A Member of the PersusBooks Group
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In memory of those who courageously risked their lives among the shadows, only to beshunned and disdained when peace arose
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Contents
Chronology of Approximate Dynastic Periods xi
Preface xiii
Part 1 Early History
1 Early Records and the First Spies 3 Yi Yin and Early History, 7
China's Second Spy: The T'ai Kung, 12
Tzu Kung, 20
2 The Spring and Autumn Period 27 Time and Communications, 28
Terminology and Agents, 30
Diplomatic Missions, 37
The Hsing-jen, 41
The Mu, or Clandestine Shepherd, 47
Military Intelligence, 49
Defectors, 50
Covert and Subversive Practices, 58 -vi-
Divination and Prognostication, 75
The Battle of Yen-ling, 77
3 The Warring States Period 85 Agents and Intelligence, 87
Su Ch'in, 89
Military Intelligence, 92
Covert Practices, 98
Rumors and Estrangement Techniques, 102
Women, Sex, and Consorts, 109
Lord of Hsin-ling, Prince of Wei, 111
Pivotal Role of Assassinations, 116
Part 2 Spycraft
4 Fundamental Thrust 123 Necessity for Intelligence and Agents, 126
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5 Nature and Theory of Agents 133 Shih Tzu-mei's Lectures on "Employing Spies," 143
Expendable and Double Agents, 156
Other Agents, 167
6 Operations and Control 170 Identifying and Recruiting Agents, 178
Operational Methods and Agent Control, 185
7 Secrecy and Countermeasures 189Communications, 196
Concealment and Deception, 201
Counterintelligence, 216
Prisoners, 222
Part 3 Covert Activities
8 Systematic Programs and Psychological Warfare 227 King Kou-chien and the State of Yüeh, 232
Later Contemplations, 243
9 Assassination and Other Techniques 249 Beauty and Sex, 261
Consorts and Concubines, 268
Bribes and Estrangement Techniques, 274
Stealthy Methods, 282
Part 4 Theories of Evaluating and Intelligence
10 Basic Theory and Issues 289 Prejudices, Inclinations, and Interference, 292
Sources and Credibility, 297
Semblances and Doubt, 300
Doubt and the Military Perspective, 302
Other Issues and Perceptions, 306
11 Knowing Men 309 Basic Problems and Questions, 312
Selecting Men, 315 -viii-
Problematic Theory of Transparency, 316
Perceiver's Qualifications, 323
The Body as Naturally Expressive, 325
The Basic Principle, 326
Constancy, 327
Criteria for Evaluating, 328
Physiognomy, 346
Expressions and Postures, 347
Possibilities and Problems in Criteria, 352
Han Fei-tzu's Views, 354
12 Character, Archetypes, and Typology 360 Somatotypes and Character, 364
Yin and Yang Somatotypes, 365
"The Offices of King Wen," 367
13 Intelligence Applications 377
14 Political Intelligence 388 Historical Episodes and Their Significance, 389
Political Evaluation in the Military Writings, 399
Political Intelligence in the Philosophical and
Political Writings, 402
Signs of a Doomed State, 411
Steppe and Border Peoples, 420
Part 5 Military Intelligence
15 Field Intelligence 427 Concept of Timeliness, 428
Observation and Reconnaissance, 430
Active Probing Measures, 437
General Field Assessments, 439
The Role and Importance of Ch'i, 457
Commanders, 463
16 Classifications of Terrain 467 Topographyand Configurations of Terrain, 469
Configurations of Terrain in the Hu-ling Ching, 482
Mountains and Rivers, 485
Hsü Tung's Contrary Practices, 488
The Wu-ching Tsung-yao, 491
Evaluating and Targeting Cities, 510
Part 6 Prognostication, Divination, and Nonhuman Factors 17 Historical Practices and Their Rejection 521Prognosticatory Systems in Military Practice, 529
Dust, Smoke, and Atmospheric Manifestations, 533
Ch'i Theory and Representative Selections, 536
Notes 549
Index 597
Chronology of Approximate Dynastic Periods DynasticPeriod Years
Legendary Sage Emperors Hsia
Shang Chou
Western Chou Eastern Chou
2852-2255 B.C. 2205-1766 1766-1045
1045-770 770-256
Dynastic Period Spring and Autumn Warring States
Ch'in
Former Han (Western Han) Later Han (Eastern Han) Six Dynasties
Sui T'ang
Five Dynasties Sung Southern Sung Yüan (Mongol) Ming
Ch'ing (Manchu)
Years 722-481
403-221 221-207
206 B.C.-A.D. 8 23-220
222-589 589-618 618-907 907-959 960-1126 1127-1279 1279-1368 1368-1644 1644-1911
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NO NATION HAS PRACTICED THE CRAFT of intelligence or theorized about itmore extensively than China, filling their military writings with discussions onconcepts and techniques, littering their histories and popular literature withrecords of clandestine activities. Moreover, rather than diminishing in thepresent era of ostensible peace and harmony, these practices have instead proliferated, expanding to target business and industry equally withgovernments. However, despite Sun-tzu Art of War being widely acknowledgedas the first theoretical writing on agents and methods, and despite thepresence of extensive chapters on these subjects in subsequent military texts,the history of intelligence and spycraft in China has never been seriouslyattempted. In fact, apart from Chu Feng-chia's late Ch'ing dynasty pasticheentitled Chien Shu, the secondary literature is virtually bereft of books devotedto the subject and the many journals devoted to China's history, whether inChinese, Japanese, or Western languages, devoid of articles. Whereas in pre-twentieth-centuryChina this absence might be attributable to the traditionaldisdain felt for military affairs in general and the "unrighteous" activity of spying in particular (not unlike the prejudice directed toward intelligence and spycraft in the West), it fails to explain the present lack of interest in China's achievements in the thorny field of intelligence over the millennia. The Tao ofSpycraft therefore focuses upon the history and development of both overtintelligence theory and covert practices in China. Even though our subjectmatter is historically focused, since the PRC aggressively deploys thousands of agents of every type throughout the world who are ardently gathering commercial, industrial, and military intelligence, the materials included arenot irrelevant to the present day.
Although based upon several years of extensive research in original Chinese materials and hopefully substantial in its conclusions, our study is designedto be accessible to anyone interested in things Chinese--whether history, intellectual developments, or military theory--as well as world military developments and the history of intelligence in general. We have perused invarying detail some fifty thousand pages of historical and theoreticalwritings and compiled hundreds of
Our focus throughout is on externally directed intelligence efforts, whether military or covert, rather then internal security--in other words, between theindependent states during the ancient period, factions during periods of fragmentation, and China and its external enemies during the imperial period. Internal measures directed toward controlling the indigenous populace, while neither unimportant nor uninteresting, constitute a radically different orientation that may be studied in Richard Deacon earlier book, theChinese Secret Service, a popular, yet insightful work that emphasizes such matters and late intelligence history in China and even the PRC. (In concordwith our overall military interest and to keep it distinct from our work oncontemporary China, our
study extends only up to the appearance of Westerners and the deployment ofhot weapons, roughly synonymous with the Ming dynasty. [The famous novelknown as The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, although apparently influentialin establishing China's clandestine intelligence service prior to World War II,thus also falls outside the scope of our work.] However, contemporary Chinesepractices have recently been addressed by Nicholas Eftimiades in ChineseIntelligence Operations.)
The sprawling nature of China's military and political history prompted abifurcated organization rather than either a chronological progression or a topical examination. Since the formative period for intelligence activities fallsinto the ancient
era, the initial section on antiquity examines the fundamental practices stimulated by the incessant conflict among the individual states as the Chou dynasty disintegrated, and the remainder of the book focuses on intelligencetheory illustrated by cases from later history and chapters from the militarytexts. Whereas the theoretical materials from the latter are representative and comprehensive, the historical examples, especially
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less detailed ones from the twenty-five dynastic histories, could have beenmultiplied almost endlessly, easily doubling the length of the book. However, the most interesting and important cases, as well as all the basic practicesand types of agents, fully evolve during the ancient period, essentially defining the field thereafter. Consequently, the earlier cases are disproportionately significant, as well as intrinsically more intriguing.
In order to provide as many original materials as possible, we have included extensive translations but refrained from summarizing and rephrasing themthereafter, assuming they will prove self-explanatory upon carefulexamination. Although this converts the book into something of a hybridsourcebook, in intelligence work accuracy lies in details, which are bestconveyed in their original form, as directly as possible, not grandiose schemesand charts. Moreover, since we hope this book will interest a wide audience, including sinologists, we have deliberately eschewed the employment of intelligence jargon while severely limiting the number of footnotes ontranslation matters, unlike in our Military Methods. However, three major topics-- the theory of agents, evaluating men, and configurations of terrain--are extensively detailed so that the progression and ongoing reintegration ofideas across the sweep of centuries may be clearly seen by readers withcorresponding interests.
The past decade has witnessed a great resurgence in Chinese interest inmatters antique ranging from Confucian theory to the Taoist classics andmilitary writings, spawning a vast horde of secondary works bent on applying ancient insights to every conceivable contemporary problem. One or twopopular, poorly
researched books touching on Chinese intelligence methods have evenappeared, largely directed to business applications or developing esoterictactics that will allow their readers to overcome others in even the most direand unrealistic circumstances. These frequently cite passages and ideas from Sun-tzu and Han Fei-tzu--China's Machiavelli--but rarely explore substantial theory or historical practice. However, contemporary interest flourishes, andvery much in accord with the centuries-long tradition of examining the past forknowledge and lessons, these traditional materials are reputedly once againbeing perused in the PRC's think tanks and spy schools for techniques,insights, and paradigms adaptable to China's quest for world domination, forforging a military and intelligence science with indigenous Chinesecharacteristics. Thus, while the Tao of Spycraft is strictly a historical study, ithas contemporary relevance because the lessons that are being taught andmind-set instilled, whether in state-sponsored contexts or popular media, aremainly derived from China's centuries of intrigue.
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As always it is a pleasure to acknowledge the efforts and cooperation of others in the development of this book. Thanks are due first of all to Professor NathanSivin for his illuminating ruminations on many subjects, not the least beingch'i and calendrical matters; next to Drs. Sean Sheehan and Rick Williams for overviews on covert medical matters; Brigadier General Karl Eikenberry foradvice on military subjects; Professor Bruce Brooks, founder of the WarringStates Project, for raising critical questions and generously sharing hisknowledge on texts and dating; Howard Brewer and Guy Baer for insightful discussions over the years on intellectual and spiritual matters both Chineseand Japanese; H. Jeffrey Davis for fruitful conversations; Antoinette Loézereand Ed Swiniarski for intriguing narrations; Peter Kracht for his initialinterest; Laura Parsons and Rob Williams for the courage to see it through; George Potter for valuable reference materials; and Max Gartenberg for hisexpertise in many matters. Happily, Lee T'ingrong has again honored the bookwith his calligraphy. As in our previous works, while I am responsible for theprimary research, translations, conceptions, and historical conclusions,
Finally, we would like to reiterate that this is a historical study based uponreadily accessible materials and open, printed sources. None of our many clients, friends, relatives, or associates in the United States or Asia, includingthe PRC, provided any restricted materials whatsoever. Even though thisproject is in part an outgrowth of a paper presented at the Society for Military History's Sixty-third Annual Meeting sponsored by the CIA's Center for theStudy of Intelligence in April 1996, there is no connection whatsoever withany intelligence agency in the United States or abroad. Moreover, although I have been a careful, hopefully astute, student of intelligence theory and methods over the years and our consulting practice has largely focused uponinformation and analysis, I have not been actively involved in any aspect of formal intelligence work on behalf of any government since the Vietnam era.
Ralph D. Sawyer
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THE TAO OF SPYCRAFT -xvii-
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Part One EARLY HISTORY
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1 Early Records
and the First Spies
DESPITE BEING COMMONLY PERCEIVED as long having been a politically and culturally integrated state, China suffered almost incessant warfare andrampant political intrigue over the three millennia of its tenuous geopoliticalexistence. In consequence, as early as the turbulent Spring and Autumn
( 722-481 B.C.) and Warring States ( 403-221 B.C.) periods a body of military theory evolved that gradually acquired canonical status centuries later. Remarkably, these ancient tactical classics--famous works such as Sun-tzuArt of War and Wu Ch'i's Wu-tzu--retained their applicability throughsuccessive dynasties because military practices were essentially continuous until the advent of hot weapons and contact with the West. Moreover, they were studied not only by professional military men, but also by statesmen, bureaucrats, and philosophers, often in conjunction with the records of battlesand intrigues preserved in China's extensive historical writings.
The disproportionate influence of the early classics on subsequent military theorizing, including the nature and objectives of China's intelligence activitiesover the past two millennia, should not be underestimated. 1 The assumptionsand principles expounded by Sun-tzu, China's earliest known theorist, largely defined the parameters and categories that were vigorously followed thereafter,particularly in assessments of the enemy and the thrust of spycraft. Many ofhis conceptions may be traced into the T'ang, when they were particularly expanded following the unrelenting strife and intrigue that had marked theprevious centuries of disunion,
and then on through the Sung into the Ming. In every case the authorsembraced Sun-tzu's principles and analysis but expanded the methodologicaldetails, cate
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gories of operatives, range of activities, types of mission, and psychology of recruitment, eventually emphasizing security and counterintelligence measures to frustrate increasingly numerous and effective agents, bothdiplomatic and covert.
Chinese intelligence efforts have historically focused upon rulers and powerfulofficials, economic factors, and military plans, capabilities, dispositions, andmovements. The data collected were comparatively analyzed to determineprobable intentions, develop a net assessment, and plot possible reactions. Clandestine operations naturally evolved to gather secret information critical to "preparing against the unforeseen," resulting in the employment of severaltypes of agents, methods of control, and techniques of analysis. Preserving secrecy became critical, necessitating efforts to prevent foreign agents fromeasily acquiring both open information and secret plans while stimulating counterintelligence activities to thwart and manipulate enemy agents. Covertmeasures and psychological operations designed to disrupt the enemy's government, solidarity, and
capabilities--including conducting assassinations, sowing doubts and rumors, bribing and corrupting officials, and executing estrangementtechniques--rapidly multiplied even in the early period.
China's historical writings, while varied and voluminous, are unfortunately sketchy for the early Chou, Spring and Autumn, and Warring States periods. However, the limited extant materials still provide a fairly comprehensivepicture of intrigue, machination, and ingenuity, even though their tersenessoften requires imaginative interpretation and their reliability has beenquestioned. Moreover, apart from their fundamental value as chronologicalhistory, they subsequently assumed a life of their own, one validated by centuries of assiduous study, eventually providing the basis for popular talesand a core of general belief. Bolstered by Confucian reverence for antiquity, they also came to function as
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following memorial a high official vehemently opposed granting their request:
Your subject has heard that these barbarians are raiders who plague us whilethe classics are the essence of our state. We must be prepared against thepassions of such barbarians. Since the classics contain timeless methods forgoverning, they cannot be loaned to other peoples. The Tso Chuan states: "TheShang did not plan against the Hsia, the Yi [barbarians] did not confuse the Hua [Chinese]." The way to resist their untamed hearts and be free of misfortune is to prepare.
In antiquity when King P'ing-tung visited the Han court seeking the Shih Chiand the writings of the philosophers, Emperor Ch'eng did not grant his requestbecause the Shih Chi is replete with military strategies and the books of thephilosophers with crafty techniques. So if the Han emperor was unwilling toshow his own beloved relative these books on the conduct of warfare, how canwe today hand over classics filled with such information to our nemesis, theWestern barbarians?
Moreover, I have heard that by nature the Turfan are cruel and decisive, their emotions sensitive and sharp, and they excel in studying everything. If they penetrate the Book of Documents, they will certainly know how to conductwarfare. If they
thoroughly understand the Book of Odes, they will know the martial. If theirteachers probe deeply into the Li Chi, they will know about the monthly ordinances. When their experienced soldiers have penetrated the Tso Chuan,they will learn numerous deceptive methods and stratagems for employingtroops. When they become thoroughly familiar with the literary pieces in theWen Hsüan, they will know the regulations governing war dispatches. Howwill this differ from loaning weapons to the invaders and providing them withprovisions?
I have heard that when the state of Lu embraced the Chou Li, Ch'i did notattack them. When Wu learned how to employ chariots, Ch'u's troops wereexhausted in running for their lives. 2 The former preserved their state bymaintaining the classics, the latter endangered their state by losing theirtactics. Moreover, having been sent out in marriage, the princess has traveled a great distance to a foreign state where she should be embracing the rites of the Yi peoples, not turning around and seeking our outstanding books. According to my bumbling analysis, this is not really the princess's idea. Isuspect that some defector is encouraging these teachings among them.
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If your majesty is concerned about losing the affection of the Turfan and preserving the state's credibility so there is absolutely no other way, I suggestyou eliminate the Ch'un Ch'iu [and Tso Chuan] because it was composed whenthe virtue of the Chou was already in decline, when the feudal lords were forcefully violating the constraints of rites and music, each going forth toengage in warfare. At that time prevarication was born, at that time changeand deceit arose. There were cases of ministers summoning their rulers aswell as seizing the awesomeness and name of hegemon. If you provide them with this book, it will be a source of misfortune to our state. In the Tso Chuanit states that [as his reward for valor] Yu-hsi requested certain minor privilegesin court dress which, when granted, prompted Confucius to say: "Alas, whynot give him more cities? Only names and vessels [of state] cannot be loaned to men."3 These barbarians clearly covet expensive goods and disdain territory, so you can formally
present them with silks and generously gift them with jades. Why must yougrant what they seek and thereby increase their knowledge? 4
The antecedent cited in which the emperor refused to provide the Shih Chiand other philosophical works even to his own uncle, the nominal king of a subsidiary Han fief, is similarly illuminating. First, it implies that nearly a century after its completion the Shih Chi was still largely retained in thecourt archives rather than generally circulated. Second, political works, including historical writings and the arguments of the philosophers, were seen as equally filled with insidious, potentially dangerous materials, viewedas veritable textbooks of plots and machinations, techniques andsubterfuges. Thus, they were not granted to the king of P'ing-tung in 29 B.C. despite his royal lineage because General Wang Feng advised:
Some of the works of the philosophers are contrary to orthodox classical studies and criticize the Great Sages of antiquity, others illustrate ghosts andspirits and believe in oddities and curiosities. The Shih Chi contains thestrategies of the Warring States, the horizontal and vertical alliances, tacticalpower and deception, the unorthodox measures employed by tacticians at therise of the Han, Heavenly Offices, disasters, abnormalities, mountain passesand strategic points, and the topography of the realm, none of which shouldbe in the hands of the feudal lords. 5
These works, together with the military writings and Twenty-five DynasticHistories, provide the basis for this study.
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Yi Yin and Early History
Deliberately gathering information about one's enemies doubtlessly commenced with the earliest Neolithic conflicts, although short-term reconnaissance and direct line-of-sight observation, aided by concealment andthe advantage of height, would have been the only means available. Over thecenturies the few military theorists and historians who contemplated theissues of intelligence gathering in China have often attributed the earliestknown spy activities to King Shao-k'ang, said to
have ruled the Hsia dynasty in the nineteenth century B.C., because he apparently dispatched an agent to clandestinely observe his father's murdererwhile secretly developing the power base necessary to successfully restoreHsia rule, an event traditionally dated to 1875 B.C. The key historicalreference, much cited thereafter, actually appears in the Tso Chuan, embedded in Wu Tzu-hsü's futile attempt to persuade the king of Wu toexterminate their archenemy, the state of Yüeh under King Kou-chien, nowthat they had vanquished it. This single line runs, " Shao-k'ang employed Ju-ai to spy upon Chiao." 6
By the end of the historical, though poorly documented, Hsia dynasty at leastone famous figure is identified as a covert agent, while another wasinstrumental in subverting and overthrowing the Shang dynasty around 1045B.C. According to Sun-tzu: "In antiquity, when the Shang arose, they had YiYin in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, they had Lü Ya (the T'ai Kung) in theShang."7 Sun-tzu's view apart, neither of them appears to have acted in theusual role of spies--that is, agents dispatched on clandestine missions--being instead "defectors," experts who had abandoned perverse governments toperform advisory roles for moral contenders. However, despite beingvolunteers rather than recruited informants, they have still been considered"spies" (chien), immediately suggesting the broad scope of the term chien inancient China. 8
Even though agents and observers had no doubt been plying their trade for centuries, Yi Yin eventually became recognized as China's first covert agentbecause Sun-tzu thus dubbed him so. However, the historical materials thatpurportedly chronicle ancient Chinese history--particularly the Shang Shu(Book of Documents)--are devoid of any justification for Sun-tzu's ascription. Rather than some secretive, shadowy figure, in a motif much repeatedthereafter these writings portray a recluse who righteously abandoned hispastoral obscurity and nominal allegiance to the tyrannical Hsia to guide a youthful ruler embarking upon the course of virtue and benevolence. In itsearliest form the story simply located him on the periphery of the Hsia, butover the centuries it became more romanticized and explicit, eventu
ally resulting in Mencius's definitive portrait in the middle Warring States period.
A chapter in the Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, a late third century B.C. eclectic text, preserves the most dramatic account to be found among China's numeroushistorical writings. Not only does it integrate the image of a moral paragonwith the deviousness of a seasoned spy; it also includes a painful cover story:
Because Emperor Chieh of the Hsia dynasty was immoral, brutal, perverse, stupid, and greedy, All under Heaven quaked in fear and were greatly troubled.However, reports of his deeds were contradictory and confused, so it wasdifficult for anyone to fathom the true situation. Availing himself of theemperor's awesomeness, the prime minister Kan Hsin was brusque andinsulting to both the feudal lords and the common people. Because the worthy and outstanding ministers were all anxious and resentful, the emperor killedKuan Lung-feng to stifle rebellious stirrings. The common masses, inconsternation and confusion, all wished to emigrate elsewhere and, afraid tospeak directly about the situation, lived in constant terror. Although the greatministers shared the same worries, they dared not cooperate to mount a revolt. Meanwhile Emperor Chieh increasingly regarded himself as a great worthy,boasted of his transgressions, and even viewed wrong as right. The imperial way was blocked and stopped, the populace in total collapse.
Terrified and troubled that the realm was not at peace, T'ang wanted Yi Yin togo and observe the mighty Hsia. However, he feared that Yi Yin would not betrusted, so he personally shot him with an arrow. Yi Yin then fled to the Hsia. After three years he reported back to T'ang at his enclave at Hao: "Earlier Chieh was befuddled and deluded by his consort Mo Hsi and now loves his two concubines from Min-shan, so he doesn't have any concern for thecommon people. The will of the people does not support him, upper and lowerranks detest each other. The hearts of the people are filled with resentment. They all say that Heaven fails to have pity on them, so the Hsia's mandate is over."
T'ang exclaimed: "What you have just said is much like a prophetic lament!" They then swore an oath together to evidence their determination to extinguish Hsia.
Yi Yin went again to observe the mighty Hsia, where he learned from Mo Hsi that "the previous night the emperor had dreamt there was a sun in the westand a sun in the east. When the two suns engaged in combat, the westernsun emerged victorious and
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the eastern sun was vanquished." Yi Yin reported this to T'ang. Although the area was suffering from a severe drought, in order to keep faith with the oathhe had sworn with Yi Yin, T'ang still mobilized their forces. Thereafter heordered the army, after proceeding out from the east, to make their advanceinto Hsia territory from the west. Chieh fled even before their blades hadclashed, but was pursued out to Ta-sha where he was finally killed. 9
Remarkably, this episode already incorporates many crucial elements of spycraft. First, from the outset Yi Yin--whatever his wisdom and moral qualifications--was deliberately employed as a covert agent responsible fordetermining the true state of affairs in the Hsia, an enemy entity despite theShang's own theoretical obligations toward their ruler. Second, he was given aplausible pretext for voluntarily allying himself with the perverse Chieh: avisible arrow wound (no doubt preceded by rumors and vivid, if inaccurate, accounts) emblematic of T'ang's hatred. Third, just as many rulers andinnumerable officials throughout Chinese history, Chieh succumbed to sexual indulgence and the allure of beauty. Moreover, Mo Hsi, much dejected because new, foreign concubines were monopolizing the emperor's favors, acted as thearchetypal slighted beauty in secretly revealing the king's frightening dream. (Throughout Chinese history many jealous consorts and concubines poisoned, stabbed, or otherwise murdered their unfaithful husbands andlovers, as well as betrayed their secrets, frustrated their plans, and thwartedtheir interests.) This information allowed King T'ang to exploit the ancientbelief in the prophetic nature of dreams by enacting a scenario that actualized Chieh's secret fears. The advance of King T'ang's
army from the west thus proved sufficient to trigger Chieh's terror and flight. Furthermore, Chieh's downfall was undoubtedly hastened because the hostilestate of Minshan had consciously exploited the debilitating power of womenand sex. The two new concubines who so fascinated him were neither accidental acquisitions nor battlefield spoils, but instead were gifts deliberately presented by the minor state of Min-shan that lay in thebarbarous area of northwest Szechwan, far beyond the central core area of Hsia-Shang culture, to debauch his mind and deflect further incursions.Finally, the importance of prophetic events, sayings, and phenomena may be seen in T'ang's reaction to Yi Yin's initial report, for he was apparently astounded that Yi's words echoed what was probably a common sayingpredicting such a downfall.
The enigmatic Yi Yin eventually garnered a hallowed place in Chinese history as one of the virtuous paragons cited by Confucian literati seeking to justifythe employment of worthy men to China's
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despotic rulers. He, the T'ai Kung, and a few other idealized figures became famous for having rescued their eras, not to mention monarchs, while everespousing the virtuous ways of Yao, Shun, Yü, and the other semimythicalSage emperors of remote antiquity. They were inevitably portrayed as active,yet unsullied, pure, yet effective, and the Shang Shu purportedly preserves Yi Yin's admonitory speeches charging the youthful ruler with the practice of virtue at the Shang dynasty's inception. However, it otherwise provides nothingmore than a sparse record of his activities, noting only that somewhat morethan a decade after he was summoned to King T'ang's court the Shangsuccessfully overthrew the Hsia in a brief battle. (The preface to the Shang Shuadds the comment that Yi Yin had been embarrassed to serve under the Hsia and therefore returned to Hao, the site of T'ang's domain.) He is furtherdepicted as having continued as prime minister under two or three of T'ang'ssuccessors, even temporarily deposing one of them for a lack of virtue untilrestoring him to the throne following three years of enforced, isolated soul-searching. 10
However, the Bamboo Annals, increasingly viewed by scholars as a somewhatreliable source for the period, offers a startlingly different conclusion to thisotherwise idealized story, stating that Yi Yin actually usurped the throne andwas eventually executed when the rightful king escaped his confinement. 11
Befitting his status as China's first recognized covert agent, Yi Yin's historical image thus subsumes two different personae: a virtuous, self-sacrificingminister, and the skilled spy who made the conquest possible. The former wastrumpeted by naive Confucians emphasizing the idea that Virtue alone issufficient to dominate the realm, the latter stressed by political realists in the late Warring States period. Although Yi Yin's name appears in a multitude oftexts, 12 he was definitively canonized as a paragon of virtue by Mencius whenqueried by a disciple as to whether, as commonly suggested, Yi Yin had soughta position under T'ang by becoming a cook rather than having beenimmediately recognized for his surpassing wisdom and virtue. (The Huai-nanTzu, a somewhat later work, notes that being troubled by the realm being ungoverned, "Yi Yin harmonized the five flavors, slung his cooking vessels over his back, and went forth." It adds that "he went to Chieh five times, and also toT'ang five times, wanting to make the turbid clear and the endangered tranquil."13) In reply, Mencius pedantically described Yi Yin as the epitome of righteousness: a scholar fending for himself in the countryside, contentedlyplowing his fields while practicing the Tao of the ancient Sage emperors. No amount of profit could coerce him into forsaking the path of righteousness,nothing cause him to commit the slightest transgression. Thus, despite themisery wrought upon the empire by Chieh, he im
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perturbably declined the gifts accompanying T'ang's fervent invitations threetimes before finally deciding that the empire desperately required his servicesand responded to T'ang's fervent call, much besought and accordingly honored. Thereafter, in the Mencian account, he transformed King T'ang into a ruler morally qualified to rescue the world from Chieh's tyranny, no covertactions or secret missions ever being mentioned. 14
Mencius's version may of course be seen as a hopeful projection of the process that rulers should undertake in humbly extending sincere invitationsto moral exemplars (such as himself) to participate in their governments. However, the story persisted that after Yi Yin had failed to win T'ang's attentiondespite many audiences, he finally resorted to becoming his cook and therebyingratiated himself sufficiently to gradually offer his persuasions. At the end of the Warring States period the brilliant but ill-fated Han Fei-tzu, often termed China's Machiavelli, in fact employed this story to illustrate the difficulty of achieving the objectives of persuasion: "In high antiquity T'ang was the mostsagely, Yi Yin the most knowledgeable. But when the wisest persuaded thesagest, after seventy times he still had not been accepted. Only after personally carrying the cooking utensils and becoming a chef did they gradually becomecloser and more intimate and did T'ang fully realize his substance and employ him." 15
Several centuries later Liu Shao, author of the incisive Jen-wu Chih, struck abalanced view: "Yi Yin's virtue was sufficient to sharpen their customs, hislaws adequate to rectify All under Heaven, and his methods enough to plot thecourt's victory." 16 Moreover, even the Chuang- tzu, the penultimate Taoistclassic, contains an interesting anecdote that unexpectedly illuminates Yi Yin's realistic methods and tactics. When he was about to invade the Hsia, T'ang asked Pu Sui how to proceed but was snubbed because such mundane,despicable topics did not fall within Pu's purview. After Kuang Wu similarly rebuffed him, he inquired about Yi Yin and was advised that Yi was "strongand able to endure insults." King T'ang then employed Yi Yin, they plotted a successful attack, and then T'ang sought to cede the empire to Kuang Wu, who disparagingly condemned the king for imagining he might be greedyenough to accept it, just as he had earlier thought him to be a brigand whowould betray Chieh, his nominal lord. 17
Chuang-tzu's anecdote implicitly raises the question of how defectors and traitors might be distinguished. From the dominant Confucian perspective, anyone who abandons a perverse ruler to support virtuous rebels claimingthe Mandate of Heaven is a discerning defector, a hero rather than a traitor.Defectors are therefore ideologically and ethically motivated to
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don the banner of righteousness or simply betray the eventual conqueror. Naturally, from a more cynical perspective, if involuntary obligations imposedby birth in a land or under a particular ruler have any legitimacy, they are alltraitors. (Since defectors and traitors played a monumental role throughoutChinese history, they will be discussed in later sections.)
In sum, China's first spy thus has two faces--the first a moral paragon and idealistic adviser, the second a realist highly versed in subterfuge, skilled indisguising his intentions and motives, capable of acting as an observer andstrategist, clearly courageous in the face of the enemy, and compellingly wisewhen confronted with tactical problems. It is of course this second visage thatthe military writers, popular legend, and many Legalist writings praiseenthusiastically.
China's Second Spy: The T'ai Kung
Lü Shang, better known as the T'ai Kung, is a shadowy historical figure whoreputedly played a crucial advisory role during the Chou's ascendancy, madethe Shang conquest possible, and exercised a major command role in thebattles that accomplished it. 18 Apart from his putative identification with theSix Secret Teachings--an extensive work of military theory--the T'ai Kung hasalso been honored throughout Chinese history as its first famous general, theprogenitor of strategic studies, and the state's martial patron. 19 However, his identification as a "spy" no doubt results from his status as a defector, someone who fled the oppressive conditions under the Shang court, afterperhaps serving in some capacity, to wander about until finally being recognized in old age by King Wen for his sagacity. As the king's most trustedadviser, he presumably furnished detailed information about the Shang'sstrengths and weaknesses, as well as tactical information for the final assaultthat surprised the Shang by crossing the frozen Yellow River to the southduring January, thereby circumventing their westward pointing defenses.20 However, if the Six Secret Teachings actually preserves his essential
thoughts, he may equally well be viewed as the father of both tactics and spycraft, a role for which he has been both praised and condemned.
The essential background to the T'ai Kung's achievements was the archetypal battle between the forces of virtue, represented by the Chou dynasty, andthose of evil, personified by King Chou, the Shang's perverse, debauched ruler. In a conflict reminiscent of T'ang's conquest of King Chieh of the Hsia, KingWen and his successor, King Wu, developed a powerful state on the westernperiphery of Shang culture. Although their policies were ostensibly based uponvirtue and benevo
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lence, designed to attract both disaffected peoples and willing allies, their rise also encompassed the brutal conquest of numerous smaller states. From the systematic way in which they proceeded and their uninterruptedsuccess, they clearly had well-developed, although now unknown, sources of information and certainly acquired further intelligence during theirexpansion from both captives and willing immigrants.
It has been suggested that the Chou easily developed alliances with nearby peoples, including disenchanted Hsia groups subjugated by the Shang, because of their agricultural heritage. In perpetuating the Hsia's agriculturaloffices and reflecting the spirit of their remote ancestor known as Hou Chi("Lord of Millet"), the Chou had for many years dispatched advisers to instructother states in basic farming practices and seasonally appropriate activities. Their efforts not only garnered them good will and respect, but also provideda perfect cover for aggressively seeking military and political intelligence, for acquiring a thorough knowledge of the inhabitants, customs, and terrainoutside the Wei River valley. 21
According to the Yi Chou-shu, when the center of Chou government was located in Feng, King Wu was kept informed about Shang's offenses andatrocities by spies (tie). Determining their reports to be substantiallycredible, he advised the Duke of Chou about the contents, prompting thelatter to comment that the time for attacking the tyrannical
Shang ruler had arrived. 22 Furthermore, the late Warring States Lü-shih Ch'un-chiu even contains a dialogue showing how the king controlled hisagents that, while definitely a fabrication, enjoyed credibility thereafter andadded to the fund of ancient lore:
King Wu of the Chou deputed an agent to observe the state of Shang. Theobserver returned to the Chou capital and reported, " Shang is in chaos."The king questioned him, "To what degree?" The agent replied, "Sycophantsand evil-doers overcome the good." The king replied, "It is not yet time."
The agent again went to Shang and then returned to report, "Their chaos has increased." The king asked, "To what extent?" The agent replied, "The worthyhave fled." King Wu said, "It is not yet time."
Once again the agent went to observe conditions and reported back, "Their chaos has become extreme." King Wu inquired, "In what way?" The observerreplied, "The common people do not dare criticize or express their resentment."
King Wu sighed and then hastened to inform the T'ai Kung, who commented: "When sycophants and evil-doers overcome the good it is termed 'extermination'; when the worthy flee it is
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called 'collapse'; and when the common people dare not criticize or express their resentment it is termed 'punishments conquering.' Their chaos isextreme, beyond control!"
The king therefore selected three hundred chariots and three thousand tiger warriors, and set the day with the feudal lords in the court for capturing theking of Shang. 23
The Chou royal house also seems to have benefited from more reliable sources of information because many of its important members, including King Wen, had married Shang princesses. Furthermore, they were frequently compelledto pay homage and offer tribute to the Shang court, further exposing them tothe political realities, coupled with opportunities for intelligence gathering, whether through observation or purchase. In this regard the Shang seem tohave singularly failed, having
Fei Chung attempted to persuade King Chieh: "The Lord of the West is aworthy so the hundred surnames are pleased with him and the feudal lordssubmit to him. You must execute him, for if you do not he will certainly be a source of misfortune for the Shang."
King Chou replied: "You are speaking of a righteous ruler. How can he be executed?" Fei Chung retorted: "A hat, even though worn through, must stillbe placed on the head; shoes, even though multicolored, must still tread uponthe ground. Now the Lord of the West is a subject. He is cultivatingrighteousness so people incline toward him. If anyone will cause youmisfortune, it will be him! Any person who does not employ his worthiness onbehalf of his ruler must be executed. Moreover, where is the transgression ina ruler punishing his subject?"
King Chou replied: "Benevolence and righteousness are what rulers employ toencourage their subordinates. Now as the Lord of the West loves benevolenceand righteousness, it is not possible to punish him." Fei Chung attempted topersuade him three times, then left the state.
However, perhaps the critical factor in the Chou's deliberate rise was the remoteness of the Wei River valley, situated in largely "bar
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barian" territory, whose isolation provided relative secrecy and deterred casual visitors. Under the T'ai Kung's guidance, King Wen was able to devise andimplement the policies necessary to nurture the state's strength withoutattracting undue attention. The Chou thus managed to perfect themselves in the era's measures and technologies, and systematically develop
Unfortunately, even though the T'ai Kung has been accorded great respect for his apparent historical role, there is considerable controversy over his exactaccomplishments, as well as centuries of Confucian revulsion over thepossibility that military power and tactical measures were employed by the great moral paragons to achieve their conquest of the Shang. More significantly, there is a dearth of historical references to the T'ai Kung in theancient sources that reputedly chronicle the period's major events, althoughthe Shih Chi and Yi Chou-shu both provide supporting evidence. However, his biography in the former, well known for some two thousand years, establisheda lasting image:
T'ai Kung Wang, properly named Lü Shang, was a native of the Eastern Seaarea. One of his ancestors had served as a labor director and meritoriously assisted the legendary Yü in pacifying the flooding waters. In the intervalbetween Emperor Shun and the Hsia dynasty he was therefore enfeoffed atLü, or perhaps at Shen, and surnamed Chiang. During the Hsia and Shangdynasties some of the sons and grandsons of his collateral lines were enfeoffedat Lü and Shen, some were commoners, and Lü Shang--the T'ai Kung--wastheir descendant. His original surname was Chiang, but he was subsequently surnamed from his fief, so was called Lü Shang.
Impoverished and in straits, Lü Shang was already old when, through fishing, he sought out King Wen, Lord of the West. The Lord of the West was about togo hunting and so divined about the prospects for success. What the divinersaid was: "What you will obtain will be neither dragon nor serpent, neithertiger nor bear. What you will obtain is an assistant for a hegemon or king."
Thereupon the Lord of the West went hunting and indeed encountered theT'ai Kung on the sunny side of the Wei River.
After speaking with him, he was greatly pleased and said: "My former lord, the T'ai Kung, said, 'There should be a Sage who will come
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to Chou, and Chou will thereby flourish.' Are you truly this Sage or not? My T'ai Kung looked out [wang] for you for a long time." Thus he called him T'aiKung Wang, and returned together with him in his carriage, establishing himas strategist.
Someone has said: "The T'ai Kung had extensive learning, and once served King Chou of the Shang. King Chou lacked the Tao, so he left him. He traveled about exercising his persuasion on the various feudal lords but didnot encounter anyone suitable, and in the end returned west with the Lord of the West."
Someone else has said: " Lü Shang was a retired scholar who had hiddenhimself on the seacoast. When the Lord of the West was confined at Yu-li,San-i Sheng and Hung Yao, having long known Lü Shang, summoned him. Lü Shang also said, 'I have heard that the Lord of the West is a Worthy and alsoexcels at nurturing the old, so I guess I will go there.' The three men soughtout beautiful women and rare objects on behalf of the Lord of the West, and presented them to the Shang king in order to ransom the Lord of the West.The Lord of the West was thereby able to go out and return to his state."24
Although the ways they say Lü Shang came to serve the Lord of the Westdiffer, still the essential point is that he became strategist to Kings Wen andWu. After the Lord of the West was extricated from Yu-li and returned to Chou,he secretly planned with Lü Shang and cultivated his Virtue in order tooverturn Shang's government. The T'ai Kung's affairs were mostly concerned with military authority and unorthodox stratagems, so when later generationsspeak about armies and the Chou's secret tactical advantage of power, they allhonor the T'ai Kung for making the fundamental plans.
The Lord of the West's government was equitable, even extending tosettling the conflict between the Yü and Jui
When King Wen died, King Wu ascended the throne. In his ninth year, wanting to continue King Wen's task, he mounted a campaign in the east to observewhether the feudal lords would assemble or not. When the army set out, theT'ai Kung wielded the yellow battle ax in his left hand, and grasped the whitepennon in his right, in order to swear the oath:
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Ts'ang-ssu! Ts'ang-ssu!
Unite your masses of common people With yourboats and oars.
Those who arrive after will be beheaded.
Thereafter he went to Meng-chin. The number of feudal lords who assembledof their own accord was eight hundred. The feudal lords all said, " KingChoucan be attacked." King Wu replied, "Not yet." He had the army return andmade the Great Oath with the T'ai Kung.
After they had remained in Chou for two more years, King Chou of the Shang killed prince Pi-kan and imprisoned the Worthy Chi-tzu. King Wu, wanting toattack the Shang, performed divination with a turtle shell to observe thesigns. They were not auspicious and violent wind and rain arose. Theassembled dukes were all afraid, but the T'ai Kung stiffened them to supportKing Wu. King Wu then went forth.
In the eleventh year, the first month, on the day chia-tzu the king swore anoath at Mu-yeh and attacked King Chou of the Shang. The Shang army wascompletely defeated, so King Chou turned and ran off, and then ascended theDeer Tower. King Wu's forces pursued and beheaded King Chou. On themorrow King Wu was established at the altars: The dukes presented clearwater, K'ang Shu-feng of Wei spread out a variegated mat,
the T'ai Kung led the sacrificial animals, and the Scribe Yi chanted the prayers in order to announce to the spirits the punishment of King Chou's offenses. They distributed the money from the Deer Tower and gave out the grain in theChü-ch'iao granary in order to relieve the impoverished people. They enfeoffed Pi-kan's grave and released Chi-tzu from imprisonment. They removed thenine cauldrons of authority, rectified the government of Chou, and begananew with All under Heaven. The T'ai Kung's plans occupied the major part.
Thereupon King Wu, having already pacified the Shang and become King of All under Heaven, enfeoffed the T'ai Kung at Ying- ch'iu in Ch'i. The T'ai Kung went east to his state, staying overnight on the road and traveling slowly. Theinnkeeper said: "I have heard it said that time is hard to get but easy to lose.Our guest sleeps extremely peacefully. Probably he is not going to return to his state." The T'ai Kung, overhearing it, got dressed that night and set out, reaching his state just before first light. The Marquis of Lai came out to attack, and fought with him for Ying- ch'iu, which bordered Lai. The people of Laiwere Yi people who, taking advantage of the chaos under King Chou and thenew set
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tlement of the Chou dynasty, assumed Chou would be unable to assemble the distant quarters. For this reason they battled with the T'ai Kung for hisstate.
When the T'ai Kung reached Ch'i he rectified the government in accord withprevailing customs, simplified the Chou's forms of propriety, opened up theoccupations of the merchants and artisans, and facilitated the realization ofprofits from fishing and salt. The people turned their allegiance to Ch'i in largenumbers, and Ch'i thus became a great state.
When the youthful King Ch'eng ascended the Chou throne and the late King Wu's brothers Kuan Shu and Ts'ai Shu revolted, the Yi people in the Huai River valley again turned against the Chou. So King Ch'eng had Duke ChaoK'ang issue a mandate to the T'ai Kung: "To the east as far as the sea, thewest to the Yellow River, south to Mu-ling, and north to Wu-ti, thoroughlyrectify and order the five marquis and nine earls." From this
Ch'i was able to conduct a campaign of rectification to subdue the rebellious and become a great state. Its capital was Ying-ch'iu. Probably when the T'aiKung died, he was more than a hundred years old.
The Grand Historian comments: "I went to Ch'i--from Lang-yeh, whichbelongs to Mt. T'ai, north to where it fronts the sea, embracing two thousandkilometers of fertile land. Its people are expansive, and many conceal theirknowledge. It is their Heaven- given nature. Taking the T'ai Kung's Sagenessin establishing his state, isn't it appropriate that Duke Huan flourished and cultivated good government and was thereby able to assemble the feudal lordsin a covenant? Vast, vast, truly the style of a great state!"
Despite the lucidity of his biography and its frequent citation in variouswritings, over the centuries the T'ai Kung's reputation equally derived from the infamous book associated with his name, the Six Secret Teachings, whichpurportedly records his strategic advice and tactical instructions to Kings Wenand Wu in the mid-eleventh century B.C. (The present book unquestionably dates from the middle to late Warring States period; however, even today sometraditionalists still believe it reflects the mature heritage of military studiesfound in the strong state of Ch'i and therefore preserves at least vestiges of the oldest strata of Chinese military thought.) Accordingly, the Six Secret Teachings would be the only Chinese military classic written to facilitate revolutionary activity because the Chou's aim was nothing less than a dynastic revolution. Paradoxically, Confucians throughout the imperial periodexcoriated the text because the T'ai Kung depicted
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therein vociferously insists upon exploiting every means available to achieve victory rather than confidently relying upon the benign power of Virtue.Critical measures therefore include feigning and dissembling to deceive theenemy and allay suspicions; using bribes, gifts, and other methods to inducedisloyalty and cause chaos and consternation; and undertaking "civil warfare,"a systematic, unorthodox program that stresses psychological techniques andcovert methods to undermine and enervate the enemy, such as by distractingthem and
The Six Secret Teachings also analyzes numerous battle situations and formulates general principles to guide the commander's efforts to determinethe most effective tactics based upon classifications of terrain, aspects of theenemy, and the relative strength of the forces. Intensive efforts to gather information must always be mounted because, in accord with the analyticthrust of Chinese military science, the enemy must be carefully evaluated andjudgments weighed before a decision whether to attack or defend can becalculated. Among the numerous related topics are techniques forpsychological warfare, procedures for probing and manipulating the enemy,ways to induce fear, and methods for deception. Because subterfuge and psychological ploys manipulate the enemy and thereby hasten their demise, confusion should be incited in the enemy's ranks, such as throughdisinformation. Furthermore, all weaknesses in an opposing general should befully exploited and assaults directed toward undefended positions. No generalshould ever suffer a defeat from lack of training, preparation, or tactical intelligence.
Additional important issues found throughout the book concern military communications and the paramount need for secrecy, evaluation of thesituation and decisive action when the moment arrives, various indicationsand cues for fathoming the enemy's situation, and the everyday basis formilitary skills and equipment. In addition, more than half the book is devotedto tactical principles, questions of command and control, the nature of leadership, and essential policies for the state. In sum, the work by which theT'ai Kung came to be known--one that has enjoyed numerous vernacularChinese and Japanese translations in recent decades, as well as cartoonversions and abstracted applications for business endeavors--is a vastcompendium of military science. Although certainly not China's firsttheoretical work, it founded the T'ai Kung's reputation for over two thousand years.
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Tzu Kung
Along with Yi Yin and the T'ai Kung, Tzu Kung, who was active in the lastdecade of the sixth century B.C. and first decade of the fifth, is the third figurefrequently identified as an early covert agent. A section of Confucius'sbiography in the Shih Chi briefly characterizes him with citations from theAnalects, the famous composite writing embodying the Master's sayings, andpurportedly preserves his successive discussions with the era's major feudal powers in his fervent quest to prevent Ch'i from exterminating the small stateof Lu. Although almost certainly the product of later Warring States writers,25 these dialogues may still reflect the essence of his arguments since heclearly persuaded several rulers to significantly alter their military plans,mostly to their regret.
Tzu Kung was prompted to undertake his mission when Confucius, openly ruing the imminent destruction of their ancestral state, sarcastically wondered why none of his disciples had been stirred to action. The Shih Chiunfolds the following events that probably occurred about 498 B.C. near theend of the Spring and Autumn period, right after Sun-tzu's strategies had made Wu powerful:
Tuan Mu-hsi, known as Tzu Kung, was a native of the state of Wei. Thirty-one years younger than Confucius, he had a sharp tongue and spoke skillfully, prompting Confucius to frequently upbraid him for his argumentiveness. Confucius once asked him, "Who is superior, you or Yen Hui?" Tzu Kung replied: "How would I dare compare myself with Hui? When Hui hears one thing he knows ten; when I hear one thing, I know two."
When Tzu Kung had completed his studies with Confucius, he asked, "Whatsort of man am I?""You are a vessel," Confucius responded. "What sort of vessel?""A jade vessel for sacrificial grains."26
Ch'en Tzu-ch'in asked Tzu Kung, "With whom did Confucius study?" Tzu Kung replied: "The Tao of Kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty has not yet totally fallen by the wayside, but is still present in men. The worthy recognize theimportant aspects, the unworthy the minor aspects. Thus everyone still
retains the Tao of Kings Wen and Wu, so where would Confucius notlearn? Why should he have had a constant teacher?"27
Ch'en Tzu-ch'in further inquired: "When Confucius goes to a state, he invariably learns about its government. Does he seek it out, or is it given tohim?" Tzu Kung replied: "The master acts
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congenially and respectfully, and gains information through courtesy. Isn'this seeking thus different from other men?"28
Tzu Kung asked Confucius, "What do you think about being rich, yet notarrogant, or poor, yet not a sycophant?" Confucius replied: "It is acceptable. However, it is not as good as being poor, yet taking pleasure in the Tao, beingrich, yet loving the true forms of behavior."29
T'ien Ch'ang, a high official in Ch'i, wanted to bring about chaos in his native state but was afraid of the four great families surnamed Kao, Kuo, Pao, andYing. Therefore he shifted the forces under his control, intending to attack thestate of Lu. Confucius, having heard about it, addressed his disciples: "Our ancestral graves are located in Lu, the state of our fathers and mothers. Whenthe state is now thus endangered, why haven't any of you gone forth to takeaction?" Tzu Lu requested permission to go, but Confucius stopped him. TzuChang and Tzu Shih similarly requested permission to go, but Confuciuswould not grant it. Tzu Kung then asked to go and Confucius agreed.
Tzu Kung first went to Ch'i, where he spoke with T'ien Ch'ang: "Your lordship's attack on Lu is in error because it is a difficult state to attack. Its fortificationsare narrow and low, its moats constricted and shallow, its ruler stupid andlacking in benevolence, and the ministers false and useless. Moreover, theofficers and people detest military service. You cannot engage them in combat. It would be better for your majesty to attack Wu. Now Wu's walls are high andwide, the moats broad and deep, their armor stout and new, the officerscarefully selected and well fed. Valuable vessels and elite troops are allgathered
there. Moreover, Wu employs enlightened officials to preserve them. They would be easy to attack."
T'ien Ch'ang angrily flushed and said: "What you consider difficulteveryone else takes as easy; what you consider easy everyone else believes to be difficult. What do you mean by instructing me in this fashion?"
Tzu Kung replied: "I have heard it said that one who suffers from internal difficulties should attack the strong, but one who suffers from external pressures should attack the weak. Now you are troubled about internal affairs. I have heard that your lordship has been enfeoffed three timesunsuccessfully because some of the important ministers do not heed yourwords. Now if your lordship destroys Lu and thus broadens Ch'i, your victory will make the ruler arrogant. Destroying Lu will also cause the minis
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terial families [who command the armies] to be further honored, while yourachievements will not rank among them. Therefore you will daily becomefurther estranged from the ruler.
"When the ruler has become arrogant and the great ministers are free topursue their desires, yet you seek to accomplish great deeds, it will be difficult. In general, when rulers become arrogant, they give free rein to theirdesires, but when ministers grow arrogant, they wrangle. For this reasondifferences will force you to defer to the ruler while you will have to struggle with the ministers. In such circumstances your position in Ch'i will beendangered. Thus I advised that it would be better to attack the state of Wu.
"If you attack Wu and fail to be victorious the people will perish outside while within the state the high ministers' positions will be empty. Then you will nothave any powerful enemies within the ministerial ranks nor excesses in thepeople below. A solitary ruler will then govern Ch'i, and it will be your majesty."
T'ien Ch'ang said: "Excellent! However, I have already sent my forces forthagainst Lu, so withdrawing them now to send
against Wu would cause the great ministers to be suspicious. What should I do?"
Tzu Kung replied: "Your lordship's forces should merely assume a positionthere without attacking. Meanwhile, I would like permission to go to Wu andpersuade the ruler to rescue Lu by attacking Ch'i. You could then employ your army to respond to their offensive."
T'ien Ch'ang agreed and had Tzu Kung proceed south on his mission, wherehe gained audience with Fu-ch'ai, king of Wu. Tzu Kung said: "I have heardthat a true king does not exterminate generations or a hegemon strengthenhis enemies. A weight of a thousand tons can shift when but a few ounces areadded. Right now the state of Ch'i, with its ten thousand chariots, and my own state of Lu, with its thousand, are struggling with Wu for supremacy. 30 Iam afraid that you will be endangered by this conflict. However, rescuing Lu would result in a glorious name, attacking Ch'i would produce great profits. Nothing would be more advantageous than dispelling the worries of the feudal lords above the Ssu River and executing brutal Ch'i in order to bring about itssubjugation to mighty Chin. Even the wise would have no doubts about thefame that would be achieved for preserving the lost state of Lu and actually putting strong Ch'i in straits."
Fu-ch'ai replied: "Excellent. Although we once engaged Yüeh in combat, isolated their forces, and then defeated them at K'uai-chi, the king of Yüehhas disciplined himself through enduring great
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suffering, nurtured his warriors, and harbors a burning intention to avenge himself. 31 Wait until we attack Yüeh, and then I will heed your words."
Tzu Kung said: "Yüeh's strength does not exceed Lu's, nor does Wu's mightexceed Ch'i's. If you defer attacking Ch'i to strike Yüeh, Ch'i will have alreadypacified Lu. Moreover, your majesty was just now concerned with garnering a name for preserving the lost and continuing the extinguished, whereasattacking the small state of Yüeh while being frightened of
mighty Ch'i is not courageous. Now the courageous never avoid hardship; the benevolent do not impoverish the straitened; the wise do not lose the moment;nor do kings extinguish generations--all just to establish their righteousness.Preserving Yüeh would display your benevolence to the feudal lords, while rescuing Lu by attacking Ch'i would impose your awesomeness on Chin. Thefeudal lords would then inevitably be compelled to lead each other to pay court to Wu, and hegemony will thus be achieved.
"Now your majesty must certainly hate Yüeh. I would like to go east for anaudience with Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, to convince him to dispatch troops tosupport you. This will truly empty out Yüeh, although the image will be of following the other feudal lords in this concerted attack on Ch'i." Elated, theking of Wu then had Tzu Kung go to Yüeh.
Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, had the roads cleared, went to meet him in the suburbs, and thereafter personally escorted him to the guest house, where he asked, "How is it that such a great official has deigned to so dishonorhimself with a visit to our uncivilized state?"
Tzu Kung replied: "I have just persuaded the king of Wu to rescue Lu by attacking Ch'i. He wants to do it but fears Yüeh and so said, 'Wait until Iattack Yüeh, and then it will be possible.' Thus the destruction of Yüeh istherefore certain. Now to not have any intention to repay Wu [for permitting your survival] but yet cause them to have doubts is stupid. To be intent ontaking revenge against others but let them know about it is disastrous. Toallow the discovery of affairs that have not yet been initiated is dangerous.These three are great worries in undertaking affairs."
Kou-chien bowed twice and said: "Formerly I failed to calculate our strength, engaged Wu in combat, and ended up being in difficulty in K'uai-chi. The painof this experience has penetrated my very bones. Day and night I have grittedmy teeth and parched my mouth, seeking only to engage the king of Wu in afatal struggle. This has been my wish."
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Thereafter he further queried Tzu Kung, who advised: "The king of Wu is fierce and brutal, his ministers cannot withstand him. The state has been exhaustedin frequent warfare, the officers and troops lack endurance, and the commonpeople harbor resentment. The great ministers suffer from internal turmoil,and Wu Tzu-hsü has perished because of his direct remonstrance. ChancellorPo P'i controls affairs and accords with the ruler's excesses in order to preservehis own position. 32 This is the government of a doomed state. Now if yourmajesty were to send forth some troops to support their rescue of Lu, it wouldencourage their ambitions. Furthermore, if you were to send valuable treasures in order to assuage his heart and speak humbly in order to honorhis court, it is certain that the king would attack Ch'i. If he engages in combatwithout being victorious, it would be your good fortune. If he proves victorious, then his army will certainly approach Chin. I would like to go north to have anaudience with the duke of Chin and bring it about that he will attack Wu, forthen Wu will inevitably be weakened. With its spirited soldiers all being spentin Ch'i and its heavy armor entangled in Chin, if your majesty exploits their exhaustion, Wu's extinction will be inevitable."
Kou-chien, being greatly pleased by these prospects, granted permission for Tzu Kung to see Chin and moreover sent him a hundred ounces of gold, a precious sword, and two superlative lances. 33 However, Tzu Kung did notaccept them but went back to report to the king of Wu: "I respectfully reportedyour majesty's words to the king of Yüeh. Terrified, he said: 'I unfortunately lost my parents while still young and, failing to calculate our internal strength, attacked and thus offended the state of Wu. Our army was defeatedand I was insulted, being isolated at K'uai-chi. The state was empty andovergrown with brambles, but through the great king's generosity we wereable to survive and continue our ancestral sacrifices. Until I die I would never dare forget it, so what plots could I possibly entertain against the king of Wu?'"
Five days later Yüeh deputed the high official Wen Chung to bow before the king of Wu and say: "From the Eastern Sea where my lord Kou-chien hasbeen established, I have been deputed to act as a minor emissary toinquire about your
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the arrows and points fly. Moreover, your humble servant offers some twentythousand pounds of armor that our ancestors had stored away, including ironspears and glistening swords, in order to honor your army's officers."
The king of Wu, greatly pleased, informed Tzu Kung: "The king of Yüeh wantsto personally accompany me in our attack upon Ch'i. Should I allow it?" TzuKung replied: "You should not. Now to empty out a ruler's state, to employ allhis masses, and moreover have the ruler follow on would not be righteous. Mylord should accept his monetary gifts, allow his forces to participate, but denythe presence of the ruler himself."
The king of Wu assented and declined Kou-chien's suggestion. Thereupon he mobilized troops from nine commanderies to attack Ch'i while Tzu Kungdeparted for Chin, where he spoke with the Lord of Chin: "I have heard it saidthat if plans are not first determined, it will be impossible to respond toexigencies; if the troops are not first ordered, it will be impossible to conquer the enemy. Now Ch'i and Wu are about to engage in battle. If Wu fails to be victorious, Yüeh will certainly cause disorder there. If they manage to conquerCh'i, their troops will inevitably approach Chin."
The duke of Chin, seriously troubled, inquired, "What should we do?" TzuKung responded, "Prepare your weapons and rest your troops while awaiting them." The ruler agreed. Tzu Kung departed and went to Lu. The king of Wu indeed engaged Ch'i in battle at Ai-ling and inflicted a serious defeat. Hecaptured the troops of seven generals and remained in the field, not returningto Wu but, as predicted, approaching Chin to confront them above YellowPool. When Wu and Chin fought for supremacy, Chin mounted an attack andseverely defeated
Wu's armies. The king of Yüeh learned of it, forded the Yangtze River, and suddenly attacked Wu, encamping seven kilometers from the capital. The kingof Wu heard about these developments, abandoned Chin, returned to Wu, andengaged Yüeh in battle at Five Lakes. He failed to be victorious in three battles and could no longer defend the city gates. Yüeh's forces then surrounded the king's palace, killed King Fu-ch'ai, and executed Chancellor Po P'i. Threeyears after destroying Wu, Yüeh faced east and became recognized ashegemon. Thus once Tzu Kung ventured forth, he preserved Lu, broughtchaos to Ch'i, destroyed Wu, and achieved hegemony for Yüeh. Tzu Kung's single mission caused the strategically powerful states to destroy each other,and within a decade each of the five states experienced significant changes. 34
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Tzu Kung loved real estate speculation and was able to profit from the material changes of the times. He enjoyed speaking about people's good points but was unable to conceal their errors. He frequently served as primeminister in Lu and Wei, and his family accumulated a fortune of onethousand ounces of gold. He finally died in Ch'i.
A modern reader puzzling through this lengthy biography might find TzuKung's reputation as an "agent" (chien) somewhat mystifying. Clearly he visitedCh'i as an overt spokesman for Lu. However, his subsequent visits, especiallyto Wu, which foolishly became persuaded to attack the strong state of Ch'i and eventually perished from its disregard of Wu Tzu-hsü's warning, wereostensibly to benefit the rulers he was addressing, not Lu, although theyshould have suspected that he was acting for Lu. Moreover, even though thiswas a period when diplomatic personnel frequently embarked on criticalmissions to save their states and acquire allies, the openness of the Warring States when peripatetic persuaders sought ready ears for their methods andstrategies had not yet evolved. Tzu Kung simply acted on behalf of Lu tosubvert the other states, exploiting existing conflicts and even internal dissensions, as in Ch'i. Therefore, although his work was largely overt, he hasstill been considered an "agent," and his activities should therefore be seen as both defining and reflecting the greater scope of the
term's meaning throughout Chinese history. As the Shih Chi summarized, "Once Tzu Kung ventured forth, he preserved Lu, brought chaos to Ch'i, destroyed Wu, and achieved hegemony for Yüeh."
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2 The Springand Autumn Period
THE FIRST PERIOD OF CHINESE HISTORY for which narrative materials become available, known as the Spring and Autumn period after the annalsthat chronicle it, is normally dated from 722 to 481 B.C. The terse Ch'un Ch'iu(Spring and Autumn Annals), traditionally said to have been personally editedby Confucius to reflect his moral approbation of political behavior during anincreasingly turbulent period and serve as a handbook for future generations, becomes comprehensible only through its three classic commentaries, thefamous Tso Chuan and the comparatively ignored Kung Yang and Ku Liang. Because all three were composed during the subsequent Warring States period, acrimonious controversy revolves around whether they accurately record Spring and Autumn history--the basic events having been distorted by later conceptions and reinterpreted to support politicized perspectives--or may be simply inaccurate. Although the veracity of events and relevance of interpretations clearly impinge upon the chronological accuracy of any intelligence history based upon them, irrespective of their fictional orsubstantial nature, the episodes and beliefs recorded in the Tso Chuanequally assumed a life of their own. Once penned, circulated, and assiduously studied, the stories and events became common knowledge, trusted andapplied by subsequent generations, constantly revisited by military theoristsand political writers throughout the imperial period.
Many of the entries in the Tso Chuan, although sometimes quite cryptic, provide crucial insights into the military history and political intrigues of theSpring and Autumn period, an era that saw several of the essentially feudalstates originally
established by the Chou dynasty after their conquest of the Shang in 1035 B.C. become increasingly pow
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erful and independent. Regional rivalries arose; states, whether in pursuit of power or defensive integrity, invaded each other; and warfare expanded fromchariot-centered battles largely conducted by the nobility, generally limited tosome ten or twenty thousand combatants, to clashes between the massiveinfantry armies that supplemented vastly greater chariot forces. During theSpring and Autumn period survival suddenly became a question of economicand military preparedness, political acumen, effective central government,unwavering control of the masses, mobilization capability, strength and training of standing forces, and degree of professionalism. Acquiringknowledge about other states, whether friendly or hostile, grew critical becauseintentions had to be fathomed, preparations made, political actions initiated,and campaigns planned. The hundreds of incidents recorded in the Tso Chuancreate a vivid portrait of these developments and provide a compelling picturethat the individual states conscientiously gathered military and politicalintelligence, even though rarely depicting clandestine agents being employed on specific missions. Tangentially, these incidents also provide a record of many other aspects of intelligence operations; incorporate materials onevaluating men and motives; show the employment of covert measures tosubvert, debilitate, and betray; portray the role of omens and divination; and illustrate how knowledge thus gained was deliberately exploited. In many waysthe period was more complex than the Warring States era that followed--eventhough the latter is associated with the inception and development of politicaland philosophical doctrines--simply because many more states were struggling to survive and fighting for power, dramatically multiplying thenumber of potential alliances. In contrast, by the commencement of theWarring States period only seven significant states remained, virtually lockedin an interminable death struggle.
Time and Communications
In the Spring and Autumn period cities were largely isolated, scattered about arural countryside still marked by major woods and extensive marshes. Transportation and mounted communication were limited to ox-drawn cartsand wagons, horse-drawn carriages, and military- style chariots. All threemodes were equally constrained by the primitive road systems, which oftenbecame impassable quagmires after rain or snow, and somewhat impeded by the varying track widths found in different regions. Pack animals were alsoemployed and mercantile goods increasingly circulated, particularly in areaswith water transportation. However, the average person traveled, if at all, onhis feet, while horses were not ridden for several more centuries, therebyprecluding the establishment of the swift messenger services found in
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the imperial period, always remaining comparatively few and expensive throughout Chinese history.
These circumstances fundamentally affected the transmission of informationand therefore its nature and relevance. A highly dedicated messenger proceeding on foot could perhaps achieve twenty miles per day for a sustainedperiod and someone driving a fleet chariot easily double, but withoutprepositioned relay stations, a change of horses, and great urgency, thenormal transmission of ordinary diplomatic and military information was severely constricted. However, the impact of these limitations was considerably ameliorated by the lengthy period needed to mobilize armies andadvance them across similarly constricted terrain. Roads not being openthoroughfares, army columns would be strung out for miles, while innumerable logistical problems had to be solved and discipline maintained.For example, speakers in the Tso Chuan noted that approximately threemonths were required to respond to a military threat developing some twothousand kilometers away, to put forces on target from the date news was received, assuming the existence of a minimal standing force that might be rapidly provisioned and dispatched. When resisting an invader coming fromsome distance, the defenders would normally enjoy a preparation time of daysor weeks based upon a sustained army advance of perhaps twelve miles
per day compared with the slowest messenger's rate of twenty to forty and anormal transmission time for vital information between states of severaldays. 1
Unlike later historical periods when, for example, messages are said to have been hidden in wax or rice balls--a development facilitated by the discovery and popularization of paper in the late Han dynasty--little information hasbeen preserved about communication techniques. Apart from messagessimply memorized by couriers and oral presentations extemporaneously composed, brush-written characters furnished the standard medium.Therefore the key questions simply become what materials could be writtenupon and how they might be protected from water since moisture wouldrender the message illegible.
During the Spring and Autumn period two materials were widely employed: narrow, thin slats of wood--usually bamboo--and cloth, especially silk. Thebamboo slips could be bound together with cords and rolled up when morethan a couple of sentences were required. Cumbersome and bulky, they mightserve adequately for diplomatic personnel and others unlikely to be searched or molested, but clearly not in doubtful circumstances or where robbers andbrigands might attack, especially as captured information could provevaluable. Conversely, silk and other cloth materials might easily be writtenupon and easily concealed, whether under layers of clothing or in innocuousobjects. (No doubt garment linings and undergarments frequently
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served to communicate clandestine messages, although there are no concrete references to it in this early period.) Hard objects, such as bowls, vessels, andwooden items, might also have messages written or inscribed upon them inrelatively obscure places. However, because writing materials were limited inantiquity, great reliance was placed upon memory, and prodigious feats inthis regard remain legion. Insofar as entire books were commonly memorizedfor study purposes and their subsequent recitation deemed flawless, lengthy diplomatic or military communiqués could be similarly treated. The difficulty--or more correctly, the fatal flaw--is that the
messenger himself not only had to be physically present to verbalize his report, but also had to be in a conscious, unimpaired condition. Anyonesuspected of conveying covert information could easily be detained, poisoned, or otherwise slain en route, the contents then irretrievably lost. In contrast,messages committed to writing existed independently of their originators or carriers and could be passed from person to person, forwarded innocuously,even unknowingly, without arousing suspicion, especially when buriedamong merchandise being plied by the itinerant traders increasingly commonin the period.
Naturally such difficulties with communication means and modes not only restricted the range of possible covert activities, but also made the passing ofinformation from clandestine sources to their consumers more difficult, oftennecessitating perilous face-to-face contact. An informant, traitor, or agentmight have vital information but nothing at hand beyond a dining plate uponwhich to write. This conjures up imaginative scenes of people desperatelytrying to wedge bulky dishes or even valuable items into a dead drop outside a privy wall or burying them in a stable's straw for later retrieval where somebumpkin might suddenly stumble upon them! Although the advent of paper obviously facilitated clandestine communications, mere inconvenience anddifficulty never deterred the truly determined, particularly when the fate of thestate or vast rewards lay at stake.
Terminology and Agents
In an age that basically lacked organized intelligence staffs or distinctly defined functions, information had to be gathered from every available source. Particularly important would have been the relatively few travelers; emigrants, although low socioeconomic status would generally have precluded access to vital information; diplomatic missions, tasked with both specific evaluative missions and general observation; merchants; and defectors from among themilitary and nobility. The Tso Chuan depicts a wide range of intelligenceactivities, the practice of which can easily be followed down through the agesand will be again
The first truly important character, tie,7 is composed from the classifier or radical for "words" or "speech" and a right hand component for the foliage of a tree, prompting speculation (but no historical evidence) that it first referred tosomeone concealed in a tree covertly listening to or observing others:
Although tie does not appear in the Ch'un Ch'iu itself, it functions both as anoun, referring to "spies," and a verb, meaning "to spy upon," in the TsoChuan. In addition, tie also designates reconnaissance scoutsinconspicuously observing the enemy, much like such ordinary terms as"observe," "watch," or even "investigate."
The first of seven usages in the Tso Chuan occurs in a passage chronicling events that occurred in 700 B.C.: "In invading Chiao, Ch'u's armies dividedup to ford the P'ang River. The forces from Luo, wanting to attack, sent PoChia to spy on them. Three times he went round their encampment, countingthem." 8 Based upon this account, Po Chia obviously passed among Ch'u's forces in some sort of disguise in order to estimate their total numbers, partof the essential information needed for the process of assessing battlefieldoptions under China's classic approach to warfare.
The next entry, for 666 B.C., sees the term being employed for areconnaissance scout that Cheng dispatched to determine Ch'u's position afterhaving successfully repelled their assault but remaining undecided aboutretreating themselves. 9 When Cheng's scout (tie) observed birds about Ch'u'sencampment, in a very basic piece of military intelligence codified later, heconcluded that it was empty, sufficient evidence to deduce that
Ch'u's forces were in retreat. (The possibility that they had been deliberately feeding the birds to attract them seems not to have arisen. 10) However, thenature of his report implies he did not actually enter the enemy encampmentto verify his deduction and, although presumably making his observationsearly in the morning--the troops having dispersed during the night--offers noconfirmatory indication of the equally important absence of cookfires.
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(The records for 484 B.C. right at the end of the Spring and Autumn period similarly indicate a spy from Lu reported one night that Ch'i's forces hadwithdrawn following a disordered battlefield retreat at the end of the day. 11)
Records of the famous episode of approximately 635 B.C. that established Duke Wen of Chin's great credibility indicate that after he besieged the city of Yüan for three days and was visibly prepared to abandon the siege in accordwith his earlier public proclamation, a spy (tie) came out and reported the city was about to fall. (Because sieges were difficult, expensive, and uncertain,employing subversives to both undermine the city's defenses and provide information about weak points in the fortifications, the defenders, andprovisions was of paramount importance. This accounts for the presence of a Chin agent within Yüan.)
In the Tso Chuan the term tie also appears in Wu Tzu-hsü's diatribe (already mentioned in the section on early history) directed against granting a peacetreaty to the just vanquished state of Yüeh, and again in a story related toCh'u and Wu Tzu-hsü's difficulties. In the latter Ch'u's exiled former heirapparent, then dwelling in Cheng, foolishly agreed to assist Chin in assaulting Cheng's capital by mounting a coordinated internal response, even though hehad been welcomed and well treated there. 12 In 477 B.C., needing to fix theexact date, Chin dispatched a covert agent, a tie, to Cheng, but thisclandestine courier was caught in the first recorded example of Chinesecounterintelligence because a staff member bitter over ill treatment had betrayed the heir apparent, resulting in the latter being secretly watched by local Cheng agents. 13
Finally, an entry for 601 B.C. illustrates the working alliances that occurred between indigenous Chinese states and so-called barbarian steppe peopleseven in antiquity. As the Tso Chuan concludes with a puzzling remark, it isworth quoting: "In the spring the White Ti and the state of Chin concluded a peace treaty, and in the summer they mounted a joint attack against Ch'in.Chin's forces captured a spy (tie) from Ch'in and executed him in Chiang'smarketplace, but after six days he revived."14 (Some commentators havesuggested that the ill-fated spy was a Ch'in general, an appropriate choice fora military intelligence mission. 15) Although long considered a dubious passage because of the bizarre conclusion, which no doubt stems from acorruption of the original text, it still provides important evidence of covertagents and countermeasures in the Spring and Autumn period.
Unfortunately the appearance of terms such as tie and chien in the Tso Chuanaccounts for these early dates does not equate with their existence and usethen because the Tso Chuan was compiled and edited
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in the Warring States period--presumably from earlier, possibly contemporary records and oral recensions--by which time the character tie had becomecommonplace. (Its appearance in the Ch'un Ch'iu, clearly a close chronicle ofearly events, would be more conclusive.) However, whatever the term, withoutdoubt "covert agents" were employed and the concept of spying was alreadywell developed in the Spring and Autumn period.
A second character frequently found in the Tso Chuan and even the Ch'un Ch'iu, hsien encompasses several meanings, only one of which designates secret activities and would then be pronounced chien. Visually interesting, thecharacter is composed of a radical or signifier depicting the leaves of a traditional Chinese double door (or possibly a gate around the outside) and essentially a pictograph of a half moon between them:
Hsien's (chien's) meaning evolved over the subsequent centuries, with avariant character that substitutes the sun for the moon assuming most of theoriginal senses:
Both characters immediately suggest the moon or sun seen through a crack between closed double doors, resulting in meanings such as "crevice" and"the space between" and, by abstraction, "interval in time." As a verb itcame to signify "to estrange," "separate," or "put space between," and thusdesignate the common, though covert, ac
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tivities of sowing dissension within the court, estranging rulers from their ministers, and besmirching successful generals and meritorious officials.16 From this basic image also derives the extended usage of "peering into a crevice"--discerning the moon through the crack and otherwise learning whatlies inside closed doors--and thus to spy on from without. Eventually hsien, the primary pronunciation of the character with moon, came to mean"leisure," "idleness," or "spare time," shedding the earlier meanings except inarcane language. However, perhaps in response to this shift an even morecomplex
character evolved, redundantly placing the signifier for "eye" to the left of the original character: 17
Also pronounced hsien, meaning "to watch" or "spy on," it appears in the famous Mencius.
In some eighty occurrences of the original character hsien in the Tso Chuan(and virtually none in the other commentaries), only four unequivocally carry the meaning of "to spy on" or "secretly observe," two of which are particularlyinteresting. In the first, disaffected members among the nobility and extendedroyal family employed one member's cousin, a spurned concubine in the marquis of Ch'i's harem, to "spy on the marquis" with a promise of marriage if their rebellious plot should prove successful. 18 In the second case the minorstate of Tun, subserviently dependent upon Ch'u for its continued existence, was compelled by the latter to clandestinely observe (chien) the nearby state of Ch'en in order to identify invasion opportunities. However, Ch'en's forcesstruck first by besieging Tun's capital. 19 Although the remaining twooccurrences of chien are essentially matters of mounting observation,discreetly and unsuspected, the term became the common one for "spy" from the Warring States on, eventually coupled with such words as "turned," fan,and with tie to form compound words designating different types of agentsfrom the Han dynasty onward. 20 In fact, its use became quite indiscriminate,with writers since the Sung even terming the merchant in the following episode a chien:
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Duke Mu of Ch'in mobilized his army and was about to mount a suddenstrike against Cheng. Chien Shu said: "You cannot. I have heard that tomount a surprise attack, the chariots
While marching forward, the army passed by Chou and went east. A merchantfrom Cheng named Hsüan Kao, pretending it was the Earl of Cheng's order, feasted Ch'in's forces with twelve cattle. Ch'in's Three Armies were then afraidand muttered among themselves: "We have traveled several thousandkilometers in order to suddenly attack an enemy, but before we reach our objective they already know it. Their preparations will certainly be complete, so we will not be able to make a surprise attack." The army turned about andreturned to Ch'in. 21
This incident was subsequently cited as an example of clear thinking insofar as Hsüan Kao mounted a ruse that convincingly deceived an enemy that clearly did not have forward scouts reporting on the actual situationin Cheng.
Another character sometimes associated with the ancient period is chan, composed of the left and right components, respectively, of the radical orsignifier for "prognostication" (chan) and that for "to see" (chien):
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In at least one Tso Chuan passage it clearly means "to clandestinely observe,"22 but the definitive use appears in the famous Warring States text on thenature, practice, and psychology of the rites or normative forms of behavior,the li, known as the Li Chi, in connection with a story about Tzu Han:
When an armed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City Magistrate, TzuHan, entered his house and wept tears of grief. An agent from Chin, havingsecretly observed [chan] this, reported back to the marquis of Chin: "When anarmed guard at the east gate of Sung died, the City Magistrate, Tzu Han,entered his house and wept tears of grief, which pleased the populace. Itappears they probably cannot be attacked yet." When Confucius heard aboutthis entire incident, he exclaimed: "Excellent, this spying upon a foreign state.The Odes state: 'Whenever the people experience mourning, he exerts every effort to assist them.' Even though this is only a minute matter for Chin, whounder Heaven is capable of opposing them?"23
Diplomatic Missions
Diplomatic missions doubtlessly provided a major, comparatively reliable source of information about other states, even though important emissarieswould probably have been denied extensive freedom. However, merely being present in a foreign state would immediately permit the emissaries to observe the general conditions, provide an opportunity to acquire information throughconversations and bribery, and perhaps allow staff members and retainers tolearn much from
their counterparts and local servants. An early example of a deliberateevaluative mission occurred in 661 B.C.:
In the winter Chung-sun Ch'iu went from Ch'i on a mission to observe Lu's difficulties [following the ruler's assassination]. After he returned, he reported,"Unless they get rid of Ch'ing Fu [the murderer], Lu's difficulties will neverend."
"How can he be eliminated?" the Duke asked.
Chung-sun replied: "Since the difficulties are unending, he will perish by himself. Can you not wait for it?"
"Can we seize Lu?" the duke inquired.
Chung-sun Ch'iu replied: "We cannot. They still firmly adhere to the rites of Chou, the very foundation of a state. I have heard
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that when a state is about to perish, only after the foundation has first beenoverturned will the leaves and branches follow. Since Lu has not yetabandoned the practice of the rites, it cannot yet be moved. My lord shouldconcentrate upon bringing about tranquillity in Lu's difficulties andmaintaining close relations with it. Being close to states that practice therites, thereby reinforcing solidity, and keeping distant from the disaffected, thereby overturning confusion and chaos, are the practices of a hegemon." 24
The dialogue suggests this mission was undertaken with a view to launching apunitive expedition to either extinguish or annex the state, and the emissary'sreply reflects the parameters by which he judged the government's adherenceto virtuous standards of behavior. The term employed to characterize hismission merits note: hsing, a variant pronunciation of the character sheng, meaning to investigate or observe, rather than chien, the character for acting as a clandestine agent.
A second example illustrates the criteria an astute observer might employto evaluate the conditions in a subject state. Although the followingepisode is probably an imaginative reconstruction dating from the WarringStates period, it is firmly rooted in historical events that took place in 603B.C. when Duke Tan Hsiang apparently undertook a mission to
ascertain the conditions in Sung. Upon his return he made a highly negative report based upon the contiguous state of Ch'en's disregard of properdiplomatic protocol and their neglect of agriculture and public works, fundamental activities that would have to be organized and administered bythe state if it was to survive. Duke Ling, whose debauched demise is retold inthis section of our study as well, was another sorry example of the myopicrulers who fervently destroyed the glorious heritage entrusted to them. Thedetailed criteria that Duke Tan systematically applied in making his politicalassessment, although illuminating in themselves, subsequently functioned as a virtual textbook example:
King Ting of Chou dispatched Duke Tan Hsing on a friendly mission of inquiry to Sung. Thereafter the duke requested permission from Ch'en to cross theirstate in order to visit Ch'u. Mars was visible in the early morning, but theroads were impassable due to heavy vegetation. The protocol officer did notappear at the border. The Director of Works did not inspect the roads, the marshes were not diked or the rivers bridged. The work of threshing was notyet finished. The roads lacked rows of border trees, newly reclaimed lands stillhad brush. The master of ceremonies did not
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bring in the sacrificial meats; the attendant of guests did not provide adwelling; the state lacked lodging places; the districts lacked way stations. Thepeople were about to erect a pleasure tower for the Hsia clan. When Duke Tanreached the capital of Ch'en, Duke Ling, K'ung Ning, and Yi Hsing-fu had goneto the Hsia family's mansions garbed in rustic clothes, where they remained, so Duke Tan never interviewed them.
On his return to Chou the duke reported, "Unless Duke Ling of Ch'enexperiences a great awakening, his state will certainly perish." The king inquired why this should be so, to which Duke Tan replied: "When chen-chiaois visible in the Heavens, the rainy season is over. When T'ien-ken is visible, water begins to dry up; when pen is seen, the season for shrubs and grass isat an end; when ssu becomes visible, frost appears; when Mars is visible, clear winds warn the people of oncoming cold.
"According to the instructions of the former kings, when the rainy seasonends, the roads should be cleared; when water dries up, the dikes are completed; when the season for trees and grass is ended, they are preparedfor storage; when frost appears, winter clothes are readied. When clear windsblow, the city's inner and outer walls and its palaces are repaired. Thus the regulations of the Hsia dynasty [employed even today] state, 'In the ninthmonth clear the roads, in the tenth complete the bridges.' The seasonalrescripts state: 'After harvesting, winnow the wheat. When the year star is inthe ying constellation, earth works are undertaken. When mars is first seen, assemble under the directors of villages.' This was the way the former kingsbespread their Virtue throughout the realm without making fiscalexpenditures. Now mars was visible when I was in Ch'en, but the roads werealmost blocked with vegetation; the fields seem to have been abandoned; themarshes were not yet banked; and the rivers lacked pontoon bridges. They areneglecting the instructions of the former kings.
"The regulations of Chou include: 'Array rows of trees in order to mark the roads, establish way stations in order to watch the roads.' Cities had pasturesin the outer suburbs, the borders had permanent lookouts. Dried marshesprovided tall grass, state gardens had trees and pools in order to prepareagainst disaster. All the remaining land was planted in grain, and the peoplenever hung up their hoes. The fields did not have weeds. The people's agricultural seasons were not interfered with, nor did the state seek thepeople's labor. There was abundance without lack, ease without exhaustion. The states were ordered, the districts disciplined. Now in the state of Ch'en the roads cannot be recognized,
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the fields are covered with grass. Their grains, although mature, remainunharvested, while the people exhaust themselves in ease and pleasure.Thus they have abandoned the laws and regulations of the former kings.
"The Royal Offices of Chou state: 'When a high-ranking envoy from an enemy state arrives, the captain of the customs barrier informs the ruler about it. Thedirector of guests greets him
with his credentials. An usher guides them to the capital, a high minister comes forth to inquire after them at the suburbs. The city gatekeeper clearsout the gate; the clan priest takes charge of the tablets; the director of villagesassigns them a residence; the director of labor prepares the way; the ministerof works checks the roads; the minister of justice suppresses evildoers; the master of marshes sees to the materials; the warden gathers firewood; themaster of fire supervises the heating; the master of water supervises bathingwater; the chief of provisions arrays the food; the chef prepares the rice; thestable master spreads the fodder; the mechanic attends to the carriages; and the hundred officials all attend to their affairs appropriately.' The guest entersas if going home, so all the members of his party embrace loving feelings.
"If a guest from an honored state arrives, all the representatives handling these affairs are increased by one grade and marked by augmented sincerity. When it is an officer of the king, all the office heads personally take charge of the affair and the chief chancellor oversees them. When the king conducts a tour of inspection and preservation [every twelve years], the ruler personally supervises.
"Now today, although I am not talented, I am still a collateral member of the Chou royal family and in accord with regal order was crossing Ch'en as anofficial guest, but none of the officials came forth. This is an insult to the officeof our former kings. Their edict states: 'It is the Tao of Heaven to reward thegood and punish the licentious. Therefore we have established states. Thosewho do not follow the precepts are dissolute, those who do not complete themare arrogant and licentious. Every one should preserve their foundations inorder to receive Heaven's blessings.' Now Duke Ling of Ch'en has not thoughtabout his role in continuing their line, has abandoned his consorts and concubines, and leads his ministers to assist in licentious relations with Hsia Chi. Ch'en's royal family is of the great surname Chi. To abandon regal robesand don a southern cap to go out, isn't this simply dissolute? So they haveagain offended against the laws of the former kings.
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"The former kings exerted themselves to lead the people with Virtue, yet they still feared nearly committing transgressions. How can anyone who abandonstheir instructions and casts aside their regulations, insults their offices andcontravenes their edicts, preserve their state? Dwelling amid four great statesand yet lacking these four, how can Ch'en long endure?"
In the 601 B.C. year Duke Tan went to Ch'en; two years later Duke Ling was killed at the Hsia mansion; the following year the king of Ch'u exterminatedCh'en.
Agriculturally based societies such as China in the early sixth century B.C. were much subject to the vagaries of weather and climate and therefore reliedfor their very existence upon carefully prepared calendrical materials thatincluded detailed instructions for initiating seasonally appropriate actionscorrelated with celestial phenomena. Failure to observe the admonitions and prohibitions, even without unexpected rains or drought, could result in cropsdamaged by frost in the spring or grains insufficiently mature for harvesting in the fall. Thus, in his report Tan Hsiang was very precise in describingCh'en's failure to meet autumn's progressive responsibilities and therefore concluded that the government could not survive. 25
The Hsing-jen
Theoreticians writing in the T'ang observed that the first administrative official operationally responsible for undertaking intelligence activities in China wasthe Hsing-jen of the Chou dynasty. A title composed of the characters forhsing, meaning "to travel" or "perform some action," and jen, "man" or "human being," the post and its duties seemed to have varied from state to state andthe circumstances of the moment rather than systematically evolving overtime. Every state that modeled on Chou bureaucratic organization employedHsing-jen, sometimes several, and while ranking in power and prestige belowthe prime minister, they still resided at the apex of power, often as functionally significant as the early specialized ministers for war and works. As with many Chinese terms, no simple English equivalent suitably translatesit in all its varied usages, but their primary responsibilities seem to have
encompassed everything from simple messenger, in which case it was not atitled position, through diplomatic courier, protocol director, secretary of state, and foreign minister.
The Chou Li (Rites of Chou), an idealized reconstruction of Chouadministrative offices and practices probably composed late in the
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Warring States period, enumerates several critical responsibilities for boththe Great Hsing-jen and Minor Hsing-jen:
The Ta Hsing-jen [Great Hsing-jen] administers the rites for important visitors and the formal ceremonies for major guests designed to gain the intimacy of the feudal lords. [Through his auspices], in the spring the king of Chou assembles the feudal lords at court to plan the affairs of the realm and in theautumn holds audiences to compare the achievements of the various states.In the summer he holds court to display the plans of the realm, and in winterconvenes them in order to harmonize their thoughts. Seasonal assembliesare held in order to publicize the prohibitions applicable throughout the fourquarters and audiences held in order to implement governmental measuresthroughout the realm.
From time to time [the Ta Hsing-jen] conducts friendly missions of inquiry tounite the feudal lords, at other times imperial audiences are employed toeliminate hidden evil among the feudal states. On an annual basis the TaHsing-jen makes inquiries among the feudal lords in order to fathom theirintentions. Through him the king has sacrificial meats sent back to the feudal lords in order to invoke good fortune, deputes missions of congratulations inorder to augment their happiness and missions of condolence in order toassist them during times of disaster. The Ta Hsing-jen discriminates amongthe edicts applicable to the feudal lords with the nine ceremonies and sets outthe various ministerial ranks in order to unify the rites of the feudal states andattend to their honored guests.
The Hsiao Hsing-jen [Minor Hsing-jen] administers the rites of tribute for the submissive states and thus attends to the emissaries from the four quarters. He orders the feudal lords to submit their offerings in the spring andcontribute their labor in the autumn. The king personally receives them andtreats them according to their respective tributes. Whenever the feudal lords come to submit these tributes, the Hsiao Hsing-jen meets them at the border.
If a state is in mourning, the Hsiao Hsing-jen orders the other states tocontribute to its funeral expenses. If a state suffers from famine, he ordersthem to distribute stores of grain as aid. If a state has suffered from military engagements, he orders the other states to provide material assistance. If a state enjoys some auspicious affair, he orders them to send presents in congratulation. If a state suffers some disaster, he orders the other states tocondole with them in their grief. Now these five things, their causes, prof
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its, and harm to the myriad people are all recorded in a book. The customs and ceremonies, government affairs, instructions, administrative measures, as well as adherence to and violation of instructions and prohibitions, are tomake up another book. Those among the feudal lords who are contrary, perverse, brutal, chaotic, conceal hidden plots, or violate edicts are to compose one book; deaths and mourning, famines and impoverishment,another book; and health, happiness, harmony, and tranquillity, anotherbook. Now all these five things should be discriminated by states in order tofulfill the king's mandate and thereby thoroughly know the causes and affairsthroughout the realm.
Although the Chou Li elaborates a coherent vision of Chou government thatwas realized only in part, the Hsing-jen was clearly entrusted with supervisingthe major rites of state, an activity that obviously brought him into closecontact with foreign dignitaries on a daily basis. Moreover, the Hsiao Hsing-jen's responsibility for not only collecting basic information about all theactivities occurring in the feudal states, but also seeing that it was properlyrecorded (and thus provide an objective basis for analyzing affairs andmaking judgments)
indicates that apart from his basic role as an observant emissary, intelligence gathering was a dedicated function. Therefore, it might be concluded thatChina's first official staff position with intelligence responsibilities was theHsiao Hsing-jen, operating within the purview of the Ta Hsing-jen. 26
Records preserved in the Ch'un Ch'iu and Tso Chuan, while providing a more historically grounded portrait of Hsing-jen activities, essentially substantiatethe claim that they should be considered not only China's first official covertagents, but also its first intelligence directors. However, their primary role was simply and probably originally that of a messenger, whether between states orenemies on a battlefield. 27 Accordingly, in such situations the title might betranslated as "messenger" or "courier," although when deputed with full statesanctification "envoy," "emissary," or "ambassador" is more appropriate and even explicitly justified by the Tso Chuan. In fact, the Kung Yang commentary to the Ch'un Ch'iu emphasizes that one is termed a Hsing-jen only when acting on official business, not private concerns. 28 However, the three titles justmentioned imply discretionary powers within the parameters of a defined mission rather than a mere verbatim presentation of a message from a ruler or prime minister to foreign counterparts. Presumably the messenger wouldnot only return with a reply or in the company of someone bearing a reply, butalso carefully scrutinize the reactions of those receiving the message,
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note the situational context, and mark other relevant facts for subsequentanalysis. In short, couriers and envoys did not simply convey messages withblind eyes and deaf ears.
Messengers were frequently employed preceding battles as part of the ancientritual of issuing noble challenges and demands that the enemy surrenderwhile no doubt undertaking a perceptive survey of their camp. For example, following the first day's clash at the battle of Yen-ling a messenger sent topique Ch'u was evaluated as being fearful because his eyes kept moving, looking about apprehensively, prompting Ch'u to incorrectly deduce thatChin's forces would surreptitiously withdraw. 29 While the messenger, being inthe midst of an
enemy encampment, might naturally have been frightened, protocol shouldhave dictated that he be returned unharmed, suggesting he was actually observing their preparations and evaluating their ability to sustain renewedcombat. 30
In their role as couriers and envoys several Hsing-jen were seized and evenkilled, implying the existence of clandestine aspects to their official roles,whatever the ostensible reasons for their detention. A number of nonfatal examples are also recorded, states such as Chin, Ch'u, or Ch'in detainingHsing-jen and seizing those who violated their territory without permissionwhile crossing to a third state. 31 Commenting on the Ch'un Ch'iu entry that"Ch'u seized Cheng's Hsing-jen, Liang Hsiao," the Tso Chuan notes that Cheng had dispatched emissaries to announce a shift in allegiance from Ch'u toChin, resulting in the envoys being detained, and adds that the Ch'un Ch'iurefers to them as Hsing-jen because they were official ambassadors. (Woefulwere the prospects for bearers of such ill tidings!) After they were held for morethan a year, Liang Hsiao and his companion finally persuaded Ch'u's rulerthat he was only subverting Ch'u's purposes by frustrating their mission,thereby further estranging Cheng and allowing the remaining lords there acomparatively free hand. 32
In another prominent incident the Tso Chuan explains that the "men of Chinseized the Hsing-jen from Wei, Shih Mai," because Wei, under Shih's leadership, had successfully mounted an attack on Ts'ao, Chin's client state,the year before. Although smoldering hatred triggered this precipitous action,of greater interest is the Hsing-jen's qualifications. Not just a facelessbureaucrat, he was an experienced commander and therefore doubtlessly seeking military information as well as fulfilling some innocuous cover mission. 33 Furthermore, Chin also detained a Hsing-jen from Lu who hadbeen sent to investigate a skirmish between their people and those from theminor state of Chu. 34
An unfortunate envoy from the peripheral southwestern state of Pa was seized and executed by border peoples in the minor state of Teng
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while en route there from Ch'u, eventually precipitating a battle between a Pa-Ch'u coalition force and Teng's army. 35 However, cases also arose in whichHsing-jen were the hapless victims of violence directed against them becauseof strife arising within their home states or some action in the greaterdiplomatic arena. For example, Ch'u seized and executed Ch'en's envoy eventhough "the guilt did not lie with the Hsing-jen." 36 A typical Ch'un Ch'iu entry for 501 B.C. that laconically states, "Ch'i seized Wei's Hsing-jen, Pei Kung-chieh, in order to invade Wei" is explicated by the Tso Chuan: "The marquis of Wei wanted to rescind his allegiance to Chin, but the great officers would notpermit it. Therefore the marquis dispatched Pei Kung-chieh to Ch'i whileprivately advising the marquis of Ch'i to seize Pei in order to invade them. Themarquis followed his suggestion and they subsequently concluded a covenantat Suo." 37 Whether the Hsing-jen unknowingly carried a written message tohave himself seized is unclear but highly likely because travel between stateswas difficult, particularly for nonofficial travelers. Finally, the small state of Wei, having killed Wu's Hsing-jen, was terrified that powerful Wu wouldannihilate them and therefore plotted possible courses of action with their own Hsing-jen, thus preserving evidence of the latter's enlarged role inplanning of military strategy. 38
The Ku Liang defines the Hsing-jen as one "who assists in words betweenstates," 39 and in the simple role of courier he was expected to verbally deliverhis message as dictated, without admixing his own views. In fact a courtincident arose in the state of Chin when the prime minister designated Tzu Yfin to undertake a mission over another Hsing-jen, the latter having beenrejected because he often changed the words of communiqués to interject hisown opinions. 40 However, Hsing-jen also acted as envoys with apparentlywide discretionary powers, authorized to independently persuade andnegotiate with officials in foreign states, and thus became, as the Tso Chuancomments, emissaries or ambassadors entrusted with diplomatic tasks.
That states apparently assumed foreign envoys bearing the title of Hsing-jenhad hidden purposes may be gleaned from an incident in the autumn of 502B.C. when Chin detained Sung's Hsing-jen. The Tso Chuan indicates that theenvoy in question,
Yüeh Hao-li, a minister in Sung, had advised the duke not to neglect the deputation of a submissive mission of allegiance to mighty Chin and was senthimself. Venturing into the state, he was met by Chao Chien, who grandly entertained him, prompting Yüeh to give him sixty willow shields as a present,despite his own steward's protests. Arriving at the capital, he was denounced by a Chin official for giving precedence to personal affairs, neglecting officialstate business, and delaying the execution of
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his mission, thereby insulting two rulers, and was accordingly imprisoned.Superficially it appears he simply violated the protocol and procedures appropriate to his task, but more likely, given the internal strife that wouldsoon sunder Chin into three independent states, he was probably suspectedof providing aid to one of the factions, including weapons, whether on hisown initiative or as part of a Sung effort to politically undermine Chin.
Whether at home in his native state or abroad in the fulfillment of a diplomatic mission, the Hsing-jen constantly interacted with foreign officials andtherefore had numerous opportunities to clandestinely acquire information forthe state. In fact, rulers routinely employed their protocol chiefs to privately query visitors on mystifying actions or behavior, thereby not only sparingeveryone embarrassment, but also establishing a convenient precedent andconducive context for the secret exchange of information. For example, whenan emissary from Wei did not respond to the performance of the Odes aswould be expected, the Hsing-jen was instructed to personally question him. 41
In their expanded roles, Hsing-jen also performed functions equivalent to amodern foreign secretary or secretary of state. While frequently defined by traditional commentaries as essentially chief of protocol, an office mainly responsible for supervising the reception and entertainment of foreignemissaries, in many cases they were clearly charged with the task of acquiring knowledge about foreign states, knowing their affairs, planning diplomatic andmilitary strategy, and initiating actions, as indicated by the Chou Li. Theposition's importance
may be seen in three specific historical instances. First, when the Duke ofShen departed from Wu after completing his military mission, he deputed hisson to act as Wu's Hsing-jen and thus control all its communications withforeign states. 42 Second, the historically famous Wu Tzu-hsü was appointed as Hsing-jen when he fled to Wu, a post he retained throughout his career "soas to plot against Ch'u." Although this vengeful plotting clearly was confinedto the court, he certainly consulted on state affairs in general and may alsohave traveled, much as he did to Ch'i late in life, on missions he could have subverted to this purpose had Ho-lü not also been in favor of an aggressive, expansionist policy. 43 Yet until the rise of King Fu-ch'ai and machinations ofthe traitor Po P'i, his influence and power were unequaled as he plottedmilitary actions with Sun-tzu.
Third, Tzu Yü, one of Confucius's most successful disciples, prominently served as Hsing-jen in Cheng, a state renowned for a government so effectivethat it flourished despite being surrounded by mighty neighbors. In theAnalects itself Tzu Yü is noted for his ability to finalize or polish the drafts of communications with other states, the commentators frequently citing a ChouLi definition of his du
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ties--"to oversee the rites connected with communicating with other states."44 Moreover, in an appraisal of Cheng's strength a minister from Wei singledout the state's two Hsing-jen--Tzu Yü and Kung-sun Hui--for theircomprehensive knowledge of other states, prompting the Tso Chuan tocomment:
Tzu Ch'an, in his administration of government, selected the capable andemployed them; Feng Chien-tzu was capable of deciding major affairs; Tzu Ta-shu was handsome and refined; Kung- sun Hui was able to know about theactivities of the four surrounding states, distinguish the clan and family names of the high officials, their positions, rank, and whether they werecapable or not, and moreover was good at drafting orders. P'i Ch'en had planing ability that when exercised in the wilds was successful, but in the citywas not. 45
Whenever Cheng had some pending matter with the feudal lords, Tzu Ch'aninquired about the actions of the surrounding states from Tzu Yü andmoreover had him draft several versions of the edicts. Then he rode out intothe countryside in a carriage with P'i Ch'en to decide whether the plans wouldwork or not, and finally informed Feng Chien-tzu to have the decisionrendered. When a decision was reached, he then entrusted it to Tzu Ta-shu tohave it transmitted as a response to their honored guests. For this reasonthey rarely encountered failure. 46
From this description Cheng Hsing-jen, while nominally protocol directors,were clearly masters of foreign information, essentially state intelligencedirectors as detailed in the Chou Li definition of the Hsiao Hsing-jen's duties. Tzu Yü's own fame derived from his superlative performance in executing foreign missions, handling visiting dignitaries, gathering and evaluating information, and planning state affairs, as befits a Ta Hsing-jen. 47
The Mu, or Clandestine Shepherd
A Han-shih Wai-chuan passage asserts that an official called the Mu-- a term meaning "shepherd"--should be established for the steppe and tribute regionsand charged with intelligence gathering responsibilities:
The king must establish two shepherds for each of the four quarters and depute them to secretly observe distant regions and oversee their masses. Whenever people in the distant quarters suffer
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from hunger or cold without receiving clothing and food, there are criminal cases and lawsuits in which the charges are not equitably decided, or theworthy fail to be appointed to office, they should send reports back to the Sonof Heaven. When their rulers come to pay homage at the court, after salutingand bringing them forward the Son of Heaven addresses them: "Alas, can it be that the instructions of our administration have not reached your domain? How can there be hungry and cold people who lack clothes and food, orcriminal cases and
lawsuits that have not been decided equitably, or worthies that remainunappointed?"
After the local ruler retires from the court, he will certainly consult with his ministers and high officials about this incident. When the people of thosedistant quarters hear about it, they will all acclaim: "He is truly the Son of Heaven. Although we live in a rustic corner, he sees us as if we were nearby.Although we live in darkness, he sees us clearly. How can he be deceived?"Thus the shepherds are the means by which to open the Son of Heaven's eyesto the four quarters and allow his perception to penetrate them. 48
From this description it would appear that the shepherds or overseers functioned as central government observers deployed in a conscious,ostensibly benevolent attempt to rectify the administrative shortcomings of peripheral states. However, an examination of the classic works associatedwith the Spring and Autumn period--the Ch'un Ch'iu and Tso Chuan--revealsonly one instance that asserts Mu are to be established for China's anciently delineated nine regions, essentially echoing a statement found in the "Cannonsof Yao" in the Shang Shu. 49 In all other cases the term refers to shepherds,herders, fodder overseers (serving in the quartermaster corps), or cattlemanagers. Furthermore, even the lengthy Chou Li, while touching on theoffice some dozen times, contains only three passages that suggest a centrallydeputed observer's role, but none that their activities would have a secret orclandestine character. 50 First, as one of the nine aspects or factors (such as"clans," "teachers," and the "Tao") by which the king gains and controls the people, the shepherd is said to "gain people with land" (whereas a "teachergains people through his worthiness" and the "Confucian gains people throughthe Tao"). 51 A second series of nine offices and aspects, such as rank andclothes, designed to rectify the states includes the establishment of Mu, understood by the commentators as "regional governors" but not necessarily so. 52 However, a third brief passage suggests they were intended to exercisesome indefinite supervisory function over the
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states, especially when the king is about to make his tour of inspection, implying that they will provide the information necessary for the king's administrative judgments. 53 Yet the available material is so sparse, thereferences so minimal, that substantive conclusions beyond recognizing thatsomething like the censors or independent inspectors of latter times that were turned against the state's own administrators, becoming an internal affair,were conceptually present in the Spring and Autumn era are unjustified.
Military Intelligence
Apart from information gained from diplomatic missions, spies, and defectors, the essential activities of military intelligence--observing the enemy andprocuring the data necessary for evaluating threats and assessing intentions--were obviously carried out in the Spring and Autumn period and almostcertainly in the Shang as well. Although structured approaches to informationgathering awaited the military theorists of the Warring States and subsequenteras, basic practices were already being implemented for field armies. Moreover, events recorded in the Tso Chuan conclusively show that theindividual states consciously and consistently acquired vital strategic and tactical information, enabling them to plan effectively and react adequately. A few examples are particularly telling.
In 706 B.C. the Spring and Autumn Annals laconically state that "in the summer the marquis of Ch'i and earl of Cheng went to Chi," but the TsoChuan explains that they sought to mount a sudden attack against Chi. Muchto their surprise and consternation, Chi already knew their intentions,evidence that it had been constantly gathering intelligence against its apparentfriends. 54
In 684 B.C. a high official of Lu went out to observe the coalition forces of Ch'i and Sung that had encamped near Lu's capital and then returned tomake this report: "Sung's army is not well ordered and can be defeated. IfSung is defeated, Ch'i will certainly return home. I suggest we launch a sudden attack." Finding his proposal rejected, he personally led an
assault on Sung's forces and defeated them, prompting Ch'i to withdraw as predicted. 55
In 645 B.C. when Chin and Ch'in were about to engage in another of thenumerous battles that would occur over the next century, Chin dispatchedHan Chien to watch Ch'in's army. He advised, "Their army is fewer than ours,but their elite warriors are twice as many."56
China's first recorded active reconnaissance probe--a technique emphasized acentury and a half later by the great tactician and general
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Wu Ch'i--is for 630 B.C.57 That spring a force from Chin made a limited incursion into Cheng to determine whether it could be successfully invaded ornot. 58 Apparently the results inspired confidence because they besieged it inalliance with Ch'in that autumn.
Barbarian peoples of the steppe region somehow were also well informed about the northern plains states--no doubt through traders and other contacts along a very porous border, as well as diplomatic missions--andfrequently exploited their knowledge by taking advantage of weakness andgaps in the contiguous states. For example, in the case just cited the Ti "spied out" (chien) Chin's preoccupation and therefore invaded its ally, Ch'i.59 Another example arose three years later when the Ti exploited the mourning period for Chin's ruler to again make an incursion into Ch'i. 60 This was justthe opposite of Wei's actions the previous year when the Jung were sufferingfrom chaos and a Wei force successfully invaded and forced them to seekpeace. Some two decades later ( 610 B.C.) a Chou force surprised and overwhelmed the Jung when they were engaged in a drinking feast, certainlynot an accidental accomplishment. 61 Thus China's pattern of alternating aggressions between the central states and the steppe peoples was already well established at this early date. Moreover, alliances were formed with theso-called barbarians not only by states intent on assaulting other states, butalso by factions involved in internal intrigues hoping to utilize foreign troops to
realize their objectives, often with unexpectedly adverse consequences for all concerned. 62
Defectors
Unlike in the Warring States period that followed, few individuals traveledabout in the Spring and Autumn to offer advice on political, military, oradministrative matters. However, as the struggle for power among the originalruling Chou families, local powerful clans, and the ministerial familiesintensified with the passing of decades, the number of disaffected, displaced, and disinherited rose dramatically. Many powerful families and members of collateral lines were reduced almost to commoner status and thereforecompelled to furnish the officers, administrators, and even warriorsincreasingly essential to managing ever more populous and prosperous states.With the internal intrigue and political infighting becoming more severe, people of every rank were forced to flee to foreign states in fear of their livesrather than simply venturing there for greater opportunities as guest ministersor experienced administrators. Others sought refuge from
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oppressive rulers or superiors who had dishonored them, hoping to exploitforeign power to exact vengeance or even annihilate their native states. Suchmen furnished not only a pool of ready advisers, but also a reasonably reliable source of detailed information on powerful individuals, currentpolicies, likely supporters, troop strength, military training, types ofweapons, and logistical preparedness. 63
In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods political defectors and even defeated generals were frequently placed in active command of troops,thereafter leading successful attacks against their former armies. (With thepassage of centuries--and particularly during periods of dynastic turmoil--following their surrender entire units were increasingly integrated andrefielded with new insignia, surprisingly going on to fight valiantly againsttheir former comrades!) However, employing defectors always entailed aninherent threat of betrayal. At best they were simply acting for their owninterests, at worst
"You acted inappropriately. When a gentleman goes into exile, he doesn'tventure to enemy states. However, if he happens to be in one when it is aboutto undertake aggressive action against his native state, if he hasn't assumedministerial office there, he should race back and die for it. If alreadyentrusted with administrative responsibility, he should seek obscurity.Moreover, a man does not abandon his village because of personal hatred. Now if you want to overturn your ancestral state for a minor hatred, isn't thisdifficult? If the duke wants to appoint you to lead the army, you shoulddecline, for then the king will certainly employ me." Shu- sun Ch'e was much troubled by his previous actions.
When the king indeed queried Kung-shan Pu-niu, he replied: "Although Lulacks any basis for sustaining itself, many men will certainly sacrifice themselves for it. Since the feudal lords will also strive to save it, you will beunable to achieve your ambitions there. If Chin, Ch'i, and Ch'u support it, this will amount to four enemies. Moreover, Lu is like the lips for the teeth of Ch'i and
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Chin. When the lips are lost, the teeth inevitably feel cold. As my lord certainly knows, what else can they do but rescue it?"
In the third month Wu still attacked Lu, with Pu-niu acting as their guide. He deliberately chose a path through precipitous terrain that bypassed the city of Wu-ch'eng. However, it happened that earlier some men from Wu-ch'eng with farms along Wu's border had seized a native of Cheng who had been
macerating rushes in the river to make mats and accused him of polluting their water. Therefore, when Wu's army arrived, he willingly led it inland toattack and subjugate Wu-ch'eng. 64
Although the rich and powerful naturally commanded the attention ofhistorians and state scribes, disaffected defectors included many ordinarypeople--such as the mat-maker in the foregoing incident--who acted as local guides, spies, and even subversives out of a variety of motivations.
Another oft-cited example unfolded toward the end of the Spring andAutumn period:
In autumn, Kao Fa of Ch'i led the army to attack the minor state of Chü. Theprince of Chü fled to Chi-chang, so Kao Fa had Sun Shu go to attack it. Long before, the prince of Chü had killed the husband of a local woman. When shegrew old, the widow had cast her lot with the city of Chi-chang. [Seeing these developments,] she plaited a rope that matched the height of the city wall andthen stored it away. When Chi's forces arrived, she [secured it and] tossed theend over the wall. Someone pointed it out to Sun Shu, who had his menascend it. When some sixty had successfully climbed up, the rope broke, butthen the army beat the drums and set up a clamor while the men already ontop of the city wall also began yelling. In terror the prince of Chü opened thewest gate and fled. Ch'i's forces then entered the city of Chi-chang. 65
A particularly dramatic recounting of the pernicious effects of defectors appears in Sheng-tzu's persuasion directed toward Ch'u's prime minister, onedesigned to gain readmittance for his exiled friend Wu Chü. 66 Observing thatCh'u had been adversely impacted by defections to other states--a devastatingtrend much remarked upon later in Chinese history, essentially one theworld's first "brain drains"--he expounded three important examples, explicating their backgrounds and severe consequences:
Wu San of the state of Ch'u and Tzu Ch'ao, Grand Counselor in the state ofTs'ai, were friends, as were their respective sons Wu
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Chü and Sheng-tzu. Wu Chü married a daughter of Prince Mou. When the duke of Shen fled and Prince Mou also departed, it was said that Wu Chü hadactually escorted them away. Wu Chü therefore raced off to the state of Cheng and was about to venture on to Chin when he encountered Sheng-tzu, whowas similarly bound for Chin on a diplomatic mission in the suburbs of Cheng. Spreading out some reeds, they sat upon the ground and ate together, discussing whether Wu Chü could somehow be restored to his position inCh'u. Sheng-tzu said: "Continue your journey, I will certainly get you restored."
When Sheng-tzu reached the state of Sung, Hsiang Hsü was just calming relations between Ch'u and Chin. Sheng-tzu completed his mission to Chinand then commenced his return by first going to Ch'u. There the primeminister, Tzu Mu, speaking with him, inquired about affairs in Chin, "Amongthe high officials in Chin and Ch'u who are more worthy?" Sheng-tzu replied: "Chin's ministers are not equal to Ch'u's, but their high officials are more worthy, all having ministerial ability. Just like the raw materials exportedfrom Ch'u such as wood and leather, they are from Ch'u. Thus, even thoughCh'u has talent, it is Chin that benefits from their employment."
Tzu Mu asked, "Is Chin the only state without any meritorious nobles?"Sheng-tzu responded: "Although they have such nobles, they actually employ a great deal of Ch'u talent. I have heard that when administrators excel atgoverning a state, neither rewards nor punishments are excessive. Whenrewards are excessive, there is the fear they might reach the dissolute, butwhen punishments become excessive, there is the danger that they mightaffect good men. If, unfortunately, there is to be an excess, one in rewards ispreferable to any in punishments. Rather than lose a good man, it is better toprofit the dissolute. Without good men the state will also be lost.
"In governing the people the ancients exerted themselves to make rewards and feared imposing punishments out of their unremitting compassion for thepeople. Rewards were bestowed in the spring and summer, punishmentsimposed in autumn and winter. Accordingly, when they were about to bestowrewards, they augmented their portions so as to feast their subordinates, fromwhich we know they rejoiced in bestowing
rewards. When they were about to impose punishments they did not hold any banquets, and since they held no banquets they abandoned the performanceof music. From this we know that they feared imposing punishments. They rose at dawn and slept late at night, administering the state from morning toevening. From this we
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know how they had compassion for the people. These three are the greatconstraints in the rites. Those who implement the rites will never be defeated.
"Now Ch'u suffers from numerous licentious punishments, so its highofficials flee the country, die all about the four quarters, and act as strategists to the detriment of Ch'u. Since you haven't been able to remedythe situation, Ch'u is appropriately said to be incapable of employing them.
"During the turbulence caused by Tzu Yi, the Duke of Hsi fled to Chin. Themen of Chin ensconced him in the rear of their martial chariots, where heacted as chief tactician. At the battle of Shao-chiao Chin was about towithdraw, but Duke Hsi said: ' Ch'u's forces lack substance and disciplineand are easily shaken. If you beat all the drums in unison and press them atnight, Ch'u's army will certainly withdraw.' The men of Chin followed his advice and Ch'u's army crumbled that night. Chin subsequently invaded Ts'ai;launched a surprise attack on Shen, capturing its ruler; and defeated theallied forces of Shen and Hsi at Sang-sui, capturing Shen Li before returninghome. Accordingly Cheng dared not face south [toward Ch'u in allegiance] and Ch'u lost its power over the civilized central states, all due to Duke Hsi.
"When Yung-tzu's father and elder brother slandered him and neither the ruler nor high officials investigated, Yung-tzu fled to Chin. The men of Chin providedhim with a metropolitan district and appointed him as a chief strategist. At thebattle of P'eng- ch'en, when Chin and Ch'i encountered each other in the valley of Mi-chiao [in Sung], Chin was about to withdraw. However, Yung-tzuissued the following order to the army: 'The very young and old should returnhome, as well as solitary sons and the ill. When two men from a family havebeen
impressed for combat, send one back. Select your best weapons and array the chariots. Feed the horses with grain and take breakfast while in yourtents. After the army has deployed burn the encampment because tomorrowwe shall engage in final combat.' 67 Those returning to Chin set off, and the prisoners from Ch'u were also released. During the night Ch'u's army collapsed. Chin then compelled the surrender of P'eng-ch'eng and restored itto Sung, taking Yü Shih back to Chin with them. Ch'u's loss of the Eastern Yi and the death of Tzu Hsin both resulted from Yung-tzu's efforts.
" Tzu Fan and the duke of Shen quarreled over the pernicious beauty HsiaChi, resulting in the duke being harmed. The duke of Shen therefore fled toChin, where the ruler assigned him the town of Hsing and made him chief of strategy. He successfully defended Chin against the Northern Ti andestablished diplomatic
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relations between Chin and Wu. Moreover he went on a mission to Wu, where he instructed the people how to rebel against the power of Ch'u. Hetaught them the martial arts related to charioteering, including driving,racing, and employing bows, as well as how to make swift invasions. Moreover, he had his son Ku Yung become Hsing-jen in Wu. Wu thenattacked your subject state of Ch'ao, seized your district of Ho, conqueredyour city of Ts'e, and invaded your city of Chou-lai. Ch'u thus becameexhausted racing about to preserve itself and continues to be troubled tothis day, all because of the actions of the duke of Shen.
"During the rebellion of Jao-au royal clan, Duke Pen's son Pen Huang fled toChin, where the ruler assigned him the city of Miao and he became a chief ofplanning. Early in the morning at the battle of Yen-ling Ch'u's forces pressedChin's army and Chin was about to withdraw. However, Pen Huang, lord of Miao, advised: ' Ch'u's best regiments--those of the royal clan--compose the Center Army. If we fill in our wells, smash our cookstoves, and deploy tooppose them, and also have the forces under the Luan and Fan clans sloppily array their formations in order to lure the enemy forward, our two armiesunder the Chung-hang clan, in coordination with our Upper
and New Armies, will certainly be able to vanquish the two Ch'u armies under the Mu clan. Then if we concentrate on the royal regiments from all foursides, we will certainly defeat them.' Chin's forces followed his counsel, andCh'u's army was badly defeated. The king himself was wounded and the armyexterminated. Tzu Fan died thereafter, Cheng revolted, Wu began to flourish, and Ch'u lost the allegiance of the feudal lords, all because of Pen Huang'sactions."
Tzu Mu assented, "These are all true."
Sheng-tzu then said: "At present there is an even more severe case thanthese. Wu Chü married into the family of Tzu Mou, so when Tzu Mou wasaccused of perversion and fled, the ruler and high officials all said hisdaughter and Wu Chü had in fact escorted him away. Wu Chü was afraid andfled to Cheng, although constantly looking back and hoping for a reprieve.However, you have not made any plans in this regard, so he is now in Chin,where the ruler is about to grant him a district. If he should plot harm againstCh'u, wouldn't it be unfortunate?"
Tzu Mu, in fear, spoke to the king about restoring Wu Chü's position and increasing his rank and emoluments. Sheng-tzu then sent Wu Chü's son tomeet him upon his return. 68
Two aspects in this extensive Tso Chuan account particularly merit noting. First, defectors from Ch'u found a ready refuge in Chin, its nat
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ural enemy, and in fact enjoyed not only a generous welcome, but also actual power in the state's administration and military command. Their insightsapparently reversed the likely outcome of several battles, further evidence thatthey conveyed detailed military knowledge. (The damage incurred at the Battleof Yen-ling, mentioned in his discussion, was actually far more extensive, aswill be evident from the detailed reprisal at the end of this chapter.) Second,the duke of Shen's defection, caused by complex intrigues that will be outlinedsubsequently, resulted in the initiation of diplomatic communications with thestate of Wu and contributed to its rise as a significant power. (Even thoughChin had been
reasonably successful in its ongoing efforts to contain Ch'u, for various reasons it sought to develop a counterbalance to Ch'u's ascending might. In584 B.C. the ruler was therefore happy to dispatch the duke of Shen--apparently at his own suggestion--with one hundred or more elite warriorsand perhaps nine chariots to Wu for the express purpose of introducing thechariot and instructing them in land warfare tactics. Although his visitmarked a military turning point and at least symbolically brought Wu into therealm of civilized states, Wu's growing strength clearly suggested thepossibilities of such a mission. However, the direct military impact of the dukeof Shen's chariot instructions was probably limited because naval and infantry forces continued to predominate.)
The duke of Shen's diplomatic mission marked two important developments: he was the first "guest adviser" to be honored in Wu, thereby initiating a practice that would later see Wu Tzu-hsü and Sun Wu entrusted with power, and his visit entangled Wu in an alliance with Chin, thereby ensuring itsfuture enmity with Ch'u. Increasingly extensive clashes between Ch'u and Wu in fact commenced in 584 B.C. when Ch'u sought to occupy the regionbetween them and Wu mounted a preemptive strike against Ch'u's client stateof Hsü. Thereafter, over the next six decades battles occurred at least every fewyears as they both strove to dominate the region, with Wu emerging victoriousfrom every significant encounter. These repeated defeats forced Ch'u toconstantly reassess its military organization and methods, to rebuild and retrain its forces. As the decades passed, Wu commenced increasingly aggressive actions against Ch'u's cities, forcing them to undertake massivedefensive preparations from 538 B.C. on, including the construction of citywalls and other fortifications. Wu also benefited from Ch'u's brutal suppression of minority peoples and smaller states, readily exploiting theirhatred and antagonism to acquire material support, local guides, and fieldintelligence.
The confluence of events that prompted the duke of Shen to flee Ch'u may be gleaned from several Tso Chuan narratives. Although he
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ran afoul of powerful government officials by opposing their interests and plans, the immediate cause of his departure was a conflict over one of thelicentious beauties of ancient China, Hsia Chi. The duke of Shen hadantagonized Tzu Chung when the latter requested two fiefs from the clientstates of Shen and Lé as a reward for his achievements following a siege of Sung's capital. Although the king of Ch'u consented, the duke of Shen immediately opposed it because the military taxes derived from those areas sustained the border defenses directed against the northern feudal lords nownecessitated by their alliance with Ch'u. When the duke succeeded inpersuading the king to rescind the grant, he invariably incurred Tzu Chung'sundying enmity. 69 A more notorious cause was the duke's entanglement withHsia Chi, reputedly a highly promiscuous widow who caused "the deaths of three husbands, a ruler, her son, the extinction of her state, and the exile of two ministers." 0 She first appears in a remarkable scene (for a Confucianclassic) of wanton excess in the court of Ch'en, 71 a minor state near Ch'uwhose ruler and two ministerial cohorts not only had licentious relations with her, but also visibly wore her undergarments in court and otherwise blatantly flaunted them. This prompted a conscientious but foolish minister toremonstrate with Duke Ling, the ruler, but to his misfortune the latter notonly failed to reform or embrace the path of exemplary virtue, but alsoinformed the others of his upbraiding, prompting them to request permissionto kill him. The Tso Chuan merely notes that the duke did not refuse, thusensuring the moralist's demise. 72
The next year Duke Ling was drinking at his paramour's house when he openly remarked that her son resembled one of the ministers, prompting theresponse that he also looked like the duke. This enraged her son, who killedthe duke, but the ministers escaped and fled to Ch'u. 73 The following year theking of Ch'u invaded Ch'en, executed Hsia Chi's son for regicide, restored the two ministers, annexed Ch'en, and converted it into a district of Ch'u, although he later restored its independent status after enduring appropriatemoral persuasion. 74 At the time the king himself had wanted to make HsiaChi one of his concubines but was eventually dissuaded by the duke of Shen,who said: "You cannot. You summoned
the other feudal lords in order to conduct campaign of rectification against theguilty. Now if you bring Hsia Chi into your palace, it will be because of avaricefor her beauty. Avarice for beauty is licentiousness, and licentiousness is a great offense."75 When the king reluctantly yielded, Tzu Fan sought to possessher, prompting the duke of Shen to similarly point out that she was the mostcursed of women and exclaim: "Human life is truly difficult, how can one avoiddeath? However, there are many beautiful
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women in the realm, so why must you have this one?" Tzu Fan naturally desisted as well, and the affair seemed at an end when the king married heroff to one of his officers (who then died in battle, allowing his own son to enjoy an illicit relationship with her as well).
However, the duke of Shen had apparently become entranced by her beautyand through a complex subterfuge managed to persuade her to marry him, extricate her from exile, and join her outside Ch'u when he supposedly undertook a military mission to Ch'i. Thereafter the couple fled to Chin, wherethey resided quietly until the king of Ch'u died and Tzu Fan, along with TzuChung, slew his clan members and appropriated their lands. (Contrary to TzuFan's urging, the former king had declined to have the duke of Shen expelledfrom Chin because he had been a faithful minister to his father, compelling them to wait until a new ruler might grant them free reign to strike. 76) Although the duke of Shen had been accompanied by his immediate family, this atrocity enraged him and gave rise to his determination to annihilateCh'u, his mission to Wu being undertaken as part of that effort.
Covert and Subversive Practices
The Spring and Autumn period witnessed the development, even perfection, of several clandestine techniques designed to adversely affect enemy states. Theprimary methods were employing sexual attraction--generally beautiful women, but not exclusively so--and bribery to debauch and undermine rulersand other powerful individuals. Spreading rumors to subvert capable individuals also proved astonishingly effective,
even resulting in the extinction of several states in the Spring and Autumnand subsequent Warring States periods. Assassination became a muchfavored tool for eliminating enemies, including rulers, because of its low costin comparison to lengthy military campaigns of uncertain prospects. Finally, spies were increasingly deployed to gather the vital, ever-changinginformation that diplomatic embassies and defectors could not provide.
Beauty and Sex
Although consorts, concubines, and other favorites initially derived their influence through sexual fascination, because of the hold they acquired overpowerful men, coupled with their exclusive access, they could tempt even themost righteous into devious and pernicious acts and thus became potentialpartners for intrigue. Moreover, the inti
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macy and isolation of these relationships provided them with virtually unlimited opportunities to poison, stab, or otherwise dispatch their lovers inunguarded moments. Although the Tso Chuan contains only a few referencesto deliberate manipulation of female companions to achieve clandestine objectives, the Shih Chi and other later texts provide extensive evidence of the power that women acquired in the era, as well as that beauty and sex werefrequently employed as covert weapons, establishing a precedent for activitiesthat continue to multiply even today.
Confucius's fate when he served as minister of justice near the end of the Spring and Autumn period in the small state of Lu, supposedly the last moralbastion of the rapidly fading Chou world, has been well known in China formore than two millennia. Naturally the district he personally supervisedimmediately became well ordered. Not only did crimes cease, but also his moral influence induced people to respect the proper distinction of the sexesat a time when propriety was still largely future theory, awaiting theformulation of Confucian doctrine and its promulgation as the basis of publicethics. Whether events proceeded as depicted in his Shih Chi biography, much of the account having long been questioned,
is basically irrelevant because later generations of thinkers, politicians, generals, and schoolchildren all learned the story from the Analects itself.77 It was an unruly time, and Lu itself suffered from internal conflict as threepowerful, nonroyal families contended for power. When Confucius began toachieve visible progress, the prospect of Lu achieving social order--one of theacknowledged foundations of a strong state--engendered fear in the mightystate of Ch'i:
The duke of Ch'i said: "If Confucius controls the government in Lu, its ruler will certainly become hegemon. If Lu is going to attain hegemony, since ourterritory is contiguous with theirs we should pay our respects first andpresent them with some land."
Li Tsu said: "Let me first try to impede Confucius. If I fail to obstruct him and we then sacrifice some territory, how will it be too late?"
Thereupon Li Tsu selected eighty beautiful women from among Ch'i's young ladies, all of whom were dressed in embroidered clothes and could both danceand play elegant music. He then chose thirty teams of dappled horses toconvey them to the state of Lu. After arriving, Li Tsu had the female musicians and horses all arrayed outside the high gate in the city's south wall. Chi Huan-tzu went in disguise to observe them two or three times and was aboutto accept them when he suggested to the ruler that
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he should wander among them. The ruler went and stared at them for awhole day, neglecting government affairs. Tzu Lu said to Confucius, "Nowyou may leave!"78
Confucius remained hopeful and didn't depart until further incidents of governmental neglect, such as in the performance of the sacrifices, one of thetwo great affairs of state with war, became manifest. The Analects tersely records that the ruler remained away from the court for three days in a paragraph that countless millions memorized over the centuries: "The peopleof Ch'i presented female musicians and Chi Huan-tzu accepted them. For three days the ruler did not hold court and
Confucius departed." 79 The fascination and appeal of beauty, subsequently decried by the Taoists for driving men mad, vividly clashed with Confucianpuritanism. In the face of such allure even Confucius himself, despitesignificant accomplishments, was easily displaced, especially as Ch'i engaged in significant overkill, sending ten octets rather than just one or two, enthralling and overwhelming both Chi Huan-tzu and the duke of Lu. Latergenerations thus acquired an indelible image and assimilated a strong lessonon how to destroy governments and ministers through the lure of sex andbeauty.
More than a century earlier an interesting incident between the peripheral state of Ch'in, just beginning to develop into a serious power, and the so-calledbarbarian Jung people illustrates the Chinese propensity to employ cultural weapons, including sophisticated women, to fascinate and thereby enervate those viewed as less civilized:
Having heard that Duke Mu of Ch'in was a worthy ruler, the king of the Jung nomadic peoples dispatched Yu Yé on a reconnaissance mission to Ch'in. Since his ancestors had been natives of the nearby state of Chin before fleeinginto Jung territory, Yu Yé could speak Chin's language. When Duke Mu displayed his palaces and accumulated treasures to him, Yu Yé remarked, "Ifyou had ghosts make all these, it surely exhausted their spirit; it you forcedmen to make them, it must have caused great suffering!"
Duke Mu, astounded by his reply, inquired: "The central states have structured their administrations on the Book of Odes, the Book of Documents, the rites and music, laws and measures, but still frequently experienceturbulence. Now since the Jung and Yi peoples lack all these, what do youemploy to govern? Isn't it difficult?"
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Yu Yé laughingly replied: "This is why the central states are unsettled. Ever since the era when the sagacious Yellow Emperor fashioned the rites andmusic, laws and measures, and personally set the example but barely attained a minor degree of order, down through the present generationrulers
Duke Mu thereupon withdrew to query his palace secretary: "I have heard thatthe presence of a Sage in a neighboring state is worrisome to its enemies.Since Yu Yé is a Worthy, we may be harmed. How should we handle this?"
The palace secretary replied: "The king of the Jung dwells in a rustic, isolated place so has never heard the sounds of the central states. You might trydispatching some female musicians in order to snatch away his will. Youcould also make some requests of Yu Yé in order to estrange him from theJung, and retain him rather than sending him back so that he misses theappointed time to return. The king of the Jung will find this strange and certainly begin to doubt Yu Yé. When a gulf has developed between ruler andminister, we can then imprison him. Moreover, if the Jung king loves themusic, he will invariably grow lax in government matters."80
Duke Mu assented. Therefore, after returning to the interview hall, he broughttheir mats close together, personally handed vessels of food to Yu Yé, andproceeded to interrogate him about the Jung's terrain, as well as the army'sstrategic power. After his queries had been fully satisfied, he had the palacesecretary dispatch two octets of female musicians to the king of the Jung. When the latter received them, he was extremely pleased and therefore failedto shift their encampment at the end of the year. 81 Thereupon Duke Mu hadYu Yé returned. After arriving, he re
monstrated with the king on several occasions but went unheeded. Inaddition, Duke Mu repeatedly had emissaries secretly press Yu Yé until hefinally abandoned the Jung and surrendered to Ch'in. Duke Mu then treatedhim with all the courtesies due an honored guest and queried him on the bestdeployments for attacking the Jung. Three years later, employing Yu Yé's strategy, Duke Mu finally attacked the king of the Jung and eventually addedtwelve new subsidiary states in territory that stretched a thousand kilometersinto the west, thereby becoming hegemon of the Western Jung. 82
Note that through their efforts to mesmerize the Jung ruler, Duke Mu acquireda "local guide," one of Sun-tzu's five types of agents, converting an enemy agent--an observer--into a defector or turned agent. Strangely, Yu Yéapparently was not perturbed about betraying the Jung's strategic secretseven after growing up among them, eventually responding to preferentialtreatment, despite his vaunted moral superiority. Ironically, Ch'in'semployment of female musicians, viewed as the essence of Chinese cultureand a symbol of its material affluence, was actually a case of a "semibarbarian" state simply wielding the enervating weapons of seductivedecadence against a more robust, less artifact burdened tribal people. (Fromthe Chinese ethnocentrist perspective, each step away from the central states led only into less civilized, more unrighteous cultures. Accordingly, thesedentary, agriculturally bound central kingdom's subsequent policies tocontain the steppe peoples focused on employing the pernicious, debilitatingeffects of cultural weapons.)
Later ages were so struck by Duke Mu's story that it was incorporated invarious forms in several eclectic works of the late Warring States and Hanperiods, as well as the writings of such political philosophers as Han Fei-tzu.83 A version found in the Lé-shih Ch'un- ch'iu embodies some interesting developments: "When Duke Mu dispatched two octets of female musicians and a skilled chef to them, the king of the Jung was overjoyed and for this reasonconstantly ate and drank day and night without interruption. Among hisattendants someone warned that Ch'in invaders would come, so he took up a bow
and shot him. When the invaders indeed arrived, the ruler was sleeping drunkenly beside a wine jar, so the troops tied him up and captured himalive." 84
The acquisition of power and influence by sexually beloved consorts and concubines invariably provided a way for external forces to achieve inimicalpurposes once the slightest disaffection became evident or the woman's or herson's position was vitally threatened. (Al
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though stories abound throughout Chinese history of widespread humantragedy wrought by internal intrigues, they fall beyond the scope of our study,which focuses upon state-initiated covert actions rather than domesticpolitics.) Women also acquired power as a ruler's queen, empress, or mother,often to the detriment of state interests. A brief but telling example, much citedthereafter, appears in a Tso Chuan account of events following one of the manybattles between the two powerful states of Chin and Ch'in. Chin's youthfulruler had been persuaded to attack Ch'in, despite his father's recent death--the body still lay uninterred--on the grounds that if "one releases an enemyeven for a single day, the misfortune will extend for several generations."Despite his qualms, Chin's forces proved victorious, capturing three importantcommanders, who were brought back to the capital for execution. However, the ruler's mother--originally a princess of the enemy state of Ch'in--interceded ontheir behalf, craftily suggesting that "since they had caused enmity betweentwo rulers, my father (the duke of Ch'in) would not be satiated even if he were to get hold of them and eat them. So why tarnish yourself by executing them? Why not have them returned to Ch'in and allow my father free expression of his will?"
Easily persuaded by his mother's words despite their obviousness, the duke assented and released them, to the great consternation of his chiefcommander, who, in scathingly rebuking him, expressed the timeless outrageof soldiers who find their sacrifices turned to naught for political reasons: "Ourwarriors, through brute strength, captured them on the plains of battle, yet injust a short while a woman has succeeded in releasing them. You havesubverted the army's
accomplishments and augmented the invader's enmity. We will certainly perish in no time!" Naturally the duke, realizing the enormity of his negligence, dispatched troops to recapture the three commanders, but the pursuerssucceeded only in hearing a sarcastic retort as the former captives crossed theriver. Rather than being executed, they were in fact warmly welcomed by the duke of Ch'in and lived to distinguish themselves in subsequent engagementswith Chin. 85
Bribes
When we extrapolate from the few important instances preserved in the TsoChuan and other writings, we see that bribes were frequently employed inthe Spring and Autumn period, whether to purchase information or alter thecourse of events by subverting important ministers. Moreover, their number and importance increased as the strife among the states intensified coincident with the decline of the Chou
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ruling house. As the peripheral states such as Ch'u, Wu, and eventually Yéehgrew in strength, alliance building among the original northern plains statesbecame important and could reasonably be ensured by suborning theimportant ministerial families through generous treatment, both openly andcovertly. One of the most famous cases in Chinese history unfolded in the upstart state of Wu in conjunction with Wu Tzu-hsé's campaign to guarantee Wu's mastery of the world by completely exterminating the just vanquishedstate of Yéeh. However, King Fu-ch'ai was persuaded by Po P'i--the BenedictArnold whose name became synonymous with shortsighted, traitorous greed--to grant Yéeh leniency. Wu Tzu-hsé was betrayed and martyred by Po P'i'sslanders, and his dramatic life story, initially portrayed in the Shih Chi,became the stuff of storytellers and playwrights down through the ages:
About 504 B.C. the state of Wu, employing the strategies of Wu Tzu-hsé andSun Wu, had destroyed the strong state of Ch'u to the west, overawed Ch'i and Chin to the north, and forced the people of Yéeh in the south to actsubmissively. Four years later Confucius was made minister in Lu, and fouryears after that Wu attacked Yéeh. King Kou-chien of Yéeh mounted a
Two years later he attacked Yéeh, defeating Yéeh at Fu-chiao. Kou-chien, king of Yéeh, with his remaining five thousand troops ensconced himself onthe heights of K'uai-chi, and had the high official Wen Chung dispatchedwith generous gifts to seek peace through Wu's Grand Steward Po P'i, offeringto subordinate their state as a menial subject to Wu. King Fu-ch'ai was aboutto give his assent when Wu Tzu-hsé remonstrated with him: "The king of Yéeh is capable of enduring great hardship. If your majesty does notexterminate him now, you will certainly regret it later." Instead of heeding his advice, the king of Wu employed Po P'i's plans and made peace with Yéeh.
Five years later the king of Wu heard that Duke Ching of Ch'i had died and that Ch'i's great ministers were contending for favor. Since the new ruler wasweak, Fu-ch'ai mobilized Wu's army to go north and attack Ch'i. Wu Tzu-hséremonstrated: " Kou-chien
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does not have two flavors in his food. He consoles the families of the dead and inquires about the ill because he wants to employ them. If this man doesn'tdie, he will inevitably cause disaster for Wu. Today Wu's possessing Yéeh islike a man having an acute illness in his abdomen. If your majesty does notmake Yéeh his priority but instead focuses upon Ch'i, won't it truly be anerror?" The king did not listen, but instead attacked Ch'i, greatly defeatingtheir army at Ai-ling and going on to overawe the rulers of Tsou and Lu beforereturning. He increasingly distanced himself from Wu Tzu-hsé's plans.
Four years later when the king of Wu was about to go north to attack Ch'i, Kou-chien, employing Tzu-kung's strategy, led his
masses to assist Wu while greatly augmenting the treasures that he had presented to Po P'i. Having already received bribes from Yéeh on several occasions, Grand Steward P'i's love and trust for Yéeh became ever greater, and day and night he spoke on Yéeh's behalf to the King of Wu. The king trusted and employed Po P'i's plans.
Wu Tzu-hsé remonstrated: "Now Yéeh is an abdominal illness. Today youtrust their specious phrases and false behavior while coveting Ch'i. If youdestroy Ch'i, it will be like gaining a rocky field, of no utility. Moreover the'Announcement of P'an Keng' said: 'If there are those who overturn, overstep, or are disrespectful to my orders, then cut off their noses, utterly exterminate them. Ensure that they will not leave behind any posterity, do not allow theirseed to be moved to this city.' This is how the Shang arose. I would like yourmajesty to abandon Ch'i and give priority to Yéeh. If you do not, you willexperience immeasurable regret."
But the king did not listen, and sent Wu Tzu-hsé to Ch'i. When Tzu-hsé was about to return to Wu, he addressed his son: "I have remonstrated with theking several times, but the king has not employed my plans. I now perceivethat Wu is lost. For you to perish together with Wu would be of no advantage."Then he entrusted his son to Pao Mu of Ch'i, and returned to report to Wu.
Wu's Grand Steward Po P'i had already had disagreements with Tzu-hsé, so he slandered him: "Tzu-hsé's character is hard and brutal, of little charity,suspicious and malevolent. I fear his enmity will cause great disaster. Previously your majesty wanted to attack Ch'i, but Tzu-hsé felt it was notpossible. In the end your majesty attacked it with great success. Tzu-hsé was ashamed that his strategies had not been employed, so he reacted with rancor. Now that you are again about to attack Ch'i, Tzu-hsé alone opposes andstrongly remonstrates against it. He obstructs and slan
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ders those in authority and would rejoice if Wu should be defeated since his own plans would then prevail. Now your majesty is himself going forth, assembling the entire military
"Moreover, I dispatched men to secretly observe him. When he was anemissary to Ch'i, he entrusted his son to the Pao clan of Ch'i. Now he is aminister who within has failed to attain his ambition and without relies on thefeudal lords; who personally acted as the former king's minister for planning but now is not used. He is constantly discontented and resentful. I would likeyour majesty to plan for it early on."
The king of Wu said: "Not only do you speak about it, I also have doubted him." Then he had an emissary present Wu Tzu-hsé with the Shu-lé sword, saying, "You should use this to die."
Wu Tzu-hsé looked toward Heaven and sighed: "Alas! The slanderous minister Po P'i causes chaos, but the king turns around and executes me! Icaused your father to become hegemon. When you had not yet beenestablished as heir apparent and the various princes were contending for thedesignation, I engaged in a death struggle on your behalf with the former king. You almost were not established. When you gained the throne, youwanted to divide the state of Wu with me, but I wouldn't dare hope for it. Yetnow you listen to the speeches of sycophants and thereby kill your elders."
Then he instructed his retainers: "You must plant my grave with catalpa treesin order that they may be used for coffins. And gouge out my eyes andsuspend them above Wu's east gate so that I may see Yéeh's invaders enterand destroy Wu." Then he cut his throat and died. When the king of Wu heardabout it, he was enraged and seized Tzu-hsé's corpse, stuffed it into a leather sack, and floated it out onto the Yangtze River. The people of Wu pitied him, sothey erected a shrine above the river. Thereafter it was called "Mount Hsé."
When the king had executed Wu Tzu-hsé, he proceeded to attack Ch'i. The Paoclan of Ch'i assassinated their ruler Duke Tao and set up Yang Sheng. Theking of Wu wanted to mount a punitive expedition against the brigands butwas not victorious and abandoned it. Two years later he summoned the rulersof
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the Chou to come. Kou-chien, king of Yüeh, suddenly attacked, killing Wu's heir apparent and destroying his forces. When the king of Wu heard about it,he returned and had envoys arrange a truce with Yüeh with generouspresents. Nine years thereafter Kou-chien went on to exterminate Wu, killing King Fu-ch'ai. He also executed the Grand Steward Po P'i because he had been disloyal to his ruler, accepted heavy bribes from external sources, and colluded with him. 86
As the section on covert programs will show, Yüeh's conquest over Wu was notaccidental, but was the result of careful planning, coupled with a focusedeffort to implement subversive measures, such as corrupting the king'sconfidant into becoming their minion. Po P'i's desire to eliminate his rival(despite Wu Tzu-hsü having introduced him when he arrived in exile), coupled with his greed, made him an ideal candidate for Yüeh's subversive efforts.Circumstantial developments were then easily twisted by Po P'i to Yüeh'sadvantage and Wu Tzu-hsü's fate sealed.
Assassins
Assassination was dramatically employed to eliminate both rivals and enemies, ensure the continued enjoyment of power, and adversely affect otherstates, as well as frequently resorted to in domestic intrigues and intracourtconflicts. The Tso Chuan notes the following incident for 626 B.C.: 87 "TzuTseng, a member of the royal family, fled Cheng and sought refuge in Sung.He liked to gather bird feathers to make hats. When the earl of Cheng heardabout this, he was angered and dispatched a robber to lure him out of Sung and kill him in the border area between Sung and Ch'en." Although the TsoChuan rationalizes that the glaring disparity between the man's actual dress and proper convention occasioned his death, the incident vividly illustrates the readiness of rulers to employ assassins outside state borders even fortrivial reasons. 88
A second example from the Tso Chuan shows how easily palace intrigues, evenamong minor nobles, spawned assassination attempts:
In the beginning Shu-sun Ch'eng-tzu wanted to establish Wu-shu to succeedhim, but Kung-juo Mao strongly argued against it, saying that he should not.However, Ch'eng-tzu still designated him as his heir and then died. Kung-nanhad a brigand shoot arrows at Wu-shu but was unable to kill him. As Kung-nan was Master of Horse, he dispatched Kung-juo to be steward of Houtownship. Af
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ter Wu-shu had been established, he ordered Hou Fan, Master of Horse inHou, to kill Kung-juo but he failed. One of Wu-shu's grooms said: "If I wanderthrough his court with a sword, Kung- juo will surely ask whose sword itmight be. When I reply it is yours, he will certainly want to see it. I will feignawkwardness and grope for the end, and then I can kill him." He was employed as suggested. Kung-juo said, "Do you intend to treat me like the king of Wu?"89 The groom then slew him. 90
Probably the most famous episode, one romanticized in later legend and literature, was Ho-lü's employment of Chuan Chu (whose name became synonymous with assassins) to kill the king so that he could succeed himlate in the sixth century B.C. The following retelling, from the Wu YüehCh'un-ch'iu, commences with Ho-lü's resistance to Wu Tzu-hsü's growinginfluence over the king, forcing Wu Tzu-hsü to adopt a long-range plan:
King Liao knew that Wu Tzu-hsü wanted to mobilize the army to attack Ch'uand gain revenge for his father's and brother's deaths. Prince Kuang [Ho-lü], who was plotting King Liao's death, feared Wu might first become favored by the king and thus somehow thwart his plan. Therefore he calumnized Wu Tzu-hsü's plan: "This attack on Ch'u is designed solely to avenge his personal grievance rather than being in Wu's interest. My lord should notemploy it."
Wu Tzu-hsü realized that Prince Kuang wanted to harm King Liao, so he said to himself, "Since this Kuang has subversive
King Liao asked, "Why do you say this?"
Wu Tzu-hsü replied: "The feudal lords exercise despotic government; it is nottheir intention to rescue the distressed and thereafter mobilize the army. Atpresent your august majesty manipulates the state and controls itsawesomeness. To mobilize the army for an ordinary fellow would not berighteous. Therefore I dare not act in accord with your majesty's edict." King Liao therefore ceased preparations for the attack, and Wu Tzu-hsü retired tofarm in the wilds. However, he continued to seek out courageous individualsand recommend them to Prince Kuang, hoping thereby to curry favor withhim. Thus the prince gained Chuan Chu.
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Chuan Chu was a native of T'ang-yi. When Wu Tzu-hsü was fleeing from Ch'uto Wu, he happened to encounter him on the road when Chuan was about tofight with another man. When he attacked his enemy, his anger became asgreat as ten thousand men, so extreme it could not be withstood. However, as soon as he heard his wife's voice, he immediately returned home. Wu Tzu-hsüfound this to be strange and therefore queried him about it: "How is it that, although your anger was overwhelming, as soon as you heard a woman'svoice it broke? I would like to know if there is an explanation."
Chuan Chu said: "You have misclassified my behavior as simply that of astupid fellow. How can you speak about it in such low terms? To humbleoneself before a single man one must be able to stretch out over tenthousand."
Wu Tzu-hsü then examined his appearance: a blunt forehead with deep seteyes, a tiger's chest with a bear's back, fierce in coping with difficulties. Knowing that he was a courageous individual, he secretly allied himself tohim, wanting to employ him later. Thus, when he chanced upon PrinceKuang's plot, Wu Tzu- hsü introduced him to the prince. After Kuang had
admitted Chuan Chu as a retainer and treated him respectfully, he saidto him, "Heaven has provided you to supplement my lost roots."
Chuan Chu replied: "When Yü-mei, the late king, died, King Liao established himself as the rightful heir. Why does your lordship want toharm him?"
Prince Kuang replied: "The previous ruler, Shou-meng, had four sons: theeldest, Chu-fan, my father; and then Yü-chi, Yü-mei, and Chi-cha. Chi-chawas morally exemplary, so when my father Chu-fan was about to die, hetransmitted the throne to the next eldest of Shou-meng's sons, thinking that itwould eventually devolve to Chi-cha. However, Chi-cha had been deputed on amission to the feudal lords and was absent, unwilling to return. When Yü-meidied, the throne was vacant and Chi-cha should have been established. Otherwise, it should have been me, the eldest son of Chu-fan, so how is itthat Liao came to be enthroned? My power was weak, inadequate to seize control of events. Without employing force, how may I now satisfy my ambitions? Even if I take the throne from Liao and Chi-cha returns from theeast, he will not depose me."
Chuan Chu said: "Why not have some of the king's favored ministers leisurely speak about the former king's edict at the ruler's side in order to stimulate histhoughts? Arrange that he knows to whom the state will give their allegiance. Why must
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you personally prepare swordsmen and thereby damage the Virtue of the former king?"
Prince Kuang replied: " Liao has always been greedy and relies on strength. He knows the advantages of advancing but never considers withdrawing oryielding. For this reason I am seeking out similarly troubled men in order tounite our strength. I only wanted you to understand my righteousness."
Chuan Chu replied: "My lord's words have been extremely expressive. What do they imply for you, sir?"
Chuan Chu said, "I would like to receive your mandate."
Prince Kuang replied, "The time is not yet appropriate."
Chuan Chu said: "When one wants to kill his ruler, he must first find outwhat he loves. What is it that the king loves?"
Kuang replied, "He loves the taste of food."
Chuan Chu asked, "What flavors does he find delicious?"
Kuang replied, "He likes barbecued fish."
Chuan Chu then departed to Lake T'ai, where he studied how to barbecue fish for three months. When he had mastered its flavor, he sat back quietly and awaited Prince Kuang's orders.
In the spring of King Liao's thirteenth year, hoping to exploit Ch'u's mourning for their king by mounting an attack, the king dispatched Princes Kai-yü andChu-yung in command of troops to besiege Ch'u's capital, and deputed Chi-cha as an ambassador to Chin, where he might observe the reactions of the feudal lords. Ch'u then sent forth some troops that cut off Wu's armies from the rear so that they were unable to return to Wu. Prince Kuang's heart thenstirred.
Wu Tzu-hsü realized that Prince Kuang perceived that the vital moment for change had arrived, so he spoke with him: "Now that the king has attackedCh'u and the fate of your two younger brothers and their troops is uncertain, Chuan Chu's actions are urgently required. The time will not come again andcannot be lost."
Accordingly the prince saw Chuan Chu: "Presently the king's two younger brothers are attacking Ch'u while Chi-cha has not yet returned from his mission. At this time, if we do not seek it, we will not gain anything. Themoment cannot be lost. Moreover, I am the former king's direct descendant."
Chuan Chu said: "KingLiao can be slain. His mother is old, his sons weak. His younger brothers have attacked Ch'u, but Ch'u
has severed their rear. Now the state of Wu suffers from external
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difficulties while lacking stalwart ministers within. If I am not the man, whois?"
In the fourth month Prince Kuang secreted mailed warriors in ambush in asubterranean chamber, prepared a feast, and invited King Liao. Liao spokeplainly with his mother: "PrinceKuang has prepared a drinking feast for me. Ido not expect any trouble, but what do you think?" His mother replied: "Kuang's temperament is hasty, and he constantly has an embarrassed,hateful countenance. You must be cautious."
King Liao then put on three layers of lamellar iron armor and had his personal bodyguards deployed along the road. All the way from the palace gate toKuang's mansion, up the steps, and around his seat, all were the king'srelatives. He had all those in attendance upon him stand, holding long spear-tipped halberds turned outward. When they were flushed with wine, Prince Kuang feigned having a foot pain and went into the subterranean chamber,where he had Chuan Chu place a dagger inside the barbecued fish and bring it in. When Chuan Chu reached King Liao he tore open the barbecued fishand pushed the dagger out. The attendants standing around the kingimmediately stabbed him in the chest with their halberds. Although his chestwas split and shattered, Chuan Chu held the dagger firmly and stabbed King Liao, piercing through the armor and penetrating his back. With King Liaoalready dead the attendants slew Chuan Chu. All the officials in attendancemoved about in confusion and Prince Kuang then attacked them with the mailed soldiers he had concealed in ambush, exterminating them all. Theprince subsequently ascended the throne as King Ho-lü, enfeoffed ChuanChu's son, and appointed him as a guest minister. 91
The dramatic account concludes with the usurper symbolically offering toyield the throne to Chi-cha, who of course declines it, consistent with his previous posture in being unwilling to accept it instead of his older brothersor after their deaths. (Such "virtuous declinations," while ensuring temporary fame,
Even though largely a case of resolving the internal issue of succession, thisepisode well illustrates not only a willingness to employ assassins, but alsothe preparation required, the importance of ferreting
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out the victim's desires and then exploiting them. Despite the prevalence of assassination throughout Chinese history, after Ssu-ma Ch'ien's definitiveShih Chi chapter the official histories never again sanctified such behaviorwith a dedicated biographical section. Individual biographies and the accountsof dynastic revolutions frequently mention covert murders, but rarely with theexpansive detail that characterized the Spring and Autumn and subsequentWarring States periods when their employment was commonplace, therebyestablishing a predisposition, a virtual mind-set for subsequent generations.
Strong-arm and Stealth Techniques
In 681 B.C. the state of Sung offered generous bribes to Ch'en if they would return a rebel who had fled there. Accordingly, "the men of Ch'en employed a woman to inebriate the rebel with wine and then thrust him into a leathersack made from rhinoceros hide. By the time they arrived in Sung, his handsand feet were both visible. He was subsequently executed and pickled."92 The men of Ch'en thus employed two potent weapons in combination, women and wine, to throw the man off guard and capture him, being motivated by the promised rewards, even though they certainly knew hewould be executed.
As a result of the complex factional struggles over Chin's regal succession in620 B.C., Shih Hui--a high official with significant military experience--andothers were compelled to
take refuge in nearby Ch'in. Since Ch'in and Chin frequently clashed, his presence there was viewed as troubling, particularly when he began toprovide intelligence and tactical advice:
Because of its defeat at the battle of Ling-ku in 620 B.C., in the middle of winter, 615 B.C., Ch'in attacked Chin and seized Chima. Chin's forces mounted a defense with Chao Tun in command of the Central Army and HsiCh'üeh in command of the Upper Army. After following Ch'in's force to Ho-ch'ü, Yü P'ien, assistant commander of the Upper Army, advised: "Ch'in cannot long endure. Let's deepen our moats, solidify the fortifications,encamp, and wait them out." They followed his suggestion.
Ch'in's soldiers wanted to fight so the Earl of Ch'in asked Shih Hui, "How canwe get them to fight?" He replied: " Chao Tun's recently appointed subordinate, Yü P'ien, certainly formulated this plan to exhaust our army. Chao has another staff member, an imperial relative named Ch'uan. He isspoiled and weak and lacks experience in military affairs, but loves courage, acts irrationally, and also hates it that Yü P'ien is acting as assistantcommander of
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the Upper Army. If you have some light troops strike him, it will be possible."The earl of Ch'in, throwing a jade disc into the Yellow River, prayed for victory to the river spirit.
On the fourth day of the twelfth month a Ch'in army suddenly mounted afleeting attack on Chin's Upper Army. Chao Ch'uan, who pursued them butwas unable to catch up, returned and angrily said: "We sack up provisionsand wear armor solely to seek out the enemy. If we do not attack the enemy when they arrive, what are we waiting for?"
The provost said, "We are waiting for the right time."
Ch'uan replied: "I do not understand such plans. I am going out alone."Then he went forth with the troops under his command.
Huan-tzu said: "If Ch'in captures Ch'uan, it will be like getting one of our ministers. If Ch'in then returns home victorious, what shall we report to ourruler?" Then they all went forth to engage the enemy in battle, after which a mutual withdrawal occurred. 93
Although Ch'in's forces eventually retreated that night after an inconclusive engagement, clearly Shih Hui understood Chin's command structure andhow their personalities might be manipulated to achieve tactical objectives.Chin's officials therefore brooded over their misfortune:
The men of Chin were troubled by Ch'in's employment of Shih Hui, so in the summer of 614 B.C. the six cabinet ministers held a meeting at Chu-fu. ChaoHsüan-tzu said: "With Shih Hui in Ch'in and Chia Chi active among the Jung,difficult days have befallen us. What can we do about it?"
Chung-hang Huan-tzu said, "Please bring Chia Chi back because he is an expert in foreign affairs and previously distinguished himself inserving the state."
Hsi Ch'eng-tzu said: " Chia Chi is rebellious and his offense was great. He is not equal to Shih Hui, who can endure mean condition and has a sense of shame, who is complaisant and not offensive. He is wise enough to beemployed and innocent of any offense."
They then dispatched Shou-yü to feign revolting from Chin with his fief of Wei in order to lure Shih Hui back. Moreover, they seized Shou-yü's wife and hadhim escape from Chin at night. He therefore sought refuge in Ch'in, where theearl allowed him to stay. While at court he deliberately stepped on Shih Hui's foot. When the earl of Ch'in deployed the army west of the Yellow River, forcesfrom Wei were on the eastern side. Shou-yü said,
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"Please depute two or three officials originally from the east to first advance with me."
The earl ordered Shih Hui to go but he tried to decline, saying: "The people of Chin are like tigers and wolves. If they break
their word, I will die and my wife and children will be exterminated. This will not be to your advantage, nor will regret be of any avail."
The earl of Ch'in said, "If they break their word, I swear by the spirit of the Yellow River to return your wife and children to Chin." Shih Hui thendeparted. Shao Ch'ao presented him with a whip, saying: "Please do not referto Chin as lacking any real men. It is simply that my plans are not employed."
When they had already forded the river, the men from Wei let out a roar andthen returned [to Chin] with Shih Hui. The earl of Ch'in accordingly sentback his wife and children, but those [from the original party] who remainedbehind changed their surnames to Liu. 94
This passage shows how a plausible cover story was concocted for the recovery effort and a second ruse--the request for eastern natives, knowing that ShihHui would certainly be among those chosen, if not the only one--employedthat was open enough for the earl of Ch'in to carelessly respond as desired. However, the plan was penetrated by Shao Ch'ao, to little avail but his ownsubsequent execution. 95 At the time the Yellow River demarked the borderbetween Chin and Wei, making Shih Hui's restoration a simple matter of fording the river, for once he was in Wei territory, essentially part of Chin, his exile was over. Interestingly, the Shih Chi recounts the affair somewhatdifferently, asserting that when Chin had Wei Shou-yü pretend to rebel, Ch'indispatched his former countryman Shih Hui to meet him somewhere insidetheir borders. Wei then forcefully seized and returned him to Chin, providing astriking example of political kidnapping. 96 In either case, as a false traitor WeiShou-yü was certainly one of history's earliest counterfeit defectors.
An example of actively exploiting an exile's predicament arose when the king's succession spawned bitter strife among Ch'i's major families in 554 B.C. and Chin exploited their chaos to effect a significant incursion. Threeyears later somewhat reversed circumstances saw Luan Ying, a strong contender for the throne of Chin, flee to Ch'u and then Ch'i:
In 551 B.C. a Chin high official named Luan Ying fled to Ch'i. Duke Chuang generously rewarded him and treated him as an
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honored guest. Yen Ying and T'ien Wen-tzu objected, but the duke wouldn'tlisten. The next year Duke Chuang dispatched Luan Ying as an agent intothe city of Ch'ü-wo in Chin to mount a subversive internal response, andhad troops follow up through T'ai- hang and Meng-men. However, whenLuan Ying was defeated, Ch'i's armies withdrew, seizing Chao-ke instead. 97
According to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's summary depiction, Luan Ying was a traitor cleverly exploited by Ch'i as a subversive agent to undermine his native city'sdefenses. However, the Tso Chuan depicts these events as distinct actionsseparated by several months. At the time of his expulsion Luan Ying wasstigmatized as a troublemaker whom the feudal lords should deny refuge, butDuke Chuang of Ch'i apparently discerned an excellent opportunity to foster renewed chaos in Chin and perhaps even facilitate Luan Ying's seizure of thethrone, thereby converting Chin from a constant threat into a useful ally. When Ch'i was about to dispatch several court women to a wedding ceremonyin the fourth month, the duke therefore arranged for Luan Ying and a few key supporters to conceal themselves within the baggage train that ventured toChin. 98 Luan subsequently attempted to mount a revolt in Ch'ü-wo, his nativecity, but failed and was eventually besieged at another location for several months. According to the Tso Chuan, 99 Ch'i's forces didn't begin their advanceuntil the autumn, some months later, commencing in the state of Wei; eventually seized Chao-ke; then divided their forces and proceeded by the tworoutes noted in the Shih Chi, scoring minor victories and occupying some terrain. Somewhat thereafter, in the winter Luan Ying was captured andexecuted, concluding the dissociated series of events. However, from them it isclear that Ch'i cleverly exploited a fleeting opportunity by employing disguiseand subterfuge to support an internal putsch. Moreover, several centuries later Ssu-ma Ch'ien viewed the events as interconnected, despite the TsoChuan's clear time lapse between actions, implying a personal predisposition--or
perhaps a Han dynasty mind-set--to perceive complex covert operations inthe historical relationships between states and the frequent utilization of agents in foreign affairs. 100
Divination and Prognostication
The Spring and Autumn period witnessed the vibrant continuation of Shangdynasty divination practices, as well as the inception of casting by milfoilstalks that eventually coalesced into the now famous IChing
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Ching. Lacking adequate information from other sources, the political elite, inthe quest for reliable information on the advisability of courses of action, frequently turned to prognostication by turtle shell, divination by milfoil, theexamination of natural phenomena, and cognizance of other unusual events. Pre-battle divination, routinely performed to decide whether to commit troopsto an engagement, accounts for roughly one-fourth of the some sixty importantprognostications recorded in the Tso Chuan, excluding the martial implications of the extensive accounts it preserves. (Marriage, sacrifices, children, moving of cities, and illness are the other common categories.)Because this tradition continued throughout Chinese history in an attempt topenetrate otherwise unfathomable events--despite strong voices raised in opposition--it will be examined more extensively in the final chapter. Anexample from 563 B.C., when a state's fate hung in the balance, illustratesthis Spring and Autumn quest for military information:
In June Ch'u and Cheng attacked Sung and besieged its capital. Themarquis of Wei sent a force to rescue Sung. Tzu Chan of Cheng said: "Wemust attack Wei; otherwise, we will not be supporting Ch'u. We havealready offended Chin [by attacking its ally of Sung], so if we then offendCh'u, how will the state survive?"
Tzu Ssu replied, "The state is exhausted."
Tzu Chan retorted: "If we offend two great states we will certainly perish. Isn't illness preferable to death?" The other
Wei's ruler performed divination by turtle shell to see if they should pursue this invading force and then presented the pattern to the late ruler's mother. She then inquired about the accompanying prognosticatory verses and wasadvised they read: "The omen is like a mountain height, there is a force thatgoes forth and suffers the loss of its stalwart leader." She then interpreted, "To lose the stalwart means that it will be advantageous to defend against theinvaders. You should plan for it." The forces from Wei pursued Cheng's army and captured Huang Erh at Ch'ien-ch'iu. 101
An incident somewhat more than two decades later, although evidencing strong belief in the veracity of such procedures, shows the importance of thecharge and the offhand rejection of results that belie the tactical situation:
In 538 B.C. Wu attacked Ch'u. Yang Kai, prime minister of Ch'u, performed divination by turtle shell to inquire about the
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prospects, but the result was inauspicious. Tzu Yü, the Minister of War, said: "We have gained a position upstream from them, so how can it beinauspicious? Moreover, of old Ch'u's Minister of War made the charge beforecracking the shell, so let me change it." He then ordered, "Even though I andmy men perish, if the remainder of Ch'u's forces follow on may it be that we gain a great victory." The result was auspicious. They then engaged the enemy at Chang-an. The Minister of War died first, but the army sustained the effortand Ch'u severely defeated Wu's army, even capturing the king of Wu'scommand vessel. 102
The Battle of Yen-ling
The battle of Yen-ling, which occurred in 574 B.C. and was previously mentioned in Sheng-tzu's review of Ch'u's numerous defectors, epitomizes thestate of intelligence activities in the Spring and Autumn period and thusmerits recounting to conclude the era's discussion:
The duke of Chin was about to attack the state of Cheng, which had shifted its allegiance to Ch'u. Fan Wen-tzu remarked: "If I had my wish, all thefeudal lords would rebel, for then Chin would truly arise. If only Cheng rebels, disaster will soon befall our state."
Luan Shu replied, "In my time we cannot lose the allegiance of the feudal lords, so we must attack Cheng." Thereupon they mobilized the army. LuanShu was in command of the Center Army and Fan Wen-tzu was his adjutant. Hsi Ch'i was in command of the Upper Army, with Hsün Yen as adjutant. HanChüeh was in command of the Lower Army, while Hsi Chih was adjutant of the New Army. Hsün Ying was in charge of defense. Hsi Ch'ou went to Wei andthen Ch'i to request forces, as did Luan Yen in Lu. Meng Hsien-tzu remarked,"They will be victorious."
After Chin's four armies had set out, Cheng learned about the Chin force and deputed an emissary to inform Ch'u, accompanied by Yao Kou-erh, a highofficial. King Kung of Ch'u led his forces out to rescue Cheng, with theMinister of War, Tzu Fan, in command of the Center Army; the prime minister,Tzu Chung, in command of the Army of the Left; and the deputy minister, TzuHsü, in command of the Army of the Right. When they passed by the formerstate of Shen, Tzu Fan visited Shen Shu-shih, a retired Ch'u high minister, toinquire about his thoughts on the army.
He replied: "Virtue, punishment, reverence, righteousness, the rites, and fidelity are the implements of warfare. Virtue is the
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means to bespread beneficence, punishment to rectify, reverence to secure the spirits, righteousness to establish what is advantageous, the rites to accordwith the seasons, and fidelity to preserve things. When the people's livelihoodis abundant Virtue is upright, when employments are advantageous affairsare constrained. Government measures meet no opposition, whatever issought is fully supplied, and everyone knows the proper measure. Thus theOdes state, 'Establish my people, let all be included.' For this reason the
spirits send down good fortune and the seasons are free from disaster and harm.
"The people's lives were formerly fruitful and abundant, harmoniously they heeded the government. Everyone exhausted their strength to implement theruler's commands and would die to supplement gaps in the line of battle. Fromthis stems virtue in battle. However, internally Ch'u now casts away its peopleand externally severs connections with formerly close allies. It violates itsalliances and eats its words. In acting, it contravenes the seasons and laborsthe populace to achieve its desires. The people no longer recognize fidelity;whether they advance or retreat, they commit offenses. When the people are anxious about their movements, who will die for the state? Exert yourself fully, but I will never see you again."
Yao Kou-erh returned to Cheng before Tzu Fan, whereupon Tzu Ssu inquiredabout his observations. He replied: " Ch'u's forces are advancing rapidly but inpassing through constricted terrain are not well ordered. When an armymoves quickly it has lost its resolve; when disordered, strength of formation issacrificed. When their resolve is lost and formations sacrificed, how will they engage in battle? I fear that they cannot be employed."
When Chin's armies crossed the Yellow River in the fifth month they heard that Ch'u's forces were about to arrive. Fan Wen-tzu, who wanted to turn back, said: "If we pretend to flee from Ch'u we can extricate ourselves from thepresent misfortune. We obviously cannot bring the feudal lords together, so letus leave it to those who can. If we ministers unite in serving our ruler it will be enough." Luan Shu replied, "It is not possible."
In the sixth month Chin and Ch'u encountered each other at Yen-ling. FanWen-tzu did not want to engage the enemy, but Hsi Chih said: "At the battleof Han Duke Hui did not deploy his regiments in good order; in theengagement at Chi, Hsien Chen failed to fulfill his mission; and the army that went to Pi under Hsün Po was unable to return, all to Chin's disgrace.You also have personally witnessed these affairs of our former rulers. Now if we avoid Ch'u, it will only increase our shame!"
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Fan Wen-tzu said: "Our former rulers fervently engaged in warfare because the Ti, Ch'u, Ch'i, and Ch'in were all strong. If Chin had not exerted all itsstrength, their sons and grandsons would have become weakened. Now thatthree powerful states have already submitted, Ch'u alone remains as anenemy. Only a Sage can be free from both internal and external worries. Since we are not Sages, if the state is externally at peace we will certainly have internal anxieties. Why not release Ch'u to provide us with an external sourceof fear?"
Early in the morning, on the last day of the lunar month, Ch'u deployed its forces close on Chin's encampment. Chin's officers were concerned, but FanWen-tzu's son raced in and said: "Fill in the wells, destroy the cookstoves,deploy our formations amid the encampment, and spread out the verticalrows. It is only a question of whether Heaven sustains us or Ch'u, so what is there to worry about?" Fan Wen-tzu seized a halberd and pursued him, shouting, "The state's preservation or destruction is a matter of Heaven. Whatdoes a kid know about it?"
Luan Shu said: " Ch'u's army is skittish, so if we solidify our fortificationsand wait them out, within three days they will certainly withdraw. If we thensuddenly attack their retreating forces, victory will be inevitable."
Hsi Chih countered: " Ch'u has six gaps that cannot be left unexploited. Itstwo ministers detest each other; the king's troops are fatigued; Cheng'sformations are not well ordered; the Man tribal regiments cannot be deployed; and in deploying for combat, Ch'u has not avoided the most inauspiciouslunar day. When in formation they are noisy, when uniting for deploymentincreasingly clamorous, every man looking behind him, no one having the willto fight. Since their veterans are not necessarily outstanding and they haveoffended the prohibitions of Heaven, we shall certainly conquer them."
When the king of Ch'u climbed up on a mobile observation tower in order tolook out at Chin's armies, Tzu Chung had the grand counselor Po Chou-li [a defector from Chin] stand behind him. The king asked, "Why are they racing about to the left and right?" Po Chou-li replied, "They are summoning thearmy's officers."
"They are all assembling in the Center Army." "They are gathering tofinalize the plans."
"They are raising a tent." "It is for respectfully performing divinationbefore the ancestral rulers."
"They are striking the tent." "They are about to issue the orders."
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"They are extremely noisy and dust is flying everywhere." "They are filling inthe wells, destroying their cookstoves and assuming formation."
"After mounting their chariots, the attendants, bearing their weapons, have descended again." "It is to listen to the admonitory oath."
"Will they fight?" "I still do not know."
"After remounting the chariots, the attendants have once more descended.""This is for the battle prayer." Po Chou-li also advised the king about theduke of Chin's men.
Miao Pen-huang, a defector from Ch'u standing beside the duke of Chin, similarly advised him about the king of Ch'u's forces. The duke's attendantsall said, "One of our natives, Po Chou-li, is with the king of Ch'u and theirforces are too great to oppose." However, Miao Pen-huang said to the duke ofChin: "Ch'u's superior soldiers are found only in the royal clans composing the Center Army. I suggest that we divide up our elite warriors to launch a sudden attack on their armies on the left and right flanks and then our threeremaining armies can concentrate upon the royal troops. Without doubt wewill severely defeat them."
The duke performed divination by milfoil to ascertain the prospects. TheScribe observed: "It is auspicious. You have encountered the hexagram Fu, 'to return,' whose implications are 'a southern state will shrink, there will bea shot, the king will be hit in the eye.' When a state shrinks and its king iswounded, if this doesn't mean defeat, what would?" The duke followed the indications.
There was a muddy stretch in front of their encampment, so all the chariots separated off to the left and right to avoid it. Pu Yi acted as the duke of Chin'sdriver, Luan Chen wielded the halberd on the right; P'eng Ming acted as driverfor the King of Ch'u, with Pan Tang taking the position on the right. ShihShou drove for the earl of Cheng and T'ang Kou attended on the right. FanWen-tzu and Luan Shu's troops advanced in parallel on either side of the dukeof Chin, but the duke's chariot became mired in the mud. Luan Shu wasabout to convey the duke away in his own chariot when Luan Chen, the duke's attendant on the right, shouted: "Get away. When the state has entrusted youwith great responsibility, how can you usurp that of others? Moreover, encroaching upon another's official duties is impudence, neglecting your ownduties is negligence, and departing from your own unit is perversity. You cannot commit these three offenses." Then he raised up the duke's chariot inorder to extricate it from the mire.
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The day before when Pan Tang and Yang Yu-chi had stacked breastplates onthe ground to hold a shooting competition, each succeeded in shooting anarrow through seven layers of armor. Boastfully, they showed the results tothe king: "Since you have two subjects so skilled as this, why worry aboutthe coming engagement?" The king angrily retorted: "This is a disgrace toour state. Tomorrow morning your archery will be the skill that kills you."
Over in the Chin camp General Wei Ch'i dreamt that he had shot at the moonand hit it but on withdrawing became enmired himself. Having the dreaminterpreted, he was advised: "The sun represents the royal surname of Chi[the house of Chin], while those of different surnames [such as Ch'u] are the moon. That is certainly the king of Ch'u. You will shoot and hit him, but inwithdrawing into the mire you will also die." When the battle was under wayhe hit the king in the eye with an arrow. The king then summoned Yang Yu-chi, gave him two arrows, and had him shoot Wei Ch'i, who was struck in theneck and fell prostrate on his quiver. Yang then took back the remaining arrow and reported the fulfillment of his mission.
Three times Hsi Chih encountered the king of Ch'u's clan troops, and eachtime when he saw the king, he removed his helmet and raced away like thewind. The king dispatched the Minister of Works to inquire after him andpresent a bow, saying: "In the fervency of our present engagement the manwearing red gaiters and leggings is a true gentleman. But since he runs off soquickly when he sees me, I wonder if he hasn't sustained some injury?"
When Hsi Chih saw the messenger, he doffed his helmet to receive the edictand then replied: "Your external servant, following his ruler in engaging inthis matter of warfare, on account of your spiritual power has for some timenow worn helmet and armor. I dare not bow in acknowledgment of your command but venture to advise it causes me uneasiness, this condescensionof your ruler. Because of the activities of the moment, I can only salute you."He saluted three times and then withdrew.
Han Chüeh of Chin began to pursue the earl of Cheng so his driver said: "Letus quickly follow him because his driver is constantly looking about andobviously does not have his mind on the horses. We can overtake him." HanChüeh replied, "I cannot insult another ruler." So they ceased their pursuit.
When Hsi Chih then pursued the earl of Cheng, his attendant on the rightsaid, "Have some reconnaissance scouts 103 cut in
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front of him and I will mount the chariot from behind and bring him off as acaptive." Hsi Chih replied, "Those who harm a ruler are punished," so he toodesisted.
Shih Shou, driving the earl of Cheng's chariot, said, "Only because Duke Yi of Wei would not abandon his flag was he defeated at the battle of Ying."Then he took down the earl's pennon and stuffed it in his quiver. T'ang Kou, the attendant on the right, said to Shih Shou: "You must remain by theruler's side. Since our defeat is horrendous, at this moment I am not as important as you. You should escape with the ruler and I will remainbehind." Then he died in battle.
Ch'u's force were pressed onto constricted terrain, so Shu-shan Jan said toYang Yu-chi, "Even though the ruler indicated otherwise, for the sake of thestate you must shoot the enemy." So he shot an arrow and then shot again, and in both cases killed a soldier of Chin. Shu-shan Jan threw a man whomhe had seized against a chariot, snapping the crossbar. Although Chin's troops then halted, they had already taken the king's son prisoner.
Luan Chen saw Tzu Chung's flag, so he appealed to the duke of Chin: "Ch'u's soldiers have advised me that is Tzu Chung's banner so that must be TzuChung. When I was formerly an emissary to Ch'u he inquired about the natureof Chin's courage. I replied, 'It is seen in masses of men well ordered.' Hefurther asked what else, and I replied, 'In being tranquil.' This time, when ourtwo states engaged in battle, we failed to dispatch a hsing-jen, so we cannot besaid to have been well ordered. Now that the battle has commenced, I havehad to eat my words, so this cannot be termed composure. Permit me to present him with some wine."
The duke of Chin consented, so he dispatched a hsing-jen with a flagon toinvite Tzu Chung to drink. Advising Tzu Chung of his mission, he said: "AsLuan Chen's ruler lacks capable men, he was ordered to drive and take up a spear and has not been able to attend to your troops. However, he hasdispatched me bearing wine for you to drink."
Tzu Chung said: "This must be from the officer who once spoke with me inCh'u. Do I not also recognize him?" He accepted the wine and drank it, dismissed the emissary, and then resumed beating the drums.
The battle had commenced at first light and was still raging when the stars became visible. That night Tzu Fan order Ch'u's officers to investigate theextent of the killed and wounded, supplement any deficiencies in troops andchariots, put the armor and weapons in good order, array the chariots andhorses, prepare
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to eat at first light, and immediately obey all orders. Learning about this, the troops from Chin were uneasy, but Miao Penhuang circulated about, saying,"Gather the chariots together, replace missing troops, tend to the horses andprepare your weapons, improve your formations and solidify your lines, eat inyour tents and intensify your prayers because tomorrow we will again engagethe enemy." Moreover he released the prisoners from Ch'u.
When the king of Ch'u in turn heard about these preparations, he summoned Tzu Fan to formulate their tactics, but the latter's attendant had given himwine to drink and Tzu Fan was too drunk to see the king. The king said,"When Heaven defeats us we cannot wait here." Then he withdrew during thenight. Chin's forces entered their encampment and found three days' worth of provisions. 104
This account of the battle of Yen-ling, the last of the Tso Chuan's well-knownfive great battles, while lengthy and evocative, actually provides virtually noinformation about the engagement itself beyond a few vignettes of ritual heroicacts (contrary to numerous Western scholars who have vigorously assertedthat traditional Chinese values do not countenance such heroism and its writings are devoid of such accounts, unlike Greek heroic literature. The TsoChuan narrative clearly depicts an encounter during the transitional periodfrom chariot-centered conflict undertaken mainly by the noble class to mass- based infantry armies). The crucial tactical thrust was perceptively formulatedby Miao Pen-huang, but the foundation, the possibility of mounting aneffective assault rather than simply withdrawing, derived from Hsi Chih'sconclusion that Ch'u's coalition was marked by dissension and fatigue, its forces too dispirited to fight effectively. However, both sides obviously employed agents and reconnaissance soldiers to gain information about theenemy prior to their confrontation and exploited extensive knowledge providedby defectors on either side. The stylized battle preparation would hardly have required a defector's explanation unless the king of Ch'u lacked battlefield experience, for Ch'u would certainly have followed similar practices. However, the value of defectors in providing key information--such as good troops being concentrated solely under the king of Ch'u--illustrates the
main intelligence thrust at the end of the Spring and Autumn period.
The slow progression of events is also evident from this battle, for emissaries have the luxury of reaching out to allies for additional forces. Tzu Fan evenmanaged to visit an old minister of Ch'u who
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reprised the essential foundations of military strength for him, all principles and values subsequently incorporated in Warring States military writings, butcertainly grounded on Spring and Autumn experience. 105 The divination anddream accounts embedded in the narrative indicate how such informationmight have been interpreted and employed, as well as the fact that prophesied death would never deter military action. The deliberate release of prisoners tojangle the enemy with news of strong preparations, of resolve to fight, was a practice much discussed in later literature, but here already witnessed. (Alternatively, false information could have been scripted but would have required careful consideration of a myriad possibilities. Miao Pen- huang, knowing that Ch'u's forces were already skittish, simply wanted to augmenttheir fears.)
Finally, amid this portrait of military intelligence as practiced at the end of the Spring and Autumn period, the ill-fated Tzu Fan merits noting because hissomewhat tragic fate was frequently employed to illustrate one principle oranother in later centuries. Obviously a man who loved wine, he was (at least inHan Fei-tzu's subsequent account) deceived by his own steward, who insisted a proffered beverage wasn't wine. Since it is inconceivable that he wouldn'thave recognized the taste of wine, once he partook of it all self-restraint musthave vanished. Thus a valiant warrior and otherwise conscientious officer was doomed to suicide in the defeat's aftermath.
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3 The Warring
States Period
THE WARRING STATES PERIOD ( 403-221 B.C.), aptly named because of the incessant warfare that plagued China throughout its two centuries, saw thefinal demise of the old Chou nobility, the rise of powerful despots, unimaginable social turbulence, and the disaffection and death of millions. The major states extant at the beginning of the period--Ch'in, Ch'u, Han, Wei, Chao, Yen, Ch'i, and Yüeh--essentially battled each other into nonexistence,with Ch'in eventually emerging from its advantageous position on the westernfringes to dominate all of China. As states and their entrenched nobilityperished, the social structure underwent a major upheaval, creating a pool of disfranchised individuals forced to seek employment through knowledge and talent. Their availability proved opportune because the period's insecuritycompelled the surviving states to implement every possible measure tostrengthen themselves economically, politically, and militarily. Political desperation fostered opportunity, giving rise to professional bureaucrats,technocrats, political theorists, strategists, and philosophers, all of whomroamed about the realm seeking a receptive ear. Although some importantofficials and members of the nobility still defected or were exiled, their importance as intelligence sources considerably diminished in comparisonwith the information that might be easily elicited from professional advisersand peripatetic persuaders such as Su Ch'in and Chang Yi, proponents of theVertical and Horizontal alliances, respectively, as well as major spies. However, prominent traitors, especially key generals, could still prove critical, often asmuch because they no longer served in an enemy state as for the intelligencedetails they might provide.
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Because the stakes had become higher and the fate of states often hung inthe balance, covert practices not only were constantly employed, but alsotended to be used in combination rather than singularly. Systematicsubversion through bribes, disaffection through calumny, and estrangementthrough false accusations and rumors made up the main weapons. All threeoften proved surprisingly successful, no doubt being much facilitated by theemerging psychological and political analyses of court dynamics and
In the military and political realms theoreticians began studying the lessons of human experience, formulating programs, and propounding systematicbeliefs. Although military theorists naturally focused upon intelligence, spycraft, and covert operations, when pondering the nature of knowledge,historical experience, and political dynamics, many of the philosophical andpolitical thinkers advanced fundamental insights and identified basicassumptions that quickly became essential to any analysis of intelligencepractices. Great advances were witnessed in methods and procedures forevaluating men and armies, analyzing enemy behavior, assessing force levels, and targeting commanders. Moreover, Sun-tzu's classifications of terrain, while certainly reflecting knowledge accumulated over the preceding centuriesand the classificatory impulse that produced regional theories embracing every aspect of flora and fauna, uniquely focused on the military impact of various characteristic features such as constricted and open areas. Since histopographical categories and their subsequent expansion will be discussed inthe military intelligence section, it merely need be noted that the existence of difficult terrain--land that could slow, even entrap a force--now had to be recognized for purposes of both avoidance and exploitation. The astutecommander therefore deployed reconnaissance patrols far ahead to preventhis own army from becoming entangled and plot measures to maneuver theenemy onto them, effectively creating a force multiplier, possibly even a killing ground such as seen at the famous battle of Ma-ling in the mid-fourthcentury. 1
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In accord with the rational character of Chinese military enterprises in partinitiated by Sun-tzu Art of War, 2 from the Warring States onward greatemphasis was placed on analyzing enemy capabilities and intentions, determining the possibilities for victory, and then effectively employing thearmy by first confusing and debilitating the enemy. The Chinese practice ofwarfare attained its definitive style by the end of the period with the cavalry's initial use in supplementing massive infantry and chariot forces, the latterincreasingly displaced from their earlier pivotal role. This analytical thrustrequired gathering information about the enemy, as well as oneself,preliminary to undertaking critical calculations. Apparently in accord withSun-tzu's emphasis upon spycraft as the most efficient and necessary military activity, clandestine undertakings flourished. Instead of relying uponoccasional diplomatic missions supplemented by dubious defectors, statesdispatched agents and constructed foreign networks, generally through bribes and coercion. Although little information has been preserved about the natureof covert intelligence practices, their extensiveness at the end of the WarringStates period may be seen in an oftcited incident found in Wei Kung-tzubiography in the Shih Chi:
King Chao of Wei's youngest son, Prince Wu-chi of Wei, was the stepbrother of King An-li. When King Chao died and An-li ascended the throne, he enfeoffedhis younger brother Wu-chi as Lord of Hsin-ling. About this time Fan Sui fledfrom Wei to Ch'in, becoming its prime minister. Because of Fan's hatred for Wei, he had Ch'in's troops surround Wei's capital of Ta-liang. Theysubsequently crushed Wei's army below Hua-yang and drove off Mang Mao.3 King An-li and Prince Wu-chi agonized over these developments.
Prince Wu-chi was benevolent and respectful to men of quality. Whether they were worthies or scoundrels, he treated them all courteously and deferentially, never presuming to be arrogant on account of his wealth and rank. Accordingly, warriors for thousands of kilometers around rushed to give theirallegiance, and eventually he retained three thousand men on stipend.Because the feudal lords regarded the prince as a worthy man
and knew he had numerous retainers, for some ten years they never dared plot against or attack Wei.
One day when the prince and the king were gambling, word came from the north that signal fires marking a border invasion
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had been seen. This was understood as indicating that Chao's forces had appeared at the border and were making an incursion. Putting the gameaside, the king wanted to summon his high officials to formulate their tactics. The prince stopped him, saying: "It's not an invasion. The king of Chao ismerely out hunting." He then returned to the game as before.
Being troubled, the king could not concentrate on their game. After a whileword again came from the border reporting that the king of Chao was merelyout hunting, not mounting an invasion. The king of Wei was astonished: "How did you know this?"
The prince replied: "Among my retainers are those who can deeply penetratethe king of Chao's secrets. Whatever the king is about to do, my retainersalways report it to your servant. Thus I was able to know it." Thereafter, fearing the prince's ability and sagacity, King An-li did not dare entrust himwith government affairs. 4
Although Sun-tzu himself was active at the end of the Spring and Autumnperiod and his thoughts reflect the era's military practices, as a conceptual analysis the Art of War became influential only in the Warring States periodwhen copies may have begun circulating and his teachings, through eitherhis disciples or a family school, carefully studied. His characterization of spies, defined by their mode of action and objectives, has been widely acknowledged even by Western historians otherwise unfamiliar with China as history's first, and his chapter termed the earliest on spycraft. In"Employing Spies" Sun-tzu identified five categories that became thefoundation for all subsequent Chinese thought upon the subject. Althoughthey will be comprehensively discussed in
the theoretical section on agents, they merit brief reprising here:
There are five types of spies to be employed: local spy, internal spy, turned spy or double agent, dead or expendable spy, and the living spy. When all fiveare employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed "spiritualmethodology." They are a ruler's treasures.
Local spies--employ people from the local district.
Internal spies--employ their people who hold government positions.
Double agents--employ the enemy's spies.
Expendable spies--employ them to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our expendable spies with false information and havethem leak it to enemy agents.
Living spies--return with their reports.
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Even though Sun-tzu's definition of "double agents" or "turned agents"--fanchien--is essentially the classical Western one, in common use from the Warring States on fan chien rarely meant "doubled agent," but insteadsomeone recruited from the other side to act as an agent in place. Simply traitors to their states, rather than foreign agents who have been compromisedand enlisted, they clearly fall into Sun-tzu's category of "internal agents,"people who hold government positions or are otherwise close to the ruler and centers of power.
Su Ch'in
Even though his diplomatic missions were patently overt and he achieved his greatest fame for advocating the vertical alliance--successfully balking Ch'in'spredatory attacks for some fifteen years--Su Ch'in has also been regarded asone of China's most successful and notorious agents. In fact, an Art of Wartext from the late Warring States period recovered in recent decades appendsSu Ch'in's name to those of Yi Yin and Lü Ya as China's first spies, observing that "when Yen arose, Su Ch'in was in Ch'i." His counterfeit betrayal andflight from
the state of Yen provide a dramatic example of subterfuge at its best, for through them he created a plausible motive for seeking revenge against theking of Yen and was therefore warmly welcomed in Ch'i, Yen's bitter enemy. Moreover, Su Ch'in not only achieved great fame in premodern China, but also continues to be a giant figure today as his story is retold in novels, comic books, TV programs, and movies.
Although his experiences and persuasions are recorded in several Shih Chibiographies and Chan-kuo Ts'e chapters, their reliability has been muchquestioned because they have apparently become admixed with romanticstories that evolved after his death. (In authoring the Shih Chi, Ssu-ma Ch'ienfelt compelled to remark that Su Ch'in's biography was nebulous at best, and he further noted that many disparate elements had coalesced around SuCh'in's name.) However, even though the dialogues and persuasions arealmost certainly later fabrications, his activities are well recorded, and lostChan-kuo Ts'e chapters that have recently resurfaced amplify the historical picture and provide further dialogues. The main difficulty therefore lies withthe dates and range of Su Ch'in's activities, tentatively resolvable into the lastdecade of the fourth century and first two decades of the third century B.C.,his death coming a year or two before 284 B.C., when Yüeh Yi led Yen's armies in a successful invasion of Ch'i. 5
In Ssu-ma Ch'ien's narrative the critical point arrives when Su Ch'in plots tobecome a counterfeit exile:
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The king of Yen's mother and Su Ch'in were involved in illicit relations. Eventhough the king knew about it, he treated him even more generously. SuCh'in, afraid of being executed, suggested to the king, "If I remain here, I willnot be able to make Yen a significant state, but if I were in Ch'i, I couldcertainly accomplish this objective."6 The king concurred: "I consent towhatever you want to do."
Thereupon Su Ch'in feigned having committed an offense in Yen and fled toCh'i where King Hsüan appointed him as a guest minister. When King Hsüandied, King Min ascended the throne. 7 Su Ch'in then persuaded King Min tomake the burial
extremely lavish in order to display his filiality and to undertake lofty palaces and large gardens to illuminate his Virtue, hoping to thereby enervate Ch'i andexhaust its resources to Yen's benefit. 8 When King Yi of Yen died, King Huiascended the throne. Thereafter Ch'i's high officials competed with Su Ch'infor the ruler's favor and eventually had an assassin attack him. After fatallystabbing Su Ch'in, the assassin escaped. Even though the king dispatchedmen to catch the brigand, they failed.
Near death, Su Ch'in proposed to the king, "I am about to die, so if you have me torn apart by chariots in the marketplace as an exemplary punishment forcausing turmoil in Ch'i on Yen's behalf, my assassin will certainly be caught."The king put his plan into effect and the assassin indeed came forth [to claim a reward], whereupon the king had him executed. When the people of Yenheard about Su Ch'in's violent death, they remarked, "How extreme was Ch'i'smethod for taking revenge on Su Ch'in." After his death Su Ch'in's actualmission completely leaked out, causing Ch'i to greatly fear and hate Yen when they learned about it.
The Grand Historian comments: " Su Ch'in and his two brothers became famous as peripatetic persuaders to the feudal lords. Their techniquesemphasized shifts in authority, but after Su Ch'in was found to be a turnedagent and executed, the world laughed at him and shunned the study of his methods. What people have said about Su Ch'in over the years varies greatly, even attributing to him unusual events from very different times. However, insofar as Su Ch'in rose from humble beginnings to unite the sixstates in a vertical alliance, his intelligence clearly surpassed that of ordinary men. Therefore I arrayed his actions and appended an introductionto his times in order that he not be tarnished solely by an evil name."9
Su Ch'in's remarkable biography raises the possibility that his reputation as a double agent for Yen was conceived solely on his deathbed
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as a final ploy to capture his assassin. However, when Ch'i employed him, they knew about his reputation among the feudal lords and his previousmissions to create alliances in opposition to Ch'in, so Ch'i easily accepted hisfabricated exile. Generations thereafter believed that he had truly betrayedCh'i, just as his brother would subsequently. Moreover, the policy ofexhausting a state through massive public undertakings was already part of current knowledge, having been a keystone in Wen Chung's systematic effortto undermine Wu at the end of the Spring and Autumn period.
The small but formidable state of Han essentially mimicked Su Ch'in's mid-fourth-century example by trying to generate unrest among the workersimpressed for a massive, arduous canal project that it persuaded Ch'in toundertake. From antiquity, when the semi- mythical Yü exhausted himself in taming the floodwaters that perpetually inundated China, through the Springand Autumn and into the Warring States periods, canals were undertaken onever vaster scales, connecting rivers, lakes, and major streams. Multiuse, theyimmediately provided water for irrigation, as well as navigable waterways thatmight be negotiated by shallow draft boats either poled or pulled along fromshore, thereby dramatically nurturing increased economic prosperity in thecanal's vicinity. The Shih Chi therefore devotes a chapter to canals andChina's ongoing struggle to control the Yellow River that coincidentally notes this covert attempt to exhaust Ch'in:
Hsi-men Pao diverted water from the Chang River to irrigate the district of Yeh and thereby enriched Wei's Ho-nei region. About this time the state of Hanheard that Ch'in's ruler liked to initiate major undertakings. Therefore, inorder to exhaust Ch'in and prevent them from launching an eastward attack,Han had the hydraulic specialist Cheng Kuo, in the capacity of a clandestine agent, persuade the king of Ch'in to chisel out a canal from the Ching Riverwest of Mt. Chung westward to Hu pass, and also eastward around thenorthern mountains toward the Luo River, a total of some three hundredkilometers, in order to provide irrigation for the fields.
In the midst of its construction the king of Ch'in realized Cheng Kuo's true intentions and therefore wanted to execute him.
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verted into productive rice fields. Consequently, Ch'in never again suffered from famine and was able to grow rich and strong, subsequently uniting allthe other feudal lords. They therefore named the canal after its engineer, Cheng Kuo. 10
Against a background of burgeoning economic prosperity stimulated by canal building, Cheng Kuo's advice would certainly have been plausible, his ownmotive apparently being to enrich himself as its director. Moreover, this wasan age when foreign advisers and technical specialists were able to travel about seeking employment under the remaining feudal lords embroiled in the struggle for survival, frequently by advocating the view that economicprosperity would provide the foundation for military strength and politicalpower. Ironically, Han's subversive efforts significantly augmented Ch'in'seconomic base and thereby substantially contributed to their own demise.
Military Intelligence
As the number of forces committed to the average campaign escalated dramatically and battlefield success became vital to a state's very survival, greater resources and expertise had to be allotted to military affairs. As may be seen in the historical and theoretical writings of the period, the importanceof military intelligence grew correspondingly, resulting in frequentadmonitions to dispatch scouts, establish roving patrols, and continuouslywatch the enemy. More intensive observation naturally provoked creativeefforts in deception, including widely implemented practices designed to masknumbers, misdirect attention, and conceal intent. Observational catalogsevolved that correlated visible phenomena with actual activities
and projected probable intent based upon battlefield behavior. Althoughlargely focused upon human intelligence, attempts were also made to captureenemy communications, interpret battlefield signals, and fathom early warningsystems. However, these and the critical issues of secrecy andcounterintelligence are extensively discussed in Warring States military writings; therefore, their analysis is best deferred to the theoretical sections tracing the development of doctrine across periods. Here a single example of a commander named Chao She astutely deceiving enemy observers will illustratethe increased sophistication of counterreconnaissance practices in the Warring States period.
Chao She became prominent in the state of Chao as an upright official whoequalized and stabilized the taxes, thereby nurturing agricultural prosperity, and also brilliantly exercised military command responsibilities:
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About 270 B.C., en route to attacking Han, Ch'in encamped at Yü- yü inChao so the king of Chao summoned Lien P'o and asked, "Can we rescue thecity of Yü-yü or not?"
Lien P'o replied: "The road is far, the passes narrow. Effecting a rescue will be difficult."
The king also summoned Yüeh Ch'eng and similarly queried him, only toreceive an identical reply. He then summoned Chao She who answered: "Theroad is far and the passes narrow. It might be compared with two ratsfighting in a cave. The more courageous general will emerge victorious."
The king therefore ordered Chao She to assume command of an army mobilized to rescue Yü-yü. When the army had ventured thirty kilometersfrom Han-tan, the capital, Chao She announced to his forces, "Anyone whopresumes to advise upon military affairs will be put to death."
Ch'in's main army encamped west of Wu-an where the thunder of their drums and noise of their men shook the very roof tiles. Among Chao She's reconnaissance units was one soldier who admonished Chao to urgently undertake the rescue of Wu-an. Chao She immediately had him beheaded,then solidified the
walls of his encampment and remained entrenched for twenty-eight dayswithout advancing. Thereupon he again increased their height andaugmented his fortifications. When enemy agents came from Ch'in, Chao Sheensured that they were well fed and then sent them off. When these agentssubmitted their reports, Ch'in's commanding general was overjoyed: "Afteradvancing only thirty kilometers they have stopped and merely increase their fortifications. Obviously Yü-yü is not Chao's objective."
However, immediately after sending off Ch'in's agents, Chao She had his troops roll up their armor and pursue them, arriving after a forced march of two days and one night. He then constructed a fortified camp but had hisskilled archers stand off about fifty kilometers from Yü-yü. Just when theywere completing their fortifications, Ch'in's forces learned about them and sped forth en masse.
An officer named Hsü Li requested permission to advise about militaryaffairs, so Chao She gave permission for him to be brought in. Hsü Li said:"Ch'in never thought our army would reach here. They have rushed forth fullof spirit, so you should deploy in depth in order to await them. Otherwise wewill certainly be defeated."
Chao She responded, "I await your orders."
Hsü Li said, "Please proceed with my execution."
Chao She replied, "That can wait until later at Han-tan."
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Hsü Li again requested permission to offer advice and said, "Whoever occupies the heights of the mountain to the north will be victorious, whoeverarrives afterward will be defeated."
Chao She agreed and dispatched ten thousand men to race there. Ch'in forces subsequently arrived and fought with them for control of the mountain butwere unable to ascend it. Chao She then released his remaining forces tosuddenly strike them and thus inflicted a severe defeat on Ch'in's army. Ch'indisengaged from the conflict and fled, thereafter lifting their siege of Yü-yüand retreating back to their borders. 11
Chao She's benign treatment of enemy spies--neither capturing nor killing them--not only is surprising for the time, but also assumes they had beendetected by conscious effort. Through his actions he deliberately exploitedthem as fan chien, agents converted (and thus "doubled," even thoughunconsciously) to his own purposes. Numerous commanders followed hisexample in later dynasties, and theoreticians discussed the importance of manipulating foreign agents from the T'ang onward. Moreover, this incident--although chosen for its tactical employment of mountains--also appears asone of the historical illustrations selected for the Sung dynasty tacticalcompendium know as the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies, thereby ensuring itwould thereafter be known to an even wider audience than simply literati studying the ancient histories. 12
The role of the peripatetic persuaders already mentioned in disseminating military knowledge and exposing state secrets during the Warring Statesperiod merits closer scrutiny. Although they openly ventured from state tostate, in the course of their travels and through discussions on statecraft and strategy with various officials and rulers, many of them--especially the more famous and those marked by noble birth, both of whom would have been wellentertained by the powerful and rich--acquired a vast store of military knowledge. Depending upon their astuteness and observational skills, theymight easily divulge a critical plan to another state after simply havingdeduced its existence. For example, the sort of force level information a rulermight obtain from peripatetic persuaders, itinerant strategists, and evenmercenaries in the Warring States may be seen in the following summarydeveloped from persuasions exercised by Chang Yi and Su Ch'in that are preserved in the Chan-kuo Ts'e. Whether their numbers were mere guesses, calculated estimates, or precise figures remains an important but unansweredquestion. Each state kept reasonably updated counts of their soldiers at boththe central and local levels, while a general or two might always be found tocarelessly discuss
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martial affairs. Alternatively, an experienced observer could certainly have estimated total strength with basic facts about
unit size and the number of armies. Each of the stronger states could apparently field several hundred thousand troops at this time, although the composition and readiness of standing forces remain less clear. However, theirforce assessments for the major states extant in the mid-fourth century maybe summarized as follows:
Wei--360,000 trained, mailed soldiers, plus perhaps a hundred thousand consigned to border defense; 1,000 or more chariots; 10,000 cavalry
Chao--100,000 trained, mailed troops; 1,000 chariots; 10,000 cavalry 13
Han--200,000 trained, mailed troops; 100,000 additional on border duty
Ch'in--100,000 trained, mailed troops; 14 1,000 chariots; 10,000 cavalry
Ch'i--300,000-400,000 trained, mailed troops
Ch'u--100,000 trained, mailed troops; 1,000 chariots 15
The Warring States period also witnessed the development of "national combatprofiles"--summary evaluations of an enemy's character and fighting potential, coupled with tactical principles for achieving victory--by such figures asHsün-tzu and Wu Ch'i. 16 The Wu-tzu, a book identified with the great generalWu Ch'i that reflects early Warring States thought, preserves the following analyses:
Although Ch'i's battle array is dense in number, they are not solid. That of Ch'in is dispersed, with the soldiers preferring to fight individually. Ch'u'sformations have good order, but they cannot long maintain their positions. Yen's formations are adept at defense, but they are not mobile. The battlearrays of the Three Chin are well controlled, but they prove useless. 17
Now Ch'i's character is hard; their country prosperous; the ruler and ministers arrogant and extravagant and insulting to the common people. Thegovernment is expansive, but salaries are inequitable. Each formation is oftwo minds, with the front being heavy and the rear light. Thus while they aredense, they are not stable. The Tao for attacking them is to divide them
Ch'in's character is strong; their land treacherous; and the governmentsevere. Their rewards and punishments are believed in;
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the people never yield but instead are all fiery and contentious. Thus they scatter and individually engage in combat. The Tao for attacking them is to first entice them with profits, for their soldiers are greedy and will abandontheir generals to pursue them. Capitalizing on their misjudgment, you canhunt down their scattered ranks, establish ambushes, take advantage of themoment, and then their generals can be captured.
Ch'u's character is weak; their lands broad; their government troubling to the people and their populace weary. Thus while they are well ordered, they do notlong maintain their positions. The Tao for attacking them is to suddenly strikeand cause chaos in the encampments. First snatch away their spirit, lightly advancing and then quickly retreating, tiring and laboring them, never actually joining battle with them. Then their army can be defeated.
Yen's character is sincere and straightforward. Their people are careful; they love courage and righteousness, and rarely practice deception in their plans.Thus they will defend their positions but are not mobile. The Tao for attacking them is to strike and press them; insult them and put distance between you; then race and get behind them so that their upper ranks will be doubtful and their lower ranks fearful. Be cautious about your chariots and cavalry, avoidconflict on the open road, for then their general can be captured.
The Three Chin are central countries. Their character is harmonious andtheir government equitable. The populace is weary from battle butexperienced in arms, and they have little regard for their generals. Salariesare meager, and as their officers have no commitment to fight to the death,they are ordered but useless. The Tao for attacking them is to press theirformations, and when large numbers appear, oppose
them. When they turn back, pursue them in order to wear them out. Thatthen is the strategic configuration of force in these countries. 18
No doubt observations such as these were common knowledge, formulated as a result of military experience, coupled with banter about the enemy. (A fewsuch concrete observations have already been seen in the battlefield materialsincluded in the Spring and Autumn section.) However, Wu Ch'i's assessments not only identify national traits derived from government practices, but alsocouple them with battlefield behavioral tendencies that, being predictable, canbe exploited with appropriate tactics. Thus the practice of intelligence hasalready moved from simple observation to characterization and expectation, from mere reaction to analysis and exploitation. Once aug
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mented with the details of concrete tactical situations, such profiles suggestplans for manipulating the enemy, for achieving Sun-tzu's critical objectivesof debilitating them and achieving complete victory.
Hsün-tzu's well-known chapter on military affairs, much cited thereafter because it vigorously asserted the fundamental importance of righteousnessand benevolence over mere military expediency (befitting good Confuciantradition), also contains a surprisingly realistic appraisal of warfare. Probablywritten by Hsün-tzu himself nearly two centuries after the Wu-tzu, several passages characterize three of the major states still extant late in the WarringStates period:
The men of Ch'i esteem skillful attacks. When such skill results in killing one of the enemy, the soldier is rewarded with eight ounces of gold from thepenalties imposed on others for battlefield failure, without any regard forwhether the army itself proved victorious. 19 Accordingly, when theengagement is minor and the enemy inconsequential, Ch'i can still get by withthem. But if the engagement is a major one and the enemy solid, they will disperse and scatter. Just like birds in flight, their formations can bedisrupted and overturned at any moment. These are the troops of a lost state,none are weaker
than they. It is almost as if they went into the marketplace to hire day laborers to engage in battle.
Wei's martial troops are selected according to standards that require them tosustain three sets of armor, be able to draw a twelve picul crossbow, carry fifty arrows in a quiver with a halberd hung on top, and when fully armored, bearing a sword, and carrying three days rations, race a hundred kilometerswithin a day. 20 Soldiers who meet these standards have their familiesexempted from labor duty and their land and household taxes remitted. However, when their skills decline with the passage of years, the benefitscannot be rescinded. Even changing the system would not be easy to fullyimplement. For this reason, although Wei's territory is vast, its tax revenues are invariably low. These are the soldiers of an endangered state. 21
The men of Ch'in are sorely deprived in their ordinary lives, and the government employs them through cruelty and harshness. It brutalizes themthrough authority, grieves them with difficulty, tempts them with glory andrewards, and vanquishes them with corporeal punishment and fines. Itensures that the suppressed people cannot gain any benefits from the government except through combat. 22 It employs them out of their desperation, and acknowledges achievement only after they are successful inbattle. Rewards compliment the degree of accomplishment. Thus someonewho slays five of the enemy is placed in charge of
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five families. Therefore, among these three states their troops have long been the most numerous and strongest, and they have expanded their territory greatly through conquest. The fact that they have been victoriousover the past four generations is not a question of luck, but of methods. 23
From a perspective that emphasized the virtually unopposable strength of Virtue, Hsün-tzu was still compelled to conclude: "Ch'i's skilled attacks areincapable of successfully countering Wei's martial troops, but Wei's martialtroops cannot counter Ch'in's elite warriors. Ch'in's elite warriors could nothave opposed the constrained and disciplined forces of the great
Although these two accounts were penned some two centuries apart, they furnish evidence that working profiles were commonly developed for enemy states, no doubt the product of extensive military experience buttressed by a pervasive theory of regionalism uniquely ascribing physical and behavioraltraits to different parts of the country. Clearly evolving from the concrete battlefield assessments witnessed in the Spring and Autumn period, they became significantly more abstract, transcending the simple capability andintentions material furnished by defectors or through direct observation.
Finally, it should be noted that spies were not dispatched solely against other states, but were also employed in border regions. For example, for many yearsGeneral Li Mu of Chao was able to thwart Hsiung-nu raiding parties through a combination of unorthodox tactics and refusing engagements, measures madepossible through deploying numerous spies and thereby being well informedabout the enemy's movements and intentions. No doubt information was alsoacquired from various trading groups, local merchants, and disaffectedmembers of the steppe peoples. Furthermore, as in the case of Chao She, a critical portion of his biography from the Shih Chi was similarly incorporated in the Hundred Unorthodox Strategies (as the historical incident in a chapterentitled "The Strong"), ensuring his experience would become a lesson forfuture leaders and commanders for centuries thereafter.
Covert Practices
The Warring States period witnessed an amazing escalation in the employment of covert techniques designed to aggressively affect and sub
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vert other states. Not only did bribes continue to play a significant role, butalso rumors and other methods were employed in combination to ensuretheir success. Most of the
recorded efforts fall into the category of estrangement techniques, measures designed to foment dissension among important ministers, cause disaffection, and effect the dismissal of highly competent officials and generals. Becausethe strength of fighting armies rapidly increased, professional generals assumed an increasingly pivotal role; therefore, forcing a change incommander could reverse previous defeats, even result in complete victory, soextreme were the differences in strategic and operational abilities. However, asmany commanders belatedly discovered, battlefield success also spawned court jealousies and created fertile ground for planting doubts in the ruler'smind that they represented a growing threat or might defect for greater glory and rewards.
The covert practice most widely employed in the Warring States was undoubtedly bribery, the limited materials preserved from the period recording a myriad instances. Without question bribery had been frequently employed inthe Spring and Autumn but reached its apex in the Warring States because itproved the simplest, yet most effective approach amid the era's dire circumstances. As an adjunct to false rumors, bribery ensured that the loyal and courageous, the meritorious and wise, would be sufficiently disparaged tosuffer exile or execution. The greater a man's achievements were, the moreintense was the jealousy he aroused, greatly facilitating the identification of likely candidates to corrupt and suborn.
The conception and implementation of bribery as a systematic policy alsoplayed an essential and heretofore unnoticed role in Ch'in's dramatic consolidation of power during the final century of the Warring States period.Even though bribery could not win final victory, a task left to Ch'in'sformidable warriors, it paved the way by undermining the formation of theantagonistic alliances that might have withstood them, thereby isolating the states for defeat in detail, and was also employed to persuade others to adoptpolicies of appeasement rather than undertake military preparations that"might be construed as provocative." According to a short reference found inthe Ch'in Annals, about 237 B.C. the noted strategist Wei Liao-tzu advised the king to systematically employ bribes as a basic tool for weakening the other feudal states:
In comparison with Ch'in's vast borders, the feudal lords may be likened torulers of provinces and districts. My only fear is that the feudal lords will forman alliance, will unite to do something unexpected. This is how Chih Po, Fu-ch'ai, and King Min perished. I suggest your Majesty not begrudge expendinghis wealth
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to bribe the great ministers and thereby confuse their plans. Without spending more than thirty thousand catties of gold, we can eliminate the feudal lords.
According to the Shih Chi account, the king followed his advice and alsofavored Wei Liao-tzu as an adviser. 24
Li Ssu, who was then wielding the government's power, apparently undertook responsibility for implementing the plan:
He secretly dispatched strategists bearing gold and jewels to offer as presents as they wandered among the feudal lords exercising their persuasions. Famous officials in the courts of the feudal lords who might be tempted by material goods were to be entangled with abundant gifts; those unwilling tocollaborate were to be assassinated with sharp swords. Whenever his plan toestrange the feudal lords from their ministers proved successful, the king of Ch'in would then have his expert generals follow up with attacks. 25
Wei Liao-tzu was not the only voice advocating the aggressive use of bribes toachieve world domination. For example, slightly earlier the marquis of Ch'insuggested an ostentatious display of gifts amid sumptuous entertainments tobuy off potential adversaries:
Officers from throughout the realm assembled in Chao in pursuit of the vertical alliance against Ch'in and wanted to attack it. Marquis Yin, then primeminister of Ch'in, said to the king: "My king, there is nothing to worry about. Irequest permission to force them to abandon their plans. The officers of therealm are assembling to attack Ch'in because they all want to be rich and honored, not because of any resentment against us. My king, observe yourdogs. Some of them are lying down, others standing up; some are moving about, others staying
Thereupon the ruler prepared to dispatch T'ang Chü, accompanied by female musicians and five thousand catties of gold, to dwell in Wu-an and drink withthe members of the high assembly. There he was to inform the men of Han-tan[Chao's capital] that anyone who came to visit him would take away monetary gifts. Accordingly, those who had been plotting against Ch'in would not obtainanything from him, while those who came and re
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ceived gifts would become his brothers. Marquis Yin further instructed him, "When you calculate the achievement for Ch'in, the ruler will not inquire aboutthe gold, for if the gold is completely exhausted, the achievements will bemany." The king moreover ordered men to follow on after T'ang Chü bearingan additional five thousand catties of gold. After T'ang Chü arrived at Wu-anand distributed the gold, before he had used up three thousand, the realm'sofficers were all fighting among themselves. 26
Similar measures were employed to undermine the vertical alliance, the only hope the other states had to prevent Ch'in from annexing the entire knownrealm through piecemeal conquest of the remaining states. When the king of Ch'in asked whether he could seize the states east of the pass, Tun Jo replied:
"Han is the throat of the realm, while Wei is the stomach. If my lord will provide your servant with ten thousand pieces of gold, I will travel aboutlistening to affairs in Han and Wei, and suborn their ministers. Then Han andWei will become submissive to Ch'in. When Han and Wei are submissive, theconquest of the realm can be plotted."
The king of Ch'in replied, "Our state is impoverished, so I am afraid I am unable to provide it."
Tun Jo retorted: "The realm is never free of affairs. If it is not the VerticalAlliance, it will be the Horizontal Alliance. If the
Concurring, the king of Ch'in provided him with ten thousand catties of gold and dispatched him east to travel among the states of Han and Wei where hesubsequently brought their generals and ministers under Ch'in's influence. Then Tun Jo went north to traverse Yen and Chao where he effected the death of General Li Mu. When the king of Ch'i visited Ch'in's court, the four other states had to follow, all because of Tun Jo's persuasion. 27
Tun Jo thus turns out to be a clandestine agent par excellence who goes aboutsubverting high officials, even though the survival of their states dependedupon adopting a strong united front against Ch'in. But perhaps, if allowancesare to be given, a political and military mind
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set (or inexplicable miasma), such as witnessed in the early days of the German onslaught of World War II, overcame them.
Somewhat contradictorily, the extinction of Chao and death of Li Mu are alsoattributed to Wang Chien, the actual commanding general in the final confrontation with Chao. According to the Chan-kuo Ts'e:
When Ch'in had Wang Chien attack Chao, Chao employed Li Mu and Ssu-maShang to command the defense. Li Mu's forces smashed and drove backCh'in's army several times, killing a general named Huan Yi. Wang Chien,enraged by these developments, made generous gifts of gold to Chao's favoredministers such as Kuo K'ai, employing them as "turned agents" to say that Li Mu and Ssu-ma Shang wanted to betray Chao and join Ch'in to therebyreceive generous fiefs from Ch'in. 28 The king of Chao, becoming suspicious,had Chao Ts'ung and Yen Ts'ui replace his generals. Thereafter he had Li Mu executed and exiled Ssu-ma Shang. Three months later Wang
Chien extensively destroyed Chao's army through a fervent sudden strike, slayed Chao's commanding general, and captured both the king and GeneralYen Tsui. Thereafter Ch'in extinguished the state of Chao. 29
The efficacy of these bribes in underpinning rumors designed to subvertChao's commanding general is truly astounding. For a few pieces of gold Chao's ministers not only endangered the state, but also destroyed it, thusfailing to learn from the well-known story of Po P'i and the state of Wu at theend of the Spring and Autumn period!
Rumors and Estrangement Techniques
The subsequent internecine strife between the two eastern states of Yen and Ch'i during the middle to late Warring States period contains an incident thatwell illustrates the effective use of spies to sow dissension and eliminate thecapable. After pursuing a self-strengthening policy for many years, Yen finallytook advantage of Ch'i's ill-advised assault on the smaller state of Sung tolaunch a massive attack in conjunction with several other states. Yüeh Yi, whoapparently formulated Yen's political and military strategy and was the chief architect for the invasion plans, acted as commander in chief. As summarizedin the various annals, the pinnacle of King Chao's rule then arrived:
In 285 B.C. the state of Yen was flourishing and rich; the officers and troops took pleasure in military discipline and regarded war lightly. Then the king commissioned Yüeh Yi as general in chief
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and planned an attack on Ch'i in unison with Ch'in, Ch'u, and the Three Chin states of Han, Wei, and Chao.
In 284 B.C. Ch'i's forces were defeated and King Min fled outside the state. Yen's army alone pursued the retreating forces to the north, penetrating thecapital, Lin-tzu; seized all of Ch'i's treasures; and burned their palaces andancestral temples. Only the cities of Liao, Chü, and Chi-mo did notsurrender; all the others were subjugated by Yen within six
months. Yüeh Yi was deputed to continue the campaign to pacify the remaining unsubmissive cities. 30
Yüeh Yi's blitzkrieg tactics accorded with Sun-tzu's emphasis upon speed, mobility, and aggressive action. However, more cautious strategists criticizedhis rapid penetration into Ch'i's heartland as foolhardy, 31 and advocatedconservative, presumably long-term views, thus sowing exploitable seeds ofacrimony and dissension. Moreover, after the first year's stunning success, the two fortified cities that remained proved both resolute and impregnable, much in contrast to many among the seventy that had quickly crumbled. Yüeh Yi's calculated reluctance to dissipate the army's strength in a horrendous urban assault naturally provided fertile ground for political intrigue and the carping voices that vilified him: 32
Three years passed, but still the cities had not submitted. Someone slandered Yüeh Yi to King Chao of Yen: "Yüeh Yi's wisdom and planning surpass othermen. After he attacked Ch'i, within the space of a single breath he conqueredmore than seventy cities. Now only two cities have not surrendered. It isn't that his strength is unable to reduce them. The reason he hasn't attacked for three years is that he wants to avail himself on the army's awesomeness toforce the people of Ch'i to submit, for then he will face south and becomeking. Now that the people of Ch'i have surrendered, the reason he hasn't yetinitiated this plan is because his wife and children are in Yen. Moreover, inCh'i there are many beautiful women; eventually he will also forget his wifeand children. I would like your majesty to plan against it." 33
Being wise, King Chao rebuked the accuser and had him beheaded, thereby temporarily silencing such accusations. However, his son, who succeeded himshortly thereafter, not only had previously quarreled with Yüeh Yi, but wasalso shortsighted and inexperienced, and thus fell prey to exactly the same innuendoes deliberately reinstigated by T'ien Tan--the popularly chosencommander in the holdout of Chi-mo--through intermediaries: 34
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In 279 B.C. it happened that King Chao died and his son was established as King Hui of Yen. When the latter had been heir-apparent, he had beendispleased by Yüeh Yi. Therefore, when he ascended the throne and T'ien Tanlearned of it, he released a double agent in Yen to say: "In Ch'i there are only two cities that have not surrendered. This being the case, I have heard thatthe reason that they were not taken earlier is that Yüeh Yi and the new king of Yen have had disagreements, so Yüeh Yi wants to unite his troops andremain in Ch'i, face south, and thus become king of Ch'i. The only thing thatCh'i fears is the disaster that would be brought about if some other generalwere to come."
When King Hui, having already been suspicious of Yüeh Yi, gained this information from the double agent, he dispatched Ch'i Chieh to replace himas commanding general and summoned Yüeh Yi back. Yüeh Yi knew thatKing Hui did not have good intentions in replacing him and, fearing execution, surrendered in the west to Chao. Chao enfeoffed Yüeh Yi at Kuan-chin with the title of Lord of Wang-chu, honoring and favoring him in orderto frighten Yen and Ch'i. 35
The new commander, being far less capable and overly self-confident, was soon tricked by T'ien Tan into believing that
Chi-mo was about to surrender, only to be shocked when Ch'i's remaining forces mounted a ferocious night escape spearheaded by fire-oxen. T'ien Taneventually succeeded in recapturing all of Ch'i's lost territory, causing theremorseful King Hui to beg Yüeh Yi to return to Yen, as much out of fear of his talent being exploited against Yen as the hope that he might again prove useful. However, Yüeh Yi wisely declined, and the destruction of Yen's mighty army became one of the most famous achievements of covert action preservedin the historical annals. 36 The Shih Chi's dramatic narrative, even as abridged here, also contains evidence of T'ien Tan's ready employment of agents tospread disinformation and thus manipulate the enemy into actions that wouldinfuriate Tan's own men:
T'ien Tan ordered that whenever they ate, the people in the city should sacrifice to their ancestors in their courtyards. The
T'ien Tan then proclaimed, "A spirit has descended to instruct me." Afterward he said to the inhabitants, "There ought to be a spiritual man here who canact as my teacher." One soldier spoke up, "Can I act as your teacher?" Thenhe turned around and went
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away. T'ien Tan got up and had him returned, seated him in the easterndirection, and treated him as his teacher. The soldier said, "I tricked you; I amtruly without ability." T'ien Tan said, "Do not speak!" Thereupon he made himhis teacher. Every time he set forth any covenants or constraints, he wouldinvariably attribute them to this spiritual teacher.
Subsequently he publicly announced: "The only thing I fear is that Yen's army might cut off the noses of our countrymen who have fallen captive and thenparade them in front of us. If they then engaged us in battle, Chi-mo would bedefeated!" Yen's soldiers heard about this and acted accordingly. When thecity's inhabitants saw all the prisoners who had surrendered from Ch'i withtheir noses cut off, they were completely enraged and mounted a solid defense, fearing only that they might be captured.
Tan also let loose double agents who said: "The only thing that Yen's soldiers fear is that you will excavate the graves outside the city and disgrace ourancestors. This would turn our hearts cold." Yen's army thoroughly excavatedthe mounds and graves and burned the dead. Witnessing it from atop the city walls, the people of Chi-mo all cried and wept, and wanted to rush forth toengage in battle. Thus their anger increased tenfold.
T'ien Tan knew that the officers and troops could be employed in battle, sohe personally took up the bar and spade used for building walls and sharedthe work with the officers and troops. His wife and concubines were enrolledin the ranks of five; he dispersed food and drink in order to feast all theofficers. He ordered all the armored soldiers to conceal themselves and hadthe old, the weak, women, and children
mount the walls. When he dispatched an emissary to arrange terms of surrender with Yen, the army all shouted, "Long life!"
T'ien Tan also gathered up the people's gold, accumulating a thousandounces, and had Chi-mo's rich families send it out to Yen's generals, saying, "When Chi-mo surrenders, we hope that you will not plunder the homes of ourclans or make prisoners of our wives and concubines, but let us be in peace."Yen's generals were overjoyed and agreed to it. From this Yen's army was increasingly lax.
Within the city T'ien Tan herded up more than one thousand cattle and thenhad red silken cloth decorated with five-colored dragon veins cover them. They tied naked blades to their horns and soaked the reeds bound to their tails infat, igniting the ends. Before this they bored several tens of holes in the walls,and at night released the cattle with five thousand stalwart soldiers fol
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lowing in the rear. When their tails grew hot the cattle became enraged and raced into Yen's army.
Being the middle of the night, Yen's forces were greatly startled. Thebrightness of the burning torches on the cattle tails was dazzling. Wherever Yen's soldiers looked were dragon veins; anyone with whom the cattle collideddied or was wounded. Availing themselves of the confusion, Ch'i's fivethousand men, with gagged mouths, suddenly attacked, accompanied by agreat drumming and clamor from within the city. The old and weak all madetheir bronze implements resound by striking them, the tumult moved Heavenand Earth. Terrified, Yen's defeated army ran off in turbulence and confusion.Ch'i's soldiers subsequently killed Yen's general Ch'i Chieh.
Ch'i's soldiers raced after the defeated and pursued those who fled. All the cities that they passed revolted against Yen and gave their allegiance back toT'ien Tan, so his troops constantly increased. Taking advantage of his victoriesand exploiting Yen's daily defeats and losses, T'ien Tan finally reached theregion above the Yellow River. By then more than seventy Ch'i cities had beenreturned. Then he went to welcome King Hsiang
at Chü, thereafter entering Lin-tzu where he submitted to the king's rule. King Hsiang enfeoffed T'ien Tan as Lord of An-p'ing. 37
Although ruthless, T'ien Tan clearly understood what was necessary toreverse Ch'i's hopeless situation and rescue the state from oblivion. His systematic exploitation of the enemy's greed and gullibility throughdisinformation and feigned bribes (or rather an actual bribe for an ostensibly different purpose) disarmed the besiegers, encouraging the laxity thatimminent victory often induces. In contrast, Yen's commanders apparentlyassumed they well understood the situation and never anticipated the possibility of unexpected change. They obviously lacked spies within the city and failed miserably in fathoming the enemy's activities, being easily misledby the birds and internal (even though termed "double") agents who provided them with prestructured data.
A second example of employing disinformation agents to effect the removal of atalented military commander and thereby achieve an overwhelming militaryvictory with epoch-making consequences occurred less than two decades later. Once again Ch'in managed to subvert another state with but little effort,exterminating Chao's forces in a battle in which the total combatants from both sides reputedly approached the astounding figure of one million: 38
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For his great victory at Wu-an, King Hui of Chao awarded Chao She the title of Lord of Ma-fu and appointed Hui Li as a state colonel. Chao She thus assumedthe same rank as Lien P'o and Lin Hsiang- ju. Four years later King Hui diedand his son was enthroned as King Hsiao. In his seventh year, 259 B.C., Chaoand Ch'in were engaged in a stand-off at Ch'ang-p'ing. At this time Chao Shehad already died and Lin Hsiang-ju was seriously ill, so King Hsiao deputedLien P'o to command the army in an assault upon Ch'in. However, Ch'ininflicted several defeats on Chao; therefore Lien P'o had his troops assumefortified positions and disengage from further hostilities. Several times Ch'inattempted to provoke Chao into combat, but Lien P'o was unwilling to engagethem. However, King Hsiao believed Ch'in's agents in Chao who said, "Theonly thing
that Ch'in fears would be the appointment of Chao Kua, Chao She's son, as commanding general."39 The king thereupon designated Chao Kua to replacegeneral Lien P'o.
Lin Hsiang-ju objected: "You are employing Kua solely because of his father's name, just like someone gluing the tuning stops but trying to play the lute.Kua only knows how to read his father's books; he doesn't have any idea howto effect battlefield segmentation and changes." Unheeding, the king formally commissioned Kua as commanding general.
From his youth Chao Kua had studied military theory and discussed military affairs and therefore felt that no one in the world could oppose him. Oncewhen he argued tactics with his father, even his father was unable to stumphim. However, when Chao She did not acclaim his son's excellence and hiswife asked why, he replied: "The army is a field of death, yet Kua easily speaks about it. If our state never appoints Kua as a general, that will be the end of it;otherwise, if they insist he serve as a commander, the one responsible fordestroying Chao's forces will certainly be Kua."
When Kua was about to depart to assume command, his mother submitted aletter to the king stating that he should not employ Kua as commanding general. When the king queried her as to the reason, she replied: "Formerly when I served his father, the general, those whom he personally presented food and drink and brought forward to dine were counted by tens, while hisfriends were numbered by the hundreds. Whatever the king or the royalhouse awarded him, he in turn presented to the officers and civil officials inthe army. On the day he received his mandate of command, he no longerconcerned himself with family affairs.
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"Now Kua has just been appointed, but when he looked east in the court, none of the officers dared look up at him. He has stored away all the gold andsilks your majesty presented to him in his house and daily concerns himself with real estate transactions. How could you imagine that he is at all like hisfather? Father and son are of different minds. I request that you do not todispatch him into combat."
"Madam, cease your protestations. I have already decided," responded the king.
Kua's mother then said, "If you must employ him after all, if he fails will youexempt me from punishment?" The king agreed.
Once Chao Kua had replaced Lien P'o, he altered all the regulations and constraints, changed and dismissed the army's officers. When Pai Ch'i, Ch'in'scommanding general, heard about it, he released his unorthodox troops in a feigned hasty retreat while also severing Chao's supply lines. Thereafter he cuttheir army into two and Chao's officers and troops became disaffected. After forty days the army was starving, so Chao Kua sent forth his elite forces andstruck Ch'in himself. However, he was killed by Ch'in's archers and his army defeated, with some several hundred thousand troops subsequently surrendering. Ch'in then buried them all alive, so that Chao lost a total of some 450,000 men in these engagements. Because Chao Kua's mother hadwarned of Kua's inadequacy, the king remitted her punishment. 40
Not only did the battle of Ch'ang-p'ing significantly weaken Chao; the losses itsustained were also the worst ever recorded in ancient Chinese history, evenallowing for significant exaggeration despite recent archaeological discoveriesthat tend to confirm a massive toll at this battle. The logic of their surrender is unknown, as is the king's insistence on appointing Chao Kua in the face ofdire warnings. According to his own biography, Pai Ch'i apparently felt themassiveness of Chao's forces presented a great danger and therefore took theopportunity to exterminate them. Chao Kua's name thus became synonymous with "armchair general," someone marked by book learning only, while Pai wascondemned ever after for his unrighteous behavior in executing surrenderedprisoners. 41
Finally, although rumor spreading was one of the simplest and least traceable methods for undermining and besmirching, more sophisticated measures--such as forgeries and preprogrammed false accusations, further examples ofwhich will be found in the covert section-- were also employed. For example,even though the following episode
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arose as the outgrowth of one official's jealousy, it illustrates howcontemporary beliefs might be exploited to frame an exemplary general: 42
Tsou Chi, Lord of Ch'eng and prime minister of Ch'i, and T'ien Chi, General of the Army, were displeased with each other. Kung- sun Han addressed TsouChi: "Sire, why not plan an attack on Wei for the king? If we are victorious, then it will have been due to my lord's plans and you can receive the credit. Ifwe engage in combat and are not victorious, if T'ien Chi has not advanced intobattle and has not perished, you can wrangle an accusation of cowardiceagainst him and have him executed."
Tsou Chi agreed, so he persuaded the king to have T'ien Chi attack Wei. Inthree engagements T'ien Chi emerged victorious three times, so Tsou Chi informed Kung-sun Han. Thereupon Kung-sun Han had a man take ten goldpieces to a diviner in the marketplace and inquire: "I am T'ien Chi's retainer.T'ien Chi engaged in battle three times and was victorious three times. His fame overawes All under Heaven. If he wants to undertake the great affair of usurping the throne, will it be equally auspicious or not?"
The diviner went out and had men detain the person who had requested the divination for T'ien Chi, and then attested to his words before the king. T'ienChi subsequently fled. 43
It seems incredible that Tsou Chi's simple ruse might have persuaded anyone that such a brilliant and successful general would have suddenly become soprofoundly stupid as to blatantly initiate such inquiries. However, several of China's dynastic founders (including the Han and T'ang) availed themselves of--or manufactured--prophecies attesting to their "extraordinary" qualitiesand predestination. Had T'ien Chi actually ordered this public solicitation, itmight well have been a sort of trial balloon to gauge the extent of potentialadherents or a nucleus for deliberately stimulating rumors that could arouse public support.
Women, Sex, and Consorts
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period. Naturally women continued to be employed to seduce and befuddle powerful men--and men to influence consorts and dowagers-- but in a morecircumscribed manner, without notoriety. Conversely, exploiting the influenceenjoyed by favored concubines and powerful consorts seems to have evolved into a common technique, despite their supposed isolation and remoteness. This is illustrated by a well- known story about a rare white fox coat thatcoincidentally portrays the tangled web of personal and political intrigue, aswell as the perceptions and expectations, that characterized the WarringStates period. Just at the start of the third century B.C. the Lord of Meng-ch'ang, a member of Ch'i's ruling house, cultivated three thousand guests andretainers of various skills, some notable, others disreputable: 44
In 299 B.C. King Min of Ch'i finally had the Lord of Meng-ch'ang return as ambassador to Ch'in where King Chao appointed him as prime minister. However, someone said to King Chao: "The Lord of Meng-ch'ang is worthy butis also a member of Ch'i's royal clan. If he now acts as prime minister in Ch'in,he will certainly put Ch'i first and Ch'in second, and then Ch'in will be imperiled." King Chao therefore had the Lord of Meng-ch'ang seized andimprisoned, planning to kill him. However, the latter had someone visit theking's favorite concubine and entreat her to get him released. The concubinesaid, "I would like to have your master's white fox robe."
Meng-ch'ang once had a white fox robe worth a thousand catties of gold,unlike any other in the world, that he had presented to King Chao when heentered Ch'in. Since there wasn't another one anywhere, Meng-ch'ang wasworried and asked his retainers for advice, but no one could reply. Then thelowest ranking guest, someone with the ability of a sneak thief, said, "I can getthe robe for you." That night, sneaking in like a dog, he entered the depths of the palace treasury and retrieved
the robe that had been given to the king, which was in turn presented to the beloved concubine. She then spoke with King Chao on Meng-ch'ang's behalf and he was released.
He raced away but first changed his fief, name, and other aspects of his identity in order to get through the pass. They reached the barrier at Hanpass in the middle of the night. Meanwhile King Chao began to regret he hadreleased Meng-ch'ang and sought him, only to discover he had already fled.Thereupon he dispatched men to race after, capture, and bring him back. Theregulations of Ch'in forbade allowing guests out of the state until the roosterscrowed in the morning. Meng-ch'ang was afraid his
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pursuers would catch up, but one of the lowliest retainers was able to imitate a rooster's crowing. When he did so the roosters all crowed, so the gate wasopened and they were allowed to pass through. In the time it would take toeat a meal the pursuit force arrived at the pass but were already too latebecause Meng-ch'ang had departed, so they returned. In the beginning whenMeng- ch'ang had ranked these two men among his guests, all the others hadbeen embarrassed. However, after they extricated him from Ch'in everyoneacknowledged Meng-ch'ang's judgments. 45
Because Meng-ch'ang and his party were ridiculed in the state of Chao, while returning to Ch'i, they angrily killed hundreds of their detractors. Hardly thebehavior expected of someone characterized as a "worthy," it shows the powerthat private forces could brutally exercise in a tenuous age of chaos. Althoughlater periods also witnessed powerful clans whose influence waxed and waneddepending upon the strength of the central government, the Warring Statesclearly displayed an ethos of violence and its admiration, contrary to muchverbiage about China's pacific heritage and pervasive deprecation of martial values.
Lord of Hsin-ling, Prince of Wei
Prince Wu-chi's biography, the first paragraphs of which have already beencited as evidence of the extensive covert
intelligence operations mounted in the Warring States period, comprehensively illustrates a number of covert practices employed against one man.46 Moreover, the significant impact of the bribery and exploitation of consortsclearly visible in it provided a lesson for subsequent ages. As background, itshould be noted that the state of Wei had an aged, reclusive official named Hou Sheng who served as a watchman at the Yi Gate and in turn patronized a worthy named Chu Hai, who happened to be the town butcher. The princemade extraordinary efforts to cultivate a relationship with them and wasrewarded, in turn, with a reputation for enduring their eccentricity simply toachieve it, one that Hou Sheng in fact had deliberately fostered. Even thoughthe prince was hardly alone in such efforts, his skill in recognizing men of worth, in addition to simply being deferential to all such men, stands out. His behavior well accorded with the trends of an era that emphasized the cultivation of miscellaneous talents against the possibility of future use, although ideally these efforts were not supposed to be utilitarian in character,never deliberately undertaken to exploit the "recognized" at some criticalmoment.
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By King An-li's twentieth year [ 257 B.C.] Ch'in forces had already destroyed Chao's armies at Ch'ang-p'ing and advanced to besiege Han-tan, Chao'scapital. Prince Wu-chi's younger sister was the wife of the Lord of P'ing-yüan inChao, so the Lord of P'ing-yüan sent several letters to the king of Wei andprince Wu-chi requesting that they dispatch a rescue force. The king of Wei deputed General Chin Pi, in command of a hundred thousand troops, torescue Chao. 47 [Learning of this], the king of Ch'in dispatched an emissary toinform Wei that "our attack on Chao will succeed sooner or later, so if any of the feudal lords dare dispatch rescue forces, we will certainly redirect our forces to attack them first." The king of Wei fearfully sent an officer to stop Chin Pi and have the army ensconce itself at Yeh. Although termed "rescueforces," they actually assumed an indefinite posture and merely observed.
The Lord of P'ing-yüan continuously sent emissaries from Chao to Wei and deprecatingly said to the prince: "The reason I allied myself to your housethrough marriage was your great
righteousness and ability to be troubled by other people's difficulties. In a fewdays Han-tan will have to surrender to Ch'in. If Wei's forces do not arrive intime, how will you ever be able to express your compassion for other people'sdifficulties? Moreover, even if you lightly abandon me to surrender to Ch'in, do you not care about your sister?"
Troubled by the situation, the prince asked the king to take action severaltimes and also had his prominent guests and sophisticated persuaders ply theking with a myriad arguments. However, fearing Ch'in, the king would notheed them in the end. Prince Wu-chi, concluding that he would not gain hisobjective, calculated that he could not live and yet allow Chao to perish. Therefore he requested his retainers assist him and gathered a force of somehundred or more chariots, intent on going forth to confront Ch'in's forces anddie with Chao. In departing he passed by Yi Gate where he saw Hou Sheng [the gatekeeper], and fully informed him about his intention to die beforeCh'in's army. After a final salutation he prepared to depart. Hou Sheng said: "Make your best effort. I am unable to follow you."
After the prince had proceeded some kilometers he felt uneasy, thinking: "I treated Hou Sheng with the greatest respect and generosity. Everyone in theworld knows this. Now I am about to die, yet Hou Sheng did not have a wordto grace my departure. Do I have some shortcoming?" Thereupon he turnedhis chariot around and went to query him.
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Hou Sheng laughed and said: "I knew you would return! Your name has beenheard throughout the realm for delighting in men of talent, yet now that thereis some difficulty, have you no other recourse but to go off and confront Ch'in'sarmy? This may be compared to throwing meat to a hungry tiger. What will itaccomplish? Among your guests you treated me very well, but when youdeparted I did not send you off. I knew you would hate it and return." Theprince bowed twice and then asked him about possible tactics.
Hou Sheng, separating them off from the others, then secretly spoke withhim: "I have heard that Chin Pi's military tally is
always kept in the king's bedroom. Now the concubine Ju, being the mostfavored, goes in and out of his bedroom and has the ability to steal it. I havealso heard that her father was slain and for three years she harbored enmity over it. From the king on down she sought to have someone avenge her, but noone succeeded. She cried before you because of it, and you dispatched one of you retainers to cut off the murderer's head which you then respectfully presented to her. She is willing to die for you, there is nothing she woulddecline, but has not yet had any opportunity. If you sincerely speak a word toher, she will certainly assent. Then you can get the tiger tally necessary to seize control of Chin Pi's forces, go north to rescue Chao, and force Ch'in inthe west to withdraw. This is an attack worthy of a hegemon."
The prince followed his plot and requested Ju's aid, who indeed stole the tally of authority and gave it to the prince. The prince was about to depart, but Hou Sheng said: "When a general is in the field, for the benefit of the state there areorders from the ruler that he does not accept. 48 If you match the halves of thetally, but instead of turning the army over to you Chin Pi queries the king,affairs will turn precarious. My retainer, the butcher Chu Hai, can accompany you. He is a warrior of strength. If Chin Pi obeys, it will be excellent, but if hedoes not, you can have Chu attack him."
Hearing this the prince cried. Hou Sheng said: "Are you afraid of death? Isthis why you shed tears?"
The prince replied: " Chin Pi is a courageous old general. If I go there, I amafraid he will not obey and I will certainly have to kill him. This is why I weep. How could I fear death?" Then he went and requested that Chu Haiaccompany him.
Chu Hai laughed and said: "Although I am merely a butcher in themarketplace, you have personally honored me several times.
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The reason I never expressed my thanks is that I have always felt minor rites to be useless. Now that you have some
Prince Wu-chi went to take leave of Hou Sheng. Hou Sheng said: "Although I am willing to follow you, I am too old. Let me give you several days' leave totravel, and on the day you reach Chin Pi's army I will face north and commitsuicide in order to send you off." The prince then departed and went to Yehwhere he forged the king's order to replace Chin Pi as commander. Chin Pi matched the halves of the tally but raising his hand said to the prince: "Rightnow I have command of some hundred thousand troops encamped here onthe border. This is a great state responsibility. So how is it that you have comeout here to replace me with a single chariot?"
Since Chin Pi was unwilling to obey, Chu Hai removed a forty-pound irontruncheon from his sleeve and slew him. The prince took command and then, when reviewing the army, announced: "If there are any fathers and sonspresent in the army, the father should return to Wei. If any brothers, the elder should return. Any solitary sons without brothers should also go back tonourish their parents." Accordingly he obtained a select force of some eighty thousand men, advanced the army, and attacked Ch'in. Ch'in lifted the siegeand retreated, thereby rescuing Han-tan and preserving Chao.
As Wu-chi had forged the transfer order, he sent the army back under asubordinate commander but personally remained in Chao with a fewattendants for some ten years, where he was well treated and attracted a local following. Fearing reprisals, he consistently rejected King An-li's entreaties toreturn--pleas prompted by unremitting Ch'in attacks that were eroding Wei'sterritory--until criticized by some worthies in Chao for failing to protect his own ancestral lands.
The prince returned to rescue Wei. When the king saw him they both wept. The king gave him the seals of supreme general and the prince took commandof the army. In the king's thirtieth year [ 247 B.C.] the prince sent emissariesto the feudal lords who all dispatched rescue forces once they learned he had assumed command in Wei. Then in supreme command the prince led the soldiers of five states in defeating Ch'in's
army out beyond the Yellow River and driving off Meng Ching, subsequently exploiting
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the victory to pursue Ch'in's forces back to Han pass. Ch'in withdrewwithin the pass and did not again venture east.
At this time the prince's awesomeness shook the realm, and retainers fromthe various feudal lords all submitted military texts to him which werecollected under his name and commonly called The Prince of Wei's Art of War. 49 The king of Ch'in, worried about these developments, sent an agent to Weiwith ten thousand catties of gold to seek out Chin Pi's former retainers and have them slander the prince before the king, saying: "The prince was in exilefor ten years, yet now he is commanding general and the feudal lords allsubmit to him. The feudal lords have all heard of the prince of Wei but not theking of Wei. The prince also wants to take advantage of the moment tobecome king while the lords, fearing his might, jointly want to establish him."
Several times Ch'in sent turned agents 50 to ostensibly offer congratulations upon the prince soon becoming king. When the king heard these things every day, he could not help believing them and therefore eventually dispatchedsomeone to replace the prince as supreme commander. The prince, knowing that he had again been maligned and cast aside, no longer attended court onthe pretext of illness, instead drinking well into the night with his guests.When he revived from his inebriation he had many women brought in, and inthis fashion drank and caroused night and day for four years. Eventually hedied from alcoholism, and the king also died the same year.
When the king of Ch'in learned that the prince was dead, he had Meng Ching mount an attack on Wei that resulted in seizing twenty cities and establishingeastern commanderies for the first time. Thereafter Ch'in gradually gnawedaway at Wei, eighteen years later [ 225 B.C.] making the king a prisoner andbutchering Ta-liang.
This account of Wei's demise at the very end of the Warring States period, just three years before Ch'in finally unified the
whole realm to establish the first imperial dynasty, contains a number of illuminating points. First of all, the king of Ch'in resorted to so-called li-chien(estrangement) techniques and, despite Wu-chi's enormous success inrescuing Wei, succeeded remarkably! (Whether this illustrates the skillful employment of estrangement methods in creating disaffection through slander and calumny or simply the stupidity of rulers is perhaps an open question. Rulers never learned from dramatic historical events such as the fataldismissals of Lien Po and Yüeh Yi.) Second,
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the prince's assiduous cultivation of shih--gentlemen of the lowest noble rank--irrespective of their immediate worth bears noting because this was a period when men of any and every talent, including tacticians, murderers, and strong arms such as Chu Kai, might prove useful. 51 The prince receivedtactical advice from Hou Sheng, no doubt a student of history who knew the lessons and techniques of the past, while the earlier incident that caused theking uneasiness proved a well-constructed web of external connections.
The traditional method for controlling military power once a general had takenthe field, for verifying that an order was genuine, may also be seen in thisstory. Tallies, usually of metal but sometimes of wood, were created in variousshapes, such as a tiger, and appropriately inscribed so that the matching halves were still distinguishable. The commander retained one, the ruler another, with the authenticity of special communications being attested by the accompanying tally. (Naturally they were intended for extremeemergencies, being usable only once.) Assuming both parties properlysafeguarded their respective halves, the method would prove secure. However, these precautions were easily circumvented when Wu-chi exploited the favored concubine who was already
emotionally predisposed to cooperate with him. Thus the prince easilyobtained the tally and made his escape through a gate guarded by the honoredconfidant who had suggested the plot. Unfortunately, his various actionsobliged Hou Sheng to righteously die, which he did after ensuring the prince'ssuccess.
The term hsien appears throughout the account in several meanings, including "secretly," "agent," and "turned agent," although the latter is notsynonymous with Sun-tzu's double agent. This single biography thus providesa portrait of spies infiltrating every aspect of statecraft, thereby dramatically affecting the outcome of Warring States political strife; the state of Ch'invirtually rolled up the other states, partly by aggressively subverting stategovernments through the stimulation of disaffection and by fomenting politicalwrangling among the remaining states.
Pivotal Role of Assassinations
During the Warring States period assassination continued to be activelyemployed by generals and rulers to swiftly resolve difficult situations, especially when confronted by disadvantageous battlefield odds. At the very end of the era Prince Tan of Yen, noting historical precedents of strong-arm measures coercing promised concessions that were subsequently honored, decided to employ an assassin
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against Ch'in to somehow forestall being vanquished by a massive Ch'ininvasion force said to number several hundred thousand men. The account ofthe entire exploit, the longest in the Shih Chi's chapter entitled "Assassins," sostruck the Chinese mind that it remained famous ever after and the name ofthe warrior chosen for the task, Ching K'o, became synonymous withassassins. Significantly abridged, the Shih Chi depiction follows: 52
Ching K'o was a native of Wei, although his forebears had moved to Wei from Ch'i. He loved to read books and train in sword techniques. Traveling about toexercise his persuasion on the feudal lords, he finally arrived in the state of Yen. While staying there he was fond of drinking wine with two belovedfriends, a lowly butcher and the lute player Kao Chien-li, so every day thethree of them drank in the marketplace. As they became inebriated, Kao would play his lute and Ching would sing in accompaniment right in themarket. Sometimes after singing they would weep, just as if no one werearound.
Although Ching K'o consorted with drunkards, he was profound and loved books. No matter which of the feudal lords he visited, he invariably associatedwith the worthy and with the leaders of powerful families. In Yen the reclusivescholar T'ien Kuang, recognizing he was not an ordinary man, similarlytreated him generously.
The tale continues with Prince Tan's escape from his ill-treatment as a hostage in Ch'in, subsequent return to Yen, and decision to slay the king of Ch'in forboth personal and state reasons. Having been introduced to Ching K'o throughthe auspices of T'ien Kuang (who then committed suicide), the prince interviewed Ching K'o:
Prince Tan said: "At this moment the king of Ch'in is so beset by greed thathis desires can never be satisfied. Unless he controls all the territory underHeaven and compels every king to become his subject, his ambitions will neverbe satiated. He has already taken the king of Han prisoner and integrated histerritory, and has also raised and dispatched troops south to attack Ch'u inthe south and encroach upon Chao in the north. General Wang Chien, in command of several hundred thousand troops, occupies Chang and Yeh,while general Li Hsin is proceeding out to T'ai-yüan and Yün-chung. SinceChao cannot withstand Ch'in, it will inevitably be annexed as a subjugated state. When it has become a subject of Ch'in, misfortune will reach Yen. SinceYen is small and weak
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and has suffered several defeats in battle, I estimate that even mobilizing theentire state would prove inadequate to oppose them. Because the otherfeudal lords have all submitted to Ch'in, no one will dare join us.
I foolishly calculate that if I can find the most courageous warrior in the realm to serve as ambassador to Ch'in, we might inveigle the king with some greatprofit. Because the king of Ch'in is greedy, circumstances could then bemanipulated as desired and the king coerced at knifepoint to restore all theterritory of the other feudal lords that he now occupies. It would be excellent if the results were similar to Ts'ao Mei threatening Duke Huan of Ch'i; however, failing that, he can
still stab the king to death. 53 With their great generals exercising independent command over troops outside the state and chaos within it, thenew ruler and his ministers will certainly be suspicious of each other. In theinterim the feudal lords could reunite and certainly defeat Ch'in. Althoughthis is my great desire, I do not know whom to entrust with the responsibility. Perhaps you might ponder it a little."
After a long pause Ching K'o replied, "As this is a great affair of state, while I have but little talent, I am afraid I would be unequal to the task." The princeadvanced, bowed his head before him, and strongly entreated him not torefuse until Ching K'o finally succumbed. Thereupon the prince honored himwith an appointment as chief counselor and assigned him a superior mansion. Every day the prince personally went to deferentially offer all thedelicacies of the greatest sacrificial feast, and separately sent over uniqueobjects, carriages, horses, and beautiful women to fulfill his every desire andply his intentions.
Time passed without Ching taking any action, until the prince finally pressed him and he revealed the plot's key, several objects that would invariably drawthe king of Ch'in's interest. It happened that a disfavored Ch'in general hadsought refuge with Prince Tan in Yen, and despite Ch'in's menacing threats,the prince steadfastly refused to be cowered into returning him to certainexecution. Ching therefore sought to have General Fan killed so that he mightcontritely present his head and a map of Yen's border region as a pretext forcalling upon Ch'in. Although the prince righteously declined to have thegeneral killed, Ching personally went and persuaded General Fan that itprovided the only way to avenge himself upon the villain who had exterminated his family. Even though the account to this point portrays the prince as a man of great honor and courage, he not only arranged thepurchase of an extremely sharp dagger that was then quenched with
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poison to ensure its effectiveness in case of a nonfatal blow, but he also "had it tried on men and found that if their clothes were stained by blood, they immediately died."
Following some additional delays, in a sorrowful scene worthy of the mosttragic opera, Ching K'o and a bravado named Ch'in Wu-yang set out. Arrivingin Ch'in, Ching arranged, through generous bribes, to be escorted into thecourt to submissively present the severed head and the map that was nowwrapped around the poisoned dagger, leading to this melodramatic scene:
When the king of Ch'in heard about these developments he was greatly elated and, wearing his imperial robes, ordered the fullest ceremonies of state ingranting an audience in the
Hsien-yang Palace. To present the box containing General Fan's head and the map, Ching Ko and Ch'in Wu-yang respectively advanced. When they reachedthe dais, Ch'in Wu-yang blanched and shook with fear. As the assembledministers thought his behavior strange, Ching K'o looked about and laughed at Wu-yang, then apologized to the king of Ch'in: "Because this uncouth fellowfrom the northern barbarian tribes has never before seen the Son of Heaven, he trembles with fear. I hope your august majesty will make some allowance for him so that we may fulfill our mission here."
The king of Ch'in, addressing Ching K'o, said, "Bring me the map Wu-yang is carrying." Ching K'o then took the map and formally offered it up to the king.The king opened the map and when it was fully unrolled the dagger becamevisible. Thereupon, seizing the king's sleeve with his left hand and grabbing the dagger with his right, Ching K'o thrust at the king. Before the blade struck his body the king had already recoiled and risen from his seat, tearingthe sleeve Ching K'o had been holding.
The king tried to draw his sword, which, being long, remained stuck in the scabbard. Furthermore, because he was flustered the scabbard was hanging straight down, frustrating attempts to pull it out. Ching K'o pursued the king around a pillar on the dais. His attendants, in panic and confusion, all losttheir heads. Moreover, Ch'in's regulations forbade any of those attending upon the king on the dais to wear any weapon whatsoever. Even thougharmed palace guards were stationed in the lower hall, unless summoned bythe king they could not come forward into the upper chamber. In the urgencyof the
moment the king failed to summon these guards from below, so Ching K'o was free to pursue the king about. In his sudden panic, lacking anything else, theking struck
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him with his fists. At this moment the attending physician Hsia Wu-chüswung his medicine bag at Ching K'o, hitting him.
Meanwhile the king had been circling around a pillar, too panicked to knowwhat to do, when his attendants shouted, "Get the sword to your back!" Doing so, he suddenly succeeded in drawing it and slashed at Ching K'o, severing hisleft thigh. As Ching K'o collapsed he cocked his arm and threw the dagger atthe king, but missed and struck a bronze pillar instead. The king slashed Ching K'o again and again. Having suffered eight wounds and knowing hecould not succeed, Ching K'o leaned back against the pillar and laughed. Sprawling out, he then cursed the king, saying: "The only reason I failed wasbecause I wanted to extort an agreement from you to repay the heir apparent."Immediately thereafter attendants rushed forward and killed him. 54
Naturally the attempted assassination only provoked the king of Ch'in toredouble his efforts to conquer Yen. The king of Yen, in a futile attempt toforestall the inevitable, had the heir apparent executed and his headpresented to Ch'in after the latter's troops had forced them from their capital. But the gesture was of little avail as he was himself captured and his state exterminated five years later in 222 B.C.
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Part Two SPYCRAFT
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